Linglingay U.

Juan 22 November 2022

19-13941-644 Civil Law Review_Case Digest

1. Heirs of Alejandra Delfin vs. Rabadon, 702 SCRA 587, G.R. No. 165014 July 31,
2013

Facts:

Respondents filed before the RTC an action to recover the ownership and possession of
the subject property from petitioners, seeking as well the payment of damages. They contended
that the property was owned by their predecessor-in-interest, Emiliana Bacalso and they were in
possession until 1988. Even if the foregoing decree was lost during the last World War, its
existence could still be shown by a certification (LRA certification) issued by the Land
Registration Authority (LRA), and a certified copy from page 19 of the daybook of cadastral lots
issued by the Register of Deeds (RD) of Cebu City. However, in 1989, they discovered that the
said property was already in the possession of Alejandra and some of her children and their
families already constructed their houses thereon when they confronted Alejandra, she claimed
that petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest, Remegio Navares, previously bought the said property;
however, when they asked to see a copy of the deed of sale, she could not produce the same.

The RTC ruled that petitioners had the better right to the ownership and possession of the subject
property. It based its conclusion on the fact that the subject property was declared by petitioners
for taxation purposes and that they paid the realty taxes due thereon. The CA reversed the RTC’s
pronouncement, holding that respondents had the better right of ownership and possession over
the subject property. The CA stressed that tax declarations and tax receipts are not conclusive
evidence of ownership or of the right to possess the land when not supported by other evidence
of actual possession which remained wanting in this case.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents have the better right to the ownership and possession of the
subject property. (Yes)

Ruling:

The Court finds that the respondents have shown a better right to the ownership and possession
of the subject property.

As may be gleaned from the records, the probative value of petitioners’ evidence, which consist
of tax declarations and tax receipts, pales in comparison to that of respondents’ evidence which
consists of a decree of ownership, i.e., Decree No. 98992, under the name of their predecessor-
in-interest, Emiliana. While the actual copy of the said decree was lost, the existence of the said
decree was actually proven by the LRA certification and the daybook entry. Likewise, the RTC

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itself observed that it is undisputable that the subject property has been issued Decree No. 98992,
for which an original certificate of title was issued to Emiliana. It is an elemental rule that a
decree of registration bars all claims and rights which arose or may have existed prior to the
decree of registration. By the issuance of the decree, the land is bound and title thereto quieted,
subject only to certain exceptions under the property registration decree. In the case of Ferrer-
Lopez v. CA, the Court ruled that as against an array of proofs consisting of tax declarations
and/or tax receipts which are not conclusive evidence of ownership nor proof of the area covered
therein, an original certificate of title, which indicates true and legal ownership by the registered
owners over the disputed premises, must prevail. Accordingly, respondents’ Decree No. 98992
for which an original certificate of title was issued should be accorded greater weight as against
the tax declarations and tax receipts presented by petitioners in this case.

Besides, tax declarations and tax receipts may only become the basis of a claim for ownership
when they are coupled with proof of actual possession of the property. In this case, records are
bereft of any showing that petitioners, or any of their predecessors-in-interest, have been in
actual possession of the subject property prior to 1989 as they claim.

2. Balais-Mabanag vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 617 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 153142,
March 29, 2010

Facts:

The Coronel brothers executed a document entitled “Receipt of Down payment” in favor
of Ramona Alcaraz upon the receiving P50,000.00 as a down payment for the sale of their
inherited house and lot in Quezon City. In the agreement with Ramona, they will execute a deed
of absolute sale immediately upon the transfer of the TCT to the name of the brothers Coronel
because the same was named to their father. On Feb.18, 1985, they sold the same property to
petitioner herein for a higher contract price than that of Ramona. For this reason, Coronel
rescinded the first agreement with Ramona by depositing to her the down payment of P50,
000.00. Consequently, respondents filed a case for specific performance and caused the
annotation of lis pendens over the property. On June 5, 1985, TCT 351382 was issued in the
name of petitioner herein. RTC ruled in favor of respondents herein ordering the cancellation of
the TCT in the name of petitioner. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the registration by the Registry
of Deeds of the Deeds of Absolute Sale despite the lack of indication of citizenship of the buyer.

Ruling:

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The issue of citizenship of the registered owner of land cannot anymore be raised to
forestall the execution of a final and executory judgment where the objecting party had the
opportunity to raise the issue prior to the finality of the judgment. The time for assailing the
capacity of the winning party to acquire the land was during the trial, not during the execution of
a final decision.

It should also be pointed out that the petitioner was not the proper party to challenge
Ramona's qualifications to acquire land.

Under Section 7, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185, the Solicitor General or his representative
shall institute escheat proceedings against its violators. Although the law does not categorically
state that only the Government, through the Solicitor General, may attack the title of an alien
transferee of land, it is nonetheless correct to hold that only the Government, through the
Solicitor General, has the personality to file a case challenging the capacity of a person to
acquire or to own land based on non-citizenship. This limitation is based on the fact that the
violation is committed against the State, not against any individual; and that in the event that the
transferee is adjudged to be not a Filipino citizen, the affected property reverts to the
State, not to the previous owner or any other individual.

Herein, even assuming that Ramona was legally disqualified from owning the subject
property, the decision that voids or annuls their right of ownership over the subject land will not
inure to the benefit of the petitioner. Instead, the subject property will be escheated in favor of
the State in accordance with Batas Pambansa Blg. 185.

3. Heirs of Johnny Aoas vs. As-il, 806 SCRA 669, G.R. No. 219558 October 19, 2016

Settled is the rule that a boundary dispute, as in this case, can only be resolved in the context of
an accion reivindicatoria, and not in an ejectment case. In Manalang v. Bacani, the Court held
that boundary dispute cannot be resolved in ejectment proceedings as it involves different issues,
to wit: The boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the
property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff’s property. A boundary dispute
cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which
are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant
unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his
right to hold such possession under any contract, express or implied. The defendant’s possession
was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or termination of
his right of possession. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the very
beginning, and the issue centers on which between the plaintiff and the defendant had the prior
possession de facto. Given the foregoing, the C.A. erred in affirming the ejectment of the Heirs

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of Aoas considering that the issue raised cannot be properly ventilated in a forcible entry case as
the main contention of the parties deal with encroachment. In other words, the MTC in passing
upon the case, acted without authority as the case was beyond the ambit of a summary
proceeding.

4. Pilar Development Corporation vs. Dumadag, 693 SCRA 96, March 11, 2013

Facts:

The petitioner owned Pillar Village Subdivision at Las Piñas where the respondents
allegedly built their shanties without the petitioner’s knowledge or consent. Thus, a Complaint
for accion publiciana was filed against the respondents. The respondents denied the material
allegations of the Complaint asserting that it’s the local government and not the petitioner, which
has jurisdiction and authority over them. RTC dismissed the complaint saying that the land in
question is situated on the sloping area leading down a creek and within the three-meter legal
easement and thus, it’s considered as public property and part of public dominion under Article
502 of the New Civil Code. With this, only the local government of Las Pinas City could
insititute an action for recovery of possession or ownership. CA dismissed the case but noted that
the proper party to seek recovery of the property is not the City of Las Pinas but the Republic of
the Philippines, through the OSG pursuant to Section 101 of the Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No.
141 otherwise known as the Public Land Act.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the land in question is a public property. (Yes)

2. Whether or not the LGU is a proper party entitled to institute a case with respect to the 3-
meter strip/zone. (No)

Ruling:

While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general rule that “[t]the owner of the
servient estate retains the ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and
may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement,” Article 635
thereof is specific in saying that “[a]ll matters concerning easements established for public or
communal use shall be governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto, and, in the
absence thereof, by the provisions of this Title [Title VII on Easements or Servitudes].”

In the case at bar, the applicability of DENR A.O. No. 99-21 dated June 11, 1999, which
superseded DENR A.O. No. 97-05 dated March 6, 1997 and prescribed the revised guidelines in
the implementation of the pertinent provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1273 and Presidential

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Decree (P.D.) Nos. 705 and 1067, cannot be doubted. Inter alia, it was issued to further the
government’s program of biodiversity preservation. Certainly, in the case of residential
subdivisions, the allocation of the 3-meter strip along the banks of a stream, like the Mahabang
Ilog Creek in this case, is required and shall be considered as forming part of the open space
requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216 dated October 14, 1977. Said law is explicit: open spaces are
“for public use and are, therefore, beyond commerce of men” and that “[the] areas reserved for
parks, playgrounds and recreational use shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable.”

Running in same vein is P.D. 1067 or The Water Code of the Philippines which provides:
Article 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their
entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in
agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the
easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No
person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation,
navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind. Thus, the above proves
that petitioner’s right of ownership and possession has been limited by law with respect to the 3-
meter strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek.

Despite this, the Court cannot agree with the trial court’s opinion, as to which the C.A.
did not pass upon, that respondents have a better right to posses the subject portion of the land
because they are occupying an area reserved for public easement purposes.

As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute a case with respect to the 3-
meter strip/zone.

We find and so hold that both the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG and the
local government of Las Piñas City, may file an action depending on the purpose sought to be
achieved. The former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under C.A. 141, while
the latter may also bring an action to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7279
(otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992).

Under R. A. 7279, which was enacted to uplift the living conditions in the poorer sections
of the communities in urban areas and was envisioned to be the antidote to the pernicious
problem of squatting in the metropolis, all local government units (LGUs) are mandated to evict
and demolish persons or entities occupying danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads,
parks, and playgrounds. Moreover, under pain of administrative and criminal liability in case of
non-compliance, it obliges LGU’s to strictly observe the law.

5. Naga Centrum, Inc. vs. Orzales, 803 SCRA 109, September 14, 2016

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Facts:

Sps. Orzales owns a house and lot situated in Valentin Street, Sabang Naga City but their
property was surrounded by different property owners and eventually lost passageway to
public highway. To access the public road, they can only pass through Rizal Street, which is in
Naga Centrum’s property, on a limited time from 9:00am to 2:00pm daily. Burdened by it, Sps.
Orzales then demanded a right-of-way from Naga Centrum but the latter declined. Naga Centum
intentionally blocked the passageway and landlocked Sps. Orzales.

Issue:

Whether or not Sps. Orzales has the right to demand right-of-way. (Yes)

Ruling:

To be entitled to an easement or right of way, the following requisites should be met: 1.

An immovable is surrounded by other immovables belonging to other persons, and is without
adequate outlet to a public highway; 2. Payment of proper indemnity by the owner of the
surrounded immovable; 3. The isolation of the immovable is not due to its owner’s acts; and 4.
The proposed easement of right of way is established at the point least prejudicial to the servient
estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance of the dominant estate to a
public highway may be the shortest. A party cannot be allowed to influence and manipulate the
courts’ decisions by performing acts upon the disputed property during the pendency of the case,
which would allow it to achieve the objectives it desires.

6. Dolar vs. Barangay Lublub (Now P.D. Monfort North) Municipality of Dumangas, 475
SCRA 458, G.R. No. 152663 November 18, 2005

Facts:

The donor donated a land in favor of the donee on condition that the donee must establish
or construct a building within five years. The donee failed to comply with the condition of the
donor. The five-year period to construct the building ended in September of 1986. Seventeen
(17) years from September 1986, the donor filed an action for the revocation of the donation for
failure to construct the building within five years.

Issue:

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Whether or not the deed of donation in question is no longer effective by reason of the
automatic reversion clause therein.

Ruling:

The action to file revocation had prescribed pursuant to Article 764 (4 years) cited above.
Even if you will apply Article 1144 (10 years prescriptive period for written contract), the action
was also barred by prescription.

In all, petitioner’s right of action to revoke or cancel the donation had indeed prescribed,
regardless of whether the applicable legal provision is Article 764 or the favorable Article 1144
of the Civil Code. It should be stated in this regard, however, that respondent barangay had
disputed the existence of the grounds upon which petitioner anchored his right to revoke,
claiming it had already complied with the construction and development conditions of the
donation.