Ng Meng Tam vs Chinabank

G.R. No. 214054, Aug. 5, 2015;

NG MENG TAM, Petitioner, vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION,Respondent.

This case stemmed from a collection suit filed by China Banking Corporation (China Bank) against Ever
Electrical Manufacturing Company Inc. (Ever), the heirs of Go Tong, Vicente Go, George Go and
petitioner Ng Meng Tam.

China Bank alleged that it granted Ever a loan. The loan was allegedly backed by two surety agreements
executed by Vicente, George and petitioner in its favor. When Ever defaulted in its payment, China Bank
sent demand letters collectively addressed to George, Vicente and petitioner. The demands were
unanswered. China Bank filed the complaint for collection.

In his Answer, petitioner alleged that the surety agreements were null and void since these were executed
before the loan was granted. Petitioner posited that the surety agreements were contracts of adhesion to
be construed against the entity which drafted the same. Petitioner also alleged that he did not receive any
demand letter.

Petitioner served interrogatories to parties pursuant to Sections 111 and 6,12 Rule 25 of the Rules of
Court to China Bank and required Mr. George C. Yap, Account Officer of the Account Management
Group, to answer.

George Yap executed his answers to interrogatories to parties.

Petitioner moved for the hearing of his affirmative defenses. Because he found Yap’s answers to the
interrogatories to parties evasive and not responsive, petitioner applied for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum against George Yap pursuant to Section 6,14 Rule 25 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

When the case was called for the presentation of George Yap as a witness, China Bank objected citing
Section 5 of the JAR. China Bank said that Yap cannot be compelled to testify in court because petitioner
did not obtain and present George Yap’s judicial affidavit. The RTC required the parties to submit their
motions on the issue of whether the preparation of a judicial affidavit by George Yap as an adverse or
hostile witness is an exception to the judicial affidavit rule.

Petitioner contended that Section 5 does not apply to Yap because it specifically excludes adverse party
witnesses and hostile witnesses from its application. Petitioner insists that Yap needed to be called to the
stand so that he may be qualified as a hostile witness pursuant to the Rules of Court. China Bank, on the
other hand, stated that petitioner’s characterization of Yap’s answers to the interrogatories to parties as
ambiguous and evasive is a declaration of what type of witness Yap is. It theorizes that the interrogatories
to parties answered by Yap serve as the judicial affidavit and there is no need for Yap to be qualified as a
hostile witness.

The RTC ruled that Section 5 did not apply to Yap since he was an adverse witness and he did not
unjustifiably decline to execute a judicial affidavit.

The RTC stressed that Section 5 of the JAR required the requested witness’ refusal to be unjustifiable. It
stated: the [JAR] requires that the refusal must be unjustifiable and without just cause. It must be pointed
out that [China Bank]’s previous motions to quash the subpoena was grounded on the claim that having
already submitted to this court his sworn written interrogatories, his being compelled to testify would be
unreasonable, oppressive and pure harassment. Thus, witness’ refusal to testify cannot be considered
unjustifiable since he raised valid grounds.
Issues:
1. Whether or not RTC committed an error of law when it interpreted sec. 5 of the JAR?
2. Whether or not RTC committed an error of law when it effectively disregarded the relevant rules on
modes of discovery which govern the presentation of adverse witnesses.

Held:

1. Under Section 10,25 parties are to be penalized if they do not conform to the provisions of the JAR.
Parties are however allowed to resort to the application of a subpoena pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules of
Court in Section 5 of the JAR in certain situations. Section 5 provides:

Sec. 5. Subpoena. – If the government employee or official, or there quested witness, who is neither the
witness of the adverse party nor a hostile witness, unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or
refuses without just cause to make the relevant books, documents, or other things under his control
available for copying, authentication, and eventual production in court, the requesting party may avail
himself of the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21 of the Rules of
Court. The rules governing the issuance of a subpoena to the witness in this case shall be the same as
when taking his deposition except that the taking of a judicial affidavit shal1 be understood to be ex parte.

While we agree with the RTC that Section 5 has no application to Yap as he was presented as a hostile
witness we cannot agree that there is need for a finding that witness unjustifiably refused to execute a
judicial affidavit. Section 5 of the JAR contemplates a situation where there is a (a) government employee
or official or (b) requested witness who is not the (1) adverse party’s witness nor (2) a hostile witness. If
this person either (a) unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or (b) refuses without just cause
to make the relevant documents available to the other party and its presentation to court, Section 5 allows
the requesting party to avail of issuance of subpoena ad testificandum or duces tecum under Rule 21 of
the Rules of Court. Thus, adverse party witnesses and hostile witnesses being excluded they are not
covered by Section 5. Expressio unius est exclusionalterius: the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others.

Here, Yap is a requested witness who is the adverse party’s witness. Regardless of whether he
unjustifiably declines to execute a judicial affidavit or refuses without just cause to present the documents,
Section 5 cannot be made to apply to him for the reason that he is included in a group of individuals
expressly exempt from the provision’s application.

2. The JAR being silent on this point, we turn to the provisions governing the rules on evidence covering
hostile witnesses specially Section 12, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. – Except with respect to witnesses referred to in
paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, the party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his
credibility.

A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon adequate
showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into
calling him to the witness stand.

The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an adverse party, may be impeached
by the party presenting him in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by
evidence of his bad character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by the adverse party, but
such cross-examination must only be on the subject matter of his examination-in-chief.

Before a party may be qualified under Section 12, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the party presenting the
adverse party witness must comply with Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules of Court which provides:

SEC. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories. – Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good
cause shown and to prevent a failure of justice, a party not served with written interrogatories may not
be compelled by the adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending
appeal.

In Afulugencia v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.,27 this Court stated that “in civil cases, the procedure of
calling the adverse party to the witness stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served
upon the latter.”

In this case, parties, with the approval of the Court, furnished and answered interrogatories to parties
pursuant to Rule 25 of the Rules of Court. They therefore complied with Section 6 of Rule 25 of the Rules
of Court. Before the present controversy arose, the RTC had already issued subpoenas for Yap to testify
and produce documents. He was called to the witness stand when China Bank interposed its objection for
non-compliance with Section 5 of the JAR. Having established that Yap, as an adverse party witness, is
not within Section 5 of the JAR’s scope, the rules in presentation of adverse party witnesses as provided
for under the Rules of Court shall apply. In keeping with this Court's decision in Afulugencia, there is
no reason for the RTC not to proceed with the presentation of Yap as a witness.

In sum, Section 5 of the JAR expressly excludes from its application adverse party and hostile witnesses.
For the presentation of these types of witnesses, the provisions on the Rules of Court under the Revised
Rules of Evidence and all other correlative rules including the modes of deposition and discovery rules
shall apply.
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Labels: case digest, G.R. No. 21405, Ng Meng Tam vs Chinabank

Monday, November 21, 2016

PHILHEALTH vs Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital

G.R. No. 193158, Nov. 11, 2015;

PHILIPPINE HEAL TH INSURANCE CORPORATION, Petitioner, versus OUR LADY OF LOURDES

HOSPITAL, Respondent.

Petitioner Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC) is a government corporation created under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7875, as amended, to administer and implement the country's National Health
Insurance Program, while respondent Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital (OLLH) is an institutional health care
provider duly accredited with the PHIC.

PHIC filed a Complaint with its Legal Sector - Prosecution Department against OLLH for the
administrative offense of filing multiple claims, which is penalized under Section 145, Rule XXVIII of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 7875. Allegedly, OLLH filed two claims of the
same amount of PhilHealth benefits involving the same patient for the same diagnosis and covering the
same period of confinement.

OLLH moved to defer the submission of its position paper pending the answer of the PHIC President and
CEO to the written interrogatories as well as the inspection and copying of the original transmittal letter
and all other claims of the Complaint. According to OLLH, these modes of discovery were availed of
because its representatives were denied and/or not given access to documents and were not allowed to
talk to PHIC personnel with regard to the charge.

Issues:
1. Whether or not PHIC petition should be dismissed for non-compliance on Rules on certification against
non-forum shopping?
2. Whether the CA erred in annulling and setting aside the order of PHIC Arbitration Department, which
denies OLLH’s resort to modes of discovery?

Held:
1. According to OLLH, PHIC Board Resolution No. 695, S. 2004, does not indicate that Alex B.
Cañaveral, who is the Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Senior Vice-President (SVP) for
Legal Services Sector (LSS) of PHIC, is duly authorized to sign the verification and certification against
forum shopping at the time of the filing of the petition on September 20, 2010. Having been signed without
proper authorization from the PHIC Board of Directors, the certification is defective and, therefore,
constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition.

Resolution No. 694 designates, among others, the Vice-President for Legal Services Group “to sign on all
verifications and certificates of non-forum shopping of all cases involving the Corporation, whether to be
filed in court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body,” while Resolution No. 1105 states that the SVP
for LSS is one of those officers authorized “to represent the Corporation in any and all legal proceedings
before any judicial and/or quasi-judicial bodies that may involve the Corporation, including the signing of
initiatory and/or responsive pleadings including all the necessary and/or incidental legal documents
relative to the legal proceedings.”

There is substantial compliance on the part of PHIC aside from the submission, albeit belatedly, of
Resolution Nos. 694 and 1105, Cañaveral, by virtue of his office, is definitely in a position to verify the
truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.

2. Through written interrogatories, a party may elicit from the adverse party or parties any facts or matter
that are not privileged and are material and relevant to the subject of the pending action. Like other
modes of discovery authorized by the Rules, the purpose of written interrogatories is to assist the parties
in clarifying the issues and in ascertaining the facts involved in a case. On the other hand, the provision
on production and inspection of documents is to enable not only the parties but also the court (in this
case, the PHIC Arbitration Department) to discover all the relevant and material facts in connection with
the case pending before it. It must be shown, therefore, that the documents sought to be produced,
inspected and/or copied/photographed are material or contain evidence relevant to an issue involved in
the action.

In this case, the questions contained in the written interrogatories filed and received on July 28, 2009
sought to elicit facts that could already be seen from the allegations as well as attachments of the
Complaint and the Verified Answer. Specifically, the entries in the three (3) Validation Report that OLLH
sought to be identified and/or explained by PHIC are either immaterial or irrelevant (to the issue of
whether OLLH is guilty of filing multiple claims and OLLH’s defense that it inadvertently attached a
second copy of the subject PhilHealth Claim Form 2 to the Transmittal Letter filed on June 19, 2007) or,
even if material or relevant, are self-explanatory and need no further elaboration from PHIC. Thus, the
interrogatories were frivolous and need not be answered. Aside from this, the PHIC Arbitration
Department correctly observed that the written interrogatories were mistakenly addressed to the
President and CEO of PHIC, who could not competently answer, either based on his job description or
first-hand experience, issues that arose from and related to the filing and processing of claims.

By OLLH in its written interrogatories and motion for production/inspection may be addressed in a hearing
to be held after submission of the position paper of the parties. If the Arbiter deemed it necessary, based
on the required pleadings already submitted, a formal hearing may be conducted wherein witnesses who
testify may be subjected to clarificatory questions. In such hearing, the Arbiter has the power to
issue subpoena ad testificandum and duces tecum; he may issue subpoenas requiring attendance and
testimony of witnesses or the production of documents and other material/s necessary. In effect, these
serve the same purposes of the modes of discovery.

The foregoing considered, Arbiter De Leon did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying OLLH's
plea for written interrogatories and production/inspection of documents. His resolutions were consistent
with the summary nature of the administrative proceedings, expeditiously resolving the case from the
perspectives of time dimension and efficiency dimension.