Computational Social Choice

Preference Aggregation I: Voting and Rank Aggregation

Robert Bredereck, What is a fair voting

Winter term 2022/2023 protocol? What is fair?

How to express
How to aggregate
preference?
different preferences?
What is the best
How to compute winners? voting protocol?
Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice
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Preference Aggregation - General Setting

The General Setting (informal)

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Preference Aggregation - General Setting

The General Setting (informal)

a set of candidates (alternatives)

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Preference Aggregation - General Setting

The General Setting (informal)

a set of candidates (alternatives)
a set of voters

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Preference Aggregation - General Setting

The General Setting (informal)

a set of candidates (alternatives)
a set of voters
voters have preferences over candidates

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Preference Aggregation - General Setting

The General Setting (informal)

a set of candidates (alternatives)
a set of voters
voters have preferences over candidates
we consider mechanisms for finding “winners/losers”, “aggregated ranking”, etc.

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Preference Aggregation - General Setting

The General Setting (informal)

a set of candidates (alternatives)
a set of voters
voters have preferences over candidates
we consider mechanisms for finding “winners/losers”, “aggregated ranking”, etc.
there are certain properties to be fulfilled by the mechanisms

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Preference Aggregation - General Setting

The General Setting (informal)

a set of candidates (alternatives)
a set of voters
voters have preferences over candidates
we consider mechanisms for finding “winners/losers”, “aggregated ranking”, etc.
there are certain properties to be fulfilled by the mechanisms
. . . these mechanisms have to be applied in reasonable time!

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Example: Select a Place for a Meeting
Choose between the following places:

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Example: Select a Place for a Meeting
Choose between the following places:
Big Blue Button (B),

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Example: Select a Place for a Meeting
Choose between the following places:
Big Blue Button (B),
Zoom.us (Z),

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Example: Select a Place for a Meeting
Choose between the following places:
Big Blue Button (B),
Zoom.us (Z),
Jitsi (J),

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Example: Select a Place for a Meeting
Choose between the following places:
Big Blue Button (B),
Zoom.us (Z),
Jitsi (J),
Skype (S),

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Example: Select a Place for a Meeting
Choose between the following places:
Big Blue Button (B),
Zoom.us (Z),
Jitsi (J),
Skype (S),
Hangouts (H).
Four students have the following rankings:

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Example: Select a Place for a Meeting
Choose between the following places:
Big Blue Button (B),
Zoom.us (Z),
Jitsi (J),
Skype (S),
Hangouts (H).
Four students have the following rankings:
B � J � Z � S � H
H � J � Z � S � B
Z � J � B � H � S
B � S � H � Z � J

Which place should be selected? It depends... � voting protocols

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice
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Types of Voting Protocols I
B � J � Z � S � H
H � J � Z � S � B
Z � J � B � H � S
B � S � H � Z � J

Voting protocols based on positional scoring:

Plurality: The winners are the candidates who are most often ranked first place.

candidiate: B J Z S H
#1st place: 2 0 1 0 1

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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 k=4 Z wins
Types of Voting Protocols I
with m candidates,
k=2 J wins
B � J � Z � S � H (m-1)-Approval
k=3 B,J,Z are H � J � Z � S � B is also called Veto
tied winners Z � J � B � H � S
B � S � H � Z � J

Voting protocols based on positional scoring:

Plurality: The winners are the candidates who are most often ranked first place.
k-Approval: The winners are the candidates who are most often ranked in one of
the first k positions.
1-Approval = Plurality
candidiate: B J Z S H
#place k: 2 3 3 3 3 3 1 3 4 1 1 3 1 2 3
m-Approval is useless...
Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice
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 Types of Voting Protocols I
B J Z S H 4 3 2 1 0
9 9 5 7 B � J � Z � S � H
10
H � J � Z � S � B
Z � J � B � H � S
B � S � H � Z � J

Voting protocols based on positional scoring:

Plurality: The winners are the candidates who are most often ranked first place.
k-Approval: The winners are the candidates who are most often ranked in one of
the first k positions.
Borda: The winners are the candidates who have the maximum number of total
points, where for m candidates position 1 in the ranking gives m − 1 points,
position 2 gives m − 2 points, and so on.
Candidate B wins.
Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice
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Types of Voting Protocols I
B � J � Z � S � H
H � J � Z � S � B
Z � J � B � H � S
B � S � H � Z � J

Voting protocols based on positional scoring:

Plurality: The winners are the candidates who are most often ranked first place.
k-Approval: The winners are the candidates who are most often ranked in one of
the first k positions.
Borda: The winners are the candidates who have the maximum number of total
points, where for m candidates position 1 in the ranking gives m − 1 points,
position 2 gives m − 2 points, and so on.
For scoring protocols, winner determination is easy!
Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice
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Types of Voting Protocols II
S � E � W � A � H
H � E � W � A � S
W � E � S � H � A
S � A � H � W � E

Voting protocols based on pairwise comparisons:

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Types of Voting Protocols II
S � E � W � A � H
H � E � W � A � S
W � E � S � H � A
S � A � H � W � E

Voting protocols based on pairwise comparisons:

Pairs of candidates # votes: x � y # votes: y � x
(x, y ) = (S, E) 2 2
(x, y ) = (S, W) 2 2
(x, y ) = (S, A) 3 1
(x, y ) = (S, H) 3 1
(x, y ) = (E, W) 2 2
(x, y ) = (E, A) 3 1
(x, y ) = (E, H) 2 2
(x, y ) = (W, A) 3 1
(x, y ) = (W, H) 2 2
(x, y ) = (A, H) 2 2

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Types of Voting Protocols II
S � E � W � A � H
H � E � W � A � S
W � E � S � H � A
S � A � H � W � E

Voting protocols based on pairwise comparisons:

Maximin: Winner is arg maxc miny # votes: c � y .
S E W A H Maximin score
2 2 2 1 1

S, E, and W are tied winners.

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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 Types of Voting Protocols II
S � E � W � A � H
H � E � W � A � S
W � E � S � H � A
S � A � H � W � E

Voting protocols based on pairwise comparisons:

Maximin: Winner is arg maxc miny # votes: c � y .
Copelandα : Assign 1 point for each won pairwise comparison and α ∈ [0, 1] points
for each tie.
W A H S E W A H
S E α=0 S wins.
α=1 1 0 0
4 4 1 3 2 1
4
S E W A H
S, E, and W are tied winners. α=0.5 S win.
Robert Bredereck
3 2.5 2.5 0.5 1.5 Computational Social Choice
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 Types of Voting Protocols III
B � J � Z � S � H
H � J � Z � S � B
Z � J � B � H � S
B � S � H � Z � J
Multi-Stage rules:
Plurality with Runoff: First round: Keep the two candidates that occur most
frequently at the first position. Second round: Take the candidate winning the head
to head contest as winner.
or

1st round: B and H 1st round B and Z

B wins. B and Z are tied winners.

Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice

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Types of Voting Protocols III
B � J � Z � S � H
H � J � Z � S � B
Z � J � B � H � S
B � S � H � Z � J
Multi-Stage rules:
Plurality with Runoff: First round: Keep the two candidates that occur most
frequently at the first position. Second round: Take the candidate winning the head
to head contest as winner.
Single Transferable Vote: In each round: Remove the candidate that occurs least
frequently at the first position. The last remaining candidate is the winner.

Now, what follows in this example is the same as in for Plurality

with Runoff.
Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice
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Types of Voting Protocols III
B � J � Z � S � H
H � J � Z � S � B
Z � J � B � H � S
B � S � H � Z � J
Multi-Stage rules:
Plurality with Runoff: First round: Keep the two candidates that occur most
frequently at the first position. Second round: Take the candidate winning the head
to head contest as winner.
Single Transferable Vote: In each round: Remove the candidate that occurs least
frequently at the first position. The last remaining candidate is the winner.
Homework: Can you find your own,
=⇒ ties may have a huge influence!
novel voting rule definition/concept?
What are desirable properties of voting rules?
Robert Bredereck Computational Social Choice
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