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The role of hedonism in Marcuse's early thought

Article in Man and World · December 1976

DOI: 10.1007/BF01249002

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 MARK STOHS
The Cleveland State University

T H E R O L E OF H E D O N I S M
IN MARCUSE'S EARLY THOUGHT*

INTRODUCTION

Freud's influence on Marcuse's later thought is wall known. The appearance

of Eros and Civilization, in which Freud occupies a decisive role, seems to
reveal a discontinuity, because prior to 1955 virtually no mention is made
of Freud. 1 Yet, the use of Freud is reflective of and, in ways, continuous
with Marcuse's published work. Indeed, an understanding of themes devel-
oped in the 1930's is helpful in appreciating the role of Freud in the later
work and the ease in which Freud was introduced. A critique of traditional
hedonism is one of his interests in which a few of these themes are revealed
in their beginning and relatively undeveloped form. The themes that will
be dealt with are primarily those that are later more fully developed in
Eros and Civilization. 2
The principal essays that will be considered are : "Philosophy and Critical
Theory" (1937) and "On Hedonism" (1938). ~ The first essay is a very
basic discussion of the role that Marcuse gives to philosophy, in particular
reference to and in line with the thought of Hegel and Marx. This makes
it possible to view Marcuse's thought without the added dimension of Freud.
The second article was chosen for a more specific reason. Often, Freud
is accused of being a reductionist, e.g. reducing the many spheres of ex-
plaining life to a singular sphere (in this case, sexual energy). Upon reading
Marcuse's works it seems possible that one might have a similar impression.
This is especially true when a statement such as the following is considered :
"The memory of gratification is at the origin of all thinking, and the
impulse to recapture past gratification is the hidden driving power behind
the process of thought. ''4 However, to take this statement at its face value,
especially in the light of Freud's reductionism, would be (it shall be argued)
misleading. Thus, it i s hoped that the essay "On Hedonism", will help us
understand the sense in which he interprets Freud.

* I am grateful to Professor Joseph DeMarco and Paul Teske for their help and en-
couragement.

325
 MARK STOHS

I. Philosophy and Critical Theory

In his 1937 essay, written before Reason and Revolution, Marcuse develops
some of the implications of Hegel and Marx. In this way he offers a
'critical theory', which is "social theory as presented . . . on the basis of
dialectical philosophy and the critique of political economy. ''s However,
Marcuse argues that this theory is "an economic, not a philosophical, sys-
tem. '''~ This position will be explained by showing how Marcuse's position
develops from that of Hegel and Marx.
Marcuse sees Hegel as positing the concept of reason as "the fundamental
category of philosophical thought. ''7 With this as a basis the highest level
of reality is eventually derived as an "authentic reality," in which the "exter-
nal, anthithetical character of material objectivity is overcome in a process
through which the identity of subject and object is established as the rational,
conceptual structure that is common to both. ''s This form of philosophy is
labeled as idealist rationalism, for 'thought' as 'reason' has a primary status,
and only that which is in line with reason is considered truly real. Thus,
"all that contradicted reason or was not rational was posited as something
that had to be overcome.''9 This notion contains the concept of freedom as
well, for "such examination and judgment would be meaningless if man
were not free to act in accordance with his insight and to bring what con-
fronts him into accordance with reason. ''*'~
However, Marcuse believed that for Hegel this freedom is only "true of
the mind", and philosophy has its definite limit in the acceptance of the
present--whether good or bad. n An understanding of this 'freedom' might
be gained if we look at Marcuse's interpretation of Luther's conception of
freedom. Marcuse's discussion of Luther's concept in "A Study of Authority"
(1936) is quite similar to his interpretation of Hegel's conception :

9 freedom was assigned to the 'inner' sphere of the person, to the 'inner'
. .

man, and at the same time the 'outer' person was subjected to the system of
worldly powers; this system of earthly authorities was transcended through
private autonomy and r e a s o n . . . , 2
Marx was not satisfied with this type of freedom. He criticized Hegel and
argued that the societal conditions which sustain the 'alienated man' must
be overthrown. ~a This would bring about pure communism, in which the
individual is the "species being T M and in which the community is essential
to the freedom of the individual. .5 It is this heritage that is left for Marcuse

326
 ROLE OF HEDONISM IN MARCUSE'S EARLY THOUGHT

to challenge. There is one primary criticism, which results in an important

change in emphasis and in a new relationship between old concepts.
For Marx the primary, if not the only, mode of interpretation and ex-
planation of society was in the sphere of economics, with philosophy being
relegated to the superstructure. It is not exactly this way for critical theory.
Rather, "in its historical forms philosophy also contains insights into human
and objective conditions whose truth points beyond previous society and
thus cannot be completely reduced to it. ''1~ Because of this the economic
struggle cannot be effectively established as the so~e basis of explanation
and set apart from other social struggles. Rather, the "determining factors
are the given situation of the entire society, the interrelationships of the
various social strata, and the relations of political power. ''iv
Yet, Marcuse still claims that the theory of society is an economic, not a
philosophical system. Initially this seems to be contradictory to his criticism
of Marx, but to the contrary, it is directly related to this criticism. While
Marcuse is not entirely clear about his own position, I will attempt to
intrepret it so that it remains consistent with what he seems to claim.
Marx seems to believe that no alienation or social struggle will exist in the
state of pure communism, and further that it is then that 'real' philoso-
phizing can take place. Until that state is reached, all efforts should be put
into the practical task of bringing about the proletarian 'revolution'. In
this sense, the positions of both Marx and Marcuse are economic, for the
revolution is supposed to be a change in the economic structure.
Marcuse differs with Marx by arguing that a pure state of communism
(with no alienation) will never exist. In an earlier article, "The Concept of
Essence" (1936), he says that "the overcoming of need, and the satisfaction
of human wants will remain a struggle." is But, this does not mean that he
accepts the present alienation (as would idealist rationalism, in his interpre-
tation). Rather, he accepts the thesis that the primary form of alienation that
exists presently arises from the competitive economic structure, and that to
overcome that alienation, the economic structure must be changed. But, also,
it does not mean that philosophy is given up. It was probably philosophy
that led Marx and Marcuse to their conclusions, and through which they
demonstrated their concern with human needs (the need to overcome
alienation). Marcuse seems to be saying that all 'good' philosophy struggles
with human needs, and that any such philosophy is legitimate not only in
Marx's state of pure communism, but also now.

327
 MARK STOHS

The above interpretation seems to be consistent not only with most (if not
all of his work) but also with the article in which he argues far this
somewhat ambiguous position (for it is primarily a philosophical work). The
ambiguity arises because Marcuse seems to argue at times, like Marx, that
philosophy should only be used directly towards the 'revolution', that any
'abstract theorizing' is not justifiable. In one particular passage, this trend
seems to be evident :
There is no philosophy alongside and outside this [critical] theory. For the
philosophical construction of reason is replaced [my emphasis] by the
creation of a rational society. The philosophical ideals of a better world and
of true Being are incorporated [my emphasis] into the practical aim of
struggling mankind, where they take on a human form. 19
The trend which emphasizes the apparent ambiguity is evident when the
'replaced' is noticed, but the ambiguity is lessened when the 'incorporated'
is noticed.:z0 This is so because it seems to be true that some 'abstract
theorizing' is necessary in order to write what Marx and Marcuse wrote. This
means that because the present human relations are determined by economic
relations, critical theory must be primarily, but not solely concerned with
economics. It also means that philosophy, like economics, has a role in
critical theory, and that the primary concern of both disciplines should be
human needs.
In explaining the relationship of philosophy and economics to critical
theory, the emphasis that eventually emerges is on the possibility of a society
which-is determined by people, rather than by the labor process. This 'utopia'
would be brought about by an "unfolding and fulfillment of needs and
wants" of the people. =1 This would not mean that "the labor process is
regulated in accordance with a plan, but the interest determining the regula-
tion becomes important : it is rational only if this interest is that of freedom
and happiness of the masses. ' ' =
But here several problems become evident. As explained so far, the theory
presented is quite consistent with what many portray utilitarianism as pro-
posing. One major criticism of such a portrayal is that it does not sufficiently
define the wants and needs of the people it takes into account in its theory.
'Critical theory' seems open to a similar criticism. This is so, espedally if it
is concerned only with the 'masses'. The upper five percent and the lower
ten percent are probably not counted along with the masses, yet any theory
which discounts their wants and needs should be viewed with suspicion. But
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 ROLE OF HEDONISM IN MARCUSE'S EARLY T H O U G H T

Marcuse is quite aware of such criticism. However, this awareness is evident

only in the next article, "On Hedonism."

II. On Hedonism

The previous section began with a partial explanation of the concepts of

reason and freedom in their historical context. It conduded with the con-
junction of freedom and happiness as confining the reasonable wants and
needs of the people. But the concepts of want, need, and happiness, which
are all closely related, were left insufficiently defined. In "On Hedonism"
Marcuse attempts to define and confine these concepts in their historical and
normative context. Marcuse derives the definitio.ns of 'want' and 'need'
from a developed definition of 'happiness'.
After a few introductory paragraphs Marcuse notes the link between
hedonism and critical theory :

In the principle of hedonism, in an abstract and undeveloped form, the

demand for the freedom of the individual is extended into the realm of the
material conditions of life. Insofar as the materialistic protest of hedonism
preserves an otherwise proscribed element of human liberation, it is linked
with the interest of critical theory. 2a
This prindple has taken different historical forms, that have different con-
tents. The two 'common' forms of hedonism that Marcnse examines are the
Cyrenaic and the Epicurean, which will be examined in order. What links
these two forms is their insistence upon the identification of the highest
good with pleasure, and upon the relationship of pleasure and happiness.
They differ in the determination of what counts as pleasure.
For the Cyrenaics', the

9 .fulfillment of specific instincts and wants of the individual is associated

.

with the feeling of pleasure. Happiness consists in having these individual

pleasures as often as possible.'2'4
Thus, experience is limited to immediate first-order sensations, in which
reflection has no place. This is a rejection of the internalization of happiness;
against the stoic's denial of the world, and against the sage's serenity in this
world. But, because "the world is to become an object of possible enjoyment
just as it is," it is an acceptance of the world as it is. One further differentia-
tion, is that

329
 MARK STOHS

What the individual instincts and wants may be makes no difference; their
moral evaluation is not based upon their "nature". They are a matter of
custom, of social convention. 25

Marcuse then shows in depth the relationship between this form of

hedonism, and the present form of society. 2s The basic relationship is that
Cyrenaic hedonism reflects the true structure o.f present society. In the
present society, which is controlled by competition in production, %11 human
relationships transcending immediate encounter are not relations of happi-
ness." 2r There are two closely related reasons' for this.
The first is that the labor process depersonalizes individuals, and thus
prevents the realization of personality. The other is concerned directly with
the 'realization of personality'. Such realization would result in the highest
pleasure. This would bring about interpersonal relationships in which 'love,
friendship, and companionship' would grow, and "in which individuals are
in the relation of 'persons' to one another." 2s But such relationships require
more than immediacy, they require knowledge and understanding of the
side of people. The other persons image would include "ugliness, injustice,
inconstancy, decay, and ephemerality.''29 Initially we can understand how
such relationships bring about unhappiness. But Marcuse goes one step
further and links himself directly with his later works, and with Freud.
Marcuse forms this link by saying that these vicious properties of people
are not subjective or individual properties that could be overcome by 'under-
standing concern', rather, they are

9 . . effects of the intervention of social necessities into the personal sphere.

These necessities actually constitute the instincts, wants, and interests of the
person in this society,a'~

The link with Freud and with his later writings now begins to become clear.
While the emphasis in this article is upon happiness, this particular passage
has another level of interpretation. He says that some social necessities
constitute the instincts, **,ants and interests of people in society. Thus, in-
stincts are not just individually given, but at least in part socially determined.
For Freud, change in the instinctual structure of individuals is an element
of the process of the development Of civilization. In discussing this process,
Freud says that

We may characterize this process with reference to the changes which it

330
 ROLE OF HEDONISM IN MARCUSE'S EARLY THOUGHT

brings about in the familiar instinctual dispositions of human beings, to

satisfy which is, after all, the economic task of our lives, al
For Marcuse, this is the beginning o,f his "Inquiry into Freud" - - it is the
starting point of Eros and Civilization. There he discusses the instincts, and
says that their

9 .original "location" in the organism and their basic direction remain the
.

same, but their objective and their manifestations are subject to change. All
psychoanalytic concepts (sublimation, identification, projection, repression,
introjection) connote the mutability of the instincts. But the reality which
shapes the instincts as well as their needs and satisfaction is a socio-historical
world, a2
This connection between Freud and Marcuse is perhaps the most essential
conceptual similarity between the two. At the same time it is most important
to an understanding of Marcuse. Yet, while this is the point at which they
are similar, it is also the basis from which each constructs different theories.
This difference was developed from one element in understanding how
increased knowledge of people brings about unhappiness. There is, however,
a further element involved in this process.
The individual who gains any of the 'uncompromising knowledge' of
others discovers that it leads to unhappiness9 But this unhappiness is no~
just the unhappiness that is a result of knowing the vicious side of people.
The other element arises from the social nature of these vicious instincts.
One way in which society forces certain instinctual changes is by repressing
these vicious instincts. The individual may not accept this, but may want
to follow these instincts. In following his vicious instincts, "the individual
wants to release himself from a situation whose social law he has hitherto
obeyed, whether marriage, occupation, or any other obligation in which he
has accepted morality." aa
The crucial determinant in this other element of the resulting unhappiness
is the social order. The way in which it affects the instincts, determines
the way in which the individual can satisfy these very instincts. With this
in mind, Marcuse can state :

In an order of unfreedom, however, passion (the vicious instincts) is deeply

disorderly and hence immoral. When not diverted toward desired goals, it
leads to unhappiness, a*
Thus we see how unhappiness results from the attempt to realize personality

331
 MARK STOHS

through becoming personally involved with others. While Marcuse does

not make the distinction clear here, we have made the distinction between
two elements of his unhappiness. The one element is quite standard, and
would seem to exist necessarily in any society. It is the human element of
drama and risk in any interpersonal human relationship. The other element
is a direct result of the given social order. Since, in an order of unfreedom
this second element is present, Marcuse argues that in an order of freedom,
happiness, rather than unhappiness would prevail.
So, knowledge in an unfree society leads to unhappiness and to the possible
expectation of happiness. But this happiness could be gained only by
confronting and supposedly changing the social order. It is either this, or the
acceptance of the social restrictions, e.g., "renunciation" of the individual
instincts. So

Knowledge does not help him attain happiness, yet without it he reverts to
reified relationships. This is an inescapable dilemma. Enjoyment and truth,
happiness and the essential relations of individuals are disjunctions, a~
A consistent Cyrenaic form of hedonism does not result in this dilemma. It
rather conceals it by restricting experience to immediate sensation - - which
is an exclusion of knowledge. Because of this it preserves the possibility of
happiness through pleasure by preserving the notion of individual wants
and needs in a society which suppresses such notions. The problem with this
is that the wants and needs of the individuals who are committed to this
form of hedonism are largely the wants and needs as determined by that very
society. This results in a perpetuation of the society in which immediate
sensation is suppressed and oftentimes not even possible.
This problem becomes more exacting on the abstract theoretical level. The
abstract problem is that this hedonism contains a subjective conception of
happiness.
This conception is unable to

. . . distinguish between true and false wants and interests and between true
and false enjoyment. It accepts the wants and interests of individuals as
simply given and as valuable in themselves, a6
Marcuse then says that any attempt at a reformulation of this hedonism
will lead to new contradictions, and that Epicurean hedonism is one of these
attempts. The Epicurean form of hedonism introduces reason in order to
regulate the limits of pleasure. According to Marcuse the archetype of this

332
 ROLE OF H E D O N I S M IN MARCUSE'S EARLY T H O U G H T

hedonism is the sage, "whose reason and whose pleasure never go too far." a7
The conjunction of pleasure and reason is an important difference from
Cyrenaic hedonism9 In the first form anything beyond immediate sensation
is not pleasure9 In the second form, reason may stipulate that immediate
sensation is not always pleasurable. Also, through the use of reason, an
individual conforming to the Epicurean form of hedonism may discover that
knowledge leads to the dilemma that was not accessable to the Cyrenaic.
This is why the sage becomes the archtype of Epicurean hedonism9 The sage
knows that knowledge in the present form of society leads to unhappiness,
and that pleasure through immediate sensation is limited. Therefore he
limits himself to the tranquility of moderation.
In limiting himself the sage gives up his claim to happiness and to reason.
He gives up certain forms of pleasure, which may actually be 'true' forms of
happiness, because they are not reasonable in the society in which he lives.
He gives up his claim to ;easo,n because he does not reason out the implica-
tions of the inaccessability of certain forms of pleasure in society, and
because he does not determine the 'true' forms of happiness.
However, because happiness remains his primary regulating principle, what
he primarily results in giving up or limiting is reason and thus truth. Marcuse
notes that the sage's reason would

9 . . be so limited from the start that it would only be occupied with the
calculation of risks and with the psychic technique of extracting the best
from everything. Such reason has abdicated its claim to truth. It appears
only as subjective cunning and private expertise, calmly acquiescing in the
persistence of general unreason . . .as
The hedonism of the sage, like that of the Cyrenaic, gives up the claim to
full troth. But, the reason that Marcuse studied these forms of hedonism is
that they did contain an element of truth. And, this element of truth is
the claim of hedonism, which is the persistent claim for happiness. Further,
"The truth of hedonism would be its abolition by and preservation in a new
principle of social organization, not in a different philosophical principle." a,,

III. Critical Theory and Hedonism

That happiness and truth are directly related to society is derived from the
examination of the historical forms of Hedonism. This is then assumed by
critical theory in the notion that "from the discrepancy between what as

333
 MARK STOHS

objects of possible enjoyment and the way in which these objects are
understood, taken, and used arises the question of the truth of the condition
of happiness in this society. ''41 This would mean that any formulation of
the notions of truth and happiness involves a Critique and judgment of
society.
In this section Marcuse's critique of society will be examined, and the
corresponding notions of truth and happiness will be explained. In the
process we will note that the concept of freedom from "Critical Theory and
Philosophy" has an essential relation to the concept of happiness from
"On Hedonism." This is so because it is argued that one is not truly happy,
unless free. But, as was noted in "On Hedonism," since happiness is basically
the satisfying of wants and needs, even before we can begin to talk about
happiness, we must determine what 'true wants and needs' are. And, wants
and needs are related to society. So, it is this relationship that will be
developed first.
For Marcuse, the underlying emphasis has been and still is on the
possibility of the development of a society in which people, and not the
labor process, determine their wants and needs. The wants and needs
determined in this way would then become "the regulating principle of the
labor process. ''~2 The reason that this is only a possibility is that in the
present society people are not free to determine their wants and needs. This
has an effect upon these very wants and needs. As Marcuse states :

. . . the wants of liberated men and the enjoyment of their satisfaction will
have a different form from wants and satisfaction in a state of unfreedom,
even if they are physiologically the same. In a social organization that
opposes atomized individuals to one another in classes and leaves their
particular freedom to the mechanism of an uncontrolled economic system,
unfreedom is already operative in the needs and wants themselves: how
much more so in enjoyment. 43
It is this that Marcuse attempts to demonstrate in the second part of "On
Hedonism." It should be noticed that while they are related, Marcuse
distinguishes between the wants and needs and the enjoyment derived from
the fulfillment of these wants and needs. He first examines 'enjoyment' in
the present society, and then looks at the status of wants and needs in the
present society.
Enjoyment, which Marcuse confines to being "an attitude or mode of
conduct toward things and human beings," is devalued in the present

334
 ROLE OF HEDONISM IN MARCUSE'S EARLY T H O U G H T

society. 44 The reason for this is that value in society is created only by
"abstract labor time," and "the individual expends no labor power, nor does
he reproduce labor power" in enjoyment, which means that "pleasure may
not be a value." 45
This devaluation of enjoyment has further implications. If enjoyment were
not devalued, the labor process would be diverted, and perhaps destroyed.
This is so because "any growth of enjoyment would endanger necessary
discipline and make difficult the punctual and reliable coordination of the
masses who keep the apparatus of the whole in operation." 4~ Thus, society
supplements this devaluation by "the police and the administration of
justice" and by "the penal code," and in doing so, prevents enjoyment from
becoming a part of the full human personality. 4~
However, there is some enjoyment in the present society, and it must
receive its value from something other than the immediate labor process.
This is accomplished through the conviction in society that one must work
in order to have any enjoyment at all. Thus, for the "immediate producer"
enjoyment becomes a tool for the labor process, for "leisure time" is only
thought of as serving to make labor time more efficient. For the "usu-
fructuaries of the labor process," the leisure time expended becomes almost
% burden or duty," since enjoyment has no value in society. 4s Thus, a
"social guilt feeling" is created, from which one feels the compulsion to
work for enjoyment. In this way, the social value of enjoyment is proven,
and "refined to the level of culture. ''49
It is at this point that 'enjoyment' is linked to the wants and needs of
society. It is also here that a further connection between Marcuse and Freud
can be clearly seen. Marc-use begins this link by noting that the actual goal
of labor is not happiness, but profit or wages. This means that for the
labor process to continue, and perpetuate itself

. . those instincts and wants which could undermine the normal relation
.

of labor and enjoyment (as the extent of the absence of labor and the
institutions that secure it (such as the family or marriage) must be diverted
or repressed. This diversion and repression is not always linked to cultural
progress. Many instincts and wants first become false and destructive due
to the false forms into which their satisfaction is channded . . .50
Before the falsifications of instincts, wants, and needs is discussed, the
connection between Marcuse and Freud, which was first noted in the section
"On Hedonism" should be elucidated. In the above passage Marcuse states

335
 MARK STOHS

that society must repress or divert the instincts. In discussing the development
of civilization, Freud states that "it is impossible to overlook the extent to
which civilization is built up upon a renunciation of instinct, how much it
presupposses precisely the non-satisfaction (by suppression, repression or
some other means ?) of powerful instincts." al
When Marcuse says that repression is not always linked to cultural
progress he seems already to be arguing (either implidtly or explicitly)
against Freud's thesis that repression is necessary to civilization. This is so
9 because Marcuse develops the notion that "the attained level of objective
development" of society would permit the true gratification of instincts
and wants. 5:2This points to a further distinction between Freud and Marcuse,
that becomes clear when Marcuse discusses the false wants and needs in
society.
The basic reason for calling wants and needs 'false' is that they "make
men less free, blinder, and more wretched than they have to be. They are
the drives and needs of individuals who were raised in an antagonistic
society." 5a Because of this close connection to society, happiness, which is
the satisfaction of these wants and needs, "can no longer or in any way be
merely subjective: it enters the realm of men's communal thought and
action. T M This is a crucial notion that eventually distinguishes Marcuse's
concept of happiness from that of the hedonists. But before that can be
shown, there is another important matter.
First, we should realize that the happiness that is derived from the
satisfaction of false wants and needs is false happiness. Further the possi-
bility os 'true, objective' happiness is derived from the notion that men do
not have to be wretched, and that they can be free. But there is even a more
essential relation between these various definitions and possibilities. Marcuse
clarifies this relationship by stating :

Only in view of the historical possibility of general freedom is it meaningful

to designate an untrue even actual, really perceived happiness in the previous
and present conditions of existence . . . Only today, at the highest stage of
development of the established order, when the objective forces making for
a higher order of humanity have become mature, and only in connection
with the theory and practice linked to such a transformation, may the critique
of the totality of the established order also take as its object the happiness
that this order provides. 55
Thus, not only the notion of false wants and needs, but also the possibility

336
 ROLE OF H E D O N I S M IN MARCUSE'S EARLY T H O U G H T

of their destruction and the corresponding development of true wants and

needs, are closely tied to society in its historical context. ~6 And, with the
destruction of these false wants and needs, a new social order will emerge.
The way in which these wants and needs are changed becomes a perplexing
problem for Marcuse. In "On Hedonism" he argues that this change must
come about "through an economic and political process, ''57 while in his
latest work, Councerrevolution and Revolt (1972), he argues that "the
individual emancipation of the senses is supposed to be the beginning, even
the foundation, of universal l i b e r a t i o n . . . " ss
But, Marcuse's image of a free society seems to remain the same
throughout. His primary emphasis is that wants and needs that are based
upon "the social compulsion of repression, on injustice, and on filth and
poverty would necessarily disappear. ''59 With this emphasis he further
demonstrates the distinction between himself and Freud, by accepting only
part of Freud's thesis that repression is necessary for civilization. This part,
only briefly mentioned in "On Hedonism" later becomes one of the central
elements of Eros and Civilization. In "On Hedonism" he states :

The realm of necessity persists; struggle with nature and even among men
continues. Thus the reproduction of the whole will continue to be associated
with privations for the individual. ~~
In Eros and Civilization this realm is preserved in the definition of
'surplus-repression' which is :

9 . . the restrictions necessitated by social domination. This is distinguished

from (basic) repression : the "modifications" of the instincts necessary for
the perpetuation of the human race in civilization. ~1
With this explained, we can see how Marcuse relates the concept of truth
to that of freedom and of happiness9 The truth of the present is linked to
that of the past and of the future. The present false wants and needs, and
happiness are only false because a society in which men can be free is
possible9 When this society changes, the corresponding concepts will also
change9 The internalized freedom that was discussed in the section on
"Philosophy and Critical Theory" will become freedom that is materialized.
The concept of truth that was preserved in philosophy will also become
'materialized'. And, the happiness of the hedonist will change. Just how
this happiness will change is definitely not clear to Marcuse. However, he
does offer a possibility.

337
 MARK STOHS

The happiness of the hedonist was basically limited to immediate sen-

sation. But, in applying the criteria of truth to this happiness, it changes.
Marcuse conjectures :

The essential role of truth for the happiness of individuals makes the charac-
terization of happiness as pleasure and enjoyment appear insufficient. When
knowledge of truth is no longer linked to knowledge of guilt, poverty, and
injustice, it is no longer forced to remain external to a happiness ceded to
immediate, sensual relationships. Even the most personal human relations
can be opened to happiness in a really guiltless knowledge. ~2
Thus we see that "hedonism is both abolished and preserved in critical
theory and practice.T M

CONCLUSION

In the introduction it was noted that largely because of Marcuse's similarity

with Freud, he is at times accused of developing a reductionist theory. While
this criticism was not dealt with explicitly in the paper, it should be noticed
that the way in which he relates 'truth', 'freedom', and 'happiness' should be
a beginning to dispelling such criticism. If we take into account the possible
expansion of the concept of happiness in a 'really guiltless knowledge', we
can further understand that Marcuse's intention was more than just reducing
the explanation of society to a single sphere.
Later, in Eros and Civilization when the primary struggle becomes that
between Eros and Thanatos, we should remember the complex meanings of
both Eros and Thanatos. Eros is the love for life, and thus includes all the
complexities of explaining what is involved in life. Thanatos is the drive
for death, and thus includes much, if not most, of the difficulties of under-
standing the unknown. When Marcuse argues that both of these primary
instincts have a common origin in the Nirvana principle, we might again
claim that he is a reductionist. But then we should recognize the essential
similarity between the Nirvana principle and happiness, and remember how
the concept of happiness was developed and related to other concepts in
"On Hedonism."
This paper was not intended to be a conclusive argument on this point
(for such an argument would have to be mor e explicit and developed), tt is
meant to draw attention to the importance of these early articles in the
development of Marcuse's thought and to argue that these articles should
338
 ROLE OF H E D O N I S M IN MARCUSE'S EARLY T H O U G H T

be taken into account in an appraisal of Marcuse's Eros and Civilization

especially when he is accused of being a reductionist.
Finally, we should notice the importance of Marcuse's emphasis in "On
Hedonism" on false wants and needs. This notion serves a dual purpose.
First, with the critique of these false wants and needs, he implicitly argues
against utilitarianism as it was portrayed at the end of the first section of
this paper. Secondly, this notion becomes important in his later works.
While it is an important underlying theme in Eros and Civilization, it is one
of the starting points of One Dimensional Man. The consistency of his
thought is shown in One Dimensional Man when he argues that false needs
are "those which are superimposed upon the individual by particular interests
in his repression: the needs which perpetuate toil, aggressiveness, misery
and injustice. T M

NOTES
1 Robinson, Paul, The Freudian Left, p. ~5o. H e r e he says : " M a r c u s e came to Freud rather
late in life; before x955 his w o r k w a s largely in tradition of H e g e l i a n philosophy and
M a r x i a n social c r i t i c i s m . "
2 Eros and Civilization will not be e x a m i n e d presently. Rather, it will be used only w h e n
certain themes that are developed there can be traced to w o r k s that will be examined.
a Marcuse, Negations, " P h i l o s o p h y and Critical T h e o r y " - pp. ~34-~58.
" O n H e d o n i s m " - pp. ~59-20o.
4 Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 3x.
5 Negations, p. 282 (footnote // x8 f r o m " O n H e d o n i s m " ) .
a " P h i l o s o p h y a n d Critical T h e o r y " , p. :t35.
Ibid., p. x55.
8 Ibid., p. x36.
0 Ibid., p. x36.
10 Ibid., p. :~36.
zl Ibid., p. ~36.
12 M a r c u s e , Studies in Critical Philosophy, p. 56. Later in this s a m e article, he h a s a section
on Hegel. There on p a g e ~o2, he s a y s : " T h e will which revolts a g a i n s t reality and is
tensed a g a i n s t existence is not yet absolutely free : it is still confronted w i t h s o m e t h i n g not
yet overcome, s o m e t h i n g external; it is not yet "with itself'. The truly free will is related
to ' n o t h i n g except itself'; a n d is t h u s released f r o m a n y 'tie of dependence on a n y t h i n g e l s e ' . "
18 M a r x , Writings of the Young Marx, Easton and Guddat, eds., p. 257-258.
14 Ibid., p. 24i.
15 Ibid., p. 457-38.
la " P h i l o s o p h y and Critical T h e o r y " , p. x42.
17 Ibid., p. ~57-
I8 Marcuse, Negations, " T h e Concept of E s s e n c e " , p. 87-
~0 " P h i l o s o p h y and Critical T h e o r y " , p. 14a.
20 For w h a t seems to be another point of v i e w in relation to this issue see Jerry C o h e n ' s
" C r i t i c a l T h e o r y : The Philosophy of M a r c u s e " , New Left Review, 57, Sept.-Oct., x969.
2~ Ibid., p. ~55.

339
 MARK STOHS

z2 Ibid., p. 144.
23 " O n H e d o n i s m " , p. I62.
24 Ibid., p. 16a.
2s Ibid., p. "t62.
26 The particular p a r a g r a p h in which M a r c u s e b e g i n s this c o m p a r i s o n can serve to illustrate
one of the difficulties in r e a d i n g his texts. H e h a d just finished d i s c u s s i n g the Cyrenaic
f o r m of H e d o n i s m , a n d h a d m e n t i o n e d that " t h e world is to become an object of possible
e n j o y m e n t just as it i s . " H e then b e g i n s his next p a r a g r a p h by s a y i n g : " I n this f o r m of
society, the world as it is can become a n object of e n j o y m e n t only w h e n e v e r y t h i n g in it,
m e n and things, is accepted as it a p p e a r s . " T h e difficulty is in d e t e r m i n i n g w h a t he m e a n s
by "this s o c i e t y . " It s e e m s n a t u r a l that h e m e a n s a society that is regulated by the Cyrenaic
f o r m of h e d o n i s m . It only becomes clear w h a t he m e a n s here u p o n several r e a d i n g s - - a n d
interpretation of intention. W h a t he does m e a n b y "this s o c i e t y , " is the present f o r m of
s o c i e t y - - t h e one controlled b y competition i n production. Realizing this is crucial to a n
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of his interpretation of h e d o n i s m and of p r e s e n t society. For f u r t h e r discussion
about the difficulty of r e a d i n g M a r c u s e ' s w o r k s s e e : Ma*~ks, Robert W . , The Meaning of
Marcuse, pp. 3-8.
2"/ " O n H e d o n i s m " , p . . i 6 4 .
~8 Ibid., p. 165.
29 Ibid., p. 165.
3,0 Ibid., p. I66.
31 Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, p. 43.
3~ M a r c u s e , Eros and Civilization, p. I2.
33 " O n H e d o n i s m " , p. z64.
84 Ibld., p. 166.
~5 Ibid., p. I66.
36 Ibid., p. I68.
,37 Ibid., p. I72.
38 Ibid., p. I72.
3o Ibld., p. 274.
4~0 T h i s section will r e m a i n limited to a d i s c u s s i o n of " P h i l o s o p h y and Critical T h e o r y ' "
and " O n H e d o n i s m . "
41 " O n H e d o n i s m " , p. I83.
42 Ibld., p. 182.
43 Ibid., p. 282-83.
44 Ibid., p. 183.
45 Ib{d., p. 185.
4~ Ibid., p. 284.
4~ Ibid., p. 284-285.
48 Ibid., p. I88.
49 Ibid., p. 288.
5o Ibld., p. 289.
51. Civilization and Its Discontents, p. 44.
52 " O n H e d o n i s m , " p. 189.
63 I b i S , p. 19o.
54 Ibfd., p. 29o.
55 Ibld., p. I9I.
56 This connection with the historical context gives M a r c u s e ' s theory a paradoxical aspect,
due to the n a t u r e of the difficulty of j u d g i n g the past, present, and future. W h i l e this aspect
can b y no m e a n s be developed presently, it should be noted t h a t this is the source of m u c h
of the m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g that can come about w h e n trying to a s s e s s M a r c u s e ' s position.
It is also one of the m a i n concerns of One Dimensional Man.
57 " O n H e d o n i s m " , p. 29~-
58 M a r c u s e , Counterrevolution and Revolt, p. 72.

340
 R O L E OF H E D O N I S M IN MARCUSE'S EARLY THOUGHT

59 " O n H e d o n i s m , " p. I9~.

6,0 Ibid., p. I9~.
61 Eros and Civilization, p. ~5.
62 " O n H e d o n i s m , " p. I98.
6~ Ibid., p. :~99-
64 Marcuse, One D'imensional Man, p. 5.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Cohen, Jerry, "Critical Theory: The Philosophy of M a r c u s e " New Left Review, 57, Sept-
Oct, I969.
Freud, Sigmund, Civilization and Its Discontents, W.W. Norton Co~., New York, :~96I (I93o).
Marcuse, Herbert, Counterrevolution and Revolt, Beacon Press, Boston, I972.
--, Eros and Civilization, Beacon Press, Boston, 1955.
--, Negations~ Beacon Press, Boston, I965.
--, One-Dimenslonal Man, Beacon Press, Boston, 1964.
--, Studies in Critical Philosophy, Beacon Press, Boston, 1973.
Marks, Robert W., The Meaning of Marcuse, Ballatine Books, N.Y., 197o.
Marx, Karl; Easton, Loyd D. and Guddat, Knrt I-L, editors, Writings of the Young on
Philosophy and Society, Doubleday and Company, New York, ~967.
Robinson, Paul A,, The Freudian Left, Harper and Row, New York, 1969.

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