Automatic and unconscious processes are traditionally considered inflexible (e.g.

, Shiffrin and
Schneider, 1977, 1984). Processes we intentionally and consciously engage in are inherently more
flexible in nature. We can stop or change the direction of a task at any desired moment. However, it
has been traditionally accepted that once an automatic and ongoing action starts, it is difficult to
modify.

Recent evidence suggests that this belief may not be entirely accurate. Processes that are below
consciousness and cannot surpass conscious control may indicate the possibility of "top-down"
processes influencing subliminal processes. Attention, intention ("task set" or current goals), and
expectations can influence automatic and subliminal processes [1].

DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN AUTOMATIC AND VOLUNTARY CONTROL

Recent research by Boy et al. (2010b) suggests that the crucial distinction lies not between automatic
and voluntary control but rather between pre- and post-stimulus control [2].

PRE-STIMULUS VS. POST-STIMULUS COGNITIVE CONTROL

Control mechanisms that can override inappropriate response plans automatically triggered by the
environment not only act to inhibit responses after stimulus presentation but also seem to operate
before the stimulus. Task set and previous experiences can modulate conflicting response tendencies
in a preparatory manner [3].

EVIDENCE FOR AUTOMATIC ACTIVATION OF MOTOR RESPONSES

Even if we don't intend to act, the perceptual processing of a visual stimulus can lead to motor
responses. For example, the "visual grasp reflex" involves a sudden and irrelevant visual stimulus
triggering a reflexive eye movement towards it, despite the observer's intention to look elsewhere.
This reflex is an inhibitory mechanism that suppresses unwanted motor activity toward the irrelevant
stimulus [4].

EVIDENCE FOR AUTOMATIC MOTOR ACTIVATION FROM "PARTIAL" ERRORS

Experiments where observers are instructed to respond to certain images show that even partial
responses triggered by irrelevant stimuli or parts of stimuli can be automatic. These responses are
not just partially activated in the brain but can be observed in muscles or small hand movements [5].

INVISIBLE INFLUENCES
In summary, shifts in attention and motor responses can be triggered automatically and
unconsciously by visual stimuli. The effects of non-perceived stimuli have provided crucial evidence
that visual stimuli can automatically prime observers to act [6].

INHIBITION OF PRIMED ACTIONS

To understand how brain systems inhibit or override responses triggered automatically by the
environment, especially those irrelevant to our current goals, it is essential to study processes during
conflicting situations. In conflict tasks, accuracy for compatible trials is high, but fast responses on
incompatible trials are often at chance level [7].

UNCONSCIOUS CONTROL OVER UNWANTED RESPONSES

Inhibition of primed responses is effective only when stimuli are presented above the threshold
required for conscious awareness. However, when the interval between the prime and mask is
extended, incompatible trials produce faster responses than compatible trials, indicating a reversed
priming effect [8].

AUTOMATIC INHIBITION IN THE AFFORDANCE PARADIGM

Visual stimuli can automatically trigger motor responses. Actions primed by object affordances may
also be subject to automatic control [9].

AUTOMATIC TRIGGERING OF "ENDOGENOUS" CONTROL

Recent research suggests that endogenous suppression of pre-potent responses can be primed or
evoked unconsciously and automatically [10].

AUTOMATIC PRE-STIMULUS CONTROL

While many researchers argue that pre-stimulus control mechanisms require conscious conflict
experience, recent evidence suggests that pre-stimulus control can be evoked automatically without
conscious awareness. Unconsciously presented stimuli can automatically evoke pre-stimulus conflict
adaptation mechanisms and modulate the effects of subsequent conflicting stimuli [11].

References:
[1] McBride, J., Boy, F., Husain, M., & Sumner, P. (2012). Automatic motor activation in the executive
control of action. Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience and Institute of Neurology, University College
London, London, UK, School of Psychology, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK