ary 3

THEGENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION

There are certain general principles ofare interpretation which have been
time to time. These as under :
applied by Courts from
1 The literal or
grammatical interpretation.
io 2. The mischief
rule.

3. The golden rule.

4. Harmonious construction.
at read as a whole.
5. The statute should be
quam pereat.
6. Construction ut res magis valeat
7. Identical expressions to have
same meaning.
noscitur a sociis.
8. Construction
9. Construction ejusdem generis.
unius est exclusio alterius.
10. Construction expressio
est fortissima in lege.
11. Construction contemporanea expositio
Interpretation
1. The Literal or Grammatical
The first principle of interpretation is the literal or grammatical
to
an enactment are to be given
interpretation which means that the words of
and if such meaning is clear and
2
their ordinary and natural meaning, provision of a statute whatever may be
unambiguous, effect should be given to a principle is that the object of al!
this
the consequences. The basis of the legislature intended, whatever was the
interpretations being to know what expressed by it through words which are
intention of the legislature has been the
rules of grammar. This has been called
to be interpreted according to the intention can be deduced only from the
safest rule because the legislature's
language through which it has expressed itself. If the language of a statute is
give effect to it and the court has no
plain, the only duty of the court is toof such interpretation. The court is under
business to look into the consequences
obligation to expound the law as it exists and leave the remedy to the
an exposition.Similarly, the court
legislature if harsh conclusions result from such word. The words of a statute are
should give technical meaning to a technical
popular sense and phrases and
first understood in their natural, ordinary or grammatical meaning, unless that
sentences are construed according to their something in the context or in the
leads to some absurdity or unless there is 'natural', 'ordinary',
The epithets
object of the statute to suggest the contrary.'employed
literal', 'grammatical', and 'popular' are almost interchangeably,
and probably, the term
but their indiscriminate use leads to some confusion, that the primary
'primary' is preferable to any of them, if it be remembered
1. Crawford v. Spooner, (1846) 4 MIA 179, at p. 181 (PC).
[11]
 THE INTERPRETATION OF
12

setting or context and with the

SIATUTES
meaning of a
whichsuch
tobe any
word varies with
applied;
it isthing,
its
subject-matthteree,
reference to the abstract meaning of words, if
is of forlittle value in interpreting statutes.! The cardinal
Act of Parliament is that they should be
for the construction of
according to the intention expressed in
the Act themselves.2
of Bonibay, the appellant, a citizen of
In Magbool Hussain v. State declare
construed
on arrival at an airport did not
that he had brought gold
violation of with him. India,
Gold, found in his possession during search in
notification, was confiscated under Section 167 (8), Sea Customs Act,
was charged under Section 8, Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 also.
HegoVernmet
1878.
appellant pleaded that his trial under the Act of 1947 was violative of The
20 (2) of the Constitution relating to double jeopardy as he was Article
punished for his act by way of confiscation of his gold. It was heldalready
Supreme Court that the Sea Customs Authority is not a court or a iudi by the
tribunal and the adjudging of confiscation or the increased rate of dub.
penalty under the Sea Customs Act was not a prosecution. Consequently
trial under the Act of 1947 was valid.
In S. A. Venkataraman v. Union of India,4 an inquiry had been made
against the appellant under the PublicService Enquiries Act. On receiving th
report of the Enquiry Commissioner, the appellant was given an opportunity
under Article 311 (2) of the Constitution to show cause, and was ultimate
dismissed. Later on, he was charged under Sections 161 and 165, Indian Pena
Code and Section 5 (2), Prevention of Curruption Act, 1947. On the
whether his trial was in violation of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution, question
Suprene Curt held that proceeding before the Commissioner was nctthe
prosecution and, therefore, his trial was legal.
In Rananjaya Singh v. Baijnath Singh,5 the Election Tribunal set
the election of the appellant under Section aside
123 (7) of Representation of the
People Act, 1951 on the grounds that the appellant had
than prescribed for employed more persot
electioneering purposes
exceeded the maximum election expenditure permissible
and that the salary of these persos
contention of the appellant was that all those persons who had under the law. I
the employment of his father andcampaigned
him in the election were in
were thereb
receiving salaries from his father by virtue of their
was concerned, he had not made
paymernts to them
employment. Aspermissibk
tar
limit. The Supreme Court, exceeding
following the grammatical interpretation the saidth
the meaning of Section 123 (7) of the Act of 1951 was
as far as these quite clear and, therefor
compaigners were concerned they were merely volu
compaigning for the appellant.
In Ram Kishan v.
crime of abetment of State of Delhi,b the appellant was convicted for
th

1
criminal misconduct by a public servant by offering
Craies, Statute
2
3 Ibid., at p. 64. Law, 7th ed, pp. 65-66.
AIR 1953 SC 325.
4
5
AIR 1954 SC 375.
AIR 1954 SC 749.
6.
AIR 1956 SC 476.
14 THE INTERPRETATION
OF ST
contended that no such tax could be levied as betel leaves were ATUTES
the sale of which no tax could be imposed. Under the Central vegetables on
Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947 as amended by Act 16 of 1948. For this,Provinces and
relied on the dictionary meaning of vegetable which says that athe
appellany
that which is pertaining to comprised or consisting of, or derived, vegetable or

contobtbotenaatiirnoicedn,al
from plants or their parts. The Supreme Court, while rejecting the
held that betel leaves could not be given the dictionary, technical or
meaning when the ordinary and natural meaning is clear and
Being a word of everyday use it must be understood in its popular
which the people are conversant with it as also the meaning which unambithesenseguouy by
dealing would attribute to it. Its sale is, therefore, liable to sales tax.
In Motipur Zamindary Company Private Limited v. State of Bihar l
statute
question was whether sugarcane fell within the term green vegetables the
6 of the Schedule and as such no sales tax could be levied under the in Entry
Bihar
Tax Act, 1947 on its sale. The Supreme Court held that while Sales
dealing
taxing statute the natural and ordinary meaning of a word should be the witha
meaning. In the present instance the word vegetables should be correctin
its natural and popular sense and that dictionary meaning is not of
here. Vegetables as the normal people mean by it are those which
interpreted
suchcanhel be
grown in akitchen garden to be used for the table, that is to say, to be
during lunch or dinner. Sugarcane definitely does not fall under this
In Rutherford v. Mauer,2 the words 'trade or business had category.
interpreted, 'Agricultural land was defined under Section 1(2) of
Agricultural Holdings Act,1948 as land used for agriculture which is so uSedi
the purposes of a trade or business. It was held that the words 'trade o
business' included the keeping of a riding school as is clear from the language
the section and it is not limited to only agricultural trade or business.
In M.B.S. Aushadhalaya v. Union of India, the question was whethe
Ayurvedic Preparation were mdicinal preparations. Holding that they wet
so, the Supreme Court upheld the Union power to legislative in the formi
Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (xcise Duty) Act, 1955 under Entry Ad
List 1.
In Rajagopalachari v. State of Madras, the Supreme Court held thit:
tax on receipt of pension is not a tax on employment under Entry 60 of List :
the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and hence, it is not within t
legislative competence of the State but is within the legislative competene!
the Union under the head tax on income in Entry 82 of List I.
In Municipal Board v. State Transport Authority, Rajasthan,5Authority.
the loc
of a bus stand was changed by the Regional Transport
application could be moved under Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act
to the State Transport Authority against this order with thirty days j
however!
date of order of the Regional Transport Authority. In this case,
1. AIR 1962 SC 660.
2 (1962)1 QB 16.
3 AJR 1963 SC 622.
4 AIR 1964 SC 1172.
5 AIR 1965 SC 458.
 INTERPRETATION
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF 15
THE
moved to the State Transport Authority after the expiry of
application was the date from the knowledge of the order passed by the
fromn
thirty days Authority. The Supreme Court observed that whenever
Regional Transport
statute is plain and unambiguous, meaning should be given to it
language of a While interpreting statutes of limitation,
irrespective of the consequences. meaning of the
considerations are out of place and clear grammatical
equitable
enactmentshouldstand.
Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, the appellant was convicted
In Ranjit 292, Indian enal Code bythe High Court for selling an obscene
under Section Chatterley's Lover the sale of which was banned by the
Lady
book titled India. The appellant contended before the Supreme Courtunder that
Government of maintain conviction
accused had always to be proved to
mens rea
of the
prosecution had failed to prove mens rea, that is to
criminal law. Since the sold or kept for selling the obscene book with the
appellant unjustified. He
say, that the the book was obscene, the conviction was
knowledge that are such a large number of books these daysin book-
there other that a book seller cannot
further argued thatcontents so different from each each book and cannot,
stalls andtheir
not expected to know the contents of held
possibly krnow. and is
absence of a guilty mind. The Supreme Courtunder
therefore. be convicted in the
obscenity was not an esserntial element of the offencemeaning
that knowledge of Code. The section is plain and its
Section 292, Indian Penal give natural meaning to the words used in the
unambiguous. The court must of the appellant held no
water:.
count the contention
section and on this Ltd., interpretation of Section 1(1)
Brothers (Builders)
In Quinn v. Burch(Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945 was involved.
of the Law Reform Act shall not operate to defeat any defence arising
According to which this contract' were interpreted literally and
'under a contract. The words 'under a meant only
that the words did not mean law related to contract but
it was held
parties to govern their liability.
a contract entered into between the of
Maradana Mosque (Board of Trustees) v. Mahmud,3 interpretation
In involved. Under a provision of an Act a
the words 'is being administered' was
was satisfied that a school 'is being
minister could pass a certain order if he the literal
administered' in violation of the provisions of the Act. Applying
rule it was held that the provision was in present tense and, therefore, only
conduct.
present conduct of the school could be looked into and not the past
landlord sued the
In Manmohan Das v. Bishun Das,4 the appellant (Temporary) Control
Spondent tenant for eviction under Section 3 (1)(e) U.P.
Okent and Eviction Act, 1947 on the ground that the tenant had, without the
latalord's permission, 'made or permittedtobe made any such construction as
Hpirnion of the court, has materially altered the accommodation or 1S
likely substantially to diminish its value'. The question was whether the
word or should be interpreted as and so that it is obligatory on the partt of the
landlord to prove that the value of the property was likely to diminish
1
2
AIK 1965 SC 881.
3 (1966) 2QB 370.
4 (1967) 1 AC 13.
AIR 1967 SC 643.
 OF INTERPREIATON
||FGENIRAL PRINCIS

As Nuch, the expression "commercial site" cannot take into its

nd Buiidings., lands used for the purpose of quarrying, A
vacant lands including
commercial site is a land on which there is a structure being utilized for an
fold
industrialor commercial
purpose. Extension of the words "commercial site" to
would result in defeating the purpose of the Act,
quarries
Nevillete Wadin v. lvory Properties and others! the Supreme
In Nusli
interpreting Section 9-A(1) (as inserted by the Maharashtra
Court while of Civil
Amendment Act (65 of 1977)) and Order XIV, Rule 2(2) of the Code
issue of limitation can be decided as a preliminary
Procedure, 1908 held that adnmitted
is based on facts. When facts about issue of limitation
issue wlhen it
are disputedit
cannot be decided as a preliminary issuc. A mixed question of
be decided as a preliminary issue either under
cannot Section 9-A
law and fact
Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Unless the question is
or Order XIV,
pure question of law it cannot be decided as a preliminary issue. An
a needs to be decided without recording
application of preliminary issueadduce
evidence. Permitting parties to
evidence on a preliminary issue of
provisions of law. Only apure question
iurisdiction amounts to grossest misuse of of
decided under Section 9-A the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
of law can be VII, Rule 11 the Court ruled that a
With respect to Section 9-A and Order averments indicate cause of action to be
plaint can be rejected where the plaint
barred by limitation and no further evidence is required to adjudicate the issue.
than Order XIV, Rules 2(2). A full
Section 9-A is limited and not broader permissible.
is not Under Section 9 of the
fledged trial by leading evidencedistinguished from merits, error in exercise of
Code "iurisdiction to entertain" is "jurisdiction" under Section 9
jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction. The word not barred either expressly or
correlates with the cognizance, which means it is means to admit a suit for
impliedly. The word "entertain" in Section 9-A irregularity or illegality
consideration. Jurisdiction exercised with material
jurisdiction to entertain a suit
lhas
constitutes jurisdictionalerror. When a Court
committed, it is open for interference in
but in exercise of jurisdiction mistake is can proceed with the trial by
appellate or revisional jurisdiction. Courtfacts are missing but not in case of
exercising its jurisdiction where adjudicatory to entertain are missing, Court
jurisdictional facts. When jurisdictional facts framed under Section 9-A on
a preliminary issue
cannot act at all. Pendency ofcommencement of the Act of 2018 can be decided
June 27, 2018, i.e., the date of the
comes within the parameters of Section 9-A as interpreted in
only if it of the provision that it has been
instant judgment and not under the guise pending consideration on the date of
framed under Section 9-A and was
commencement of the Act of 2018.

2. The Mischief Rule

originated in Heydon's case,' in 1584. In
The mischief rule of interpretation
Exchequer resolved "that for the sure and true
this case, the Barons of the
penal or beneficial, restrictive
interpretation of all statutes in general (be they considered;
things are to be discerned and
Or enlarging of the common law) four
1. AIR 2019 SC5125.
2 3Co. Rep. 7a; 76 ER 637.
3. Ibid, at p. 76.
 THE INTERPRETATION
40 OF
(1st) What was the common law before the making of the Act. What (2nd) STATUTE
the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide, Was
What remedy the Parliament had resolved and appointed to cure the (3rd
of the Commonwealth. And, (4th),The true reason of the remedy;
shall
office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as
and then diseasthee
mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle
evasions for continuance of the mischief and pro privato commodo, and
suppress andthe
inventions
force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the to add
of the Act, pro lono publico".1 This principle is also known as the maker
purposive construction. It has been said in Macmillan v. Dent,2 rule o
interpreting an Act of Parliament you are entitled, and in many cases that int
look to the state of the law at the date of the passing of the Act, not
common law but the law as it then stood under previous statutes, in o
bound,
only th
properly interpret the statute in question. Thus, the mischief rule as it
originally laid down has now been modified to the extent that not nn
cormmon law but also the statute law prior to the Act being interpreted neds
be looked into.
In Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar, the appellarnt, a deale
registered under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, had neither an office no
manager or an agent in Bihar. The Bihar Sales Tax authorities maintained
that all sales in West Bengal or any other State under which the delivery
goods took place in the State of Bihar, as a direct result of the sale for te
purpose of consumption in that State, were liable to Bihar Sales Tax unda
Article 286 of the Constitution (as it then stood). The Supreme Court observe
that to arrive at the true intention of the legislature, an enactment should
interpreted in the light of the history of the legislation, the mischief :
intended to suppress and the provisions of the statute. So interpreted, te
majority of judges held that explanation and clause (2) of Article 286 de
with different subjects. The explanation was concerned with explaining E
outside sale or purchase and was a provision independent of clause (1) (a)
Article 286, whereas clause (2) of Article 286 took note of the inter-Stu:
character of sales or purchases which was an entirely different matt
Therefore, Article 286 (1) (a) and Article 286 (2) did not relate to the sant
subject and it was incorrect to say that the one was a general rule and the othe
aprevailed
particularbecause
rule on
of the sametaxation
multiple subject.4 It was feltprovinces
by different that a loton of
thecontusit
princjp
ofTheterritorial nexus which hindered smooth inter-state trade and counme
Supreme Court observed that it was to cure this mischief of multp
taxation and to preserve the free flow of inter-state trade and Commercein
barn
Union of India regarded as one economic nit without any provincial
that the Constitution makers adopted Article 286 in the Constitution.
1 Qucted by Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, p.40.
2 (1907) 1Ch. 107.
3 AIR 1955 SC 661.
4 The clause()
Constitution (Seventh Amendment)
Article 286 and clause Act, 1956 omitted the explanation to
5
(2) of Article 286was substituted. Cout4
See Goodyear India Ltd., v. State of Supreme
Haryana,
applied the Mischief Rule in símilar context AIR 1990 SC 781, whereamendments
the
madeby

Conctitution Forty-sixth while interpreting the

Amendment Act.
 Dato

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION

43
with the provisions of the
respondent contended that Employees'
according to Provident Fund Act, 1952. The
Section
industry mentioned in Schedule I in which at 1(3)(a), the Act
and since in each of the four units
applied to an
least fifty persons are
nnloved, it was not obligatory to (industries) less than that numberemployed
comply with the provisions of the Act were
Deiecting the argument the Supreme Court held that the respondent were bound
by the terms of the Act because the
context so required and that the
which qualifies the word factory
oRntention of the respondent was accepted and not the word expression
the industry. If the
mischief sought to be remedied would be defeated.object of the statute and the
In Kanwar Singh v.Delhi
respondents, while rounding up stray Administration,!
cattle, were
the officers of the
he owners of the cattle.
When prosecuted for an beaten
offence
up by the appellants
Indian Penal Code the appellants pleaded under Section 332.
They alsocontended that the cattle right of private defence of property.
were not abandoned within the
Section 418, Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 in that
meaning of
completely leaving a thing as a final rejection of one's abandoned means
it becomes ownerless as have been described in the responsibilities so that
Court, while rejecting this dictionaries. The Supreme
dictionary meaning of a wordargument, held that it is not necessary that the
is to be always adhered to even if the
In the present instance, to know thecontext of
an enactment does not so
warrant.
the legislature, it is expedient to see mind of
what mischief was intended to be
suppressed and what remedy advanced. So interpreted, the word
must mean let loose or left unattended. abandoned
In Ranjit Udeshi v. State of
under Section 292, Indian Penal Code Maharashtra,? the appellant was convicted
for selling an obscene book titled Lady
Chatterley's Lover. He contended that the prosecution had a duty to prove
guilty mind against him which in this case is the knowledge
contained obscene material. Further, he argued that when there isthat
a
the bock
number, of books in a book shop, the shopkeeper is not expected to govery large
each book to see as to whether some books contain obscene literature. through
Rejecting
these arguments the Supreme Court held that there was no ambiguity in the
language of the enactment and that the meaning of Section 292 is clear and
precises. Further, the mischief of sale of obscene literature was sought to be
remedied by the provision and, therefore, the interpretation given by the
appellant was unacceptable.
In Shivanarain v, State of Madras,3 the appellant was convicted under
Section 21(d) and 21(e) of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 with
regard to certain forward contracts. Section 2(c) of the Act defines a forward
contract as a contract for the delivery of goods at a future date and which is not
a ready delivery contract. The appellant contended that since in the present
case the contracts were not meant for delivery of goods at a future date, but were
Speculative in nature, the present Act did not apply. The Supreme Court held
would defeat
that the appellant's argument could not be accepted because it
1. AIR 1965 SC 871.
2. AIR 1965 SC 881.
3. AIR 1965 SC 986.
 IHE N T
4
ERPRETATION OF
the
pmVided
wen obËect of
was abount
this statute. The
speculative contracts
mischief for which the
~hich ostensibly are for earlie law STATh
haa
OO s.
remnedy
n FinI
since the uty
Section 2(c)
ek
AmAr NathChand,
of the ourt is t o suPpress the
has to be intepreted in the light of this
a notification Was issued
mischief and
obiec delivery
adyance
East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
exeCution as suits
Act, 1949 e x e m p t i n g s u c h
institItea
were p a s s e d i n during t h e sPecifiea underfrotte
deCrees
Denod, the exact c ¡ n i t i o n to be fulfilled under the five notificatiOn beirng t y
suits for ejectment of tenants in possession f t h s e buildings Nere i n s i
duing he period of exemption and derrees of eviction were Or a r e
questiOn before the
institution of s u i t a s
Supreme CoUrt Was w h e t h e r thee
wel as p a s s i n g of t h e e r e e
Act
w i t h i n tthe five v e Dbo
The
o
passed.
intended
Holding o h e m i s e , he S u P r e n e Court held t h a t t h e d u t y o f t h e court
as to What was the mischief which was n o t proVided for a n d w h a t remedS
been resolved to Cure that mischief. The intenntion of t h e legislature in tte
Dresent instance was t o g i v e s o m e k i n d o f e n c o r a g e m n e n t to Private hous
builders t o help OVercOmne s h o r t a g e o f a c c o m n o d a t i o n . T n e s u i t s , there
had to be instituted within the specified five y e a r period a n d decrees ther
cOuid be p a s s e d e v e n a f t e r t h e e x p i r y o f t h a t p e r i o d .
n PeyarelaI v. Mahadeo R A n a c h a n d r a , 2 a charge n e r t h e Preventir
of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was b r o u g h t against t h e a P p e l l a n t f o r sellin
an keeeping f o r s a l e s p a r i which Was s w e e t e n e d with a b a n n e d artifi a
SWeetener. The appellant argued that was n o t a
supari fooa within the
meaning o f t h e Act. T h e S u p r e m e Court r e j e c t e d
t h i s a r g u n e n t a n d held t
Supari is a n a r t i c l e o f f o o d . he definition of food nder the Act i s very wi
and it covers all a t i c l e s uSed a s f o o d a s a l s o e v e r y c o m p o n e n t entering into
including flavouring and colouring mnatters a n d Preservatives. F u r t h e r , it wz
held
which
thatmdictionary
ight haVe
meaning
been
is n o t anecessarily
useed 0n
the
particular
c o r r e c ti n meaniing
Context the
of a wor
s t a t u t e . Th

Supreme Court enphàsise that the word ood should be interpreted in

COntext of the mischief which t h e P r e v e n i O n o f FoDd A d u l t e r a t i o n Act, 3
was i n t e n d e d t o s u p p r e s s a n d a d v a n c e t h e r e m e d y . TherefOre, from aI a e
taken separately Or jointly supari had no other i t was
food meaning except that
within t h e meaning o f t h e Act. pubi
n Carew appellant,
mitedcomPany, Conpany
sought to
and

float
V-
a
Unon o f India,3
new company. ít
the
was proposed that tg
COnpany wil} take over t h e s u g a r unit o f t h e appellant COmnpany
Wksanundertaking of the Section
was, however, rejected under n e company. The application of
a nthne R appc
Trade Practices Act, 23(4) of t h e Monopolies
2969.z eThe Supreme Court a ltlhw e the appeal an
interpreting the
COnstrActiOn are.pOSsible, t n a t
WOrd
ndertaking observed at when mOre
which
Temnedy has t o be preferrea. If t h e s u o r e s s e s t h e Onischief a n a a o n s t r
A 1972SC 1548.
languae I s e d i n a s t a a t u t e c a n b e
AIR 19A
3.
AIR 19SSC 22B.
SSC2260.
 PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATIOS
GENERAL
THE
Section 148 of the Act is generally to be comstrsed as "ruse
usedin 148 of the Act confers power upon the hppellate
"may" amended Section
"shall". directthe accused to deposit a sum not less than 20% c fie
The
Courtto
compersation to suspend the sentence. The Appellate Camthas
on applicationsum not less than 20% of the fine warded by e
direct to deposit a
irrespective of the. provisions of Section 357(2) of the Code t
to
power
Court
Trial Procedure, 1973.
Criminal

In Om
Prakash Agarwal Since deceased through lezal Representatives
v. Vishan Dayal Rajp0ot
and anotherl a srnali causes suít for
others Court of Additional
and arrears of rent and damages was pending in the
eviction,
under the Provincíal Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 [28 zmerded
DistrictJudgePradesh Civil Laws (Amendment) Act, 2015] and it continsed to
bythe Uttar
after Commencement of the Act of 2015. No cbjection was taken by
proceedeven
pecuníary jurisdiction of the Additional District judge and to
the tenant the
to
competence ofthe Court. Heheld took a chance to obtain judgnent ín his favour on
Court that he cannot be allowed to turn around ad
merits. The Supreme
contendthat the Court had
no jurisdíction to try the srnall cause suít and that
the judgment is wwithout jurisdiction and a nullity. The Act of 2915 is though
prospectivein nature, it is no longer in competence of the Snali Cause Court
presided over by the District Judge or the Additional District Judge to proceed
lakh. The proper
to decide a suit of having valuation of less than rupees one decide such suits.
Court to
course is to transfer these cases before the cormpetent
is a prOvÍsion
Even though if Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908jurisdiction of
which regulates institution of suits and does not affect the of the Act of
Courts,reading this provisions along with the relevant provisions
1887, the legislative
1887 and the Bengal, Agra, Assam Civil Courts Act, cognízance of by the
scheme is clear that small cause cases should be taken
SmallCauses Court presided by the Civil Judge up to the valuation of rupees
lakh by the
one lakh and cases having valuation of more than upees oneinvested with
District Judge or the Additional District Judge who have been
the above legislative intent and
the power of Small Causes Court. Unless Legislatíve
scheme is followed, there shall be confusion and inconsistency. the object
provisions have to be interpreted in a manner which may advancea particular
and purpose of the Act. Whern a statute provides that cognízance of
Court can take cognizarnce of
cause is to be taken by aparticular Court, no other
the cause, since the legislature never creates or provides for a parallel
When a
jurisdiction in two different Courts for taking cognízance of a cause.
Single judge notices that an earlier víew of another single Judge is not laying
to refer the matter
down the correct law, the appropriate Court open to hím is
for consideration by a larger bench.
3. The Golden Rule
The golden rule is a modification of the principle of grammaticai
intention of
Interpretation. It says that ordinarily the court must find out the thei natural
the legislature from the words used in the statute by giving them hardship,
neaning but if this leads to absurdity. repugnance, inconvenience,
1 AIR 2018 SC 5486.
58 THE

injustice or evasion, the Court must modify the INTERPRETATI

meaning such
further as would prevent such a consequence. On the face of it, an
to
ON OF ST
ATUTPA
all problems and is, therefore, known as the golden rule. this
literal meaning is modified to some extent, this
exte nt
rule and nm
Further, sincesovethe
modifying method of interpretation. This rule, approach is
therefore,
consequences or effects of an interpretation deserve
because these are clues to the true meaning of a
a lot cal
moresuuggests
le d the
tha
presumption that the legislature does not intend certain
construction leading to any of such objects deserves to be
legislation.
i
objects
rejected. The
m por
Therandeta ng,
is 2
any
faced with more than one possible interpretation is court when
of an
take into consideration the result of each enactment
the true intention of the legislature.
interpretation in a bid toentitled to
There may be cases where even though literal interpretation
arrive a
certain consequences not intended by the legislature, the court shall may include
interpret because some lawful justification is available far doing so. not so
an Act may be construed within a linited scope even though the
not specifically so provide. In certain other.-situations, a statute may
restricted interpretation on the basis of the object of it
Similary,
language
be givendoesa
grammatical I construction would carry its operation for beyond. although
Whenever, moe
the
than one construction are possible, that which seems reasonable will beR
effect to. The Court will try to avoid unreasonable, inconvenient and anomal
results. When the consequence of an interpretation is manifest injustice the cone
willgenerally hesitate to give effect to it. Similarly, a construction leading th
an absurd conclusion will be rejected. The duty of the court is to suppress a
evasions for the continuance of the mischief which the statute is supposed to
control.
In Tirath Singh v. Bachitter Singh,! the appellant argued that it was
obligatory under Section 99(1)(a) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951
for the tribunal to record names of all persons who had been guilty of corrupt
practices including parties and non-parties to the petition and that under the
proviso notice should be given to all persons named under Section 99(1)\4)ü,
He being aparty to the petition was, therefore, entitled to a fresh notice. 1he
Supreme Court said that such an interpretation will lead to an absurdity and
held that the proviso alongwith clause (b) thereto and the setting ot
section pointed out that notice is contemplated only against non-parties to t
petition.
In M. Pentiah v. Veeramallappa,2 the respondents were elected meme Town
of a municipal committee under the Hyderabad Municipal andDistrid
Committee Act, 1951 which was repealed by the Hyderabad the
Municipalities Act, 1956. The Act of 1956, however, provided that fist
Committee constituted under the Act of 1951 would continue till the
meeting of the Committee elected under the Act of 1956 was called. Since
thr
elections were held the old Committee continued in office for more than
underthe
years, the maximum period provided for a Committee to hold office Supremt
Act of 1951. The appellant prayed for a The
writ of quo warranto.
1 AIR 1955 SC 850.
2 AIR 1961 SC 1105.
 PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION 59
GENERAL
THE
agreeing with the
prayer, held that if more than one construction were
Court, one
which was narrower and failed to achieve the object of the
the
possible fail. The Act should be so interpreted as to avoid absurdity. In the
should
Act since the Act of 1956 continued with the Committee constituted
case
Act of 1951 till elections took place and the first meeting ofthe newly
present
under members held, it is reasonable to hold that the provision of maximum
the
elected
tenure ofthe Committee
under the old Act should also stand under the
period of Therefore, if no elections are held, the members of the Committee
Act.
automatically ceaseto be
new members after the expiry of the three year period.
In Ms
Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan, the State Legislature enacted
the Rajasthan
Passengers and Goods Taxation Act, 1959 which imposed atax on
passengerSand goods carried by road on motor vehicles. This was challengedon
grounds that the tax had not been levied upon passengers and goods under
the fares and freights, a Union subject under Entry 89 of
List II but uponviolation
Entry 56 of the
List I, and Act was in of Articles 301 and 304 of the Constitution.
It was held by the
Supreme Court that the tax was not upon the income of the
operators but was upon passengers and goods, and that though the measure of
the tax was furrnished by the amount of fare and freight charged, it did not
cease to be a tax on passengers and goods.
In Waerly Jute Mills v. Raymond and Company,2 where the Forward
Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 was challenged on the ground that it being in
the State List, the Union was not empowered to legislate on it, the question of
interpretation of the word market was in question. The Supreme Court held
that market ordinarily means a place where business is trarnsacted. It was
probably so because in the olden times transactions took place in specified
places. But with the passage of times bargains came to be conducted through
correspondence also, resulting in the change of the concept of market.
Consequently, market now means business as well as the place of business. The
expression future market in Entry 48 of List I of the Seventh Schedule of the
Constitution refers only to business and not to location of the business.
Therefore, the impugned Act which is a legislation on forward contracts would
be a legislation on future markets. Though such a law would be with respect to
trade and commerce under Entry 26of List I, Entry 48 of List I being aspecific
one must be excluded from the general Entry 26 in List II.
In State of Punjab v. Qaiser Jehan Begum, the respondent made an
application under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for reference to
the civil court within six months from her knowledge of the award regarding
Compensation whereas the section says that such reference would be made
witnin six months from the date of the award. Holding that the application
Was within time, the Supreme Court held that unless an award of compensation
nes to the knowledge, either actually or constructively, how can a reference,
any, be made against the award. Therefore, justice and fair play required
that the counting of the limitation period must begin from the date of
knowledgeof the award.
1
2
AIR 1961SC 1480.
3
AIR 1963 SC 90.
AIR 1963SC 1604.