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Drivers of Religious Extremism in South Asia

Zahid Shahab Ahmed, Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin
University
https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.779
Published online: 23 August 2023
Summary
Religious extremism is not a new phenomenon in South Asia but it has certainly grown during the 21st century and
that too across the region. While there are historical reasons behind religious divisions and fissures in South Asia
(e.g., the two-nation theory with reference to the creation of a separate homeland for the Muslims of the Indian
subcontinent), religious nationalism is a key driver behind the securitization of religious minorities. Although the
existence of Muslim extremists is linked to how religion was used as a tool to recruit and mobilize mujahideen
against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan between 1979 and 1988, the global dynamics after the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks and the “war on terror” have also influenced religious radicalization and extremism in
Pakistan. In contrast, Buddhist and Hindu nationalism have been key drivers of religiously motivated extremism
targeting religious minorities, especially Muslims, in Sri Lanka and India. There are similarities in terms of how
Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim extremist groups have been propagating hate and inciting violence; for instance,
many extremist groups now increasingly use social media. As this article argues, the presence of religious
extremism in South Asia presents a significant challenge to peace and security. This includes various forms of
extremism targeting different religious groups and promoting anti-Western sentiments. International terrorist
organizations are active in the region, while Hindu and Buddhist nationalists contribute to the marginalization and
violence against Muslims. Creating an environment of tolerance, inclusivity, and respect for all religious
communities is crucial to address these complex issues effectively.
Keywords: religion, extremism, violence, South Asia, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam
Subjects: Conflict Studies, Human Rights, Identity, Security Studies
Introduction
There is a lot of published research on the causes of violent extremism and radicalization. Push
and pull factors are used to classify these drivers. According to a study, human rights violations,
marginalization, inequality, and discrimination are the main reasons driving university students
to violent extremism (Vergani et al., 2020). However, according to some experts, the existence of
organized extremist groups with violent ideologies and initiatives that offer benefits and
employment in exchange for membership may be a draw for educated students (Zeiger et al.,
2015). Yet, resentments against some institutions may breed radicalization. Such complaints may
be based on a sense of deprivation brought on by a lack of access to facilities for education, health,
and welfare (Orsini, 2013; Pisoiu, 2015). According to research conducted on university students
in Kenya, educated millennials harbor grudges against corrupt political figures (Botha, 2014).
Religious, national, political, and ethnic divisions can also be the primary causes of
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radicalization, and extremist groups frequently use these factors in their fundraising and
recruitment efforts (Angus, 2016). In South Asia alone, there have been many studies that have
found religious divisions to be a key factor in terms of radicalizing people toward violent
extremism. A study focusing on the drivers of violent extremism in two Pakistani universities
found a link between religion and extremism (Ahmed & Jafri, 2020). Similarly, an edited volume
titled Religion, Extremism and Violence in South Asia provides various case studies from
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka in terms of an alarming trend of growing religious
extremism in the region (Ahmed et al., 2022). This article focuses on religiously motivated
extremism in South Asia for various reasons: (a) religiously motivated extremism has been on the
rise across South Asia, and this is evident through increasing incidents of hate speech and
violence against religious minorities; and (b) in South Asia, religiously motivated extremism is
not limited to any particular religion as there are many organized religious groups that are
inciting violence against religious minorities. Hence, this article offers some useful comparison
to help understand the drivers of religiously motivated extremism in South Asia—the region
home to roughly one-fifth of the human population.
One of the most important threats to the state and society in the modern world is religious
extremism. While extremism means the “belief in and support for ideas that are very far from
what most people consider correct or reasonable” (United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization [UNESCO], 2017, p. 19), violent extremism “refers to the beliefs and actions
of people who support or use violence to achieve ideological, religious or political
goals” (UNESCO, 2017, p. 19). Hence, violent religious extremism refers to the use of violence to
achieve religious goals. Although religious extremism is a worldwide phenomenon and the focus
of extensive academic research and journalistic investigation, this problem appears in South Asia
in ways that are often no less lethal but also very distinct. Few issues incite violent conflicts as
fervently as religious extremism does in South Asia: whether it be the coordinated suicide attacks
allegedly carried out by the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba on the Indian parliament and
Mumbai’s financial district in 2008 or the “epidemic” of “mob” lynchings of Muslims in India in
2017 and 2018 under the pretext of upholding doctrines of cow protection (Adcock & Govindrajan,
2019); whether it be the murderous attack by Bangladeshi militants in 2016 on the Holey Artisan
Café in Dhaka, which resulted in the deaths of 29 people, mostly tourists, or the Sinhala Buddhist
attacks on Muslims in Sri Lanka following the 2019 Easter bombings by an Islamist militant
group on Christian churches, which resulted in the deaths of several hundred worshippers
(Brasted et al., 2022). This article aims to understand how and why religious extremism is not
only prevalent but also expanding in some countries of the region.
A common casualty of the increasing religious extremism can be seen through direct attacks on
religious freedom. Religious freedom in South Asia faces a serious challenge from a growing
majoritarianism, and its impact is visible in the decreasing spaces for religious freedom in
various countries of the region. While Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights protects individuals from coercion that would impair their freedom to choose
their religion or belief, the trend reported in South Asia is “alarming” because of the tension
between the freedom to spread one’s beliefs and the freedom of others to not be coerced (United
States Commission on International Religious Freedom [USCIRF], 2018). There are widespread
Page 2 of 15
restrictions on “freedom of expression” in the context of religious freedom in South Asia.

Interventions by both state and nonstate actors have diminished the capacity to express one’s
beliefs freely. Linked to their overall blasphemy laws, both Bangladesh and Pakistan have cyber
laws to prevent the discussion of some religious issues. Bangladesh, for example, began enforcing
Article 28 of its 2018 Digital Security Act, which criminalizes any publication or broadcast that can
be deemed hurtful to religious sentiments and beliefs. According to a report by the USCIRF, the
government of Bangladesh arrested 29 individuals under this law (USCIRF, 2020, p. 88).
Similarly, Pakistani authorities also arrested people for posting content deemed blasphemous on
social media (Sheikh, 2019).
Religious minorities have also faced increasing incidents of forceful conversions. Despite the
criminalization of forced religious conversion in some Indian states (e.g., Gujarat, Haryana, and
Himachal Pradesh; Munjal, 2022), religious minorities have been targeted and forcefully
converted to Hinduism under the “ghar wapsi” (homecoming) campaign of extremist groups like
the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. To protect the dominant religion, some countries in the
region have developed laws to limit religious conversions. In India, for example, conversion from
Hinduism to another religion has been criminalized. Similarly, in Pakistan, national blasphemy
laws criminalize the conversion of Muslims to other religions (Sheikh, 2019). Religious groups in
Nepal and Sri Lanka have also been watchful of the activities of faith-based humanitarian
organizations that, they believe, are converting people from their dominant religions (e.g.,
Hinduism and Buddhism) to other faiths. In India, although the National Investigation Agency
closed an investigation in relation to “love jihad,” in which Muslims were thought to be
intentionally marrying Hindu girls to promote Islam in India, Hindu extremist groups have an
ongoing campaign that targets interreligious couples (e.g., the partnerships of Muslim boys and
Hindu girls). To discourage interfaith marriages, mainly between Muslims and Hindus, the
current Indian government has implemented the Prohibition of Unlawful Religious Conversion
Ordinance, which empowers local authorities to decide on applications linked to religious
conversion. If the local authorities find that the conversion was not voluntary, the offending
person can face up to 10 years in jail (Ganguly, 2021).
In Pakistan, the forceful conversion of girls from religious minorities to Islam has received some
media attention. According to one estimate, roughly 1,000 girls from Christian and Hindu faiths
are converted to Islam every year in Pakistan through forced marriages (Gannon, 2020). As most
of these marriages involve underage girls, there have been debates and laws around criminalizing
underage marriage in Pakistan; for example, the Sindh government implemented the Sindh Child
Marriage Restraint Act, 2013 in 2014 in an attempt to restrict the vulnerability of minority girls
(Dilmurad, 2022). It is because of these and other challenges facing people of minority religions
and beliefs that the U.S. State Department deemed Pakistan “a country of concern” after the
USCIRF found that underage minority girls were “kidnapped for forced conversion to Islam . . .
forcibly married and subjected to rape” (USCIRF, 2020, p. 32).
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It is evident through the constant attacks on the religious freedom of religious minorities that
religious extremism is growing across South Asia. However, it is important to understand the
drivers of religious extremism in connection to the dominant religions in the region (i.e.,
Hinduism, Islam, and Buddhism). This article aims to do that by taking into consideration a
general understanding of religious extremism.
Drivers of Religious Extremism
While extremism and terrorism in South Asia are also motivated by other factors, such as ethnic
differences, a prominent driver of violent extremism is religious identity. In the South Asian
context, however, it is important to pay attention to structural factors that influence religious
extremism. This article aims to look at the drivers of religious extremism in connection to
Hinduism, Islam, and Buddhism in South Asia. Of course, these are not the only religions in South
Asia—a very diverse region in terms of religious and cultural diversity—but these are dominant
religions in countries. For instance, Hindus are in majority in India and Nepal; Buddhists in
Bhutan and Sri Lanka; and Muslims in the four other South Asian states, namely Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Maldives (see Table 1). In most South Asian states, rReligiously
motivated violence is due to a growing sense of religious nationalism. As Juergensmeyer writes:
“Recent decades have seen the rise of violence related to Hindu nationalist movements in India,
the Muslim Taliban in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the militant Khalistan movement of Sikhs
in India’s Punjab, and Buddhist nationalism in Sri Lanka” (Juergensmeyer, 2020, p. 110).
Similarly in an earlier study, Butt (2004) pointed to an increasing security threat due to the rising
extremism and terrorism in South Asia. She argued, “The politics of violence and extremist
trends in South Asia can be linked to the contradictions arising as a consequence of faulty
national policies” (Butt, 2004).
Table 1. Majority Religions in South Asian States
Country Majority religion Percentage of the majority religion
Afghanistan Islam 99
Bangladesh Islam 90
Bhutan Buddhism 75
India Hinduism 79.5
The Maldives Islam 100
Nepal Hinduism 82
Pakistan Islam 96.28
Sri Lanka Buddhism 70.19
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Source: World Atlas (n.d.).
Buddhist Extremism
In terms of Buddhist religious groups engaging in acts of extremism, Myanmar and Sri Lanka
come to mind. Sri Lanka, which suffered for decades because of the Tamil insurgency, now faces
religiously motivated extremism and terrorism. The Easter Sunday bombings on April 21, 2019,
carried out by the radical Islamic National Thowheeth Jama’ath, which murdered more than 253
people, the majority of whom were Christians, represented the most extreme example of religious
fanaticism ever seen in Sri Lanka (Imtiaz & Subedi, 2019). The terrorist act severely eroded the
confidence that Muslims had built among their fellow citizens, especially the majority Sinhalese,
while the Easter Sunday explosions showed radical theological changes emerging within a section
of Muslim society. Several Buddhist extremists, including the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS; Buddhist
Power Force), Sinhala Ravaya (Sinhala Outcry or Sound of Sinhala), Ravana Balakaya (Ravana
Power), and Mahasohon Balakaya (the Greatest Demon), have seen a sharp increase in
membership since 2010. The escalation of Buddhist extremism raises basic issues and serves as a
reminder of the social, religious, and political transformation taking place within the Sinhalese
society.
The radical ideologies and violent behavior of Buddhist extremist groups like the BBS are only
supported by a small minority of hardliner Sinhala Buddhists (Subedi, 2022). The BBS is the
largest organization of ultranationalists due to its political roots. It has thus started to have an
impact on nationalist politics. Kirama Wimalajothi and Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara, two
ultranationalist Buddhist monks, created it in July 2012. In 2004, the right-wing Buddhist
nationalist political party Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), also known as the National Heritage Party,
was founded. Both the founders were former members of the JHU. The BBS was founded after the
end of the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009. President Mahinda Rajapaksa was reelected in the 2010
elections due to his involvement in putting an end to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The
BBS was founded at a time when Rajapaksa’s nationalist administration was losing support from
minority Tamils and Muslims due to its preference for Sinhala Buddhist nationalism. The BBS
was crucial in igniting Sinhala Buddhist nationalism in this rapidly shifting political
environment. In fact, the BBS’s proxy role in mobilizing numerous Sinhala Buddhist voters in
Rajapaksa’s support during the 2015 election worked in his favor (Subedi, 2022).
The Rajapaksa administration came under intense pressure from the international community,
particularly the UN Human Rights Council, to launch an investigation into war crimes allegedly
committed during the closing stages of the war in 2009. Instead, the Rajapaksa administration
prevented a UN probe into atrocities committed during the war with the aid of Sinhala Buddhist
troops and the military. By portraying Sri Lankan Muslims as the enemy, the BBS and other
Buddhist extremist groups diverted political and public attention away from postwar
reconstruction and reconciliation and toward battling a new foe (Subedi, 2022). Since then, there
have been various anti-Muslim developments in Sri Lanka; for example, violence against
Muslims has increased. In 2013, there were a series of attacks on mosques led by Buddhist monks
who reacted to rumors regarding animal slaughter and banned the halal system of food
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classification in Sri Lanka. The BBS has been inciting violence against minority Muslims and it
has used “coarse, derogatory language to describe Muslim imams and have told the Sinhalese
majority not to rent property to Muslims” (BBC, 2013). In addition, the organization’s secretary,
Gnanasara Thero, urged each Buddhist to become “an unofficial policeman against Muslim
extremism” (BBC, 2013).
In the last decade alone, Islamophobia and violent attacks on Muslims in Sri Lanka have
increased. Buddhist religious leaders (monks) have been at the forefront of these anti-Muslim
actions and often incite violence. In 2018, another wave of clashes involving Buddhist extremists
and Muslims started in Kandy and Ampara. This wave was triggered by hate speech targeting
Muslims by Buddhist extremists on Facebook (Johansson, 2018). A study focusing on the BBS
narrative against Muslims found that the organization uses rumors to mobilize violent public
actions against the so-called “others.” The study also found,
BBS literature that allegedly exposes the manner in which Muslims seek to gain a
population advantage in Sri Lanka; how Muslims have deployed political strategies to
gain power far beyond their proportional representation in the country; and how elected
Muslim members of parliament . . . have exploited the patronage system to benefit
Muslims businesses.
(Silva, 2016, p. 1)
Anti-Muslim actions are however not just limited to some nonstate actors like the BBS, as the
state has been affected by the rise of Islamophobia. In 2021, Sri Lanka’s minister of public
security announced that the government will ban wearing the burqa for Muslim girls in more
than a thousand Islamic schools across the country. The minister, Sarath Weerasekara, further
added that the burqa was a “sign of religious extremism” (Haniffa, 2021). After the Easter
bombings in Sri Lanka in 2019, the government has targeted prominent Muslims; for example,
Hejaaz Hizbullah(lawyer) and Ahnaf Jazeem (poet) were arrested on the suspicion of being
involved in the terrorist attack. Instead of taking action against the BBS, President Gotabaya
Rajapaksa appointed the leading anti-Muslim figure in the country, Galagoda Aththe Gnanasara,
to head a presidential task force on legal reforms. Through this appointment, the government has
sent a message in accordance with its slogan, “one country, one law.” This is very concerning for
Sri Lankan Muslims as Gnanasara’s task force aims to review changes to the Muslim Marriage
and Divorce Act (Keenan, 2021).
In some ways, the actions and narratives of Buddhist extremist groups in Sri Lanka are inspired
by what Buddhist groups are doing in Myanmar and Hindu extremists in India. Hindu extremists
also target Muslims by spreading misinformation regarding what they deem as the Muslims’
growing population in India. As far as connections between Buddhist extremists in Sri Lanka and
Myanmar are concerned, they are no longer a secret. Ashin Wirathu, who calls himself “the
Burmese bin Laden,” has been inciting violence against Muslims in Myanmar for several years.
Wirathu has been calling for a transnational partnership of Buddhists to counter “Buddhism in
Page 6 of 15
danger.” While speaking at a gathering in Colombo, Wirathu said, “I’d like to announce that 969
[a Buddhist nationalist group] and I will join hands with Sri Lanka’s Bodu Bala Sena to protect
Buddhists all around the world” (Sirilal, 2014).
Hindu Extremism
With the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under Narendra Modi’s leadership since 2014,
there has been a greater emphasis on increasing religious extremism in India. However, there are
a variety of factors, such as historical, religious, and political, that have resulted in rapid Hindu
extremism in different parts of the country. This can be witnessed through the increasing
restrictions on the religious freedom of minorities and their persecution in India. The trend of
Hindu preachers demanding India to be a Hindu rashtra (nation) is growing, and that also
involves inciting violence through hate speech against others. What has led to this in the world’s
biggest democracy?
While Hindu extremism in its current form may appear as a recent phenomenon that is linked to
the rise of the BJP, Hindu nationalism has a long history in India. Hindu nationalist organizations
known as the Sangh Parivar, including the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), the BJP, the
Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), Bajrang Dal, the Shiv Sena, and many more, place a high priority
on advancing the Hindutva ideology. Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883–1966) made the idea
popular by promoting the concept of Hindu rashtra in 1923. Savarkar lists three requirements for
belonging to the Hindu country: a lineage that can be traced back to the Vedic nation, territorially
bounded descent, and shared culture (Chacko, 2012). Savarkar’s theories affected the RSS and
were developed by its founding members and later leaders in their publications. Hindus were “the
people of the land,” according to RSS founder Keshav Baliram Hedgewar, and everybody else who
lived in India did so at the expense of the Hindu majority and, as a result, should be expected to
adopt Hindu culture. Non-Hindus were not included in Madhav Sadashivrao Golwalkar’s image of
India. Golwalkar, better known as Guruji, served as the RSS's second Sarsanghchalak (head).
Golwalkar is regarded by his supporters as one of the most important and well-known members
of the RSS.
As Hindu nationalist tendencies have existed in India for decades, it is important to see the degree
to which these have influenced the rise of Hindu nationalism in the shape of the BJP. Many Indian
political experts were shocked by Modi’s victory in the 2014 elections (Singh, 2014). It was a
resounding victory for the BJP, which won 282 seats as a member of the National Democratic
Alliance, as opposed to just 44 for the Indian National Congress (Burke, 2014). It was obvious that
the BJP would have the freedom to make choices without any assistance from the other political
parties in the parliament after such a stunning victory. However, worries about the treatment of
religious minorities in India were raised because of the triumph of the right-wing Hindu
nationalist party. Hindu nationalists look up to Modi as a role model and comrade who joined the
RSS at an early age and achieved mainstream political success, first as the chief minister of the
state of Gujarat and now as India’s prime minister. The confidence that many groups have gained
since the BJP’s victory in the 2014 elections can also be attributed to the unexpected surge in the
1
visibility of Hindu nationalists, specifically the Sangh Parivar, and violent extremism.
Page 7 of 15
It is hardly unexpected that many Hindu nationalist organizations regard the BJP government as
their “golden moment” given that the Sangh Parivar served as the foundation of Modi’s electoral
campaign. This component is particularly apparent in several programs that have gained traction
since then, such as ghar wapsi (return home), a joint initiative of the VHP and the RSS to convert
non-Hindus to Hinduism. Because they believe that everyone in India was a Hindu at one point in
time, including non-Hindus, the organization refers to it as a “ghar wapsi.” Over 8,000 persons in
Andhra Pradesh and Telangana reportedly converted to Hinduism in 2014; the VHP refers to this
as “reconversion” (Deccan Chronicle, 2014). Hindu nationalist groups have different views in
terms of how they want to see religious minorities in India, especially Muslims. The Shiv Sena, a
Sangh Parivar member, holds differing views on ghar wapsi and promotes the idea of India and
Pakistan exchanging Hindus and Muslims in accordance with the two-nation theory (Khan,
2014). Dharm Jagran Samiti is another organization that works to rid India of non-Hindus.
Rajeshwar Singh, the leader of the organization in Uttar Pradesh, stated,
Our target is to make India a Hindu Rashtra by 2021. The Muslims and Christians don’t
have any right to stay here . . . so they would either be converted to Hinduism or forced to
run away from here.
(Srivastava, 2014)
Violent attacks against religious minorities have increased because of India’s worrying rise in
Hindu fundamentalism. Muslims have been persecuted in several parts of India under the pretext
of “cow protection” or beef politics, whereas ghar wapsi primarily concentrates on Abrahamic
religions. Attacks by Hindus on Muslims in India were specifically mentioned in a U.S.
Department of State report from 2015, which stated: “Religiously driven communal violence,
including attacks by Hindus on Muslims owing to alleged cow slaughter, led to deadly attacks and
public riots” (USCIRF, 2015, p. 2). Since Modi became the prime minister, there has been an
increasing desire from Hindu nationalists to outlaw all beef sales, which are a significant source
of revenue for the Indian Muslim minority. Soon after the BJP’s victory in 2014, there were many
attacks on Indian Muslims by cow vigilantes (Calamur, 2015). While communal violence has been
prevalent in India before (e.g., hundreds of Muslims were killed in the Gujarat massacre in 2002;
Aswani, 2022), random attacks on Muslims have grown across the country in recent years.
Violent attacks on religious minorities are growing because of growing Islamophobia and hate
speech. These are not new developments but have become more prevalent, widespreadand more
noticeable because of social media. According to a report by the Australia-based Islamic Council
of Victoria, the highest number of Islamophobic tweets were recorded from India (871,379)
between August 28, 2019, and August 27, 2021 (Butler, 2022, p. 10). It was also reported in the
same publication that Indian Muslims are often targeted based on conspiracy theories that
“Muslims are being sent as migrants to outreproduce non-Muslims communities (known as the
‘Great Replacement’ in the West and ‘population jihad’ in India)” (Butler, 2022, p. 5). Such
conspiracy theories are popular among Hindu nationalists and extremists who regularly attack
Muslims. A prominent example of these is another conspiracy theory that Muslim boys lure
Page 8 of 15
Indian girls and convert them to Islam under “love jihad.” In 2022, a young Muslim man, Arbaaz
Aftab Mullah, was brutally murdered for allegedly falling in love with a Hindu girl in southern
India (Ellis-Petersen & Khan, 2022).
There are many such examples that are becoming far too common across India. It is however not
just limited to hate speech as there are many Hindu preachers who incite violence against
religious minorities, especially Muslims. While addressing a Hindu mob, Yati Narsinghanand
warned Indian Hindus of the growing Muslim population in India: “The way their [Muslims’]
population in increasing, there will be a Muslim prime minister in 2029” . . . “Once that happens,
50% [of] Hindus will have to undergo religious conversion, and 40% will be killed” (Kasturi,
2022). Such conspiracy theories have gained broader acceptance in India despite the fact that
India’s own official data shows that the Muslim fertility rate in India has dropped from 4.4 to 2.36
(Kasturi, 2022). Earlier Narsinghanand was arrested for hate speech but later released on bail like
many others who have been either engaged in hate speech or hate crimes against religious
minorities in India. In 2017, an Indian court acquitted five RSS men who were earlier sentenced to
death for killing two Muslims (Ghatwai, 2017). As perpetrators are often either not caught or
punished, this trend of violent religious extremism in India is likely to continue.
Muslim Extremism
There are four majority Muslim states in South Asia, namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the
Maldives, and Pakistan, and there are around 200 million Muslims in India (Maizland, 2022). The
manifestation of religious extremism in these countries varies due to historical, social, and
political factors.
A manifestation of religious extremism in Pakistan can be witnessed through an increasing

number of attacks on religious and sectarian minorities, including Ahmadiyas, Christians,
Hindus, and Shi’as. Ahmadiyas have long been persecuted in Pakistan and were declared non-
Muslims in 1974. Further legal changes were made in the 1980s, and Ahmadiyas were barred from
calling their places of worship as “mosques” (Nasser, 2017). A key turning point in terms of
religious extremism in Pakistan was when the country partnered with the United States in the
Afghan–Soviet War (1979–1988). In this war, Pakistan played a key role in terms of a U.S.-led
proxy war against the Soviet Union by recruiting, training, and mobilizing mujahideen. In fact,
the mainstream political parties of Pakistan, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, played a key role in
promoting jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan (Ahmed, 2012). While the war was limited to
Afghanistan, Pakistan was affected in the shape of millions of Afghan refugees and socioreligious
transformation in various ways. There was a sudden growth of foreign-funded madrassas
(Islamic seminaries) across Pakistan. It was mainly because of Saudi and Iranian funding that
more than 1,000 madrassas were established during the Afghan–Soviet War (Grare, 2007; Iqbal &
Raza, 2015). In many madrassas of that time, the curriculum promoting jihad against the Soviets
was originally produced at the University of Nebraska in the United States (Ahmed, 2012).
Pakistan continues to face the impacts of radicalization, which expanded at such a large scale in
the country in the 1980s, in the shape of violent religious extremism and terrorism. The 1990s
Page 9 of 15
was the worse decade in terms of sectarian violence in the country. Besides the targeted killing of
both Shi’a and Sunni leaders, militant organizations also targeted mosques and other places that
led to the deaths of 581 between 1990 and 1997 across the country (Haleem, 2003, p. 469).
The post–September 11, 2001, dynamics are different but somewhat similar too. There is little
denying of the fact that the roots of much of today’s violent religious extremism are in the way
Pakistan acted as a frontline U.S. ally during the Afghan–Soviet War. Before 2001, however, the
country mainly suffered because of the Shi’a–Sunni conflict, and later there has been the
emergence of numerous religiously motivated extremist and terrorist groups. Among those are
the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)—a group that has been regularly carrying out terrorist
activities in Pakistan. The country has paid a heavy price due to terrorism, mainly carried out by
religious groups, with more than 80,000 deaths from 2005 to 2013 (Iqbal, 2015).
While groups like the TTP have both political and religious agendas (e.g., they want to implement
the Islamic law or Shari’a in its purest form), it is important to look at other manifestations of
religious extremism, such as hate speech and hate crimes. There are groups like the Tehreek-e-
Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) that have been participating in mainstream politics, but there are many
others that incite violence based on religious differences at home or abroad. Much of that is
responsible for anti-Western and anti-Indian sentiments in the country (Ahmed & Zahoor, 2020;
Jamal, 2021). A study argued that some local extremist groups in Pakistan “view local Christians
with suspicion, labelling them Western agents” while the minority Christians continue to suffer
dehumanization due to social factors, such as being engaged in sectors not seen with respect (e.g.,
cleaners) (Ahmed & Zahoor, 2020, p. 87). Anti-Western sentiments, which are fueled by
extremist organizations, are also manifested in the shape of hate speech and hate crimes in
Pakistan. As social media is becoming increasingly popular, many religious groups like the TLP
are using whatever avenues available to them to spread their messages—often with hateful
content against other religious minorities. The TLP has been using YouTube, Twitter, and
Facebook (Nizamani, 2022). While often members of religious minorities suffer due to allegations
of blasphemy, now there is a growing trend of deadly attacks on both Muslims and non-Muslims
by religious fanatics. Prominent cases include the lynching of a Muslim university student,
Mashal Khan, in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the killing of a Sri Lankan expatriate
(Priyantha Kumara Diyawadana) in Sialkot, Punjab (Chaudhry, 2021). A report suggests that there
were 1,855 people charged under the blasphemy laws between 1987 and 2021, and 80 people have
been killed on allegations of blasphemy since 1990 (Ochab, 2021).
Conclusion
Religious extremism has become a major problem for peace and security in South Asia. Most
South Asian countries are facing the severe impacts of religiously motivated radicalization,
extremism, and violence. There are a variety of Muslim extremists as there are some that target
sectarian minorities and others that promote anti-Western sentiments by also inciting violence
against religious minorities, especially Christians. This has continued to happen more often since
9/11. More so in the case of South Asia’s majority Muslim states, there are also international
terrorist organizations actively recruiting and operating, such as the Islamic State–Khorasan
Page 10 of 15
Province and Al-Qaeda, which have a greater presence in Afghanistan but have been able to carry
out activities in India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan. In contrast, Hindu nationalists in India and
Buddhist nationalists in Sri Lanka have been targeting Muslims through a continued
securitization of minority Muslims and various legal reforms. Hence, religiously motivated
organizations in India and Sri Lanka have found a conducive environment to spread their anti-
Muslim agenda, which has been responsible for a series of attacks on Muslims in both countries.
Some Indian states have anticonversion laws but there is no national anticonversion law.
Islamists in Pakistan opposed the anticonversion bill in the Sindh parliament.
There is a similarity in terms of how various extremist groups are spreading their hateful
messages against their target groups as most use social media to spread hate speech and incite
violence. This is no surprise considering that the ever-expanding reach of the internet and
millions of social media users in the region. But what is promoted through social media has an
impact in real life as often violent incidents were triggered by social media (religious) posts in
India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. While the governments are grappling with this increasing
religious extremism, there is more that needs to be done by first acknowledging that these are not
random incidents and also by categorizing it violent extremism. Once that is done, there is a need
to have national action plans on countering violent extremism—something that Pakistan did in
2014. That, of course, would require the desired political will in states facing this problem.
Further Reading
Ahmad, I. (2014). Kafka in India: Terrorism, media, Muslims. In R. Jeffrey & S. Ronojoy (Eds.), Being Muslim in South
Asia: Diversity and daily life (p. 289). Oxford University Press.
D’Souza, S. M. (2017). Countering insurgencies, terrorism and violent extremism in South Asia <https://doi.org/
10.1080/09592318.2016.1266163>. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 28(1), 1–11.
Guansingham, A. (2019). Buddhist extremism in Sri Lanka and Myanmar: An examination. Counter Terrorist Trends and
Analyses, 11(3), 1–6.
Hasan, M., Isezaki, K., & Yasir, S. (Eds.). (2019). Radicalisation in South Asia: Context, trajectories and implications. SAGE
India.
Leidig, E. (2020). Hindutva as a variant of right-wing extremism <https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2020.1759861>.

Patterns of Prejudice, 54(3), 215–237.
Mishra, A. (2012). Islamic fundamentalism in South Asia: A comparative study of Pakistan and Bangladesh <https://
doi.org/10.1177/0974928412454606>. India Quarterly, 68(3), 283–296.
Morrison, C. (2020). Buddhist extremism, anti-Muslim violence and civil war legacies in Sri Lanka <https://doi.org/
10.1080/14631369.2019.1610937>. Asian Ethnicity, 21(1), 137–159.
Ollapally, D. M. (2008). The politics of extremism in South Asia. Cambridge University Press.
Ramakrishna, K. (2021). Deconstructing Buddhist extremism: Lessons from Sri Lanka. Religions, 12(11), 970.
Page 11 of 15
Siyech, M. S. (2022). Salafist approaches to violence and terrorism: The Indian case study <https://doi.org/10.1111/
rec3.12431>. Religion Compass, 16(6), e12431.
Zaman, M. Q. (2018). Islam in Pakistan: A history. Princeton University Press.
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Notes
1. The Sangh Parivar is a group of Hindu nationalist organizations. It was founded by RSS members and includes RSS
and dozens of other organizations from across India.
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South Asia and Foreign Policy
The Ethnic, Nationalist, and Religious Roots of Terrorism
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Drivers of Religious Extremism in South Asia

Keywords: religion, extremism, violence, South Asia, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam

Subjects: Conflict Studies, Human Rights, Identity, Security Studies

restrictions on “freedom of expression” in the context of religious freedom in South Asia.

Drivers of Religious Extremism

Table 1. Majority Religions in South Asian States

Country Majority religion Percentage of the majority religion

India Hinduism 79.5

The Maldives Islam 100

Pakistan Islam 96.28

Sri Lanka Buddhism 70.19

Source: World Atlas (n.d.).

A manifestation of religious extremism in Pakistan can be witnessed through an increasing

Leidig, E. (2020). Hindutva as a variant of right-wing extremism <https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2020.1759861>.

Zaman, M. Q. (2018). Islam in Pakistan: A history. Princeton University Press.

Jamal, U. (2021, December 2). Pakistan’s surging religious extremism <https://thediplomat.com/2021/12/pakistans-

Maizland, L. (2022). India’s Muslims: An increasingly marginalized population <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/

World Atlas. (n.d.). Religious composition of South Asian countries <https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/religious-

The Ethnic, Nationalist, and Religious Roots of Terrorism

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