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Safety critical elements: Performance standards

development process

Adel OUESLATI

Managing the integrity of critical assets has become increasingly complex as oil and gas
operators struggle to balance operational excellence and asset performance while minimizing
costs and maintaining the highest safety and environmental standards. Risk-based Asset
Management focuses on identifying, mitigating and eliminating risk to provide the proper
application of resources based on asset criticality.
These performance-based standards ensure proper control measures are put in place and
maintained throughout the life cycle of a facility.
The process for developing performance-based standards for critical assets that address
safety and environmental concerns can be divided into two distinct phases:
1. Identify and Analyze Safety-Critical Elements (SCEs).
2. Develop and Apply Performance Standards.

The steps for developing of the performance standards are:

1. Safety-critical elements (SCEs) identification and analysis


1.1. Major accident events (MAEs) identification:
1.2. Safety case development
1.2.1. Facilities description
1.2.1.1. Site-1 facility
1.2.1.2. Site-2 Facilities
1.2.1.3. Existing pipelines network
1.2.1.4. Central Production Facility (CPF)
a. Process Flow Description
 Main Gas separation
 Vapor recovery system
 Dew Pointing Unit
 Export Compressor

1.2.2. Formal safety assessment (FSA)


1.2.2.1. Hazard identification
1.2.2.1.1. General Approach
1.2.2.1.2. Scope
1.2.2.1.3. Selecting the Hazard Identification Technique
a) Hazard identification techniques
 Hazard and operability (HAZOP):
 Cause and effect
 ESD C&E Diagram
 Fire and Gas C&E Diagram
 Checklists
 Historical records of incidents
 Task Analysis
 FMECA and FMEA
 Brainstorming
 Guide word based techniques
 Fault Tree and Event Tree Analysis
1.2.2.1.4. Selecting the Hazard Identification Team
1.2.2.1.5. Scheduling
1.2.2.1.6. Documentation and Linkages
1.2.2.2. Risk assessment
1.2.2.2.1. Qualitative and quantified risk assessment:
1.2.2.2.2. Risk ranking and estimation:
a. Risk assessment Matrix:
b. The bow-tie methodology:
For each severity 5 or high level hazard, the bow-tie methodology allows for:
1. Identification of the hazard release, escalation and consequence scenarios
2. Identification of controls, e.g. barriers and escalation factor controls required to
manage the hazards
3. Categorization of controls into Inherent Safety, Safety Critical Element (hardware) or
Critical activity (procedures, processes, operator action)
4. A clear visual representation to enable the ALARP review to be undertaken
5. An aid in the incident review process if occurrence of such a major incident has
occurred.
 Barrier:
 Consequence:
 Escalation factor:
 Escalation factor control:
 Hazard:
 HSE critical task:
 HSE critical position:
 Major accident hazards (MAH):
 Recovery measures:
 Risk:
 Threat:
 Tolerable risk:
 Top event:

c. Safety Risks:
 Qualitative demonstration of ALARP:
 Quantitative demonstration of ALARP
1.2.2.3. Control measures
a. Using a Hazard management hierarchy to determine control measures:
b. Control measures tools :

Critical drawings include, but are not limited to:


 Cause and Effect matrix
 Hazardous area classification
 Area Layout
 Site plan (sub-field layout)
 Key plan and Plot plan
 Escape routes
 Safety equipment layout
 Critical valve list (including locked open and locked closed valves)
 Fire and Gas layouts.

1.2.3. Safety management system description


1.3. Safety critical elements (SCEs) identification

The hazard management barriers are as follows:


 Structural Integrity
 Process Containment
 Ignition Control
 Detection Systems
 Protection Systems
 Shutdown Systems
 Emergency Response
 Life Saving Equipment
 Safety critical elements selection:

2. development and application of performance standards:


2.1. Performance standards development :
Each Performance Standard describes the required performances in the following terms:
 Functionality.
 Reliability and Availability.
 Survivability and,
 Dependencies and Interactions.
 Functionality:
 Reliability and Availability:
 Survivability:
 Dependencies and Interactions:
2.2. Performance measurement:
2.2.1. Monitoring and measurement:
The board of directors or other senior management controlling body needs to ensure that its
safety and health responsibilities are properly discharged by:
 reviewing its safety and health performance at least annually;
 ensuring the safety statement reflects current board priorities;
 ensuring its safety and health management system provide effective monitoring and
reporting on safety and health performance or when circumstances change;
 appointing someone at senior management level who has executive responsibility for
implementing its safety and health management system;
 ensuring managers at all level take their safety and health responsibilities on board;
 being kept informed about any significant safety and health failures and of the
outcome of the investigations into their causes;
 Ensuring that safety and health risk management systems are in place and remain
effective.

Two types of monitoring are required:


 Active systems that monitor the design, development, installation, and
operation of management arrangements, safety systems, and workplace
precautions;
 Reactive systems that monitor accidents, ill-health, incidents and other
evidence of deficient safety and health performance.

2.2.2. Active monitoring


The monitoring system should include:
 Identification of the appropriate data to be collected and accuracy of the results
required;
 monitoring of the achievement of specific plans, setting performance criteria and
objectives;
 Installation of the requisite monitoring equipment and assessment of its accuracy and
reliability;
 calibration and regular maintenance of this equipment together with documented
records of both the procedures involved and the results obtained;
 Analysis and records of the monitoring data collected, and documented actions to be
taken when results breach performance criteria;
 Evaluation of all the data as part of the safety and health management review;
 Documented procedures for reviewing the monitoring and safety and health
implications of forthcoming changes to work systems.
 The following techniques should be used for active measurement of the safety and
health management system:
 Systematic inspections of workplace processes or services to monitor specific
objectives, e.g. weekly, monthly, or quarterly reports;
 systematic review of the company’s risk assessments to determine whether they are
functioning as intended, need to be updated and any necessary improvements are
being implemented;
 Plant or machinery inspections, e.g. statutory plant inspections and certification;
 Environmental sampling for dusts, chemical fumes, noise, or biological agents;
 Analysis of safety and health management system records.

2.2.3. Reactive monitoring


Those responsible for investigating accidents, and incidents should be identified and the
investigation should include plans for corrective action, which incorporate measures for:
 restoring compliance as quickly as possible;
 preventing recurrence;
 evaluating and mitigating any adverse safety and health effects;
 reviewing the risk assessments to which the accident relates;
 Assessing the effects of the proposed remedial measures.

2.3. Auditing and reviewing performance


2.3.1. Safety and Health Management System Audits
2.3.2. Audit Protocols
2.3.3. Audit Records
2.3.4. Reviewing Performance

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