Acta Anal (2010) 25:71–79

DOI 10.1007/s12136-009-0076-y

Self-expression, Expressiveness, and Sincerity

John Eriksson

Received: 30 November 2009 / Accepted: 1 December 2009 / Published online: 7 January 2010
# Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2009

Abstract This paper examines some aspects of Mitchell Green’s account of self-
expression. I argue that Green fails to address the distinction between success and
evidential notions of expression properly, which prevents him from adequately
discussing the relation between these notions. I then consider Green’s explanation of
how a speech act shows what is within, i.e., because of the liabilities one incurs and
argue that this is false. Rather, the norms governing speech acts and liabilities
incurred give us reason to think that the speaker is in a particular state of mind. It
thus supports an evidential rather than success notion. Finally, I suggest that it is
because of the sincerity of what is said, rather than the liabilities incurred, that you
show what is within.

Keywords Mitchell Green . Self-expression . Expression . Expressiveness .

Speech acts . Sincerity

Fred’s tears express his grief. Mary’s sincere smile expresses her happiness. Peter’s
sincere assertion that it is raining expresses his belief that it is raining. Examples of
acts and behaviors that express our heart and mind could be multiplied by the
million. Indeed, expressing ourselves through linguistic behavior (words, sentences,
tone of voice, intonation) or nonlinguistic behavior (gestures, music, paint, dancing)
is an integral part of practically every aspect of human life and of who we are.
Given the centrality of expressive behaviors in human life one expects the notion
of ‘expression’ to have received serious examination by scholars in philosophy,
linguistics and psychology. This is not the case. When the term ‘expression’ is used
(as it often is) it is usually left unexplained. Rather, it seems as if it is presupposed
that we already know what the term means and what kind of relation it denotes. For
the purposes of everyday life, of course, this is quite innocuous. In philosophy, on

J. Eriksson (*)
Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science, Gothenburg University, Box 200, 405
30 Gothenburg, Sweden
e-mail: john.eriksson@gu.se
72 J. Eriksson

the other hand, it risks to ‘stupefy and bewilder, yet in a way satisfy’ (Ogden and
Richards 1923: 231). Consequently, if we want to minimize the risk of being
bewitched by the seductive power built into the concept of ‘expression’ it needs to
be systematically examined. This is not only important for philosophical purposes,
but it also promises to give us a better understanding of ourselves.
Mitchell Green’s Self-Expression is an admirable attempt to correct some of the
shortcomings in literature by undertaking such a systematic study of expression. Green
argues that we should understand self-expression as a way of signaling and showing
what is within. This account is outlined in section I. In section II, I argue that Green
does not adequately explain how we should understand the expressiveness of speech
acts. As a consequence, Green fails to properly distinguish between self-expression
and expressiveness and it is difficult to see whether Green’s disagreement with an
evidential understanding of expression is merely terminological or more substantial. In
section III, I argue that Green’s putative explanation of how speech acts show the
speaker’s states of mind fails. Rather, his account supports an evidential notion.
Moreover, such an account is easily transformed into an account of self-expression by
adding a sincerity clause. By asserting something sincerely you perform an act that,
because of the sincerity of what is said, shows your belief.

Mary’s sincere smile, it seems plausible to think, expresses her happiness. But what does
it mean for Mary’s smile (or some other behavior) to express her happiness (or some
other state of mind)? Green develops and defends an account of self-expression as a way
of signaling and showing what is within. In order to properly understand and assess
Green’s account we need to understand what he means by ‘signaling’ and ‘showing.’
A self-expression is a signal where a signal is defined ‘as any feature of an entity
that conveys information (including misinformation) that was designed for its ability
to convey that information’ (Green 2007). In relation to Mary’s smile we are to think
that it was designed for its ability to convey information about an inner state, viz.,
happiness. If this is right, a smile is a signal in Green’s technical sense. A signal can be
involuntary, voluntary but not willed, willed, and willed and overt. Upon seeing my
son after being away from him I cannot help smiling. At other times I may have the
ability to refrain from smiling although I allow my mouth to form a smile. At still
other times I intentionally smile in order to convey my happiness. Finally, I sometimes
make this intention overt, i.e., I make it clear that I have that very intention. These
different examples correspond to the four different ways of signaling outlined above.
A signal is designed to convey information. The design in question may be the
result of natural selection, artificial selection or conscious design by intelligent
agents. However, the fact that we think that Mary’s smile expresses her happiness
shows that “folk psychology” takes it to be a signal, but folk psychology is
notoriously fallible. For instance, although it may seem plausible to think that
blushing expresses embarrassment Green hypothesizes that this is wrong because
blushing does not seem to be a signal of embarrassment.1 Whether or not something

1
See Tormey (1971), 46.
Self-expression, Expressiveness, and Sincerity 73

is a signal in Green’s technical sense depends on whether it was designed to signal,

e.g., happiness or embarrassment which is an empirical question Green does not
presume to answer.
Mary’s sincere smile does not only signal her happiness, but also shows it. To
show something is to somehow make it manifest. This can be accomplished in
different ways. For instance, Achilles may show his courage by acting bravely. His
behavior is good evidence of his courage. A second way of showing something is
by making it perceptible. For instance, Paris may show you his bruise and thereby
enable you to see it. Finally, Achilles may show how beautiful Helen of Troy is by
drawing a picture of her. These forms of showing correspond to what Green calls
showing-that, showing-α, showing how. These different forms of showing are united
in the sense that they enable knowledge in appropriate observers. For instance,
Mary’s smile shows her happiness and enables knowledge of how she feels.
However, showing a state of mind is not the same as expressing it. For instance,
Achilles may show his courage by acting bravely yet Green doubts that courage is
something that can be expressed. Green’s reason for doubting that courage is
something that we can express is that he claims that we can express only states of the
sort that we can introspect.
The concept of “showing” raises a number of difficult questions. For instance, in
ordinary parlance it is quite common to claim to see the happiness conveyed by
someone’s smile, hear the horror in someone’s voice and so on. But how can a smile
show someone’s happiness? Green suggests that we may see someone’s happiness in
her smile via part-whole perception. “An observable object, event, or process A that
is a characteristic component of object, event, or process B can make B perceptible”
(Green 2007). This may enable us to perceive, e.g., Mary’s happiness by seeing her
smile, much in the same way as we may perceive something by seeing only a part of
it. For instance, we may perceive a boat by merely seeing it’s mast or measles by
seeing certain red spots. This is a hypothesis that may seem promising given that a
smile is taken to be a natural sign of happiness (Grice 1957).2
By contrast, it seems less plausible to think that speech acts, e.g., assertions, show
the speaker’s belief in such a way. Asserting that it is raining is not a natural sign of
the speaker’s belief that it is raining. Green argues that an assertion that p shows the
speaker’s belief that p because assertion involves a handicap, i.e., one incurs a
commitment to defend what is said if appropriately challenged, which gives rise to a
liability to lose credibility. This, Green argues, explains how an assertion that p
shows the speaker’s belief that p. In section III I will argue that Green’s explanation
only supports a weaker evidential relation. We therefore need an alternative
explanation of how an assertion that p may show the speaker’s belief.
Having briefly examined Green’s two technical terms we are in a position to
understand Green’s characterization of self-expression as cases “where A is an agent
and B a cognitive, affective or experiential state of a sort to which A can have
introspective access, A expresses her B if and only if A is in state B, and some action
or behavior of A’s both shows and signals her B” (Green 2007). This makes self-
expression a “success” notion (Green 2007), i.e., a person can express only a state of
mind that he or she has. This raises a number of questions.

2
See also Tormey (1971), 48-51.
74 J. Eriksson

II

Mary’s smile does not express her happiness unless she is experiencing happiness. If
we discover that Mary is not experiencing any happiness we would presumably
withdraw any previous judgment to the effect that Mary’s smile expresses her
happiness (note that this is consistent with claiming that Mary expressed happiness
by intentionally smiling and that her smile gives us reason to think she is
experiencing happiness). However, not all modes of expression seem to require that
someone is experiencing the state of mind that gets expressed.
Consider a work of art. In ordinary parlance it would not be anything strange
about saying that a painting like Edvard Munch’s The Scream expresses an emotion,
viz., anguish. Yet a painting is not capable of experiencing anguish. Green would
presumably deny that The Scream expresses anguish. Rather, he would prefer to say
that it is expressive of anguish.3 The painting, Green may argue, does nevertheless
show how anguish feels, e.g., by showing the face of an anguished person. This is
part of Green’s Expressiveness-As-Showing Theory (EST) according to which “an
object O possesses affective or experiential quality E just in case O is a potential
source of knowledge of E - either by showing how E characteristically appears, how
E characteristically behaves, or how E characteristically feels” (Green 2007). This
theory, Green argues, explains how a work of art may be expressive of, e.g., anguish,
by showing how it characteristically appears or feels without it being anguish
experienced by anyone.
But a work of art is not the only thing that does not seem to require that someone
is experiencing the state of mind that gets expressed. In fact, the received view
amongst philosophers seems to be that it is possible for a speech act to express a
state of mind that one does not have. For instance, an agent who says “Thanks” yet
feels no gratitude is said to have expressed gratitude. Similarly, someone who asserts
that p expresses the belief that p and someone who promises to p expresses an
intention to p. As Searle writes, “[w]henever there is a psychological state specified
in the sincerity conditions, the performance of the act counts as an expression of that
psychological state” (Searle 1969: 65) and the sincerity conditions for thanking,
asserting that p and promising to p specifies that the speech act is sincere if and only
if the speaker is experiencing gratitude, believes that p and intends to p respectively.
This is the standard conception of sincerity and the standard view of expression.4
According to this picture, an assertion that p counts as an expression of the belief
that p whether or not the speaker believes that p. This also explains why questions
about the sincerity of what is said naturally arise if we have reason to doubt that the
speaker has the state of mind that the particular speech act functions to express.
Given this conception it is essential that we can express states of mind that we do not
have. Again, Green would presumably say that insincerely thanking someone does
not express any gratitude. If anything, it is expressive of gratitude. But how should
we understand the expressiveness of linguistic acts?
3
For most part I will follow Green and reserve the term “expression” for the success notion.
4
This is just one out of many different conception of sincerity in speech. For instance, sincerity is
sometimes understood as speaking spontaneously or as believing that one is in the expressed state of mind.
See Eriksson, “Straight Talk: conceptions of sincerity in speech” (forthcoming) for a discussion of
different conceptions and their respective roles.
Self-expression, Expressiveness, and Sincerity 75

EST may shed light on how we should understand the expressiveness of a work
of art. However, it seems doubtful that it throws much light on the expressiveness of
“Thanks” and other speech acts. Saying “Thanks” does not possess an affective or
experiential quality which somehow show how gratitude characteristically appears,
behaves or feels, yet it is expressive of gratitude. The reason is, I think, that
“Thanks” is not in any sense a natural sign of gratitude, but more adequately
compared to what Grice called non-natural signs. This makes the connection
between “Thanks” and gratitude more arbitrary and more aptly thought of as a
matter of convention - where a convention is an arbitrary regularity which is the
result of how previous speakers of English have used “Thanks,” viz., to indicate
gratitude (see e.g., Davis 2003).
Green’s lack of explicit discussion of the common view that it is possible to
express states of mind that one does not have points to a problem with the distinction
between “self-expression” “expression” and “expressiveness” in his work. This
problem gets highlighted when Green considers some of the rival accounts of self-
expression on the market. For instance, Bach and Harnish (1979) characterize
expression as follows. “In uttering x, S expresses attitude A iff S utters x with the
intention that an addressee H by means of recognizing this (entire) intention, take the
utterance as a reason to think that S has A” (Bach and Harnish 1979: 15). Second, he
considers Davis’ characterization of expression in terms of intentionally indicating a
state of mind (Davis 2003). I agree with Green that both proposals have difficulties.
For instance, Bach and Harnish wrongly take expression to require reflexive
intentions. However, these accounts, in contrast to Green’s, allow for the possibility
of expressing states of mind that one does not have. Someone who feels no gratitude
yet utters “Thanks” may express gratitude. Of course, unless the speaker is
experiencing gratitude she will not express her gratitude. However, since the
accounts allow for such possibilities it seems doubtful that the accounts are meant to
be accounts of self-expression in the first place. It is thus doubtful that they really are
rival accounts.
Moreover, I do believe that both accounts shed important light the expressiveness
of linguistic act. The reason why e.g., “Thanks” is expressive of gratitude is because
“Thanks” gives us reason to think that the speaker is experiencing gratitude. A
plausible explanation of this is that intelligent agents have designed “Thanks” to
convey this information. Previous speakers of English have used “Thanks” with the
intention of indicating their gratitude and this use has become conventionalized.
These accounts are weaker compared to Green’s account and more properly
thought of as “evidential” notions. Nevertheless, an evidential notion, it seems to
me, provides a good understanding of the expressiveness of speech acts like
thanking. Of course, Green is not unaware of the fact that these accounts are weaker
than the account he advances. However, this makes it difficult to understand why he
considers the accounts to be rival accounts of self-expression. Given Green’s
terminology it seems much more reasonable to think of the accounts advanced by
Bach and Harnish and Davis as accounts of expressiveness rather than self-
expression since they allow for the possibility of expressing states of mind that one
does not have. They are evidential rather than success notions.
This raises questions about the differences between Green’s account and accounts
of expressiveness, i.e., accounts that allow for the possibility of expressing states of
76 J. Eriksson

mind that one does not have. Is the expressiveness of a speech act sometimes, if in
not always, dependent on the speaker’s intention to indicate states of mind? Can the
intentions of previous speakers result in an expressive convention? Does an assertion
that p give us reason to think that the speaker believes that p? Green says too little
about the expressiveness of speech acts in order to answer these questions.
Ultimately, maybe Green’s disagreement with the received view that an assertion
that p expresses the belief that p (regardless of whether or not the speaker believes
that p) is terminological.5 But the fact that Green considers the accounts to be
accounts of self-expression suggests that the disagreement is more substantial.
Indeed, Green’s use of “expression” to denote a success notion seems to prevent him
from adequately distinguishing success and non-success accounts of “expression.”
One is left wondering what Green would have said if he conceived of the “rival”
account as accounts of expressiveness rather than self-expression. By contrast, the
accounts of expression advanced by e.g., Tormey (1971) and Bar-On (2004) are
accounts that do not allow for expressing states of mind that one does not have.
These accounts are therefore better thought of as rival accounts of self-expression,
but they are not considered.
The moral is that in examining “expression” we need to properly distinguish
between possessive formulations which imply that someone is having the state of
mind that gets expressed and non-possessive formulations that do not. The former is
a success notion and fit for self-expression. The latter is best thought of as an
evidential notion. This is fit for expressiveness. Of course, not all examples of
expressiveness are evidential notions. The term “expressiveness” is a very broad
notion. Not only does it encompass examples like Munch’s The Scream, but we may
also say that a windswept cliff may be expressive of, e.g., melancholy (we would
not, however, say that the cliff expresses melancholy). The expressiveness of a
painting or a cliff is not evidential because they do not warrant us inferring anything
about the states of the painting or cliff. By contrast, the expressiveness of “Thanks”
does warrant thinking that the speaker is experiencing gratitude. This is why it is
properly thought of as an evidential account. (It would be nice with a terminology
which reflects these different notions. Maybe we could reserve “self-expression” to
success notions, “expression” to evidential notions and “expressive” to non-
evidential notions).
Once we acknowledge the distinction between the possessive and non-possessive
formulation I see no reason to think that an account like Davis’ is inconsistent with
an account of self-expression that requires showing. Showing what is within is
essential to self-expression since showing requires expressing a state of mind one
has. Furthermore, it is easy to see how, e.g., Davis’ account can be transformed into
an account of self-expression, viz., we simply add a sincerity requirement.
According to the standard conception of sincerity, recall, a speech act expressing a
state of mind is sincere if and only if the speaker is in the expressed state of mind.
Saying “Thanks” is expressive of gratitude, but sincerely thanking requires
experiencing gratitude. Consequently, someone who sincerely says “Thanks” will
not only express her gratitude, but also show it.

5
This is suggested by a remark in relation to Searle in Green (2009, p. 144, n. 6)
Self-expression, Expressiveness, and Sincerity 77

III

Green devotes part of chapter 3 to defend an account of speech acts as a kind of

handicap. The concept of a handicap is taken from evolutionary biology and is defined
as “any signal that can only be faked with great difficulty as a result of being very
costly to produce” (Green 2007). In performing different speech acts we undertake
different commitments. For instance, in asserting that p the speaker is undertaking a
commitment to defend what is said if appropriately challenged. This is due to the fact
that speech acts are governed by norms. The norm governing assertion prescribes
asserting only what you justifiably believe is true. This norm justifies the thought that
someone who asserts that p believes that p. If she did not believe that p she would not
have asserted that p. However, if a speaker is unable to live up to the commitments
undertaken she risks “losing credibility in the community in which she has a
reputation” (Green 2007). Faking an assertion, in the sense of not being able to live up
to the commitments undertaken, thus comes at a high cost.
Green’s hypothesis is that the fact that a speaker incurs a risk of losing credibility
unless she is able to live up to the commitments undertaken is what explains how,
e.g., a sincere assertion can show the speaker’s belief. This is why performing a
speech act is a handicap. Indeed, “by asserting something sincerely you perform an
act that, because of the handicap it involves, shows your belief” (Green 2007).
I am sympathetic to the idea that that an assertion is governed by the kind of norm
mentioned above, but Green’s putative explanation of how an assertion shows the
speaker’s belief is problematic for at least two reasons. First, it does not seem
necessary to incur a risk of losing credibility in order to either express or show one’s
state of mind. Second, even if one incurs a risk of losing credibility it does not seem
as if this is what explains how an assertion that p shows the speaker’s belief that p.
Let us consider these problems in turn.
First, suppose someone (e.g., a local pointing out the way to the train station to a
tourist) asserts that “The train station is located in that direction.” This person, it
seems reasonable to think, does not incur a risk of losing credibility (supposing that
they will never meet again). Nevertheless, it seems plausible to think that such a
person may well show and express his belief. If this is right then it cannot be the
liabilities incurred that necessarily explain how it is possible to show one’s belief.
Second, suppose that a speaker who asserts that p does indeed incurs a risk of
losing credibility if he is not able to defend what is asserted if challenged. However,
undertaking the commitments does not imply that the speaker has the belief or else it
would not be possible to insincerely assert that p. Indeed, in order to deceive one’s
interlocutor it is often necessary to be able to defend what is asserted if challenged.
Someone who insincerely asserts that p (and hence does not believe that p) does not
show his belief. Nevertheless, he or she is subject to the same commitments and
liabilities as other assertors. Consequently, it does not seem right to think that a
speaker shows his belief because of the handicap he incurs. It may therefore seem
more plausible to think that the explanation of how an assertion can show the
speaker’s belief depends on the norm governing assertion, i.e., assert only what you
justifiably believe is true. However, this norm is not by itself sufficient (for the same
reason as in the case regarding the liabilities incurred) to explain how a speaker can
show his belief by asserting that p.
78 J. Eriksson

Although the liabilities incurred and norms governing assertion do not explain
how an assertion can show the speaker’s belief they do seem to explain why we have
good reason to think that a speaker who asserts that p believes that p. For instance,
someone who says “Grass is green” gives us reason to think that he believes that
grass is green - regardless of whether or not the assertion is sincere or insincere.
Similarly, “Thanks” gives us reason to believe that the speaker is experiencing
gratitude. This is plausibly explained by the norms governing the respective speech
acts (and the liabilities incurred). Assert only what you justifiably believe. This norm
(which is the product of the design of intelligent speakers) governs the speech act of
assertion and explains why an assertion that p gives us reason to think that the
speaker has the belief that p. Moreover, asserting what one does not believe is, if
Green is right, often very risky, which further explains why an assertion warrants
thinking that the speaker has the belief. Green’s purported explanation of how an
assertion shows the speaker’s belief thus seems to support only a weaker relation,
viz., an evidential relation.
Of course, we sometimes have reason to think that the speaker is not speaking
literally. For instance, we can use “Thanks” to express ingratitude by, e.g., speaking
ironically. Such a use is often signaled by tone of voice or some other contextual
feature. When speakers flout the conversational norms, e.g., assert only what you
justifiably believe, we consider hypotheses about the speaker’s intentions in
speaking. In such a manner the speaker may give us reason to think that he is
experiencing ingratitude although he utters words that are conventionally expressive
of gratitude. When this is the case the speaker’s intentions are clearly relevant to
understand expression. This suggests that the expressiveness of a speech act can
depend on either the norms governing the words we use or the speaker’s intention to
indicate being in a particular state of mind.
Green may now respond that it is not just any assertion that shows the speaker’s
belief. It is by asserting something sincerely that the speaker shows his belief. This
may well be true. However, given that it is asserting something sincerely that shows
the speaker’s belief one wonders what role sincerity plays in all this. Green’s
hypothesis, I argued, explains why an assertion that p gives us reason to think that
the speaker believes that p. This explains the expressiveness of the assertion. This is
no different for sincere or insincere assertions. However, asserting something
sincerely requires that the speaker has the belief in question. Hence, sincerity seems
to play an important explanatory role. Indeed, given the standard conception of
sincerity it seems plausible to think that someone who sincerely asserts that p is not
merely performing an act which is expressive of p, but actually expresses and shows
her belief. By contrast, someone who insincerely asserts that p is, if you want,
purporting to show his belief. Paraphrasing Green, by asserting something sincerely
you perform an act that, because of the sincerity of what is said, shows your belief.
This account of self-expression is only natural given an evidential account of
expression.
Green does not consider an explanation along these lines. I think the main reason
for this is that he does not properly distinguish between the possessive and non-
possessive notions of expression because he takes “expression” to be a success
notion. However, in subsequent work Green seems to allow for a more inclusive
notion saying that expression “requires showing, or doing something apt to show,
Self-expression, Expressiveness, and Sincerity 79

what’s within with the aid of something designed (consciously or not) for the
purpose” (Green 2008: 392). Although the distinction between “showing” and “apt
to show” is not worked out this seems to be a step in the right direction. A natural
move is to suggest that “showing” is apt for a success-notion, i.e., self-expression
and that “apt to show” is suitable for an evidential notion of expression (reserving
the term “expressive” for non-evidential notions). However, Green needs to say
more about how we should understand “apt to show” in order for us to properly
assess it and understand how it differs from rival accounts of evidential expression.
This not only promises to give us a better understanding of the relation between
expression and self-expression, but also a more proper understanding of how Green
conceives of sincerity and the possibility of insincerity and their respective roles in
relation to how we manage to show what is within.
Expressive behaviors permeate our lives and the concept of “expression”
permeates philosophy. However, the concept has not received the attention it
deserves. Although Green fails to do properly address the relations between self-
expression, expression and expressiveness (at least with respect to speech acts) there
is much to admire in his insightful book which undoubtedly does much to improve
our understanding of “expression” and thus of ourselves.

Acknowledgments Thanks to Wayne Davis and Ragnar Francén for valuable comments.

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