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POLITICAL AND PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

2024 Bar Examinations
Office of the Bar Chairperson

I. 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

A. Definition, Nature, and Concepts of the Constitution (start 1/2/2024)

1. Declaration of Principles
a. Democracy and Republicanism

SECTION 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State.

Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.

NOTES (Nachura):

Essential features: representation and renovation.

Manifestations:
● Ours is a government of laws, and not of men.

● Rule of the majority. (plurality in elections)

● Accountability of public officials.

● Bill of Rights.

● Legislature cannot pass irrepealable laws.

● Separation of powers.

Purpose: To prevent concentration of authority in one person or group of persons

that might lead to an irreversible error or abuse in its exercise to the detriment of
republican institutions. (Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Public Service
Commission)

CASES:
1. La Bugal-B’Laan Tribal Association v. Ramos

⮚ Court restrained itself from intruding into policy matters to

allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using
mineral resources of our country in securing the assistance of foreign
groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer
their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country.
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Application: interdependence.

CASES:
1. Maceda v. Vasquez (221 SCRA 464)
⮚ In the absence of any administrative action taken against the RTC Judge
by SC with regard to the former’s certificate of service, the investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Supreme Court’s
power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. (A
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers)

Principle of Blending of Powers.

⮚ Instances when powers are not confined exclusively within one
department but are assigned to or shared by several departments

⮚ Ex. enactment of general appropriations law.

Principle of Checks and Balances.

⮚ allows one department to resist encroachments upon its prerogatives or
to rectify mistakes or excesses committed by the other departments

⮚ Ex. veto power of the President as check on improvident legislation

CASES:
1. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139

 Note that when the court mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries

or invalidates the acts of a coordinate body, what it upholds is not its
own superiority but the supremacy of the Constitution.

The first and safest criterion to determine whether a given power has been
validly exercised by a particular department is:

 whether or not the power has been constitutionally conferred upon the
department claiming its exercise since the conferment is usually done
expressly.

 Even in the absence of express conferment, the exercise of the power

may be justified under the doctrine of necessary implication, i.e. that
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the grant of an express power carries with it all other powers that may
be reasonably inferred from it.

 There are powers which although not expressly conferred/implied, are

inherent or incidental (because it is an act of the State)

o President’s power to deport undesirable aliens (through

Immigration)
o Marcos v. Manglapus – SC justified Cory’s banning of the
return of the Marcoses to the Philippines (President’s residual
powers)

Political and Justiciable Questions

CASES:
1. Casibang v. Aquino, 92 SCRA 642

 A purely justiciable question implies a given right, legally

demandable, and enforceable, an act or omission violative of such
right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law for said breach
of right.

2. Tatad v. Secretary of Energy

 What the petitioners raised were justiciable questions.

 Statement of facts and definition of issues clearly show that the
petitioners are assailing R.A. 8180 because its provisions infringe
the Constitution.

3. Tanada v Angara

 petition seeking the nullification of the Senate concurrence of the

President’s ratification of the Agreement establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO), was held to present a justiciable
controversy.

 Where an action is alleged to infringe the Constitution, it becomes

not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.

Political Question
⮚ A question of policy

CASES:
1. Tanada v Cuenco, 100 Phil 1101
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⮚ questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people

in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
government.

⮚ concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a

particular measure.

2. Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

⮚ Senator Defensor-Santiago questioned the election of Senator Guingona

as Minority Floor Leader

⮚ SC: “it has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that
exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it
is bound to protect and uphold --- the very duty that justifies the Court’s
being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign
acts of a co-equal branch prevent this Court from prying into the
internal workings of the Senate.”

⮚ SC: “This Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will
remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and the majesty of
the law.”

3. Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization

 SC: “The decision of PNOC to privatize Petron and the approval of

such by the Committee on Privatization, being in accordance with
Proclamation No. 50, cannot be reviewed by the Courts, because
such acts are an exercise of executive functions over which the
Court will not pass judgment nor inquire into the wisdom of.”

NOTE: The scope of the political question doctrine has been limited by the 2nd
paragraph, Sec. 1, Art. VIII,

particularly the portion which vests in the judiciary the power “to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government”.

Delegation of Powers
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Rule: “Potestas delegate non potest delegare”

 delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed

by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and
not through the intervening mind of another.

b. Renunciation of War

SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of

national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with
all nations.

NOTES: RedGelo and Nachura

Two constitutional provisions incorporate or transform portions of international

law into the domestic sphere, namely:

(1) Article II, Section 2, which embodies the incorporation method; and
(2) Article VII, Section 21, which covers the transformation method.
[PANGILINAN VS. CAYETANO, G.R. No. 238875/G.R. No. 239483/G.R. No. 240954.
March 16, 2021, EN BANC]

Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere
of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation.

The TRANSFORMATION INCORPORATION METHOD

METHOD
requires that an international
law be transformed into a
domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such
as local legislation.
[Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines v.
Duque, G.R. No. 173034,
October 9, 2007]
applies when, by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to
have the force of domestic law
[Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of
the Philippines v. Duque, G.R. No. 173034,
October 9, 2007]
applied whenever municipal tribunals or
local courts are confronted with situations in
which there appears to be a conflict between
a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of
the local state. Efforts should first be exerted
to harmonize them, so as to give effect to
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both.

NOTE: where the conflict is irreconcilable

and a choice has to be made between a rule
of international law and municipal law,
jurisprudence dictates that municipal law
should be upheld by the municipal courts.
[Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of
the Philippines v. Duque, G.R. No. 173034,
October 9, 2007]

generally accepted principles of

international law, by virtue of the
INCORPORATION CLAUSE of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the
land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations.

Generally accepted principles of

international law include international
custom as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law, and general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations. [Poe-
Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697,
2016]

By virtue of this clause, our Courts have

applied the rules of international law in a
number of cases even if such rules had not
previously been subject of statutory
enactments, because these generally
accepted principles of international law are
automatically part of our own laws.
[Nachura]

International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the

combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion
juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is
a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a
rule of law requiring it. [Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, 2016].

NOTES: Nachura
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The historical development of the policy condemning or outlawing war in the
international scene:

a) Covenant of the League of Nations, which provided conditions for the right to
go to war;

b) Kelloqq-Briand Pact of 1928. also known as the General Treaty for the
Renunciation of War, ratified by 62 states, which forbade war “as an instrument
of national policy”

c) Charter of the United Nations. Art. 2 of which prohibits the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State.

“Generally Accepted Principles of International Law”

 refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding

on all states

 e.g., renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, sovereign

immunity, a person’s right to life, liberty, and due process, and pacta sunt
servanda [Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque,
G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007]

NOTE: where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a
rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. [Pharmaceutical and
Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque, G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007]

CASES:
1. Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil 115

⮚ The reason given by the Court was that the Retail Trade National
Law was passed in the exercise of the police power which cannot
be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract.

2. Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 and In Re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984

⮚ on the basis of separation of powers and the rule-making powers

of the Supreme Court, respectively.

⮚ Courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by

it in all circumstances.
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3. Gonzales v. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 and In Re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984

⮚ on the basis of separation of powers and the rule-making powers

of the Supreme Court, respectively.

⮚ Courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by

it in all circumstances.

4. Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000, citing
Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed.

⮚ As applied in most countries, the doctrine of incorporation

dictates that rules of international law are given equal standing
with, and not superior to, national legislative enactments.
⮚ Accordingly, the principle of lex posterior derogat priori takes effect.

⮚ In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the
Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if
they are in conflict with the constitution

5. Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000, citing Salonga
& Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed.

⮚ The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land
does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national
law in the municipal sphere.

c. Supremacy of Civilian Authority over Military

SECTION 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the

military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the
people and the State. Its goal is to secure the sovereignty of the State
and the integrity of the national territory.

SECTION 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and

protect the people. The Government may call upon the people to
defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be
required, under conditions provided by law, to render personal
military or civil service.

Related provision:
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ARTICLE VII
Executive Department

SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed

forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it,
he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation
or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion
or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any
need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any

citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and
must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over
civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with the invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.

Section 4 - This is an exception to involuntary servitude under Sec 18 of the Bill of

Rights.
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CASES:

1. IBP VS. ZAMORA, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000

⮚ The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the

civilian supremacy clause.

The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of

military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the
Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately
circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the
provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the metes and
bounds of the Marines’ authority.

It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of
the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the
PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the
PNP - Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. In view of the
foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is
supreme over civilian authority.

Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not
unmake the civilian character of the police force.

Right to Bear Arms [Chavez v. Romulo, GR 157036, 6.9.2004]

⮚ a statutory, not a constitutional right.

⮚ The license to carry a firearm is neither a property nor a property right.

Neither does it create a vested right.

⮚ Even if it were a property right, it cannot be considered absolute as to be

placed beyond the reach of police power.
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⮚ The maintenance of peace and order, and the protection of the people
against violence are constitutional duties of the State, and the right to
bear arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with these
constitutional duties.

⮚ The first real firearms law is Act No. 1780, enacted by the Philippine
Commission on October 12, 1907, to regulate the importation,
acquisition, possession, use and transfer of firearms. Thereafter,
President Marcos issued P.D. 1856, which was amended by R.A. 8294.
Being a mere statutory creation, the right to bear arms cannot be
considered an inalienable or absolute right.

2. State Policies
a. Independent Foreign Policy

SECTION 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In

its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be
national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the
right to self-determination.

Related provision:

Art. II. SECTION 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national

interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear
weapons in its territory.

CASES:

1. Lim v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 151445, April 11, 2002

⮚ SC: these provisions, along with Sec. 2, Art. II, Sec. 21, Art. VII, and Sec.
26, Art. XVIII, betray a marked antipathy towards foreign military
presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general.

⮚ The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the

civilian supremacy clause.

NOTES: RedGelo
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DISTINCTION BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SELF-

DETERMINATION

Self-determination

⮚ denotes the legal right of people to decide their own destiny in the
international order.

⮚ a core principle of international law, arising from customary

international law, but also recognized as a general principle of law, and
enshrined in a number of international treaties.

⮚ For instance, self-determination is protected in the United Nations

Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as a
right of “all peoples.”
[law.cornell.edu/wex/self_determination_(international_law)] All
peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic,
social and cultural development. [Article 1, Par. 1, UNCICCPR]

⮚ The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having

responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust
Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-
determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. [Article 1, Par. 2,
UNCICCPR]

Self-determination has two aspects, internal and external.

Internal self- External self-determination

determination
right of the people of a right of peoples to determine
state to govern their own political status and to
themselves without be free of alien domination,
outside interference. including formation of their own
independent state

BASIS: The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations with
other states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial
integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination. [SEC. 07, Article II]
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b. Social Justice

SECTION 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order
that will ensure the prosperity and independence of the nation and
free the people from poverty through policies that provide adequate
social services, promote full employment, a rising standard of living,
and an improved quality of life for all.

SECTION 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of
national development.

SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights.

NOTES: RedGelo

Concept of Social Justice

⮚ The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures

that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good. To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition,
ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments. [SEC 1,
ART XIII]

⮚ The promotion of social justice shall include the commitment to create

economic opportunities based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
[SEC 2, ART XIII]

CONCEPT: Social justice is:

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⮚ "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but
the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic
forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
secular conception may at least be approximated.

⮚ means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by
the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of
all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a
proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of
measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the
exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the
time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex.

⮚ must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence

among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that
should be equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined
force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental
and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort,
and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the
greatest number." [CALALANG VS. WILLIAMS]

The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply

because it is committed by the underprivileged. At best it may mitigate the
penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassion for the poor is
an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a
rascal claiming an undeserved privilege.

Social justice cannot be permitted to be refuge of scoundrels any more than can
equity be an impediment to the punishment of the guilty. Those who invoke
social justice may do so only if their hands are clean and their motives
blameless and not simply because they happen to be poor. This great policy of
our Constitution is not meant for the protection of those who have proved they
are not worthy of it, like the workers who have tainted the cause of labor with the
blemishes of their own character. [International School Manila v. International School
Alliance of Educators]

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1987 PhilCon Art. XIII Sec 17-18-19)

HUMAN RIGHTS - Section 17.

1 There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission

7 on Human Rights.

(
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1
)
1
7 The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four
Members who must be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
( and a majority of whom shall be members of the Bar. The term
2 of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members of
) the Commission shall be provided by law.

1
7
Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential
Committee on Human Rights shall continue to exercise its present
(
functions and powers.
3
)
1
7
The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be
( automatically and regularly released.
4
)
Carpentero Notes
- recommendation to the prosecution only
- not a quasi-judicial body; Can only investigate, not adjudicate
- CHR exists only because of the 1987 constitution, it is a mandate (their budget
depends upon the Congress)
- Can only refer to the City Prosecutor and file information before the Court

CHR
- Creation of the Constitution
- Cannot altogether be dispensed by Congress
- Given fiscal autonomy
- Not on the same level as ConComms of ART IX (full operationalization will
require congressional action)
- CHR is only limited to Civil (rights for being a member of the community) and
Political rights (rights which allow us to participate in affairs of the state). Both
rights are covered by Bill of Rights.

Organization of CHR . [SEC 17(2), ART XIII]

- 1 chairman, 4 members
- Natural born PHL citizens
- Majority shall be members of the Bar
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HUMAN RIGHTS - Section 18.

The Commission on Human Rights shall have the

following powers and functions:
1
8

(
1 Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of
) human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
1
8

( Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite

2 for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of
) Court;
1
8 Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human
rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos
( residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal
3 aid services to the under-privileged whose human rights have
) been violated or need protection;
1
8

(
4 Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention
) facilities;
1
8

(
5 Establish a continuing program of research, education, and
) information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
1
8

( Recommend to Congress effective measures to promote human

6 rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of
) human rights, or their families
1 Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with
8 international treaty obligations on human rights;

(
7
 2
)
1 Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony
8 or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary
or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
( conducted by it or under its authority;
8
)
1
8

(
9 Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
) agency in the performance of its functions;
1
8

(
1
0
) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
1
8

(
1
1 Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by
) law.
HUMAN RIGHTS - Section 19.

The Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that
should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its
recommendations.
- Principal function: investigatory
- Beyond investigation, it will have to rely on DOJ which has full control over
prosecutions
- Scope of investigation: all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights, whether committed by public officers, civilians or rebels
- Its rules of procedure MUST NOT violate the Rules of Court, but is not strictly
bound by judicial procedural rules
- Has power to cite for contempt
- Allowed to visit, not allowed to release
- Can grant immunity to witnesses and can help shape scope of authority
through Sec 19
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CHR HAS NO ADJUDICATION POWERS.

CASES:

1. Cariño v. CHR

⮚ The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the

power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and
determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do.
To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge.

2. EPZA v. CHR

⮚ The Commission is not a court of justice or a quasi-judicial body. The

Commission cannot try and resolve cases on merits as it is not within its
power to investigate. Its power to investigate is only factfinding. When
providing preventive measures, it can file a case before a court to
represent victims.

c. Sanctity of Family and Vital Role of Youth in Nation-Building

SECTION 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.

SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in
nation-building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It shall inculcate in the
youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement
in public and civic affairs.

CASES:

1. SPARK v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, 2017, EN BANC

 Quezon City’s imposed curfew does not violate Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution because the curfew was done within the role of the
State as parens patriae. While parents have a primary role in raising a
child, “when actions concerning the child have a relation to the public
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welfare or the well-being of the child, the State may act to promote
these legitimate interests”, especially in cases that may bring harm to a
child or to public safety.

 This overrides a parent’s right to control upbringing of a child. The State

is mandated to support parents in exercise of rights and duties, and state
authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather complementary to
parental supervision.

 The Curfew Ordinances merely serve as legal restrictions designed to

aid parents in promoting their child’s welfare. Though these are
inherently limiting on the part of the minor, this is necessary because the
youth is vulnerable and inexperienced, and “their moral well-being is
likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making detrimental
decisions”

2. IMBONG VS. OCHOA, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014

 WHEN LIFE BEGINS; The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization.

 Consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in

line with the principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its
constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules
must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion.

 Thus, the word "primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR

should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G)
of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the
primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the
floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy
the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."

 In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) should be

struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent
to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right
of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical
procedures." Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the
case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)
(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of
parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
 2
3. People v. Larin, G.R. No. 128777, October 7, 1998

 R.A. 7610, which penalizes child prostitution and other sexual abuses,
was enacted in consonance with the policy of the State to “provide
special protection to children from all forms of abuse”. Thus, the Court
grants the victim full vindication and protection granted under the law.

B. Amendment and Revision (1987 CONST., art. XVII, secs. 1-4; R.A. No.
6735)
ARTICLE XVII
Amendments or Revisions

SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may

be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.

SECTION 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be

directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at
least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of
which every legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of
this Constitution nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.

The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of

this right.

SECTION 3. The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its

Members, call a constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all
its Members, submit to the electorate the question of calling such a
convention.

SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under

Section 1 hereof shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days nor
later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or
revision.

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof shall be valid when ratified by

a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier
than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the certification by the
Commission on Elections of the sufficiency of the petition.
 2

Article XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the

Constitution. The first mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all
its Members. The second mode is through a constitutional convention. The third
mode is through a people's initiative.

Amendment vs. Revision: Lambino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 174153, October 25,
2006

AMENDMENT
broadly refers to a change that
adds, reduces, deletes, without
altering the basic principle
involved
REVISION
broadly implies a change
that alters a basic principle
in the Constitution, like
altering the principle of
separation of powers or the
system of checks and
balances

change alters the

substantial entirety of the
Constitution, as when the
change affects substantial
provisions of the
constitution

amendment generally affects generally affects several

only the specific provision provisions of the
being amended. Constitution

TEST TO DETERMINE IF AMENDMENT OR REVISION: TWO-PART TEST

1. QUANTITATIVE TEST

 asks whether the proposed change is so extensive in its provisions as to

change directly the “substance entirety of the Constitution by the
deletion or alteration of numerous provisions.

 The court examines only the number of provisions affected

 2
 Does not consider the degree of change

2. QUALITATIVE TEST

 asks whether the whether the change will accomplish such far-reaching
changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision

 inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in the

constitution.

APPLICATION OF THE LAMBINO CASE

The Lambino proposal constituted a revision, not simply an amendment, of the

Constitution, because:

 it involved a change in the form of government, from presidential to

parliamentary, and
 a shift from the present bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

Thus, "a change in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" includes "change
in its fundamental framework or the fundamental powers of its Branches." A
change in the nature of the basic governmental plan also includes changes that
"jeopardize the traditional form of government and the system of check and
balances."

Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's proposed changes overhaul two articles -

Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the Executive - affecting a total of
105 provisions in the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed changes
alter substantially the basic plan of government, from presidential to
parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.

A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when

the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are
reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift
from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary
system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and executive
branches is a radical change in the structure of government. The abolition alone
of the Office of the President as the locus of Executive Power alters the separation
of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise, the
abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system of checks-and-
balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the Constitution.

Steps in the amendatory process:

 2
1. Proposal
2. Ratification

a) Proposal The adoption of the

[Secs. 1-3, Art. XVII]. suggested change in the
Constitution.
A proposed amendment may come from:

i.) Congress, by a vote of 3/4s of all its members. Majority of authorities opine
that this is to be understood as 3 /4 of the Senate and 3 /4 of the House of
Representatives.

 See Occena v. Comelec, 104 SCRA 1, which is authority for the principle
that the choice of method of proposal, i.e., whether made directly by
Congress or through a Constitutional Convention, is within the full
discretion of the legislature.

ii) Constitutional Convention, which may be called into existence either by:
- a 2/3 vote of all the members of Congress, or
- (if such vote is not obtained) by a majority vote of all the members of Congress
- with the question of whether or not to call a Convention to be resolved by the
people in a plebiscite [Sec. 3, Art. XVII].

 Three Theories on the position of a Constitutional Convention vis-a-

vis the regular departments of government:

(1) Theory of Conventional Sovereignty

(2) Convention is inferior to the other departments
(3) Independent of and co-equal to the other departments [Mabanag v.
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1]

iii) People, through the power of initiative [Sec. 2, Art. XVI].

 Requisite: A petition of at least 12% of the total number of registered

voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least
3% of the registered voters therein.

 Limitation: No amendment in this manner shall be authorized within

five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor more often
than once every five years thereafter.

 Under Republic Act No. 6735 [An Act Providing for a System of Initiative
and Referendum], approved on August 4, 1989, initiative is the power of
 2
the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose
and enact legislation through an election called for the purpose.

 There are three systems of initiative, namely:

1. initiative on the Constitution - which refers to a petition proposing

amendments to the Constitution;

2. initiative on statutes - which refers to a petition proposing to enact a

national legislation; and

3. initiative on local legislation - which refers to a petition proposing to

enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution
or ordinance [Sec. 2(a), R.A. 6735].

 Indirect Initiative - is exercise of initiative by the people through a

proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for action (Sec
2(b) RA 6735)

In the Resolution (on the Motion for Reconsideration) in Lambino v. Comelec, the
Court noted that the majority of the justices had voted to declare RA 6735
sufficient and adequate for a people’s initiative. Lambino thus effectively
abandoned the ruling in Defensor-Santiago v. Comelec, G.R. No. 127325, March 19,
1997, where the Supreme Court declared R.A. 6735 inadequate to cover the
system of initiative to amend the Constitution.

 Procedure: The essence of amendments directly proposed by the people

through initiative upon a petition is that the entire proposal on its face
is a petition of the people.

Thus, two essential elements must be present:

(1) The people must author and sign the entire proposal; no agent or
representative can sign in their behalf.

(2) As an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in

the petition.

Rationale: the signature requirement would be meaningless if the

person supplying the signature has not first seen what it is that he is
signing, and more importantly, a loose interpretation of the subscription
requirement would pose a significant potential for fraud.

In Lambino, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the
signature sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before
signing; they were not apprised of the nature and effect of the proposed
 2
amendments. Failure to comply with these requirements was fatal to the
validity of the initiative petition [Lambino v. Comelec, supra.].

 People’s Initiative applies only to an amendment, not a revision, of

the Constitution.

A people’s initiative can only propose amendments to the Constitution,

inasmuch as the Constitution itself limits initiatives to amendments, as
shown by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

The Lambino initiative constituted a revision because it proposed to

change the form of government from presidential to parliamentary and
the bicameral to a unicameral legislature. Thus, the people’s initiative as
a mode to effect these proposed amendments was invalid [Lambino v.
Comelec, supra.].

Congress
In contrast, Congress or a constitutional convention can propose both
amendments and revisions to the Constitution.

The Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a

constitutional convention, or by a majority vote of all its Members,
submit to the electorate the question of calling such a convention. [SEC
3]

b) Ratification The proposed amendment

[Sec. 4, Art. XVII] shall become part of the
Constitution when:

1. ratified by a majority of the

votes cast in a plebiscite

2. held not earlier than 60 nor

later than 90 days after the
approval of the proposal by
Congress or the Constitutional
Convention, or after the
certification by the
Commission on Elections of
the sufficiency of the petition
for initiative under Sec. 2, Art.
XVII.

Doctrine of proper submission.

 2

A plebiscite may be held on the same day as a regular election. The entire
Constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. No
“piecemeal submission,” e.g. submission of age amendment ahead of other
proposed amendments.

Because the Constitution itself prescribes the time frame within which the
plebiscite is to be held, there can no longer be a question on whether the time
given to the people to determine the merits and demerits of the proposed
amendment is adequate.

Other related principles:

 The plebiscite may be held on the same day as regular elections

[Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774; Occena v. Comelec, 104 SCRA 1;
Almario v. Alba, 127 SCRA 69].

 The use of the word “election” in the singular meant that the entire
Constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only.
Furthermore, the people have to be given a “proper frame of reference”
in arriving at their decision.

 Thus, submission for ratification of piece-meal amendments by the

Constitutional Convention (which is tasked to revise the Constitution)
was disallowed since the people had, at that time, no idea yet of what
the rest of the revised Constitution would be [Tolentino v. Comelec, 41
SCRA 702].

Judicial Review of Amendments.

The question is now regarded as subject to judicial review, because invariably,
the issue will boil down to whether or not the constitutional provisions had been
followed [Sanidad v. Comelec, 78 SCRA 333; Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50
SCRA 50]

C. National Territory (1987 CONST., art. I; UNCLOS, arts. 1, 3-8, 33, 46-48, 50
and 55-58)

ARTICLE I
National Territory

The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all

the islands and waters embraced therein, and all other territories over
 2
which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its
terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the
seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas.
The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of
the internal waters of the Philippines.

UNCLOS

Article 1
Use of terms and scope

1. For the purposes of this Convention:

(1) "Area" means the seabed and ocean floor and

subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction;

(2) means the International Seabed

"Authority" Authority;

(3) "activities means all activities of exploration for,

in the Area" and exploitation of, the resources of the
Area;

(4) "pollution means the introduction by man,

of the marine directly or indirectly, of substances or
environment" energy into the marine environment,
including estuaries, which results or is
likely to result in such deleterious
effects as harm to living resources and
marine life, hazards to human health,
hindrance to marine activities,
including fishing and other legitimate
uses of the sea, impairment of quality
for use of sea water and reduction of
amenities;

(5) (a) (i) any deliberate disposal of wastes or

"dumping" other matter from vessels, aircraft,
means: platforms or other man-made
structures at sea;

(ii) any deliberate disposal of vessels,

 2
aircraft, platforms or other man-made
structures at sea;

(b) "dumping" (i) the disposal of wastes or other

does not matter incidental to, or derived from
include: the normal operations of vessels,
aircraft, platforms or other man-made
structures at sea and their equipment,
other than wastes or other matter
transported by or to vessels, aircraft,
platforms or other man-made
structures at sea, operating for the
purpose of disposal of such matter or
derived from the treatment of such
wastes or other matter on such vessels,
aircraft, platforms or structures;

(ii) placement of matter for a purpose

other than the mere disposal thereof,
provided that such placement is not
contrary to the aims of this
Convention.

2. (1) "States Parties" means States which have consented to be

bound by this Convention and for which this Convention is in force.

(2) This Convention applies mutatis mutandis to the entities referred

to in article 305, paragraph l(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f), which become
Parties to this Convention in accordance with the conditions relevant
to each, and to that extent "States Parties" refers to those entities.

SECTION 2. LIMITS OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA

Article 3
Breadth of the territorial sea

Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea
up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines
determined in accordance with this Convention.

Article 4
Outer limit of the territorial sea

The outer limit of the territorial sea is the line every point of which is
at a distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the
 2
breadth of the territorial sea.

Article 5
Normal baseline

Except where otherwise provided in this Convention, the normal

baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-
water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially
recognized by the coastal State.

Article 6
Reefs

In the case of islands situated on atolls or of islands having fringing

reefs, the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is
the seaward low-water line of the reef, as shown by the appropriate
symbol on charts officially recognized by the coastal State.

Article 7
Straight baselines

1. In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or

if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity,
the method of straight baselines joining appropriate points may be
employed in drawing the baseline from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.

2. Where because of the presence of a delta and other natural

conditions the coastline is highly unstable, the appropriate points
may be selected along the furthest seaward extent of the low-water
line and, notwithstanding subsequent regression of the low-water
line, the straight baselines shall remain effective until changed by the
coastal State in accordance with this Convention.

3. The drawing of straight baselines must not depart to any

appreciable extent from the general direction of the coast, and the sea
areas lying within the lines must be sufficiently closely linked to the
land domain to be subject to the regime of internal waters.

4. Straight baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide

elevations, unless lighthouses or similar installations which are
permanently above sea level have been built on them or except in
instances where the drawing of baselines to and from such elevations
has received general international recognition.
 2
5. Where the method of straight baselines is applicable under
paragraph 1, account may be taken, in determining particular
baselines, of economic interests peculiar to the region concerned, the
reality and the importance of which are clearly evidenced by long
usage.

6. The system of straight baselines may not be applied by a State in

such a manner as to cut off the territorial sea of another State from the
high seas or an exclusive economic zone.

Article 8
Internal waters

1. Except as provided in Part IV, waters on the landward side of the

baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the
State.

2. Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with

the method set forth in article 7 has the effect of enclosing as internal
waters areas which had not previously been considered as such, a
right of innocent passage as provided in this Convention shall exist in
those waters.

SECTION 4. CONTIGUOUS ZONE

Article 33
Contiguous zone

1. In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the

contiguous zone, the coastal State may exercise the control necessary
to: (a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or
sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; (b)
punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea.

2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from
the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured.

PART IV ARCHIPELAGIC STATES

Article 46
Use of terms
 2
For the purposes of this Convention:

(a) "archipelagic State" means a State constituted wholly by one or

more archipelagos and may include other islands;

(b) "archipelago" means a group of islands, including parts of islands,

interconnecting waters and other natural features which are so closely
interrelated that such islands, waters and other natural features form
an intrinsic geographical, economic and political entity, or which
historically have been regarded as such.

Article 47
Archipelagic baselines

1. An archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic baselines

joining the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs
of the archipelago provided that within such baselines are included
the main islands and an area in which the ratio of the area of the
water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1 to 1 and 9
to 1.

2. The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles,
except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing
any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of
125 nautical miles.

3. The drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable

extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.

4. Such baselines shall not be drawn to and from low-tide elevations,

unless lighthouses or similar installations which are permanently
above sea level have been built on them or where a low-tide elevation
is situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of
the territorial sea from the nearest island.

5. The system of such baselines shall not be applied by an archipelagic

State in such a manner as to cut off from the high seas or the exclusive
economic zone the territorial sea of another State.

6. If a part of the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State lies

between two parts of an immediately adjacent neighbouring State,
existing rights and all other legitimate interests which the latter State
has traditionally exercised in such waters and all rights stipulated by
agreement between those States shall continue and be respected.

7. For the purpose of computing the ratio of water to land under

 2
paragraph l, land areas may include waters lying within the fringing
reefs of islands and atolls, including that part of a steep-sided oceanic
plateau which is enclosed or nearly enclosed by a chain of limestone
islands and drying reefs lying on the perimeter of the plateau.

8. The baselines drawn in accordance with this article shall be shown

on charts of a scale or scales adequate for ascertaining their position.
Alternatively, lists of geographical coordinates of points, specifying
the geodetic datum, may be substituted.

9. The archipelagic State shall give due publicity to such charts or lists
of geographical coordinates and shall deposit a copy of each such
chart or list with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article 48
Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous
zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf

The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47.

Article 50
Delimitation of internal waters

Within its archipelagic waters, the archipelagic State may draw

closing lines for the delimitation of internal waters, in accordance
with articles 9, 10 and 11.

PART V EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

Article 55
Specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone

The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the

territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established in this
Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and
the rights and freedoms of other States are governed by the relevant
provisions of this Convention.

Article 56
Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive
economic zone

1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:

 2

(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,

conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or
non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed
and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of
energy from the water, currents and winds;

(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this

Convention with regard to:

(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands,

installations and structures;

(ii) marine scientific research;

(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine

environment;

(c) other rights and duties provided for in this Convention.

2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this

Convention in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall
have due regard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act
in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.

3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and
subsoil shall be exercised in accordance with Part VI.

Article 57
Breadth of the exclusive economic zone

The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea
is measured.

Article 58
Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone

1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-

locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention,
the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and
of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such
as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine
 2
cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of this
Convention.

2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law

apply to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not
incompatible with this Part.

3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this

Convention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due
regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply
with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of
international law in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.

Territory defined. The territory of a State includes not only the land over which
its jurisdiction extends, but also the rivers, lakes, bays and airspace above it. The
domain of a State therefore may be described as terrestrial, fluvial or maritime.

SCOPE (TERRESTRIAL, AERIAL, AND FLUVIAL DOMAINS)

The national territory comprises:
 the Philippine archipelago,
 with all the islands and waters embraced therein, and
 all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or
jurisdiction,
o consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains,
o including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular
shelves, and other submarine areas.
 [ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE] The waters around, between, and
connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and
dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines. [ART. 1]

Territorial Domain
 Includes properties of public dominion as well as properties of private
ownership. Properties of public dominion include those for public use,
those for public service, and those for the development of the national
wealth. (Paras, International law and world politics, 1994, pp. 257)

Maritime or fluvial domain

consists of rivers, lakes, bays, gulfs, straits and canals. Theoretically, there are two
(2) kinds of waters:
 2
1. The internal or inland national waters (these are completely within the
territory); and
2. The external or territorial or maritime waters (those found within the
maritime or territorial zone, along the coastline). (Paras, International law and
world politics, 1994, pp. 258)

aerial domain
includes the air space above the land and waters.

CASE:
3. MAGALLONA VS. ERMITA, G.R No. 187167, August 16, 2011, EN
BANC

 RA 9522 [adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying

the baseline regime of nearby territories] is not Unconstitutional. RA
9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Country’s Maritime Zones and
Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine
Territory.

ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE
Under the archipelago doctrine, an archipelago, which consists of a number of
islands separated by bodies of water, should be treated as one integral unit, and
the waters inside the baselines are considered internal waters.

Straight baseline method

Imaginary straight lines are drawn joining the outermost points of outermost
islands of the archipelago, enclosing an area the ratio of which should not be
more than 9:1 (water to land); provided that the drawing of baselines shall not
depart, to any appreciable extent, from the general configuration of the
archipelago. The waters within the baselines shall be considered internal waters;
while the breadth of the territorial sea shall then be measured from the baselines.

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea [April 30,1982; ratified by the Philippines
in August, 1983] provides
(i) Contiguous Zone of 12 miles;
(ii) Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 miles. Although the contiguous
zone and most of the exclusive economic zone may not, technically,
be part of the territory of the .State, nonetheless, the coastal State
enjoys preferential rights over the marine resources found within
these zones.

SOVEREIGNTY, JURISDICTION and TERRITORY

 2

Rule: Sovereignty is the possession of sovereign power, while jurisdiction is the

conferment by law of power and authority to apply the law.

From the text of EDCA itself, Agreed Locations are territories of the Philippines that the
U.S. forces are allowed to access and use. By withholding ownership of these areas and
retaining unrestricted access to them, the government asserts sovereignty over its
territory. That sovereignty exists so long as the Filipino people exist. G.R. No. 212426
January 12, 2015, RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, WIGBERTO E. TANADA vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA

TREATY LIMITS OF THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO

1. Treaty of Paris (December 10, 1898): Spain cedes to the United States the
archipelago known as the Philippines Islands, and comprehending the islands
lying within the following line.

N.B. Art. 3 defines the metes and bounds of the archipelago by longitude and
latitude, degrees and seconds. Technical descriptions are made of the scope of the
archipelago as this may be found on the surface of the earth.

2. Treaty of Washington (November 7, 1900) between the United States and

Spain: Ceding Cagayan, Sibuto, and Sulu.

3. Treaty between the United States and Great Britain (January 2, 1930): Ceding
the Turtle and Mangsee Islands.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3046: An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea
of the Philippines (June 17, 1961) –

This law recognized the Strait Baseline Method in determining Philippine

territory. The appropriate points of the outermost islands of the archipelago are
connected with straight lines until all islands are surrounded or enclosed by the
imaginary straight line. All landmasses within the baselines are part of the
national territory.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9552 – amended R.A. No. 3046, which specified that
baselines of Kalayaan Group of Islands and Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal)
shall be determined as “Regime of Islands” under the Republic of the Philippines,
consistent with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

R.A. No. 9552 is not unconstitutional. It is a statutory tool to demarcate the

maritime zone and continental shelf of the Philippines under UNCLOS III and
does not alter the national territory. While UNCLOS III does not bind the
Philippines to pass a Baseline Law,
 2
 Congress may do so. (Magallona vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16,
2011)

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition,
enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional
international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through
occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with
the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial
claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the
rules on general international law.” (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 2014, pp.26)

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 5446 (September 8, 1969) –

This statute specifically indicates that Sabah is part of Philippine territory. This
law has not been repealed and thus the Philippines has not formally dropped its
claim to Sabah.

🕮 The law [R.A. No. 9552] does not abandon the country’s claim to Sabah, as it
does not expressly repeal the entirety of R.A. No. 5446. (Magallona vs. Ermita, G.R.
No. 187167, August 16, 2011)

🕮 Under Articles 13 and 121 of the Convention on the Law of the Sea:

● features that are above water at high tide – generate an entitlement to at least a
12 nautical mile territorial sea,

● features that are submerged at high tide – generate no entitlement to maritime

zones.

The Tribunal agreed with the Philippines that Scarborough Shoal, Johnson Reef,
Cuarteron Reef, and Fiery Cross Reef are high-tide features and that Subi Reef,
Hughes Reef, Mischief Reef, and Second Thomas Shoal were submerged at high
tide in their natural condition. However, the Tribunal disagreed with the
Philippines regarding the status of Gaven Reef (North) and McKennan Reef and
concluded that both are high tide features. (The South China Sea Arbitration, July
12, 2016)

REGIME OF ISLANDS –
a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water which is above water at
high tide. (Article 121, UNCLOS)

Meanwhile, “rocks” cannot sustain human habitation of their own. The

importance of the difference between a natural island and rock is that an island is
provided with territorial sea, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf,
whereas rocks have no exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.
 2
Whether referred to as Philippine “internal waters” under Article I of the
Constitution or as “archipelagic waters” under UNCLOS Part III, Article 49(1, 2,
4), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of
its baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath."

Further, under Part VI, Article 79 of the UNCLOS, the Philippines clearly has
jurisdiction with respect to cables laid in its territory that are utilized in
support of other installations and structures under its jurisdiction. (Capitol
Wireless, Inc. vs. The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas, G.R. No. 180110, May 30, 2016)

D. Separation of Powers, and Checks and Balances

SEPARATION OF POWERS

 a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not

through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution.
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters
within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. [ANGARA
VS. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION]

 The Constitution delineated the powers among the legislative,

executive, and judicial branches of the government, with each having
autonomy and supremacy within its own sphere. This is moderated by a
system of checks and balances "carefully calibrated by the Constitution
to temper the official acts' of each branch. [PANGLINAN VS.
CAYETANO, G.R. No. 238875/G.R. No. 239483/G.R. No. 240954. March 16,
2021, EN BANC]

 When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it

does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. [BIRAOGO VS. PHILIPPINE
TRUTH COMMISSION, EN BANC]

 The principle of separation of powers dictates that each of the three

government branches has exclusive cognizance of matters falling within
its constitutionally allocated sphere. The power to enact laws is
primarily lodged with the legislature, which is generally prohibited
from delegating its legislative functions and duties and relieving itself
from its mandate under the Constitution. However, the rule is not
absolute. Legislative power may be validly delegated to the president,
 2
which power is not actual lawmaking, but is only limited "to fill[ing] in
the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law." To
be a valid delegated legislative power, it must not supplant or modify
existing laws, including the Constitution, as the power to create, change,
or abolish laws is exclusive to the legislature and any usurpation of such
power renders the issuance invalid. [PROVINCE OF PAMPANGA VS.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 195987, January 12, 2021, EN BANC]

 Our governmental structure rests on the principle of separation of

powers. Under our constitutional order, the legislative branch enacts
law, the executive branch implements the law, and the judiciary
construes the law. In reality, however, the powers are not as strictly
confined or delineated to each branch. "[T]he growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the
laws"[ require the delegation of powers traditionally belonging to the
legislative to administrative agencies. The legislature may likewise
apportion competencies or jurisdictions to administrative agencies over
certain conflicts involving special technical expertise. [THE
PROVINCIAL BUS OPERATORS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES
(PBOAP) vs. DOLE, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018 ]

 Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to

implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce
have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such rules and
regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are just as binding as if
they have been written in the statute itself.

As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption
of constitutionality and legality until they are set aside with finality in an
appropriate case by a competent court. Congress, in the guise of
assuming the role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by
subjecting them to its stamp of approval without disturbing the
calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In
exercising discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based on a
determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of
RA 9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power
exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution. [ABAKADA GURO
PARTY LIST VS. PURISIMA, G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008]

 Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of

project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow
legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to
 2
the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing,
legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate
in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational aspects of
budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities" and the "regulation and release of funds" in
violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as
categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that
empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of
separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional. That the said
authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter
its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition, to repeat, covers any role
in the implementation or enforcement of the law.

 Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in
Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on
the guise that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such,
respondents’ reliance on the same falters altogether. Thus, for all the
foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as
well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to
wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as
violative of the separation of powers principle and thus
unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which
legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of budget
execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment. [BELGICA VS. OCHOA, G.R. No.
208566, November 19, 2013, EN BANC]

 To apply the standard that the LNMB is reserved only for the "decent
and the brave" or "hero" would be violative of public policy as it will put
into question the validity of the burial of each and every mortal remains
resting therein, and infringe upon the principle of separation of powers
since the allocation of plots at the LNMB is based on the grant of
authority to the President under existing laws and regulations. [Ocampo
v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 08, 2016, EN BANC]

PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. This

presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon
the three (3) coordinate departments of the government a becoming courtesy for
 2
each other's acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the
Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in
accord with the fundamental law. [FEDERATION OF CORON VS. DENR, G.R.
No. 247866, September 15, 2020, EN BANC]

SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES

 Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters

within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does
not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government. [ANGARA VS. THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION]

 A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the

President’s power to veto an item written into an appropriation, revenue
or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a
process known as "bill presentment." Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the
amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit
since the said amount would be further divided among individual
legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and
could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds
based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations
are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence,
outside of the law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF
appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration.
This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget"
which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment and
consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners
aptly point out, the above-described system forces the President to
decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79 Billion PDAF allocation
without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or
may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the
whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate
projects. [BELGICA VS. OCHOA, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013, EN
BANC]

 Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770, providing that the President may remove
a Deputy Ombudsman, is unconstitutional. Subjecting the Deputy
Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President, whose own
 2
alter egos and officials in the Executive department are subject to the
Ombudsman’s disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at
risk the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman itself. Section
8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 intruded upon the constitutionally-granted
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. By so doing, the law
directly collided not only with the independence that the Constitution
guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but inevitably with the
principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman
office seeks to revitalize. What is true for the Ombudsman must equally
and necessarily be true for her Deputies who act as agents of the
Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The Ombudsman can
hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate
officials who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are
subject to pressures and controls external to her Office. The fear of
external reprisal from the very office he is to check for excesses and
abuses defeats the very purpose of granting independence to the Office
of the Ombudsman. [Gonzales III v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231
2014, EN BANC].

 We declared Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 unconstitutional by granting

disciplinary jurisdiction to the President over a Deputy Ombudsman, in
violation of the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.
However, by another vote of 8-7, the Court resolved to maintain the
validity of Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 insofar as Sulit is concerned. The
Court did not consider the Office of the Special Prosecutor to be
constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence,
not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the
Constitution. [Gonzales III v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231 2014,
EN BANC].

E. State Immunity (1987 CONST., art. XVI, sec. 3; P.D. No. 1445)

ARTICLE XVI
General Provisions

SECTION 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1445

ORDAINING AND INSTITUTING A GOVERNMENT
AUDITING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
 2

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Section 1. Title. This law shall be known and cited as the

"Government Auditing Code of the Philippines."

Section 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the declared policy of the State

that all resources of the government shall be managed, expended or
utilized in accordance with law and regulations, and safeguard
against loss or wastage through illegal or improper disposition, with a
view to ensuring efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the
operations of government. The responsibility to take care that such
policy is faithfully adhered to rests directly with the chief or head of
the government agency concerned.

Section 3. Definition of terms. Wherever used in this Code, the

following terms shall be taken and understood in the sense indicated
hereunder, unless the context otherwise requires:

1. "Fund" is a sum of money or other resources set aside for the

purpose of carrying out specific activities or attaining certain
objectives in accordance with special regulations, restrictions, or
limitations, and constitutes an independent fiscal and accounting
entity.

2. "Government funds" includes public moneys of every sort and

other resources pertaining to any agency of the government.

3. "Revenue Funds" comprises all funds derived from the income of

any agency of the government and available for appropriation or
expenditure in accordance with law.

4. "Trust funds" refers to funds which have come officially into the
possession of any agency of the government or of a public officer as
trustee, agent, or administrator, or which have been received for the
fulfillment of some obligation.

5. "Depository funds" comprises funds over which the officer

accountable therefore may retain control for the lawful purposes for
which they came into his possession. It embraces moneys in any and
all depositories.

6. "Depository" means any financial institution lawfully authorized to

receive government moneys upon deposit.

7. "Resources" refers to the actual assets of any agency of the

 2
government such as cash, instruments representing or convertible to
money, receivables, lands, buildings, as well as contingent assets such
as estimated revenues applying to the current fiscal period not
accrued or collected and bonds authorized and unissued.

8. "Government agency" or "agency of the government," or "agency

refers to any department, bureau or office of the national government,
or any of its branches and instrumentalities, or any political
subdivision, as well as any government-owned or controlled
corporation, including its subsidiaries, or other self-governing board
or commission of the government.

Section 4. Fundamental principles. Financial transactions and operations

of any government agency shall be governed by the fundamental
principles set forth hereunder, to wit:

1.No money shall be paid out of any public treasury of depository

except in pursuance of an appropriation law or other specific
statutory authority.

2. Government funds or property shall be spent or used solely for

public purposes.

3. Trust funds shall be available and may be spent only for the specific
purpose for which the trust was created or the funds received.

4. Fiscal responsibility shall, to the greatest extent, be shared by all

those exercising authority over the financial affairs, transactions, and
operations of the government agency.

5. Disbursements or disposition of government funds or property

shall invariably bear the approval of the proper officials.

6. Claims against government funds shall be supported with complete

documentation.
7. All laws and regulations applicable to financial transactions shall be
faithfully adhered to.

8. Generally accepted principles and practices of accounting as well as

of sound management and fiscal administration shall be observed,
provided that they do not contravene existing laws and regulations.

CHAPTER 2
JURISDICTION, POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE
COMMISSION
 2

Section 25. Statement of objectives. In keeping with its Constitutional

mandate, the Commission adheres to the following primary
objectives:

1. To determine whether or not the fiscal responsibility that

rests directly with the head of the government agency has
been properly and effectively discharged;

2. To develop and implement a comprehensive audit program

that shall encompass an examination of financial
transactions, accounts, and reports, including evaluation of
compliance with applicable laws and regulations;

3. To institute control measures through the promulgation of

rules and regulations governing the receipts, disbursements,
and uses of funds and property, consistent with the total
economic development effort of the government;

4. To promulgate auditing and accounting rules and

regulations so as to facilitate the keeping, and enhance the
information value, of the accounts of the government;

5. To adopt measures calculated to hasten the full

professionalization of its services;

6. To institute measures designed to preserve and ensure the

independence of its representatives; and

7. To endeavor to bring its operations closer to the people by

the delegation of authority through decentralization,
consistent with the provisions of the new Constitution and
the laws.

Section 26. General jurisdiction.

The authority and powers of the Commission shall extend to and
comprehend all matters relating to auditing procedures, systems and
controls, the keeping of the general accounts of the Government, the
preservation of vouchers pertaining thereto for a period of ten years,
the examination and inspection of the books, records, and papers
relating to those accounts; and the audit and settlement of the
accounts of all persons respecting funds or property received or held
by them in an accountable capacity, as well as the examination, audit,
and settlement of all debts and claims of any sort due from or owing
to the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies and
 2
instrumentalities. The said jurisdiction extends to all government-
owned or controlled corporations, including their subsidiaries, and
other self-governing boards, commissions, or agencies of the
Government, and as herein prescribed, including non-governmental
entities subsidized by the government, those funded by donations
through the government, those required to pay levies or government
share, and those for which the government has put up a counterpart
fund or those partly funded by the government.

https://lawphil.net/statutes/presdecs/pd1978/pd_1445_1978.html

BASIS
The State may not be sued without its consent. [Article XVI, Section 3 of the 1987
Constitution]

There can be no legal right against the authority which makes the law on which
the right depends [Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 83]

However, it may be sued if it gives consent, whether express or implied. The

doctrine is also known as the Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty.

RATIONALE
A continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for
as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of
governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious
functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the
availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. [PHILIPPINE TEXTILE
RESEARCH INSTITUTES VS. CA, G.R. No. 223319, October 09, 2019, CAGUIOA]

PAR IN PAREM NON HABET IMPERIUM – IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN

STATES AND ITS AGENTS
Immunity is enjoyed by other States, consonant with the public international law
principle of par in parem non habet imperium. The Head of State, who is deemed
the personification of the State, is inviolable, and thus, enjoys immunity from suit.

 The State’s diplomatic agents, including consuls to a certain extent, are

also exempt from the jurisdiction of local courts and administrative
tribunals.

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from
suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives
of the sending State. The cloak of protection is removed the moment the foreign
 2
agent is sued in his individual capacity, as when he is sought to be made liable
for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad
faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

CASES:

1. Minucher v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003

 It was sufficiently established that respondent Arthur Scalzo an agent of

the US Drug Enforcement Agency, was tasked to conduct surveillance
on suspected drug activities within the country, and having ascertained
the target, to inform the local law enforcers who would then be expected
to make the arrest. In conducting this surveillance and later, acting as
the poseur- buyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a
principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo can
hardly be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official functions or
duties. He should, therefore, be accorded diplomatic immunity.

 The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is
a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely
identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit
and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to
the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also
distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity.

 If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by
its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but
acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the
immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state
itself.

 The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for
the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim -par in parem, non
habet imperium -that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert
jurisdiction over one another. The implication, in broad terms, is that if
the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform
an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the
amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must
be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been
formally impleaded.
 2
The United Nations, as well as its organs and specialized agencies, are likewise
beyond the jurisdiction of local courts [Convention on Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations; Convention on Privileges and Immunities of Specialized Agencies of
the United Nations; World Health Organization v. Aquino, supra.].

CASES:

1. Lasco v. UNRFNRE (United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural

Resources Exploration), 241 SCRA 681

 The Supreme Court upheld the diplomatic immunity of private

respondent as established by the letter of the Department of Foreign
Affairs recognizing and confirming such immunity in accordance with
the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN of
which the Philippines is a signatory.

Even other international organizations or international agencies may be

immune from the jurisdiction of local courts and local administrative tribunals.

CASES:

1. SEAFDEC (Southeast Asia Fisheries Development Center) v. NLRC,

241 SCRA 580, and SEAFDEC v. Acosta, G.R. Nos. 97468-70.
September 02, 1993

 SEAFDEC, as an international agency, enjoys diplomatic immunity. It

was established through an international agreement to which the
Philippines became a signatory on January 16, 1968.

 The purpose of the Center is to contribute to the promotion of fisheries

development in Southeast Asia by mutual cooperation among the
member governments of the Center.

 The invocation by private respondents of the doctrine of estoppel is

unavailing, because estoppel does not confer jurisdiction the directives
of the sending State. as long as it can be established that he is acting
within the foreign agent is sued in his individual capacity, the moment
United Nations, other international organizations or international
agencies 38 Constitutional La* on a tribunal that has none over a cause
of action. The Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29, ruling cannot apply to
parties which enjoy foreign and diplomatic immunity [SEAFDEC-
Aquaculture v. NLRC, 206 SCRA 283].
 2
2. Callado v. IRRI, 244 SCRA 210
 Court upheld anew the constitutionality of Sec. 3, P.D. 1620, which
provides that the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) shall enjoy
immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except
insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director
General of the Institute or his authorized representative.

 The letter of the Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of

Labor and Employment constituted a categorical recognition by the
Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities
accorded to international organizations, a determination held to be a
political question conclusive upon the Courts in order not to embarrass a
political department of the government.

HOW TO DETERMINE IF IT IS A SUIT AGAINST THE STATE

The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would
require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as
the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him,
the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been
formally impleaded. If so, then it is a suit against the State. [Garcia v. Chief of Staff,
16 SCRA 120]

CASES:

1. Tan v. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302

 State immunity from suit may be invoked as long as the suit really
affects the property, rights or interests of the State and not merely those
of the officers nominally made party defendants.

 In this case, the Court said that the promotion of public welfare and the
protection of the inhabitants near the public forest are property rights
and interests of the State.

2. Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 214

SCRA 286
 2
 the suit for damages filed against the PC Chief and the PC-SUSIA would
require an affirmative act of appropriation should damages be awarded,
and is, therefore, a suit against the State.

SUITS AGAINST GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Suability depends on whether the agency is:

INCORPORATED UNINCORPORATED
there is a separate charter no separate personality

has a Charter of its own with has no Charter of its own

a separate juridical
personality

has a Charter of its own with Inquire into principal

a separate juridical
personality
If the charter provides that
the agency can sue and be
sued, then suit will lie,
including one for tort.
The provision in the charter
constitutes express consent on
the part of the State to be
sued.
functions of the agency:
If governmental: NO suit
without consent
If proprietary: suit will lie
because when the State
engages in principally
proprietary functions, then
it descends to the level of a
private individual, and may,
therefore, be vulnerable to
suit.

CASES re: INCORPORATED

1. Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Judge Firme, 195 SCRA 692

 Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they are engaged
in governmental functions and, therefore, should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit.

 However, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such

functions because their respective charters provide that they can sue and
be sued.

 One of the corporate powers of local government units, as enumerated

in Sec. 22, Local Government Code, is the power to sue and be sued.
 2

2. National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 35

 NIA is a corporate body performing proprietary functions, whose

charter, P.D. 552, provides that it may sue and be sued.

3. Philippine National Railways v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 217 SCRA

401

 Although the charter of PNR is silent on whether it may sue or be sued,

it had already been ruled in Malong v. PNR (185 SCRA 63) that the PNR
is not performing any governmental function and may therefore be
sued.

4. BPI VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (NOW BANGKO

SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS), SECOND DIVISION, October 12, 2020, G.R. No.
197593; HERNANDO

 The Charter of an incorporated agency shall explicitly provide that it has

waived its immunity from suit by granting it with the authority to sue
and be sued. This applies regardless of whether its functions are
governmental or proprietary in nature.

 Indubitably, the CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (CBP),

which was created under RA 265 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
72 (PD 72), is a government corporation with separate juridical
personality and not a mere agency of the government. Specifically,
Sections 1 and 4 of RA 265, as amended, provided for the creation of the
CBP, a corporate body with certain corporate powers which include the
authority to sue and be sued.

 Nonetheless, while the CBP performed a governmental function in

providing clearing house facilities, it is not immune from suit as its
Charter, by express provision, waived its immunity from suit.

 However, although the CBP allowed itself to be sued, it did not

necessarily mean that it conceded its liability.

 Anent the issue of whether CBP is liable for the torts committed by its
employees Valentino and Estacio, the test of liability depends on
whether or not the employees, acting in behalf of CBP, were performing
governmental or proprietary functions. The State in the performance of
 2
its governmental functions is liable only for the tortuous acts of its
special agents.

 The State becomes liable as an ordinary employer when performing

its proprietary functions. Thus, Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code
provide that the responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage. To reiterate, CBP's
establishment of clearing house facilities for its member banks to which
Valentino and Estacio were assigned as Bookkeeper and Janitor-
Messenger, respectively, is a governmental function.

 As such, the State or CBP in this case, is liable only for the torts
committed by its employee when the latter acts as a special agent but
not when the said employee or official performs his or her functions
that naturally pertain to his or her office. A special agent is defined as
one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to
the exercise of the duties of his office.

 Evidently, both Valentino and Estacio are not considered as special

agents of CBP during their commission of the fraudulent acts against
petitioner BPI as they were regular employees performing tasks
pertaining to their offices, namely, bookkeeping and janitorial-
messenger. Thus, CBP cannot be held liable for any damage caused to
petitioner BPI by reason of Valentino and Estacio's unlawful acts.

 Nonetheless, even assuming that CBP is an ordinary employer, it still

cannot be held liable. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that an
employer shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. An act is deemed an
assigned task if it is "done by an employee, in furtherance of the interests
of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the
infliction of the injury or damage." Obviously, Valentino and Estacio's
fraudulent acts of tampering with and pilfering of documents are not in
furtherance of CBP's interests nor done for its account as the said acts
were unauthorized and unlawful. Also, petitioner BPI has the burden to
prove that Valentino and Estacio's fraudulent acts were performed
within the scope of their assigned tasks, which it failed to do. It is only
then that the presumption that CBP, as employer, was negligent would
arise which then compels CBP to show evidence that it exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.
 2
 Thus, where a public officer acts without or in excess of jurisdiction,
any injury or damage caused by such acts is his or her own personal
liability and cannot be imputed to the State.

CASES re: UNINCORPORATED (GOVERNMENTAL)

1. ARIGO VS. SWIFT, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014

 This traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from
being sued in the courts of another State without the former's consent
or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes
sovereign and governmental acts (Jure imperii) from private,
commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis).

 Under the restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends

only to acts Jure imperii.

 Re: VFA - the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only
to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the
present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be
inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case
against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to
be filed separately.

2. Veterans Manpower case

 PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are instrumentalities of the national
government exercising primarily governmental functions (regulating
the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen or
security guard agencies), and thus may not be sued without consent.

3. Farolan v. Court of Tax Appeals, 217 SCRA 298

 Bureau of Customs, being an unincorporated agency without a separate
juridical personality, enjoys immunity from suit.

 It is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty, namely the power

of taxation; it performs governmental functions.

4. Mobil Philippines Exploration v. Customs Arrastre Service, 18 SCRA 1120

 The Customs Arrastre Service is merely an adjunct of the Bureau of
Customs.

 A suit against it is, therefore, a suit against the Bureau of Customs, an

unincorporated agency performing primarily governmental functions.
 2

[NOTE: Even in the exercise of proprietary functions incidental to its primarily

governmental functions, an unincorporated agency still cannot be sued without
its consent.]

5. Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693

 The express consent contained in Act No. 3038 (where the Philippine
Government “consents and submits to be sued upon any money claim
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could
serve as a basis of civil action between private parties”), the Department
of Agriculture could be sued on the contract for security services entered
into by it (subject to prior filing of the claim with the Commission on
Audit), despite it being an unincorporated agency performing primarily
governmental functions.

6. BUISAN VS. COA, G.R. No. 212376, January 31, 2017, EN BANC
 Suits filed against government agencies may either be against
incorporated or unincorporated agencies.
 In case of incorporated agencies, its suability depends upon whether its
own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in
Court.

 As the State's engineering and construction arm, the DPWH exercises

governmental functions that effectively insulate it from any suit, much
less from any monetary liability. The construction of the Project which
was for the purpose of minimizing the perennial problem of flood in
the area of Tunggol, Montawal, Maguindanao, is well within the
powers and functions of the DPWH as mandated by the
Administrative Code of 1997.

 Hence, the Doctrine of Non-Suability clothes the DPWH from being

held responsible for alleged damages it performed in consonance with
its mandated duty. Nowhere does it appear in the petition that the State
has given its consent, expressly or impliedly, to be sued before the
courts. The failure to allege the existence of the State's consent to be sued
in the complaint is a fatal defect, and on this basis alone, should cause
the dismissal of the complaint.

7. THE CITY OF BACOLOD VS. PHUTURE VISIONS CO., INC., G.R. No.
190289, January 17, 2018
 Consent may be express or implied, such as when the government
exercises its proprietary functions, or where such is embodied in a
general or special law.
 2

 In the present case, respondent sued petitioners for the latter's refusal to
issue a mayor's permit for bingo operations and for closing its business
on account of the lack of such permit. However, while the authority of
city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is granted by
the Local Government Code (LGC), which also vests local government
units with corporate powers, one of which is the power to sue and be
sued, this Court has held that the power to issue or grant licenses and
business permits is not an exercise of the government's proprietary
function.

 Instead, it is in an exercise of the police power of the State, ergo a

governmental act. No consent to be sued and be liable for damages can
thus be implied from the mere conferment and exercise of the power to
issue business permits and licenses.

 Accordingly, there is merit in petitioners' argument that they cannot be

sued by respondent since the City's consent had not been secured for
this purpose. Accordingly, there is merit in petitioners' argument that
they cannot be sued by respondent since the City's consent had not been
secured for this purpose.

SUIT AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS.

GENERAL RULE: The doctrine of State immunity also applies to complaints

filed against officials of the State for acts performed by them in the discharge
of their duties within the scope of their authority.

EXCEPTION: Doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be
invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and personal
capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection afforded the officers and
agents of the government is removed the moment they are sued in their
individual capacity.

This situation usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in
excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law that a
public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. [ARIGO VS. SWIFT, G.R. No.
206510, September 16, 2014]

CASES re: SUIT AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS.

 2
1. Veterans Manpower case

 The suit against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA was dismissed for being a
suit against the state, since it was a suit against public officers in the
discharge of official functions which are governmental in character.

2. Larkins v. NLRC, 241 SCRA 598

 Private respondents were dismissed from their employment by Lt. Col.
Frankhauser acting for and in behalf of the US government which, by
right of sovereign power, operated and maintained the dormitories at
the Clark Air Base for USAF members.

3. Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88

The Supreme Court spoke of a number of well-recognized exceptions
when a public officer may be sued without the prior consent of the State,
viz:

(1) to compel him to do an act required by law;

(2) to restrain him from enforcing an act claimed to be unconstitutional;

(3) to compel the payment of damages from an already appropriated

assurance fund or to refund tax over-payments from a fund already
available for the purpose;

(4) to secure a judgment that the officer impleaded may satisfy by

himself without the State having to do a positive act to assist him; and

(5) where the government itself has violated its own laws, because the
doctrine of state immunity “cannot be used to perpetrate an injustice.

All this is not to say that in no case may a public officer be sued as such
without the previous consent of the state. To be sure, there are a number
of well-recognized exceptions. It is clear that a public officer may be
sued as such to compel him to do an act required by law, as where, say,
a register of deeds refuses to record a deed of sale; or to restrain a
Cabinet member, for example, from enforcing a law claimed to be
unconstitutional; or to compel the national treasurer to pay damages
from an already appropriated assurance fund; or the commissioner of
internal revenue to refund tax over-payments from a fund already
available for the purpose; or, in general, to secure a judgment that the
officer impleaded may satisfy by himself without the government itself
having to do a positive act to assist him.
 2
We have also held that where the government itself has violated its
own laws, the aggrieved party may directly implead the government
even without first filing his claim with the Commission on Audit as
normally required, as the doctrine of state immunity "cannot be used as
an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

4. Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713

 The unauthorized acts of government officials are not acts of state; thus,
the public officer may be sued and held personally liable in damages for
such acts.

5. Wylie v. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357

 Where a public officer has committed an ultra vires act, or where there is
a showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence, the officer can be
held personally accountable, even if such acts are claimed to have been
performed in connection with official duties.

6. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 142476, March 20, 2001

 The PCGG or any of its members, may be held civilly liable (for the sale
of an aircraft to Fuller Aircraft, which was void) if they did not act with
good faith and within the scope of their authority in the performance of
official duties.

7. U.S. v. Reyes, 219 SCRA 192

 Petitioner Bradford, Activity Exchange Manager at JUSMAG
Headquarters, was held personally liable, inasmuch as the search of
respondent Montoya at the JUSMAG parking lot (which subjected
respondent to embarrassment) was held to be beyond the scope and
even beyond the Manager’s official functions.

8. Republic v. Hon. Edilberto Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124

 Even as the Supreme Court dismissed the suit against the Republic of
the Philippines, the action for damages against the military personnel
and the policemen responsible for the 1989 Mendiola massacre was
upheld, inasmuch as the initial findings of the Davide Commission
(tasked by President Aquino to investigate the incident) showed that
there was, at least, negligence on their part when they fired their guns.

Where the public official is sued in his personal capacity, the doctrine of state
immunity will not apply, even if the acts complained of were committed while
the public official was occupying a public position.

CASES re: SUIT AGAINST PUBLIC OFFICERS in PERSONAL CAPACITY.

 2

1. Lansang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000

 Petitioner was sued for allegedly “personal motives” in ordering the
ejectment of the General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) from the
Rizal Park; thus, the case was not deemed a suit against the State.

NEED FOR CONSENT.

In order that suit may lie against the state, there must be consent, either express
or implied.

Where no consent is shown, state immunity from suit may be invoked as a

defense by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings, because waiver
of immunity, being in derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly and
must be construed in strictissimi juris. Accordingly, the complaint (or
counterclaim) against the State must allege the existence of such consent (and
where the same is found), otherwise, the complaint may be dismissed [Republic v.
Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424].

The State may be sued with its consent. The State's consent to be sued may be
given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a
general law or a special law. [PHILIPPINE TEXTILE RESEARCH INSTITUTES
VS. CA, G.R. No. 223319, October 09, 2019, CAGUIOA]

a) Express consent.

 can be given only by an act of the legislative body [Republic v. Feliciano,

supra.], in a general or a special law.

1. General Law.

An example of a general law granting consent is CA327, as amended by PD 1445,

which requires that all money claims against the government must first be filed
with the Commission on Audit before suit is instituted in court.

CASE:

1. Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693

 The Department of Agriculture may be sued for money claims based on
a contract entered into in its governmental capacity, because of the
express consent contained in Act No. 3038, provided that the claim be
first brought to the Commission on Audit in accordance with CA 327, as
amended.
 2

 When a money judgment is given against the government, the ordinary

rule for execution would not apply, for the consent of the government to
be sued is only up to the point of judgment. If it does not pay, it cannot
be compelled to pay by attachment or otherwise.

 To enforce monetary decisions against the Government, a person may

file a claim with the Commission on Audit. It is settled jurisprudence
that upon determination of State liability, the prosecution, enforcement,
or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules
and procedures laid down in P.D. No 1445 (Government Auditing Code
of the Philippines). All money claims against the Government must
first be filed with the Commission on Audit, which must act upon it
within 60 days. Rejection of the claim will authorize the claimant to
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on certiorari and in effect, sue
the State thereby.

2. Amigable v. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360

 An action for the recovery of the value of the property taken by the
government and converted into a public street without payment of just
compensation was allowed, despite the failure of the property owner to
file his claim with the Auditor General.

 Invoking Ministerio v. City of Cebu, 40 SCRA 464, the Supreme Court said
that suit may lie because the doctrine of State immunity cannot be used
to perpetrate an injustice.

 This ruling was reiterated in De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court,

223 SCRA 11, where it held that the public respondents’ belief that the
property is public, even if buttressed by statements of other public
officials, is no reason for the unjust taking of petitioner’s property. After
all, the TCT was in the name of the petitioner.

3. EPG Construction v. Secretary Vigilar, G.R. No. 131544, March 16, 2001
 The ruling in Ministerio was invoked when the respondent DPWH
Secretary denied the money claims of petitioners even after the DPWH
Auditor interposed no objection to the payment and the DBM had
ordered the release of the amount under a corresponding Advise of
Allotment it issued.

 Where in Ministerio, the Court said that the doctrine cannot serve as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen, in this case the
Supreme Court declared that it is just as important, if not more so, that
 2
there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of
law were to be maintained.

4. Santiago v. Republic, 87 SCRA 294

 An action for the revocation of a donation because of the failure of the
defendant to comply with stipulated conditions was allowed, inasmuch
as the action did not involve a money claim.

5. PHILIPPINE TEXTILE RESEARCH INSTITUTES VS. CA, G.R. No.

223319, October 09, 2019, CAGUIOA
 "The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in
Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government 'consents and submits to
be sued upon any money claim involving liability arising from
contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action
between private parties."

6. PEOPLE VS. TALAUE, G.R. No. 248652, January 12, 2021

 The task of ensuring the remittance of accounts due the GSIS is,
therefore, as much a burden and responsibility of the mayor as it is the
burden and responsibility of those personnel who are involved in the
collection of premium contributions. Congress purposely included
heads of office in the list of those liable in order to create a sense of
urgency on their part and deter them from passing the blame to their
subordinates.

 Further, their liability is construed as waiver of the State of its

immunity from suit. Just as the principle of state immunity from suit
rests on reasons of public policy, so does waiver thereof in cases of
violation of Section 52(g).

7. Article 2189, CC
 Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the
death or injuries suffered by any person by reason of the defective
conditions of roads, streets, public buildings and other public works
under their control and supervision.

8. Section 24, LGC

 Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability
for death or injury to persons or damage to property

2. Special Law.
 2
This form of consent must be embodied in a statute and cannot be given by a
mere counsel [Republic v. Purisima, 78 SCRA 470].

CASE:

1. Callado v. IRRI, supra

 By virtue of P.D. 1620, the grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and
unequivocal, and an express waiver by its Director General is the only
way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

b) Implied Consent

When the State commences litigation and it becomes vulnerable to a

counterclaim.

 Intervention by the State would constitute commencement of litigation,

except when the State intervenes not for the purpose of asking for any
affirmative relief, but only for the purpose of resisting the claim
precisely because of immunity from suit. [Lim v. Brownell, 107 Phil. 345]

When the State enters into a business contract.

CASE:

1. U.S. v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487

 The Supreme Court distinguished between contracts entered into by the
State in jure imperii (sovereign acts) and in jure gestionis (commercial or
proprietary acts).

 Where the contract is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, there is no

waiver of immunity, and no implied consent may be derived therefrom.

 The contract for the repair of wharves was a contract in jus imperii,
because the wharves were to be used in national defense, a
governmental function.

2. JUSMAG Phil. v. NLRC, 239 SCRA 224

 The engagement of the services of private respondent was held to be
performance of a governmental function by JUSMAG, on behalf of the
United States. Accordingly, JUSMAG may not be sued under such a
contract.
 2
3. Republic of Indonesia v. Vinzon, G.R. No. 154705, June 26, 2003
 Contracts entered into by a sovereign state in connection with the
establishment of a diplomatic mission, including contracts for the
upkeep or maintenance of air conditioning units, generator sets,
electrical facilities, water heaters and water motor pumps of the embassy
and the Ambassador’s residence, are contracts in jure imperii.

 The fact that the contract contains a provision that any legal action
arising out of the agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the
Philippines and by a specified court of the Philippines does not
necessarily mean a waiver of the state’s sovereign immunity from suit.

4. U.S. v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644

 The contract bidded out for barbershop facilities in the Clark Field US
Air Force Base was deemed commercial.

5. U.S. v. Rodrigo
 A contract for restaurant services within the Camp John Hay Air Station
was likewise held commercial in character.

6. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 204 SCRA 212

 Even if, in exercising the power of eminent domain, the State exercises a
power jus imperii, as distinguished from its proprietary right of jus
gestionis, where property has been taken without just compensation
being paid, the defense of immunity from suit cannot be set up in an
action for payment by the owner.

7. Republic (PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 129406, March 6, 2006

 227 shares in Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI)
owned and registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto were
sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents.

 In a suit for payment of dues of the sequestered shares, PCGG raised,

among others, the defense of immunity from suit.

 The Supreme Court held that by entering into a Compromise

Agreement with Benedicto, the Republic stripped itself of its
immunity and placed itself in the same level as its adversary.

 When the State enters into a contract through its officers or agents, in
furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to
constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal
benefits accruse and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State
 2
may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by
entering into a contract, the sovereign descends to the level of the
citizen.

8. PHILIPPINE TEXTILE RESEARCH INSTITUTES VS. CA, G.R. No. 223319,

October 09, 2019, CAGUIOA

 227 shares in Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI)
owned and registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto were
sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents.

 There is implied consent on the part of the State to be subjected to suit

when the State enters into a contract. In this situation, the government
is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party
and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. However, not all
contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-
suability; distinction must still be made between one which is executed
in the exercise of its sovereign functions and another which is done in its
proprietary capacity.

 State immunity extends only to acts executed in the exercise of its

sovereign functions.

 The State may be sued with its consent. The State's consent to be sued
may be given either expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be
made through a general law or a special law. The general law waiving
the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the
Philippine government 'consents and submits to be sued upon any
money claim involving liability arising from contract, express or
implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private
parties.

 PTRI is being sued upon a claim involving liability arising from a

contract. Hence, the general law on the waiver of immunity from suit
finds application.

9. DOTC VS. SPOUSES ABECINA, June 29, 2016, G.R. No. 206484

 EMINENT DOMAIN CASES; Consequently, our laws require that the

State’s power of eminent domain shall be exercised through
expropriation proceedings in court. Whenever private property is taken
for public use, it becomes the ministerial duty of the concerned office or
agency to initiate expropriation proceedings.
 2

 By necessary implication, the filing of a complaint for expropriation is

a waiver of State immunity.

SCOPE OF CONSENT.

Consent to be sued does not include consent to the execution of judgment against
it.

Consent to be sued is not a concession of liability. Suability depends on the

consent of the State to be sued, and liability on the applicable law and the
established facts. The circumstance that a State is suable does not necessarily
mean that it is liable, but it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to
be sued. When the State does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the
plaintiff the chance to prove that it is liable [USA v. Guinto, G.R. No. 76607 (1990)]

CASE:

1. Republic v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 84; Department of Agriculture v. NLRC,

227 SCRA 693
 Such execution will require another waiver, because the power of the
court ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment,
unless such disbursement is covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law

2. Larkins v. NLRC, 241 SCRA 598

 Considering that the employer of private respondents was not Lt. Col.
Frankhauser or the petitioner but the U.S. Government which, by right
of sovereign power, operated and maintained the dormitories at the
Clark Air Base for USAF members, the awards (of monetary claims to
the private respondents) will have to be satisfied by the U.S.
Government. Without its consent the properties of the U.S. Government
may not be subject to execution.

3. Philippine National Bank v. Pabalan, 83 SCRA 595; Rizal Commercial Bank

v. De Castro, 168 SCRA 49
 But funds belonging to government corporations (whose charters
provide that they can sue and be sued) that are deposited with a bank
are not exempt from garnishment
 2
4. National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Quivelondo, G.R. No. 154411, June
19, 2003
 If the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or
controlled corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own,
then the funds are not exempt from garnishment. This is so because
when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons its
sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. NHA
is one such corporation; thus, its funds are not exempt from garnishment
or execution.

5. Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez, 130 SCRA 56

 Funds of a municipality (although it is an incorporated agency whose
charter provides that it can sue and be sued) are public in character and
may not be garnished unless there is a corresponding appropriation
ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan.

6. City of Caloocan v. Allarde, G.R. No. 107271, September 10, 2003

 All government funds deposited with any official depositary bank of the
Philippine Government by any of its agencies or instrumentalities,
whether by general or special deposit, remain government funds and
may not be subject to garnishment or levy in the absence of a
corresponding appropriation as required by law.

 In this case, the City of Caloocan had already approved and passed
Ordinance No. 0134, Series of 1992, allocating the amount of P439.377.14
for respondent Santiago’s back salaries plus interest. Thus, this case fell
squarely within the exception, and the amount may therefore be
garnished.

7. Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 206

 Where the municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to
effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the
claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the
enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance and
the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds to satisfy the money
judgment.

8. Pacific Products v. Ong, 181 SCRA 536

 By the process of garnishment, the plaintiff virtually sues the garnishee
for a debt due from the defendant. The debtor-stranger becomes a forced
intervenor; when served with the writ of attachment, he becomes a party
to the action.
 2
 Money in the hands of government agency (engaged in governmental
functions), even if due to a third party, is not liable to creditors of the
third party through garnishment. To allow this would be to allow a suit
against the State without the latter’s consent.

Suability not equated with outright liability.

Liability will have to be determined by the Court on the basis of the evidence and
the applicable law.

CASE:

1. Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands

 While consent to be sued was granted through a special law, the
government was held not liable for damages, because under the
attendant circumstances the government was not acting through a
special agent.

2. Fontanilla v. Maliaman, 194 SCRA 486

 The National Irrigation Administration is a government agency with a
juridical personality separate and distinct from the government; it is a
corporate body performing proprietary functions. Thus, the NIA may be
held liable for damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who was
not a special agent.

 Ruling reiterated in National Irrigation Administration v. Court of

Appeals, 214 SCRA 35

SATISFACTION OF CLAIM

CASE: [TAISEI SHIMIZU JOINT VENTURE VS. COA, G.R. No. 238671, June
02, 2020, EN BANC]

The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private
parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up
to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the
power of the Court ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds
and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.

Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding

appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by
 2
the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
Moreover, it is settled jurisprudence that upon determination of State liability, the
prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in
accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in P.D. No. 1445, otherwise
known as the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (Department of
Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, 701-02 1993 citing Republic vs. Villasor, 54
SCRA 84 1973).

All money claims against the Government must first be filed with the
Commission on Audit which must act upon it within sixty days. Rejection of the
claim will authorize the claimant to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on
certiorari and in effect sue the State thereby (P.D. 1445, Sections 49-50).

However, notwithstanding the rule that government properties are not subject to
levy and execution unless otherwise provided for by statute (Republic v. Palacio,
23 SCRA 899 1968; Commissioner of Public Highways v. San Diego, supra) or
municipal ordinance (Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 206
1990), the Court has, in various instances, distinguished between government
funds and properties for public use and those not held for public use.

Thus, Viuda de Tan Toea v. Municipal Council of Iloilo (49 Phil. 52 1926), the Court
ruled that "[w]here property of a municipal or other public corporation is
sought to be subjected to execution to satisfy judgments recovered against such
corporation, the question as to whether such property is leviable or not is to be
determined by the usage and purposes for which it is held."

The following can be culled from Viuda de Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo:
(i) PROPERTIES - and generally everything held for
HELD FOR governmental purposes
PUBLIC USES
- are not subject to levy and sale under
execution against such corporation.
The same rule applies to funds in the
hands of a public officer and taxes due
to a municipal corporation
(ii) WHERE A as distinguished from its public or
MUNICIPAL governmental capacity,
CORPORATIO
N OWNS IN ITS property not used or used for a public
PROPRIETARY purpose but for quasi private purposes,
CAPACITY it is the general rule that such property
may be seized and sold under
execution against the corporation.
 2

(iii) PROPERTY is not subject to execution merely

HELD FOR because it is temporarily used for
PUBLIC private purposes.
PURPOSES
If the public use is wholly abandoned,
such property becomes subject to
execution.

F. Delegation of Powers (1987 CONST., art. VI, secs. 1, 23(2) and 28(2))

ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department

SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of

the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.

SECTION 23 (2). In times of war or other national emergency, the

Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers
necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless
sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall
cease upon the next adjournment thereof.

SECTION 28 (2). The Congress may, by law, authorize the President

to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.

DELEGATION OF POWERS

 Rule: what has been delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non
delegari potest)
 2

 based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes

not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the
instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the
matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another.
Congress however may delegate to another branch of the Government
the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law for the reasons stated above. [RODRIGO, JR., VS.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN]

RATIONALE OF DELEGATION OF POWERS

Given the volume and variety of interactions involving the members of today's
society, it is doubtful if the legislature can promulgate laws dealing with the
minutiae aspects of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative
bodies, as the principal agencies tasked to execute laws with respect to their
specialized fields, the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement
a given statute and effectuate its policies. [Equi-Asia Placement, Inc. v. Department
of Foreign Affairs]

CASES:

1. Lim v. Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649

 SC: “Since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate jai-alai, it
cannot, even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor, operate
jai-alai in the City of Manila.”

2. Jaworski v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 144463, January 14, 2004

⮚ While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator’s

and/or management contracts, it is not allowed to relinquish or share
its franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity
such as SAGE.

⮚ PAGCOR cannot delegate its power, inasmuch as there is nothing in the

charter to show that it has been expressly authorized to do so.

⮚ SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative franchise, and not “ride on”
PAGCOR’s franchise if it were to legally operate on-line Internet
gambling.

Permissible delegation:
 2
1. Tariff Powers to the President
2. Emergency Powers to the President
3. Delegation to the People
4. Delegation to Local Government Units
5. Delegation to Administrative Bodies

LEGAL BASIS CASES

T Sec. 28(2), Art. VI: The Tariff and
a Customs Code
r “(2) The Congress may, by grants such
i law, authorize the President stand-by powers
f to fix within specified limits, to the President.
f and subject to such
limitations and restrictions Garcia v.
P as it may impose, tariff rates, Executive
o import and export quotas, Secretary, 211
w tonnage and wharfage dues, SCRA 219
e and other duties or imposts
r within the framework of the
s ⮚ SC upheld
national development
program of the Government.” the
t constitution
o ality of
Executive
t Orders Nos.
h 475 and 478,
e ⮚ which
levied a
P
special duty
r
of P0.95 per
e
liter on
s
imported
i
crude oil,
d
and P1.00
e
per liter on
n
imported oil
t
products, as
a valid
exercise of
delegated
legislative
authority
under the
Tariff and
Customs
 2
Code.

Philippine
Interisland
Shipping
Association v.
Court of
Appeals, G.R.
No. 100481,
January 22, 1997

⮚ fixing
of rates
is
essentia
lly a
legislati
ve
power

⮚ When
the
same is
delegat
ed to
the
Preside
nt, he
may
exercise
it
directly

(Ex. issuance of
the questioned
Executive Order
1088, without
thereby
withdrawing an
earlier
delegation made
to the Philippine
Ports Authority
(PPA).)
 2

NOTE: But
when the
President
directly exercises
the delegated
authority, the
PPA may not
revise the rates
fixed by the
former.

E Sec. 23(2), Art. VI Example:

m
e (2) In times of war or other RA 6826,
r national emergency, the approved on
g Congress may, by law, December
e authorize the President, for a 20,1989. The
n limited period and subject to President issued
c such restrictions as it may National
y prescribe, to exercise powers Emergency
necessary and proper to carry Memorandum
P out a declared national Orders
o policy. Unless sooner (NEMOs) in the
w withdrawn by resolution of exercise of
e the Congress, such powers delegated
r shall cease upon the next legislative
s adjournment thereof. powers.

t
o

t
h
e

P
r
e
s
i
d
e
n
t

President’s Authority to:
Declare a “State of
Emergency”
Since Sec. 18, Art. VII,
grants the President such
power, no legitimate
constitutional objection
can be raised.
2
Exercise Emergency Powers
manifold constitutional
issues arise.
The exercise of emergency
powers, such as the taking
over of privately-owned
public utilities or businesses
affected with public interest,
requires a delegation from
Congress.
CASE: David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo
Sec. 17, Art. XII, must be
understood as an aspect of
the emergency powers
clause. The taking over of
private businesses affected
with public interest is just
another facet of the
emergency powers generally
reposed in Congress.
Thus, when Sec. 17, Art. XII,
provides that “the State may,
during the emergency and
under reasonable terms
prescribed by it, temporarily
take over or direct the operation
of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with
public interest”, the State
refers to Congress, not the
President.
Whether the President may
exercise such power is
dependent on whether
Congress delegates it to the
former pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable
terms thereof.
 2

LEGAL BASIS CASES

D Sec. 32, Art. VI; Sec. 10, People v. Vera,
el Art. X; Sec. 2, Art. XVII; 65 Phil 56
eg Republic Act 6735
ati ("The Initiative and was decided
on Referendum Act.") under the 1935
to Constitution
th Art. VI, SECTION 32.
e The Congress shall, as SC: Courts have
Pe early as possible, provide sustained the
op for a system of initiative delegation of
le and referendum, and the legislative power
exceptions therefrom, to the people at
whereby the people can large.
directly propose and enact
laws or approve or reject Under the 1987
any act or law or part Constitution,
thereof passed by the there are specific
Congress or local provisions
legislative body after the where the
registration of a petition people have
therefor signed by at least reserved to
ten per centum of the total themselves the
number of registered function of
voters, of which every legislation.
legislative district must be
represented by at least
three per centum of the
registered voters thereof.

Art. X, SECTION 10. No

province, city,
municipality, or barangay
may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially
altered, except in
accordance with the
criteria established in the
Local Government Code
and subject to approval by
a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the
 2
political units directly
affected.

Art. XVII, SECTION 2.

Amendments to this
Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the
people through initiative
upon a petition of at least
twelve per centum of the
total number of registered
voters, of which every
legislative district must be
represented by at least
three per centum of the
registered voters therein.
No amendment under this
section shall be authorized
within five years following
the ratification of this
Constitution nor oftener
than once every five years
thereafter.

The Congress shall

provide for the
implementation of the
exercise of this right.

Referendum Plebiscite
the power of the electorate the electoral process by
to approve or reject which an initiative on
legislation through an the Constitution is
election called for the approved or rejected by
purpose. the people

It may be of two classes:

1. referendum on statutes
- a petition to approve
or reject an act or law, or
part thereof, passed by
Congress; and
 2
2. referendum on local
law - a petition to
approve or reject a law,
resolution or ordinance
enacted by regional
assemblies and local
legislative bodies

LEGAL CASES
BASIS
D R.A. People v. Vera
el 7160 –
eg Local Such legislation (by local
ati Govern governments) ) is not regarded
on ment as a transfer of general
to Code legislative power, but rather as
lo the grant of the authority to
cal prescribe local regulations,
go according to immemorial
ve practice, subject, of course, to
rn the interposition of the
m superior in cases of necessity.
en
t This recognizes the fact that
un local legislatures are more
its knowledgeable than the
national lawmaking body on
matters of purely local
concern, and are in a better
position to enact appropriate
legislative measures thereon.

(RedGelo)
Local legislative bodies are
allowed by our Constitution to
legislate on purely public
matters. Since what was given
to local legislative bodies are
not power to make rules and
regulations but legislative
power, the rules on valid
delegation do not apply.
However, when what is given
to local legislative body is
executive power, the rules
 2
applicable to the
empowerment of
administrative agencies also
become applicable.

CASES
D “the [KILUSANG MAYO UNO
el power VS. AQUINO III, April 2,
eg of 2019, G.R. No. 210500]
ati subordi Given the volume and variety
on nate of interactions involving the
to legislati members of today's society, it
A on” is doubtful if the legislature
d can promulgate laws dealing
mi with the minutiae aspects of
ni everyday life. Hence, the need
str to delegate to administrative
ati bodies, as the principal
ve agencies tasked to execute
Bo laws with respect to their
di specialized fields, the authority
es to promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a
given statute and effectuate its
policies.

Conference of Maritime
Manning Agencies, Inc., v.
POEA, 243 SCRA 666

POEA Governing Board

Resolution No. 01-94,
increasing and adjusting the
rates of compensation and
other benefits in the Standard
Employment Contract for
Seafarers, was held to be a
valid exercise of delegated
legislative authority,

inasmuch as it conforms to the

sufficient and valid standard
of fair and equitable
employment practices
prescribed in EO 797
(REORGANIZING THE
 2
MINISTRY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, CREATING
THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES)

Osmena v. Orbos
There was no undue
delegation of legislative power
in the authority granted by
legislature to the Energy
Regulatory Board to impose
additional amounts to
augment the resources of the
Oil Price Stabilization Fund.

EXCEPTIONS:

Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor

Center v. Garcia
The authority given by LTFRB
to provincial bus operators to
set a fare range over and above
the existing authorized fare
was held to be illegal for being
an undue delegation of power.

Pelaez v. Auditor General, 15

SCRA 569
Sec. 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code
(authorizing the President to
create municipalities through
Executive Orders) was
declared unconstitutional for
being an undue delegation of
legislative power.

XPN to Pelaez Ruling:

Municipality of San Narciso

(Quezon) v. Mendez, 239
SCRA 11
EO 353 creating the Municipal
 2
District of San Andres in 1959
was not declared
unconstitutional

because it was only after

almost 30 years that the
legality of the executive order
was challenged; throughout its
30 years of existence, the
municipal district had
exercised the powers and
authority of a duly created
local government institution,
and the State had, at various
times, recognized its continued
existence.

Municipality of Candihay,
Bohol v. Court of Appeals, 251
SCRA 530

The municipality had been in

existence for 16 years before
the Pelaez ruling was
promulgated, and various
governmental acts throughout
the years all indicate the State’s
recognition and
acknowledgment of the
existence of the municipal
corporation.

Municipality of Jimenez,
Misamis Occidental v. Borja,
265 SCRA 182

Not only was the Municipality

of Sinacaban in existence for 16
years before the Pelaez ruling,
but that even the State and the
Municipality of Jimenez itself
had recognized Sinacaban’s
corporate existence (by
entering into an agreement
concerning common
boundaries), and that
 2
Sinacaban had attained de jure
status by virtue of the
Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution apportioning
legislative districts throughout
the country which considered
Sinacaban as part of the 2nd
district of Misamis Occidental.

REQUISITES FOR A VALID EXERCISE OF DELEGATION

All that is required for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation
is that:

1. The regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes of the law;
and

2. That the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the
standards prescribed by the law. [DTI VS. STEELASIA
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 238263, November 16, 2020]

Tests for valid delegation

NOTE: Both of the following tests are to be complied with [Pelaez v. Auditor
General, 15 SCRA 569; Tatad v. Secretary of Energy, supra.]

Completeness Test Sufficient standard test

The law must be complete in all A sufficient standard is
its essential terms and conditions intended to map out the
when it leaves the legislature so boundaries of the
that there will be nothing left for delegate’s authority by
the delegate to do when it defining the legislative
reaches him except to enforce it. policy and indicating the
circumstances under
which it is to be pursued
and effected.

This is intended to
prevent a total
transference of
legislative power from
the legislature to the
delegate. The standard is
usually indicated in the
 2
law delegating
legislative power.

There should be
adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to
determine the
boundaries of the
delegate's authority and
prevent the delegation
from running riot. [DTI
VS. STEELASIA
MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION, G.R.
No. 238263, November 16,
2020]

CASES:

1. Chiongbian v. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253

 On the challenge relative to the validity of the provision of RA 6734,
which authorized the President to “merge”, by administrative
determination, the regions remaining after the establishment of the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao

 SC: the legislative standard need not be expressed, it may simply be

gathered or implied; neither should it always be found in the law
challenged, because it may be found in other statutes on the same
subject.

 In this case, the standard was found in R.A. 5435 on the power of the
President to promote simplicity, economy, and to enable it to pursue
programs consistent with national goals for accelerated social and
economic development

2. Tatad v. Secretary, Department of Energy

 Even as the Supreme Court found that RA 8180 (The Oil Deregulation
Law) for the delegation of power to the President to advance the date of
full deregulation (of the oil industry), EO 392 (CONSTITUTING THE
METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY, PROVIDING FOR ITS
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES)
constituted a misapplication of RA 8180, because the President rewrote
the standards set forth in the law when he considered the extraneous
factor of depletion of OPSF funds.
 2

3. Gerochi v. Department of Energy, G.R. No. 159796, July 17, 2007

 SC: The EPIRA (Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001), read and
appreciated in its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all
its essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient
standards.

Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, “To ensure the total
electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and
affordability of the supply of electric power” and “watershed
rehabilitation and management” are sufficient standards, as they
provide the limitations on the Energy Regulatory Commission’s power
to formulate the Implementing Rules and Regulations.

4. DTI VS. STEELASIA MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, G.R. No.

238263, November 16, 2020

 Simply put, what are needed for a valid delegation are: (1) the
completeness of the statute making the delegation; and (2) the presence
of a sufficient standard.

 To determine completeness, all of the terms and provisions of the law

must leave nothing to the delegate except to implement it. "What only
can be delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall
be but the discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced."
More relevant here, however, is the presence of a sufficient standard
under the law. Enforcement of a delegated power may only be effected
in conformity with a sufficient standard, which is used "to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus 'prevent the delegation
from running riot.'" The law must contain the limitations or guidelines
to determine the scope of authority of the delegate.

5. KILUSANG MAYO UNO VS. AQUINO III, April 2, 2019, G.R. No. 210500
 Social Security Act has validly delegated the power to fix the
contribution rate and the minimum and maximum amounts for the
monthly salary credits. It is within the scope of the Social Security
Commission's power to fix them, as clearly laid out in the law.

6. DTI VS. ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 225301, June 02, 2020, EN BANC

 While the power to impose penalty remains with the President or the
Ombudsman, the power to investigate, as well as to designate a
committee or officer to investigate, and thereafter to report its findings
and make recommendations, may be delegated to and exercised by
 2
subordinates or a special commission or committee specifically
created for such purpose.

 Stated more specifically, while it is the President as the Chief Executive,

or the Ombudsman as mandated by law, who has the authority to
impose penalty upon erring presidential appointees, it does not preclude
said disciplining authorities from utilizing, as a matter of practical
administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and
report to them the facts, on the basis of which the President or the
Ombudsman, as the case may be, make their decision. It is sufficient that
the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer
authorized by law.

7. SOBREJUANITE-FLORES VS. PILANDO, G.R. No. 251816. November 23,

2021; EN BANC

 Here, RA No. 10029 satisfied the completeness test and sufficient

standard test.

 The law states the policy to guide the implementing agencies in carrying
out its provisions. The clear legislative intent is to regulate the practice of
psychology and to protect the public from incompetent individuals
offering psychological services. Before the enactment of the law, persons
who studied and graduated from the academic discipline of psychology
were not required to obtain a license to practice their profession.

 Corollarily, Section 16 of RA No. 10029 granted a window period for

practitioners to register without examination and crafted sufficient
standards on who may avail the exemption measured in terms of
educational attainment and work experience. Specifically, the law
provides that applicants who have Bachelor's Degree in Psychology may
be registered without examination if they accumulated a "minimum of
ten (10) years of work experience in the practice of psychology as a
psychologist" and "updated their professional education in various
psychology-related functions."

 Contrary to Florentina's contention, the use of these phrases neither

render the law incomplete nor grant the PRC and the BOP a wide
latitude of discretion. The standards set for subordinate legislation in the
exercise of the administrative bodies' rule making authority are
necessarily broad and highly abstract. The standards may be either
expressed or implied.
 2
 The standards do not have to be spelled out specifically, and could be
implied from the purpose of the act considered as a whole. This Court
has recognized "public interest", "justice and equity", "public
convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy, and welfare" as
sufficient standards. In this case, the declared policy of the law and the
body of the statute complied with the requirements of valid delegation
of legislative power. The guidelines for persons seeking to practice
psychology are infused with the public interest.

G. Fundamental Powers of the State – Police Power, Eminent Domain and

Taxation
– Concept, Application, and Limitations (1987 CONST., art. III, sec. 9; art.
VI, sec. 28; art. XIV, sec. 4(3))

ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights

SECTION 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation.
ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department

SECTION 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.

SECTION 28 (2). The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to

fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.

ARTICLE XIV
Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture, and Sports

SECTION 4 (3). All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit

educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the
dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions,
their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law.

Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively

owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions subject to the
limitations provided by law including restrictions on dividends and
provisions for reinvestment.
 2

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. The inherent powers of the State are:

(a) Police Power;
(b) Power of Eminent Domain; and
(c) Power of Taxation

As to… TAXATIO POLICE EMINENT

N POWER DOMAIN
similarities a) Inherent in the State, exercised even without need of
express constitutional grant.

b) Necessary and indispensable; State cannot be effective

without them.

c) Methods by which State interferes with private

property.

d) Presuppose equivalent compensation

e) Exercised primarily by the Legislature.

1. concept Power to Power to Power to

enforce make and take
contributio implement private
n to raise laws for property
governmen the general for public
t funds welfare use with
just
compensat
ion
2. scope Plenary, Broader in Merely a
comprehen applicatio power to
sive, n take
supreme private
General property
Affects all power to for public
persons, make and use
property implement
and laws Affects
exercise of only the
rights Affects all particular
persons, property
Only liberty, comprehen
property property, ded
 2
rights privileges
and even Only
rights property
rights
3. authority Exercised Exercised May be
which only by only by granted to
exercises gov’t or its gov’t or its public
the power political political service or
subdivision subdivisio public
s ns utility
companies

4. purpose Money is Property is Private

taken to taken or property is
support the destroyed taken for
governmen to promote public use.
t general
welfare Taking of
Levied for property
the purpose Exercised for public
of raising to promote use
revenue public
welfare
thru
regulation
s

5. Necessity The power Can be Can be

of to make tax expressly expressly
delegation laws cannot delegated delegated
be to the to the
delegated LGUs by LGUs by
the law- the law-
making making
body body

6. Person Operates Operates Operates

affected on a on a on the
community communit particular
or a class of y or a class private
individual of property of
individual an
individual

7. Benefits Continuous Healthy Market

received protection economic value of
and standard the
 2
organized of society property
society; expropriat
protection No direct ed
given benefits
and/or but a Direct
public healthy benefit
improveme economic results in
nts standard the form of
instituted of society just
by or compensat
governmen “damnum ion
t for the absque
taxes paid. injuria” is Full and
attained fair
No special equivalent
or direct Intangible of the
benefits altruistic property
received feeling taken
but the that the
enjoyment individual
of the has
privileges contribute
of living in d to the
an public
organized good
society. The
fact na
meron
kang pulis,
meron
kang army,
the fact na
meron
kang
madaanan
na concrete
road, the
fact na
meron
kang
bridges.

8. Amount Generally Limited to No

of no limit the cost of imposition
imposition; regulation or
Amount of s, issuance exaction,
 2
exaction of the compensat
license or ion paid by
surveillanc the
e and governme
other nt
necessary
expenses

The fees or
the
penalties
to be
imposed
must be
commensu
rate with
the cost of
regulation.

NOTE: If masyadong mataas

yung tax na iniimpose na hindi
naman sya commensurate doon
sa expenses for regulation, then
that is for tax purposes, not for
regulation.

9. Inseparable Protection, Common

Importance for the safety and necessities
existence of welfare of and
a nation – it society interest of
supports the
police communit
power and y
eminent transcend
domain individual
rights in
property

10.Relation Subject to Relatively Superior to

ship to consti and free from and may
Constitutio inherent consti override
n limitations limitations Consti
impairmen
Non- Inferior to Superior t provision
impairment non- to non- because
of contracts impairment impairmen the welfare
clause, the t clause, of the State
 2
impairment contract is superior
rule subsist may be to any
impaired private
Meaning, if contract.
there is
already a Contracts
contract may be
tapos impaired.
nagkaroon
ng tax law,
that should
not be able
to impair
the
contract.
11. Constraints Limited by Bounded
Limitation by the by public
constitution demand purpose
al and for public and just
inherent interest compensat
limitations and due ion
process

Generally,
the Bill of
Rights,
although
in some
cases the
exercise of
the power
prevails
over
specific
constitutio
nal
guarantees
. The
courts
may annul
the
improvide
nt exercise
of police
power,
e.g., in
Quezon
 2
City v.
Ericta, 122
SCRA 759
and in
Philippine
Press
Institute v.
Comelec,
244 SCRA
272.

12. Transfer Taxes paid No Property is

of Property become transfer taken by
Rights part of the but only the
public restraint governme
funds on the nt upon
exercise of payment
property of just
right exists compensat
ion

13. Basis Public Public Public

necessity necessity necessity,
and the private
right of the property is
State and taken for
the public public use
to self-
protection
and self-
preservati
on

14. Property is Usually Property is

Property wholesome noxious or wholesom
Taken and intended e and
devoted to for a devoted to
public use noxious public use
or purpose purpose or purpose
and may
thus be
destroyed

POLICE POWER

Definition.
 2
 The power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating
the use of liberty and property.

Scope/Characteristics:
 Police power is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most
demanding of the three powers.

 The justification is found in the Latin maxims: salus populi est suprema
lex, and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.

CASES:

1. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814; Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
 Police power cannot be bargained away through the medium of a
treaty or a contract.

2. Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148; Tiu v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151

SCRA 208; Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, 158 SCRA 626; Osmena
v. Orbos, 220 SCRA 703
 The taxing power may be used as an implement of police power

3. Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175

SCRA 343
 Eminent domain may be used as an implement to attain the
police objective.

4. Ortigas & Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000
 A law enacted in the exercise of police power to regulate or
govern certain activities or transactions could be given
retroactive effect and may reasonably impair vested rights or
contracts.
 Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts,
but equally to those already in existence. Non-impairment of
contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the
superior and legitimate exercise by the State of the police
power.
5. PNB v. Office of the President, 255 SCRA 5
 Thus, despite the retroactive effect of PD 957 (Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), there is no violation of
the non-impairment clause, because the decree is a valid exercise
of police power, and police power prevails over contracts.

6. Professional Regulation Commission v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 144681,

June 21, 2004
 2

 It is true that the Court has upheld the constitutional right of

every citizen to select a profession or course of study subject to
fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements.

 But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their
exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the
State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety,
and the general welfare of the people. This regulation assumes
particular pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public
from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance.

7. Chavez v. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534

 The right to bear arms is merely a statutory privilege. The license

to carry a firearm is neither a property or a property right.
Neither does it create a vested right. A permit to carry a firearm
outside one’s residence may be revoked at any time. Even if it
were a property right, it cannot be considered as absolute as to be
beyond the reach of the police power.

8. Southeast Mindanao Goldmining Corporation v. Balite Portal Mining,

G.R. No. 135190, April 3, 2002

 Like timber permits, mining exploration permits do not vest in

the grantee any permanent or irrevocable right within the
purview of the non-impairment and due process clauses, since
the State, under its all-encompassing police power, may alter,
modify or amend the same in accordance with the demands of
the general welfare.

9. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, G.R. No.

130230, April 15, 2005

 A license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a

privilege granted by the State, which may be suspended or
revoked by the State in the exercise of its police power, in the
interest of public safety and welfare, subject to the procedural
due process requirements.

10. Carlos Superdrug Corporation v. DSWD, etal., G.R. No. 166494, June
29, 2007
 2

 RA 9257 (Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003) is a legitimate

exercise of police power.

 Administrative Order No. 177 issued by the Department of

Health, providing that the 20% discount privilege of senior
citizens shall not be limited to the purchase of unbranded generic
medicine but shall extend to both prescription and non-
prescription medicines, whether branded or generic, is valid.

 When conditions so demand, as determined by the legislature,

property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because
property rights, though sheltered by the due process clause, must
yield to the general welfare.

Who may exercise the power.

The power is inherently vested in the Legislature. However, Congress may

validly delegate this power to the President, to administrative bodies and to
lawmaking bodies of local government units. Local government units exercise the
power under the general welfare clause [Sec. 16, R.A. 7160], and under Secs. 391,
447, 458 and 468, R.A. 7160]
CASES:

1. Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative v. Torres, G.R. No. 127249,

February 27, 1998

 While police power may be validly delegated to the President by

law, R.A. 6939 and P.D. 260, as amended, do not authorize the
President, or any other administrative body, to take over the
internal management of a cooperative. Accordingly,
Memorandum Order No. 409, issued by the President,
constituting an ad hoc committee to temporarily take over and
manage the affairs of CANORECO is invalid.

2. Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association,

G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000

 Unlike the legislative bodies of local government units, there is

no provision in R.A. 7924 that empowers the Metro Manila
Development Authority (MMDA) or its Council to “enact
ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila.
 2
 Thus, MMDA may not order the opening of Neptune St. in the
Bel-Air Subdivision to public traffic, as it does not possess
delegated police power.

3. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin, G.R. No.

130230, April 15, 2005

 While Sec. 5(f), R.A. 7924, does not grant the MMDA the power to
confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses without need
of any other legislative enactment, the same law vests the MMDA
with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations.

 Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by

the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative power has
been delegated (the City of Manila, in this case), the MMDA is
not precluded and in fact is duty-bound to confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses in the exercise of its mandate
of transport and traffic management, as well as the
administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education
programs.

4. Francisco v. Fernando, G.R. No. 166501, November 16, 2006

 A petition for prohibition and mandamus was filed against the

MMDA and its Chairman, Bayani Fernando, to enjoin the further
implementation of the “Wet Flag Scheme” and to compel
respondents to “respect and uphold” the pedestrians’ right to
due process and right to equal protection of the law.

 (As implemented, police mobile units bearing wet flags with

words “Maglakadandmag-abang sa bangketa” are deployed along
major Metro Manila thoroughfares.)

 It was held that the petitioner failed to show the lack of basis or
the unreasonableness of the Wet Flag Scheme.

 On the alleged lack of legal basis, the Court noted that all the
cities and municipalities within MMDA’s jurisdiction except
Valenzuela City have each enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or
traffic management codes with provisions for pedestrian
regulation.
 2
 This serves as sufficient basis for the respondent’s
implementation of schemes to enforce the anti-jaywalking
ordinances and similar regulations. The MMDA is an
administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules
and regulations enacted by proper authorities.

 The absence of an anti-jaywalking ordinance in Valenzuela City

does not detract from this conclusion absent any proof that
respondents implemented the Flag Scheme in that city.

5. Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation,

G.R. No. 170656, August 15, 2007

 While concededly, the President has the authority to provide for

the establishment of the Greater Manila Mass Transport System,
in order to decongest traffic by eliminating bus terminals along
major Metro Manila thoroughfares, EO No. 179, which designates
the Metro Manila Development Authority as the implementing
agency for the project, is ultra vires.

 Under the provisions of EO 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, not

the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement such
a project. The President must exercise the authority through the
instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law is the primary
implementing and administrative entity in the promotion,
development and regulation of networks of transportation. By
designating the MMDA as the implementing agency, the
President overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by
law.

Limitations (Tests for Valid Exercise):

1. Lawful Subject
2. Lawful Means
Lawful Subject

 The interests of the public in qeneral, as distinguished from those of a

particular class, require the exercise of the power. This means that the
activity or property sought to be regulated affects the general welfare;
if it does, then the enjoyment of the rights flowing therefrom may have
to yield to the interests of the greater number.

CASES:
 2
1. Lim v. Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649

 P.D. 771, which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits
to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including jai-alai) issued
by local governments, was a valid exercise of the police power.

 Gambling is essentially antagonistic to the objectives of national

productivity and self-reliance; it is a vice and a social ill which the
government must minimize (or eradicate) in pursuit of social and
economic development.

2. Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, 240 SCRA 100

 Upheld the validity of Administrative Orders Nos. 57 and 82 of the

DENR Secretary which effectively converted existing mining leases
and other mining agreements into production-sharing agreements
within one year from effectivity, inasmuch as the subject sought to be
governed by the questioned orders is germane to the objects and
purposes of E.O 279, and that mining leases or agreements granted
by the State are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of
the police power of the State.

3. Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 112

 Ex parte cease and desist orders issued by the Pollution Adjudication

Board are permitted by law and regulations in situations such as
stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated
effluents into the rivers and other inland waters.

 The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations

were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of police power, x x x
The ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the
necessities of protecting vital public interests through the exercise of
police power.

Lawful Means

 The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment

of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on individuals.

CASES:

1. JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA

319
 2

 Police power concerns government enactments, which precisely

interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general
welfare or the common good.

 A thorough review of the facts and circumstances leading to the

issuance of DOLE Order No. 3 (establishing various procedures
and requirements for screening performing artists as a prerequisite
to the processing of any contract of employment by POEA) shows
that the assailed order was issued by the Secretary of Labor
pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power.

2. Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec, 244 SCRA 272

 Sec. 2 of Comelec Resolution No. 2772, which mandates

newspapers of general circulation in every province or city to
provide free print space of not less than 1/2 page as Comelec
space, was held to be an invalid exercise of the police power, there
being no showing of the existence of a national emergency or
imperious public necessity for the taking of print space, nor that
the resolution was the only reasonable and calibrated response to
such necessity.

 [This was held to be an exercise of the power of eminent domain,

albeit invalid, because the Comelec would not pay for the space to
be given to it by the newspapers.]

3. City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759

 Police power concerns government enactments, which precisely

interfere with personal liberty or property to promote the general
welfare or the common good.

The Quezon City ordinance which required commercial cemetery owners to

reserve 6% of burial lots for paupers in the City was held to be an invalid exercise
of the police power, but was, instead, an exercise of the power of eminent domain
which would make the City liable to pay the owners just compensation. iii) The
proper exercise of the police power requires compliance with the following
requisites: (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require the intereference by the State; and (b) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals. An ordinance aimed at relieving traffic
congestion meets the first standard; but declaring bus terminals as nuisances per
 2
se and ordering their closure or relocation contravenes the second standard
[Lucena Grand Central Terminal v. JAC Liner, G.R. NO. 148339, February 23,
2005]. iv) In Cabrera v. Lapid, G.R. No. 129098, December 6, 2006, the Supreme
Court upheld the dismissal by the Office of the Ombudsman of criminal charges
against respondents local government officials who had ordered and carried out
the demolition of a fishpond which purportedly blocked the flow of the Pasak
River in Sasmuan, Pampanga, The Court agreed with the findings of the
2PEXGVPDQWKDW
³WKRVHZKRSDUWLFLSDWHGLQWKHEODVWLQJRIWKHVXEMHFWILVK
SRQG were only impelled by their desire to
VHUYHWKHEHVWLQWHUHVWRIWKHJHQHUDOSXEOLF´5. Additional
Limitations [When exercised by delegate]: a) Express grant by law [e.g., Secs. 16,
391,447, 458 and 468, R. A. 7160, for local government units] b) Within territorial
limits [for local government units, except when exercised to protect water
supply], c) Must not be contrary to law. [Activity prohibited by law cannot, in the
guise of regulation, be allowed; an activity allowed by law may be regulated, but
not prohibited.] See: De la Cruz v. Paras, 123 SCRA 569; City Government of
Quezon City v. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759; Villacorta v. Bernardo, 143 SCRA 480. i) In
Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority, G.R. No. 102782, December
11,1991, reiterated in Tatelv. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, March 11,
1992, and in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994, the
Supreme Court declared that for municipal ordinances to be valid, they: [a] must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; [b] must not be unfair or
oppressive; [c] must not be partial or discriminatory; [d] must not prohibit, but
may regulate, trade; [e] must not be unreasonable; and [f] must be general in
application and consistent with public policy. ii) In City of Manila v. Judge
Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, the Supreme Court declared as an invalid
exercise of the police power City
RI0DQLOD2UGLQDQFH1RZKLFKSURKLELWHG³WKHHVWDEOLVKPHQW
RURSHUDWLRQRI businesses providing certain forms of amusement,
entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita-0DODWHDUHD
´&RQFHGHO\WKHRUGLQDQFHZDVHQDFWHGZLWK the best of motives
and shares the concern of the public for the cleansing of the Ermita-Malate area of
its social sins. Despite its virtuous aims, however, the enactment of the ordinance
has no statutory or constitutional OUTLINE / REVIEWER IN POLITICAL LAW
54 Constitutional Law authority to stand on. Local legislative bodies cannot
prohibit the operation of sauna and massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses,
night clubs, day clubs, supper clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels
and inns, or order their transfer or conversion without infringing the
constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws, not
even in the guise of police power. iii) The authority of a municipality to issue
zoning classification is an exercise of the police power, not the power of eminent
domain. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation
which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given.political
 2
subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs
[Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 142359 and
142980, May 25, 2004]

II. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

A. Congress: Senate and House of Representatives

1. Compositions and Qualifications – 1987 CONST., art. VI, secs. 2-14

ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department

SECTION 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four

Senators who shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of
the Philippines, as may be provided by law.

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-

born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is
at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a
registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less
than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

SECTION 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years

and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon
on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms.

Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.

SECTION 5.
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more
than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations.
 2
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to
party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,

contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts
based on the standards provided in this section.

SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of

Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list
representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall
be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the election.

SECTION 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall

be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election.

No member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more

than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.

SECTION 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular

election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.

SECTION 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of

Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such
vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve
 2
only for the unexpired term.

SECTION 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House

of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in
said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of
the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives approving such increase.

SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of

Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than
six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be
held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.

SECTION 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of

Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full
disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall
notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest that
may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they
are authors.

SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of

Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been
created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for
which he was elected.

SECTION 14. No Senator or Member of the House of

Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial
and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or
indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any
government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary,
during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
 2
2. Privileges and Inhibitions – 1987 CONST., art. VI, secs. 10, 11 and 13-14

ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department

SECTION 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the

House of Representatives shall be determined by law. No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives approving such increase.

SECTION 11. A Senator or Member of the House of

Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor
be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.

SECTION 13. No Senator or Member of the House of

Representatives may hold any other office or employment in
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.

SECTION 14. No Senator or Member of the House of

Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-
judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall
not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government
for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act
on account of his office.

3. Quorum and Voting Majorities, and Discipline of Members – 1987

CONST., art. VI, sec. 16

ARTICLE VI
 2
The Legislative Department

SECTION 16.
(1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members.

Each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem

necessary.

(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do

business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner,
and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

(3) Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings,

punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a
Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not
exceed sixty days.

(4) Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may, in its
judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

(5) Neither House during the sessions of the Congress shall,

without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three
days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses
shall be sitting.

B. Law-Making Process (1987 CONST., art. VI, secs. 26-27)

ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department

SECTION 26.
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
 2
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law
unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its
passage, except when the President certifies to the
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill,
no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote
thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the
yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

SECTION 27.
(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes a law, be presented to the President.

If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he

shall veto it and return the same with his objections to
the House where it originated, which shall enter the
objections at large in its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it.

If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the

Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it
shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that
House, it shall become a law.

In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be

determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the
Members voting for or against shall be entered in its
Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of
any bill to the House where it originated within thirty
days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it.

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any

particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or
tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items
to which he does not object.
 2

C. Appropriation (1987 CONST., art. VI, secs. 24-25 and 29)

ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department

SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills

authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application,
and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.

SECTION 25.
(1) The Congress may not increase the appropriations
recommended by the President for the operation of the
Government as specified in the budget. The form,
content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall
be prescribed by law.

(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the

general appropriations bill unless it relates specifically
to some particular appropriation therein. Any such
provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation
to the appropriation to which it relates.

(3) The procedure in approving appropriations for the

Congress shall strictly follow the procedure for
approving appropriations for other departments and
agencies.

(4) A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose

for which it is intended, and shall be supported by
funds actually available as certified by the National
Treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue
proposed therein.

(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of

appropriations; however, the President, the President of
the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized
to augment any item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices from savings in other items
 2
of their respective appropriations.

(6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials

shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be
supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law.

(7) If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have
failed to pass the general appropriations bill for the
ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations law for
the preceding fiscal year shall be deemed reenacted and
shall remain in force and effect until the general
appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.

SECTION 29.
(1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.

(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated,

applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned
to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or
government orphanage or leprosarium.

(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special

purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out
for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a
special fund was created has been fulfilled or
abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to
the general funds of the Government.

D. Legislative Inquiries and Oversight Functions (1987 CONST., art. VI, secs.
21-22)

ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department
 2

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of

its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own

initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of
either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before
and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President
of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least
three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall
not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related
thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so
requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall
be conducted in executive session.

E. Declaration of Existence of State of War (1987 CONST., art. VI, sec. 23)

ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department

SECTION 23.

(1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint

session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole
power to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress

may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period
and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of
the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next
adjournment thereof.
 2
F. Power to Revoke/Extend the Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus and Declaration of Martial Law (1987 CONST., art. VII,
sec. 18) (end 1/2/2024)

ARTICLE VII
Executive Department

SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all

armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative
of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours

following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without any need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed

by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within
thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the

Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able
to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with the invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus
 2
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released.

G. Power of Impeachment (1987 CONST., art. XI, secs. 2-3) (start 1/3/2024)
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the

Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

SECTION 3.
(1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.

(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any

Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof,
which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within
three session days thereafter. The Committee, after hearing,
and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such
referral, together with the corresponding resolution. The
resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.

(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House

shall be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with
the Articles of Impeachment of the Committee, or override its
contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is
filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the
same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by
the Senate shall forthwith proceed.

(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the

 2
same official more than once within a period of one year.

(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all
cases of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the
Senators shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of
the Philippines is on trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person shall be
convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate.

(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further

than removal from office and disqualification to hold any
office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
prosecution, trial, and punishment according to law.

(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to

effectively carry out the purpose of this section.

H. Electoral Tribunals (1987 CONST., art. VI, sec. 17)

ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department

SECTION 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members,
three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated
by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall
be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.

I. Commission on Appointments (1987 CONST., art. VI, sec. 18; art. VII, sec.
16; art. VIII, sec. 8)
ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department
 2

SECTION 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments

consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman,
twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie.
The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within
thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.

ARTICLE VII
Executive Department

SECTION 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until after disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department

SECTION 8.
(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative
of the private sector.

(2) The regular Members of the Council shall be appointed by

 2
the President for a term of four years with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first
appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall
serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the
retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the
private sector for one year.

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex

officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its
proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such

emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the
appropriations for the Council.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of

recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise
such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may
assign to it.

III. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

A. President and Vice President

1. Term, Qualifications, and Election – 1987 CONST., art. VII, secs. 2-4

ARTICLE VII
Executive Department

SECTION 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-

born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and
write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a
resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding
such election.

SECTION 3. There shall be a Vice-President who shall have the same

qualifications and term of office and be elected with and in the same
manner as the President. He may be removed from office in the same
manner as the President.

The Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such

 2
appointment requires no confirmation.

SECTION 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by

direct vote of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at
noon on the thirtieth day of June next following the day of the election
and shall end at noon of the same date six years thereafter. The
President shall not be eligible for any reelection. No person who has
succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years
shall be qualified for election to the same office at any time.

No Vice-President shall serve for more than two consecutive terms.

Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of the service for the full
term for which he was elected.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President

and Vice-President shall be held on the second Monday of May.

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly

certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be
transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate.
Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate
shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all
certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon
determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the
manner provided by law, canvass the votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed

elected, but in case two or more shall have an equal and highest
number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a
majority of all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice- President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
 2

2. Privileges, Inhibitions, and Disqualifications – 1987 CONST., art.

VII, secs. 6 and 13

ARTICLE VII
Executive Department

SECTION 6. The President shall have an official residence. The

salaries of the President and Vice-President shall be determined by
law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in
said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved.
They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument
from the Government or any other source.

SECTION 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the

Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business,
or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise,
or special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the

fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be
appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

B. Executive and Administrative Powers (1987 CONST., art. VII, secs. 1 and
17)

ARTICLE VII
Executive Department

SECTION 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of

the Philippines.
 2

SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.

C. Power of Appointment (1987 CONST., art. VII, secs. 13, 15 and 16)
1. Regular and Ad Interim
2. With or without COA Confirmation
3. Midnight Appointments
4. Removal from Office

ARTICLE VII
Executive Department

SECTION 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the

Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment
during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business,
or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the

fourth civil degree of the President shall not during his tenure be
appointed as members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

SECTION 15. Two months immediately before the next presidential

elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting
President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

SECTION 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
 2
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
appointments shall be effective only until after disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.

D. Power of Control and Supervision (1987 CONST., art. VII, sec. 17)

ARTICLE VII
Executive Department

SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.

1. Executive Departments and Offices; Doctrine of Qualified Political

Agency

2. Local Government Units – 1987 CONST., art. X, sec. 4

ARTICLE X
Local Government

SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general

supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities
with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of
 2
their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers
and functions.

E. Military Powers (1987 CONST., art. VII, sec. 18)

ARTICLE VII
Executive Department

SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all

armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the
President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke
such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours

following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without any need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed

by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the

Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are
able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to

 2
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with the invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released.

F. Pardoning Power and Executive Clemency (1987 CONST., art. VII, sec. 19)
ARTICLE VII
Executive Department

SECTION 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise

provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence
of a majority of all the Members of the Congress.

G. Diplomatic Power (1987 CONST., art. VII, secs. 16 and 21)

ARTICLE VII
Executive Department
SECTION 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the
recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such
 2
appointments shall be effective only until after disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the
Congress.

SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and

effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.

H. Power relative to Appropriation Measures (1987 CONST., art. VI, secs.

25(5) and 27(2); art. VII, sec. 20)

ARTICLE VI
The Legislative Department

SECTION 25 (5). No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of

appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may,
by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.

ARTICLE VII
Executive Department

SECTION 20. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans

on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. The Monetary Board shall, within thirty
days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the
Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans
to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or government-
owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of
increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be
provided by law.

I. Veto Power (1987 CONST., art. VI, sec. 27)

ARTICLE VII
Executive Department
 2
SECTION 27.

(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it;
otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to
the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at
large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to
the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall
become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be
determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for
or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated
within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall
become a law as if he had signed it.

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not
affect the item or items to which he does not object.

J. Residual Power (E.O. No. 292, Book III, Title I, Chapter 7, sec. 20)
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292
INSTITUTING THE “ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987”

BOOK III – OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Title I – POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
CHAPTER 7 – Other Powers

SECTION 20. Residual Powers.—Unless Congress provides

otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and
functions vested in the President which are provided for under the
laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are
not delegated by the President in accordance with law.

K. Removal from Office (1987 CONST., art. XI, sec. 2) (end 1/3/2024)
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
 2

SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the

Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public
trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.

L. Rules of Succession (1987 CONST., art. VII, secs. 7-12) (start 1/4/2024)

ARTICLE VII
Executive Department

SECTION 7. The President-elect and the Vice-President-elect shall

assume office at the beginning of their terms.

If the President-elect fails to qualify, the Vice-President-elect shall act

as President until the President-elect shall have qualified.

If a President shall not have been chosen, the Vice-President-elect

shall act as President until a President shall have been chosen and
qualified.

If at the beginning of the term of the President, the President-elect

shall have died or shall have become permanently disabled, the Vice-
President-elect shall become President.

Where no President and Vice-President shall have been chosen or

shall have qualified, or where both shall have died or become
permanently disabled, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall act as
President until a President or a Vice-President shall have been chosen
and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide for the manner in which one who
is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice-
President shall have qualified, in case of death, permanent disability,
or inability of the officials mentioned in the next preceding
 2
paragraph.

SECTION 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from

office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become
the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent
disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President
and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act
as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been
elected and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in

case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting
President. He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President
shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same
restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President.

SECTION 9. Whenever there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice-

President during the term for which he was elected, the President
shall nominate a Vice-President from among the Members of the
Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office
upon confirmation by a majority vote of all the Members of both
Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

SECTION 10. The Congress shall, at ten o’clock in the morning of the
third day after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-
President occurs, convene in accordance with its rules without need
of a call and within seven days enact a law calling for a special
election to elect a President and a Vice-President to be held not earlier
than forty-five days nor later than sixty days from the time of such
call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed certified
under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article VI of this Constitution and
shall become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress.

Appropriations for the special election shall be charged against any

current appropriations and shall be exempt from the requirements of
paragraph 4, Section 25, Article VI of this Constitution. The convening
of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the special election
postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs
within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential
election.

SECTION 11. Whenever the President transmits to the President of

the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his
written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
 2
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the

President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President
shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as
Acting President.

Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the

Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and
duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members
of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that
purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within
forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of
call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written
declaration, or, if not in session, within twelve days after it is required
to assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as the President;
otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and
duties of his office.

SECTION 12. In case of serious illness of the President, the public

shall be informed of the state of his health. The Members of the
Cabinet in charge of national security and foreign relations and the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, shall not be
denied access to the President during such illness.

IV. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

A. Definition of Judicial Power (1987 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1)

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court

and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
 2

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

B. Judicial Review
1. Requisites
a. Actual Case or Controversy
b. Proper Party
c. Raised at the Earliest Possible Opportunity
d. Necessary to the Determination of the Case Itself

2. Exceptions
a. Political Questions
b. Moot Questions
c. Advisory Opinions

3. Operative Fact Doctrine

C. Fiscal Autonomy (1987 CONST., art. VIII, secs. 3 and 10)

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department

SECTION 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.

Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the
legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and,
after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

SECTION 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be
fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased.
 2

D. Appointments to the Judiciary

1. Qualifications – 1987 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 7

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department

SECTION 7.
(1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or
any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty
years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a
lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines.

(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower

courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a
citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.

(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven

competence, integrity, probity, and independence.

2. Judicial and Bar Council – 1987 CONST., art. VIII, secs. 8 and 9

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department

SECTION 8.
(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision
of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.

(2) The regular Members of the Council shall be appointed by the

President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative
of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law
for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the
representative of the private sector for one year.

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of
 2
the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such

emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations
for the Council.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending

appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and
duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

SECTION 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower

courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy.
Such appointments need no confirmation.

For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments
within ninety days from the submission of the list.

E. Supreme Court of the Philippines (end 1/4/2024)

1. Composition – 1987 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 4

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department

SECTION 4.
(1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and
fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,

international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be
heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases
which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en
banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees,
proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the
 2
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or

resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in
the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the
concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the
required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed except by the court
sitting en banc.

2. Procedural Rule-Making Power – 1987 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5 (start

1/5/2024)

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or

certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity

of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,

assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower

 2
court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is

reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of

law is involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations

as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment
shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a

miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement

of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated
Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in

accordance with the Civil Service Law.

3. Disciplinary Powers – 1987 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 11

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department

SECTION 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of

lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reached
the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office. The Supreme Court en banc shall have the power
 2
to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote
of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

4. Administrative Supervision – 1987 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 6

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department

SECTION 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative

supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

5. Jurisdiction – 1987 CONST., art. VI, sec. 30; art. VIII, sec. 5

ARTICLE VIII
Judicial Department

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting

ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or

certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(f) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity

of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.

(g) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost,

assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto.

(h) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower

court is in issue.
 2
(i) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or higher.

(j) All cases in which only an error or question of

law is involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations

as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment
shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a

miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement

of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated
Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of
the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in

accordance with the Civil Service Law.

V. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS (1987 CONST., art. IX)

A. Powers, Functions, and Jurisdiction (1987 CONST., art. IX-A, sec. 8; art.
IX-B, sec. 3; art. IX-C, secs. 2-5, 9 and 11; art. IX-D, secs. 2-4)
 2
B. Composition and Qualifications of Members (1987 CONST., art. IX-B,
sec. 1; art. IX-C, sec. 1; art. IX-D, sec. 1)

C. Prohibited Offices and Interests (1987 CONST, art. IX-A, sec. 2)

D. Review of Final Orders, Resolutions and Decisions

1. Rendered in the Exercise of Quasi-Judicial Functions – 1987 CONST, art.
IX-A, sec. 7

2. Rendered in the Exercise of Administrative Functions – 1987 CONST, art.

IX-A, secs. 4 and 6

VI. BILL OF RIGHTS (1987 CONST., art. III)

The Constitution is not self-executing except Art. 3 (Bill of Rights)

G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997 MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS

 We have treated as self-executing the provisions in the Bill of Rights on arrests, searches
and seizures, the rights of a person under custodial investigation, the rights of an accused,
and the privilege against self-incrimination,

 It is recognized that legislation is unnecessary to enable courts to effectuate constitutional

provisions guaranteeing the fundamental rights of life, liberty and the protection of
property.

 The same treatment is accorded to constitutional provisions forbidding the taking or

damaging of property for public use without just compensation.

Definition.

The set of prescriptions setting forth the fundamental civil and political rights of the individual, and
imposing limitations on the powers of government as a means of securing the enjoyment of those
rights. The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security
“against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of
small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with
general principles” [quoted in PBM Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills, 51
SCRA 189].

Generally, any governmental action in violation of the Bill of Rights is void. These provisions are also
generally self-executing.

Constitution of Government – defines the powers of government and distributes

it among various organs (exec, legis, judiciary, concomms)
 2
Constitution of Sovereignty – methods and procedures for amending or revising
the fundamental law (Amendments or Revisions of the Constitution)

- People = sovereign; principle is only the people can amend or revise

the Constitution

Constitution of Liberty – guarantees the fundamental rights and liberties of

citizens (limitations on State power – Bill of Rights)

NOTE: Congress cannot temper with the Bill of Rights. Provided by the
Constitution.

BASIC PRINCIPLES THAT GOVERN BILL OF RIGHTS: Limitations on State

Power

Bill of Rights is intended as a limitation on State Power.

1. Provisions of the Bill of Rights are self-executing (ready for use)

 Can be invoked anytime
 No more need of an implementing legislation

2. They can only be invoked against the State

 The provisions of the Constitutions are intended only to govern

a relationship between the individual and the state

 (Bell Air. v. Dionisio, 174 SCRA 589 | G.R. No. L-38354, June 30,
1989) The constitutional proscription that no person can be
compelled to be a member of an association against his will
applies only to government acts and not to private transactions
like the one in question.

 (Bell Air. v. Dionisio, 174 SCRA 589 | G.R. No. L-38354, June 30,
1989) The constitutional proscription that no person can be
compelled to be a member of an association against his will
applies only to government acts and not to private transactions
like the one in question.

 (People v. Bongcarawan | G.R. No. 143944, July 11, 2002) The

constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and
seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the
government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of
the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to
whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise
of power is imposed.
 2

 In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-

appellant was searched by the vessel security
personnel. It was only after they found “shabu” inside
the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast
Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the
suitcase and the contraband items was therefore
carried out without government intervention, and
hence, the constitutional protection against
unreasonable search and seizure does not apply.

3. Basic human rights are superior to property rights

 (PBLMO v. PBMCI, 51 SCRA 189 (1973) [human rights v.

property]) Issue: Whether the rights of the workers (right to
assembly, expression and petition for redress of grievances)
should be given more importance over the rights of the
management-property rights

 Ruling: The court ruled in favor of the workers. Human rights

enjoy primacy over property rights. Not all rights are equal.
There is a hierarchy of rights in the Bill.

 Basis of the Court’s decision

1. Property rights prescribe, human rights do not.

2. Test for limiting property rights - Test is the Reasonable
Standard.

NOTE: The Doctrine of Prescription and Estoppel apply only to

property rights, not to human rights.

4. Its provisions have no retroactive application.

 The Bill of rights gives rights. It does not punish unlike penal
laws. If the law is favorable to the accused, the provisions of the
Bill of Rights have no retroactive application.

 (Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 263 S 222 (1996)) FACTS: Accused

committed a crime on May 3, 1982 [under the 1973
Constitution]. He was investigated by the police during which
he waived his right to a lawyer in writing but without the
assistance of counsel. He is now before the Supreme Court
challenging the admissibility of his confession on the ground
that under the 1987 Constitution the waiver of the right to
counsel can only be made with the assistance of counsel.
 2

Held: Petitioner’s contention that Art. III, Sec. 12 of the 1987

Constitution should be given retroactive effect for being
favorable to him as an accused, cannot be sustained. While Art.
22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that “penal laws shall
have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty
of a felony who is not a habitual criminal,” what is being
construed here is a constitutional provision specifically
contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a penal
Statute. A bill of Rights is a declaration of the individual rights
and privileges which the constitution is designed to protect
against violations be government, or by individuals or groups
of individuals.

 (People v. Domantay, 307 S 1 (1999) RE: Confessions to

mediamen: Not covered by the Bill of Rights. The prohibitions
therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. In
this case, the presence of the police officers 2-3 meters away did
not exert undue pressure or influence on accused or coerced
him into giving his confession. Accused could have refused to
be interviewed, but instead he agreed.

 (Serrano v. NLRC, 323 S 445 (2000) The employer’s failure to

comply with the notice requirement does not constitute a denial
of due process, but a mere failure to observe a procedure for
termination. The reason is that the due process clause is a
limitation on government power, not on private power such as
the termination of employment under the Labor Code.

5. Provisions of the Bill of Rights are generally applicable to aliens.

 EX: All persons have the right to life, liberty. It says “persons”,
if it is persons, it means actually that it does not matter if you
are a Filipino or an alien.

6. Provisions of the Bill of Rights are generally subject to restrictions or

are not absolute.

 The provision of the Bill of Rights allow exceptions. There are

very few laws which are absolute or do not allow deviations.

 There is nothing absolute. Almost all are subject to exceptions.

They can always be subject to restrictions imposed by the State
by virtue of police power.
 2
Since rights in the Bill of Rights are not absolute, how do we know whether
the restrictions impose by the State are valid?

STRICT The test is applied in relation to statutes interfering

SCRUTINY with
TEST
a) Fundamental rights
 Freedom of speech
 Freedom of expression
 Assembly
 Religion
 Privacy
 Right to travel or

b) To classifications based on race, alienage

or national origin and religion.

EFFECT: Court starts with the heavy presumption

that the law is unconstitutional. Presumption of the
constitutionality of a government act is removed.

Government has the burden of proving that the

classification/restriction:

1. is necessary to achieve a compelling State

interest, and

2. is the least restrictive means to protect such

interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to
accomplish the interest (if the government is
passing a law to protect a right, it must ensure that
no other rights are affected).

3. Intermediate scrutiny

INTERMEDIATE when the challenge restriction does not involve

SCRUTINY fundamental rights or suspect classes (classification
TEST based on gender, legitimacy, financial need and
age).

Also if the restriction on speech is content-neutral.

(no heavy presumption of
unconstitutionality/substantial government
interest)
 2

Ex. As to financial need and age, we have cases

involving these issues but the Supreme Court
likewise has not applied this test. For instance
senior citizens, who are entitled to 20% discount.

But the Supreme Court did not use the test because
it is favorable to people by age. However, take note
of our situation now that those aged 65 cannot enter
malls because of COVID. This is an example of
classification based on age. (will further discuss
upon reach Equal Protection Clause).

What is the effect if the court applies the

intermediate scrutiny test? No heavy presumption
of unconstitutionality.
 The act of the government is still
presumed to be unconstitutional but the
presumption is not heavy.

 The government´s interest is substantial

but not compelling

RATIONAL applies to all other subjects not covered by the first

BASIS TEST two tests. Lawful subject and Lawful method.

Applies to exercise of police power that tend to

restrict property right, or other rights which are not
regarded as fundamental.

NOTES:

 The Bill of Rights cannot be invoked against a private individual. Emilio

is not a policeman nor an agent of the state. They can only be invoked
against the State because they are actually limitations of the State power.

 Natural rights prevail over property rights.

SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without

due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.

Right to life, liberty, or property – not absolute rights

 2

Requirement of due process – absolute right

Not covered as “property”:

Permits and Are only privileges granted by the State

Licenses
Can be withdrawn anytime and one cannot invoke the
due process clause

Acosta v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 211559, Oct, 15, 2019

Is the requirement of a license to own and operate a

firearm protected by the due process clause of the Bill
of Rights?

Held: No. The bearing of arms is a mere privilege

granted by the State. There is no vested right in the
continued ownership and possession of firearms (unlike
in the US where it is embodied in the Constitution that
they can possess firearms). Like any other license, the
license to possess a firearm is "neither a property nor a
property right."

BAR QUESTION 2006, No. VI.

Does a Permit to Carry Firearm Outside Residence

(PTCFOR) constitute a property right protected by the
Constitution? 2.5%

It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal

privilege, subject to restrictions. A licensee takes his
license subject to such conditions as the Legislature sees
fit to impose, and may be revoked at its pleasure without
depriving the licensee of any property.

Private Private employment is not covered by the due process

employment clause. While you are entitled to due process before you
are removed, that is because that is provided in the Labor
Code, a statute. You have due process but it does not
spring from Section 1 of the Bill of Rights.

That is why in the end, they only give you some kind of
compensation for the violation of the due process clause
 2
[as the Labor Code provides].

Because take note: you cannot invoke Section 1 of the Bill

of Rights against your private employer.

Public When you are removed from office, you are also entitled
office to due process because of the Civil Service Law.

But the context of the decision is always on abolition.

When an office is abolished (maybe by the act of
Congress or the Executive), you cannot claim due process
for the reason that the public office is a public trust and it
is not covered by Section 1.

Pages left: 7-18 (11pages)

7. Void-for-Vagueness Rule (end 1/5/2024)

8. Judicial and Administrative Due Process (start 1/6/2024)

For both 61-62
Refer also to nachura, gito and redgelo

B. Equal Protection Clause (1987 CONST., art. III, sec. 1)

1. Requisites for Valid Classification
2. Standards of Review

18-24 (7pages)
C. Arrest, Search and Seizure; Requisites; Exclusionary Rule (1987 CONST.,
art. III, sec. 2)

Article III, Sec. 2.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized
 2

24-54 (30 pages)

D. Privacy of Communication and Correspondence; Exclusionary Rule

(1987 CONST., art. III, sec. 3; R.A. No. 4200); Informational, Decisional, Locational
Privacy

55-58 (3 pages)
E. Freedom of Speech and Expression (1987 CONST., art. III, secs. 4 and
18(1))
1. Prior Restraint and Subsequent Punishment
2. Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulations
3. Facial Challenges and Overbreadth Doctrine
4. Tests for Valid Government Interference
5. Doctrine of Privileged Communication – Act No. 3815, art.
354

58-69 (11 pages)

D. Freedom of Religion (1987 CONST., art. III, sec. 5) (end 1/6/2024)
1. Non-Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses (start
1/8/2024)
2. Tests for Valid Government Interference
3. Separation of Church and State – 1987 CONST., art. II, sec.
6

69-79 (10 pages)

E. Liberty of Abode and Right to Travel; Limitations (1987 CONST.,

art. III, sec. 6)

79-84 (5 pages)
F. Right to Information; Limitations (1987 CONST., art. II, sec. 28; art.
III, sec. 7; art. XVI, sec. 10)

84-96 (12 pages)

G. Right to Association (1987 CONST., art. III, sec. 8; art. XIII, sec. 3; art.
IX-B, sec. 2(5))
 2
96-102 (6 pages)
H. Non-Impairment of Contracts (1987 CONST., art. III, sec. 10)

118-121 (4 pages)

I. Free Access to Courts and Adequate Legal Assistance (1987

CONST., art. III, sec. 11; R.A. No. 9999)

121-123 (3 pages)

J. Rights under Custodial Investigation (1987 CONST., art. III, sec. 12;
R.A. No.
7438)
1. Requisites of a Valid Waiver
2. Exclusionary Rule

123-138 (15 pages)

K. Rights of the Accused (1987 CONST., art. III, secs. 13-17, 21 and 22)

138-185 (47 pages); 191-212

L. Right against Involuntary Servitude (1987 CONST., art. III, sec. 18)

185-187 (2 pages)

SECTION 18.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for
a crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

1. Reinforced by Art. 272, Revised Penal Code, which provides: "The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine of not exceeding P10,000 shall be imposed upon anyone
who shall purchase, sell, kidnap, or detain a human being for the purpose of
enslaving him." See Caunca v. Salazar, 82 Phil 851.

2. Exceptions:

a) punishment for a crime whereof one has been duly convicted.

 2
b) service in defense of the State [Sec. 4, Art. II], See People v. Zosa, 38 0.G.
1676].

c) naval [merchant marine] enlistment. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165

d) posse comitatus. See U.S. v. Pompeya, 31 Phil 245.

e) return to work order in industries affected with public interest. See

Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Kahoy v. Gotamco Sawmills, 45 O.G. Supp. No.
9, p. 147.

f) patria potestas [Art. 311, Civil Code]

M. Right against Excessive Fines, and Cruel and Inhumane Punishments

(1987 CONST., art. III, sec. 19)

187-190 (4pages)
SECTION 19.
(1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against
any prisoner or detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities
under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.

1. Mere severity does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment [People v.

Dionisio, 22 SCRA 299]. To violate the constitutional guarantee, the penalty must
be flagrantly and plainly oppressive, wholly disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the moral sense of the community [People v. Estoista, 93 Phil
647].

Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel or

degrading unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive or wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense. It takes more than merely being
harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. Thus, while PD 818 increased the imposable penalties for estafa
committed under Art. 315, par. 2(d) without increasing the amounts
corresponding to the new penalties, it does not violate the constitutional
injunction against excessive punishment. The fact that the decree did not increase
the amounts only proves that the amount is immaterial. What the law sought to
avert was the proliferation of estafa cases committed by means of bouncing
checks [Lim v. People, G.R. No. 149276, September 27, 2002].
 2
a) Penalties for violation of the Generics Act ranging from a fine of P2,000 (for
2nd conviction) to not less than P10,000 (for 4th conviction) and suspension of
license to practice profession for one year or longer, do not constitute cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment [del Rosario v. Bengzon, 180 SCRA 521]. The
indeterminable period of imprisonment prescribed as a penalty in Sec. 32, R.A.
4670 [Magna Carta for Public School Teachers] does not make it a cruel or
unusual punishment. However, because it has neither a maximum nor a
minimum duration, it gives the court wide latitude of discretion, without the
benefit of a sufficient standard, and is unconstitutional for being an invalid
delegation of legislative power [People v. Judge Dacuycuy, 173 SCRA 90]. PD
818, the decree increasing the penalty for estafa committed through the issuance
of bouncing checks, is constitutional; it is not cruel, degrading nor inhuman
punishment [Lim v. People, G.R. No. 149276, September 27, 2002].

2. The death penalty is not a cruel or unusual punishment [Harden v. Director of

Prisons, 81 Phil 741; People v. Camano, 115 SCRA 688]. It is an exercise of the
State's power "to secure society against the threatened and actual evil" [People v.
Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682].

a) In People v. Echegaray, supra., the Supreme Court upheld the validity of R.A.
7659 (Death Penalty Law) against the challenge that there

are no compelling reasons for the enactment of the same. The Court also rejected
the contention that the death penalty is cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment,
and said that the U.S. Supreme Court, in Furman.v. Georgia, did not categorically
rule on such issue; what was in issue was the arbitrariness pervading the
procedure by which the death penalty was imposed on the accused by the
sentencing jury. While the U.S. Court nullified all discretionary death penalty
statutes in Furman, it did so because the discretion which these statutes vested in
the trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any
parameters, guidelines or standards intended to lessen, if not altogether
eliminate, the intervention of personal biases, prejudices and discriminatory acts
on the part of the trial judges and sentencing juries. This ruling was re-affirmed in
People v. Rivera, G.R. No. 130607, November 17, 1999. Lately, in People v. Baway,
G.R. No. 130406, January 22, 2001, the Supreme Court added that the issue of
whether the death penalty should remain in our penal laws is a question which
should be addressed to the legislature, because the courts are not the proper
venue for a protracted debate on the morality and the propriety of capital
punishment.

In Louisiana v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, where a mechanical failure in the electric
chair prevented the execution of the convict, and another execution date was
scheduled by the warden, the US Supreme Court denied the plea of the convict
that he was being subjected to a cruel and unusual punishment - as there is no
intent to inflict unnecessary pain or any unnecessary pain involved in the
 2
proposed execution. The situation of the unfortunate victim of this accident is just
as though he had suffered the identical amount of anguish and physical pain in
any other occurrence, such as, for example, a fire in the cellblock.

4 In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, January 19, 1999, the
Supreme Court said that the suspension of the execution of the death sentence is
indisputably an exercise of judicial power, as an essential aspect of jurisdiction. It
is not a usurpation of the presidential power of reprieve, although its effect is the
same, i.e., the temporary suspension of the execution of the death convict. In the
same vein, it cannot be denied that Congress can, at any time, amend R.A. 7659
by reducing the penalty of death to life imprisonment. The effect of such
amendment is like commutation of sentence. The powers of the Executive, the
Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not exclude
each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.

i) But the mere pendency in the two houses of Congress of a bill seeking the
repeal of R.A. 7659 should not per se warrant the outright issuance of a
temporary restraining order to stay the execution of a death sentence that has
become final. In fact, being speculative, it is not and should not be considered as a
ground for the stay of a death sentence [Pagdayawon v. Secretary of Justice, G.R.
No. 154569, September 23, 2002].

Plea of guilt in capital offenses. When an accused pleads guilty to a capital

offense, the stringent constitutional standards of the due process clause require
that the trial court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the
plea, and the accused's full comprehension of the consequences thereof. It shall
also require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused
and the precise degree.of his culpability. The accused must also be asked if he
desires to present evidence, and in the affirmative, allow him to do so [People v.
Sta. Teresa, G.R. No. 130633, March

20, 2001; People v. Galas, G.R. Nos. 139413-15, March 20, 2001]. Because these
standards were not complied with, the Supreme Court remanded to the trial
court the cases in People v. Aranzado, G.R. Nos. 132442-44, September 21, 2001,
and People v. Benavidez, G.R. Nos. 142372-74, September 17, 2002. On the other
hand, in People v. Principe, G.R. No. 135862, May 02, 2002, the conviction was
affirmed, because even if the accused's improvident plea were to be disregarded,
in addition to his plea, other evidence, consisting of his extrajudicial confession,
his testimony in court and the testimony of other witnesses, were sufficient to
sustain a conviction.

3. Automatic review in death penalty cases shall proceed even in the absence of
the accused, considering that "nothing less than life is at stake and any court
decision must be as error-free as possible" [People v. Palabrica, G.R. No. 129285,
 2
May 7, 2001]. The automatic review of the death penalty includes an appeal of the
less serious crime not punished by death but arising out of the same occurrence
or committed by the accused on the same occasion [People v. Panganiban],

N. Non-imprisonment for Debts (1987 CONST., art. III, sec. 20)

190-191 (2 pages)
SECTION 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a
poll tax.

CASES:
Serafin v. Lindayag, 67 where a judge issued a warrant of arrest on the
SCRA 166 strength of a criminal complaint charging the
accused with willful non- payment of debt, the
Supreme Court annulled the warrant.

Sura v. Martin, 26 trial court ordered the arrest of the defendant for
SCRA 286 failure, owing to his insolvency, to pay past and
present support. The Supreme Court held that
the arrest was invalid.

Lozano v. Martinez, 146 While the debtor cannot be imprisoned for

SCRA 323 failure to pay his debt, he can be validly
punished in a criminal action if he contracted
his debt through fraud, as his responsibility
arises not from the contract of loan, but from
the commission of the crime.

Arceta v. Judge In a recent challenge to the constitutionality of

Mangrobang, G.R. No. B.P. 22 in the Supreme Court said that even the
152895, June 15, 2004 thesis of petitioner that the present economic
and financial crisis should be a basis to declare
the law constitutionally infirm deserves scant
consideration.

As stressed in Lozano, it is precisely during

trying times that there exists a most compelling
reason to strengthen faith and confidence in the
financial system and any practice tending to
destroy confidence in checks as currency
substitutes should be deterred, to prevent
 2
havoc in the trading and financial
communities.

People v. Judge Nitafan, BP 115 (Trust Receipts Law) is a valid exercise

207 SCRA 726, reiterated of the police power and does not violate this
in Tiomico v. Court of provision, because the law does not seek to
Appeals, G.R. No. enforce a loan but to punish dishonesty and
122539, March 4, 1999 abuse of confidence in the handling of money
or goods to the prejudice of another.

Violation of trust receipt agreement is

punishable as estafa which is not an offense
against property, but against public order.

VII. CITIZENSHIP (1987 CONST., art. IV)

1935 1973 1987

11/15/1935 1/17/1973 2/2/1987
SECTION 1.
(1) Those who are citizens (1) Those who are (1) Those who are
of the Philippine Islands at citizens of the citizens of the
the time of the adoption of Philippine Islands at Philippine Islands at
this Constitution. the time of the adoption the time of the
of this Constitution. adoption of this
(Spanish subjects who did not Constitution.
declare intention of preserving (citizens under 1935
Spanish nationality between consti) (citizens under 1935
4/11/1899 – 10/11/1900; and 1973 consti)
Jones Law)

(Jus soli – but was later

abandoned in Tio Tiam v
Republic.)

(2) Those born in the (2) Those whose (2) Those whose
Philippine Islands of fathers or mothers are fathers or mothers
 2
foreign parents who, before citizens of the are citizens of the
the adoption of this Philippines. Philippines.
Constitution, had been
elected to public office in
the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers (3) Those who elect [3] Those born
are citizens of the Philippine citizenship before January 17,
Philippines. pursuant to the 1973, of Filipino
provisions of the mothers, who elect
(4) Those whose mothers Constitution of Philippine citizenship
are citizens of the nineteen hundred and upon reaching the
Philippines and, upon thirty-five. age of majority; and
reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine (check par. 4 of 1935 (check par. 4
citizenship. consti) of 1935
consti)
(5) Those who are (4) Those who are (4) Those who are
naturalized in accordance naturalized in naturalized in
with law. accordance with law. accordance with law.

SECTION 2.
Philippine citizenship may A female citizen of the Natural-born
be lost or re-acquired in Philippines who citizens are those
the manner provided by marries an alien shall who are citizens of
law. retain her Philippine the Philippines from
citizenship birth without
having to perform
unless by her act or any act to acquire
omission she is or perfect their
deemed, under the Philippine
law, to have citizenship.
renounced her
citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine
citizenship in
accordance with
paragraph (3),
Section 1 hereof
shall be deemed
natural-born
citizens.
SECTION 3.
- Nothing Philippine citizenship Philippine citizenship
follows - may be lost or may be lost or
reacquired in the reacquired in the
manner provided by manner provided by
law. law.
SECTION 4.
 2
A natural-born citizen Citizens of the
is one who is a citizen Philippines who
of the Philippines from marry aliens shall
birth without having to retain their
perform any act to citizenship
acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship. unless by their act or
omission, they are
deemed, under the
law, to have
renounced it.
SECTION 5.
- Nothing
follows - Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical
to the national
interest and shall
be dealt with by
law.

General Principles.

1. Defined: Membership in a political community which is personal and more or

less permanent in character.

a) Distinguished from nationality.

Nationality is membership in any class or form of political
community. Thus, nationals may be citizens [if members of a
democratic community] or subjects [if members of a monarchical
community].

Nationality does not necessarily include the right or privilege of

exercising civil or political rights.

2. Usual modes of acquiring citizenship:

a) By birth
i) jus sanguinis
ii) jus soli

b) By naturalization

c) By marriage

3. Modes (by birth) applied in the Philippines:

 2

a) Before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution:

i) Jus sanguinis.

All inhabitants of the islands who were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899, and residing in the islands who did not declare their intention of preserving
Spanish nationality between said date and October 11, 1900, were declared
citizens of the Philippines [Sec. 4, Philippine Bill of 1902; Sec. 2, Jones Law of 1916],
and their children born after April 11, 1899.

ii) Jus soli.

As held in Roa v. Collector of Customs, 25 Phil 315, which was uniformly followed
until abandoned in Tan Chong v. Secretary of Labor, 79 Phil 249; but applied again
in Talaroc v. Uy, 92 Phil 52, until abandoned with finality in Teotimo Rodriguez Tio
Tiam v. Republic, 101 Phil. 195. Those declared as Filipino citizens by the courts are
recognized as such today, not because of the application of the jus soli doctrine,
but principally because of the doctrine of res judicata.

b) After the adoption of the 1935 Constitution:

Only the jus sanguinis doctrine.

Natural-born citizens.

Those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect
Philippine citizenship shall be deemed natural-born citizens [Sec. 2, Art. IV]

Marriage by Filipino to an alien:

Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their citizenship, unless
by their act or omission they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it.
[Sec. 4, Art. IV]

Policy against dual allegiance:

Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law. [Sec. 5, Art. IV]
 2

Sec. 5, Art. IV of the Constitution is a declaration of policy and it is not a self-

executing provision. The legislature still must enact the law on dual allegiance. In
Secs. 2 and 3, RA 9225, the legislature was not concerned with dual citizenship
per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance
to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a
mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really
constitutes dual allegiance; thus, it would be premature for the judicial
department to rule on issues pertaining to it. It should be noted that Mercado v.
Manzano did not set the parameters of dual allegiance, but merely made a
distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship. [Nachura]

CASES:

1. Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630

 SC clarified the "dual citizenship" disqualification in Sec. 40, Local
Government Code, and reconciled the same with Sec. 5, Art. IV of the
Constitution on "dual allegiance".

 Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may, without

performing any act and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting
laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court
explained that "dual citizenship" as a disqualification must refer to
citizens with "dual allegiance". Consequently, persons with mere dual
citizenship do not fall under the disqualification.

 This ruling is reiterated in Valles v. Comelec, G.R. No. 137000, August 9,

2000.

2. Mercado v. Manzano, supra.; Valles v. Comelec, supra

 Furthermore, for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they
elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of
candidacy to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.

 The filing of a certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce foreign

citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as dual citizen.
This is so because in the certificate of candidacy one declares that he/she
is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the
Constitution and will maintain true faith and allegiance to the same.
Such declaration under oath operates as an effective renunciation of
foreign citizenship
 2
 NOTE: overturned by Gana-Carait v COMELEC: No need to renounce if
Dual Citizenship by birth.

3. Lopez v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008

 However, this doctrine in Valles and Mercado that the filing of a
certificate of candidacy suffices to renounce foreign citizenship does not
apply to one who, after having reacquired Philippine citizenship under
R.A. 9225, runs for public office.

 To comply with the provisions of Sec. 5 (2) of R.A. 9225, it is necessary

that the candidate for public office must state in clear and unequivocal
terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship

4. Jacot v. Dal and Comelec, G.R. No. 179848, November 27, 2008
 In Mercado, the disqualification was sought under another law, Sec. 40
(d) of the Local Government Code, in which the Court defined the term
“dual citizenship” vis-à-vis the concept of “dual allegiance”, and at the
time the case was decided, R.A. 9225 was not yet enacted by Congress

5. Calilung v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007

 The constitutionality of R.A. 9225 (An Act Making the Citizenship of
Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, amending for
the purpose, Com. Act No. 63) was challenged, allegedly for violating Sec.
5, Art. IV of the Constitution.

 It was claimed that Sec. 2 allows all Filipinos, whether natural-born or

naturalized, who become foreign citizens, to retain their Philippine
citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship; while Sec. 3 allows
former natural-bom citizens to regain their Philippine citizenship by
simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their foreign
allegiance.

 In upholding the validity of RA 9225, the Court said that the intent of
the legislature is to do away with the provision in CA63 which takes
away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become
naturalized citizens of other countries.

 It allows dual citizenship; but on its face, it does not recognize dual
allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the
person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship.

 Plainly, Sec. 3 stays clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifts
the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual
 2
allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other
citizenship was not made a concern of RA 9225.

6. Co v. HRET, 199 SCRA 692

 Attack on one’s citizenship may be made only through a direct, not a
collateral proceeding.
Res judicata in cases involving citizenship.

CASE:

1. Board of Commissioners, CID v. de la Rosa, 197 SCRA 853, citing Zita Ngo
Burca v. Republic, 19 SCRA 186
 The doctrine of res judicata does not ordinarily apply to questions of
citizenship. It does so only when:

a) A person's citizenship is resolved by a court or an administrative

body as a material issue in the controversy, after a full-blown
hearing;

b) With the active participation of the Solicitor General or his

representative; and

c) The finding of his citizenship is affirmed by the Supreme Court.

Then the decision on the matter shall constitute conclusive proof of such party's
citizenship in any other case or proceeding.

A. Filipino Citizens (1987 CONST., art. IV, secs. 1-2)

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this
[1987] Constitution.

a) Re: 1935 Constitution

i) Sec. 4, Philippine Bill of 1902; Sec. 2, Jones Law of 1916 [including
children born after April 11, 1899],
 2

CASES:

1. Valles v. Comelec
 Supreme Court made reference to these organic acts and declared that
private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez who was born in Australia to
parents Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian, on May 16, 1934, before the 1935 Constitution took effect,
was a Filipino citizen.

 Under these organic acts, inhabitants of the islands who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899, who did not opt in writing to retain Spanish
nationality between April 11, 1899 to October 11, 1900 including their
children were deemed citizens of the Philippines.

 Rosalind's father was, therefore, a Filipino citizen, and under the

principle of jus sanguinis, Rosalind followed the citizenship of her
father.

2. Maria Jeanette Tecson v. Comelec, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004

 Re: the controversy surrounding the citizenship of Fernando Poe, Jr.
(FPJ), presidential candidate.

 The issue of whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen would depend

on whether his father, Allan F. Poe, was himself a Filipino citizen, and if
in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of FPJ
prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father.

 The Court took note of the fact that Lorenzo Pou (father of Allan F. Poe),
who died in 1954 at 84 years old, would have been born sometime in
1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence
of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill of 1902 effected.

 That Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou, if acquired, would thereby

extend to his son, Allan F. Poe (father of FPJ), The 1935 Constitution,
during which regime FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
 2
ii) Act No. 2927 [March 26,1920], then CA 473, on naturalization [including
children below 21 and residing in the Philippines at the time of naturalization, as
well as children born subsequent to naturalization],

iii) Foreign women married to Filipino citizens before or after November 30, 1938
[effectivity of CA 473] who might themselves be lawfully naturalized [in view of
the Supreme Court interpretation of Sec. 15, CA473, in Moy Ya Lim Yao v.
Commissioner of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292].

iv) Those benefited by the Roa doctrine applying the jus soli principle.

v) Caram provision: Those born in the Philippines of foreign parents who, before
the adoption of this [1935] Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Islands.

CASES:

1. Chiongbian v. de Leon
 Supreme Court held that the right acquired by virtue of this provision is
transmissible.

vi) Those who elected Philippine citizenship.

b) Re: 1973 Constitution.

Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines. Provision is prospective in

application; to benefit only those born on or after January 17, 1973 [date of
effectivity of 1973 Constitution],

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

Prospective application, consistent with provision of the 1973 Constitution.

B. Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship

(3) Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner

provided by law.

Loss of citizenship.
 2
a) By naturalization in a foreign country. (Frivaldo v. Comelec, 174 SCRA 245)

i) However, this is modified by R.A. 9225, entitled An Act Making the

Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent (which took effect September 17, 2003), which declares the policy
of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under
the conditions of this Act.

ii) Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

I solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion." [Sec. 3, R.A. 9225]

iii) Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this
Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath [Sec. 3, R.A. 9225].

iv) The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below 18

years of age, of those who reacquire Philippine citizenship upon the
effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines [Sec. 4, R.A.
9225].

v) Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:

va) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Sec. 1, Art. V of the Constitution, R.A. 9189,
otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and
other existing laws;

vb) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
 2
CASE:

1. Gana-Carait case: Dual citizens by birth can run for public office.

--

vc) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office; Provided,
That they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they
took that oath;

vd) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall

apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice;

ve) The right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in

the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(1) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the
country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or

(2) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned

officers in the armed forces of the country which they are
naturalized citizens [Sec. 5, R.A. 9225].

b) By express renunciation of citizenship.

CASE:

Board of Immigration Express renunciation means a renunciation that

Commissioners v. Go is made known distinctly and explicitly, and not
Callano, 25 SCRA 890 left to inference or implication.

Labo v. Comelec, 176 Labo lost Filipino citizenship because he

SCRA 1 expressly renounced allegiance to the
Philippines when he applied for Australian
citizenship.

Valles v. Comelec, supra. The fact that private respondent was born in
Australia does not mean that she is not a
Filipino.

If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then

at most she can also claim Australian
citizenship, resulting in her having dual
citizenship.
 2

That she was a holder of an Australian passport

and had an alien certificate of registration do not
constitute effective renunciation, and do not
militate against her claim, of Filipino citizenship.
For renunciation to effectively result in the loss
of citizenship, it must be express.

Willie Yu v. Defensor- where obtention of a Portuguese passport and

Santiago, 169 SCRA 364 signing of commercial documents as a
Portuguese were construed as renunciation of
Philippine citizenship.

c) Bv subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of

a foreign country upon attaining 21 years of age; Provided, however, that a
Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine citizenship in any manner while the
Republic of the Philippines is at war with any country.

i) This should likewise be considered modified by R.A. 9225.

ii) The proviso that a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine
citizenship in this manner while the Republic of the Philippines is at war
with any country may be considered as an application of the principle of
indelible allegiance.

d) Bv rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a

foreign country; Provided, that the rendering of service to, or acceptance of such
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country and the taking of an oath of
allegiance incident thereto, with consent of the Republic of the Philippines ,
shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following
circumstances is present:

(i) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive

pact of alliance with the said foreign country; or

(ii) The said foreign country maintains armed forces in Philippine

territory with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines.

e) Bv cancellation of the certificate of naturalization.

f) By having been declared by competent authority a deserter of the Philippine

armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or amnesty
has been granted.
 2
C. Retention and Re-acquisition of Citizenship (R.A. No. 9225)

[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9225]

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO

ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63, AS AMENDED, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Short Title. — This Act shall be known as the “Citizenship

Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.”

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State that
all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the

contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost
their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

“I _________________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines, and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.”

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the aforesaid oath.

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. — The unmarried child, whether legitimate,

illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-
acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed
citizens of the Philippines.

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. — Those who retain or re-
acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
 2
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No.
9189, otherwise known as “The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003” and
other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted authorities
prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of
allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of
which they are naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in

the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized citizens.

SEC. 6. Separability Clause. — If any section or provision of this Act is held

unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or provision not affected thereby
shall remain valid and effective.

SEC. 7. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.

SEC. 8. Effectivity Clause. — This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days
following its publication in the Official Gazette or two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.

2. Reacquisition of citizenship.
 2
a) Under R.A. 9225, by taking the oath of allegiance required of former natural-
born Philippine citizens who may have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their acquisition of the citizenship of a foreign country.

b) By naturalization, provided that the applicant possesses none of the

disqualifications prescribed for naturalization.

Republic v. Judge de la the naturalization proceeding was so full of

Rosa procedural flaws that the decision granting
Filipino citizenship to Governor Juan Frivaldo
was deemed a nullity.

c) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corps, provided that a

woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her marriage to an alien may be
repatriated in accordance with the provisions of this Act after the termination
of the marital status.

i) See P.D. 725, which allows repatriation of former natural-born Filipino

citizens who lost Filipino citizenship.

Frivaldo v. Comelec and P.D. 725 was not repealed by President

Lee v. Comelec, 257 Aquino's Memorandum of March 27, 1986, and,
SCRA 727 thus, was a valid mode for the reacquisition of
Filipino citizenship by Sorsogon Governor Juan
Frivaldo.

Angat v. Republic, G.R. The Special Committee on Naturalization

No. 132244, September created by PD 725, chaired by the Solicitor
14, 1999 General with the Undersecretary of Foreign
Affairs and the Director of the NICA as
members, was reactivated on June 8, 1995, and
it is before this Committee that a petition for
repatriation is filed.

ii) When repatriation takes effect.

Frivaldo v. Comelec, repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of

257 SCRA 727 filing of his application on August 17, 1994.

Altarejos v. Comelec, The same principle was applied. Petitioner took

G.R. No. 163256, his Oath of Allegiance on December 17, 1997,
November 10, 2004 but his Certificate of Repatriation was registered
with the Civil Registry of Makati only after six
years, or on February 18, 2004, and with the
Bureau of Immigration on March 1, 2004. He
completed all the requirements for repatriation
 2
only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for
a mayoralty position, but before the elections.
But because his repatriation retroacted to
December 17, 1997, he was deemed qualified to
run for mayor in the May 10, 2004 elections.
iii) Effect of repatriation.

Bengzon v. House of The act of repatriation allows the person to recover,

Representatives or return to, his original status before he lost his
Electoral Tribunal, Philippine citizenship. Thus, respondent Cruz, a
G.R. No. 142840, May former natural- born Filipino citizen who lost his
7, 2001 Philippine citizenship when he enlisted in the
United States Marine Corps, was deemed to have
recovered his natural- born status when he
reacquired Filipino citizenship through repatriation.

iv) Repatriation under R. A. 8171 (lapsed into law on October 23, 1995).

The law governs the repatriation of Filipino women who may have lost Filipino
citizenship by reason of marriage to aliens, as well as the repatriation of former
natural-born Filipino citizens who lost Filipino citizenship on account of political
or economic necessity, including their minor children, provided the applicant is
not a person:

[a] opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association

or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing
organized government;

[b] defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal

assault or assassination for the predominance of his ideas;

[c] convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; or

[d] suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious disease.

Repatriation is effected by taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper Civil Registry
and in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.

CASE:

Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125793, August 29, 2006

FACTS: Joevanie Tabasa, a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, acquired

American citizenship through derivative naturalization when, still a minor, his
father became a naturalized citizen of the United States.

October 3,1995 - he was admitted to the Philippines as a "balikbayan"

 2
within a year - he was charged by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(BID), because it appeared that the US Department of Justice had revoked his
passport and was the subject of an outstanding federal warrant of arrest for
possession of firearms and one count of sexual battery. Finding him an
undocumented and undesirable alien, the BID ordered his deportation.

After learning of the BID order, he then immediately executed an Affidavit of

Repatriation and took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.

ISSUE: whether he validly reacquired Philippine citizenship

RULING: NO.

The privilege of RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost

their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity and to their
minor children.

This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to
political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA8171, his
repatriation will also benefit his minor children.

Thus, to claim the benefit of RA 8171, the children must be of minor age at the
time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child
does not have the legal capacity to undertake a political act like the election of
citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or
naturalization separately from the parents.

Tabasa is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA8171.

D. Naturalization (C.A. No. 473, secs. 2-4; C.A. No. 63, as amended;
A.M. No. 2107-22)

C.A. No. 473, secs. 2-4

AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE

CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALIZATION, AND TO REPEAL ACTS
NUMBERED TWENTY-NINE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVEN AND
THIRTY-FOUR HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHT.

Section 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this Act, any person

having the following qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by
naturalization:

First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of
 2
the hearing of the petition;

Second. He must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous

period of not less than ten years;

Third. He must be of good moral character and believes in the

principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and must have
conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the
constituted government as well as with the community in which he is
living.

Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than
five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known
lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation;

Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English or Spanish and any
one of the principal Philippine languages; and

Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any
of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of
Private Education1 of the Philippines, where the Philippine history,
government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school
curriculum, during the entire period of the residence in the Philippines
required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as
Philippine citizen.

Section 3. Special qualifications. The ten years of continuous residence

required under the second condition of the last preceding section shall be
understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner having any of the
following qualifications:

1. Having honorably held office under the Government of the

Philippines or under that of any of the provinces, cities,
municipalities, or political subdivisions thereof;

2. Having established a new industry or introduced a useful

invention in the Philippines;

3. Being married to a Filipino woman;

4. Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a

public or recognized private school not established for the
exclusive instruction of children of persons of a particular
nationality or race, in any of the branches of education or
 2
industry for a period of not less than two years;

5. Having been born in the Philippines.

Section 4. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot be naturalized

as Philippine citizens:

a. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with

any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized governments;

b. Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of

violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success
and predominance of their ideas;

c. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;

d. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;

e. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable

contagious diseases;

f. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the

Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or
who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace
the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;

g. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United

States 2and the Philippines are at war, during the period of
such war;

h. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the

United States 3whose laws do not grant Filipinos the right to
become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

C.A. No. 63, as amended

 2

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE WAYS IN WHICH PHILIPPINE

CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED

Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:

(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;

(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or

laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more:

Provided, however, That a Filipino may not divest himself of Philippine

citizenship in any manner while the Republic of the Philippines is at war
with any country;

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a
foreign country:

Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such

commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking
of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his
Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is
present:

(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or

offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country; or

(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on

Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines:

Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of

rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission,
and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that
he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign
country:

And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is

rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed
forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to
 2
participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the
Philippines during the period of his service to, or
commission in, the armed forces of said foreign country.
Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign
country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full
enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino
citizen;

(5) By cancellation of the of the certificates of naturalization;

(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the

Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary
pardon or amnesty has been granted; and

(7) In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a foreigner if, by virtue of
the laws in force in her husband's country, she acquires his nationality.1

The provisions of this section notwithstanding, the acquisition of citizenship

by a natural born Filipino citizen from one of the Iberian and any friendly
democratic Ibero-American countries or from the United Kingdom shall not
produce loss or forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship if the law of that
country grants the same privilege to its citizens and such had been agreed
upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign country from which
citizenship is acquired.2

Section. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired. – Citizenship may be

reacquired:

(1) By naturalization:
Provided, That the applicant possess none of the disqualification's
prescribed in section two of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and
twenty-seven,

(2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air Corp:

Provided, That a woman who lost her citizenship by reason of her
marriage to an alien may be repatriated in accordance with the
provisions of this Act after the termination of the marital status;4 and

(3) By direct act of the National Assembly.

Section 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. – The

procedure prescribed for naturalization under Act Numbered Twenty-nine
hundred and twenty-seven,5 as amended, shall apply to the reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship by naturalization provided for in the next preceding
section:
 2

Provided, That the qualifications and special qualifications prescribed in

section three and four of said Act shall not be required:

And provided, further,

(1) That the applicant be at least twenty-one years of age and shall have
resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for
naturalization;

(2) That he shall have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable

manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines, in
his relations with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he is living; and

(3) That he subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to renounce

absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign
authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a citizen or subject.

Section 4. Repatriation shall be effected by merely taking the necessary oath of

allegiance to the Commonwealth6 of the Philippines and registration in the
proper civil registry.

Section 5. The Secretary of Justice shall issue the necessary regulations for the
proper enforcement of this Act. Naturalization blanks and other blanks
required for carrying out the provisions of this Act shall be prepared and
furnished by the Solicitor General, subject to approval of the Secretary of
Justice.

Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved, October 21, 1936.

A.M. No. 21-07-22

Re: Proposed Rule on Facilitated Naturalization for Refugees and Stateless

Persons
 2
SECTION 1. Title. –
This Rule shall be known and cited as the "Rule on Facilitated Naturalization
of Refugees and Stateless Persons."

SEC. 2. Applicability.
This Rule shall apply to petitions for naturalization under relevant laws filed
by refugees and stateless persons recognized by the Philippine Government.

Where applicable, the Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily to proceedings

under this Rule.

SEC. 3. Objective. –
This expedited procedure shall simplify and reduce legal and procedural
hurdles in obtaining Philippine citizenship to facilitate the assimilation and
naturalization of refugees and stateless persons into Philippine society, in
accordance with the international obligations of the Philippines under Article
34 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol, Article 32 of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless
Persons, and other applicable and relevant international legal instruments,
and United Nations (UN) treaties or conventions to which the Philippines is a
State Party.

SEC. 4. Basic Principles. - This Rule shall be governed by the following basic
principles:

a) Refugees and stateless persons are to be accorded the same respect and
dignity as citizens of the Philippines, free from all forms of discrimination on
account of race, color, gender, national origin, political view, religious belief,
or physical or mental condition.

b) The unity of the family of refugees and stateless persons, particularly the
protection of children, shall at all times be promoted and preserved.
Unaccompanied children who are refugees and stateless persons shall be
referred to the appropriate government agencies and/or non- government
organizations for their care, welfare, and access to legal services, including the
filing of their petition for naturalization.

SEC. 5. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule:

a) Refugee - any person who, owing to a well-founded fear of being

persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his or her nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country;
or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his
 2
or her former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

b) Stateless person - a person who is not considered as a national by

any State under the operation of its law.

c) Child - a person below eighteen (18) years of age or eighteen (18)

years of age or over but is unable to fully take care of himself or
herself, or protect himself or herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.

d) Unaccompanied child - a child who is separated from both parents

and other relatives and is not being cared for by an adult who, by law
or custom, has responsibility to do so.

e) Best interests of the child - the totality of the circumstances and

conditions as are most congenial to the survival, protection, and
feelings of security of the child with the aim of encouraging his or her
physical, psychological, and emotional development, as well as
respecting his or her right to identity, including his or her nationality.
It also means the least detrimental available alternative for
safeguarding the growth and development of the child.

f) Child-caring agency - a duly licensed and accredited agency

providing complementary child care and protection services."

g) Family Members - the spouse and children who accompany the

applicant. The term also includes any person who is dependent
socially, economically, or emotionally upon the applicant."

h) Removal or expulsion - the formal act or conduct, pursuant to a

decision reached by the Department of Justice-Refugees and Stateless
Persons Protection Unit (DOJ-RSPPU) or the appropriate Philippine
government agency, of compelling a refugee or stateless person to
leave the territory of the Philippines within a reasonable period of
time, in case of conviction with finality of a serious offense and being
considered a danger to the community after having served his or her
sentence, or on grounds of national security or public order.

i) Deportation - is an act by or under the authority of the State of

removing a foreigner from Philippine territory. It applies to a
foreigner whose presence in the Philippines is found to be injurious
to national interest, public health, public safety, and public interest."

j) Termination of refugee or stateless status - refers to the cessation,

 2
cancellation or revocation of status of petitioner as refugee or
stateless person under Department of Justice Circular No. 5810 or
other relevant laws.

SEC. 6. Petition for naturalization; who may file. –

A verified petition for naturalization may be filed by individual petitioners
who are recognized as refugees or stateless persons.

A joint petition may be filed by immediate family members, related either by

consanguinity or affinity.

A petition, in behalf of the unaccompanied child or a joint petition involving

related unaccompanied children, may be filed by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD), the appropriate Local Social Welfare and
Development Office (LSWDO) where the unaccompanied child resides, or the
child-caring agency having care and custody of the child.

In matters concerning children, their best interests shall be given paramount

consideration.

SEC. 7. Where to file the petition.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the locality in which the petitioner has
resided at least one (1) year immediately preceding the filing of the petition
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the petition.

SEC. 8. Contents of the petition.

The verified petition shall specifically allege the following:

a) Personal circumstances of the petitioner:

i. Name and surname of the petitioner and other aliases by which he or
she may be known;

ii. The present and former places of habitual residence within the
Philippines and/or abroad;
iii. Place and date of birth

iv. Civil status as well as name, age, sex, birthplace, residence of the
spouse(s) and child(ren), if applicable;

v. The actual or approximate date of first arrival in the Philippines, as

may be evidenced by a certificate or document issued by the
appropriate government agency; and,

vi. An undertaking that the petitioner will reside continuously in the

 2
Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of
admission to Philippine citizenship.

b) The petition shall also specifically allege the following:

i. The petitioner has met the minimum age requirement pursuant to

the relevant law on naturalization on the day of the hearing of the
petition;

ii. That the petitioner has resided in the Philippines for a continuous
period of not less than ten (10) years, or for a reduced period of five (5)
years when the special circumstances in paragraph (c) of this Section
are present: Provided, that for this purpose, the reckoning period shall
be the date of first arrival into the Philippines;

iii. That the petitioner is of good moral character and believes in the
principles underlying the Philippine Constitution, and has conducted
himself or herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the
entire period of his or her residence in the Philippines in his or her
relation with the constituted government as well as with the
community in which he or she is living;

iv. That the petitioner owns real estate in the Philippines, or any
interest therein, or must have some known trade, profession, or
occupation for as long as the petitioner would not become a public
charge or an economic burden to the society, or that the petitioner
could serve as a potential asset to the country;

v. That the petitioner is able to speak and write in any one of the
principal Philippine languages, 14 unless he or she suffers from any
disability that hampers his or her ability to speak or write;

vi. That the petitioner has enrolled his or her minor children of school
age, in any of the public or private schools recognized by the
appropriate government agency, where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school
curriculum, during the entire required period of residence in the
Philippines prior to the hearing of the petition: Provided, that this
requirement is not applicable if petitioner or his or her minor children
were unable to reside in the Philippines during the children's minority
due to their status as refugee or stateless persons or other justifiable
reasons; and,
vii. That the petitioner has duly filed with the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), at least one (1) year prior to the filing of his or her
petition for naturalization, a declaration under oath that it is his or her
 2
bona fide intention to become a citizen of the Philippines.

In the case of an unaccompanied child, the petition shall state only

such facts as may be relevant to the circumstances surrounding his or
her status.

c) Other special circumstances such as:

i. Having established a new industry or introduced a useful invention

in the Philippines;

ii. Being married to a Filipino;

iii. Having been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines in a public or

recognized private school not established for the exclusive instruction
of children of persons of a particular nationality or race, in any of the
branches of education or industry for a period of not less than two (2)
years; and,

iv. Having been born in the Philippines.

d) Statement that the petitioner does not possess any of the following
disqualifications:

i. Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any

association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines
opposing all organized governments;

ii. Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence,

personal assault, or assassination for the success and predominance of
their ideas;

iii. Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;

iv. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;

V. Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious

diseases;

vi. Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines,
have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a
sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of
the Filipinos;

vii. Citizens or subjects of nations with which the Philippines is at war,

 2
during the period of such war.

However, these disqualifications shall not be construed in a manner as to

discriminate the petitioner on account of the petitioner's religion, culture,
political opinion, physical or mental condition.

SEC. 24. Derivative Effect of Naturalization.

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines. Minor children of persons naturalized under
relevant laws who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered
citizens.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the

naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a Philippine citizen,
and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the
parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his or
her minority, unless the child begins to reside permanently in the Philippines
when still a minor, in which case, the child will continue to be a Philippine
citizen even after becoming of age.

A minor child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of the
child's parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within one (1)
year after reaching the age of majority, he or she fails to register himself or
herself as a Philippine citizen at the Philippine Consulate of the country where
he or she resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.

NATURALIZATION.

The act of formally adopting a foreigner into the political body of a nation by
clothing him or her with the privileges of a citizen [Record, Senate, 12 Congress,
June 4-5, 2001]

1. Modes of naturalization:

a) Direct: Citizenship is acquired by:

(i) Individual, through judicial or

administrative proceedings;

(ii) Special act of legislature;

(iii) Collective change of nationality, as a result of

 2
cession or subjugation; or

(iv) In some cases, by adoption of orphan minors

as nationals of the State where they are born.

b) Derivative: Citizenship conferred on:

(i) Wife of naturalized husband;

(ii) Minor children of naturalized person; or on

the

(iii) Alien woman upon marriage to a national.

2. Doctrine of indelible allegiance.

An individual may be compelled to retain his original nationality even if he has

already renounced or forfeited it under the laws of the second State whose
nationality he has acquired.

3. Direct naturalization under Philippine laws.

Under current and existing laws, there are three (3) ways by which an alien may
become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:

a) judicial naturalization under Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended;

b) administrative naturalization under Rep. Act No. 9139; and

c) legislative naturalization in the form of a law enacted by Congress,

bestowing Philippine citizenship to an alien.

4. Naturalization under C.A. 473.

a) Qualifications:

[a] Not less than 21 years of age on the date of the hearing of the petition;

[b] Resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than 10 years;

 may be reduced to 5 years if he:

o honorably held office in Government,

o established a new industry or introduced a useful invention in

the Philippines,

o married to a Filipino woman,

 2
o been engaged as a teacher in the Philippines (in a public or
private school not established for the exclusive instruction of
persons of a particular nationality or race) or in any of the
branches of education or industry for a period of not less than
two years, or

o born in the Philippines;

[c] Good moral character; believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution; must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his
relations with the constituted government as well as the community in which he
is living;

[d] Own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than P5,000.00, or must have
some known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation;

[e] Speak and write English or Spanish and any of the principal Philippine
languages;

[f] Enrolled his minor children of school age in any of the public or private
schools recognized by the Government where Philippine history, government
and civics are taught as part of the school curriculum, during the entire period of
residence in the Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for
naturalization.

b) Disqualifications: Those

[a] Opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group

of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;

[b] Defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault

or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas;

[c] Polygamists or believers in polygamy:

[d] Convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude;

[e] Suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious disease;

[f] Who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled
socially with the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipinos;
 2
[g] Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the Philippines is at war, during the
period of such war;

[h] Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do not grant Filipinos the
right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

c) Procedure:

i) Filing of declaration of intention one year prior to the filing of the petition with
the Office of the Solicitor General. The following are exempt from filing
declaration of intention:

ia) Born in the Philippines and have received their primary and
secondary education in public or private schools recognized by the
Government and not limited to any race or nationality.

ib) Resided in the Philippines for 30 years or more before the filing of the
petition, and enrolled his children in elementary and high schools
recognized by the Government and not limited to any race or
nationality.

ic) Widow and minor children of an alien who has declared his intention
to become a citizen of the Philippines and dies before he is actually
naturalized.

ii) Filing of the petition, accompanied by the affidavit of two credible persons,
citizens of the Philippines, who personally know the petitioner, as character
witnesses.

iii) Publication of the petition.

Under Sec. 9, Revised Naturalization Law, in order that there be a valid

publication, the following requisites must concur:

(a) the petition and notice of hearing must be published;

(b) the publication must be made once a week for three consecutive weeks;
and

(c) the publication must be in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of

general circulation in the province where the applicant resides.

In addition, copies of the petition and notice of hearing must be posted in

the office of the Clerk of Court or in the building where the office is
located [Republic v. Hamilton Tan Keh, G.R. No. 144742, November 11, 2004]
 2
The same notice must also indicate, among others, the names of the
witnesses whom the petitioner proposes to introduce at the trial [Republic
v. Michael Hong, G.R. No. 168877 March 23 2006]

Publication is a jurisdictional requirement. Noncompliance is fatal for it

impairs the very root or foundation of the authority to decide the case,
regardless of whether the one to blame is the clerk of court or the
petitioner or his counsel [Gan Tsitung v. Republic, 122 Phil. 805; Po Yo Bi v.
Republic, 205 SCRA 400].

b) This rule applies equally to the determination of the sufficiency of the

contents of the notice of hearing and of the petition itself, because an
incomplete notice or petition, even if published, is no publication at all.

Sy v. Republic, 154 the copy of the petition to be posted and published

Phil. 673 should be a textual or verbatim restatement of the
petition filed.

Ong Chua v. Republic
G R No 127240, March
27, 2000
The failure to state all the required details in the
notice of hearing, like the names of applicant's
witnesses, constitutes a fatal defect. The publication
of the affidavit of such witnesses did not cure the
omission of their names in the notice of hearing. It is
a settled rule that naturalization laws should be
rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favour of
the government and against the applicant.

iv) Actual residence in the Philippines during the entire proceedings.

v) Hearing of the petition.

vi) Promulgation of the decision.

vii) Hearing after two years.

At this hearing, the applicant shall show that during the two-year probation
period, applicant has:

(i) not left the Philippines;

(ii) dedicated himself continuously to a lawful calling or

profession;

(iii) not been convicted of any offense or violation of rules; and

(iv) not committed an act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or

contrary to any Government-announced policies.
 2
viii) Oath taking and issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization.

d) Effects of naturalization:

i) Vests citizenship on wife if she herself may be lawfully naturalized (as

interpreted by the Supreme Court in Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration,
supra.).

Moy Ya Lim Yao The alien wife of the naturalized Filipino need
not go through the formal process of
naturalization in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship.

All she has to do is to file before the Bureau of

Immigration and Deportation a petition for the
cancellation of her Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR).

At the hearing on the petition, she does not

have to prove that she possesses all the
qualifications for naturalization; she only has to
show that she does not labor under any of the
disqualifications.

Upon the grant of the petition for cancellation of

the ACR, she may then take the oath of the
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
thus, become a citizen of the Philippines.
ii) Minor children born in the Philippines before the naturalization shall be
considered citizens of the Philippines.

iii) Minor child born outside the Philippines who was residing in the Philippines
at the time of naturalization shall be considered a Filipino citizen.

iv) Minor child born outside the Philippines before parent's naturalization shall
be considered Filipino citizens only during minority, unless he begins to reside
permanently in the Philippines.

v) Child born outside the Philippines after parent's naturalization shall be

considered a Filipino, provided that he registers as such before any Philippine
consulate within one year after attaining majority age, and takes his oath of
allegiance.

e) Denaturalization.

i) Grounds:

ia) Naturalization certificate is obtained fraudulently or illegally.

 2
Republic v. Li Yao, A certificate of naturalization may be cancelled if
214 SCRA 748 it is subsequently discovered that the applicant
obtained it by misleading the court upon any
material fact.

Availment of a tax amnesty does not have the

effect of obliterating his lack of good moral
character.

ib) If, within 5 years, he returns to his native country or to some foreign
country and establishes residence there;

provided, that 1-year stay in native country, or 2-year stay in a foreign

country shall be prima facie evidence of intent to take up residence in
the same.

ic) Petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention.

id) Minor children failed to graduate through the fault of the parents
either by neglecting to support them or by transferring them to another
school.

ie) Allowed himself to be used as a dummy.

Republic v. Guy, 115 Although the misconduct was committed after the two-
SCRA 244 year probationary period, conviction of perjury and
rape was held to be valid ground for denaturalization.

ii) Effects of denaturalization:

If the ground for denaturalization affects the intrinsic validity of the

proceedings, the denaturalization shall divest the wife and children of their
derivative naturalization.

But if the ground was personal to the denaturalized Filipino, his wife and
children shall retain their Philippine citizenship.

5. Naturalization by direct legislative action.

This is discretionary on Congress; usually conferred on an alien who has made

outstanding contributions to the country.
 2
6. Administrative Naturalization [R.A. 9139].

 would grant Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings to

aliens born and residing in the Philippines.

CASE: So v. Republic, G.R. No. 170603, January 29, 2007

Distinction of CA 473 (Revised Naturalization Law) and

RA 9139 (The Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000)

CA 473 (Revised Naturalization Law) RA 9139 (The Administrative

Naturalization Law of 2000)

covers aliens regardless of class covers native-born aliens who lived

in the Philippines all their lives, who
never saw any other country and all
along thought that they were
Filipinos, who have demonstrated
love and loyalty to the Philippines
and affinity to Filipino customs and
traditions

Intention of RA 9139: to make the process of acquiring Philippine citizenship

less tedious, less technical, and more encouraging.

There is nothing in the law from which it can be inferred that CA473 is intended
to be annexed to or repealed by RA 9139. What the legislature had in mind was
merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine citizenship which
may be availed of by native-born aliens. The only implication is that a native-
born alien has the choice to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization,
subject to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.

a) Special Committee on Naturalization. Composed of the Solicitor General, as

chairman, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or his representative, and the National
Security Adviser, as members, this Committee has the power to approve, deny or
reject applications for naturalization under this Act.

b) Qualifications: Applicant must [1] be born in the Philippines and residing

therein since birth; [2] not be less than 18 years of age, at the time of filing of
his/her petition; [3] be of good moral character and believes in the underlying
principles of the Constitutioin and must have conducted himself/herself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of residence in
the Philippines in his relatioins with the duly constituted government as well as
with the community in which he/she is living: [4] have received his/her primary
and secondary education in any public school or private educational institution
 2
duly recognized by the Department of Education, where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught and prescribed as part of the school curriculum
and where enrolment is not limited to any race or nationality, provided that
should he/she have minor children of school age, he/she must have enrolled
them in similar schools; [5] have a known trade, business, profession or lawful
occupation, from which he/she derives income sufficient for his/her support and
that of his/her family; provided that this shall not apply to applicants who are
college degree holders but are unable to

practice their profession because they are disqualified to do so by reason of their

citizenship; [6] be able to read, write and speak Filipino or any of the dialects of
the Philippines; and [7] have mingled with the Filipinos and evinced a sincere
desire to learn and embrace the customs and traditions and ideals of the Filipino
people.

c) Disqualifications: The same as those provided in C.A. 473.

d) Procedure: Filing with the Special Committee on Naturalization of a petition

(see Sec. 5, RA 9139, for contents of the petition); publication of pertinent portions
of the petition once a week for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation, with copies thereof posted in any public or conspicuous area; copies
also furnished the Department of Foreign Affairs, Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, the civil registrar of petitioner's place of residence and the National
Bureau of Investigation which shall post copies of the petition in any public or
conspicuous areas in their buildings offices and premises, and within 30 days
submit to the Committee a report stating whether or not petitioner has any
derogatory record on file or any such relevant and material information which
might be adverse to petitioner's application for citizenship; Committee shall,
within 60 days from receipt of the report of the agencies, consider and review all
information received pertaining to the petition (if Committee receives any
information adverse to the petition, the Committee shall allow the petitioner to
answer, explain or refute the information); Committee shall then approve or deny
the petition. Within 30 days from approval of the petition, applicant shall pay to
the Committee a fee of P100,000, then take the oath of allegiance and a certificate
of naturalization shall issue. Within 5 days after the applicant has taken his oath
of allegiance, the Bureau of Immigration shall forward a copy of the oath to the
proper local civil registrar, and thereafter, cancel petitioner's alien certificate of
registration.

e) Status of Alien Wife and Minor Children. After the approval of the petition for
administrative naturalization and cancellation of the applicant's alien certificate
of registration, applicant's alien lawful wife and minor children may file a
petition for cancellation of their alien certificates of registration with the
Committee, subject to the payment of the required fees. But, if the applicant is a
 2
married woman, the approval of her petition for administrative naturalization
shall not benefit her alien husband, although her minor children may still avail of
the right to seek the cancellation of their alien certificate of registration.

f) Cancellation of the Certificate of Naturalization. The Special Committee on

Naturalization may cancel certificates of naturalization issued under this act in
the following cases: [1] if the naturalized person or his duly authorized
representative made any false statement or misrepresentation,

or committed any violation of law, rules and regulations in connection with the
petition, or if he obtains Philippine citizenship fraudulently or illegally; [2] if,
within five years, he shall establish permanent residence in a foreign country,
provided that remaining for more than one year in his country of origin or two
years in any foreign country shall be prima facie evidence of intent to
permanently reside therein; [3] if allowed himself or his wife or child with
acquired citizenship to be used as a dummy; [4] if he, his wife or child with
acquired citizenship commits any act inimical to national security.

VII. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

A. Public Officers; De Facto and De Jure

B. Civil Service; Scope, Appointments, Personnel Actions, and

Removal
1. Preventive Suspension and Dismissal from Service
2. Illegal Dismissal, Reinstatement, and Back Salaries
 2

C. Accountability of Public Officers; Ombudsman (1987 CONST., art. XI,

secs. 513; R.A. No. 6770, as amended; R.A. No. 6713)

VIII. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

A. General Principles

Administrative Law Defined.

That branch of public law which fixes the organization and determines the
competence of administrative authorities and indicates to the individual remedies
for the violation of his rights.

Administrative law is that branch of modern law under which the executive
department of the government, acting in a quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial
capacity, interferes with the conduct of the individual for the purpose of
promoting the well-being of the community [Dean Roscoue Pound, as cited in
RedGelo].

Kinds:
a) Statutes setting up administrative authorities.

b) Rules, regulations or orders of such administrative authorities promulgated

pursuant to the purposes for which they were created.

c) Determinations, decisions and orders of such administrative authorities made

in the settlement of controversies arising in their particular fields.

d) Body of doctrines and decisions dealing with the creation, operation and effect
of determinations and regulations of such administrative authorities.

Administration.

a) Meaning. Understood in two different senses:

i) As a function: the execution, in non-judicial matters, of the law

or will of the State as expressed by competent authority.

ii) As an organization: that group or aggregate of persons in

whose hands the reins of government are for the time being.

b) Distinguished from government.

 2

c) Kinds:

i) Internal: legal side of public administration

a. e.g., matters concerning personnel, fiscal and planning
activities.

ii) External: deals with problems of government regulations

a. e.g., regulation of lawful calling or profession, industries or
businesses.

B. Administrative Agencies; Definition, Types, and Manner of

Creation

Administrative Agencies Defined.

Organ of government, other than a court and other than a legislature, which
affects the rights of private parties either through adjudication or rulemaking.

A quasi-judicial agency or body is an organ of government other than a court

and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through
either adjudication or rule-making. The very definition of an administrative
agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever-increasing
variety of powers and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the
need for the active intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for
technical knowledge and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly
be handled by regular courts.

A “quasi-judicial function” is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc.

of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts,
or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature. [UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK V. E. GANZON, INC.]

Manner of Creation.
They are created either by:

a) Constitutional provision;
b) Legislative enactment; or
c) Authority of law.

Criterion: A body or agency is administrative where its function is primarily

regulatory even if it conducts hearings and determines controversies to carry out
its regulatory duty. On its rule-making authority, it is administrative when it
 2
does not have discretion to determine what the law shall be but merely prescribes
details for the enforcement of the law.
Types

a) Bodies set up to function in e.g., Bureau of Lands

situations where the government is
offering some gratuity, grant or special
privilege

b) Bodies set up to function in e.g., BIR

situations wherein the government is
seeking to carry on certain of the
actual business of government

c) Bodies set up to function in e.g., MWSS

situations wherein the government is
performing some business service for
the public

d) Bodies set up to function in e.g., LTFRB

situations wherein the government is
seeking to regulate business affected
with public interest

e) Bodies set up to function in e.g., SEC

situations wherein the government is
seeking under the police power to
regulate private business and
individuals

f) Bodies set up to function in e.g., ECC

situations wherein the government is
seeking to adjust individual
controversies because of a strong
social policy involved

g) Bodies set up to make the e.g., GSIS

government a private party

CASE:

1. UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK V. E. GANZON, INC.

 2
 A quasi-judicial agency or body is an organ of government other than a
court and other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private
parties through either adjudication or rulemaking. The very definition of
an administrative agency includes its being vested with quasi-judicial
powers.

 The ever-increasing variety of powers and functions given to

administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention
of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge
and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled
by regular courts.

 A “quasi-judicial function” is a term which applies to the action,

discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official
action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature.

C. Powers of Administrative Agencies

1. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power;

2. Quasi-judicial or adjudicatory power; and
3. Determinative powers (Nachura)

CASE:
THE CHAIRMAN and EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR VS. LIM, G.R. No. 183173,
August 24, 2016
Quasi-legislative or rule- power to make rules and regulations that
making power results in delegated legislation that is within
the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability
of powers.

Quasi-judicial or adjudicatory power to hear and determine questions of fact

power to which the legislative policy is to apply and
to decide in accordance with the standards
laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law

The administrative body exercises its quasi-

judicial power when it performs in a judicial
manner an act that is essentially of an
executive or administrative nature, where the
power to act in such manner is incidental to
 2
or reasonably necessary for the performance
of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it.

Quasi-legislative power (also Power of Subordinate Legislation)

Nature.
This is the exercise of delegated legislative power, involving no discretion as to
what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the execution
or enforcement of a policy set out in the law itself.

Rules and regulations issued by administrative authorities pursuant to the

powers delegated to them have the force and effect of law; they are binding on all
persons subject to them, and the courts will take judicial notice of them.

CASES:

1. ALFI VS. GARIN, G.R. No. 217872, April 26, 2017

 QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER, otherwise known as the POWER OF

SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION, has been defined as the authority
delegated by the lawmaking body to the administrative body to adopt
rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of law and
implement legislative policy.

 "[A] legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed

to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof."

 The exercise by the administrative body of its quasi-legislative power

through the promulgation of regulations of general application does not,
as a rule, require notice and hearing.

 The only exception being where the Legislature itself requires it and
mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as
determined at an appropriate investigation.

2. DAGAN vs. PHILIPPINE RACING COMMISSION, EN BANC

 The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be delegated, or as

expressed in the Latin maxim: potestas delegate non delegare potest.
 2
 This rule is based upon the ethical principle that such delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate
by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon
the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of
another.

 This rule however admits of recognized exceptions such as the grant of

rule-making power to administrative agencies. They have been granted
by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the
implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has
become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing
complexity and variety of public functions.

 However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a

showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law:

o is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be

executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and

o fixes a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently

determinate and determinable—to which the delegate must
conform in the performance of his functions.

 A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its

limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply
it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is
to be effected.

3. Holy Spirit Homeowners Association v. Secretary Defensor, G.R. No. 163980,

August 3, 2006

 quasi-legislative power is the power to make rules and regulations

which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separation of
powers.

4. Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Torres, 225 SCRA 417

 Both Letters of Instruction and Executive Orders are presidential

issuances; one may repeal or otherwise alter, modify or amend the other,
depending on which comes later.
 2

5. Land Bank v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 149

 The function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately
exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the law
into effect.

 Thus, administrative regulations cannot extend the law or amend a

legislative enactment, for settled is the rule that administrative
regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law.

6. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 368

 Administrative issuances must not override but must remain consistent
with the law they seek to apply and implement. They are intended to
carry out, not to supplant nor to modify, the law.

7. Land Bank v. Court of Appeals, 249 SCRA 149

 The function of promulgating rules and regulations may be legitimately
exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the law
into effect.

8. Eastern Shipping Lines v. Court of Appeals G. R. No. 116356, June 29, 1998
 It is axiomatic that an administrative agency like the Philippine Ports
Authority has no discretion whether or not to implement a law. Its duty
is to enforce the law. Thus, if there is a conflict between PPA circulars
and a law like EO 1088, the latter prevails.

9. Ople v. Torres, 293 SCRA 141

 An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which
relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of
Government. It cannot be argued that Administrative Order No. 308
(prescribing a National Computerized Identification Reference System)
merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. Such a national
computerized identification reference system requires a delicate
adjustment of various contending State policies, the primacy of national
security, the extent of privacy against dossier gathering by the
Government, and the choice of policies. It deals with a subject which
should be covered by a law, not just an administrative order.

Kinds of Administrative Rules or Regulations

(mainly based on REPUBLIC VS. DRUGMAKER'S LABORATORIES, INC., G.R.

No. 190837, March 5, 2014, unless otherwise stated)
 2
Supplementary or are in the nature of subordinate legislation and
detailed legislation. designed to implement a primary legislation by
providing the details thereof.
(Also known as
Legislative Rules) They usually implement existing law, imposing
general, extra-statutory obligations pursuant to
authority properly delegated by Congress and
effect a change in existing law or policy which
affects individual rights and obligations

They are rules and regulations “to fix the details set
out in the law”, e.g., Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code. (Nachura)

Interpretative intended to interpret, clarify or explain existing

legislation. statutory regulations under which the
administrative body operates.
(Also known as
Interpretative Rules) Their purpose or objective is merely to construe the
statute being administered and purport to do no
more than interpret the statute.

Simply, they try to say what the statute means and

refer to no single person or party in particular but
concern all those belonging to the same class which
may be covered by the said rules.

They are rules and regulations construing or

interpreting the provisions of a statute to be
enforced and they are binding on all concerned
until they are changed, e.g., BIR Circulars, CB
circulars, etc.

They have the effect of law and are entitled to great

respect; they have in their favor the presumption of
legality [Gonzalez v. Land Bank, 183 SCRA 520].

The erroneous application of the law by public

officers does not bar a subsequent correct
application of the law [Manila Jockey Club v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 103533, December 15, 1998].

Contingent legislation. rules and regulations issued by an administrative

authority based on the existence of certain facts or
(Also known as things upon which the enforcement of the law
Contingent Rules) depends. (Nachura)
 2

CASES:

1. DENR Employees Union v. Abad, G.R. No. 204152, January 19, 2021

 Accordingly, an administrative regulation can be construed as simply

interpretative or internal in nature, dispensing with the requirement of
publication, when its applicability needs nothing further than its bare
issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself
has already prescribed.

 When, however, the administrative rule goes beyond merely

providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome
the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of
those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those
directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter, to be duly
informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.

2. THE PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., vs. SECRETARY OF

FINANCE, G.R. No. 213860. July 05, 2022, EN BANC; HERNANDO

 In fine, the gauge on determining if a regulation requires prior notice

and hearing is its substance or content.

 Prior notice and hearing are required if the regulation substantially

increases the burden of those governed, notwithstanding its
nomenclature—despite the regulation being called or designated as
interpretative.

 Thus, if the questioned regulations here in this case are legislative rules
or substantially increase the burden of those governed, they should have
undergone prior notice and hearing (which, in this case, are
undisputedly absent) for their validity. If they are interpretative rules,
prior notice and hearing are not essential for their validity.

3. THE PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, INC., vs. SECRETARY OF

FINANCE, G.R. No. 213860. July 05, 2022, EN BANC; HERNANDO

Here, the Court finds that the questioned regulations are not mere
interpretative issuances; they are legislative in nature that change, if not
increase, the burden of those governed. Notice and hearing are thus required
for their validity.
 2
The questioned regulations, particularly SEC MC 10-2014, substantially changed
the procedure currently observed by the market participants. The questioned
regulations impose a new obligation—that is, the transmittal of the alphalist of
payees to the listed companies—on the PDTC, their transfer agents and
depository account holders. This obligation did not exist before because the
practice then was the reporting of PCD Nominee as the payee in the alphalist.
With the questioned regulations, there will be a significant change on how the
parties involved, including the investors themselves, will make decisions and act.

As aptly pointed out by Senior Associate Justice Leonen and Associate Justice
Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (Justice Lazaro-Javier), the questioned regulations
upended long established practices and changed a long-standing rule in
imposing this new burden. Also, the questioned regulations impose penalties for
noncompliance. The withholding agent may be penalized if it reported PCD
Nominees in the alphalist, in addition to an invalid submission that may even
result to failure to file the return, which is a completely different matter in itself.
On the part of the PDTC and brokers, they may be penalized for failure to
provide the listed companies with the information needed in the alphalist.

It may be argued that this new burden is not substantial because the list of payees
is available and can easily be submitted to the listed companies as withholding
agents, given that the PSE Revised Trading Rules require participants to maintain
a record of their clients. However, it is to be stressed that its submission to the
listed companies is not previously required. Submission also means that data
previously not available to the listed companies will be made available to them
and eventually to the BIR. In this regard, there is a significant change in the
expectation of privacy with regard to the data.

As pointed out by Senior Associate Justice Leonen, the obligation of providing

the list of payees produces the obligation to safekeep the information provided.
Hence, these effects highlight the questioned regulations' imposition of
substantial burden. In fine, the questioned regulations should have undergone
notice and hearing prior to their enactment. They imposed new and substantial
burdens on those governed. For failure to conduct notice and hearing prior to
issuance and publication, the questioned regulations are therefore void.

4. People v. Maceren

 A lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to

declare what acts should constitute an offense. Penal statutes are
exclusive to the legislature and cannot be delegated. Administrative
rules and regulations must not include, prohibit or punish acts which
the law does not even define as a criminal act.
 2

5. Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc.

 For an administrative regulation, such as the Circular in this case, to
have the force of penal law, (1) the violation of the administrative
regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and (2)
the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself.

Requisites for validity:

To be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order, must comply

with the following requisites:

1. ITS PROMULGATION MUST BE AUTHORIZED BY THE LEGISLATURE.

 The administrative body may not make rules and regulations which are
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute,
particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which
are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. [DAGAN vs.
PHILIPPINE RACING COMMISSION, EN BANC]

 Issued under authority of law. See: Olsen v. Aldanese, 43 Phil 64..

2. IT MUST BE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE AUTHORITY GIVEN BY THE

LEGISLATURE.

 Within the scope and purview of the law

 Rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode

or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been
enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or expand the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the
provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the
two will always be resolved in favor of the basic law [Commissioner v.
Fortune Tobacco]

 The Court need not belabor that administrative agencies, which are
tasked to promulgate IRR, cannot supplant, modify, or amend the law
by altering, enlarging, or restricting the provisions of the law its seeks to
implement. And in case there is a discrepancy between the law and its
IRR, it is the law that must prevail because the IRR cannot go beyond the
 2
terms and provisions of the law. [PEOPLE VS. TUYAY, SECOND
DIVISION, December 01, 2021, G.R. No. 206579; HERNANDO]

 The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the

implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for
in the legislative enactment. The implementing rules and regulations of
a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to
amend or repeal a statute is vested in the legislature. However,
administrative bodies are allowed, under their power of subordinate
legislation, to implement the broad policies laid down in the statute by
“filling in” the details. All that is required is that the regulation be
germane to the objectives and purposes of the law; that the regulation
does not contradict but conforms with the standards prescribed by law
[Public Schools District Supervisors Association v. Hon. Edilberto de Jesus,
G.R. No. 157299, June 19, 2006]

 The Court nullified DAR Adm. Circular No. 9, which allowed the
opening of a trust account in behalf of the landowner as compensation
for the property taken, because Sec. 16 (e), of RA 6657 (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law) is specific that the deposit must be made in
“cash” or in “Land Bank bonds”. The implementing regulation cannot
outweigh the clear provision of the law. [Land Bank v. Court of Appeals,
249 SCRA 149]

 The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a

regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to enforce and administer.
Administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law.
[Romulo, Mabanta Law Office v. Home Development Mutual Fund, G.R. No.
131082, June 19, 2000]

 Where the regulatory system has been set up by law, it is beyond the
power of an administrative agency to dismantle it. Any change in policy
must be made by the legislative department [Association of Philippine
Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, G.R. No. 110526,
February 10, 1998].

 R.A. 8171 empowers the Secretary of Justice, in conjunction with the

Secretary of Health and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, to
issue the necessary implementing rules and regulations. The rules,
however, authorized the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to
prepare a manual setting forth the details of the proceedings prior to,
during and after the administration of the lethal injection on the convict.
 2
Because the rule did not provide for the approval of the said manual by
the Secretary of Justice, considering that the Bureau of Corrections is
merely a constituent unit of the Department of Justice and it is the
Secretary of Justice who is granted rule-making authority under the law,
the rule authorizing the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to
promulgate said manual is invalid being an abdication of responsibility
by the Secretary of Justice [Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
132601, October 12, 1998]

 Sec. 17 of the rules and regulations implementing R.A. 8171 which

provided that the death penalty shall not be inflicted upon a woman
within three years next following the date of the sentence or while she is
pregnant was declared invalid, the same being an impermissible
contravention of Sec. 83 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
the death penalty shall not be inflicted upon a woman while she is
pregnant or within one year after delivery. [Echegaray v. Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 132601, October 12, 1998]

3. IT MUST BE REASONABLE.

 It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities

should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and
regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable
and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no
reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be
issued, then they must be held to be invalid. [EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
VS. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC., G.R. No. 164171, February
20, 2006, EN BANC]

 Petitioner claims that the prescribed fee amounting to P24,000,000.00 for

the mere examination of an amendment of a single paragraph in a
corporation's articles of incorporation is unreasonable, oppressive,
confiscatory and amounts to a tax. It is settled that "[t]o be valid,
implementing rules and regulations (IRRs) must be reasonable.
Administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in
the issuance of their IRRs, but must ensure that their IRRs are reasonable
and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If the IRRs are shown to
bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were
authorized to be issued, they must be held to be invalid and should be
struck down. In the instant case, the SEC, the national government
regulatory agency charged with supervision over the corporate sector,
has been authorized to promulgate rules and regulations reasonably
necessary to enable it to perform its duties and mandates. Its power to
 2
prescribe fees, and the reasonableness of the amount, must therefore be
read in light of this regulatory function.

Notably, the Court, in Securities and Exchange Commission v. GMA

Network, Inc., found the filing fee of P1,212,200.00 for the extension of
GMA's corporate term already unreasonable. It bears emphasis that the
fee of P1,212,200.00 is a far cry from the P24,000,000.00 imposed on
herein petitioner, even after accounting for inflation. Indeed, the amount
appears exorbitant and confiscatory for the mere filing, "processing,
examination, and verification" of a single paragraph of petitioner's
articles of incorporation, even if the same were to be done by the SEC's
most competent "Certified Public Accountants, lawyers, technical staff
and competent support personnel." In view of the foregoing discussion,
the prescribed rate for extending a corporation's term under SEC M.C.
No. 9, S. 2004 is hereby declared invalid and unreasonable. [FIRST
PHILIPPINE HOLDINGS CORPORATION VS. SEC, G.R. No. 206673, July
28, 2020, CAGUIOA]

4. IT MUST BE PROMULGATED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE

PRESCRIBED PROCEDURE.

 NOTICE, HEARING, AND PUBLICATION; In general, an administrative

regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by Executive Order
No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987," on prior
notice, hearing, and publication in order to be valid and binding, except when
the same is merely an interpretative rule. This is because "[w]hen an
administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs
nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than
what the law itself has already prescribed.

When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing
for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation
of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves
the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and
effect of law. [REPUBLIC VS. DRUGMAKER'S LABORATORIES, INC., G.R. No.
190837, March 5, 2014]

 FILING REQUIREMENT; The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly

Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the
National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines
Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative
 2
issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and
may not be enforced. [GMA NETWORK, INC., VS. MTRCB]

Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed
with the UP Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent character are to
be filed. According to the UP Law Center’s guidelines for receiving and
publication of rules and regulations, "interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the Administrative
agency and not the public," need not be filed with the UP Law Center. [THE
BOARD OF TRUSTEES VS. VELASCO]

Resolution No. 372 was about the new GSIS salary structure, Resolution No. 306
was about the authority to pay the 2002 Christmas Package, and Resolution No.
197 was about the GSIS merit selection and promotion plan. Clearly, the assailed
resolutions pertained only to internal rules meant to regulate the personnel of the
GSIS. There was no need for the publication or filing of these resolutions with the
UP Law Center. [THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES VS. VELASCO]

 In Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court held that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, must be published for their effectivity. Included in
these are "presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution."

Here, the CA affirmed the trial court's ruling that there was no proper notice to
MIPTI considering that EO 30 was not published. However, a review of the
Official Gazette shows that EO 30 was actually published. This was done on July
21, 1986, the same day that PPA implemented the order. Considering that EO 30
expressly provides for immediate effectivity, and considering further that
jurisprudence recognizes the effectivity of laws that provide for immediate
effectivity upon publication, the publication requirement was deemed satisfied
when EO 30 was enforced on July 21, 1986. Thus, the appellate court erred in
ruling that EO 30 is unconstitutional for not being published. [MANILA
INTERNATIONAL PORTS TERMINAL, INC., VS. PHILIPPINE PORTS
AUTHORITY, EN BANC, December 07, 2021, G.R. No. 196199; HERNANDO]

 Publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, as

provided in Executive Order No. 200. However, interpretative rules and
regulations, or those merely internal in nature, or the so-called letters of
instruction issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties,
may be simply posted in conspicuous places in the agency itself. Such posting
 2
already complies with the publication requirement. Publication must be in full, or
it is no publication at all [Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446]

 Administrative rules and regulations the purpose of which is to enforce or

implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation, must be published in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation, except interpretative
regulations and those merely internal in nature, i.e., regulating only the personnel
of the administrative agency, not the general public. [De Jesus v. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 109023, August 12, 1998, also upheld in Caltex (Philippines) Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 273]

 The DBM Corporate Compensation Circular (DBM-CCC) No. 10, which

completely disallows payment of allowances and other additional compensation
to government officials and employees starting November 1, 1989, is not a mere
interpretative or internal regulation, and must go through the requisite
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The
reissuance of the CCC and its submission for publication per letter to the National
Printing Office on March 9, 1999, will not cure the defect precisely because
publication is a condition precedent to its effectivity. [Philippine International
Trading Corporation v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 132593, June 25, 1999]

 DOLE Department Order No. 16-91 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos.
30 and 37, while recognized as valid exercise of police power as delegated to the
executive department, were declared legally invalid, defective and unenforceable
for lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Register (as required by Art. 5, Labor Code of the Philippines).
[Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Torres, 212 SCRA 298]

 POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983, which provided the

schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies,
was declared ineffective because it was not published and filed with the National
Administrative Register. [Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation v.
Secretary of Labor and Employment, G. R. No. 103144, April 4, 2001]

 On the question of the validity of the cancellation of the petitioner’s license to

recruit workers for overseas work because the Revised Rules of Penalties had not
been filed with the University of the Philippines Law Center as required by the
Administrative Code of 1987, the Supreme Court said that the Revised Rules of
Penalties did not prescribe additional rules governing overseas employment but
merely detailed the administrative sanctions for prohibited acts. Besides, the
cancellation of the license was made under authority of Art. 35 of the Labor Code,
 2
not pursuant to the Revised Rules of Penalties. [Transaction Overseas Corporation v.
Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 109583, September 5, 1997]

Administrative rules with penal sanctions; additional requisites:

a) The law must itself declare as punishable the violation of the administrative
rule or regulation.

b) The law should define or fix the penalty for the violation of the administrative
rule or regulation.

Necessity for notice and hearing.

There is no constitutional requirement for a hearing in the promulgation of a

general regulation by an administrative body. Where the rule is procedural, or
where the rules are, in effect, merely legal opinions, there is no notice required.
Neither is notice required in the preparation of substantive rules where the class
to be affected is large and the questions to be resolved involve the use of
discretion committed to the rule-making body.

CASES:

1. Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Philippines, G.R. No.

111953, December 12, 1997
 Supreme Court reiterated the rule that a prior hearing is not necessary
for the issuance of an administrative rule or regulation.

2. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 236

 Supreme Court distinguished between administrative rules in the nature
of subordinate legislation and those which are merely interpretative
rules.

 An administrative rule in the nature of subordinate legislation is

designed to implement a law by providing its details, and before it is
adopted there must be a hearing under the Administrative Code of 1987.
When an administrative rule substantially adds to or increases the
 2
burden of those concerned, an administrative agency must accord those
directly affected a chance to be heard before its issuance.

 In this case, prior to the issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular No.

37-93, the cigarettes manufactured by the respondent were in the
category of locally-manufactured cigarettes not bearing a foreign brand.
Had it not been for Revenue Memo Circular No. 37-93, the enactment of
R.A. 7654 would not have resulted in a new tax rate upon the cigarettes
manufactured by the respondent. The BIR did not simply interpret the
law; it exercised quasi-legislative authority, and the requirements of
notice, hearing and publication should not have been ignored.

3. Philippine Consumers Foundation v. Secretary, DECS, 153 SCRA 622

 The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be
either a legislative or an adjudicative function.

 If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to

the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates
prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of
such rates.

 Where the rules and the rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a
given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative
character. But if they apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon
a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.

4. Lina v. Carino, 221 SCRA 515

 Supreme Court upheld the authority of the Secretary of Education to

issue DECS Order No. 30, prescribing guidelines concerning increases in
tuition and other school fees.

5. Maceda v. Energy Regulatory Board, 192 SCRA 363

 Supreme Court declared that while under Executive Order No. 172, a
hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering,
ex parte, a provisional increase subject to its final disposition of whether
or not to make it permanent, to reduce or increase it further, or to deny
the application. Sec. 3 (e) is akin to a temporary restraining order or a
 2
writ of preliminary attachment issued by the court, which are given ex
parte, and which are subject to the resolution of the main case.

6. Holy Spirit Homeowners Association v. Secretary Defensor, G.R. No. 163980,

August 3, 2006

 A petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail

Implementing Rules and Regulations issued in the exercise of quasi-
legislative functions. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed
against any board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist
from further proceedings when the said proceedings are without or in
excess of jurisdiction, or is accompanied by grave abuse of discretion,
and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. Thus, prohibition lies against the exercise of
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, not against legislative or
quasi-legislative functions.
QUASI-JUDICIAL (ADJUDICATORY) POWER o QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER

 known as the power of the administrative agency to determine

questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply, in
accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself. As it
involves the exercise of discretion in determining the rights and
liabilities of the parties, the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power
requires the concurrence of two elements:

one, jurisdiction which must be acquired by the administrative body and

two, the observance of the requirements of due process, that is, the right
to notice and hearing. [ALFI VS. GARIN, G.R. No. 217872, April 26, 2017]

 An agency is said to be exercising judicial function where it has the

power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the
parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. Quasi-judicial function is a
term which applies to the action, discretion, etc. of public administrative
officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a
basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature. [Civil Service Commission v. Magoyag]

 Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial

function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office.
The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts
 2
of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the
act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law
to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. [Biraogo v.
Philippine Truth Commission]

 Proceedings partake of the character of judicial proceedings.

Administrative body is normally granted the authority to promulgate its
own rules of procedure, provided they do not increase, diminish or
modify substantive rights, and subject to disapproval by the Supreme
Court [Sec. 5(5), Art VIII, Constitution], The requisites of procedural due
process must be complied with. [Nachura]

Administrative due process

a) The requisites of administrative due process, as enumerated in Ang Tibay v.

CIR, 40 O.G. 7th Supp. 129 are:

i) Right to a hearing;

ii) Tribunal must consider evidence presented;

iii) Decision must have something to support itself;

iv) Evidence must be substantial;

v) Decision must be based on the evidence adduced at the hearing, or

at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties;

vi) The Board or its judges must act on its or their independent
consideration of the facts and the law of the case, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

vii) Decision must be rendered in such a manner that the parties to the
controversy can know the various issues involved and the reasons
for the decision rendered.

Cases:

1. Ute Paterok v. Bureau of Customs, 193 SCRA 132

 2
 In a forfeiture proceeding where the owner of the allegedly prohibited
article is known, mere posting of the notice of hearing in the
respondent’s Bulletin Board does not constitute compliance with
procedural due process.

2. Civil Service Commission v. Lucas, G.R. No. 127838, January 21, 1999
 Due process demands that the person be duly informed of the charges
against him. He cannot be convicted of an offense with which he was not
charged. Administrative proceedings are not exempt from basic and
fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in
investigations and hearings. The right to substantive and procedural due
process is applicable in administrative proceedings.

3. Padilla v. Sto. Tomas, 243 SCRA 155; M. Ramirez Industries v. Secretary of

Labor, 266 SCRA 483; Napolcom v. Bemabe, G.R. No. 129943, May 12, 2000
 The essence of due process is that a party be afforded reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in
support of his defense. In administrative proceedings such as the one at
bench, due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side
or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of; a formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times,
necessary.

4. Arboleda v. NLRC, G.R. No. 119509, February 11, 1999

 The essence of due process is administrative proceedings is an

opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity or seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

 The requirement of notice and hearing in termination cases does not

connote full adversarial proceedings, as actual adversarial proceedings
become necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to
propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies.
This is a procedural right which the employee must ask for since it is not
an inherent right, and summary proceedings may be conducted thereon.

5. Calma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122787, February 9, 1999

 As long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with.

6. Philippine Merchant Marine School v. Court of Appeals, supra.

 2
 The Court said that the facts clearly demonstrate that before the DECS
issued the phase-out and closure orders, the petitioner was duly
notified, warned and given several opportunities to correct its
deficiencies and to comply with the pertinent orders and regulations.
The petitioner had gone all the way up to the Office of the President to
seek a reversal of the phaseout and closure orders. It cannot now claim
that it did not have the opportunity to be heard.

7. Lumiqued v. Exenea, G.R. No. 117565, November 18, 1997

 Administrative due process does not necessarily require the assistance

of counsel.

8. Gonzales v. NLRC and Ateneo de Davao University, G.R. No. 125735, August
26, 1999

 The Supreme Court held that there was a violation of administrative due
process where the teacher was dismissed by the university without
having been given full opportunity to confront the “witnesses” against
her.

9. Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, January 18, 2000

 In the evaluation by the Department of Foreign Affairs and the

Department of Justice of a request for extradition, the prospective
extraditee does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of
property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead
to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. He is, therefore, entitled to
the minimum requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard, as
basic elements of due process.

10. Ocampo v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 114683, January 18, 2000

 However, administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due

process in the strict judicial sense.

11. Adamson v. Amores, 152 SCRA 237

 The standard of due process that must be met in administrative

tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is
not ignored; even in the absence of previous notice, there is no denial of
due process as long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard.
 2

12. De la Cruz v. Abille, G.R. No. 130196, February 26, 2001

 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as

applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of

13. Pilipinas Loan Company v. Securities and Exchange Commission, G.R. No.
104720, April 4, 2001

 Or an opportunity to explain one’s side

14. Busuego v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95326, March 11, 1999

 The Monetary Board, as an administrative agency, is legally bound to

observe due process. In the case at bench, the Supreme Court held that
the Monetary Board complied with all the requisites of administrative
due process, as enumerated in Ang Tibay. As to petitioner’s suspension,
no notice was necessary because it was only preventive in nature.

15. Globe Telecom v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No.

143964, July 26, 2004

 Supreme Court said that the assailed Order of NTC violated due process
for failure to sufficiently explain the reason for the decision rendered, for
being unsupported by substantial evidence, and for imputing violation
to, and imposing a corresponding fine on, Globe, despite the absence of
due notice and hearing which would have afforded Globe the right to
present evidence on its behalf.

16. MIAA v. Airspan Corporation, G.R. No. 157581, December 1, 2004

 The Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) cannot validly raise,

without prior notice and public hearing, the fees, charges and rates
being paid by aviation entities doing business at the airport. The rate
increases imposed are also ultra vires because, to begin with, it is the
DOTC Secretary, not MIAA, who is authorized to increase the subject
fees.

17. Nicolas v. Desierto, G.R. No. 154668, December 16, 2004

 2
 The Supreme Court found that Nicolas was not accorded the first
requirement of administrative due process: the right to present his case
and submit evidence in support thereof.

 Petitioner was not notified of the preliminary conference which would

have afforded him the opportunity to appear and defend his rights,
including the right to request a formal investigation. Substantial
evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion which is the quantum of proof
necessary to prove a charge in an administrative case, was not met here.

18. Casimiro v. Tandog, G.R. No. 146137, June 8, 2005

 In administrative proceedings, procedural due process simply means the

opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

 “To be heard” does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may
also be heard through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
procedural due process.

19. Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161086, November
24, 2006

 In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving

reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due
process. As long as the party was given the opportunity to defend his
interests in due course, he was not denied due process.

 Moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly

applied in administrative proceedings; administrative due process
cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.

20. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals

 Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all

situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when
 2
a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity
to explain or defend himself.

 In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving

reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the
accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due
process.

 The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to

administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.

21. ATTY. TURIANO VS. TASK FORCE ABONO, G.R. No. 222998, December
09, 2020, CAGUIOA

 Administrative charge need not be drafted with the precision of an

information in a criminal prosecution. The stringent requirements on
information in criminal proceedings do not apply in administrative
cases, and that the requirements of due process in the latter are satisfied
so long as the respondent is given the opportunity to be heard.

 The cornerstone of due process in administrative proceedings is the

opportunity to be heard. To reiterate, Turiano was given every
opportunity to present his side of the case -through his counter-affidavit,
position paper, motions for reconsideration, and his participation in the
investigation and hearings.

 Having participated in the proceeding before the Ombudsman

extensively, he cannot be permitted to clamor for the nullification of its
Decision and Order.

Administrative determinations where notice and hearing are not necessary for
due process.

a) Grant of provisional authority for [RCPI v. National

increased rates, or to engage in a particular Telecommunications Commission,
line of business 184 SCRA 517; PLDT v. National
Telecommunications Commission,
190 SCRA 717].

b) Summary proceedings of distraint and

levy upon the property of a delinquent
 2
taxpayer.

c) Cancellation of a passport where no abuse [Suntay v. People, 101 Phil 770].

of discretion is committed by Secretary of
Foreign Affairs

d) Summary abatement of a nuisance perse [Art. 704, Civil Code of the

which affects the immediate safety of Philippines]
persons or property

e) Preventive suspension of a public officer [Sec. 51, Book V, Title I, Subtitle

or employee pending investigation of A, Administrative Code of 1987]
administrative charges filed against him

Right against self-incrimination.

 Since the administrative charge of unexplained wealth against the

respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the property under
R.A. 3019, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness
stand without encroaching on his right against self-incrimination. [Cabal
v. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1064]

 The same rule was followed in administrative proceedings against a

medical practitioner where the proceedings could possibly result in the
loss of his privilege to practice medicine. [Pascual v. Board of Medical
Examiners, 28 SCRA 345]

 This right may be invoked by the respondent at the time he is called by

the complainant as a witness; however, if he voluntarily takes the
witness stand, he can be cross-examined; but he may still invoke the
right at the time the question which calls for an answer which
incriminates him of an offense other than that which is charged is asked.
[See People v. Judge Ayson, supra.]

Power to punish contempt

 is inherently judicial

 may be exercised only if expressly conferred by law, and when

administrative body is engaged in the performance of its quasi-judicial
powers. [See Guevara v. Comelec, supra, Dumarpa v. Dimaporo, 177 SCRA
478].
 2
Administrative decisions not part of the legal system.

Art. 8 of the Civil Code recognizes judicial decisions applying or interpreting

statutes as part of the legal system of the country. But administrative decisions do
not enjoy that level of recognition.

A memorandum-circular of a bureau head could not operate to vest a taxpayer

with a shield against judicial action. For there are no vested rights to speak of
respecting a wrong construction of the law by the administrative officials and
such wrong interpretation could not place the Government in estoppel to correct
or overrule the same [Philippine Bank of Communications v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, G.R. No. 112024, January 28, 1999]

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL AND REVIEW

Where provided by law, appeal from an administrative determination may be

made to a higher or superior administrative officer or body. [Nachura]

CASES:

1. See Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil 328

 By virtue of the power of control which the President exercises over all
executive departments, the President by himself or through the
Department Secretaries (pursuant to the “alter ego” doctrine), may
affirm, modify, alter, or reverse the administrative decision of
subordinate officials and employees.

2. Reyes v. Zamora 90 SCRA 92

 The appellate administrative agency may conduct additional hearings in
the appealed case, if deemed necessary.

3. ALLIANCE OF NON-LIFE INSURANCE WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINE

VS. MENDOZA, G.R. No. 206159, August 26, 2020

 Determining whether the act under review is quasi-legislative or quasi-

judicial is necessary in determining when judicial remedies may
properly be availed of. Rules issued in the exercise of an administrative
 2
agency's quasi-legislative power may be taken cognizance of by courts
on the first instance as part of their judicial power.

 However, in cases involving quasi-judicial acts, Congress may require

certain quasi-judicial agencies to first take cognizance of the case before
resort to judicial remedies may be allowed.

 It is settled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

finds no application when a questioned act was done in the exercise of
quasi-legislative powers.

i. Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, an appeal from a final

decision of an agency may be taken to the Department Head

ii. Appeals shall be perfected within 15 days after the receipt of a copy of the
decision complained of by the party adversely affected.

iii. The appeal shall stay the decision appealed from unless otherwise provided
by law, or the appellate agency directs execution pending appeal, as it may
deem just, considering the nature and circumstances of the case.

4. NACILLA VS. MTRCB, G.R. No. 223449, November 10, 2020, CAGUIOA

 When the Adjudication Committee rendered a decision against

petitioners on April 8, 2008, the applicable CSC rule was MC 19, as
amended by Resolution No. 07-0244. Following Section 43 as amended,
petitioners had two options: appeal to the department head before
appealing to the CSC or directly file an appeal with the CSC.

 It was a mistake for them to appeal the decision of the Adjudication

Committee with the OP as the MTRCB had its own charter and
considered a department under MC 19, as amended by Resolution No.
07- 0244, making Laguardia the department head.

 The CA was therefore correct in affirming the CSC's dismissal of the

appeal for being filed out of time. By the time petitioners filed the appeal
with the CSC, the decision of the Adjudication Committee had already
become final and executory and could no longer be disturbed.

ADMINISTRATIVE RES JUDICATA

 2
 Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment."

 It lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the
merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or any
other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and
matters in issue in the first suit.

The elements of res judicata are:

(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and
(4) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action. [MONTERONA VS. COCA-
COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. No. 209116 January 14, 2019]

CASES:

1. Salazar v. De Leon
 Res judicata is a concept applied in the review of lower court decisions
in accordance with the hierarchy of courts.

 But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of ADMINISTRATIVE

RES JUDICATA: "The rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once
judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and
quasi-judicial facts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards
acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general
judicial powers. It has been declared that whenever final adjudication of persons
invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is
examinable by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such
final adjudication may be pleaded as res judicata."

 To be sure, early jurisprudence was already mindful that the doctrine of

res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by
what are usually understood as courts without unreasonably
circumscribing the scope thereof; and that the more equitable attitude is
to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon whom
judicial powers have been conferred.

2. LIGTAS VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015

 2
 Res judicata applies only to decisions rendered by agencies in judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings and not to purely administrative proceedings.

3. Ysmael v. Deputy Executive Secretary, 190 SCRA 673

 Decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality,
the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of
the doctrine of res judicata.

 These decisions and orders are as conclusive upon the rights of the
affected parties as though the same had been rendered by a court of
general jurisdiction. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening
of a matter once determined by competent authority acting within their
exclusive jurisdiction.

4. United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union v. Laguesma, 288 SCRA 15

 Supreme Court reiterated the principle that the doctrine of res judicata
applies to adversary administrative proceedings.

 Because proceedings for certification election are quasi-judicial in nature

the decisions therein can attain finality.

5. Fortich v. Corona, 289 SCRA 624

 When the Office of the President declared its decision final because the
motion for reconsideration was filed out of time, it lost jurisdiction over
the case; accordingly, its act of modifying its decision (upon a second
motion for reconsideration) was in gross disregard of the rules and the
legal precept that accords finality to administrative decisions.

6. Board of Commissioners, CID v. Judge de la Rosa, 197 SCRA 853

 However, the doctrine does not apply in administrative adjudication
relative to citizenship

 On questions of citizenship), the doctrine of res judicata can apply only

when the following conditions mentioned in Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic,
supra., obtain:

o the question of citizenship is resolved by a court or an

administrative body as a material issue in the controversy after
a full-blown hearing;

o with the active participation of the Solicitor General; and

 2
o the finding made by the administrative body on the citizenship
issue is affirmed by the Supreme Court.

7. B.F. Goodrich Philippines v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 1988

 Neither is the doctrine applicable where the administrative decision of
the WCC Referee awards the employee less than what the law provides.

8. LLDA V. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 42

 Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) has regulatory and quasi-
judicial powers in respect to pollution cases, with authority to issue a
cease and desist order, and on matters affecting the construction of
illegal fishpens, fish cages, and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna
de Bay, pursuant to R.A. 4850 and its amendatory laws.

 The charter of LLDA grants it exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for

fish pens and fish enclosures in Laguna de Bay. The Local Government
Code did not repeal this provision expressly and the charter of LLDA
being a special law prevails over the Local Government Code, a general
law.

9. Regional Director, DECS Region VII v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110193,
January 17, 1995
 The DECS Regional Director has the authority to issue a return- towork
order (to striking public school teachers), to initiate administrative
charges, and to constitute an investigating panel.

10. Realty Exchange Venture Corporation v. Sendino, G.R. No. 109703, July 5,
1995
 The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) is the successor-
agency of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission and has,
therefore assumed the latter’s powers and functions, including the
power to hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices
and cases of specific performance.

11. Calma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122787, February 9, 1999

 The Prosecution and Enforcement Division was established as the
adjudicatory arm of the Securities and Exchange Commission
 2
12. Energy Regulatory Board and lligan Light & Power, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 127373, March 25, 1999
 By virtue of R.A. 7638, it is now the Department of Energy, not the
Energy Regulatory Board, that has jurisdiction over disputes involving
direct connection of electric power. Definitely, the exploration,
production, marketing, distribution, utilization or any other activity
involving any energy resource or product falls within the supervision
and control of the Department of Energy.

13. Unilongo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123910, April 5, 1999

 Disputes involving homeowners associations fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Home Insurance Guarantee Corporation (HIGC), as
expressly provided in R.A. 580, as amended.

 Note that at present, exclusive original jurisdiction are such disputes

is lodged in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB),
now Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development
(DHSUD).
Determinative Powers.

1. : to permit or allow e.g., grant or denial of licenses

Enabling something which the law to engage in a particular
undertakes to regulate business

“Licensing” includes agency process involving the grant,

renewal, denial, revocation, suspension, annulment,
withdrawal, limitation, amendment, modification or
conditioning of a license [Sec. 2, Chap. 1, Book VII,
Administrative Code]

When the grant, renewal, denial or cancellation of a

license is required to be preceded by notice and hearing,
the provisions concerning contested cases shall apply
insofar as practicable.

Except in cases of willful violation of pertinent laws, rules

and regulations or when public security, health, or safety
require otherwise, no license may be withdrawn,
suspended, revoked or annulled without notice or hearing
[Sec. 17, Chap. 3, Book VII, Administrative Code].

2. Directing illustrated by the power of assessment of the BIR or the

Bureau of Customs
 2
3. Dispensing to exempt from a general e.g., authority of zoning
prohibition, or relieve an boards to vary provisions of
individual or zoning ordinances, or the
corporation from an authority of the Acceptance
affirmative duty Board of the Philippine Army
to relieve certain persons from
military training

4. Examining consists in requiring production of books, papers, etc., the

(also called the attendance of witnesses and compelling their testimony.
investigatory
power) a) Power to compel attendance of witnesses not inherent
in administrative body; but an administrative officer
authorized to take testimony or evidence is deemed
authorized to administer oath, summon witnesses, require
production of documents, etc.

b) Power to punish contempt must be expressly granted to

the administrative body; and when so granted, may be
exercised only when administrative body is actually
performing quasi-judicial functions.

CASE: Evangelista v. Jarencio

The lifeblood of the administrative process is the flow of

fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of
evidence. Investigations are useful for all administrative
functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and
licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and
directing, for determining general policy, for
recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more
specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if
anything should be done.

An administrative agency may be authorized to make

investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or
judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole
purpose is to obtain information upon which future action
of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken and may
require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a
purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general
inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report
findings to appropriate bodies and make
recommendations for actions.

5. Fact-Finding Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to

 2
the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-
judicial agency or office.

The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining

therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function. [Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission]

6. Rate- In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the

Fixing only standard which the legislature is required to
prescribe for the guidance of the administrative
authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
[PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE
CORPORATION VS. ALCUAZ]

What is a just and reasonable rate is a question of

fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good
sense, and a fair, enlightened and independent
judgment. [Republic v. Meralco]

The function of prescribing rates by an

administrative agency may be either a
legislative or an adjudicative function.

If it were a LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION, the grant

of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties
is not a requirement of due process.

As regards rates prescribed by an administrative

agency in the exercise of its QUASI-JUDICIAL
FUNCTION, prior notice and hearing are
essential to the validity of such rates.

When the rules and/or rates laid down by an

administrative agency are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the
country, they may partake of a legislative
character. Where the rules and the rates imposed
apply exclusively to a particular party, based
upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-
judicial in character. [Philippine Consumers
Foundation, Inc. v. Secretary of Education, Culture
and Sports]

In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall

be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been
published in a newspaper of general circulation at
 2
least two (2) weeks before the first hearing
thereon [Sec. 9, Chap. 2, Book VII, Administrative
Code]

7. power to apply compulsion or force against

Summary persons or property to effectuate a legal purpose
without a judicial warrant to authorize such
action, e.g., in the fields of health inspections,
abatement of nuisances, etc.

D. Primary Administrative Jurisdiction

 Also known as the doctrine of prior resort

 Where there is competence or jurisdiction vested upon an administrative

body to act upon a matter, no resort to the courts may be made before
such administrative body shall have acted upon the matter.

 applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes

into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of
issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the
special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court
in which the claim is sought to be enforced may suspend the judicial
process pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its
view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss the
case without prejudice.

 The doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction refers to the

competence of a court to take cognizance of a case at first instance.
Unlike the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it cannot
be waived. [REPUBLIC VS. GALLO, G.R. No. 207074, January 17, 2018]
CASES:

1. Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 426

 Inasmuch as the memorandum of agreement between IEI and MMIC
was derived from the coal-operating contract and intrinsically tied up
with the right to develop coal-operating contract and intrinsically tied
up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands, IEI’s cause of action
was not merely rescission of contract but the reversion of the operation
of the coal blocks. Accordingly, the case should have been filed with the
Board of Energy Development, not with the Regional Trial Court.
 2

2. Regional Director, DECS Region VII v. Court of Appeals, supra.

 The Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeals to suspend action on
the cases brought before the latter until the final outcome of the
administrative investigation, conformably with the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction.

3. Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100579, June 6, 2001

 Where petitioner, who was at that time the Administrator of Philippine
Coconut Administration, after having been preventively suspended on
the basis of administrative charges filed against him, immediately filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, it was held that resort
to the courts was premature and precipitate, because the
administrative proceedings were still on-going. Furthermore, from the
decision of the Philcoa Board, the administrative remedy of appeal to the
Civil Service Commission would still be available to the administrator.

4. Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 122

 Questions relative to compliance with the requirements for the
conversion of subdivision lots are properly cognizable by the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board, not by the regular courts. Thus, no
resort to the court may be made before the administrative body shall
have acted upon the matter.

5. Paat v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167

 The enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations fall within the
primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources; thus, the assumption by the RTC of jurisdiction
over the suit filed by respondents constitutes an encroachment into the
domain of the administrative agency.

6. Sy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121587, March 9, 1999

 The lumber forfeited under RD. 705 which the petitioner sought to
recover came under the custody of the DENR, and all actions seeking to
recover possession thereof should be directed to that agency, before any
resort to the courts may be made.

7. Crusaders Broadcasting System v. National Telecommunications

Commission, G.R. No. 139583, May 31, 2000
 In the-matter of issuing licenses to operate radio stations, the National
Telecommunications Commission is in a better position than the courts
to determine to whom the privilege should be granted in order that
public interest may be served.
 2

 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction prevents the court from arrogating

unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy which falls under the
jurisdiction of a tribunal possessed with special competence.

8. Philrock v. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, G.R. Nos.

132848-49, June 28, 2001
 Executive Order No. 1008 vests in the Construction Industry Arbitration
Commission (CIAC) original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes
arising from or connected with construction contracts entered into by
parties who have agreed to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration.

9. Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113079, April 20, 2001
 The interpretation of a law, made by an administrative agency like the
Energy Regulatory Board, is accorded great respect and ordinarily
controls. It is the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters
which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special
technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

 The courts give much weight to the government agency or officials

charged with the implementation of the law, considering their
competence, expertise, experience and informed judgment, and the fact
that they frequently are the drafters of the law they interpret.

10. Prosecutor Tabao v. Judge Lilagan, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651, September 4, 2001
 Since the complaint for replevin stated that the shipment of tanbark, as
well as the vessel on which it was loaded, was seized by the NBI for
verification of supporting documents, and that the NBI had turned over
the seized items to the DENR “for official disposition and appropriate
action”, these allegations should have been sufficient to alert the
respondent judge that the DENR had custody of the seized items and
that administrative proceedings may have already been commenced
concerning the shipment.

 Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot

take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of
special competence. Besides, it was clear that the plaintiff in the replevin
suit had not exhausted administrative remedies available to him.
Respondent judge’s act of taking cognizance of the replevin suit clearly
demonstrates ignorance of the law.

11. Same v. Maquiling, G.R. No. 138839, May 9, 2002

 2
 Sec. 50, RA 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) vests the
Department of Agrarian Reform with quasi-judicial powers. Since the
law does not distinguish, the jurisdiction of the DARAB should,
therefore, include all “agricultural lands under the coverage of the
CARP”, including private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture, as
defined in Sec. 4 of the law.

 Accordingly, it was held that DARAB may properly take cognizance of

this case involving a complaint for redemption, it being a case
concerning the rights of respondents as tenants on agricultural land.

12. Estrada v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137862, November 11, 2004
 The Pollution Adjudication Board is the agency of government tasked
with determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial
establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory
and regulatory provisions. It also has the power to issue, ex parte, cease
and desist orders.

 Thus, the premature invocation of the court’s intervention renders the

complaint without cause of action and dismissible on such ground.

13. Caballes v. Sison, G.R. No. 131759, March 23, 2004

 The petitioner’s premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal
to their cause of action. It is presumed that an administrative agency, in
this case the Board of Optometry, if afforded an opportunity to pass
upon a matter, would decide the same correctly, or correct any previous
error committed in its forum.

14. Regirto v. Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology, G.R. No. 156109
 Where the petitioner sued the school for damages before the RTC for
preventing her from taking the final exams due to her failure to pay for
tickets for a school fund-raising activity, and respondent insisted that
the complaint should first be filed with the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED), the Supreme Court said that the CHED does not
have the power to award damages, and thus, the petitioner could not
have commenced her case before the CHED.

E. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

 2

COLMENARES VS. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION

(ERC),
G.R. No. 210245. August 03, 2021; EN BANC
DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF
JURISDICTION ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

Applies when both the court and the Applies "where a claim is cognizable
regulatory agency have the in the first instance by an
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the administrative agency alone; [in
case. which case] judicial interference is
withheld until the administrative
When there are pending issues that process has run its course." It
require the special knowledge or concerns itself with judicial review
technical expertise of the regulatory of administrative cases.
body, the doctrine works in such a
manner that court action is deferred The rule provided by the doctrine
pending the action of the could be simply stated as follows:
administrative tribunal despite the "recourse through court action, as a
fact that the court has jurisdiction to general rule, cannot prosper until all
act on the case. the remedies have been exhausted at
the administrative level."

The doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.

Whenever there is an available administrative remedy provided by law, no
judicial recourse can be made until all such remedies have been availed of and
exhausted. See Aquino v. Mariano, 129 SCRA 532; National Development Company v.
Hervilla, 151 SCRA 200; Union Bank v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 198.

No resort to the courts will be allowed unless the administrative action has been
completed and there is nothing left to be done in the administrative structure.

Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-

condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that
comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must be exhausted first before
the court’s power of judicial review can be sought. The premature resort to the
court is fatal to one’s cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver
or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action. [SAMELCO II
VS. SELUDO, G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012]

Reasons.
 2
a) If relief is first sought from a superior administrative agency, resort to the
courts may be unnecessary.

 The petitioners, instead of appealing the action of the Regional Executive

Director to the DENR Secretary, immediately filed their complaint with
the Manila RTC, thus depriving the DENR Secretary the opportunity to
review the decision of his subordinate. Under applicable jurisprudence,
petitioners' omission renders their complaint dismissible for lack of
cause of action. [Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v. Lanzanas, G.R. No. 131442, July
10, 2003]

b) The administrative agency should be given a chance to correct its error.

 For failure of the petitioners to file a motion for reconsideration from the
resolution of the Comelec en banc dismissing the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence, the petition for certiorari filed with the
Supreme Court was deemed premature and was dismissed. It was held
that the purpose of the motion for reconsideration is to give the Comelec
an opportunity to correct the error imputed to it. [Bernardo v. Abalos, G.R.
No. 137266, December 5, 2001]

c) Principles of comity and convenience require that the courts stay their hand
until the administrative processes are completed.

d) Since judicial review of administrative decisions is usually made through

special civil actions, such proceedings will not normally prosper if there is
another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

 This was also cited by the Supreme Court as one of the reasons for the
dismissal of the petition for certiorari in Bernardo v. Abalos, supra.

CASES:

Failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not

affect the jurisdiction of the court. We have repeatedly stressed this in a long line
of decisions. The only effect of non-compliance with this rule is that it will
deprive the complainant of a cause of action, which is a ground for a motion to
dismiss. If not invoked at the proper time, this ground is deemed waived and the
court can then take cognizance of the case and try it. [REPUBLIC VS. GALLO, G.R.
No. 207074, January 17, 2018]

Verily, even with the advent of RA 9048, as amended by RA 10172 prescribing the
administrative remedy for correction of entries with the civil registry, the regional
 2
trial courts are not divested of their jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for
correction of entries "Even the failure to observe the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not affect the jurisdiction of the court." [REPUBLIC
VS. FELIX, G.R. No. 203371, June 30, 2020]

The rule must be observed in order to prevent unnecessary and premature resort
to the courts. Besides, Sec. 187, R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code) expressly
provides that administrative remedies must exhausted before the
constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance may be challenged in court. [Lopez
v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 127139, February 19, 1999]

Where the contractor tasked to widen a river immediately sued the National
irrigation Administration in court for payment without first filing a claim with
the Commission on Audit, it was held that the contractor’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies is fatal to his collection suit. [National Irrigation
Administration v. Enciso, G.R. No. 142571, May 5, 2006]

Only those decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of quasi-

judicial powers are subject to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
[Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, G.R.
No. 110526, February 10, 1998]

In like manner, the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction applies only

where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
powers.

Thus, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or

regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to.pass upon the same
[Smart Communications v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 151908,
August 12, 2003]

Because the petitioner did not take an appeal from the order of the Director,
Bureau of Labor Relations, to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, but went
directly to court, it was held that the court action was made prematurely and the
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies [SSS Employees Association v.
Bathan-Velasco, G.R. No. 108765, August 27, 1999] .

A party aggrieved must not merely initiate the prescribed administrative

procedure to obtain relief, but must also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion
before seeking judicial intervention in order to give that administrative agency an
opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the courts [Zabat v. Court of Appeals, 338 SCRA 551]
 2

However, the Orders of the SENR are different from the issuances of the PAB.
While under its 1997 rules, the PAB had jurisdiction to impose the fine or
administrative sanction on all cases of pollution, it is Section 28 of the Clean
Water Act and its IRR, Rule 28 of DAO No. 2005-10, which must be correctly
applied. It was already in effect in 2009 and specifically bestows upon the
Secretary of the DENR, upon recommendation of the PAB, in cases of
commission of prohibited acts under and violations of the Clean Water Act, the
power to impose fines, order the closure, suspension of development or
construction, or cessation of operations, or, where appropriate disconnection of
water supply.

The herein assailed Orders dated October 7 and December 2, 2009 were not
issued by the PAB but by the SENR. Thus, we affirm the appellate court's
holding in CA-G.R. SP No. 112041 that the appropriate remedy from the Orders
of the SENR is an appeal to the Office of the President. Consequently,
petitioners prematurely filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals
and failed to exhaust administrative remedies. These erroneous procedural steps
effectively rendered petitioners' appeals dismissible, resulting in the finality of
the Orders of the SENR. [MAYNILAD WATER SERVICES, INC., VS. SECRETARY
OF DENR, EN BANC, G.R. No. 202897, August 06, 2019; HERNANDO]

In connection with acts of administrative agencies, ripeness is ensured under the

doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Courts may only take
cognizance of a case or controversy if the petitioner has exhausted all remedies
available to it under the law. The doctrine ensures that the administrative agency
exercised its power to its full extent, including its authority to correct or
reconsider its actions. It would, thus, be premature for courts to take cognizance
of the case prior to the exhaustion of remedies, not to mention it would violate
the principle of separation of powers. Thus, in Rule 65 petitions, it is required that
no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy is available to the party. [KILUSANG
MAYO UNO vs. AQUINO III, April 2, 2019, G.R. No. 210500; EN BANC]

Effect of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

The jurisdiction of the court is not affected; but the complainant is deprived of a
cause of action which is a ground for a motion to dismiss. However, if no motion
to dismiss is filed on this ground, there is deemed to be a waiver.

Exceptions to the doctrine:

Note: However, we are not unmindful of the doctrine that the principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an ironclad rule.
 2
It may be disregarded: (REMEMBER THESE EXCEPTIONS, this is where the
questions are being asked)

1. Doctrine of qualified political agency (alter ego doctrine).

when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as AN ALTER EGO

OF THE PRESIDENT bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter

CASES:

1. Nazareno v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 589

 When the Undersecretary of Natural Resources denied the motion for

reconsideration, he was acting on behalf of the Secretary of Natural
Resources; accordingly, administrative remedies had been exhausted.

2. Tan v. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302

 Except where the law expressly provides for exhaustion.

 Where the failure of the petitioner to appeal the order of the Secretary of
Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines (who issued
Executive Proclamation No. 238, withdrawing the area from private
exploration and establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest
Reserve) was deemed fatal to the petition.

3. Calo v. Fuertes, 5 SCRA 399

 Where appeal had already been made to the President and, before the
President could act on the appeal, the same was withdrawn, there was
deemed to have been failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Besides, by appealing to the President, the party recognized a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy still open to him in the ordinary course of
law ² and thus, his special civil action must fail.

4. Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators v. Philippine Coconut

Authority, 286 SCRA 109

 Where the appeal to the Office of the President had not been acted upon
(and despite follow-ups for two months, no reply was received by the
petitioner), and in the meantime, the Philippine Coconut Authority,
pursuant to the assailed resolution, was issuing certificates of
 2
registration indiscriminately, the Supreme Court held that the
Association of Philippine Coconut Desiccators was justified in filing the
case in court.

5. Samahang Magbubukid ng Kapdula, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

103953, March 25, 1999

 The decisions of the DAR Secretary cannot be questioned before the

DARAB. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is improper in this case,
because Sec. 54 of R.A. 6657 specifically provides that decisions and
awards of the DAR shall be brought up to the Court of Appeals by
certiorari.

2. Where the administrative remedy is fruitless, e.g., suit for recovery of title to
office must be instituted within one year from illegal ouster, otherwise the
action prescribes.

3. Where there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency [Vda. De Tan
v. Veterans Backpay Commission, 105 Phil 377]

CASES:

1. STAR SPECIAL CORPORATE SECURITY MANAGEMENT, INC. VS.

COA, G.R. No. 225366, September 01, 2020, EN BANC

 In this case, this Court agrees with petitioner that respondent Puerto
Princesa is barred by laches from impugning the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court. Respondent Puerto Princesa neither objected to the
Regional Trial Court's jurisdiction nor invoked the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit over the money claim.

 On the contrary, respondent Puerto Princesa actively participated in the

proceedings before the Regional Trial Court. Even after the November
18, 2003 Decision attained finality, respondent Puerto Princesa did not
avail of the remedies under the Rules of Court to assail the Regional
Trial Court's jurisdiction.

 Verily, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and its corollary, "the

doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies . . . are not ironclad
rules. An exception to these rules is where there is estoppel on the part
of the party invoking the doctrine. Respondent Commission on Audit
could no longer assail the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,
indirectly or collaterally, by way of its Comment here after respondent
 2
Puerto Princesa had effectively lost its right to question the validity of
the November 18, 2003 Decision.

4. Where the issue involved is purely a legal question [Palma Fernandez v. De la

Paz, 160 SCRA 751; Eastern Shipping Lines v. POEA, supra.; Samson v. NLRC, 253
SCRA 112].

CASES:

2. Castro v. Secretary Gloria, August 20, 2001

 The Supreme Court said that there is a question of law when the doubts
or differences arise as to what the law is on a certain state of facts. There
is a question of fact when the doubts or differences arise as to the truth
or falsity of alleged facts.

 The petitioner was not disputing the administrative finding of guilt, but
the correctness of the penalty imposed. He claimed that the proper
penalty for the first offense of immoral or disgraceful conduct is only
suspension, not dismissal from the service. Understandably, the issue is
a pure question of law.

3. Bordallo v. Professional Regulation Commission & Board of Marine Deck

Officers, G.R. No. 140920, November 19, 2001

 The issue was purely a legal question, inasmuch as the question was
which law to apply: RA 8544 (Philippine Merchant Marine Officers Act
of 1998) which prescribed a passing grade in the licensure examination
of 70%, or Presidential Decree No. 97, which prescribed a passing grade
of 75%.

4. Boncodin v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 168476, September 27,

2006

 Where the dispute was on the legality of the resolution adopted by the
Board of Directors of National Power Corporation granting a salary step
increment to all officials and employees who had served the NPC for ten
years as of 1999, it was held that the issue involved were purely legal.

5. Ty v. Trampe, 250 SCRA 500

 2
 It was held that there was no necessity to appeal to the Board of
Assessment Appeals, considering that the parties agreed that the issues
in the petition were purely legal, and thus, no evidence was presented in
the lower court.

6. Espina v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97903, August 24, 1998

 Considering that the issue raised called for the interpretation and
application of the law creating the National Electrification
Administration and the bylaws of the Leyte IV Electric Cooperative, it
was held that inasmuch as the issue was a purely legal one, there was no
need to exhaust administrative remedies.

7. Vigilar vs. Aquino G.R. No. 180388. January 18, 2011

 The government project contracted out to respondent was completed

almost two decades ago. To delay the proceedings by remanding the
case to the relevant government office or agency will definitely prejudice
respondent. More importantly, the issues in the present case involve the
validity and the enforceability of the ―Contract of Agreement‖ entered
into by the parties. These are questions purely of law and clearly beyond
the expertise of the Commission on Audit or the DPWH.

8. MARZAN VS. CITY GOVERNMENT OF OLONGAPO, G.R. No. 232769,

November 03, 2020, CAGUIOA

 Accordingly, Marzan should have questioned her termination by filing

an appeal before the CSC Regional Office. However, instead of doing so,
Marzan wrote a letter to Regional Director Rabang seeking an advisory
opinion on matters relating to the disapproval of her appointment as
Department Head of the CBO, and her consequent termination from
service.

 By failing to perfect an appeal with the CSC Regional Office and

observing the procedure set forth under the RRACCS, Marzan
violated the well-established rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies.

 Nonetheless, the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies admits

of exception as when the issue involved is purely a legal question.
Here, Marzan does not assail the disapproval of her appointment as
Department Head of the CBO. What Marzan questions is respondents'
refusal to reinstate her to her former position as Department Head of the
 2
CPDO, claiming that such reinstatement is mandated by Section 13, Rule
VI of the Omnibus Rules.

 Clearly, Marzan seeks judicial intervention in order to determine

whether Section 13, Rule VI of the Omnibus Rules applies. This
question is one that is purely legal, and thus constitutes an exception
to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. In this light, the
Court finds that Marzan's direct resort to the courts may be permitted.

9. LRTA VS. CITY OF PASAY, FIRST DIVISION, JUNE 28, 2022, G.R. No.
211299; EN BANC

 The issues involved in this petition are purely legal issues. It is evident
that from the outset, LRTA primarily intended to question the
authority of the tax assessor to impose tax assessments on its property,
and the authority of the treasurer to collect said tax, as LRTA claims to
be a non-taxable entity. This can be seen when the LRTA deliberately
chose to file the remedies of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
instead of just filing a protest to contest the amounts in the assessment. It
must be emphasized that the very nature of a petition under Rule 65
involves questions of jurisdiction. Questions regarding jurisdiction are
necessarily legal as the existence or extent of an entity's jurisdiction over
a certain subject matter is determined by what is conferred by law. Being
a legal question, there was no need for the LRTA to exhaust
administrative remedies, even assuming that such remedies exist. []

5. Where the administrative action is patently illegal, amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction [Industrial Power Sales v. Sinsuat, supra.].

CASES:

1. Cabada v. Alunan, 260 SCRA 838

 The Commissioner of the National Police Commission who denied

petitioners’ appeal to the Secretary of Interior and Local Government
acted in a patently illegal manner, because only the Secretary of DILG
could act on the appeal and that the National Police Commission, being
a collegial body, cannot be bound by the act of an individual
Commissioner.

6. Where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction.

CASES:
 2
1. Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 255 SCRA 438

 The inaction of the PCGG on the motion filed by the respondent and co-
respondent (it took seven years before the PCGG filed its motion to
dismiss based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies] gave rise to
unreasonable delay.

2. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF MALOLOS, INC., VS. THE

HEIRS OF MARIANO MARCOS, G.R. No. 225971, June 17, 2020,
CAGUIOA

 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, in and of itself, is

grounded on practical reasons, including allowing the administrative
agencies concerned to take every opportunity to correct its own errors,
as well as affording the litigants the opportunity to avail of speedy relief
through the administrative processes and sparing them of the laborious
and costly resort to courts. However, this principle is not inflexible, and
admits of several exceptions that include situations where the very
rationale of the doctrine has been defeated.

 With the peculiar length of time with which this case has lasted, this
Court concludes that RCBMI's action falls within the temporal
exempting circumstance, or where there is unreasonable delay or
official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant.

 Specifically, the exempting circumstance is the suspension of RCBMI's

enjoyment of its legal victory, which was awarded to it by the MAR in
1982, but to date, 37 years later, remains to be executed.

3. PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION VS.

URDANETA SACRED HEART HOSPITAL, THIRD DIVISION,
January 11, 2021, G.R. No. 214485; HERNANDO

 USHH's filing of the complaint with the RTC without first exhausting
available administrative remedies is justifiable in light of the denial of its
claims by the PHIC's Board itself, the body superior to the RO or the
PARD where USHH was supposed to file an MR or appeal.

 To put it into perspective, "[PHIC's] President and Chief Executive

Officer (CEO) is directly appointed by the President of the Republic
while its Board of Directors (the Board) is composed of several cabinet
secretaries (or their permanent representatives) and representatives of
different stakeholders."
 2
 Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the PHIC Board exercises a
higher authority than the ROs or the PARD, and that to file an MR or
appeal to it would be futile since the PHIC Board already directed its
denial.

 The trial court and the appellate court also correctly considered USHH's
Complaint as an exception to the application of the doctrine on
exhaustion of administrative remedies on the basis of strong public
interest. Alternatively, the instant case may also fall under the following
exceptions: (a) "when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies
would be unreasonable" and (b) "when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention."

7. Where there is irreparable injury or threat thereof, unless judicial recourse is

immediately made [De Lara v. Cloribel, 14 SCRA 269].

CASES:

1. National Food Authority v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 470

II. because the contracts of the security agencies had already been terminated
and their replacements were hired, appeal to the Board of Trustees of the
National Food Authority and to the Secretary of Agriculture was not a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law. The respondents had to
go to court to stop the implementation of the new contracts.

8. In land cases, where the subject matter is private land [Soto v. Jareno, supra.].

9. Where the law does not make exhaustion a condition precedent to judicial
recourse.

10. Where observance of the doctrine will result in the nullification of the
claim.
11. Where there are special reasons or circumstances demanding immediate
court action.

CASES:

1. Roxas & Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999
 2
 Where exhaustion of administrative remedies before the DAR does not
provide the party with a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, then the
party may seek immediate redress in court.

2. Department of Agrarian Reform v. Apex Investment and Financing

Corporation, G.R. No. 149422, April 10, 2003

The Supreme Court said that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies may be disregarded when, as in this case,

(i) there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial

intervention; and

(ii) the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack

or excess of jurisdiction.

In this case, the PARO did not take immediate action on the respondent’s protest,
and it was only after more than one year that it was forwarded to the DAR. Since
then, what petitioner DAR did was to require respondent every now and then to
submit copies of supporting documents which were already attached to its
Protest. In the meantime, respondent found that the PARO had caused the
cancellation of its title and that a new one was issued to an alleged farmer-
beneficiary.

12. When due process of law is clearly violated [Anzaldo v. Clave, 119 SCRA 353;
Zambales Chromite v. Court of Appeals, 94 SCRA 261]

CASES:

1. Pagara v. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 606

 Because the parcels of land of the respondent were placed under

Operation Land Transfer of the Land Reform Program and the
certificates of title issued to the petitioners without the respondent
having been given an opportunity to be heard, the Supreme Court said
that there was denial of due process, and therefore, there was no need
for the respondent to exhaust administrative remedies.

13. When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
[Quisumbing v. Judge Gumban, 193 SCRA 520]

CASES:

1. Estuerte v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 541

 2

 The Supreme Court said that in a civil action for damages, the court’s
concern is whether or not damages, personal to the plaintiff, were
caused by the acts of the defendants; it can proceed independently of the
administrative action. Accordingly, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply.

2. Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Comelec, G.R.

No. 159139, January 13, 2004

The Supreme Court referred to this as one of the reasons why there was no
necessity for the petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies.

In fact, the Court, citing Paat v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 167, enumerated the
instances when the rule on exhaustion may be disregarded, as follows:

[1] When there is violation of due process;

[2] when the issue involved is purely a legal question;

[3] When the administrative action is patently illegal amounting

to lack or excess of jurisdiction;

[4] When there is estoppel on the part of the administrative

agency concerned;

[5] When there is irreparable injury;

[6] When the respondent is a Department Secretary whose acts, as

an alter ego of the President, bears the implied and presumed
approval of the latter;

[7] When to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would

be unreasonable;

[8] When it would amount to a nullification of the claim;

[9] When the subject matter is a private land in land case

proceedings;

[10] When the rule does not provide a plain, speedy or adequate
remedy; and
 2
[11] When there are circumstances indicating the urgency of
judicial intervention.

14. when a questioned act was done in the EXERCISE OF QUASI-

LEGISLATIVE POWERS.

CASES:

1. ALLIANCE OF NON-LIFE INSURANCE WORKERS OF THE

PHILIPPINES VS. MENDOZA, G.R. No. 206159, August 26, 2020

 It is settled that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

finds no application when a questioned act was done in the exercise of
quasi-legislative powers. In questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative
agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going
to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative
agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function,
and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-
legislative power.

 DO No. 2007-28 was issued pursuant to DOTC's exercise of its delegated

legislative power under the foregoing provision. Its issuance was done
pursuant to its quasi-legislative powers. Thus, the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies does not apply in this case.

2. KILUSANG MAYO UNO VS. AQUINO, G.R. No. 210500, April 2, 2019,
EN BANC

 Courts cannot ignore Congress' determination that the Social Security

Commission is the entity with jurisdiction over any dispute arising
from the Social Security Act with respect to coverage, benefits,
contributions, and penalties.

 Here, respondent Social Security Commission qualifies as an

administrative tribunal, given sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact. Thus, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction,
petitioners should have first filed their case before respondent Social
Security Commission.
 2
3. PRC VS. ALO, SECOND DIVISION, FEB 14, 2022, G.R. No. 214435;
HERNANDO

 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is grounded on

practical reasons, including allowing the administrative agencies
concerned to take every opportunity to correct its own errors, as well as
affording the litigants the opportunity to avail of speedy relief through
the administrative processes and sparing them of the laborious and
costly resort to courts. However, the records would show that none of
these exceptions are present in this case. Alo filed the petition for review
with the CA on May 2, 2013 without any justification or reason on why
she did not file an appeal with the PRC instead, considering that the
latter is the proper procedure and it was still within the 15-day
reglementary period. Not only is this a blatant disregard of procedural
rules, but also a denial of an opportunity for the PRC to review the
Board's decision and if necessary, correct or modify the same, without
resorting to the judiciary and unnecessarily adding to the courts' already
clogged dockets. This is definitely contrary to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies, and thus, the CA should have dismissed the
petition for lack of cause of action. []

4. Estuerte v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 541

 The Supreme Court said that in a civil action for damages

 First, judicial intervention is urgent. To recall, petitioners sought a TRO.
While the general rule is that it is prohibited to enjoin the
implementation of the EPIRA, the exception to the said rule is when it is
ordered by the Court (through injunction or restraining order). Under
the law, petitioners could solely seek injunctive relief from the Court,
hence, judicial intervention is necessary and indispensable.

5. COLMENARES VS. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (ERC),

G.R. No. 210245. August 03, 2021; EN BANC

 The doctrine on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply

because a TRO and an injunction were involved.

 "[w]hatever circumstances warranted the grant of injunction in the court

below would be no different than the circumstances which created the
urgency, and there can ordinarily be no better judge to determine the
existence thereof than the x x x court itself."

 The controverted acts allegedly violated due process. When the ERC
immediately granted MERALCO's letter, it is claimed that they deprived
 2
the consumers from participating in the concerns raised in MERALCO's
letter dated December 5, 2013, which thereby violated due process under
the EPIRA.

 Petitioners argued that the violation of their due process rights was part
of the grave abuse of discretion committed by respondents. Third, there
is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. There is no other
tribunal where petitioners could raise grave abuse of discretion and
likewise seek an injunction against the ERC.

IX. ELECTION LAW

A. Suffrage; Qualification and Disqualification of Voters (1987

CONST., art. V, sec. 1; R.A. No. 8189, secs. 9 and 11)

B. Registration of Voters; Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings (R.A.

No. 8189;
R.A. No. 10367)
1. Overseas Absentee Voting – R.A. No. 9189; R.A. No.
10590
2. Local Absentee Voting – E.O. No. 157, Series of 1987;
R.A. No. 7166, sec.
12; R.A. No. 10380
3. Persons Deprived of Liberty Voting – COMELEC
Resolution No. 9371, as may be amended

C. Political Parties and the Party-List System of Representation (1987

CONST., art.
VI, sec. 5(2); art. IX-C, sec. 2 (5)); R.A. No. 7941)
1. Registration – R.A. No. 7941, sec. 5
a. Grounds for Refusal or Cancellation of Registration
– R.A. No. 7941, sec. 6
*Exclude computation of party-list seat allocation

D. Candidacy
1. Certificate of Candidacy – B.P. Blg. 881, sec. 73
2. Ministerial Duty of Comelec to Receive Certificates of
Candidacy – B.P. Blg. 881, sec. 76
3. Effect of Filing of Certificate of Candidacy – B.P. Blg. 881,
sec. 66
 2
4. Eligibility and Material Misrepresentation – B.P. Blg. 881,
secs. 74 and
78
5. Withdrawal of Certificates of Candidacy – B.P. Blg. 881,
sec. 73
6. Effects of Denial and Cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy due to Material Misrepresentation
7. Substitution of Candidates – B.P. Blg. 881, sec. 77
8. Nuisance Candidates and Effects of Declaration of
Nuisance Candidacy
– B.P. Blg. 881, sec. 69; R.A. No. 6646, sec. 5
9. Disqualification of Candidates; Effects

E. Campaign
1. Limitations on Expenses and Prohibited Contributions –
R.A. No. 7166, sec. 13
2. Lawful Election Propaganda – R.A. No. 9006
3. Statement of Contributions and Expenses – R.A. No. 7166,
sec. 14

F. Remedies
1. Pre-election
a. Petition for Disqualification
b. Petition Not to Give Due Course or Cancel
Certificates of
Candidacy – B.P. Blg. 881, sec. 78
c. Petition to Declare a Nuisance Candidate – B.P.
Blg. 881, sec. 69
2. During election
a. Petition to Postpone Elections – B.P. Blg. 881, sec. 5
b. Petition to Declare Failure of Elections – B.P. Blg.
881, sec. 6
3. Pre-Proclamation Controversy
4. Post-Proclamation
a. Election Contest
i. Election Protest ii. Quo warranto iii.
Jurisdiction
 2
- Presidential Electoral Tribunal –
1987 CONST., art. VII, sec. 4
- Senate Electoral Tribunal – 1987
CONST., art. VI, sec. 17
- House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal – 1987 CONST., art. VI,
sec. 17
- COMELEC – 1987 CONST., art. IX-
C, sec. 2(2); B.P. Blg.
881, secs. 250 and 253
- RTC – R.A. No. 7166, sec. 22; B.P.
Blg. 881, secs. 251 and 253
- MTC – B.P. Blg. 881, secs. 252-253

G. Prosecution of Election Offenses (B.P. Blg. 881 as amended by R.A.

No. 9369, sec. 265)

X. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1987 CONST., art. X; R.A. No. 7160)

A. Principles of Local Autonomy

B. Local Government Units

1. Powers of Local Government Units
a. Police Power and General Welfare Clause
b. Eminent Domain and Taxation
c. Requisites of a Valid Ordinance; Local
Initiative and Referendum
d. Corporate Powers
2. Local Elective and Appointive Officials
3. Rules of Succession
4. Term Limitations and Recall

XI. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. Doctrine of Incorporation and Transformation (1987 CONST., art.

II, sec. 2; art. VII, sec. 21)
 2
B. Sources of Obligations in International Law (Statute of the
International Court of Justice, art. 38)

C. Subjects of International Law

D. Diplomatic and Consular Law (Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations; Vienna Convention on Consular Relations)

E. Treaties; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

F. Nationality and Statelessness (R.A. No. 9225; Hague Convention of

1930)

G. Jurisdiction of States
1. Territoriality Principle
2. Nationality Principle
3. Protective Principle
4. Universality Principle
5. Passive Personality Principle
6. Conflicts of Jurisdiction

H. Treatment of Aliens; Extradition and Deportation

I. International Human Rights Law (The United Nations’ Universal

Declaration of Human Rights)

J. International Humanitarian Law (R.A. No. 9851)

1. War Crimes, Genocide, and Other Crimes against
Humanity – Sections 4-6
2. Jurisdiction and Double Jeopardy – Section 17
3. Irrelevance of Official Capacity – Section 9
4. Responsibility of Superiors – Section 10
5. Nonprescription – Section 11
 2

NOTE: All Bar candidates should be guided that only laws, rules, issuances, and
jurisprudence pertinent to the topics in this syllabus as of June 30, 2023 are within
the coverage of the 2024 Bar Examinations.