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Determinants of Government Effectiveness

Article in International Journal of Public Administration · July 2013


DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2013.772630

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International Journal of Public Administration, 36: 567–577, 2013
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0190-0692 print / 1532-4265 online
DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2013.772630

Determinants of Government Effectiveness


Isabel Maria Garcia-Sanchez and Beatriz Cuadrado-Ballesteros
Administration and Business, University of Salamanca, Salamanca, Spain

Jose Frias-Aceituno
Financial Economics and Accounting, University of Granada, Granada, Spain

The direct relationship between government effectiveness and the population’s well-being has
generated a growing interest about the explanatory factors of governance quality. Thus, the aim
of this study is to determine the determinants of government effectiveness, in relation to the
organizational environment and political and internal characteristics of public administrations.
For this, we used a sample composed by 202 countries observed between 2002 and 2008.
A World Bank governance indicator represents the government effectiveness. We estimated
a panel data dependence model by the Generalized Method of Moments estimator to avoid
heterogeneity and endogeneity problems. Furthermore, a CHAID algorithm provides a classi-
fication of governance quality according to the predicted determinants.
The results show that government effectiveness is initially explained by the organizational
environment, related to economic development and educational status. Later, and according
to countries’ income distribution, political constrains and some organizational characteristics,
such as gender diversity and government size, may improve governance quality.

Keywords: government effectiveness, political factors, gender diversity

INTRODUCTION public sector (Huther & Shah, 1998). Several studies show
that improved governance leads to better development out-
Governance is a multi-faceted concept encompassing all comes such as, among other variables, economic growth,
aspects of the exercise of authority through formal and public investment, foreign direct investment, and social
informal institutions in the management of the resource infrastructure (Gupta et al., 1998; Mauro, 1998; Boswell &
endowment of a state (Huther & Shah, 1998). Its effective- Richardson, 2003; McKinney & Moore, 2008), as well as
ness refers to whether the public administration does well reducing infant mortality (Gupta et al., 1999; Kaufmann
what it is supposed to do, whether people in these entities et al., 1999, 2004), since countries with high levels of cor-
work hard and well, whether the actions and procedures of ruption invest more in housing and physical capital than
the public organizations and its members help achieve the in health and education (de la Croix & Delavallade, 2006;
objectives, and in the end, whether it actually achieves its Rajkumar & Swaroop, 2008).
mission (Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999). Some authors (e.g., Wolf, 1993, 1997; O’Toole & Meier,
More concretely, government effectiveness is oriented to 1999, 2003; Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999; Brewer & Selden,
more closely matching services with citizen preferences, 2000; Lynn et al., 2000; Provan & Brinton, 2001; Boyne,
and moving governments closer to the people they are 2003; Ingraham et al., 2003; Kim, 2004; Moynihan &
intended to serve, thus ensuring greater accountability of the Pandey, 2005) have proposed a variety of effectiveness
models, and at the conceptual level as well (Rothstein &
Teorell, 2008), but the number of studies that predict orga-
nizational effectiveness using sets of independent variables
Correspondence should be addressed to Isabel Maria Garcia-Sanchez,
is smaller (e.g., Campbell, 1977; Adserá et al., 2003;
Administration and Business, University of Salamanca, Campus Miguel de Bäck & Hademius, 2008; Lee & Whitford, 2009; Charron &
Unamuno, Edificio FES, Salamanca, 37007, Spain. E-mail: lajefa@usal.es Lapuente 2010).
568 GARCIA-SANCHEZ, CUADRADO-BALLESTEROS, AND FRIAS-ACEITUNO

These previous papers have proposed several possible The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
explanations for the differences in government effective- an approach to the explanatory factors of government effec-
ness across a variety of countries: geographic location, legal tiveness. Section 3 explains the methodological approach.
origin, economic development, the constitutional design Section 4 incorporates the empirical results and their discus-
(presidential versus parliamentary systems; federalism and sion. The final section highlights the main conclusions of the
electoral system), and the characteristics of the govern- research.
ment in power (electoral fraud and military regimes), among
others.
The results obtained in these studies are limited, since in DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNMENT
order to avoid endogeneity problems, some of the authors EFFECTIVENESS
used dummy variables to identify different status and sys-
tems, but all of them turned out to be highly correlated Previous studies that have sought to identify the explana-
to each other, that is, they tend to represent the countries tory factors of government effectiveness show that national
themselves. Moreover, they did not use panel data mod- income is its only determinant. However, these papers have
els that allow us to control for unobservable heterogeneity, not considered that public sector reform trajectories are
an important problem when the available information com- broadly determined as well by the features of the political-
prises several yearly measurements of the same countries. administrative regime (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2004).
In addition, these papers have not considered that public sec- The Public Choice theory proposed by Buchanan (1954)
tor reform trajectories are broadly determined as well by argues that politicians’ behavior is oriented to satisfy their
the features of the political-administrative regime (Pollitt & own interests and, eventually, to achieving governance qual-
Bouckaert, 2004). ity and social welfare. Nevertheless, Buchanan recognizes
Thus, the objective of this article is to determine the some limits to this political activity, since the goods and
explanatory factors of government effectiveness in order funds managed are public in nature; consequently, citizens—
to evidence how it is affected by the organizational envi- as owners of those resources—have legal mechanisms to
ronment, that is, the political and the internal characteris- monitor politicians’ decisions, such as contrary votes in
tics of public administration. In this sense, Public Choice future elections. Therefore, politicians will make decisions
theory develops a conceptual framework in which gov- based on the exchange relationships among many individu-
ernance, in addition to organizational characteristics, is als; starting from these relationships, politicians will attempt
a balance between collective citizen interests and politi- to satisfy the different and probably divergent citizens’ pref-
cal considerations, since political decisions affect voters erences with the purpose of obtaining favorable results for
and interest groups in return for, respectively, votes and them. On the other hand, political actions are determined
resources (i.e., money to finance electoral campaigns), which also by organizational characteristics that favor or discourage
increases the probability of politicians’ retaining their posi- certain behaviors or reforms.
tions (Bavetta & Padovano, 2000, p. 5). Taking into account these arguments, this article presents
In line with the latest research, we selected the entire gov- an exploratory theoretical framework for possible explana-
ernment of countries worldwide since previous studies have tions for the differences in government effectiveness. More
generally focused on a specific unit of the administration of concretely, this framework links organizational environment
a single country. Moreover, when the sphere is higher, they and internal and political characteristics. Figure 1 represents
only refer to a specific group of countries with similar levels these relationships.
of economic development.
In particular, our article assesses effectiveness by examin-
Organizational Environment
ing entire governments and comparing them across countries
using the World Bank dataset of Governance Indicators The organizational environment comprises the demand
for 2002–2008 to assess perceived effectiveness of gov- for government effectiveness (Brudney & Selden, 1995;
ernments across 202 countries. In order to avoid the cited Moon & Norris, 2005), strongly joined to citizens pressure.
limitations, the analysis model proposed is estimated using Traditionally, socioeconomic variables are used as surrogates
panel data models, specifically, the Generalized Method of for these factors, given that a higher economic and educa-
Moments (GMM) estimator. In addition, we estimated a tional status usually leads to greater public sector reforms
CHAID algorithm in order to identify different classifica- (Cheng, 1992, pp. 7–8).
tions of government effectiveness according to its predicted A well-educated and trained population will demand a
determinants. The results show that the organizational envi- higher volume of information from public administrations
ronment and political and organizational characteristics play (Tolbert et al., 2008). In relation to economic development
an important role in the process of improving government and, according to Lee and Whitford (2009), countries with
effectiveness; however, the role of these factors depends on unstable economies are unable to hire adequate staff and
the countries’ economic development. maintain quality government infrastructures, processes, and
DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS 569

ORGANIZATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT
Demand
• Economic development
• Educational status

ORGANIZATIONAL
CHARACTERISTICS
GOVERNMENT
Size EFFECTIVENESS
Diversity

POLITICAL
CHARACTERISTICS

FIGURE 1 Government effectiveness framework.

practices, and therefore these deficiencies become reasons enhances creativity and innovation inside the organization
for evaluators to grade some governments as having lower and will lead to more effective problem-solving, since a more
effectiveness. diverse board, for example, provides a wider variety of per-
spectives and, consequently, a higher number of alternatives
to evaluate (Rose, 2007; Welbourne et al., 2007).
Organization Characteristics
In general, the organizational characteristics are strongly Political Characteristics
joined to the complexity of public bodies. However, in line Politicians are the main actors in decision-making about the
with the private sector, it is necessary to consider other future evolution of the public administration. They are the
relevant and current aspects such as diversity. focus of attention because they determine institutional form
Size is considered to be the major variable in the pub- and organization, the financing of administrative activity,
lic sector reforms literature (Brudney & Selden, 1995). the rules governing the employment in administrations, the
It is presented as one of many organizational characteris- incentives, and so on.
tics because country size is related to the magnitude of its Traditionally, their effect could be observed by political
government’s level of resources and public services. Larger ideology, stability, and competition, but the representative-
countries have more and better trained staff, a larger budget ness that these factors have in developed countries and
and well-established departments (Moon & Norris, 2005). developing countries is not the same, and therefore they have
The positive impact of large size on public sector technical had limited success in empirical studies (Alesina et al., 1992;
or managerial innovations has been widely evidenced (e.g., Barro, 1997).
Smith & Taebel, 1985; Norris & Moon, 2005). The use of a political constraint index allows us to directly
However, nowadays, there is an important conviction that measure the feasibility of a change in policy given the struc-
diversity in regard to age, gender, and nationality could ben- ture of a nation’s political institutions-the number of veto
efit organizations by providing a greater understanding of points-and the preferences of the actors that inhabit them-the
their environmental demands (Carter et al., 2003). Of these, partisan alignment of various veto points and the heterogene-
gender presence is the most important diversity effect since ity or homogeneity of the preferences within each branch
women introduce their roles as women and mothers into their (Henisz & Zelner, 2010).
profession (Betz et al., 1989), present different ethical frames
and criteria from those habitually used by men in their judg-
ments, and have a positive impact on the work environment
METHOD
(Harris, 1989).
Gender diversity is a widely discussed topic from a social
Population and Sample
perspective, given its advantages and drawbacks and its
influence on the generation of organizational effectiveness In order to achieve our research goals and for the rea-
(Rodríguez-Dominguez et al., 2010). Women’s presence sons that we have presented in the Introduction section,
570 GARCIA-SANCHEZ, CUADRADO-BALLESTEROS, AND FRIAS-ACEITUNO

we selected most countries worldwide as our target popu- governance situation in the country, etc.). The Appendix
lation. The sample used refers to the 202 countries selected shows the concepts measured under GE.
by Kaufmann et al. (2008) in order to draw up the World Several authors argue that while this indicator is a very
Bank Governance Indicators. Although in recent years the useful first snapshot of experts’ perceptions of a country’s
countries available have increased to 208, 209, and 212, quality of governance, users often fail to take into account
we maintain the initial data in order to create a com- their limitations (Arndt, 2008; Andrews, 2010; Pollitt, 2011),
plete panel database. The information needed for the cre- such as
ation of the proposed variables was obtained from the
World Bank website (http://www.worldbank.org) and from
1. lack of transparency,
the POLCON Database (http://www-management.wharton.
2. absence of an underlying theory of good governance,
upenn.edu/henisz/).
3. hidden bias,
4. lack of comparability over time, and
5. lack of actionability.
Variables
Dependent Variable However, it is produced by powerful, expertly staffed
The good governance community has grown in the past organizations that have all been operating for some time.
decade, producing many indicators (Andrews, 2010) that Moreover, Kauffman et al. (2007) have refuted these criti-
spotlight structural characteristics of governments and asso- cisms as either conceptually incorrect or empirically unsub-
ciated outcomes considered important for development, such stantiated.
as the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) proposed Figure 2 represents the evolution of the mean of the
by Kaufmann et al. (2004, 2008). These indicators make government effectiveness indicator for the analyzed period,
the most suitable index to measure government effectiveness 2002 to 2008. It can be seen that the values of government
(La Porte, 2005). Among the several WBGI, government effectiveness are lowest in the first two years, whereas in
effectiveness indicators (GE) measure perceptions of the 2004 this indicator underwent an important increase. Since
quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and 2006, the opposite trend can be observed, although the
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the reduction in government effectiveness is smaller than the
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the increment identified in the previous years.
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.
This index reflects the effectiveness of the entire government
Independent variable
by drawing on data sources that reflect the perceptions of
a very diverse group of respondents through surveys (e.g., In relation to organizational environment, the variables
analysts, firms, agencies with first-hand knowledge of the selected are Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDPpc) to

FIGURE 2 Yearly Evolution of Government Effectiveness.


DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS 571

represent economic wealth and Adult Literacy (LITERACY)


to stand for educational status. GEit = β1 POLCONit + β2 WOMENit + β3 DENSITYit
(1)
Institutional characteristics are represented by DENSITY
+ β4 LITERACYit + β5 GDPpcit + ηi + υit
and WOMEN. The size of the public body and the overall
level of resources and the professionalization and special-
ization of the civil servants, in general, are measured by The equation proposed (1) is estimated using panel data
population. However, several studies have observed that the models, specifically, the Generalized Method of Moments
complexity of public management could be affected by pop- (GMM) estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
ulation density since the dispersion hinders the development More concretely, this research technique allows us to control
of physical services as well as e-government administration. for unobservable heterogeneity problems, as well as pos-
Gender diversity is measured by the proportion of seats held sible endogeneity between the dependent and independent
by women in national parliaments, expressed in percent- variables.
ages. The measure gender diversity in parliaments is used Unobservable heterogeneity problems refer to unobserv-
instead of women in public services because parliaments able differences between the countries that do not vary over
pass diverse laws relating to public management. time and directly affect the levels of government effective-
With respect to political characteristics, as mentioned ness of each country. The panel data model offers useful
above, we have considered the variable Political Constraint opportunities for taking these latent characteristics of coun-
Index (POLCON) in order to homogenize these factors tries’ governments into account by modeling it as an indi-
worldwide. vidual effect, ηi, which is then eliminated by taking first
Table 1 contains the description and the sources of the differences of the variables.
variables proposed for the analysis of the determinants of The problem of endogeneity arises when the factors or
government effectiveness. independent variables that are supposed to affect a partic-
ular outcome or dependent variable depend themselves on
that outcome. In this sense, Lee and Whitford (2009) have
Analysis Techniques observed that the economic development of a country has
a positive effect on government effectiveness, and previous
Dependence model
papers have shown that poor governance contributes to lower
In order to test the hypotheses proposed, a dependence model economic growth and adverse economic circumstances (e.g.,
was estimated. The equations used in this research can be Mauro, 1998). To avoid this problem, our model has been
expressed as follows: estimated using instruments. To be exact, we have used all

TABLE 1
Variables

Variable Definition

Government This variable encompasses certain issues such as the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the
Effectiveness competence of civil servants, the independence of the Civil Service from political pressures and the credibility of the
(GE) government’s commitment to policies.
Source: World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2008).
POLCON Political constraints, as employed in this paper, estimates the feasibility of policy change using the following methodology.
First, extracting data from political science databases, it identifies the number of independent branches of government
(executive, lower and upper legislative chambers) with veto power over policy change. The preferences of each of these
branches and the status quo policy are then assumed to be independently and identically drawn from a uniform,
unidimensional policy space. This assumption allows for the derivation of a quantitative measure of institutional hazards
using a simple spatial model of political interaction.
This initial measure is then modified to take into account the extent of alignment across branches of government using data
on the party composition of the executive and legislative branches. Such alignment increases the feasibility of policy
change. The measure is then further modified to capture the extent of preference heterogeneity within each legislative
branch which increases (decreases) decision costs of overturning policy for aligned (opposed) executive branches.
The main results of the calculations detailed in Henisz (2002).
Source: POLCON Database
WOMEN Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments.
Source: World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2008).
DENSITY Government size: Population density measured by people per square kilometer.
Source: World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2008).
LITERACY Literacy rate of total number of adults.
Source: World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2008).
GDPpc Gross Domestic Product per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity (US$).
Source: World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 2008).
572 GARCIA-SANCHEZ, CUADRADO-BALLESTEROS, AND FRIAS-ACEITUNO

the right-hand-side variables in the models lagged from t-1 to differences are the result of Table 3 reflecting the mean of GE
t-3 as instruments for the equations in differences. for all of the 202 countries in each year, while Figure 1 first
determines the evolution of each country during the period
2002–2008 and, then, the mean of this evolution.
CHAID algorithm
The correlation between the proposed variables is pre-
CHAID modeling is an exploratory data analysis method sented in Table 4. In this respect, it can be observed that
used to study the relationships between a dependent measure all the independent variables show a strong positive cor-
and a large series of possible predictor variables with which relation with government effectiveness. Ordered according
it may interact. For quantitative variables, the case of this to their Pearson’s correlation coefficients, the most sig-
article, analysis of variance methods are used where inter- nificant relations would exist with the variables GDPpc
vals are determined optimally for the independent variables (0.683), POLCON (0.490), and LITERACY (0.475). As for
so as to maximize the ability to explain a dependent measure the relations between the independent variables, the GDPpc
in terms of variance components. variable is the one showing the highest correlations with
the rest of the variables, although the coefficients are
not high.
ANALYSIS RESULTS

Descriptive Approach Dependence Model


Table 2 provides a synthesis of the descriptive statistics for Table 5 presents a synthesis of the results of the panel data
each of the variables proposed for the analysis, reflecting the model (1), proposed in section 3.3, to find the determinants
maximum and minimum values, their mean, and the standard of government effectiveness. All of the proposed variables
deviation. are relevant from the statistical point of view at different
In Table 3, the univariate descriptive statistics related to confidence levels.
the sample mean is identified for each of the time peri- In relation to organizational environment, the variables
ods analyzed. The mean of the variable GE show values GDPpc and LITERACY have a positive effect for a con-
very similar between years; however, Figure 2 allows us fidence level of 90 percent (0.05 < p-value < 0.1) and
to observe significant variances for the same periods. The 99 percent (p-value < 0.01), respectively. Both impacts

TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics (whole sample)

Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation

GE 0.00 100.00 49.8105 29.15150


GDPpc 80.94293 77880.32418 7531.8509274 11834.34752406
LITERACY 21.82292 99.80000 81.3242785 19.45231101
DENSITY 1.57798 18658.79433 370.2256447 1769.45633972
WOMEN 0.00000 56.30000 14.9926834 9.90028423
POLCON 0.00 0.73 0.2762 0.21314

Note: Dependent variable GE (government effectiveness); Independent variables Organizational envi-


ronment GDPpc (economic development); LITERACY (educational status) Organizational characteristics
DENSITY (government size); WOMEN (gender diversity) Political characteristics POLCON (political con-
straint index).

TABLE 3
Mean Statistic by Year

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

GE 49.21 49.24 50.09 50.11 50.02 50.02 49.93


POLCON 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.26
WOMEN 12.96331 13.77273 13.98864 15.32000 15.67624 16.14624 16.84153
GDPpc 359.33455 360.71836 365.49599 370.30487 372.49771 378.26635 384.56272
LITERACY 78.37770 58.14118 79.17057 75.36962 80.88475 89.01590 83.84874
DENSITY 6951.69134 7126.76223 7458.37212 7730.54805 8096.60300 8268.64129 7077.25562

Note: Dependent variable GE (government effectiveness); Independent variables Organizational environment GDPpc (economic development);
LITERACY (educational status) Organizational characteristics DENSITY (government size); WOMEN (gender diversity) Political characteristics POLCON
(political constraint index).
DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS 573
TABLE 4
with highly concentrated populations in specific areas show
Bivariate Correlations
lower governance quality.
GE POLCON WOMEN GPpc LITERACY DENSITY POLCON, the variable representing political characteris-
tics, has an inverse relationship with the dependent variable
GE
POLCON 0.490∗
for a confidence level of 99 percent. Thus, lower values of
WOMEN 0.328∗ 0.220∗∗ this variable indicate that the executive has total political dis-
GDPpc 0.683∗ 0.289∗∗ 0.336∗ cretion and could change existing policies at any point of
LITERACY 0.475∗ −0.020 0.089 0.405∗ time, while higher values of this factor indicate that a change
DENSITY 0.147 −0.119 0.049 0.205∗∗ 0.069 in existing policies is politically unfeasible.
∗ p-value < 0.01 ∗∗ p-value < 0.05. In order to clearly show the effect of all of the previous
Note: Dependent variable GE (government effectiveness); factors on government effectiveness, a CHAID has been esti-
Independent variables Organizational environment GDPpc (eco- mated. This methodology allows us to obtain a classification
nomic development); LITERACY (educational status) Organizational model of government effectiveness according to the values
characteristics DENSITY (government size); WOMEN (gender diversity)
Political characteristics POLCON (political constraint index).
of the proposed independent variables.

TABLE 5 CHAID Results


GMM Estimations for Government Effectiveness
Figure 3 reflects the effect of the variables proposed on
Coefficient Std. Err. t p-value
government effectiveness according with the results of the
GDPpc 0.003756∗∗∗ 0.0019438 1.93 0.085 CHAID algorithm. Since this algorithm generates segment
LITERACY 0.8237765∗ 0.131283 6.27 0.000 for quantity variables, it permits correction of the high
DENSITY −0.7612781∗ 0.2076942 −3.67 0.005 standard deviation that numerical variables present.
WOMEN 0.1277172∗∗ 0.0575252 2.22 0.054
Economic development is the first determinant of country
POLCON −3.133707∗ 9.510328 −3.30 0.009
z1 78.46(5) groups according to government effectiveness. This variable
m1 −0.63 allows us to observe three clusters:
m2 −0.95
Hansen 6.78(10) 1. countries with a gross domestic product per capita
Notes:
equal to or less than 3806.78517 US$,
1. Heteroscedasticity consistent asymptotic standard error in 2. those with an income level higher than this quantity
parentheses. and under or equal to 25034.92856 US$ and
2. ∗ , ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 3. those with an economic level higher than the latter
10 percent level, respectively. amount.
3. z1 is a Wald test of the joint significance of the reported coefficients,
asymptotically distributed as χ 2 under the null of no relationship, degrees
of freedom in parentheses. The level of government effectiveness of the first group
4. mi is a serial correlation test of order i using residuals in first dif- (GDPpc ≤ 3806.78517 US$) has been determined by the
ferences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial political characteristics of the country. In this respect, it is
correlation. possible to observe two groups of countries according to
5. Hansen is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically
distributed as χ 2 under the null of no correlation between the instruments
whether the POLCON variable was higher than 0.38 or not.
and the error term, degrees of freedom in parentheses. For the second group (3806.78517 US$ < GDPpc ≤
6. Dependent variable GE (government effectiveness); Independent 25034.92856US$), the size of the government allowed us
variables Organizational environment GDPpc (economic development); to observe three different clusters of governance prac-
LITERACY (educational status). tices: those with a population density equal to or less than
Organizational characteristics DENSITY (government size);
WOMEN (gender diversity) Political characteristics POLCON ( political
59.05719, those with a density higher than this amount and
constraint index). below 141.12983, and those with a density higher than the
latter value. This last group is disaggregated into two other
clusters by LITERACY as a function of whether this variable
indicate that government effectiveness is higher in those is above 49.5213 or not.
countries in which citizens’ demands are quite important. For the last cluster (GDPpc > 25034.92856 US$), gen-
With respect to organizational characteristics, the variable der diversity is the relevant factor in order to improve public
DENSITY has a statistically significant negative impact for sector management. More specifically, the WOMEN variable
a confidence level of 99 percent. In contrast, WOMEN has allows us to define two country groups of government effec-
a direct effect on government effectiveness for a confidence tiveness, those with a diversity higher than 22.79 percent and
level of 95 percent (0.01 < p-value < 0.05). These results those with a diversity below that.
mean that gender diversity plays an important role in the Therefore, jointly, the previous analyses indicate that the
improvement of public sector management, while countries effect of income level is similar to the evidence obtained by
574 GARCIA-SANCHEZ, CUADRADO-BALLESTEROS, AND FRIAS-ACEITUNO

GE
Mean 49.81
St. Dv. 29.15

GDPpc
F = 305.175
(p-value = 0.000)

<3806.78517 (3806.78517 to 25034.92856] >25034.92856


GE mean = 91.328 GE mean = 73.469 GE mean = 33.4442

POLCON DENSITY WOMEN


F = 13.860 F = 30.813 F = 36.143
(p-value = 0.000) (p-value = 0.000) (p-value = 0.000)

<0.38 >0.38 <22.70 >22.70


GE mean =26.2787 GE mean = 46.2353 GE mean = 86.549 GE mean = 96.836

<59.05719 (59.05719 to 141.12983] >141.12983


GE mean = 65.223 GE mean =74.228 GE mean = 53.564

LITERACY
F = 39.018
(p-value = 0.000)

<49.5213 >49.5213
GE mean = 40.168 GE mean = 64.409

FIGURE 3 Determinants of government effectiveness.

Lee and Whitford (2009) in the sense that it is the first deter- endogeneity and heterogeneity problems, since they did not
minant of government effectiveness. Following that, and as a use panel data models.
function of income level, the rest of the proposed explanatory In this sense, this article tries to overcome these lim-
factors play a different role. itations, adding new evidence about the determinants of
Political characteristics form the most important deter- governance quality. Thus, the main aim of our study is to
minant in countries with a lower gross domestic product determine the explanatory factors of government effective-
per capita. In economies in transition, density is strongly ness, specifically, to provide evidence of how it is affected
associated with an unclear effect on the level of effective- by the organizational environment and the political and inter-
ness, while in those with a higher GDP per capita, citizens’ nal characteristics of public administration. For this, we
demands, represented by their educational status, are espe- have analyzed the effectiveness of the entire governments
cially relevant. For countries with a higher income level, of 202 countries for the period 2002–2008. In order to con-
gender diversity improves governance. trol for heterogeneity and endogeneity problems, we used
GMM estimator for panel data models. In addition, we
employed a CHAID algorithm in order to provide more con-
crete relationships between government effectiveness and
CONCLUSIONS its determinants. The evidence obtained shows that all of
the proposed factors play a relevant role in the process of
Government effectiveness is clearly associated with coun- improving governance quality, confirming the validity of the
tries’ economic and social growth, and reflects that public arguments of Public Choice Theory.
organizations and their personnel perform the actions and The main determinant of governance is organizational
procedures of their mission well, that is, in accordance with environment or citizen’s demands, which have a direct rela-
social well-being. tionship with economic development. Results indicate that
A limited number of previous studies have sought to voters direct their votes and resources to the center of power
identify the explanatory factors of government effective- that best satisfies their preferences, and they therefore influ-
ness, explaining the differences across countries through ence the policy implementation decisions of the political
geographic location, legal origin, economic development, leadership. These actors are expected to be particularly inter-
and government characteristics. However, they have not ested in having their governments increase effectiveness and
considered several features of the political and adminis- politicians try to satisfy these demands in order to obtain
trative system. Furthermore, these previous studies have electoral support.
DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS 575

However, the political reforms and actions that improve Barro, R. (1997). Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country
governance quality could be favored or discouraged by char- Empirical Study, Working paper, W5698. Washington, DC: National
Bureau of Economic Research.
acteristics of internal organization. In this sense, government
Bavetta, S., & Padovano, F. (2000). A model of the representation of inter-
size hinders the implementation of political decisions, while est in a compound democracy. Constitutional Political Economy, 11(1),
diversity has the contrary effect. Concretely, gender diversity 5–25.
may improve the public sector management since women’s Betz, M., O’Connell, L., & Shepard, J.M. (1989). Gender differences
presence enhances creativity and innovation in the decision in proclivity for unethical behaviour. Journal of Business Ethics, 8,
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Boswell, N. & Richardson, P. (2003). Anti-corruption: Unshackling eco-
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characteristics more or less prone to solving problems of and Theory, 13(3), 367–394.
Brewer, G. A., & Selden, S. C. (2000). Why elephants gallop: Assessing
bureaucracy. When the political constraints are low, the exec-
and predicting organizational performance in federal agencies. Journal of
utive can change the policies, when it desires, for improving Public Administration Research & Theory, 10(4), 685–711.
the citizens’ satisfaction, allowing them to obtain more Brudney, J.L., & Selden, S.C. (1995). The adoption of innovation by smaller
favorable electoral results. local governments: The case of computer technology. American Review
These results provide an international guide for improv- of Public Administration, 25(1), 71–86.
Buchanan, J.M. (1954). Individual choice in voting and the market. Journal
ing the quality of the governance around the world, taking
of Political Economy, 62, 330–354.
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33–53
in transition, the educational status is the most impor- Charron, N., & Lapuente, V. (2010). Does democracy produce qual-
tant determinant in densely populated areas. Finally, gender ity of government? European Journal of Political Research, 49(4),
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There are some limitations to this work that could be
Public Policy, 11, 1–42.
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used has several drawbacks as previously mentioned(e.g., and corruption with failing institutions, Working Paper 2007-61. Verona,
lack of transparency, absence of good governance theory, Italy: Society for the Study of Economic Inequality.
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country. investment. Industrial and Corporate Change. 11(2), 355–389.
Henisz, W.J., & Zelner, B.A. (2010). The hidden risks in emerging markets.
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DETERMINANTS OF GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS 577

APPENDIX

Government effectiveness: Concept measured

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