Misunderstanding Russia

Chapter 3
Analysis of Key Foreign Policy Documents

of the Russian Federation
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the primary official documents of Russian
foreign policy and present the institutional structure of Russia’s state authorities
and offices that deal with the acceptance of foreign policy decisions. Some authors
have cast doubts on the usefulness of these documents for analyzing foreign policy,
arguing that they are exceedingly general. This, they say, provides too wide a space
for interpretation while referring to the tone of compromise in the content of these
documents—a result of domestic political discussions (Lo, 2002, p. 68). Although
these objections should be taken into consideration, the now third generation of
such documents existing in the Russian Federation at present can help us follow
development trends and transformations in domestic policy discussions, and also
help us to study the lessons that the leadership of the country has learned from the
previous years of operation in the international system.
Such an approach, contrary to objections, can prove quite useful. Analyzing
foreign policy documents can actually serve as a valuable display of domestic
perceptions of international systems. They are not to be read as an accurate or
honest version of the opinions of Russia’s ruling elite on the surrounding world,
but may be used to determine a certain basic framework—they are lines that
Russian foreign policy follows, although its specific political steps do not always
necessarily have to fulfill the content of these documents. Despite this fact, foreign
policy documents, when seen as a collection of the products of Russia’s political
system, show the explicit transformations and constant characteristics of the
discourse that forms the background for the formulation of Russian foreign policy.
This is evident in the mutual differences of these documents, in their various
reiterated topics, and even in the choice of language. Therefore, this chapter is
not an analysis of individual documents, but rather a study of these documents as
a whole with an emphasis on seeking out the continuities and fissures in Russian
foreign policy priorities or in the definitions of key terms created by political elites
over the last 20 years.
For these purposes, this chapter has been divided into three basic sections.
The first section will be devoted to the analysis and comparison of the documents
adopted in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation up to the present. This
will allow us to better trace the development of thematic priorities and regional
involvement of the Russian Federation over the course of previous years. Using
a similar structure for all documents will also allow for the relatively easy
comparison of their individual versions. The main goal of the analysis is to follow
40 Misunderstanding Russia
how/whether Russian superpower status is incorporated into these documents

and how exactly the changing international situation, domestic conditions and
ideological foundations of Russian foreign policy are reflected in the formulation
of the interests and priorities of Russia in the present system.
The second section of this chapter will provide an analysis of currently
published documents of national security that can help us better follow the
securitization (or de-securitization) of international topics and processes by the
leaders of the Russian Federation. The national security document from 2000
also provides an explanation for terms that are crucial in analyzing the foreign
policy of President Putin’s administration — namely the definition of the Russian
Federation’s national interests. This section of the chapter will thus be focused
on finding topics that representatives of the country explicitly label or indirectly
specify via official documents as endangering the country’s security.
In the third section of this chapter we will continue by adding information on
the priorities of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy, with a short excursion into
the institutional framework that is used in the Russian political system to accept
foreign policy decisions. This section has been included in this chapter because
definitions of jurisdictions and key institutions are an integral part of the analyzed
documents. The aim of this section is to compare officially stated roles (or shifts
in the roles) of individual institutions with the changes in their significance that
played out unofficially in connection with the internal transformations of the
regime. While analyzing foreign policy, this can allow us to take into consideration
the institutional limits or, contrarily, the non-standard opportunities to interfere in
the creation of foreign policy that individual political actors have had in the past
or have at present.
The sections of this chapter, which have been created solely according to these
mentioned documents, have not been given the standard system of citation. This is
due to the fact that they are not specifically numbered and are only available to me
online. We would therefore like to ask the reader for understanding in this matter.
Concepts of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation has released three
conceptual documents whose dates of first publication create a stable timeline
of the transformations of the Russian regime while depicting the milestones in
the formulation of foreign policy priorities. The first of these documents was
issued at the turn of 1992–93 (further referred to as D1993; Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2002a). This document was created in a time
of domestic political crisis (see Chapter 5), and we consider it to be one of the
important steps the executive branch has taken to strengthen its political influence
in the country while in dispute with the Parliament. Its date of publishing also
gives us reason to assume that it reflects the attitudes of Yeltsin’s administration
upon entering the international scene.
Analysis of Key Foreign Policy Documents of the Russian Federation 41
The second document was issued in 2000 (further referred to as D2000;

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2002b) after Putin’s rise
to the presidency. This document is useful in reflecting Russian foreign policy
in two ways. By comparing it to the previously mentioned document, it can
help us identify the “lessons” that Russian elites gained in international politics
in the 1990s and trace these lessons to their formulation of foreign policy. The
second advantage of this document is that it can allow us to reveal the initial
priorities and standpoints of the new presidential administration and can serve
as appropriate grounds for evaluating the development of Russian foreign policy
direction after 2000.
The third and final foreign policy document was issued in 2008 (further
referred to as D2008; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2008),
two months after President Medvedev took office. In comparison with strategies
from 1993 and 2000 it is a valuable source of information on the shifts in the
priorities and transformations in orientation that Russian foreign policy has seen
during years of strengthening Putin’s rule. When we take into consideration the
high level of continuity in the character and direction of the Russian political
regime, which is strengthened by the marked continuity in its officials, it provides
us with all necessary data for analysis of the rebirth of Russian superpower self-
confidence. Moreover, this in turn leads to the weakening of the “innovative” role
of any new document.
The following section will be divided according to the individual basic sections
that are found in the actual documents—(1) general information, (2) Russia and the
modern world, (3) priorities of foreign policy and (4) regional priorities—which,
for the purposes of this work, will be directed mainly at relations between Russia
and the West. Other regions will be dealt with more in terms of the weakening or
strengthening of their significance for Russian foreign policy.
General Information
While only two basic topics were enough in D1993, in D2000 and D2008 the
general information section has gradually become longer over time, in order to
define more exactly the goals of Russian foreign policy and the position of Russia
in the international system,.
Logically, D1993 reflects in its very introduction the collapse of the bipolar
structure and labels it as being beneficial to international peace. The main topics
of the general information section of D1993 are: the affirmation of Russia being a
democratic country that must be included in the international system as a great land
with a rich history; the affirmation of its territorial integrity and the authority of its
capital, Moscow, in the Russian Federation; and, finally, the affirmation of Russia’s
interest in the countries of the former Soviet Union, in the security of these regions
and the rights of Russians living in them. D1993 thus accurately reflects the era
when Russian elites were gradually becoming oriented in international relations
after the collapse of the Soviet Union and desperately needed to both strengthen
their own position as leaders of an autonomous state, and at the same time normalize
and formalize as quickly as possible relations with their close neighbors appearing
along the vast majority of Russia’s borders after the fall of the USSR.
In 2000 the document expresses satisfaction at the fact that Russia’s basic
challenge had been overcome through establishing itself as an independent
actor on the international scene. One of the first main goals of the document in
international policy, however, is listed as the necessity to maintain the country’s
territorial integrity. The second priority is the support of international law and the
authority of the UN in international relations. The third priority is the creation of
appropriate conditions for the economic development of the Russian Federation.
Post-Soviet territory falls to a fourth priority, in that Russia is attempting to create a
zone of allied countries along its borders. As one of its main priorities, D2000 also
lists the protection of the rights of Russians living beyond Russia’s borders, and
commits itself to them through “all possible means.” The final priority listed in the
document is the building of a positive image of Russia in international relations.
The shift between D1993 and D2000 is evident immediately. D2000 is much
more specific and self-confident; it is completely disengaged from the fall of the
USSR; and it again includes the global tasks of the Russian Federation in the
international system. D2000 shows Russia’s improved orientation in international
policy over the course of the 1990s in comparison to D1993, which was created
during a time when the whole system was experiencing structural transformations
and the entire future development and direction of both the system and all of
Russia were still very unclear. D1993 is therefore aimed at estimable and acute
questions such as Russia’s establishing itself on the international scene and its
relations with its neighbors.
D2008 continues in the previously mentioned trend. The tone of the document
is again more self-confident. Already in its introduction it actually states that
the reason for creating a new document is to strengthen Russia in international
relations—a process that requires setting new goals and defining the roles the
country could play in international politics. As one of its first specific goals Russia
labels itself as being a center of influence for the modern world, while D2000 still
voiced concerns over the country’s integrity. Creating the appropriate conditions
for Russian economic growth takes second place among the priorities in this
document, as Russia sees this growth as a condition not only for the success of
its own reforms but also for the strength of the country in international relations.
The third priority is the strengthening of international law and the role of the
UN. Similar to the question of establishing a positive image of Russia (D2000),
D2008 is more self-assured, as it aims to promote the Russian culture and language
while adopting the role of a world-class civilization that advocates the creation of
inter-civilizational dialogue in the contemporary system.
In regard to neighboring countries, the rhetoric of the document is actually
toned down in comparison to D1993 or D2000. Russia uses a new and neutral
label of “neighboring states” rather than “zone” (D2000) or “contiguous countries”
(D1993). Similarly, compared to other documents, it offers Russians abroad
“comprehensive aid” instead of “all possible means” and commits to “fostering the
removal” instead of “advancing the removal” of tensions and conflict situations
in neighboring states.
Comparison of these doctrines shows proof of the transformation in foreign
policy rhetoric, which (sincerely or not) has become more assertive and is clearly
aimed at strengthening the image of Russia as a world power in international
discourse. While D1993 aspires to this position, D2000 considers it a necessity
and deals with the challenges that could endanger this course of action. D2008,
however, simply labels Russia as a world power. The transformation that took
place in Russia in the eight years between 2000 and 2008 was dramatic; however,
it actually did not finally lead to the strengthening of Russia on any globally
significant scale. Thus, it is fairly evident that the change in rhetoric is meant to
lead primarily to a change in discourse, which, in the 1990s led to doubts as to
whether Russia was a global power or not.
Russia and the Modern World
D1993 had to create a completely new definition of what place Russia should
hold in the international system. The document begins just after the finished
dispute between Gorbachev’s “new thinking” and Yeltsin’s “pro-democratic”
direction. With the poise of a winner, Yeltsin’s administration acknowledged the
concept of “new thinking” and its importance in launching the transformation
of a bipolar ordering of international affairs. At the same time, D1993 saw it
necessary to overcome the theory of two systems and strove to transform Russia
into a democratic country involved in international affairs based on partnerships.
These partnerships would then lead to the fulfilling of his interests in place of
an ideological confrontation.
D1993, albeit slightly secretively, also points to the conviction of Russia’s
global importance when it connects the fate of Russian reforms directly with the
state of the new international system, just as it also points to the fact that it will not
agree to one-sided, disadvantageous partnerships—cooperation must foster the
promotion of Russian interests.
The document labels the post-Soviet area as a main priority of Russian foreign
policy, while it emphasizes the necessity to effectively negotiate with post-Soviet
states that could need Russian help in completing their own transformation. At
the same time, according to D1993, a task of Russia’s elite is to overcome the
resistance of these states to cooperate—an aversion that lingered in relations
between Russia and post-Soviet states after the collapse of the USSR. Peace in
neighboring regions is directly connected in the doctrine to Russia’s own survival.
D1993 refers to the West as the scientific, technological, economic and financial
center of the world that it intends to join and cooperate with in the creation of global
inter-civilizational dialogue. At the same time, it warns against the decline of the
West’s unification, which was previously determined by bipolar confrontation and
can now be disrupted by the growing power of Western Europe as an independent
actor. It also warns of its incorporation of the regions of Eastern Europe, to which
D1993 predicts a ten-year period of instability and conflict. Here we can find clear
evidence of the desire among Russia’s political elites to strengthen the standing of
their country against Western nations and their wish to preserve their former ties
and influences. This desire was rhetorically masked by the willingness or even
“necessity” of cooperation in the suppression of conflicting tensions in a region of
shared interest—Eastern Europe.
The main source of danger for the security of the international system in the
following decade, according to D1993, was undoubtedly the growing imbalance
between world regions and the conflicts in the third world. In this regard, the
document makes a strong theme out of the transformation of the security in
international relations. It does this by pointing to the fact that, although the
significance of military power has fallen on a global scale, it is nevertheless
more important than ever in a regional context. D1993 states that Russia is
sufficiently powerful and responsible to adopt the post-Soviet security area as its
own. Similarly, Russia here takes global responsibility for dealing with conflicts
through membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC).
D1993 also weighs up the meaning of individual power segments in the
present system, and reaches the conclusion that the power of the state is more
and more dependent on economic and technological advances and less and
less on sheer military force. For this reason, it sets a priority to orient Russia
towards economically developed as well as newly industrialized countries.
However, it states that partnerships must be created with respect to the promotion
of Russian interests.
If we were to summarize the position of Russia in the modern world
according to D1993, then Russia would be striving to join Western countries in a
civilizational sense—breaking down hostilities of the past and likely connecting
to European traditions in its policies and following suit in economic development.
Both should foster the transformation and strengthening of Russia, which could
then effectively play the role of security guarantor not only on a global scale but
also on a regional one with countries of the post-Soviet area. In this sense we can
detect a certain feeling of ambivalence. Russian elites here are evidently trying
to create and legitimize the idea of a sphere of influence in post-Soviet space
and partially also in Eastern Europe where other powers will not have access
without Russian consent. At the same time, however, Russia is committing itself
to becoming one of the great Western powers in the inter-civilizational dialogue
to come. On a rhetorical level, D1993 follows this security-cooperation approach.
It makes its argument through the necessity of stabilizing Eastern Europe and
the post-Soviet area, offering Russian capabilities and resources. In light of the
fact that both the post-Soviet area and Eastern Europe were not much more stable
than Russia itself, this rhetoric seems to be solely the pragmatic desire of Russia
to create its own sphere of influence while only seeming to be under the framework
of cooperation with the West.
The ideas in D2000 and D2008 are markedly different from those in D1993.
Russia still intends to play its role in creating a new world order, but the method
of doing so differs greatly from D1993. D2000 warns the strongest superpowers
in the international system against destabilizing and one-sided acts that would lead
to the circumvention of international law and UN authority: “Russia must strive to
achieve a multipolar system of international relations that truly reflect the diversity
of the modern world” (D2000). In the document, the 1990s are labeled as a time
of establishing contacts with other actors and international organizations; and now
these contacts must be utilized to promote democratic and mutually governed
international relations based on a multipolar division of power in the field of both
economy and security. D2000 notes that Russia has the true potential to gain an
important role in the system, and this should be further advanced by independent,
constructive but also reliable and transparent foreign policy. D2000 considers
the balance between Western and Asian directions to be of utmost importance to
Russian foreign policy. This is made possible by the acceptance of the image of
Russia as a unique entity that is at the same time a Eurasian superpower accessible
to both East and West. The Eurasian character of Russian foreign policy according
to D2000 commits Russia to shared responsibility in regional and global security.
D2000 is in this section of the text briefer than D1993, which can be interpreted
as a confirmation of the fact that Russia has, according to its leaders, established
itself on the international scene. It shows that although it is not yet clear where and
how Russia should proceed, it is no longer necessary to defend the basic assertion
that it is a peace-loving country. The difference between D1993 and D2000 also
accurately illustrates the shift in the ideological basis of Russian foreign policy
in the 1990s (for more see Chapter 2). Prospects of equal (and shared) decision
making with other Western superpowers in a partnered dialogue were gradually
replaced by a more independent course which, on an ideological level, played off
the futility of disregarding the Eurasian (physical-geographic) character of Russia.
This change in direction was to allow Russia to become an independent balancer
in the international system against undesirable unipolar tendencies and ambitions
of individual actors.
D2008 is interesting not only in that it reflects the domestic policy transformation
of the regime (for this reason, this section is also much more extensive). D2008
does not contain the elementary definitions of Russia in terms of the surrounding
world (D1993), but explains the interconnection of the domestic system with its
foreign policy. Thus, it seems that D2008 can be considered one of the tools of
harmonization and synchronization of the Russian political regime after 2000.
According to the document, foreign policy should serve as a tool of national
development, while Russia’s global role is determined also by its domestic priorities.
At the same time, the state commits itself to utilizing all possible economic tools
(profits from an expanding state sector) for an active foreign policy. A key term
that reflects the changes in the ideological foundations of Russian foreign policy is
“national interest.” National interest provides the long-desired connection of both
the foreign and the domestic. National interest is formulated on a domestic scale
and the state promotes it in the international forum. Simultaneously, the state will
enjoy the support of society and domestic state structures while promoting these
international interests abroad.
Apart from incorporating foreign policy into the domestic policy regime,
D2008 is also striking in its assertive position towards the West. While D2000
points out the tendencies towards unipolarity, D2008 is more specific and markedly
more critical. It deems the contemporary international system as discriminatory
towards the majority of cultures and cultural identities, and warns against the
circumvention and undermining of the UN Security Council’s authority. D2008
states that the West fears the loss of its monopoly on directing the development
of international relations, which is manifested in the ongoing psychological
“containment” of Russia, including attempts to reinterpret postwar history.
In order to prevent these trends, Russian elites, according to their foreign
policy documents, intend to continue support for the multipolar organization of
international relations. This should be achieved by partnerships with and support
for countries whose significance in international relations is on the rise—Russia
and its leaders can thus slip into the role of a sort of “educator” of new centers
of the international system. The second step in achieving such a multipolar
system is the support of multilateral institutions as tools for solving conflicts in
international relations.
D2000 and D2008 reflect Russia’s disappointment from two specific
interventions that took place against its will and outside the framework of UN
consent. While Kosovo in 1999 could have seemed to be an isolated incident,
Iraq in 2003 showed that Western states, and particularly the USA, are able to
exert their will in international relations unilaterally. Therefore, it seems that while
D2000 warns of certain indicators, D2008 shows clear resistance to this existing
trend. Emphasis on the role of the UNSC is understandable, as Russia is a standing
member of the UNSC and holds the power of veto. If all international military
actions were truly passed through UNSC consent, then no action could be carried
out against Russia’s will. This situation would be ideal for Russia’s elites, who are
striving to gain the post of respected superpower despite the fact that these efforts
are being undermined by the West’s actions.
From D1993 to D2008, the crucial aspect for determining the position of
“Russia in the modern world” is its relationship with the West. This ranges from the
efforts to become an integral part of one civilization to the aspirations of balancing
Western “unilateralism” and the assertive condemnation of Western states for their
attempts at keeping Russia in a weak position. The West is thus a true counterpart
to Russia that formulates Russian self-confidence and self-awareness, and is the
cornerstone for defining its role and goals in the system.
According to D2000, Russian policy must develop several fundamental
vectors that are determined by the country’s Eurasian character. These are vectors
which the country should then follow and strive toward. D2008 directly refers
to the multi-vectored character of foreign policy as one of its defining symbols
(next to promoting national interests). Here there is an evident effort towards the
development of an independent foreign policy. We assume, however, that Russia

does not yet have the potential to truly balance Western influence in the international
system with its multi-vector policy. By accepting global responsibilities stemming
from a multi-vector policy and the regional priorities laid out in D2008, Russian
elites are mainly struggling to keep Russia in an indispensable position and to
maintain its right to have its word in crucial decisions in the contemporary system
in and out of UN sessions.
Priorities of Foreign Policy
This section of D1993 accurately characterizes the main ideas of the document
as a whole. The priorities of foreign policy are summarized very briefly. In its
introduction, D1993 states that international policy is aimed at promoting
Russian national interests; however, the priorities are in reality aimed at two
main topics—internal transformation and neighboring foreign countries that will
evidently represent these national interests in the given period. Foreign policy
should then fulfill the needs of domestic policy transformation, including the
mobilization of support (not excluding financial support) for these processes
abroad. Peace and stability of neighboring foreign countries is presented as
being fundamental elements for the success of reforms, and D1993 strives for the
integration of the post-Soviet region in an economic and political sense. Efforts
to assure its readers that Russia is not the USSR can also be found in this section,
and the document also states that Russia does not plan to negotiate with any state
in a primarily friendly or primarily hostile manner. In the event of conflict, it states
that the country will be prepared to deal with any dispute through political means.
The text of the document partially shows the incongruity of Russian foreign
policy in the 1990s. It provides only very general lines to follow, while the most
important elements of foreign policy actually proved unattainable. Several years
after the document was published, it became evident that Russia was not and
probably would not be an equal partner with Western states, and that a number of
former Soviet states actually were not (and would not be) interested in Russia’s
guarantees of security and integration projects. Russian foreign policy thus
logically stumbled from one strategy to another according to the (international,
domestic or personnel) situation at hand until after a regime change and the
entrance of a new President formulated new and clearer standpoints. D2000 and
D2008 are substantially more comprehensive in the formulation of foreign policy
priorities, which again lends proof to the fact that the 1990s provided Russia’s
elites with time for orientation in the international system. Also, thanks to the
regular transformations in foreign policy discourse, it gave them time to test out
various forms of relations with the West.
Both the newer doctrines list a new world order as a priority. While D2000
speaks of its formulation, D2008 considers it to be already created. The task of
Russian foreign policy in the new world order is to strengthen the role of the UN
while preserving Russia’s role inside this organization. D2008 is more open to
reform of the UNSC while preserving the rights of its standing members. Apart
from the UN, D2000 also mentions the G8 as a very important partner to Russia in
the new world system. The multi-vector character of D2008 expands the grouping
of such “desirable” international groups to Russian, China and India, three of the
BRIC group (the fourth being Brazil). D2008 in this context mentions the priority
of protecting the principles of international law, again especially against the one-
sided or selective interpretation of international norms by some states.
Both documents identically follow with the priority of strengthening
international security and are both in agreement concerning the importance of
strengthening international security through disarmament. D2000 warns against
US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and takes a position
against the building of the missile defense shield. In D2008, however, there are
only warnings against certain elements of missile defense. D2000, evidently
working off the impressions of events in Kosovo, specifically warns against the
circumvention of the UNSC in carrying out military interventions, and suggests
strengthening the mandate and number of UN peacekeeping forces in order to
become a more effective tool in conflict resolution. The Russian government
intends to participate in all such missions, either militarily or otherwise (evidently
in an effort to expand its presence in the former Yugoslavia, and especially in
Kosovo), and allows for the possibility of participating in UN peacekeeping
operations or with other (regional) security organizations in exceptional
circumstances. D2008 also insists that the UNSC be the main authority in the
area of decision making in military interventions. The diversified nature of the
directions of Russian foreign policy and the occasionally anti-American tone of
the document are highlighted by mention of Russia’s interest in cooperating with
European states in ensuring European security.
The most pressing danger for Russia that is identical in both documents is
terrorism. D2000 evidently included this point in connection with the second war
in Chechnya, while D2008 skillfully utilizes the acknowledgment of terrorism
as a security threat of global dimensions. Whereas D2000 rather vaguely calls
on international cooperation in anti-terrorism activities, D2008 suggests the
creation of an international anti-terrorism coalition under the supervision of
the UN. In D2008, the Russian Federation again allows for the possibility of
taking all necessary measures in the event of self-defense against terrorism. As a
consequence, any measures taken by the central government under the aegis of the
war against terror, whether in Chechnya or the whole country, will now be carried
out in “international interests.”
An interesting shift takes place here in another prioritized area, international
relations. D2000 focuses on involving Russia in the international economic
system, attracting foreign investments, paying off debt, entrance to the WTO and
other steps that are meant to help a weakened Russia overcome the consequences
of the economic crisis from the end of the 1990s. Contrary to D2000, D2008 in
foreign economic policy establishes the rules and patterns of the new political
regime of Putin’s Russia, as the state gained a much closer level of supervision
over the economy than it had previously (see Chapter 5). According to D2008,
the state provides aid to businesses upon entering new markets and assists
investors from abroad in gaining investment opportunities in Russia. According
to the text, a state priority is the building and modernization of the energy
industry and ensuring the transit of raw goods to clients. A new element in D2008
also calls for the diversification of the Russian economy in the effort to limit
dependence of state income on the energy industry. At the same time, however,
it confirms the importance of the energy sector of the economy by mentioning
the need to define the borders for raw materials from the rich continental
shelf along the northern coast. D2000 and D2008 also establish (D2008 very
specifically) the foreign economic priorities of the Russian Federation – a topic
that D1993 practically ignores, with the exception of vague efforts to become
involved in the capitalistic economic system.
The final priority mentioned in the D2000 and D2008 documents is humanitarian
cooperation and human rights. Interesting here is the question of Russians living
abroad, a topic that has permeated Russian foreign policy since D1993. While
D2000 in this respect is rather brief in explaining that the Russian government
is committed to aiding Russians abroad in ensuring their rights and maintaining
ties with them, D2008 is much more specific. A new element in this document
is the offer of assistance in moving Russians back to Russia should they show
interest in doing so.1 The Russian government additionally states its commitment
to spreading the Russian language and contributing to the Russian language, while
vowing to strongly oppose any efforts to rewrite history or other manifestations of
neo-fascism—a direct reference to previous disputes in the Baltic.
This priority in D2008 (Part III, sect. 5), on a general level, contains an
indirect defense of various forms of democracy, whereby Russia’s goals include:
“preventing double standards, respecting national and historic peculiarities of each
State in the process of democratic transformations without imposing borrowed
value systems on anyone.”2 This statute can clearly be considered a unique effort
in justifying the place of domestic policy in foreign policy, for example in defense
of Russia’s “sovereign democracy.”
Regional Priorities
All documents in the regional priorities section are markedly focused on two
directions of interest—the post-Soviet domain and the West. This focus weakens
1 As early as 2007, this program had been allotted a relatively significant amount
of funding as it expected up to 50,000 Russians would be interested in relocating back
to Russia during the first year of its announcement. The actual number in the first six
months—roughly ten families—was a significant disappointment and saw no further
growth in interest in the following years (Zevelev, 2008).
2 The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Available in English
at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml.
over time throughout the various documents as the concept of foreign policy
changes. D2008 evidently attempts to apply a multi-vector approach, although the
West and the territory of the former USSR occupy privileged places in terms of
priorities even in this document.
D1993 is very comprehensive in the section on regional priorities. This fact
is again a testament to the era when the document was formulated. With this
document, the Russian political elite laid the groundwork for foreign policy
relations with all regions and hinted at what direction this cooperation could
move in for the future. D2000 and D2008, however, merely reflect the actual state
of relations between Russia and various regions, allowing them to be relatively
briefer in detail.
D1993 represents an absolutely clear priority in its sections on creating stable
and strong ties with the countries of the post-Soviet area. D1993 warns against
efforts of individual states to exploit the collapse of the Soviet Union for their own
benefit, endangering not only relations with Russia but also the rights of Russians
living in these countries. Because the document repeatedly labels the situation in
this area as crucial to Russia’s development and transformation, this section of
the document calls on post-Soviet countries to coordinate their activities through
international integration. In 1993, Russian elites evidently still had faith in the
integration potential of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as the
document gives it considerable attention. It attempts to introduce this concept as
a multi-thematic and gradually integrating structure in that each member has the
opportunity to regulate the degree and topics of its integration.
Aside from the efforts to integrate the CIS and thus coordinate activities in post-
Soviet space, D1993 also lays out guidelines for the presence and power activities
of third parties. According to this idea, third parties, who would undoubtedly
assert their power in post-Soviet space, should respect Russian interests as the
Russian government will be carefully evaluating and diplomatically reacting to
the activities of these parties. It very clearly states its opposition to the placement
of any military facilities in these areas. By stating such, the Russian administration
is indirectly striving towards controlling the entry of third parties into the post-
Soviet area, as it reserves the right to judge these activities and modify their
relations with a given third party accordingly.
D1993 also mentions nuclear disarmament in Kazakhstan and Ukraine and
states that all nuclear forces must be concentrated solely in Russia.3 In addition, it
commits to fulfilling the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) II Treaty, which, as
we know, was slightly premature.4 The document also attempts to designate space
for trade in conventional weapons, which was one of the Soviet Union’s most
significant export items.
3 The United States significantly sided with Russia in these efforts and supported it
under the NATO framework (including financial support of the redeployment or liquidation
of rockets).
4 The Russian Duma did not ratify the START II Treaty until 2000.
D2000 and D2008 list the CIS as one of its regional priorities. Both documents
draw on the fact that the CIS did not prove to be a full-fledged, multi-thematic
integration project as was planned, and thus emphasize the importance of certain
platforms of cooperation either inside or outside the CIS. Both documents also
list the Agreement on Collective Security (the Tashkent Agreement) as the main
tool of military and security cooperation. In the area of the economy, D2000 refers
to the creation of a custom union, while D2008 labels the Eurasian Economic
Community (EurAsEC) as a crucial integration platform.
While D1993 names relations with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan as
priorities, neither D2000 nor D2008 states any specific group of priority countries;
however, both do express the wish to continue the integration process with Belarus.
Both documents mention the Russian commitment to participate in conflict
resolution and peacekeeping operations in the region. D2008 is more confident
in terms of Russia’s immediate surroundings, as it ceases to tempt post-Soviet
countries to cooperate in the CIS and offers a diversification of mutual relations
with the opportunity to form “strategic partnerships” with key allies in the region.
D2008 is also specific in naming the most important security threats for the region,
listing for example the situation in Afghanistan, while D2000 mentions disputes
over the Caspian Sea as a potential threat.5
For the purpose of this book, defining relations between Russia and the West
is fundamental. Even foreign policy documents show the transformations these
relations underwent over time. While D1993 puts relations with the USA, and
subsequently Europe, second, just below relations with the CIS, D2000 and
D2008 deal first with relations with Europe and NATO and only after then with
the USA, reflecting the difference in Yeltsin’s and Putin’s approach to Western
countries. While Yeltsin attempted to gain the status of power-partner with the
USA by building mutual ties, Putin has carried out a more diversified policy based
on the proclamation that Russia is a European country and that developed relations
with Europe can surely aid in strengthening Russia’s position with the USA and
in general. Perceiving Russia as a unified whole can work as detrimental to the
Russian administration in various areas of possible cooperation. D2000 therefore
points out that it is necessary to negotiate not only with Europe in terms of the
European Union (EU)—which D1993 already mentions as a growing independent
player in international relations—but also with the individual countries of Europe
in a bilateral fashion. This in fact was a precursor to the subsequent practices of
Russian foreign policy towards Europe.
In sections concerning relations with America, D1993 offers up very
interesting information. The Russian administration offers the USA a strategic
5 The dispute over the Caspian Sea resurfaced in a new dimension after the collapse
of the Soviet Union, when questions arose concerning the legal status of the Caspian Sea
as either sea or lake. This significantly affected the manner in which it was divided up (as
international waters or as an exclusive economic zone) in terms of the mineral resources
found among its coastal states.
partnership that would allow for cooperation over a wide spectrum of areas. At the
same time, D1993 warns against mistrust or the anti-Russian sentiment of some
American political circles, and offers a reliable policy based on meeting mutual
commitments as a tool to overcome this mistrust. In this section of the document,
this doctrine seems to be more a wish than a statement of realistic facts. In further
sections, the document attempts to explain in a similar tone that it is mutually
advantageous for the United States to support the Russian transformation and its
entrance into international organizations, including the G7, while including Russia
in negotiations concerning international crises. In addition, D1993 also positions
itself against the potential efforts of the USA in replacing Russian influence in
the post-Soviet area.
D2000 deals with relations with the USA only briefly and in a generally less
open manner. D2000 states that although there are a number of barriers in these
mutual relations, it is necessary to create a globally stable environment for both
countries to continue in their cooperation. Nuclear disarmament is listed as the main
theme of cooperation. Indirect references to the USA can be found in the section
devoted to NATO and is more confrontational. D2000 states that NATO’s security
interests are not in accordance with Russian interests. It claims that the degree of
Russia’s willingness to cooperate with NATO is dependent on the ability of coming
to an agreement on a number of disputed issues. Here, a marked shift is evident
in comparison to D1993, which is open and inclined to cooperation with NATO.
D2000 can be interpreted as a display of the efforts of Russia’s representatives
at the time to create a shift in Russian–American relations, but it also shows the
impossibility of achieving such a goal. The Russian administration is in evident
disagreement on a number of issues concerning American foreign policy and seems
to consider some even as direct threats. However, once Russia defines its position
against these policies (even quite confidently), it immediately begins again to
defend the necessity of Russian–American cooperation and is quick in reminding
us of its nuclear arsenal (although in the context of disarmament), which is the
only globally compelling tool of power that Russia possessed. It seems then that
Putin’s first administration does not agree with the direction that the USA has taken
in various areas, and at the same time has concerns that an overly confrontational
approach could lead America to cease taking Russia into consideration.
D2008 expresses similar ideas on the USA but does so in a different manner.
D2008 is more open to cooperation and states that both countries possess great and
untapped potential for cooperation not only in a military but also in an economic
context. According to the document, both countries should establish a strategic
partnership, overcome disagreements and focus on important present and shared
threats and opportunities alike. The overall tone of the document reveals Russia’s
efforts to incorporate American–Russian relations into the “pragmatic” framework
of Russian foreign policy, and shows attempts at avoiding qualitative or even
emotive evaluations of mutual relations.
Russia’s standpoint on NATO is clear but relatively more negative in this
document. D2008 adheres mainly to the statements in D2000—the degree of
Russia’s cooperation will be directly dependent on the amount of consideration

given to its interests. This general phrase, however, poses definite limits by
specifically and unequivocally refusing the expansion of the Alliance, specifically
by adding Ukraine or Georgia. D2008 just as specifically rejects any sort of military
facility being placed in close proximity to Russia’s borders—in this context it
expands its original stance on missile defense by including all military facilities in
general. The text states that such activities needlessly create new dividing lines in
Europe and heighten the conflict potential of the region.
In regard to Europe, D1993 divides European countries into three groups. The
first group comprises Western European countries, which are perceived together
as a stable region with institutional structures that Russia should contractually
join. Of these structures, the document names the European Communities, the
Western European Union and the Council of Europe. Crucial areas according to
the document include relations with Germany and France and improving relations
with the UK. The second European region the document identifies is Eastern
Europe, which the document contrarily and repeatedly labels as unstable and
potentially conflictual. In terms of ensuring European security, the Russian elite
at the beginning of the 1990s typically believed that the resolution of conflicts
or other disputes should mainly fall under the responsibility of the UN and the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).6 D2008 also
expresses the historically determined interests in Eastern European countries
and renounces Soviet imperialism in mutual relations. The third region towards
which Russia takes a unique approach is the Baltic States. In this context, the
D1993 commits itself to resolving as soon as possible the question of withdrawing
Russian troops, and plans to establish a legal framework of mutual relations with
respect to securing the rights of Russians living in these regions. In addition to
this, Russia plans to resolve questions surrounding the state of its border regime
and the system of utilizing seaport and infrastructural capabilities in the Baltic Sea.
In the conclusion of this part of the document, D1993 explicitly states that
the organization responsible for establishing an area of peace and cooperation
“from Vancouver to Vladivostok” should be the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe. According to D1993, the CSCE should form a suitable
gateway for Russia’s entrance into Europe and at the same time for the creation of
a secure Eurasian zone.
D1993 reflects the relatively vague relations between Russian leaders and
Western Europe, as the document seems to be seeking general orientation in
the system rather than laying down true political priorities. In the more defined
approach to Eastern Europe, we can still find fresh traces of the collapse of the
bipolar system. Whereas D1993 is almost timidly polite in referring to Western
Europe, with Eastern Europe it attempts to assume the role of mediator in conflict
resolution and strives to preserve at least a portion of its former relations and ties.
6 After 1994 this organization was renamed the Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
With growing geographical proximity comes a wider spectrum of interests and

increased specificity of Russian priorities. Thus, on the Baltic States, the doctrine
laid out is relatively clear, stating that relations with them will bring certain
challenges (the Russian minority, border regimes) and expressing concerns about
the geopolitical shift in the Baltic region after the collapse of the USSR.
D2000 contains a number of significant changes. The text clearly reflects the
growth in significance and intensity of the European integration process, as it
highlights cooperation with the EU as a Russian priority in Europe. Immediately
following this, however, it points out the importance of bilateral ties with individual
countries. A reason for this could be the lack of respect mentioned in the document
on the part of the EU towards Russia’s interests, namely in the area of expansion.
The text openly mentions the basis for the effective and flexible policy of Russia’s
new leaders, and hopes to make maximum gain from negotiations either on an EU
level or bilaterally with other various countries which would help Russia attain its
goals. D2000 is more modest than D1993 in dividing the European continent into
individual regions. Although it does differentiate between the countries of Western
Europe; Central and Eastern Europe; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; and finally the
Balkan States as four different areas, it is very brief in characterizing them. The
document considers Western Europe to be an important tool for Russia’s entry into
world politics and the improvement of Russia’s economic situation. In addition
to Britain, Germany and France, D2000 also mentions Italy as a priority power.
Central and Eastern Europe are still (although gratuitously) presented as unstable
regions, and the completely empty-sounding tone of this paragraph gives evidence
of the probable crisis in mutual affairs, in that both sides have practically nothing
to offer one another. D1993’s warnings against Eastern Europe becoming a barrier
between Russia and the West did not prove true, but in perhaps a different manner
than Yeltsin’s political elites had initially hoped for. The countries of Central and
Eastern Europe clearly oriented and integrated themselves into the structures of
Western Europe, and thus did not become the space for cooperation with the West
that Russia had hoped for. Similarly, the note on the Baltic States merely reiterates
Russia’s interest in good relations and protecting the rights of Russian minorities.
Mention of the Balkan States is interesting as it is a clear product of the
time. D2000 emphasizes that the situation in the region must be dealt with in a
coordinated manner by the whole international community, which is a reference
to the NATO intervention in Kosovo. Similarly, the text lists the preservation of
the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia as a Russian priority; or, in other words, it is
taking a position against ideas of Kosovo’s possible declaration of independence.
In the area of security, D2000 also gives preference to strengthening the role
of the OSCE, and objects to other regional organizations taking over some of its
functions. D2008 continues in this tone, although this section of the document
appears to show evidence of a slow “loss of faith” in the OSCE. Here, the OSCE
is mentioned rather as a tool for promoting international law and coordinating
activities, and is more embedded in Russian projects for a multipolar world and
the necessity to make fundamental decisions collectively than it is in the creation

of a new security structure in Europe.
In general, D2008 introduces the concept of strategic partnership in Russian
foreign policy, or, in other words, the concept of multilayered bilateral ties with
various actors in the international community. While D1993 used this term
only in connection with the USA, D2008 has created a specific category out
of strategic partnership that the Russian administration subsequently “bestows”
upon perspective partners from the international community. In addition to
the USA, D2008 also lists the EU, China, India and Vietnam as candidates for
establishing strategic partnerships.
D2008 sees the strategic partnership with the EU primarily as an economic
opportunity. D2008 continues to view Western Europe as a region that can help
Russia promote its national interests and, thanks to the effectiveness of the adopted
foreign policy of flexible diplomacy, help expand the spectrum of countries that
are important for Russia in terms of maintaining close bilateral relations. In
addition to the four countries mentioned previously, this document adds Spain,
Finland, Greece and the Netherlands. In relation to Central and Eastern Europe,
D2008 is more limited in stating that mutual relations should be pragmatically
defined, and also for the first time speaks of ensuring access rights to Kaliningrad
through the Baltic States.
We can venture to say that, in terms of these documents, the image of Russian
relations with Europe has undergone a very dynamic development. While D1993
was more certain in defining Russian interests in Central and Eastern Europe,
Russia after 2000 looks rather to Western Europe as its focus of interest. At the
same time, the documents seem almost to ignore Central and Eastern European
states altogether. A continuing priority for Russian interests in Europe are
relations with the Baltic States and the topics concerning them are similar in all
documents—the position of the Russian-speaking minority and the country’s
border regime with these states.
In regard to Russia’s standing in other world regions, we can note a growing
interest in Asia. D2008 mentions Russia’s relations towards a number of states
that have long been centers of attention for Western countries, for example
Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea the Palestinian Authority etc. This shows
evidence of true efforts in giving their own policy its “multi-vectored” character.
It also shows attempts to involve Russia in the majority of crisis and conflict
regions in the modern world, forcing other world powers to negotiate with it
in the resolution of these crises (for more see Chapter 5). Africa seems to be
overlooked almost completely in all the documents in spite of the fact that
inequalities in the world are contrarily labeled in the documents as being a threat
to international security.
Concepts of National Security
At present, the Russian Federation has issued two official documents concerning
national security in the relatively short space of three years. The first security
document was ratified by the Duma in 1997 (further referred to as SD1997; Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2002c), while the newest document
was ratified in 2000 (further referred to as SD2000; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Russian Federation, 2002d). In light of this, both documents can be compared
in a new and different way compared to the foreign policy documents, as both
security documents are drawn from a similar international situation. This allows
us to compare transformations in the way that Russia perceives threats to national
security and the international interests of the Russian Federation during Yeltsin’s
and Putin’s administration. Such a comparison was not possible with the previous
foreign policy documents due to the longer intervals between their publications.
The previous analysis of foreign policy documents has provided us with
a basic summary of the development of Russia’s foreign policy priorities.
Therefore, the main goal of this section of the chapter is to compare the approach
of both administrations towards security and the factors involved in ensuring and
maintaining it. For these purposes, this section has been divided into three parts
that—similarly to above—will copy the organization of the sections in the actual
documents: (1) Russia in the international community; (2) national interests of the
Russian Federation; (3) threats to the national security of the Russian Federation.
Russia in the International Community
The introductions of both documents immediately point to a significant shift in

Russia’s perception of the character of the international system. SD1997 is fairly
optimistic concerning the development of a multipolar system while listing the
main negative trends in the system, such as growing inequality among states,
rising competition in the struggle for resources and the willingness of some
states to use force in promoting their interests. SD2000 begins its analysis of the
current international system with a sharper division. According to SD2000, there
are two basic trends visible in the current system. The first is the strengthening
of multipolarity in areas of politics and the economy, while the second is the
trend towards unilateral negotiations and establishing the dominance of certain
countries—mainly Western states led by the USA.
We can also spot a difference in the characterization of Russia’s standpoint in
international relations at the time of each document’s publication. SD1997 is in
this respect more modest, and states that Russian participation in the resolution of
important international situations has markedly decreased and that it is necessary
to improve this situation. Similarly, the document acknowledges the fact that
Russia is lagging behind in terms of technology and economy. Despite this
fact, the document deals with Russia’s assets—such as its military potential or
geographical position—and states that it is worth renewing Russia’s superpower
status because of these assets. In comparison, SD2000 simply assumes that

Russia, despite certain obstacles, is still an important and legitimate actor in
international relations equivalent to other superpowers. The development of
these security concepts follows a trend of the gradual rise of self-confidence and
assertiveness of Russian foreign policy. Noting that the documents are separated
by less than three years—during which time the Russian economy nearly
collapsed, NATO was expanded and the Kosovo intervention took place—both
against Russian will, we can perceive this shift as simply an exercise in rhetoric.
This exercise, however, allows the authors of the doctrines laid out in SD2000
to formulate much more ambitious goals and require a much more privileged
position in the international system.
SD1997 and SD2000 attempt to integrate Russia into the international
economy, but while SD1997 views this as an opportunity to strengthen the country
and its security, SD2000 warns against the threats of excessive dependence and
global reliance.
Both documents agree on the existence of a group of (unnamed) states that
are making efforts to weaken Russia’s position and slow its post-transformational
rise, or countries that ignore Russian interests in the international environment. In
both documents this statement appears in an independent paragraph and is neither
linked to previous information nor backed up by any further statements. Neither of
the documents lists the specific names of these countries. We may therefore assume
that this statement has a double function: first, it aims to heighten precautions in
an almost preventive manner; and, second, it serves as an empty mold that can be
used either against Western states or countries of the CIS according to necessity.
Threatening factors in the current international system worthy of direct attention
in the introduction to both documents are the expansion of NATO in SD1997 and
international terrorism in SD2000.
National Interests of the Russian Federation
Because President Putin’s regime set national interests as a sort of mantra of

Russian foreign policy, it is surely appropriate to discuss the definition of the term
here. SD1997 does not offer any definition, but relies on the statement that the
(evidently already familiar) term “national interest” is based on the means and
norms of the nations of the Russian Federation and is supported by the economic,
political and military means of the state. SD2000 includes a definition of national
interest and states that it is a “combination of balanced interests of the individual,
society and the state in economic, domestic-political, social, international, military,
informational, border, ecological and other spheres.” It is also worth mentioning
the shift and the strengthening of the state’s role in formulating national interests.
While SD1997 claims the state only serves the national interests of the people,
SD2000 plays the role of actor in its formulation.
National interests in both documents are divided into a number of categories.
Individual interests in both documents represent personal security and dignified
living conditions of the citizens of the Russian Federation. Interests that are
shared in both documents include the spiritual rebirth of the nation, achieving
social harmony and developing democracy. In this respect, SD2000 also adds the
creation of a welfare state directed by the effective legal system. Both documents
also agree on national interests of the state, which should mainly stay territorially
integrated: enforce the law and ensure economic and social stability; and lead
cooperative foreign policy.
In the area of economic interests, SD2000 merely states that economic
growth is a condition for fulfilling national interests, and it becomes one of these
interests itself. SD1997 gives more attention to the economic sphere; it warns
against unilateral economic dependence on natural resources, and calls on
Russian companies and entrepreneurs for support. In this respect, SD1997 shows
the transformational and rather unclear character of Yeltsin’s term and, on the
contrary, the ability of Putin’s Russia to suddenly act as a country with a completed
transformation process—a country that only here and there carries out reforms in
the interest of achieving stability of the legal system and social unity.
In naming national interests shared with domestic policy, both documents also
agree on the important domestic interests that they list, including law enforcement,
achieving social harmony and leaving the state an active role in the “neutralization”
of separatist or extremist manifestations and movements. SD1997 is more detailed
in dealing with the struggle against organized crime, which is understandable but
at the same time almost ironic in light of the image of Russia’s political elites.
As a spiritual national interest, both documents list the strengthening of the
Russian nation in the spirit of respect for the nation (SD1997) and also patriotism
and humanism (SD2000). It is interesting to note that although SD1997 primarily
attempts to renew national spirit, SD2000 vows to develop it—in other words, it
leaves a wider field open for influencing the actual shape of this national spirit.
In the international sphere, we are again confronted with a previously
mentioned discrepancy. SD1997 deems it necessary to make efforts to gain a
position as a world power and even introduces steps to achieve this, while SD2000
sees Russia as already holding this position and attempts only to confirm this
fact. Both documents see Russia’s national interest in the international system as
cooperation with countries in the CIS and with other world powers (in SD2000
this is in the opposite order). Both documents, albeit in different areas, warn of the
risk of international terrorism as one of the greatest present international threats.
A national interest in the military area is primarily the maintenance of territorial
integrity and defense against aggression. SD1997 “critically” adds that the armed
forces of the Russian Federation are in dire need of reform in order to fulfill these
tasks. SD2000 mentions the reform of military forces only later; and, characteristic
of the rhetoric of a new world power, it is intentionally light on criticism and
details of the state of the military, and instead interprets reforms as an adaptation
to new threats and as a question of professionalization.
SD2000 also lists a national interest of Russia as being the creation of a

peaceful and cooperative environment around its borders. This is also included in
SD1997, albeit in a different area of the text.
Threats to the National Security of the Russian Federation
The most significant difference between the two previously mentioned documents
is located in the section concerning threats to security. Here, the fact that the
Russian Federation began building a new regime after 2000 is quite evident.
Both texts begin with a summary of the weaknesses in the new Russian system
that could become threats to national security. Although the summaries are
fundamentally similar (although information in SD1997 is richer and more
specific)—including economic slowdown, the risk of dependence on exporting
energy resources, international debt, the loss of qualified workers, internal fissures
in society, uncontrolled migration (mainly from CIS countries) or weak elements
of the legal system—each document takes a different stance on these weaknesses.
SD1997 wants mainly to complete the transformation process while viewing
the previously mentioned mistakes as barriers along the way. SD2000, as was
stated previously, ceases to speak of transformation, as though this period has
been already completed. Both documents claim that mistakes were made in the
early phases of transformation that led to the weakening of the state, including
a weakening in the system of regulation and control. They also state that Russia
was not capable of formulating a clear political program. As a consequence, this
led to the creation of the previously mentioned weaknesses accompanied by the
criminalization of the economy and the state sphere. Additionally, SD2000 adds
that Russian society is divided between the thin layer of the rich and the multitudes
of the poor, and this division, according to the document can lead to a threat to
Russian national security.
In terms of international threats, the text indicates that the world is significantly
more dangerous in 2000 than it was only three years earlier. SD1997 is very
general and refers to the efforts of some actors to impede Russia’s development as
one center in a multipolar world. The text also labels the CIS’s slow progress of
integration as an additional threat. SD2000 is significantly more specific. First it
warns against circumventing the UN and the OSCE and lists threats such as:
the creation of regional security blocks;

NATO’s expansion to the east;
efforts to position military facilities close to Russia’s borders;
the weakening of the CIS’s integration;
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;
conflicts on Russia’s borders or borders of the CIS;
claims to Russian territory;
efforts of other countries to weaken Russia.
Special attention is then given to international terrorism. This shift shows the
transformation of Russian foreign policy towards being more independent
and aimed at a greater number of threats. This often results in Russia’s more
confrontational line towards the West.
In the area of military threats, both documents warn against the development
and proliferation of new weapons systems. Both documents mention NATO:
SD1997 does so in terms of expansion to the east, while SD2000 voices concerns
particularly about unilateral actions without UN agreement. SD2000 also warns
against the growing number of foreign secret service members it claims are
operating inside Russian Federation territory.
Here we may summarize in this phase of the analysis the main information
that is crucial to this study: Russia’s executive branch made detailed changes in
the rhetoric of official documents after the year 2000. These changes mainly lie
in the conviction about the position of Russia as a superpower in the international
system, contrary to the previous administration, which was attempting to renew
or gain such a status. Although in reality not much has changed in the country, the
change in Russia’s outward presentation opens up a more advantageous playing
field for implementing a more assertive foreign policy with a global reach, and
prepares the ground for the creation of a multi-vector policy, which is a product
of this belief. If we were not to perceive Russia as a superpower, then its globally
reaching vectors of foreign policy would lack justification. It is true that Russian
multi-vector policy often means the creation of ties with ostracized actors of the
international system more than the creation of an alternative and attractive center
of power. A result of this policy, however, is the inclusion of the Russian Federation
in the majority of important international disputes in the present system.
By comparing both SD documents, we can state that the change in rhetoric
and the “spirit” of the Russian Federation’s foreign policy does not represent a
radical transformation in the definition of Russian national interests. A constant
that exists in its national interests is the maintenance of the state’s territorial
integrity and the security of a non-conflict environment of its surroundings; and
also the Russian nation’s revival in an ideological and demographic sense, the
strengthening and diversification of the Russian economy on the international
market and, finally, the building/strengthening of Russia’s position as a
superpower in the current international system.
National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020
In May 2009, the Russian Federation issued a document entitled “National Security
Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020” (further referred to as SS2020;
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2009). This strategy merely
updates and expands upon SD2000, which still remains valid.
SS2020 directly refers to the multi-vector character of Russian foreign policy
and speaks of Russia’s global commitments as a fact, not a goal. This is furthered
by naming the prioritized areas of interest, which include the Middle East, the
Barents Sea and the Arctic, regions of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, Iraq,
Afghanistan, South Asia, the Korean Peninsula and some countries of Africa
(point 11). In addition, SS2020 refers to the pragmatic formulation of priorities,
leaving aside the ideological disputes surrounding the character of international
relations or those surrounding Russia itself that were contained in previous foreign
policy documents. The document states that the fulfillment of national interests is
what will determine the direction of the Russian Federation (point 9).
In defense of Russia’s security, SS2020 reserves the right to use force in the
event of an outbreak of conflicts in close proximity to Russia’s borders that could
directly threaten Russia’s security or lead to the creation of a hostile environment
near its territory (point 12). Here we can see an evident result of Russia’s war with
Georgia from 2008, as the Russian administration is attempting to open a door
to the role of “police officer” (if critical of these activities) or “peacekeeper” (if
supporters of these activities) of the post-Soviet area—a door that stayed closed
to Russia’s administration in terms of countries not included in the Tashkent
Agreement. SS2020 directly names the regions in which the Russian Federation
should focus on the protection of its borders. If we count these regions of priority
together, however, the result in reality encompasses all of Russia’s borders, both
land and sea (point 42).
As SS2020 looks to take lessons from current developments, it places
emphasis on the diversification and competitiveness of the Russian economy, as
it compares the danger of the global economic crisis to Russian national interests
with the damages that armed conflict would cause. The dependence of the regime
on fulfilling the wide range of commitments of a thriving bureaucratic system
and, therefore, dependence on high revenues in the state treasury through state
intervention into the strategic economic sector, is very evident in this section
(point 12). In point 53, Russia’s ambition is explained—Russia, according to
SS2020, is to reach fifth place in the world in a medium-term plan in its level of
gross domestic product (GDP).7
In the section devoted to ensuring national security, we can also see the
transformation of the relations of state and society and the ongoing trend of the
state’s permeation into a larger and larger segment of social life. Russia’s goal
is to revive the image of the military and thus raise interest in military service
7 This choice of indicator is interesting in analyzing the relationship of the present

regime towards liberal democratic principles and priorities: Russia chose neither the Human
Development Index (HDI) nor GDP per capita, but instead chose total GDP—an indicator
which gives no consideration to the quality of life of the individual but is comparable to
other powers in the international system. In defense of this Russian approach, however,
we can point to article 62 in the document, which objects to the unequal development of
individual regions and calls for efforts against this and for the redistribution of wealth
in Russia.
of its population.8 In addition to direct influence, SS2020 intends to create a

system to support the military-patriotic training of its citizens (point 26). This
point is connected with the assumption that the state and society are establishing a
partnership in order to fulfill national interests (point 52).
SS2020 provides valuable evidence of Russia’s growing distrust of the
good intentions of other actors in the international system. In comparison to
the documents from the 1990s, in which this risk is practically non-existent, the
threat of hostile operations of foreign secret services within Russian Federation
territory has become the number one threat to Russian national security in SS2020,
followed by terrorism (point 37). In spite of these innovations and shifts, SS2020
also considers the Russian Federation’s main priorities to be territorial integrity,
democratic development, economic competitiveness and strengthening its position
of superpower in the international system (point 21).
The goal of this sub-chapter was primarily to point out the shift in the process
of formulating threats and the Russian elite’s definitions of dangers to their country
after 2000. Here we can see a shift in two directions. On one hand, we see a more
intense stylization of the state into the role of protector and unifier of society.
The state is presented less as the administrator of the basic security demands of
society and more as an actor in the formulation of these demands. The state thus
activates not only its own potential in fulfilling these demands, but also involves
Russian society as a whole (education, food safety, demographic situation). Such a
concept of security is then logically justified by the proliferation of a bureaucratic
and state-run system and the creation of a paternalistic state which, through the
formulation of national interests from the top down, defines the direction of the
efforts of the whole society.
On the other hand, the document gives proof of Russia’s growing fear of the
rest of the world. The transformation of the character of the political regime is
connected with concerns that Russia is misunderstood or that it will be absorbed
or reshaped in foreign models which have demonstrably failed in the Russian
environment. Critique of the character of Russia’s regime is thus interpreted as an
effort to weaken the country in its development. In these terms it is easy for Russia
to interpret military bases close to Russia’s borders or the economic interests of
other countries in Russia or its surroundings, the activity of secret services or even
presence of foreign non-governmental organizations as threats.
8 The author’s own experience here can confirm that the regime is truly making
strong efforts in this respect. In addition to creating commercials in which military service
is depicted as the path to adulthood and masculinity, and as a feature which is irresistible
to women, the Russian Federation creates and airs films and shows on primetime television
that are focused on the military environment. In these works, the military is depicted as
a place for heroism and true friendship (mostly historical films) or as a joyous, friendly
environment (for example, the primetime series Soldaty/Soldiers).
The Institutional Background of Russian Foreign Policy
There is a relatively wide spectrum of actors in various influential and officially

defined positions who take part in the creation of the foreign policy of the Russian
Federation. The goal of this section is to briefly introduce this institutional structure
in order to delve deeper into the process of Russia’s acceptance of specific political
decisions in the area of foreign policy.
The character of the Russian Federation’s political regime, its constitution and
all previously analyzed documents point to the fact that the most important actor
in formulating foreign policy is the President of the Russian Federation. D1993,
which was created even before the new Russian constitution was approved,
clearly points out the dispute between the executive and legislative branch over
power in the country—the document backs up the executive branch, as it states
that the President not only defines basic foreign policy lines but also oversees
the implementation of these lines through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The
President remained the most important creator of foreign policy after the 1993
constitution was ratified. In SS2020 and D2008, however, we can see the growing
importance of the government in the process of formulating foreign policy, which
was evidently connected to the shift in the division of power in the Russian
political system after the 2008 presidential elections. In D2008, the government
is explicitly mentioned as a tool of implementation, and in the security strategy
document it is even referred to as a consultative body.
The focal point for the creation of foreign policy lies in the executive branch of
Russia’s political system. This trend was strengthened in the 1990s by splits in the
opinions of the Parliament, which was thus weakened in terms of the constructive
formulation of its demands. After 2000, these fractures were overcome by the
success of the United Russia Party, a party which in fact has barely any practical
influence on the formulation of the political priorities of the country, as it supports
the decisions of the executive branch in all areas.
An expression of the power of the executive branch in the adoption of
foreign policy decisions is also the existence of a number of influential advisory
bodies which are connected to the President or the government. Closest to the
President are his team of advisors. Both President Yeltsin and President Putin
had their own chief advisor on questions of foreign policy—this post was held by
professional diplomats Dmitry Ryurikov and Sergei Prikhodko. In addition to his
team of advisors, the Russian President makes use of an analytical-bureaucratic
system known as the Presidential Administration. This administration is made up
of more than 1,000 employees who function as the President’s personal think-
tank and administrative apparatus. Individuals at the head of the Presidential
Administration usually enjoy the position of assistant or close advisor to the
President—for example, Alexander Voloshin during Yeltsin’s term, or Dmitry
Medvedev, who led Putin’s administration in his second term of office (Donaldson
and Nogee, 2005, pp. 141–2).
A crucial position in defining security threats and challenges is held by

the Security Council of the Russian Federation, which is mentioned as being
a consultative and coordinating body in SS2020, SD2000 and also SD1997.
The goal while creating this council was to gather the most important actors
of the political system in the area of security into one advisory body. It is made
up of standing members (mostly politicians) and supplementary members
(mostly military officers), while the chairman of the council is the President
of the Russian Federation, whose closest aid is the Secretary of the Council.
In addition to the President, its standing members include the Prime minister
and his deputies, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs and Defense,
the Director of the Federal Security Service (FSS) and the Foreign Intelligence
Service, the chairmen of the Duma and the Federation Council, the director of
the President’s administration and the Secretary of the Council.9 The Council
serves as an advisory body to the President, whose goal is to formulate the
priorities of the Russian Federation’s security policy, define security threats and
propose methods of resolving them. It also participates in preparing the annual
presidential speech in the Parliament. The Council sits four times annually, and
more often when necessary.10 As is evident from the make-up of the Council, it
is a highly influential body. The Security Council enjoyed a significant degree of
trust from the President in the first half of the 1990s under the leadership of Yuri
Skokov and later Oleg Lobov (Donaldson and Nogee, 2005, pp. 142–3). During
Putin’s term, the Security Council took on further significance in connection
with the gradual increase in the influence of military and security components in
the political system.
According to Yeltsin, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to encompass a
coordinating center for all foreign policy. Proof of this was the relative freedom
of action and often direct support from the President which was given to
ministers Kozyrev and Primakov in disputes with other institutions. The fissures
and unofficial practices in the institutional framework of the political system in
the 1990s often stemmed from the fact that ministers often negotiated directly
with the President behind the Prime Minister’s back, and the fact that a portion
of the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s agenda was often taken over at will by other
ministries such as the Ministry for Economic Development with the CIS and other
similar institutions (Donaldson and Nogee, 2005, pp. 150–53).
Unlike Yeltsin, President Putin mostly engaged in foreign policy alone; and
although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs maintained its position of advisory body,
its minister’s actual function has been pushed into the background by President
Putin himself. This phenomenon is connected with the transformation in the
character of the Russian regime and with the harmonization of the whole system,
9 For the current make-up, see the official web page of the Security Council, http://
www.scrf.gov.ru/persons/sections/6/ (last updated 12 December 2013).
10 For status, historical make-up and legal basis, see http://www.scrf.gov.ru/
documents/15.html (last updated 26 June 2010).
which has begun to function more and more as a supporting body to the President
rather than as a political system with a diverse spectrum of players (Lo, 2003,
p. 23). This harmonization achieved such levels that it allowed Putin to put foreign
policy formally under the supervision of President Medvedev for a few years
without compromising Russia’s international image or foreign policy strategies.
Since 2012 the return of the Minister of Foreign Affairs into the center of events
has occurred partially, as Mr. Lavrov gains position as one of the most prominent
figures of the contemporary regime.
This shift in the Russian political system is also connected with the rise in
number and influence of contemporary and former employees of the secret service
and military among officers working for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in the
ranks of the diplomatic corps. There is also an evident connection here between
this trend and the growing suspicions towards other states and the emphasis on
building “hard-power” guarantees for Russia in the international system.
Summary
Through analyzing the Russian Federation’s main official foreign policy documents
we can state that, although the approach towards foreign policy and its priorities
in Russia’s political circles is significantly transformative in connection with the
shifts and changes of the regime as a whole (see the analysis on foreign policy
concepts), there exist certain priorities and threats which have proved relatively
resistant to the political changes in the country. Opinions on the current position
of the Russian Federation in the international system—the degree of the state’s
involvement in the revival of the nation; the definitions of priority regions for
the policy of the Russian Federation; allies, enemies and the means of achieving
national interests—all of these factors are changing significantly in connection
with the experience of the country’s leaders in the international system, the current
economic situation and the transforming domestic policy regime. However, the
documents clearly show the basic characteristics of Russian foreign policy, which
tend to stay relatively constant and differ only in their specific conditions, the
belief in the possibility of achieving them or in the means and methods of reaching
such goals. If we are to summarize our observations up to this point and list the
main outputs of this chapter, the list would be as follows:
1. There is a direct connection between the security of Russia and the security
of its surrounding regions.
2. This security should be understood not only as the absence of conflict but
also as the absence of other strong actors whose activities are outside the
boundaries of Russian control and could therefore be, and is (to a larger and
larger degree) interpreted as, potentially threatening.
3. There is a direct and invisible connection between the revival of the Russian
nation and its superpower standing in international relations.
4. There is a connection between national self-assurance and support of the

regime; and its foreign policies and policies, which are seen as correct,
are increasingly connected with a strong, self-confident Russia with
global interests.
5. Finally, there is a growing tendency to interpret significant actors in the
international system as enemies hostile to Russia’s advancement and whose
efforts are aimed at keeping Russia in an inferior position, which confirms
the idea of a strong and powerful Russia as a vital necessity.
In the next chapter it is time to explore relations of Russia towards the West in
more detail in order to confirm or disconfirm the ever-present hypothesis that it is
the West that is the most important Other for Russian foreign policy.
Chapter 6
Conclusion: Russia Under Construction
The Russian Federation was established in 1991. It emerged from a period of

turbulent transformations in the international system out of the rubble of the
Soviet Union. It came into existence as the legal successor to the USSR, a
country that is logically considered to have been a form of the same empire that
from the times of Ivan the Terrible until the twentieth century expanded from
the lowlands surrounding the Volga to the sprawling distances of Eastern Europe
and Northern Eurasia.
At the same time, however, the Russian Federation emerged as a new state
unit under completely new international conditions. In other words, neither tsarist
Russia nor the Soviet Union was completely similar to the Russian Federation in
terms of its geographic location, political organization or the method of operation
of its economic system. The country also found itself in a different configuration
of the international system. Russia was faced with the problem of finding its place
in international politics, its own self-importance and its own methods of operation.
In this book, I have attempted to point out that throughout the whole examined
period, Russia has been in a turbulent period of constructing the meaning of where
and what is the “New Russia.” Russia, simply, has long been “under construction”.
Social construction, however, is a lasting process that takes place even in states
that have existed for extremely long periods of time and in relative stability. The
development of national identities, concepts on the location of a given country in
the world, the threats and opportunities that open up to it, justice and the legitimacy
of its internal organization—all these take shape over time in all countries in
the world. There is no final state when this process of constant negotiations and
the transformation of ideas, which build the framework for each social system,
including nation states, comes to an end. Of course the Russian Federation—a
state established in a historically exceptional situation, and one that has inherited
the many traits and ambitions of a superpower—has gone through a very dramatic,
perhaps even “compact” process of searching for its own place in the world and its
own methods of operation.
This book should aid the reader in viewing this process in its complexity, while
taking into consideration the influence of various concepts and images of Russia
and the rest of the world, which have not completely changed after the collapse of
the USSR and now must find their own voice in a new environment. In the second
level of this work, we have pointed out the crucial and prominent role that Western
states, and mainly the USA, have played in this process. The process of social
construction is a process that takes place always in interaction with other actors,
and the actor that has played an extraordinary role in the case of Russia is the West.
I dare not predict whether the pace of transformations of Russian domestic

and foreign policy will now take on a freer tempo under the long-term leadership
of President Putin and his potential successors headed by a stably operating
regime, or whether Russia will take another dramatic turn in its development in
upcoming presidential elections. So far it seems that the situation has remained
stable since the parliamentary elections in 2007, when United Russia took
a comfortable majority in the Russian Duma. The opposition to the current
regime, however, has grown in force and is gaining more and more charismatic
and influential individuals—such as former Prime Minister Kasyanov, one of
Yeltsin’s protégés; the reputedly “sexiest” politician in the Russian Federation,
Boris Nemtsov; or the “scapegoat” of the current regime, blogger Alexei
Navalny. Thus, the Russian opposition is no longer just a group of extremists
and radicals who are connected merely by their defiance of the current regime
and who are incapable of taking the helm of the country. On the other hand, even
this new Russian opposition has not been able to defeat or even realistically
threaten the candidates of United Russia in any elections that have taken place.
The current regime supports this situation by providing advantageous conditions
to its candidates and evidently modifying election results which are put in place
to ensure comfortable majorities rather than victories themselves. Defeat has
never been a part of the Russian electoral program; nor has it in gubernatorial
elections or those for Moscow’s mayors, and thus can hardly be a part of the
program in the presidential battle, no less against Putin himself.
The conditions under which the regime operates, however, may undergo
dramatic changes—Putin so far has been without a doubt a skillful politician, but
also a child of fortune. Entering office after a Russian currency collapse at a time
of unprecedented rises in the prices of important raw materials that Russia was
able to export in a globally attractive scale and quality, all just before terrorist
attacks opened the space for a completely new concept of relations with the USA;
leaving office after the onset of an economic crisis and famously returning at a
time of economic rehabilitation—this is a scenario that cannot take place thanks to
mere political calculation. At the same time, it is a scenario that supports Putin’s
efforts to build his own version of Russia in the eyes of the public. However,
similar external and internal events can at the same time undermine the popularity
of the current regime and open a path for citizens to begin to heed the version of
Russia that is being offered by the opposition.
As we have seen in this book, the process of “Russia under construction” is a
process that is taking place in a new country and under new conditions, but at the
same time is not taking place in a political vacuum. The Russian perceptions of the
international system and of itself are older than the beginning of the nineties, when
the Russian Federation was established. Russians of course see themselves as the
heirs to the forms of the country that Russia possessed in the past and derive from
them their expectations and concepts of the world and of themselves. Similarly to
other players, they have certain concepts about what Russia is and how to behave
toward it despite all the restarts in mutual relations. It is these ideas that determine
Conclusion: Russia Under Construction 153
the acceptable and desired content for Russian politics, which lend a certain sense
to Russian behavior and legitimize its domestic policy transformations.
In the chapter on the ideological foundations of Russian foreign policy, we
introduced a number of rather lasting characteristics that form the Russian identity
and the perception of Russia’s role in regard to its citizens and the international
system. We have labeled the conviction of the exceptional position of global
power that Russia holds and enjoys in the international system as the most
prominent of these ideas. Proof of this can be found not only in previous chapters
but also in the chapter in which we analyzed the official documents of foreign
and security policy of the Russian Federation, which are the official and practical
embodiment of Russia’s concepts of the world—this means they are a certain form
of institutionalized norms, as was mentioned in the introduction. As such, they
summarize the influence of these aforementioned concepts on the enforcement
of practical policy and also create certain borders for the leaders of the Russian
Federation. These Russian foreign policy documents and security doctrines at
the same time substantiate the Russian Federation’s global interests and the ever-
growing self-importance and assertiveness in reaching them. Russian leaders, via
these official documents, truly declare their belief in the fact that Russia is an
international superpower.
From this point, it is only a small, additional step to involve Western countries
in our analysis. For these purposes, we can use the famous concept established by
Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, who deal with how a certain issue
becomes a threat or, in other terms, what makes up the construction of a threat. In
short, the securitizing actor must successfully convince his public that a certain
issue, phenomenon or actor represents a threat, and that it is necessary to accept
measures in order to eliminate their possible impacts (Buzan, Wæver and de
Wilde, 1998, p. 25). We can assume that a parallel can be found in Russian concepts
of their own position as a world power. Russians and Russian political leaders can
be deeply and honestly convinced that the Russian Federation is a superpower; but
for this to actually happen, this view of Russia must be accepted by an “audience,”
by leaders and then by the public of other states of the international system, who
will then behave according to this conviction in practical politics—for example by
discussing their moves in the international system with Russia. The country whose
acknowledgment is absolutely crucial for any country aspiring to superpower
status was in the 1990s and still without a doubt is the USA. If America does not
acknowledge the fact that it is necessary to discuss their activities with the Russian
Federation or define their behavior according to Russia, the country will not be a
global power however strongly other less significant actors in the international
system attempt to convince it of this fact. And—extremely importantly—if
Russian politicians cannot prove to their public, which is convinced that it lives
in an extraordinary country, that they are respected as leaders of the world power
in the international arena, their foreign policy is not understood as successful
at home. This subsequently has far-reaching domestic political impacts for the
legitimacy and support of any given Russian regime.
We have already paid significant attention to pointing out that Western

countries, and mainly the USA, are therefore the prominent addressees of Russian
foreign policy steps. We have completed an analysis of the statements of the
crucial leader of the Russian political system, President Putin, which shows that
Western countries, and especially the USA, enjoy an exclusive position among
all the actors of the international system. The connection between the consistent
efforts of the Russian Federation in gaining acknowledgment as a superpower and
the basically privileged right of Western countries in acknowledging this status
for Russia has led us to the hypothesis that the specific strategy of Russian foreign
policy is merely made up of various tactics used to achieve this same goal in terms
of the same addressee. If we can again paraphrase the concept of securitization,
Russian foreign policy strategies of cooperation with the West, the balancing of
the West by coalitions with other actors and sometimes the attempts at intimidating
the West, are only techniques of “playing superpower,” where the actor playing
this role—the Russian Federation—selects various persuasive tactics to convince
crucial members of the public that the Russian Federation is truly a superpower.
As we have attempted to point out in the final chapter before this conclusion,
relations between Russia and the West are even deeper and more complex than it
may seem from the mere race for superpower status. There is no need to hesitate
here in using the term Orientalism. Russians’ concepts of what is and what is not
legitimate in their own country are, in my opinion, created to an extremely large
extent by their view of the West, although this view is very vicarious and indirect.
The Russian Federation has not undergone a transformation only in terms of the
international system, but has passed through a transformation of its political and
economic system. Both of these transformations have taken place via the adoption
of Western models of representative democracy and capitalist economics. Not
one of these models has succeeded in the Russian environment, for reasons that
we have substantially explored previously, which has led (unfortunately) to the
discrediting of both concepts and opened the path to a “Putinized” version of
democracy and capitalism.
Because both these concepts have been introduced in Russia openly according
to Western models and with clear Western support (including the provision of
consultants and experts), their failure in the fight for Russian “hearts and minds”
has led inevitably to Russia to begin defining itself against the West. In terms of
Said’s Orientalism, this means beginning to build the legitimacy of a different and
unique system based on their concept of Western models of states’ operation.
This differentness then manifested itself in the quality of relations with Western
countries, which of course perceive the deviations from Western democratic
standards and the various steps of the state in the economic sphere (mainly in
the battle with oligarchs) as a regression away from the desired state of affairs.
This inevitably manifests itself in the quality of mutual relations and legitimizes
Russia’s assertive foreign policy, which we know under the term multi-vector
policy, the goal of which, as we have mentioned, is to acquire a sufficient number
of allies and engagements in problematic areas in the international system for
Conclusion: Russia Under Construction 155
Russia to gain the position of superpower, as it cannot gain this position in terms
of bilateral relations. Relations between Russia and the West thus surpass the
framework of traditional bilateral relations, and even some other special ties.
This is a complex and deeply constitutive process of forming domestic policy
and foreign policy strategies of the Russian Federation. It would of course be unfair
to state that the West or the USA directly carries responsibility for the current
shape of the Russian Federation. We can return here to Ted Hopf, mentioned in
the introduction, who points out that the process of social construction is a process
directed and controlled by one individual or groups of individuals or actors. This
applies without doubt to Russia and Russian foreign policy. In the conclusion of
this analysis, it is however evident that the role of Western countries in “Russia’s
construction” is absolutely exceptional, and this is a fact that Western analysts and
leaders should be aware of.

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Chapter 3

Analysis of Key Foreign Policy Documents

how/whether Russian superpower status is incorporated into these documents

Concepts of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation

The second document was issued in 2000 (further referred to as D2000;

Russia and the Modern World

development of an independent foreign policy. We assume, however, that Russia

Priorities of Foreign Policy

Russia’s cooperation will be directly dependent on the amount of consideration

With growing geographical proximity comes a wider spectrum of interests and

the necessity to make fundamental decisions collectively than it is in the creation

Concepts of National Security

Russia in the International Community

The introductions of both documents immediately point to a significant shift in

status because of these assets. In comparison, SD2000 simply assumes that

National Interests of the Russian Federation

Because President Putin’s regime set national interests as a sort of mantra of

SD2000 also lists a national interest of Russia as being the creation of a

Threats to the National Security of the Russian Federation

the creation of regional security blocks;

National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020

7 This choice of indicator is interesting in analyzing the relationship of the present

of its population.8 In addition to direct influence, SS2020 intends to create a

The Institutional Background of Russian Foreign Policy

There is a relatively wide spectrum of actors in various influential and officially

A crucial position in defining security threats and challenges is held by

4. There is a connection between national self-assurance and support of the

The Russian Federation was established in 1991. It emerged from a period of

I dare not predict whether the pace of transformations of Russian domestic

We have already paid significant attention to pointing out that Western

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