Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs

ISSN: 1360-2004 (Print) 1469-9591 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjmm20

For Islam and Kashmir: the prison diaries of

Sayyed Ali Gilani of the Jama'At‐I‐Islami of Jammu
and Kashmir

Yoginder S. Sikand

To cite this article: Yoginder S. Sikand (1998) For Islam and Kashmir: the prison diaries of
Sayyed Ali Gilani of the Jama'At‐I‐Islami of Jammu and Kashmir, Journal of Muslim Minority
Affairs, 18:2, 241-249, DOI: 10.1080/13602009808716409

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13602009808716409

Published online: 20 Mar 2007.

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Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1998 241

For Islam and Kashmir: The Prison Diaries of

Sayyed Ali Gilani of the Jama'at-i-Islami of Jammu
and Kashmir

YOGINDER S. SIKAND

Introduction
Ever since the eruption of a mass uprising against Indian rule in the mid-1980s, more
than 50,000 people have lost their lives in unabated violence in the disputed region of
Jammu and Kashmir. There have been several reports of large-scale persecution of
Kashmiri Muslim civilians by the Indian armed forces, including of indiscriminate
killings, rape and looting. On the other hand, militants belonging to certain anti-Indian
Kashmiri organizations are also believed to have been involved in numerous incidents
of violence, including even murder, of their Hindu as well as Muslim opponents. Rivers
of blood continue to flow today in what was from time immemorial said to be a
veritable paradise on earth.
Of the several Kashmiri groups'fighting for the independence of Jammu and Kashmir
from Indian control, the Jama 'at-i-hlami Jammu and Kashmir (JIJK), established as an
independent organization in 19471 is one of the most influential, in terms of military
resources, external links and networks and organizational capacity.2 The JIJK has, since
its very inception, consistently voiced its strong opposition to Indian rule, demanding
instead that the state be allowed to join neighbouring Muslim-majority Pakistan. Until
the mid-1970s, the JIJK actively participated in local and provincial level elections in
Jammu and Kashmir, using these as fora to project its stand on the Kashmir issue
before the electorate. Following the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, however, the
JIJK began shifting towards a distinct radicalism, calling for an Iranian-style movement
in Jammu and Kashmir to free the region from Indian control. Since then, the JIJK has
been in the forefront of the political struggle for the independence of Jammu and
Kashmir from India.3 Today it is actively involved in the armed Kashmiri uprising,
which it considers to be a jihad. In this, it has received the support of, among others,
the Jama'at-i-Islami of Pakistan, which has long characterized the struggle in Kashmir
as a religious war between Islam and disbelief (kufr).*
While much has been written about the Jama'at-i-Islami in Pakistan,5 with which the
JIJK shares a common ideological orientation while at the same time being organiza-
tionally independent, little is known about the JIJK despite its key role in the ongoing
movement for the independence of Jammu and Kashmir. The hitherto unexplored
Rudad-i-Qafas6 ('Records of the Jail'), the two-volume prison diaries in Urdu of the
former amir of the JIJK and still its main ideologue, Sayyed Ali Gilani, however, sheds
much light on the history of the JIJK, the part it has played in the ongoing movement
for Kashmiri self-determination and, more importantly, the organization's own
approach to a possible solution to the Kashmir question.
Written over a two-year period (1990-1992) while in detention under the Public

1360-2004/98/020241-09 © 1998 Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs

242 Yoginder S. Sikand

Safety Act in various jails in Delhi, Jammu and Naini (Allahabad), and running into
almost 800 pages, Gilani's diaries provide the perspective of a key figure in the Kashmir
dispute on the ongoing uprising in the region, making a valuable contribution to our
understanding of this vexed issue. In his introduction to the book, Khurshid Ahmad, a
well-known leader of the Jama'at-i-hlami of Pakistan, writes that it is 'not simply the
song of freedom but the complete history of the [Kashmiri] freedom struggle as well'.7
As a literary production the Rudad-i-Qafas may strike one as leaving much to be
desired. A chapter might start off with an account of Gilani's personal experiences in
jail and be suddenly interrupted by a discussion on early Islamic history or on the
Quran extending into several pages. Condensed on a single page maybe Gilani's
reflections on a wide range of issues, from the Hindu religion and the caste system to
the present state of Indian and Pakistani politics, interspersed with fond memories of
some dear friend or fellow activist. To judge the book solely on the basis of its literary
worth would, however, be uncharitable, for at the very outset Gilani asserts that it is not
intended to be an autobiography or a remarkable work of literature, but, rather, an
inspiration for the guidance (rahnumai) and instruction (nasihat) for the youth of
Jammu and Kashmir. Here Gilani approvingly quotes from the autobiography of the
former chief (murshed-i-am) of the Ikhwan-ul Muslimun, Sayyed Omar Talmisani, to
stress his point that the purpose of one's published memoirs should not be simply to
highlight one's own personal achievements but to actually serve as a means for the
'invitation to the Truth' (da'awat-i-haq).s
Four major themes form the underlying structure around which the Rudad-i-Qafas,
with all its many embellishments, revolves. These are (1) the ideology of the JIJK; (2)
Gilani's analysis of the causes of the Kashmiri uprising; (3) a critique of the form that
the uprising has now assumed; and (4) the JIJK's own approach to a possible solution
to the Kashmir dispute. In the following section of the paper we shall turn to a
discussion of each of these four broad issues in turn.

Ideology of the JIJK

In matters of ideology, the JIJK is at one with the parallel units of the Jama'at-i-hlami
in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. The writings of Sayyed Abul Ala Maududi (1903-
1979), the founder of the Jama'at-i-hlami, are taken by it as guiding both the
organization's understanding of Islam as well as its own practical efforts and activities.
Maududi's writings have already been studied in considerable detail and so need not
detain us here.9 Suffice it to say that for the Jama'at-i-hlami, Islam is seen as a complete
system (mukammil nizam), covering every aspect of the personal as well as collective life
of the Muslims, with nothing being left out of the purview of the sharia, the Islamic law.
Islam must, then, be enforced in its entirety (iqamat-i-din), and central to this project
is the establishment of an Islamic state based on the Qur'an and the example (sunnah)
of the Prophet. Although every Muslim, male or female, has a role to play in this grand
enterprise, it is necessary for a special Islamic party (jama 'at) to emerge from among the
community to lead the struggle for the establishment of the rule of Islam. This jama'at
is the Jama'at-i-hlami, which every conscious (ba-sha'ur) Muslim should associate
himself with.10 When the Islamic state is finally set up under the leadership of this
jama'at, Islamic justice must prevail, for it is pointless if in the process of struggling
against an un-Islamic system, a new set of oppressors (zalini) take the place of the old,
and oppression (zulm) is not wiped out."
In both Pakistan as well as India the Jama'at-i-hlami has chosen to adopt democratic,
 For Islam and Kashmir 243

peaceful means in pursuit of its aims. In the former, it is a registered political party and
regularly participates in provincial and national elections. In the latter, it is an avowedly
non-political religious organization, and although it does not participate in elections, it
still maintains strong political positions on major issues of concern to the Muslims of
the country. In contrast, in Jammu and Kashmir while it did exist earlier as a registered
political party, making its first entry into the field of electoral politics in the local council
(panchayat) elections of 1969,12 the Jama 'at-i-Islami has, since the outbreak of violence
in the mid-1980s, and further since its banning in 1990, adopted a strongly radical line,
and its militant wing has been involved in armed conflict with Indian soldiers. The
JIJK's armed struggle against the Indian army is seen by it as a religious war or jihad.
When Islam is under threat, says Gilani, it is the collective duty of the Muslims to
spearhead jihad against the 'enemies of the faith'. According to the JIJK, such a
situation prevails in Kashmir today. Jihad can take various forms—physical as well as
through the 'pen' (qalam) and the 'tongue' (zabari).n Besides armed fighters (m«-
jahidiii), writers (qalamkar) and journalists (sahafi) also have an important part in the
jihad. 'With their fingers on the pulse of the people', they can play a crucial role in
transmitting vital information to the mujahidin.1*

Causes of the Kashmiri Uprising

A central purpose of the Rudad-i-Qafas is to present before its readers a forceful,
emotive justification of the current uprising against Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir
and an impassioned plea that the people of the state be allowed the right to determine
their own political future. Gilani's case for Kashmir's right to self-determination rests
on two pillars. First, the 'two-nation' theory (do qaumi nazariya) on which the pre-Par-
tition Muslim League had based its claim for a separate Muslim state—Pakistan—for
the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent.15 Second, the various United Nations resolu-
tions on Jammu and Kashmir that envisage for the Kashmiris the exercise of the right
to choose to join either India or Pakistan.16
For Gilani, Muslims and Hindus, despite living in the same territory, form two
completely different (mukhtalif) nations (millat, qaum). This, he claims, is, despite what
others may assert to the contrary, an 'undeniable truth' (naqabil-i-tardid haqiqai).11
Focusing on what apparently divides Muslims from Hindus, rather on what unites
them, Gilani says that not just in matters of faith, beliefs and customs do the two stand
diametrically opposed to each other, but they are also distinct and set apart even in such
matters as food, lifestyle and clothing. For Muslims to stay among Hindus or in general
environment which in all respects is so different from their own, is as difficult as it is
for 'a fish to stay alive in the desert'. Hinduism with its capacity to absorb all external
elements, poses a constant threat to all other communities, including the Muslims. For
Gilani, then, Muslims cannot live harmoniously with a Hindu majority without their
own traditions and religion coming under grave threat.18 Jammu and Kashmir presently
being a Muslim-majority state within a Hindu-majority country, its political future lies
in freeing itself from Indian control and joining Muslim-majority Pakistan. In this
regard the Kashmiris have, says Gilani, since the Partition of India in 1947 itself, been
consistently demanding the right to join Pakistan, first peacefully, and then, from 1988
onwards, through a mass upsurge against Indian rule.19 The current uprising is, then,
in this sense, only a further extension of earlier, less overt forms of anti-Indian protest.
Gilani maintains that in advancing his 'two nation' theory to justify his plea for the
merger of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan, he is not putting forward any novel
244 Yoginder S. Sikand

claims of his own. Rather, he writes, the leaders of the two principal political parties in
pre-Partition India, the Congress and the Muslim League, had themselves accepted the
'two nation' theory on the basis of which the Muslim state of Pakistan came into being
in 1947.20 The first Indian Prime Minister, Jawahar Lai Nehru, had himself asserted
that, in keeping with its pledges, India would allow the people of Jammu and Kashmir
to decide their own future, thus suggesting, says Gilani, an implicit acceptance and
endorsement of the logic of the 'two nation' theory. Taking into cognizance these
promises, the United Nations had passed numerous resolutions calling for a peaceful
settlement of the Kashmir dispute in line with the wishes of the Kashmiri people. Gilani
argues that not only has India failed to keep its promises and reneged on its pledges to
the United Nations, it has actually gone ahead to unleash a reign of terror in Jammu
and Kashmir, resulting in large-scale violence against civilians. This, he says, is what
has fuelled Kashmiri hostility towards India, culminating in the present mass upsurge.
Besides the large-scale violation of human rights by Indian armed forces in Jammu
and Kashmir, Gilani points to certain other developments within India as a whole that,
from the mid-1980s onwards, apparently led to a rapidly growing resentment among
the people of Kashmir against Indian rule. Gilani thus claims, and he is not the only
one to have done so, that successive elections held in Jammu and Kashmir have been
consistently rigged by the Indian authorities anxious to prevent a genuinely democratic
government from assuming power in the state.21 Pointing to events unfolding beyond
Kashmir itself, Gilani notes the growing power of staunchly anti-Muslim Hindu
chauvinist groups all over India, especially from the mid-1980s onwards, that has
resulted in large-scale violence directed principally against Muslims, in which literally
thousands of Muslims have lost their lives. Consistent efforts are being made, Gilani
contends, to efface every trace of Muslim identity in India. The examples he gives,
ranging from the 'martyrdom' (shahadat) of the beards of some of his fellow Kashmiri
Muslim co-prisoners and their being refused to be allowed by prison authorities to offer
their prayers, 22 to the Hinduization of names of cities and towns, all point, he says, to
a rapidly escalating and increasingly menacing Hindu cultural imperialism. 'Cultural
hegemony (tehzibighalba) is a logical culmination of political supremacy (siyasighalbd)',
23
he notes. All these—denial of the right to political self-determination, rigging of
elections, escalating violation of human rights and the rapidly growing influence of
anti-Muslim Hindu chauvinism—have, then, combined to make for a fast mounting
anti-Indianism in Kashmir that has today taken the form of a militant struggle for
independence from the Indian Union. The JIJK has, therefore, declared the ongoing
mass upsurge as a religious jihad, based on its own evaluation of the situation. Gilani
opines that existing conditions justify declaring the struggle a jihad because, apparently,
the government of India has, in effect and through its actions, proved its 'extreme
hostility to the religious and moral sensibilities [of the Muslims] and to the tenets of
Islam'. Whenever and wherever the laws of Islam are held out for insult and the
religious rights [of the Muslims] are trampled upon, 'jihad becomes a binding duty
(farz) upon all Muslims'. Those Muslims who hesitate to participate in jihad shall be
'struck by great calamities from God (azab-i-ilahi)',24
Defending this jihad from charges of religious terrorism arid indiscriminate violence
against innocent Kashmiri Hindus, Gilani argues that far from being bigoted fanatics or
wild terrorists, truly pious Muslims are, in fact, actually 'friends of [the whole of]
humanity' (tnsan dost) and 'symbols of peace' (aman ka alambardar).25 The jihad in
Kashmir, then, is not directed against non-Muslims, specifically Hindus, as such, but
merely against the Indian state. In actual fact, contends Gilani, the Kashmiri Muslims
 For Islam and Kashmir 245

have always cherished a tradition of peaceful coexistence with Kashmiri Hindus and
Sikhs, and were it not for the unspeakable horrors that they have been forced to
undergo in the past decade this would still have remained the case even today. Pointing
to this long tradition of Kashmiri tolerance, Gilani notes that in sharp contrast to the
rest of the sub-continent, in 1947 when India was divided, Kashmir was a haven of
peace free from inter-communal strife. Even though fierce anti-Muslim pogroms had
broken out in the rest of India in the years after the Partition as well, and still continue
to do so on an increasingly menacing scale, Kashmir remained largely free all the while
from inter-communal violence.26 As for the mass exodus of the Hindu Pandit com-
munity from the Kashmir valley in the wake of the present upsurge in the mid-1980s,
Gilani maintains that this was actually engineered by the Indian authorities themselves
so as to whip up anti-Muslim passions in India and to project the struggle for the
independence of Jammu and Kashmir as yet another instance of 'Islamic terrorism', so
as to win crucial Western support for what he calls India's anti-democratic, inhuman,
barbaric and oppressive suppression of the Kashmiri people.27
In putting forward the case tot jihad against the Indian state, Gilani seeks to deny any
suggestion that the JIJK is an anti-Hindu 'communalist' (firqa parasi) organization.
While in the Rudad-i-Qafas Gilani does come out as a passionate upholder of Islam, he
reveals no rancour against individual Hindus as such. Thus, scattered throughout the
text are snippets of often-friendly conversations with top-level Hindu jail and intelli-
gence department officials. Some of these Gilani praises as good, warm-hearted men,
willing to lend him a ear and patiently listen to his point of view. Interestingly, Gilani
writes that he even sought to convey the message of Islam, the 'invitation to the Truth',
to one of these, a friendly, high caste Hindu official of the Central Intelligence
Department (CID). 28 Elsewhere, Gilani writes of his encounter with a low caste Hindu
servant employed in the jail, who opened up to him, relating to him the horrors of
untouchability and caste oppression that are still a way of life for millions of people in
India today.29 Gilani sees Islam as a solution to these and all other of India's many
social ills,30 but nowhere does he preach hatred and violence against ordinary Hindus
or even against their religion, in marked contrast, it is interesting to note, to leaders of
violently chauvinist anti-Muslim Hindu groups in India.31

Critique of the Present State of the Movement

While fully endorsing the current mass uprising as a jihad, Gilani is not unmindful of
what he sees as serious errors that the movement has been led into in recent years.
Thus, he notes that while in the early 1950s the Islamic movement in Kashmir as
represented by the JIJK was characterized by such a strong sense of unity (yeganeyat),
brotherhood (bhai chard) and comradeship (khulus, muhabbat) that it brought back
'fond memories of the Ansars and Muhajirs [of the Prophet's days]', today 'there has
been a considerable erosion' of that spirit.32 Instead of uniting under a strong political
leadership, the movement has been fractured into some 150-odd groups. The leaders
of each of these groups are all selfishly seeking to 'build their own mosques of
two-and-a-half bricks (dhai int ki masjid)', and refuse to work in tandem with each other
for fear that they might lose their own leadership (sardari), powers and privileges.
Concern for their own petty selves and egos {and) have led them to place their own
interests above those of the Kashmiri people as a whole.33 Fragmentation of the
movement has resulted in a loss of direction, growing indiscipline in the ranks of the
militants and a dispersion of efforts. Gilani quotes, in this regard, Husamuddin, leading
246 Yoginder S. Sikand

activist of the JIJK, as saying that as a result of this infighting and the sidelining by the
militant youth of a mature political leadership, the Kashmiri movement has actually
been almost aborted.34
Central to Gilani's critique of the present state of the Kashmiri struggle is his concern
that the movement, as he sees it, has actually gone out of control of the political
leadership and into the hands of the militant youth (sargaram-i-amal naujawari), who,
although fired by a passionate sense of zeal, have little understanding of the complexity
of the problem as well as the uphill task of resolving it. Lamenting the fact that the
current uprising has failed to proceed according to a 'pragmatic policy' (hikmat-i-
'amalt) and 'balanced methods' (mutazvazan tariq-i-kar), he writes that the youth ought
to have entered the movement under the leadership of a truly Islamic and honest
political leadership (saleh siyasi qayadai)—an obvious reference to the JIJK itself—and
carried on the struggle under its direction and supervision on strict Islamic lines, for
that alone can bring about success. He implicitly recognizes that this has not actually
happened and that the Islamist leadership as represented by the JIJK has proved unable
to establish its overall control over the movement as against other competing groups,
such as the Kashmiri nationalist Jammu and Kashmir liberation Front (JKLF), with
which the JIJK is said to be at fundamental odds. Gilani laments that the youth have
entered the field with much enthusiasm (josh, jazbai) on their own, unfettered by any
authority above them as if they have 'sworn not to accept any political leadership at all'
and 'not to even allow it to emerge'. They have apparently miscalculated the enormity
of the demands of the struggle and the strength of the power they are fighting against,
fondly imagining that their goal would be attained in no time.35 Instead of working on
the political front, they have turned their entire attention to military confrontation with
the Indian armed forces. By giving the gun (banduq) alone as a decisive status (Jaislakun
haisiyat) they have turned for leadership and guidance to those 'with Kalashnikovs
slung on their shoulders and hand-grenades and pistols hidden in their cloaks'. This,
however, has proved to be a costly mistake. Gilani observes that '[a policy of] simply
the gun alone, bereft of virtuous principles (saleh usul) has never, in any period of
history, been able to succeed in either wiping out oppression or establish justice'.
'Mindless [use of] weapons and guns' has only resulted in 'changing the hands that
oppress', and to expect any positive results from such a policy is to 'live in a fool's
paradise'.36
Gilani admits that some militants have indulged, from time to time, in unjustified
acts of violence, thus confirming reports of their involvement in the killings of both
Kashmiri Hindus as well as activists of rival Kashmiri Muslim groups. He condemns
such acts, seeing them as a clear violation of the injunctions of Islam and the rules of
Islamic jihad. In his view, it is the fundamental duty of Muslims to ensure the safety of
all innocent people, men as well as women, Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Protec-
tion of life, property, self-respect (abru, izzat), religion (mazhab) and belief (aqida) must
be extended to all without discrimination.37 Islamic activists in Kashmir should closely
abide by these rules, for not to do so would be going against the very demands of Islam
itself.

Solution to the Kashmir Crisis

Following his analysis of the genesis of the Kashmir problem as well as his critique of
the present state of the struggle, Gilani comes up with his own suggestions to solve the
seemingly intractable dispute. Suggesting that armed conflict alone is not the solution
 For Islam and Kashmir 247

to the problem and that, instead, the militants should have turned to a mature political
leadership for guidance and direction, Gilani believes that a final solution of the
Kashmir issue can only come about at the political level.38 Kashmir, he says, is not
simply a border dispute between India and Pakistan, but a matter of life and death and
a question of the basic human right to political self-determination of some twelve
million people living in the province.39 Consequently, a lasting and meaningful sol-
ution of the Kashmir question cannot be decided by India and Pakistan alone, whether
with or without external third party mediation, but must have the approval of the
representatives of the people of Jammu and Kashmir themselves as well. All three
parties to the dispute—India, Pakistan and the people of Jammu and Kashmir—must
agree on a political solution of the problem.40 Settling, once and for all, the dispute
over which much blood has already been spilled in vain, lasting peace in Kashmir, says
Gilani, is in the vital interests of not just the people of Jammu and Kashmir alone, but
of the people of India and Pakistan as well, whose governments have, owing principally
to the unresolved Kashmir tangle, been forced to engage in a dangerous arms race,
thus diverting scarce resources that could have been used for development purposes
instead.
As a first step towards a solution of tfte Kashmir question Gilani suggests that the
people of Jammu and Kashmir be allowed to exercise the right to determine their own
political future. In such a referendum, they should be allowed to choose to join either
India or Pakistan. Gilani is strongly opposed to the suggestion of the rival JKLF that
they be allowed a third option, i.e. independent status.41 Gilani argues that such an
option has not been envisaged in the various United Nations resolutions on Jammu
and Kashmir. He writes that inclusion of the third option would only suit India and
would probably enable it to annex the whole of Jammu and Kashmir through the
backdoor. In the event of a referendum in which the third option was allowed, India
might be able to actually win, because there would be a division in the votes of
Kashmiri Muslims between supporters of Pakistan and advocates of an independent
Jammu and Kashmir, while the Hindus and Buddhists of the province, along with the
Muslims of Poonch, Rajouri and Jammu, who are culturally closer to them than to the
Kashmiri Muslims, would probably vote en bloc for India.42 Moreover, he says, an
independent Kashmir based on Kashmiri nationalism (Kashmiriyat) shall only serve
the interests of those inimical to Muslim unity, who seek to 'create narrow divisions
within the Muslim ummah (worldwide community) on the basis of regional and
cultural differences'.43 Anyhow, he argues, since, on the basis of the 'two nation'
theory, all Muslims form but one nation, an independent Jammu and Kashmir
separate from Pakistan would be a profound violation of Islam itself.
In the event of a referendum to decide between India or Pakistan, Gilani writes that
the JIJK would make every effort to convince the people of Jammu and Kashmir to
unhesitatingly opt for Pakistan. Not to do so would, apparently, be going against the
injunctions of Islam and the spirit of Muslim brotherhood. Further, Pakistan has, says
Gilani, already sacrificed the lives of many of its soldiers in wars against India simply
for Kashmir, and so for the Kashmiris not to reciprocate that gesture by joining
Pakistan would be to evade their 'moral responsibility' (tkhlaqi zimmedari) for this great
'obligation' (ahsari) that they owe to that country.44 Gilani, however, admits that
Pakistan is far from the truly Islamic state that he claims it was intended by its
founding fathers to be. Recognizing that feudalism, parochialism and corruption are
deeply entrenched in Pakistan,45 he suggests that while uniting with it special measures
should be taken to protect the economic interests of Jammu and Kashmir.46
248 Yoginder S. Sikand

Conclusion
The major point of contention between India and Pakistan, and a direct cause of the
rapid escalation of the arms race in South Asia, the dispute over the province of Jammu
and Kashmir still continues unresolved, with the death toll in violence in the region
mounting by the day. JIJK is playing a major role in the current uprising against Indian
rule in Kashmir. Though little has been written about the JIJK, the prison diaries of its
chief ideologue and one-time amir, Sayyed Ali Gilani, bring to light new facets of the
Kashmiri movement, in particular the role of the JIJK in it, the JIJK leadership's
analysis of the causes of the uprising, its critique of the present state of the movement
as well as its own suggestions for a possible meaningful and permanent resolution of the
crisis. While other Kashmiri groups, as of course, the Indian government as well, may
seriously differ with the JIJK on many issues that Gilani has raised, what is undeniable,
and what all parties to the dispute would probably agree with Gilani on, is that a lasting
solution to the question of Kashmir can only come about through political, not military,
means. The terms that Gilani puts down for entering into political negotiations may not
be acceptable to all, though his offer of shifting the focus of attention from armed
confrontation to the political path could mark a significant beginning in the long and
arduous path to peace in Jammu and Kashmir.

NOTES
1. Although the JIJK was established at the time of the Partition of India in 1947, a number of
Kashmiris had already come into contact with the founder of the Jama'at-i-hlami, Maulana
Maududi, as early as 1937-38. The first cells of the Jama'at in the Jammu province were set up
in 1944 and in 1946 in the Kashmir province. See Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the
Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-i-hlami of Pakistan, London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1994, p.
238.
2. At present the JIJK is a banned organization, having been declared illegal by the Government of
India in April 1990.
3. Mumtaz Ahmad, 'Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jama'at-i-Islami and the Tablighi
Jama'at', in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), Fundamentalisms Observed, Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 1991, pp. 506-507.
4. Nasr writes that in 1948 in the wake of armed hostilities between India and Pakistan over Kashmir,
Maududi had raised a great controversy by declaring that the war was not a jihad. Later, however,
he altered his stand and the Jama'at-i-Islami of Pakistan has after that been the most vocal group
demanding that jihad be declared against India over Kashmir. See Nasr, Vanguard, op. cit., pp.
120-121, 156-157.
5. See, for instance, Kalim Bahadur, The Jama'at-i-Islami of Pakistan: Political Thought and Political
Action, New Delhi: Chetana Publications, 1977, and Nasr, Vanguard, op. cit. Nasr, writes that the
Jama'at-i'Islami exists as eight discrete organizations, one each in Pakistan, India, Pakistani-ruled
Kashmir, Indian-ruled Kashmir, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Britain and North America (Vanguard, op.
cit., p. xiv).
6. Sayyed Ali Gilani, Rudad-i-Qafas (Vols. 1 and 2), Srinagar: al-Huda Publishing House, 1993.
7. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 11.
8. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 18.
9. There is no dearth of material on this subject. For the latest work on the topic and a review of past
writings, see Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Maududi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism, New York and
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
10. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 149.
11. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 158.
12. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 338.
13. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 75-76.
14. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 156-157.
15. It is important to note, however, that Gilani's understanding of the 'two nation' theory coincides
 For Islam and Kashmir 249

with that of Maududi, who differed with the Muslim League's version of the theory which sought
to legitimize Indian Muslim nationalism as the basis of a Muslim state. Maududi, while also
arguing that all Muslims form a single nation, stressed, instead, Islam as the ideology of the
Muslim/Islamic state. See Nasr, Vanguard, op. cit., p. 21, pp. 109-110.
16. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 29.
17. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 239.
18. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 239, 386. Interestingly, Gilani traces the secessionist movements in
other parts of India, including Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Assam and other states in the Northeast to
essentially this growing threat of cultural absorption by Brahminical Hinduism. See Rudad, Vol. 1,
p. 386.
19. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 119.
20. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 103.
21. Sayyed Ali Gilani, Qaul-i-Faisal, 1991, pp. 9-10. This booklet is attached as an appendix to the
second volume of the Rudad-i-Qafas and is a report presented before a tribunal arguing the case
against the banning of the JIJK in 1990.
22. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 125.
23. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 100.
24. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 125.
25. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 332-333.
26. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 332.
27. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 29.
28. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 354-359.
29. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 22-27.
30. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 358.
31. Much has been written on this subject. For a recent intensive study see the essays in David Ludden
(ed.), Contesting the Nation: Religion, Community and the Politics of Democracy in India, Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996.
32. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 48^19.
33. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 376.
34. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 376.
35. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 374-375.
36. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 168.
37. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 168.
38. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 14.
39. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 332.
40. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 333.
41. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 101.
42. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 412.
43. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 412.
44. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 103-104.
45. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 205-206.
46. Rudad, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 109.