BOOK REVIEWS 333

contemporaries; Williams does not mention that Rousseau’s bones were later disinterred and re-buried in
the Pantheon. He is pre-eminently ‘modern’ in having given birth to ‘ideology’, the rhetorical
transformation of historical presentation into a plot involving a demonized ‘other’ bordering on a
conspiracy theory, designed to propel society towards revolution.
Rousseau was mature enough in his Platonism to see that it involved a series of painful ‘conversions’ by
which the individual turned ‘within’ and remade himself according to progressively higher patterns;
however, his view of the unfolding of man’s ‘natural’ condition was dire to the point of being gnostic;
working one’s way back from such a great distance would be extremely difficult, and certainly justified
anger at whatever ‘creator god’ placed us in this parlous condition. Despite his early success in music and
writing an opera, Rousseau’s personality displays an unsociable or churlish streak that grew more
pronounced as he grew older; there may have been an element of mental illness present from the
beginning. In his prize winning essay he provocatively proposes that the arts and sciences have brought
about the corruption rather than the elevation of society. His later blanket condemnation of the theatre
would never lead one to suppose that he lived during an era when the works of Corneille, Racine, and
Molière were being performed.
In his ‘state of nature’ he specifies that people originally lived happily as hermits, without social
communication. Natural catastrophes then drove them into society, which was a ‘fall’. ‘Everyone
began to look at everyone else and to wish to be looked at himself, and public esteem acquired a price. The
one who sang or danced best, the handsomest, the strongest, the most skillful, or the most eloquent
came to be the most highly regarded, and this was the first step at once toward inequality and vice.’
(quoted p. 240) This is the ‘original sin’ of society which is constitutional and universal, that eventually
gives rise to the lust for domination that brings about the class system, and which no ‘revolution’ can
remove. It seems contradictory to claim that a ‘Platonic’ conversion can overcome or reverse it. But here
the old adage applies, the first person a preacher is preaching to is – himself. The pressure of society, the
desire to ingratiate himself and be accepted especially into aristocratic circles, was something
this mis-born Swiss youth who was a psychological orphan never successfully accomplished or
accommodated. His high-born mother died before he could know her, and his low-born father was forced
to move literally ‘down’ to the banks of Lake Geneva and apprentice Jean-Jacques to a cruel printer.
Rousseau began with a strong sense of injured merit and unrecognized entitlement, of having been passed
over and shabbily treated by the patricians of his home canton. He embarked on an aggressive program of
social-climbing, only to be surprised and eventually frustrated and embittered at the rebuff he received
and refusal of admittance by the upper classes. In his works he returned the compliment and took his
revenge.

Heythrop College Patrick Madigan

Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love: Evil, Rationality, and the Drive for Recognition. By Frederick Neuhouser.
Pp. xii, 279, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, $70.00.

This work does an admirable job of clarifying the central notion of Rousseau’s philosophy, amour-propre,
by placing it within the context of a theodicy. It is arguably the first comprehensive treatment of
Rousseau’s theory of amour-propre, or, the desire for recognition in the eyes of other human beings. By
relating the theory to theodicy specifically, Neuhouser is able to highlight the uniqueness of Rousseau’s
theory of evil in two ways: Rousseau locates moral evil in the actions that follow from maligned
manifestations of the human drive for recognition rather than in the designs of nature; and, Rousseau
locates the possibility for redemption in human institutions geared towards reshaping those motivations
such that proper relations amongst human beings can be established through the cultivation of the
standpoint of reason from the positive resources offered by amour-propre.
Neuhouser follows thinkers like N.J.H. Dent and Timothy O’Hagan who challenge the orthodox
readings of Rousseau’s theory of amour-propre by maintaining that it has a dual nature over and above
the primary distinction of Rousseau’s philosophy, i.e., amour-propre and amour-de-soi. Inflamed amour-
propre issues forth in complex relations of dominance and superiority, while in its healthy form, it is a
neutral drive for esteem in relation to others of equal standing and does not necessarily lead to dangerous
senses of recognition and the evil actions that they inspire. Neuhouser argues that Rousseau holds that
amour-propre not only presents the motivation for evil but that it also presents remedies for that very evil.
334 BOOK REVIEWS

When cultivated in relation to pity and self-love, it can play a useful role in forming human beings into
rational subjects, an insight that stays true to Rousseau’s suggestion that it is both a dangerous and useful
phenomenon. Rousseau’s theodicy then locates both the capacity for moral evil and its redemption in
amour-propre, which is to say that redemption stems from the same origin as the cause.
The organization of the book follows from the main argument. The first part presents Rousseau’s
theory of human nature and locates the rise of amour-propre within the context of the narrative provided
in the Discourse on the Origins of Inequality and various passages of Emile. A nuanced discussion follows,
which broadens the concept’s meaning beyond the orthodox reading in order to pave the way for
unearthing its positive potentialities. The second part focuses on inflamed amour-propre specifically in
terms of a diagnosis, the remedies for which follow in the last two parts. The third part deals with
Rousseau’s social and political remedies for its inflamed incarnation and the role of domestic education in
shaping individuals as rational subjects. The fourth part deals with the potential for amour-propre to
provide the resources for rational subjectivity.
It follows from Neuhouser’s interpretation that the remedies offered by Rousseau for inflamed amour-
propre in part three and four are less radical than sometimes proposed. Social, political, and educational
institutions cannot be aimed at simply eradicating the evils that follow from amour-propre in their
entirety, as a less nuanced reading of Rousseau might suggest. Instead, they have to be understood to limit
them by striking a balance between the potential for the good and evil consequences of amour-propre.
In the fourth part of the book then, Neuhouser explores the positive potential of Rousseau’s account of
amour-propre. His claim is that it provides human subjects with the resources necessary for rationality,
morality, and freedom, all of which are necessary for subjectivity. Understanding oneself through
relations to others makes it possible to compare, empathize, and determine one’s ends within the context
of the human world. In other words, to be a self capable of reasoning, acting morally, and acting freely
requires that one situate oneself in relation to others, no less so than relations of dominance, superiority,
or, alienation. The former perspective entails situating oneself in such a way that the rational standpoint
contextualizes the self, while the latter entails that the self puts itself outside of community with others. In
this way, what Neuhouser calls ‘the standpoint of reason,’ entails a healthy form of amour-propre held in
check through the counterweight of the rightful demands of human community that shape subjectivity.
In the conclusion, Neuhouser focuses on a limitation of Rousseau’s account. As a description of the
source of human evil, it is overly simplistic. It is not Rousseau’s justification for the original innocence of
human nature in the face of evil, but his designation of the locus of a complex phenomenon like evil in one
source that Neuhouser ultimately finds tenuous.
While Neuhouser’s book may appeal to philosophers of religion, political theorists, thinkers interested
in psychology, and interpersonal communications, it should appeal to Rousseau scholars especially. It is
one of the most nuanced and comprehensive studies of Rousseau’s theory of amour-propre available
today. His treatment of the theory is persuasive, and he stays true to Rousseau’s thought. Neuhouser’s
treatment offers a unified analysis of Rousseau’s work in the tradition of thinkers like Ernst Cassirer and
Jean Starobinski who attempt to offer comprehensive accounts of Rousseau’s system. Rousseau scholars
will also find much that will inspire lively dispute here, especially those who are apt to understand amour-
propre as exclusively negative.
While Neuhouser’s scholarship is remarkably solid, situating the concept of amour-propre historically
would be beneficial, since it would allow the reader to see what is unique in Rousseau’s appropriation of
it. Of course, in general, the treatment of Rousseau’s work in relation to religious concepts like theodicy is
a start in the direction of understanding his thought in relation to the religious concepts that he tended to
appropriate to secular ends. However, much can be gained by comparing his work with his predecessors
like Pascal who discusses amour-propre extensively. In fairness, this is not Neuhouser’s primary intention,
since he returns to Rousseau in order to shed light on the problems of recognition, domination, and
violence, which continue to appear in nineteenth and twentieth century continental philosophy.

Southern Illinois University Carbondale Jeff Linz

Kant and Skepticism. By Michael N. Forster. Pp. x, 154, Princeton University Press, 2008, $29.95.

Forster’s aims in the first part of Kant and Scepticism are to clarify what kind of skepticism motivates and
concerns Kant (in the Critique of Pure Reason) and outline how Kant deals with such skepticism. Forster
argues that Kant is concerned with those varieties of skepticism that threaten metaphysics – Humean and