FACTS:
In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a
criminal case filed against him by the Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). In
1936, he applied for probation. The application
was raffled to Judge Jose Vera. However, due to
numerous delays in the hearing for the
application, both the public and the private
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari before
the Supreme Court. Among the issues raised in
the petition was the constitutionality of the
Probation Law (Act No. 4221). The allegations
against its constitutionality were (1) Courts like
the Court of First Instance of Manila have no
jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng
under probation because under the said law,
probation is only meant to be applied in
provinces with probation officers; that the City
of Manila is not a province, and that Manila,
even if construed as a province, has no
designated probation officer – hence, a Manila
court cannot grant probation, (2) there is undue
delegation of power the said law makes it the
prerogative of provinces whether or nor to apply
the probation law – if a province chooses to
apply the probation law, then it will appoint a
probation officer, but if it will not, then no
probation officer will be appointed, and (3) the
Probation Law is an encroachment of the
President’s pardoning power.
Cu Unjieng opposed the Petition on the ground
that it is premature because there was still no
final judgment by the lower court as to his
application for probation and that the State,
through the public prosecutor, cannot question
its own laws.
ISSUE:
1. May the State question its own laws?
2. May the Supreme Court in this case rule on
the constitutionality of the Probation Law?
3. Is the Probation Law constitutional?
HELD:
1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State,
or its duly authorized representative, from
questioning the validity of a law. Estoppel will
also not lie against the State even if it had been
using an invalid law.
2. Yes. It is a well-settled rule that the
constitutionality of an act of the legislature will
not be determined by the courts unless that
question is properly raised and presented
inappropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case; i.e., the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota
presented. In this case, the determination of Cu
Unjieng’s right under the Probation Law is
dependent on whether or not the said law is
constitutional.
2. No, Act No. 4221 or the [old] Probation Law
is unconstitutional.
Violation of the Equal Protection Clause
The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is
well taken on this note. There is violation of the
equal protection clause. Under Act 4221,
provinces were given the option to apply the law
by simply providing for a probation officer. So if
a province decides not to install a probation
officer, then the accused within said province
will be unduly deprived of the provisions of the
Probation Law.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
There is undue delegation of legislative power.
Act 4221 provides that it shall only apply to
provinces where the respective provincial boards
have provided for a probation officer. But
nowhere in the law did it state as to what
standard (sufficient standard test) should
provincial boards follow in determining whether
or not to apply the probation law in their
province. This only creates a roving commission
which will act arbitrarily according to its whims.
Encroachment of Executive Power
Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court recognized the power of
Congress to provide for probation. Probation
does not encroach upon the President’s power to
grant pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation
is within the power of Congress to fix penalties
while pardon is a power of the president to
commute penalties.
In probation, the probationer is in no true sense,
as in pardon, a free man. He is not finally and
completely exonerated. He is not exempt from
the entire punishment which the law inflicts.
Under the Probation Act, the probationer’s case
is not terminated by the mere fact that he is
placed on probation. A probation law does not
conflict with the pardoning power of the
Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to
those serving their probationary sentences,
remains as full and complete as if the Probation
Law had never been enacted. The President may
yet pardon the probationer and thus place it
beyond the power of the court to order his
re-arrest and imprisonment.
ESCRA:
ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS;
CLASS LEGISLATION; CLASSIFICATION
ON REASONABLE BASIS.—" * * * nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws." This basic individual right sheltered by
the Constitution is a restraint on all the three
grand departments of our government and on the
subordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions
thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like
the police power, taxation and eminent domain.
What may be regarded as a denial of the equal
protection of the laws is a question not always
easily determined. No rule that will cover every
case can be formulated. Class legislation
discriminating against some and favoring others
is prohibited. But classification on a reasonable
basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is
permitted. The classification, however, to be
reasonable must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; it must
be germane to the purposes of the law; it must
not be limited to existing conditions only, and
must apply equally to each member of the class.
34.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; RESULTANT INEQUALITY
FROM UNWARRANTED DELEGATION;
PROBATION ACT PERMITS DENIAL OF
EQUAL PROTECTION.—In the case of Act
No. 4221, the resultant inequality may be said to
flow from the unwarranted delegation of
legislative power to the provincial boards. While
inequality may result in the application of the
law and in the conferment of the benefits therein
provided, inequality is not in all cases the
necessary result. But whatever may be the case,
it is clear that section 11 of the Probation Act
creates a situation in which discrimination and
inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to
be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual
denial of the equal protection of the law before
courts should assume the task of setting aside a
law vulnerable on that score, but premises and
circumstances considered, we are of the opinion
that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the
denial of the equal protection of the law and is
on that account bad. We see no difference
between a law which denies equal protection and
a law which permits of such denial. A law may
appear to be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal
discrimination, it is within the constitutional
prohibition. In other words, statutes may be
adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect
in operation. If a law has the effect of denying
the equal protection of the law it is
unconstitutional.
ID.; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS;
CLASS LEGISLATION; CLASSIFICATION
ON REASONABLE BASIS.—" * * * nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws." This basic individual right sheltered by
the Constitution is a restraint on all the three
grand departments of our government and on the
subordinate instrumentalities and subdivisions
thereof, and on many constitutional powers, like
the police power, taxation and eminent domain.
What may be regarded as a denial of the equal
protection of the laws is a question not always
easily determined. No rule that will cover every
case can be formulated. Class legislation
discriminating against some and favoring others
is prohibited. But classification on a reasonable
basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is
permitted. The classification, however, to be
reasonable must be based on substantial
distinctions which make real differences; it must
be germane to the purposes of the law; it must
not be limited to existing conditions only, and
must apply equally to each member of the class.
34.ID. ; ID. ; ID. ; RESULTANT INEQUALITY
FROM UNWARRANTED DELEGATION;
PROBATION ACT PERMITS DENIAL OF
EQUAL PROTECTION.—In the case of Act
No. 4221, the resultant inequality may be said to
flow from the unwarranted delegation of
legislative power to the provincial boards. While
inequality may result in the application of the
law and in the conferment of the benefits therein
provided, inequality is not in all cases the
necessary result. But whatever may be the case,
it is clear that section 11 of the Probation Act
creates a situation in which discrimination and
inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to
be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual
denial of the equal protection of the law before
courts should assume the task of setting aside a
law vulnerable on that score, but premises and
circumstances considered, we are of the opinion
that section 11 of Act No. 4221 permits of the
denial of the equal protection of the law and is
on that account bad. We see no difference
between a law which denies equal protection and
a law which permits of such denial. A law may
appear to be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal
discrimination, it is within the constitutional
prohibition. In other words, statutes may be
adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect
in operation. If a law has the effect of denying
the equal protection of the law it is
unconstitutional.
People vs. Vera., 65 Phil. 56, No. 45685
November 16, 1937