BATCH 3 CASE DIGEST

2- JD- B, Civil Procedure under Dean Roderick E. Manzano

1. EAGLE RIDGE DEV’T CORP. VS. CAMERON GRANVILLE ASSET, G.R. No.
204700, 24 Nov. 2014
Mode of Production of Documents
PROBLEM: Respondent Cameron was ordered to produce the Loan Sale and
Purchase Agreement (LSPA), annexes, and attachments so that petitioner Eagle Ridge
may inspect or photocopy the said document. However, a Motion for Reconsideration
was filed arguing that, among others, the Order was issued beyond the pre-trial period.
They assert that there was no insistent refusal to present the LSPA, but the Motion for
Production was filed way out of time beyond the protracted pre-trial period from
September 2005 to 2011.
Whether or not a Motion for Production or Inspections shall be filed within the
protracted pre- trial period.
ANSWER: No. Petitioners counter that their motion for production was not filed
out of time, and there is no proscription, under Rule 27 or any provision of the Rules of
Court, from filing motions for production, beyond the pre-trial.
The court held that the discovery mode of production/ inspection of document
may be availed of even beyond pre- trial upon a showing of good cause. The availment
of a Motion for Production is not limited to the pre-trial stage.
Rule 27 does not provide for any time frame within which the discovery mode of
production or inspection of documents can be utilized. The rule only requires leave of
court upon due application and a showing of due cause. To emphasize, its Section 1(a)
provides, “Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor the court in which an
action is pending may order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying
or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and
which are in his possession, custody or control.”

2. Santamaria vs. Cleary, 15 June 2016, deponent outside of the Phils.

3. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 16 December 2011; Admissibility of deposition

4. DASMARINAS GARMENTS, INC. VS. HON. RUBEN REYES AND AMERICAN

PRESIDENT LINES, LTD. G.R. No. 108229 August 24, 1993
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Deposition without the deponent

PROBLEM: APL sued Dasmarinas to recover sum of money. During the second
hearing, APL filed a motion praying that it intended to take depositions of two Taiwan
nationals, that a commission or letters rogatory be issued addressed to Director Joaquin
Roces, Executive Director of Asian Executive Exchange Center to hear and take the
oral deposition. The lower court granted the deposition upon written interrogatories.
Dasmarinas sought reconsideration and argued that deposition of witness in a foreign
jurisdiction before a private entity is not authorized by law in lieu of the oral exam in
open court. Whether foreign deposition may be taken by private entity?

ANSWER: Supreme Court ruled that deposition taken in a foreign country where
the Philippines has no secretary, embassy, legation, consul general, consul, vice-
consul, or consular agent, then obviously it may be taken only before such a person or
officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory. (Rule 23, Section
12) Deposition taken from witness outside the Philippines is allowed provided that it is
taken in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Rules of Court and in the
existence of any of the exceptions for its admissibility, e.g., that witness is out of the
province and at a greater distance than 50 kilometers from the place of the trial or
hearing or it out of the Philippines, unless appears that his absence was procured by
the party offering the deposition or that the witness is unable to attend to testify because
of age, sickness, infirmity or imprisonment.

5.  ARELLANO VS. CIF OF SORSOGON, G.R. NO. L-34897,1975

Failure to answer written interrogatories 

PROBLEM: Respondent Barreta filed with the respondent court against

petitioner Arellano for reconveyance and damages of a certain parcel of land located in
Sorsogon. Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and dispatched written interrogatories to
the respondent. Respondent failed to submit opposition to which the petitioner prays for
the dismissal of the complaint pursuant to Section 5, Rule 29 and Section 3, Rule 17,
alleging that Barreta had failed to serve answers to the interrogatories sent to him
despite the periods previously given to him by the court. The court granted the
dismissal.
Respondent filed a Motion for Reinclusion of Raul Arellano. Arellano opposed on the
ground that the case had already been dismissed. 

After Baretta filed an opposition to Arellano’s motion, the court ruled that since the
dismissal of the case against defendant Raul Arellano dated August 19, 1969 does not
constitute res judicata, the filing of an amended complaint is admitted and petitioner is
hereby order to file a responsive pleading within fifteen (15) days from receipt.
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The petitioner then was directed to file a responsive pleading. Hence, this petition. The
issue here is whether or not the court order of dismissal dated August 19, 1969 was
legally issued by the court.

ANSWER: Yes. The court upheld that the order of dismissal in question on the
strength of the basic principles of discovery procedure, more specifically, for failure of
Barreta to serve any answer to Arellano's interrogatories is valid. "Leave of court is not
necessary before written interrogatories may be served upon a party."

The Court explained that the order of dismissal of August 19, 1969, which counsel
referred to in his motion of December 16, 1969, as having been issued "in view of
plaintiff's failure to answer the written interrogatories" was virtually accepted as final in
said motion, so much so that the artifice of moving for the reinclusion of Arellano as an
indispensable party was conceived. In brief, there is here a case where the party served
with written interrogatories has four unexplained reasons failed altogether to comply
with the requirements of Section 2 of Rule 25 that they be answered.

6.  NG MENG TAM V. CHINA BANKING CORP, AUGUST 5, 2015

Interrogatories Issue
PROBLEM: On March 15, 2011, Ng Meng Tam served interrogatories to parties
to Mr. George C. Yap as Account Officer of the Account Management Group (China
Bank) need to answer.  
On June 22, 2011, Mr. Yap executed his answers, then it was re-raffled off to
RTC Branch 139, Makati City; petitioner found his answers to the interrogatories to
parties ambiguous and evasive and not responsive, thus; petitioner applied for the
issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum against Mr. Yap under
section 6, Rule 25 of RROC. On April 29, 2014, presented case of Mr. Yap as witness. 
China Bank objected citing Sec.5 of JAR, contented that Yap cannot be compelled to
testify in court because petitioner did not obtain and present Yap’s judicial affidavit.
Petitioner contented that Sec. 5 of JAR does not apply to Yap because it is
specifically excluding adverse party witnesses and hostile witnesses from its
application; thus, Yap needed to be called to the stand, to qualified as hostile witness
according to the ROC.  But China Bank, said that the interrogatories to parties
answered by Yap serve as the judicial affidavit and there is no need for Yap to be
qualified as a hostile witness.
Whether the preparation of a judicial affidavit by George Yap as an adverse or
hostile witness is an exception to the judicial affidavit rule? No.
ANSWER: According to the RTC, ruled that Section 5 did not apply to Yap since
he was an adverse witness, and he did not unjustifiably decline to execute a judicial
affidavit.  Thus, Yap as an adverse or hostile witness is not utilize for the petitioner
because this court found it has no merit to the contention of petitioner.  Therefore, the
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motion of the petition that Yap would be adverse witness without a judicial affidavit is
DENIED for lack of merit. (Ng Meng Tam vs China Bank Corp)
The RTC stressed that Section 5 of the JAR required the requested witness’
refusal to be unjustifiable. It stated: the [JAR] requires that the refusal must
be unjustifiable and without just cause.  It must be pointed out that [China Bank]’s
previous motions to quash the subpoena was grounded on the claim that having already
submitted to this court his sworn written interrogatories, his being compelled to testify
would be unreasonable, oppressive and pure harassment. Thus, witness’ refusal to
testify cannot be considered unjustifiable since he raised valid grounds.

7. ONG V. MAZO, G.R. NO. 145542, JUNE 4, 2004

Fishing Expedition

PROBLEM: Respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioner before

the RTC. After petitioner filed her answer with Counterclaim and later a motion to
dismiss the complaint, respondents were granted leave to amend the complaint.
Petitioner then served written interrogatories upon respondents and thereafter, she filed
a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion seeking, among other things, an order from the
trial court directing respondents to answer the interrogatories. RTC denied the motion
on the ground that it constituted a “fishing expedition” which would be more properly
ventilated in a pre-trial conference. Motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA assailing the twin orders of the RTC
as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Whether or not it is proper to object to written Interrogatories on the ground
that they constitute a "fishing expedition".

ANSWER: No. The refusal to answer written interrogatories on the ground that
they constitute a “fishing expedition” is not a meritorious ground. Precisely the purpose
of discovery is to enable a party to obtain relevant facts from the other party in advance
of trial so as to facilitate settlement or to expedite the trial.

8. Afulugencia vs. Metro Bank, 5 Feb. 2014; party not served with written interrogatories

9. Lanada vs. CA, G.R. No. 102390, Feb. 1, 2022; services of a counsel to make a response

10. AIR PHILIPPINES CORP V PENNSWELL, INC., G.R NO. 172835, DECEMBER
12, 2007

Production and inspection of trade secrets

PROBLEM: Petitioner is a domestic corporation that provides air transportation

services. Respondent Pennswell  was organized to engage in the business of
manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals, solvents and special lubricants.
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Respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade. Under the
contracts, petitioner’s obligation amounted to P 449,864.98 until the amount would be
fully paid. For failure to pay comply with its obligations under said contract.

Respondent then filed a complaint against the petitioner. During the pendency of
the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel respondent to give a detailed list of the
ingredients and chemical components of the following products. 
CA ruled respondent’s products  are traded secrets that are not subject to compulsory
disclosure.
W/N the CA is correct 
 
ANSWER: Yes. The court ruled that a trade secret is defined as a plan or
process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those of his
employees to whom it is necessary to confide it, which definition also extends to a
secret formula or process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in
compounding some article of trade having a commercial value. 

A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of

information that: 1 is used in one’s business; and 2 gives the employer an opportunity to
obtain an advantage over competitors who do not possess the information. Generally, a
trade secret is a process or device intended for continuous use in the operation of the
business, for example, a machine or formula, but can be a price list or catalogue or
specialized customer list. It is indubitable that trade secrets constitute proprietary rights.

11. Insigne vs. Abra Valley, July 29, 2015; denial of production/inspection

12. Sibayan vs. Ada, 17 Jan. 2018; modes of discovery on administrative proceedings

13. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. V. CAMILLE T. CRUZ AND COURT OF

APPEALS, G.R. NO. 137136, NOVEMBER 3, 1999

Deposition, discretion not unlimited

PROBLEM: On August 6, 1993, Cruz filed a complaint against petitioner

Northwest Airlines, Inc. for breach of contract of carriage. Cruz claimed to have suffered
actual, moral and exemplary damages. Trial progressed until 1995 when it was
Petitioner’s turn to present its witness on three scheduled dates. Two of the settings
were cancelled when Petitioner’s counsel filed notice for oral deposition of one Mario
Garza, witness for Petitioner, in New York. Cruz filed her opposition and suggested
written interrogatories instead. In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court denied
PR’s opposition, thus allowing the deposition to proceed. The oral deposition took place
in New York on July 24, 1995 or notably two days before the issuance of the trial court’s
order allowing the deposition to proceed. 
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Whether or not the oral deposition should be admitted into evidence.

ANSWER: Section 16 of Rule 24 (now Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure of

1997) provides that after notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination,
upon motion seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined and for
good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may, among others, make
an order that the deposition shall not be taken. The rest of the same section allows the
taking of the deposition subject to certain conditions specified therein. Respondent court
correctly observed that the deposition in this case was not used for discovery purposes,
as the examinee was the employee of Petitioner, but rather to accommodate the former
who was in Massachusetts, U.S.A. Such being the case, the general rules on
examination of witnesses under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requiring said
examination to be done in court following the order set therein, should be observed.

14. Capitol Hills vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 182738, Feb. 24, 2014

15. Go vs. People, G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012; Applicability in Criminal Cases

16. Chan vs. Chan, G.R. No. 179786, July 24, 2013; Summary

17. SPS. EXPEDITO ZEPEDA AND ALICE D. ZEPEDA VS. CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION, G.R. NO. 172175, OCTOBER 9, 2006

Sanctions

PROBLEM: Sps. Zepada obtained a loan from Chinabank which was secured by
a Real Estate Mortgage. They requested for loan restructuring which was allegedly
granted. However, the Chinabank extrajudicially foreclosed the REM. Petitioners filed a
motion to annul the foreclosure before the RTC of CamSur. Chinabank filed an answer
with special affirmative defenses and counterclaim. It also filed a set of written
interrogatories with 20 questions. The trial court denied Chinabank's affirmative
defenses. Chinabank’s petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was granted by the CA. It
ruled that compelling hearing set by trail court to determine the veracity of Chinabank’s
affirmative defenses; they failed to answer Chinabank’s written interrogatories; and the
complaint states no cause of action. Whether the complaint should be dismissed for
failure of petitioners to answer respondent's written interrogatories as provided for in
Section 3(c), Rule 29 of the Rules of Court.

ANSWER: NO. Chinabank should have filed a motion based on Sec. 5 Rule 29
and not Sec 3(c) Rule 29. The consequences enumerated in Section 3(c) of Rule 29
would only apply where the party upon whom the written interrogatories is served,
refuses to answer a particular question in the set of written interrogatories and despite
an order compelling him to answer the particular question, still refuses to obey the
order.
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In the instant case, petitioners refused to answer the whole set of written
interrogatories, not just a particular question. Clearly then, respondent bank should
have filed a motion based on Section 5 and not Section 3(c) of Rule 29.

18. Yu v. Mapayo, 29 March 1972; reverse trial

19. Re: Judicial Audit Conducted In The RTC, Branch 20, CDO City, Misamis
Oriental, A.M. No. 14-11-350-RTC    5 December 2017

Delegation of Reception of Evidence

PROBLEM: A Judicial Audit was conducted in RTC, then presided by Judge

Macabaya. The audit team found out among others that there was delay in rendering a
decision/resolution on cases submitted for decision and there are errors/irregularities in
several orders issued by the Judge. 
The audit team noted that in four criminal cases both entitled People v Alba, Judge
Macabaya issued twin orders both dated 26 September 2006, directing the issuance  of
a Warrant of Arrest against the accused for his failure to appear, and directing the
Branch Clerk of Court to receive evidence of the prosecution through ex-parte hearing.
Whether or not the Clerk of Court can receive evidence ex-parte in criminal
proceedings.
ANSWER:  No. Nowhere in the Rules of Criminal Procedure are Clerks of Court
allowed to receive evidence ex-parte in criminal proceedings - unlike in ordinary civil
actions and in special proceedings where the judge may delegate such act to his Clerk
of Court.
Rule 30 of the Rules of Court. Section 9. Judge to Receive Evidence; Delegation
to Clerk of Court. - The judge of the court where the case is pending
shall personally receive the evidence to be adduced by the parties. However, in default
or ex parte hearings, and in any case where the parties agree in writing, the court may
delegate the reception of evidence to its clerk of court who is a member of the bar. The
clerk of court shall have no power to rule on objections to any question or to the
admission of exhibits, which objections shall be resolved by the court upon submission
of his report and the transcripts within ten (10) days from termination of the hearing.

20. NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, V. SPS. MARGARITO

ASOQUE AND TARCINIA ASOQUE, RESPONDENTS G.R. NO. 172507,
SEPTEMBER 14, 2016

Non-appointment of commissioners

PROBLEM: Sps Asoque filed a complaint before the RTC of Calbayog against
National Power Corporation (NPC) for payment for just compensation and damages.
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During the pretrial, the trial court allowed the respondents to present their
evidence ex parte before a court-appointed Commissioner despite the absence of the
counsel of NPC. The Petitioner filed Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Reset Pre-Trial
and subsequent Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court.
Respondent presented evidence ex parte before Atty. Arpon, court-appointed
Commissioner and filed their Formal Officer of Documentary Evidence which NPC
failure to admit.
Commissioner’s submitted report to the trial court recommended the fair market
value of the property at Php800.00 per sq. meter and that schedule of prevailing market
value prepared by the Office of the Provincial Agriculturist, Catbalogan, Samar be
adopted to compute the amount of compensation for the damaged improvements.
Whether or not the appointment of the branch clerk of court as the Commissioner to
receive and report on respondents' evidence is proper.
ANSWER: Yes, the appointment of the branch clerk of court as the
Commissioner is proper since the appointment in this case is dispensable and
discretionary only. The trial court is not bound by the Commissioner's recommendation
since it is still within the discretion of the court whether to adopt the Commissioner's
recommendation or to make its own independent valuation based on the report
submitted by the Commissioner. In cases that the owner file a case for recovery of
compensation, Rule 32 would apply and not Rule 67. Section 3 of Rule 32 speaks of the
authority that may be granted to a Commissioner.
21. DANIEL D. CELINO VS. HEIRS OF ALEJO AND TERESA SANTIAGO, G.R. NO.
161817  JULY 30, 2004

Rule 33 Demurrer to Evidence

PROBLEM: Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss,  alleging that complainant Juliet

Santiago did not have the legal capacity to sue, since she did not have the
corresponding written authority to represent her co-plaintiffs, and since
the Complaint failed to state a cause of action.

Juliet Santiago, one of the plaintiffs,however, was able to secure a copy of

Special Power of Attorney, authorizing her to represent her co-plaintiffs of the
suit.Petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence,  still on the ground of Juliet Santiago's
alleged lack of legal capacity to sue. Petitioner claimed that the evidence presented by
Santiago should not be admitted since she failed to present any evidence of authority to
file the complaint for and on behalf of her co-plaintiffs. The issue in this case is whether
or not demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 of RROC may be resorted when clearly the
complaint has no authority to sue for and on behalf of her co-plaintiffs.

ANSWER: NO. A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of

insufficiency of evidence and is presented after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an
objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
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adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a
case or sustain the issue. The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that
which pertains to the merits of the case. Thus, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals,
lack of legal capacity to sue is not a proper ground for a demurrer to evidence ,
pertaining as it does to a technical aspect, and it having nothing to do with the evidence
on the merits of the complaint.

Considering that plaintiff Juliet Santiago has submitted the necessary Special

Power of Authority from her co-plaintiffs authorizing her to institute the instant
action against the defendant, the Demurrer to Evidence is denied for lack of merit. 

22. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. FE GIMENEZ AND IGNACIO GIMENEZ,

G.R. NO. 174673, JANUARY 11, 2016

Rule 33 - Demurrer to evidence; Judgment on the merits

PROBLEM: Petitioner, through the PCGG, instituted a complaint against the
respondent spouses before the Sandiganbayan. Said complaint seeks to recover ill-
gotten wealth acquired by the spouses as dummies of former President Marcos. In the
1st assailed resolution of the Sandiganbayan, it noted that the petitioner failed to file its
formal offer of evidence notwithstanding repeated extensions and declared that the
latter waived the filing of the same. Respondent spouses then filed a motion to dismiss
on demurrer to evidence since the petitioner showed no right to relief as there was no
evidence to support its cause of action. In the 2 nd assailed resolution, the
Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and granted the
spouses’ motion to dismiss. It should be noted however that in the petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration, it wanted to admit attached formal offer of evidence although
belatedly considering it has actually gathered documentary exhibits to present. Did the
Sandiganbayan erred in holding that the petitioner waived the filing of its formal offer of
evidence and in granting respondent spouses’ motion to dismiss on demurrer to
evidence?

ANSWER: Yes. The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when
resolving a demurrer to evidence which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence.

A liberal application of the Rules is in line with the state’s policy to recover ill-
gotten wealth. In case of doubt, courts should proceed with caution in granting a motion
to dismiss based on demurrer to evidence. An order granting demurrer to evidence is a
judgment on the merits. This is because while a demurrer "is an aid or instrument for the
expeditious termination of an action," it specifically "pertains to the merits of the case."

In Cabreza, Jr., et al. v. Cabreza, this court defined a judgment rendered on the
merits: A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts,
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irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections"; or when the judgment is

rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment
rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical point."

To reiterate, "demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the

case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his [or her] part, as he [or she]
would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff’s evidence shows that he [or she] is not entitled to
the relief sought." The order of dismissal must be clearly supported by facts and law
since an order granting demurrer is a judgment on the merits: As it is settled that an
order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, it is
imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts
and the law on which it is based. 

To erroneously grant a dismissal simply based on the delay to formally offer

documentary evidence essentially deprives one party of due process.

23. GMA NETWORK INC. VS. CENTRAL CATV, INC., 18 JULY 2014
Present evidence in demurrer
PROBLEM: The petitioner filed with the NTC a complaint against the respondent
to stop it from soliciting and showing advertisements in its CATV system, pursuant to 
EO 205. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss by demurrer to evidence claiming that the
evidence presented by the complainants failed to show how the respondent’s acts of
soliciting and/or showing advertisements infringed upon the television and broadcast
market. NTC granted the demurrer. CA upheld. Whether the CA erred in affirming the
order of NTC.

ANSWER: No. The remedy of a demurrer to evidence is applicable in the

proceedings before the NTC pursuant to its Rules of Practice and Procedure which
provides for the suppletory application of the Rules of Court. The issue to be resolved in
a motion to dismiss based on a demurrer to evidence is whether the plaintiff is entitled
to the relief prayed for based on the facts and the law. In granting the demurrer to
evidence, the NTC considered both the insufficiency of the allegations in the complaint
and the insufficiency of the complainants’ evidence in light of its interpretation of the
provisions of EO No. 205 and EO No. 436.

24. Basbas vs. Sayson, G.R. No. 172660, August 24, 2011; genuine issue

25. PROBLEM- ANSWER FORMAT PLEASE

Comglasco Corp vs. Santos Car Check Center, March 25, 2015; rebus sic stantibus and legal
or physical impossibility
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26. EQUITABLE PCI VS. ONG, 502 SCRA 127, SEPT. 15, 2006
Summary judgment
PROBLEM: PCIB had stopped the payment of a Manager’s check issued by the
bank to Ong on the ground that the check which supposed to fund the MC was drawn
against a closed account.

The matter was brought about by the TCBT check deposited by Serande from
which he issued check against its proceeds amounting to Php 132,000 payable to Ong.
Ong instead of encashing the check, requested PCIB to issue manager’s check. The
MC was returned by Equitable Bank due to stop payment order by PCIB. 

Ong was constrained to file a Complaint for sum of money, damages and
attorney’s fees against PCIB when PCIB refused to pay the amount of check despite
several demands. Ong filed a motion of summary judgment after pre-trial. PCIB and its
counsel failed to appear at the scheduled hearing. Neither did they file any written
comment or opposition thereto. The trial court then granted the motion for summary
judgment and ruled in favor of Ong. PCIB filed an appeal but RTC’s decision was
affirmed by CA.

PCIB filed an appeal to the SC questioning the granting of Ong’s motion for
summary judgment notwithstanding the glaring fact that there are genuine, material and
factual issues which require the presentation of evidence. Is the petition meritorious?

ANSWER: The SC finds the petition without merit based on Sec 1, Rule 35 of the
1997 Rules of Court. Thus, it has been held that a summary judgment is proper where,
upon a motion filed after the issues had been joined and on the basis of the pleadings
and papers filed, the court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact to
except as to the amount of damages. By admitting it committed an error, clearing the
check of Sarande and issuing in favor of Ong not just any check but a manager's check
for that matter, PCI Bank's liability is fixed. Under the circumstances, we find that
summary judgment was proper and a hearing would serve no purpose. 
 
27. REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGAYAN, G.R. NO. 152154, 15 JULY 2003

Summary judgment after pretrial

PROBLEM: Republic sought before the Sandiganbayan the declaration of

US$356M as ill-gotten wealth. Republic filed for a summary judgment based on the
grounds that Marcoses’ admission that they do not have any interest or ownership over
the funds tenders no genuine issue or controversy. Sandiganbayan granted the
petitioner’s motion for summary judgment. However, this decision was subsequently
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reversed by the Sandiganbayan upon Marcoses’ motion for reconsideration on the

grounds that the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that
the money belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record
as to the ownership of the same. Is the summary judgment proper? (Yes)

ANSWER: Summary judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1,

Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The theory of summary judgment is that,
although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is
demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine
but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering
summary judgment for petitioner Republic.

28. PHILIPPINE BUSINESS BANK VS. CHUA, 634 SCRA 635, G.R. NO. 178899,
NOVEMBER 15, 2010

Separate appeal from judgment

PROBLEM: Tomas Tan, a stockholder and director/Treasurer of CST

Enterprises, Inc. (CST), filed a derivative suit against PBB, and several others including
the respondent. Tan alleged that the properties of CST were mortgaged with a loan
from PBB with an invalid secretary’s certificate, which stated that John Dennis Chua
was authorized to open a bank account and obtain credit facilities under the name of
CST with PBB using CST’s properties as security for these loans in the total amount of
Ninety-One Million One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱91,100,000.00).

When PBB threatened to foreclose the mortgage on these properties, Tan filed
the present complaint, essentially arguing that the loans/promissory notes and
mortgage made out in CST’s name are unenforceable against it, since they were
entered into by persons who were unauthorized to bind the company.

PBB’s file a cross-claim against respondent Chua, demanding payment of the

promissory notes he signed as co-maker with John Dennis Chua. Respondent Chua
claimed that he never applied for a loan with the PBB. He further denied authorizing
John Dennis Chua to apply for any loans in CST’s name, or to use CST properties as
security for any loans. Nevertheless, he admitted that he signed, as co-maker, six
promissory notes covering the loans obtained by John Dennis Chua with PBB
amounting to Seventy-Five Million Pesos (₱75,000,000.00).

PBB subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment based on

Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, claiming that since respondent
Chua already admitted its cross-claim against him, there was no genuine issue on any
material fact on the issue of his liability to PBB. Acting on PBB’s motion, the RTC issued
a partial summary judgment on PBB’s cross-claim against respondent Chua liable as a
signatory to the promissory notes amounting to Seventy-Five Million Pesos
(₱75,000,000.00).
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The RTC resolved respondent Chua’s Notice of Appeal, as well as PBB’s Motion
to Disallow Appeal and to Issue Execution. Citing Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules, the
RTC ruled that respondent Chua could not file a notice of appeal. Instead, he should
have filed a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. However, since
the period for filing a certiorari petition had already lapsed without respondent filing any
petition, the partial summary judgment had become final and executory. Thus, it ordered
the issuance of a writ of execution for the satisfaction of the partial summary judgment
in favor of PBB. Whether a partial summary judgment is a final judgment about PBB’s
cross-claim against respondent Chua since respondent Chua’s liability will not be
affected by the resolution of the issues of the main case. 

ANSWER: NO. The rendition by the court of a summary judgment does not
always result in the full adjudication of all the issues raised in a case. For these
instances, Section 4, Rule 35 of the Rules provides:
Section 4. Case not fully adjudicated on motion. – If on motion under this
Rule, judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the reliefs sought
and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel shall ascertain
what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what are actually
and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the
facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which
the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such
further proceedings in the action as are just. The facts so specified shall be
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted on the controverted facts
accordingly.

This is what is referred to as a partial summary judgment. A careful reading of

this section reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be
considered a "final judgment," as it does not "[put] an end to an action at law by
declaring that the plaintiff either has or has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he
sues for." The Rules provide for a partial summary judgment as a means to simplify the
trial process by allowing the court to focus the trial only on the assailed facts,
considering as established those facts which are not in dispute.

From the partial summary judgment rendered by the RTC, it did not dispose of
the case as the main issues raised in plaintiff Tomas Tan’s complaint, i.e., the validity of
the secretary’s certificate which authorized John Dennis Chua to take out loans, and
execute promissory notes and mortgages for and on behalf of CST, as well as the
validity of the resultant promissory notes and mortgage executed for and on behalf of
CST, remained unresolved.

29. PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN VS. CA, 124 SCRA 297 [1993]

Execution of partial judgment

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30. PAHILA-GARRIDO VS. TORTOGO, AUGUST 17, 2011

Distinction of final order from interlocutory order