VBLD 23 ND

Resolved: The United States ought to prohibit the extraction of
fossil fuels from federal public lands and waters.
November/December 2023 Lincoln‑Douglas Brief*
*Published by Victory Briefs, PO Box 803338 #40503, Chicago, IL 60680‑3338. Edited by Nick
Smith. Written by Amadea Datel, Leah Willingham, and Jacob Palmer. Evidence cut by
Amadea Datel. For customer support, please email help@victorybriefs.com.
Contents
1 Topic Analysis by Amadea Datel 6

1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2 Interpreting the Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.1 Prohibit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.2 Extraction of Fossil Fuels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.3 Federal Lands and Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Aff Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.1 Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.2 Economic Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.3 Environmental Racism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.4 Legal Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4 Neg Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4.1 Perfect Substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4.2 Economic Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4.3 Grid Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4.4 Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.5 Concluding Thoughts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2 Topic Analysis by Leah Willingham 16

2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.1.2 Interpreting the Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1.3 Defining the Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Affirmative Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.1 Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.2 Conservation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.2.3 Ecocentrism and Biocentrism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.3 Neg arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.1 Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2
Contents
2.3.2 Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.3 National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.4 Counterplans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3 Topic Analysis by Jacob Palmer 26

3.1 Topic Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1.1 Debating a Climate Topic Today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2 Defining the Topic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2.1 Prohibitions and Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.2.2 Federal Public Lands and Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3 Affirmative Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3.1 Protecting the Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.4 Negative Ground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.4.1 Avoiding Market Volatility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.5 Closing Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.5.1 Caring for Oneself and the Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4 Affirmative Evidence 36
4.1 Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.1.1 Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.1.2 Prohibition Solves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.1.3 Fossil Fuel Leasing Prevents Renewables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.1.4 Renewables Shift Possible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.1.5 Renewables Solve Econ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.1.6 AT: Perfect Substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.1.7 Legal Obligation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
4.1.8 Promises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4.2 Structural Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2.1 Laundry List . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
4.2.2 Coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2.3 Natural Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.2.4 Oil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.2.5 Indigenous Activism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.3 Other Environmental Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3.1 Air Pollution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3.2 Water Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3
Contents
4.3.3 Fossil Fuel Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

4.4 Economic Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4.1 Costs of Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4.2 Fossil Fuels Unsustainable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.4.3 Uncompetitive Leasing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4.4.4 Stagnant Bids & Royalty Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.4.5 Externalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.4.6 Royalty Rate Loopholes & Deductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.4.7 AT: Lost Revenues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.5 AT: Energy Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.5.1 Doomed/Renewables Solve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
4.6 AT: Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.6.1 Can’t Solve Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.6.2 AT: Agency Decision‑Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5 Negative Evidence 125

5.1 Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.1.1 Imports Substitute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
5.1.2 Renewables Impossible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.1.3 Renewables Bad – Resource Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
5.1.4 Renewables Bad – Interdependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
5.1.5 Renewables Bad – Cyberattacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
5.2 Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.2.1 Economic Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.2.2 Costs of Ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.2.3 Energy Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
5.2.4 AT: Finite Resource . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
5.3 Grid Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.3.1 Electricity Shortages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
5.4 Energy Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.4.1 Energy Independence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
5.5 Backlash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.5.1 Public Opinion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
5.6 Selling Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
5.6.1 GOP Sells Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4
Contents
5.7 Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

5.7.1 Regulations Solve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
5.7.2 Royalties/Bonds Solve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
5.7.3 Ending Fossil Fuel Subsidies Solves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
5.7.4 Carbon Capture & Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
5.7.5 NEPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
5
1 Topic Analysis by Amadea Datel
Amadea Datel is a senior at Dartmouth College who debated college policy at both
Columbia and Dartmouth. She reached the quarterfinals at the Gonzaga Jesuit De‑
bates and won the University of Minnesota College Invitational, the Crowe Warken
Debates at USNA, and the Mid America Championship, ranking as the 25th team
nationally her sophomore year. In high school, she built and coached her school’s LD
debate team, won several tournaments in Massachusetts, and was the top speaker
and a semifinalist at the MSDL State Championship and the first student from her
school to qualify for NSDA and NCFL Nationals, clearing at the former. She is cur‑
rently the Co‑Director of LD and a Newsletter Editor at the Victory Briefs Institute
and an Assistant Coach at Apple Valley High School.
Resolved: The United States ought to prohibit the extraction of fossil fuels from fed‑
eral public lands and waters.
1.1 Introduction
The fossil fuel extraction topic tackles an important issue – climate change – that has
not been featured in a topic since November/December 2022, which was also distinct
because it did not focus on domestic climate change solutions. The topic area thus
promises debaters a new literature base to explore, and this resolution seems more rele‑
vant than others since the aff would make a significant dent in fossil fuel emissions due
to the significant amount of extraction that occurs on public lands,¹ strengthening the
aff solvency arguments that often suffer on climate topics. I expect the best negative
arguments to take advantage of the term “prohibit” to carve out exceptions to a full ban
on fossil fuel extraction, which might not engage with the core aff offense on the topic.
Nevertheless, I’m excited to break this topic down further so that debaters can gain a
better sense of the arguments on both sides!
¹https://www.carbonbrief.org/one‑quarter‑of‑us‑emissions‑since‑2005‑come‑from‑fossil‑fuels‑on‑public‑
lands/
6
1.2 Interpreting the Topic
I’ll start by breaking the resolution down into its three components – “prohibit,” “ex‑
traction of fossil fuels,” and “federal lands and waters” – to give debaters a better sense
of the division between aff and neg ground on the topic.
1.2.1 Prohibit
The term “prohibit” is a strong word since it requires forbidding a practice as opposed
to hindering it, with court cases elaborating that “the term ‘prohibit’… has an ordinary
meaning: to formally forbid (something) by law, rule, or other authority; or to prevent,
stop, rule out, preclude, make impossible,” then distinguishing it from a “mere hin‑
drance.”² The “impossible” part of the definition seems to indicate that the aff cannot
prohibit a particular subset of fossil fuel extraction or impose conditions on that extrac‑
tion because that would not make fossil fuel extraction impossible.
I don’t think this definition will be too relevant in terms of determining which affs teams
choose to read because the advantage ground under whole res affs is so strong that
I don’t see a strong incentive to specify a subset of fossil fuel extraction. If anything,
specification could both reduce the aff’s ability to solve its impacts and open debaters up
to topicality objections (arguments that the aff does not affirm the resolution). However,
this definition of prohibit as “impossible” does make PICs (plan inclusive counterplans)
competitive because the neg can argue that we should prohibit all fossil fuels extraction
with the exception of a subset of fossil fuels or extraction subject to specific conditions –
and the aff won’t be able to argue that the counterplans are an example of the aff because
the aff must be absolute.
1.2.2 Extraction of Fossil Fuels
Fossil fuels are decomposed plants and organisms buried under sediment and rock that
have become carbon‑rich deposits over thousands of years. We burn fossil fuels to gen‑
erate electricity, heat, and transportation while contributing to products like steel and
plastics. However, burning fossil fuels releases greenhouse gasses such as carbon diox‑
ide or methane, which trap heat in our atmosphere and cause climate change.³
²https://tellusventure.com/downloads/policy/fcc_row/smart_communities_siting_coaltion_comments_
mobilitie_8mar2017.pdf
³https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/fossil‑fuels
7
When the resolution mentions the “extraction of fossil fuels,” it refers to the process
that removes fossil fuels from their reservoirs, which varies depending on whether that
fuel is oil, coal, or natural gas. Oil is extracted via drilling or strip mining (also known
as open‑pit or surface mining) depending on whether the oil resides in underground
reservoirs, cracks or crevices within sedimentary rocks, or tar sands near the earth’s
surface. Most coal is also extracted through strip mining, although some is accessible
via underground mining, a process that uses heavier machinery to cut coal from deep
underground deposits. Natural gas can be divided into two categories: conventional
gas, which is accessed via standard drilling, and unconventional gas, which refers to
gas that is too difficult or expensive to extract through standard drilling and requires
fracking – the process of injecting liquid at high pressures into rocks and boreholes to
open fissures and extract the gas.⁴
1.2.3 Federal Lands and Waters
Federal lands and waters constitute around 30 percent of the nation’s total surface area.
Four major federal land management agencies – the Department of Agriculture’s Forest
Service, the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS), and the National Park Service (NPS) – manage almost all of
the lands, with the BLM responsible for most of the land on which fossil fuel extraction
occurs.⁵
Congress requires the BLM to balance ecological and economic values in its manage‑
ment of federal lands, stating that such a balance must “best meet the present and future
needs of the American people.” Some scholars have suggested that fossil fuel extraction
is incompatible with this “multiple use mandate” due to its environmental impact,⁶ but
over 90% of the 245 million acres under BLM authority are designated as open to fossil
fuel leasing, with more than 26 million acres currently under lease.⁷
⁴https://www.nrdc.org/stories/fossil‑fuels‑dirty‑facts#sec‑disadvantages
⁵https://www.gao.gov/managing‑federal‑lands‑and‑waters
⁶https://dc.law.utah.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1222&context=scholarship
⁷https://earthjustice.org/press/2023/environmental‑groups‑react‑to‑new‑blm‑rules‑for‑oil‑and‑gas‑
leasing‑on‑federal‑lands#:~:text=Fully%2090%25%20of%20the%20245,under%20lease%20as%20of%202021.
8
1.3 Aff Arguments
The aff can read various arguments about how fossil fuel production causes environ‑
mental and economic damage due to its contribution to global emissions, unsustainable
nature, and resource‑intensive practices. Even though most of these arguments are not
about fossil fuel production on federal lands, the aff can still argue that extraction on such
lands constitutes a large portion of total fossil fuel extraction, so the resolution would
solve those impacts.
1.3.1 Climate Change
As one might expect, the aff’s main argument on the topic is that prohibiting fossil
fuel extraction reduces emissions, which mitigates climate change. Recent studies have
found that a quarter of the U.S.’s emissions have come from fossil fuels extracted on
public lands and waters. The studies predict that absent major changes, the emissions
will remain at a consistent level through 2030, which doesn’t even take into account
Biden’s recent plans to open up new federal lands to drilling to address rising fuel costs.
However, implementing a ban on fossil fuel extraction could cut global CO2 emissions
by 280MtCO2 annually in the next seven years, equivalent to around 5 percent of US
emissions.⁸
I imagine that the neg will refute this argument by claiming that a 5 percent reduction in
emissions is so small that it would not make a significant dent in global climate change.
The neg might also point out that fossil fuel extraction would continue to occur on pri‑
vate or state lands (since the aff only bans extraction on federal lands) and that other
countries are responsible for most global emissions, with U.S. emissions constituting a
mere 11 percent of the global total.⁹
Despite the fact that the resolution might not reduce all the sources of emissions that aff
debaters might hope it would, the aff still has recourse against these solvency arguments.
First, the aff could argue that every source of emissions matters due to invisible tipping
points: every degree of temperature increase in global climate levels matters, not be‑
cause climate change is a linear impact in that every degree produces the same global
⁸https://www.carbonbrief.org/one‑quarter‑of‑us‑emissions‑since‑2005‑come‑from‑fossil‑fuels‑on‑public‑
lands/
⁹https://www.cnbc.com/2021/05/06/chinas‑greenhouse‑gas‑emissions‑exceed‑us‑developed‑world‑
report.html
9
changes, but in the sense that every degree introduces new risks of crossing thresholds
that will trigger impacts such as heat waves, sea level rise, and food shortages.¹⁰
Second, the aff could argue that fossil fuel extraction on public lands is preventing a
transition to renewables – federal lands include areas with high potential for renewables
development but prioritizing oil in those areas is precluding such a shift. For example,
Nevada is considered one of the top states for solar potential but the land is notorious for
speculative and low‑potential oil and gas leasing. Thus, the resolution has the potential
to jumpstart a shift to renewables with broader implications than those for public lands
alone.¹¹
Third, the aff could argue that ambitious climate action can serve as a strong incentive
for other countries to follow suit, which is especially important to reverse Trump’s prece‑
dent against global climate commitments – and means that the aff could both spillover
to reduce global emissions and strengthen the U.S.’s role as a global actor.¹²
1.3.2 Economic Growth
If the aff argues that banning fossil fuels will enable an effective shift to renewables,
the aff could also access an economic growth impact based on the idea that fossil fuels
are financially unsustainable so we need to transition to another form of energy. Im‑
portant to this argument is the concept of energy return on investment (EROI), which
refers to the ratio between the total energy output of a source and the amount of energy
expended in extracting that energy. Lower EROIs indicate that an energy source is less
efficient because one derives less energy for each unit of energy expended. This con‑
cept is broader than profitability alone because it accounts for the energy investment
that cannot be measured in monetary terms alone since markets do not always internal‑
ize environmental costs.¹³
While the discovery of fossil fuels initially led to economies based on high EROIs, the
energy surplus is growing slower than the industry requires due to the heavy extraction
costs and continuous capital investment and drilling required for dwindling natural
gasses. The fossil fuel industry continues to dominate due to government subsidies
incentivizing a high influx of capital into projects to mask the effects of a declining EROI.
¹⁰https://www.theclimatebrink.com/p/why‑are‑climate‑impacts‑escalating
¹¹https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the‑oil‑industrys‑grip‑on‑public‑lands‑and‑waters‑may‑be‑
slowing‑progress‑toward‑energy‑independence/
¹²news.climate.columbia.edu/2021/02/04/u‑s‑rejoins‑paris‑agreement/
¹³https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ajes.12336
10
However, the industry will eventually face a Catch‑22: either companies will have to
lower their market prices so consumers can afford energy at the risk of the companies
facing bankruptcy, or they’ll have to raise market prices to sustain their profits while
risking economic stagnation since most people will be unable to afford energy.¹⁴
On this topic in particular, I do think most affs should consider including an economic
growth scenario because that will be the most common neg impact. By arguing that
fossil fuels harm the economy, affs can set up the 1AC as a direct response to the 1NC,
preventing the 1AR from having to read too much new evidence. I’m also not too con‑
cerned about the neg impact turning economic growth (and arguing that we should
decrease growth to its destructive impact on the environment) since the aff has much
clearer inroads to a climate impact than the neg.
1.3.3 Environmental Racism
The aff could also read arguments about environmental racism since fossil fuel extrac‑
tion on public lands has presented dangers for local communities that often include
indigenous peoples and low‑income groups. The literature on the topic criticizes a nar‑
row focus on carbon emissions that ignores the more “invisible” components of fossil
fuel racism, such as the “sacrifice zones” where fossil fuel companies deposit their pollu‑
tion and subject inhabitants to health risks.¹⁵ The aff could draw on solvency advocates
from local communities that have advocated to prohibit federal fossil fuel leasing, from
the Navajo Nation to the Native Conservancy in Alaska.¹⁶
1.3.4 Legal Obligations
Finally, the aff could read arguments about how the BLM is not meeting its legal obli‑
gations to preserve the environment. As discussed above, the BLM is required to make
“judicious use” of federal grounds without impairing the environment but fossil fuel ex‑
traction violates that mandate. The BLM’s own scoping reports on the federal coal leas‑
ing program have found that extraction is leading to a “critical climate threshold beyond
which rapid and potentially permanent – at least on a human timescale – changes… may
occur,” but the agency continues to condone high levels of extraction on its lands. This
¹⁴Ibid
¹⁵https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629623001640
¹⁶https://biologicaldiversity.org/w/news/press‑releases/millions‑americans‑hundreds‑groups‑support‑
halting‑fossil‑fuel‑leasing‑permitting‑public‑lands‑oceans‑2021‑01‑25/
11
argument is unique because it is specific to public lands, unlike others on the topic, but
debaters might struggle to attach it to a terminal impact – so they might want to con‑
sider reading this contention under a non‑util framework that could regard meeting
legal promises/obligations as an intrinsic good.¹⁷
1.4 Neg Arguments
On the neg, I expect that debaters will struggle to wade through fossil fuel industry‑
produced literature to find solid evidence but will emerge with three main categories
of arguments: arguments that the aff causes a shift towards worse forms of fossil fuels,
“fossil fuel good” arguments (with economic growth and grid stability impacts, among
others), and various counterplans that regulate the industry or carve out exceptions to
the aff’s prohibition.
1.4.1 Perfect Substitution
One of the most common neg arguments in the literature is that reducing U.S. oil pro‑
duction increases oil imports from other countries, which net increases emissions be‑
cause other countries produce higher emissions than the U.S. does due to “upstream
emissions” – those that occur in the production, transportation, and refinement process.
Upstream emissions vary considerably across fossil fuel companies and countries and
the U.S. average is significantly lower than the global average, indicating that curbing
domestic fossil fuel production might backfire if that causes us to turn to worse alterna‑
tives.¹⁸
Even though this argument might sound convincing on face, the aff has access to several
potential responses – for example, that importing fossil fuels would become too expen‑
sive, so banning domestic production would catalyze a shift to renewables instead of
increasing foreign imports. Studies have also found that the substitution effect does
hold true to some extent, but that substitution is closer to 50 percent, so eliminating one
barrel from domestic supply decreases global supply by half a barrel.¹⁹ The aff could
¹⁷https://dc.law.utah.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1222&context=scholarship
¹⁸https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the‑united‑states‑can‑take‑climate‑change‑seriously‑while‑
leading‑the‑world‑in‑oil‑and‑gas‑production/
¹⁹https://www.theregreview.org/2021/11/29/sarinsky‑howard‑curbing‑fossil‑fuel‑extraction‑reduce‑
climate‑pollution/
12
also point out that the “perfect substitution” issue is not intrinsic to prohibiting fossil
fuel extraction – the government could also prohibit fossil fuel importation or otherwise
reduce the cost‑competitiveness of that option.
The neg could also approach the topic through the traditional “fossil fuels good” angle
and argue that alternative energy sources are impossible – nuclear energy is too expen‑
sive and renewable energy cannot operate at large scales – so fossil fuels are our one
option to generate electricity and sustain our current living standards.²⁰ Looking at our
energy supply, one notices that oil, coal, and natural gas supply over 80% of the U.S.’s
energy, so we might not be able to provide for our basic needs in the absence of a viable
replacement for those sources.²¹
1.4.3 Grid Stability
In a similar vein, the aff could argue that fossil fuels are good because a sudden shift
towards renewables would create grid instability. As a well‑established energy source,
fossil fuels have proven consistent and reliable, qualities that do not translate to new
energy sources like renewables due to their intermittent nature.²²
This argument is strategic because it might not require the neg to argue that fossil fuels
are a sustainable or preferable energy source in the long run, but that an abrupt transi‑
tion might create issues for the grid in a manner that slower regulations might not. The
neg can also read several impacts – the classic grid/blackouts impact is the most intu‑
itive, but a failing power grid can also harm specific sectors of the economy (such as
agricultural production), allowing the neg to access large external impacts along with
similar impacts as the aff.
1.4.4 Reforms
Several proposals in the literature advocate for regulating fossil fuel extraction on public
lands without banning it altogether. Such counterplans would prevent the neg from
²⁰https://www.wsj.com/articles/fossil‑fuels‑will‑save‑the‑world‑really‑1426282420
²¹https://www.aei.org/op‑eds/fossil‑fuels‑are‑essential‑despite‑renewable‑energy‑zealotry/
²²https://www.aei.org/op‑eds/fossil‑fuels‑are‑essential‑despite‑renewable‑energy‑zealotry/
13
having to defend an otherwise unsustainable status quo by staking out a middle ground
between prohibiting extraction and doing nothing.
For example, the neg could defend increasing regulations on methane emissions, a com‑
ponent of natural gas that has a more potent effect than the otherwise low carbon emis‑
sions that natural gas generates, or advocate that the U.S. provide leadership and tech‑
nological assistance to other countries aiming to transform their energy systems and
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.²³
Yet another option is defending the use of carbon capture and storage (CCS), which
involves capturing carbon dioxide emissions from industrial processes, then transport‑
ing the carbon and storing it in geological formations.²⁴ While CCS does not constitute
“fossil fuel extraction,” the neg could read arguments mandating the use of CCS devel‑
opment in conjunction with fossil fuel extraction – or combine the argument with the
“perfect substitution” arguments to further present domestic extraction as preferable
to imported fossil fuels, especially given the literature about the importance of public
lands for CCS due to their high storage capacities.²⁵
The one challenge with defending these counterplans is that it will be difficult to pair
them with net benefits since most disadvantages will have to argue “fossil fuels good,”
meaning that the counterplan would link to (cause) the net benefit to the extent that it
solves the aff’s impacts because it would argue that its mechanism would decrease fossil
fuel use (and thus emissions). In simpler terms, if the counterplan decreases fossil fuel
use, the neg won’t be able to decrease fossil fuel use is bad. However, the neg might be
able to access arguments about how complete prohibitions on fossil fuel extraction are a
poor mechanism to transition to more sustainable energy sources or how a prohibition
might deliver a shock that more moderate regulations might not (as I discussed with the
grid instability argument above). Such counterplan/disadvantage combinations might
suffer from the same problem – admitting that the counterplan is a more moderate op‑
tion also requires admitting that the counterplan cannot solve the aff impacts as well –
but the neg might be able to draw a nuanced distinction between the link to the disad‑
vantage (which is more about the instant impact of prohibition on energy companies)
and the solvency argument (which is about the long‑term potential of regulations).
²³https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the‑united‑states‑can‑take‑climate‑change‑seriously‑while‑
leading‑the‑world‑in‑oil‑and‑gas‑production/
²⁴https://www.nationalgrid.com/stories/energy‑explained/what‑is‑ccs‑how‑does‑it‑work
²⁵https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1847&context=pelr
14
1.5 Concluding Thoughts
As mentioned earlier, I am concerned about neg ground on this topic – “fossil fuel ex‑
traction good” is not an easy position to defend given the overwhelming evidence that
even the most benign fossil fuels (such as natural gas) are the leading contributors of
existential climate change.²⁶ However, I hope this TA was helpful in breaking down aff
and neg arguments for the November/December topic!
²⁶https://www.ucsusa.org/about/news/study‑finds‑top‑fossil‑fuel‑producers‑emissions‑responsible‑
much‑half‑global‑surface
15
2 Topic Analysis by Leah Willingham
Leah Willingham is a freshman at Michigan State University studying Interna‑

tional Relations with a minor in Jewish Studies. When she competed in Lincoln
Douglas, she was captain of her debate team and debated for three years. In her
senior year, she qualified to NSDA Nationals and the Tournament of Champions.
Her accomplishments include second speaker and sixth place at NSDA, top speaker
and runner‑up in the state of Minnesota, and placing at almost every local. She
also received the MDTA All‑State award which recognizes the top eight debaters in
the state for success. Her JV season accomplishments include semifinaling at Apple
Valley and finaling at Glenbrooks. She holds a degree of Outstanding Distinction
from the NSDA for her three years of experience in LD and two years in Original
Oratory.
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Background
Before this topic was selected, I was not at all aware of how present fossil fuel extraction
has been in U.S. politics and climate policy. The idea of banning fossil fuel extraction
on federal public lands and waters extends back to when Obama was in office, and he
issued a temporary prohibition on coal mining on federal public lands.¹ The concept
gained popularity with the 2016 presidential race and resurged in 2020 as well. Demo‑
cratic candidates lobbied for the prohibition of leasing lands for fossil fuel extraction.
While Trump was in office, he made a big push for American energy dominance and
advocated for more leasing of federal public lands to be approved by the Bureau of Land
¹Firozi, Paulina. “The Energy 202: Fossil fuel ban on public lands becomes an is‑
sue in 2020 Democratic race”. The Washington Post. 4‑29‑2019. Accessed
10‑6‑2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the‑energy‑
202/2019/04/25/the‑energy‑202‑fossil‑fuel‑ban‑on‑public‑lands‑becomes‑issue‑in‑2020‑democratic‑
race/5cc0d685a7a0a46fd9222b18/
16
Management (BLM) to make land available for oil and gas leasing.² More recently, there
have been a few proposals, but the only significant impacts surrounded Biden’s execu‑
tive order to end new leases on federal public lands in 2021. New leases on and offshore
have only recently opened again since April of 2022 to address climbing energy prices
likely caused by the loss of gas imports due to the war in Ukraine and the lasting im‑
pacts of the pandemic. Executive decisions about oil drilling have slowed since February
2022 in response to a Supreme Court ruling that reduced the executive branch’s power
to make changes regarding climate policy.³ Fossil fuel extraction on federal public lands
and waters has been an on‑and‑off issue because of its significance to the environment
as well as politics.
2.1.2 Interpreting the Topic
The biggest question I see coming up in the topic literature is the question of an imme‑
diate ban on extraction or a phase‑out that leads to an eventual ban. I am inclined to
believe that a phase‑in is affirmative ground to an extent. Since the topic doesn’t specify
a timeframe, the aff could still be topical since it still accomplishes the ban eventually.
Most of the proposals that have been written up for fossil fuel extraction bans start with
phase‑out, and negative counterplans for a phase‑out end up reducing to “do the aff
later” instead of “don’t do the aff”. Then rounds become a question of how long the aff
can wait to implement the ban before it’s no longer accomplishing the aff. Doing the aff
in a hundred years is much different than in the next ten years. This debate will make
for muddled rounds that don’t actually get into the core of the arguments in the liter‑
ature. I’d advise focusing the negative strategy on some of the more concrete negative
benefits rather than trying to undercut the affirmative’s benefits.
2.1.3 Defining the Topic
“The United States” refers to the federal government, since the topic concerns federal
public lands controlled by the BLM.⁴ To prohibit is defined by the Cambridge dictionary
²Kelly, Alison and Mordick, Briana. “Our Public Lands Must Be Part of the Climate Change Solution”.
NRDC. 7‑12‑2019. Accessed 10‑6‑2023. https://www.nrdc.org/bio/alison‑kelly/our‑public‑lands‑must‑
be‑part‑climate‑change‑solution
³Friedman, Lisa. “Biden Administration Halts New Drilling in Legal Fight Over Climate Costs”. The New
York Times. 2‑22‑2022. Accessed 10‑6‑2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/20/climate/carbon‑
biden‑drilling‑climate.html
⁴Eisenberg, Jacob. “Public Lands’ Fossil Fuels & Climate Change”. NRDC. 2‑12‑2019. Accessed 10‑6‑2023.
https://www.nrdc.org/bio/jacob‑eisenberg/public‑lands‑fossil‑fuels‑climate‑change
17
as “officially stop something from being done by making rules or laws that do not allow
it.”⁵ It’s also important to understand the basics of fossil fuel extraction. Fossil fuels are
an incredibly energy‑dense source of fuel, made up of fossils that take millions of years
to form under pressure and heat: making them nonrenewable. Oil and natural gas are
currently the cheapest and most prominent fossil fuels to drill for in the U.S., but coal
is also mined for on federal public lands and waters.⁶ Fossil fuel extraction happens
on public lands and waters through private companies who lease the land through the
federal government in exchange for fees, royalties, taxes, or tariffs. This makes leasing
economically appealing for the federal government.⁷ “Federal public lands and waters”
include national parks, conservation areas, recreation areas, battlefields, and many other
historical sites. However, what the topic primarily concerns is the 250 million acres
of other public lands, which are primarily leased to private companies for oil and gas
drilling.⁸
2.2 Affirmative Arguments
The primary Aff argument centers around the environmental impact of fossil fuel extrac‑
tion on public lands and waters. Emissions from drilling and mining on public lands
are a quarter of U.S. emissions. On top of this information, Biden earlier this year an‑
nounced a commitment to opening up even more federal lands and waters for drilling
and extraction. This was a response to the ever‑increasing costs of fuel. One of the
strongest arguments the aff can make relates to reducing these emissions. At the cur‑
rent trajectory, the U.S. will not be on track to cut emissions as much as it wanted to by
2030.⁹ I considered doing an entirely separate section on the economic arguments the
aff can make, but I find them to be inevitably entwined with the environmental impacts.
⁵Cambridge Dictionary. “Prohibit”. Cambridge University Press. No Date. Accessed 10‑3‑2023.

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/prohibit
⁶National Geographic Society. “Fossil Fuels”. National Geographic. 6‑16‑2022. Accessed 10‑3‑2023.
https://education.nationalgeographic.org/resource/fossil‑fuels/
⁷Department of Energy. “Fossil”. Energy.gov. No Date. Accessed 10‑4‑2023.
https://www.energy.gov/fossil
⁸U.S. Department of the Interior. “America’s Public Lands Explained”. 1‑31‑2023. Accessed 10‑5‑2023.
https://www.doi.gov/blog/americas‑public‑lands‑explained
⁹Gabbatiss, Josh. “ ‘One quarter’ of US emissions since 2005 come from fossil fuels on public lands”. Car‑
bonBrief. 4‑21‑2022. Accessed 10‑5‑2023. https://www.carbonbrief.org/one‑quarter‑of‑us‑emissions‑
since‑2005‑come‑from‑fossil‑fuels‑on‑public‑lands/
18
The economic costs of increasing fossil fuel extraction don’t make up for the social cost
of carbon that Biden labeled. The costs of climate change are estimated to be over ~$2
trillion in the future if it continues at the current rate.¹⁰
Prohibiting extraction could reduce emissions from the U.S. annually by 280 million
tons in time to accomplish 2030 climate targets even taking into account that some fos‑
sil fuel extraction will just get outsourced elsewhere. Some studies show a genuine
reduction globally in the amount of oil consumed even considering that companies will
substitute oil drilling elsewhere in the world.¹¹ A lot of federal offshore lands are being
wasted because of prioritizing oil and gas drilling. Only a third of offshore areas leased
for drilling were producing oil in 2019. So, the aff can argue that federal public lands
would be better suited to promote clean energy, renewable energy use, carbon capture
technology development, or even just conservation and recreational use.
To strengthen climate arguments, the aff can emphasize how necessary it is to act now
in the face of climate change. The longer we continue to use fossil fuels, the harder it is
to get away from them. Additionally, allowing leasing for longer means that suppliers
of fossil fuels are considering sunk costs in creating rigs and drilling when making de‑
cisions about alternative energy investment.¹² So much federal land is preserved for oil
and gas leases even in areas where the potential for gas and oil fracking to be successful
is incredibly low. Regulations make it simple to get leases for oil and gas, while the pro‑
cess for leasing for renewables is more extensive. Banning fossil fuel extraction would
free up a significant amount of land for increasing renewable energy farming.¹³
One of the main aff benefits concerns renewable energy. In the status quo, a lot of public
lands are dedicated to oil and gas drilling even when there isn’t an indication of oil or gas
present. The process of leasing federal lands for renewable use is more expensive and
complex than it is to lease lands for fossil fuel extraction. Banning fossil fuel extraction
may not make the process for renewables simpler, but it would free up a significant
amount of federal lands and waters for renewables to replace fossil fuels.
¹⁰Ibid. (Kusnets 2022)

¹¹Erickson, Peter, and Lazarus, Michael. “Opening public lands and waters to fossil fuel extraction could
have major climate consequences.” SEI. 2‑22‑2018. Accessed 10‑5023. https://www.sei.org/about‑
sei/press‑room/public‑land‑extraction‑climate‑consequences/
¹²Ibid. (Eisenberg 19)
¹³Rowland‑Shea, Jenny, and Mirza, Zainab. “The Oil Industry’s Grip on Public Lands and Waters
May Be Slowing Progress Toward Energy Independence”. Center for American Progress. 7‑19‑2022.
Accessed 10‑5‑2023. https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the‑oil‑industrys‑grip‑on‑public‑lands‑
and‑waters‑may‑be‑slowing‑progress‑toward‑energy‑independence/
19
2.2.2 Conservation
A few terms I see coming up in the literature on this topic concern preservation, con‑
servation, and restoration. They are similar terms, but it’s important to understand
the distinctions when debating them. Conservation is focused on properly using the
environment by using human resources if needed, and preservation takes a hands‑off
approach. It relies on protecting the environment from human destruction. Restora‑
tion is an active involvement in repairing the damage that humans have caused to the
environment.¹⁴
This brings me to another core aff argument: the conservation of public lands and wa‑
ters. If fossil fuel companies are forced to stop drilling on public lands, it makes them
more available for public recreation as well as preserving the ecosystem. I find this to be
a strong, unique argument, but I think it’s somewhat difficult to quantify that benefit or
appeal to an intuitive judge. However, it’s certainly not impossible: one study from the
Journal of Forest Economics found an economic value people derived from conserving
freshwater and forest resources.¹⁵ Banning extraction will boost support for conserva‑
tion efforts which is good for societal welfare. Millions of acres will be available for
public recreation or more environmentally friendly energy projects.¹⁶
Conservation arguments can focus on protecting indigenous lands as well. Emissions

and extraction also impact indigenous groups who rely on the land for their well‑being.
Considering how much of public lands are damaged by fossil fuel extraction, the aff
could make arguments about conserving federal lands to protect indigenous communi‑
ties.¹⁷
2.2.3 Ecocentrism and Biocentrism
This topic is pretty util‑oriented with the policy as a basis. However, I always enjoy de‑
bating philosophy frameworks when I can, so I looked into what philosophical ground
¹⁴Fransen, Bas. “Protect, Conserve, Prevent and Reverse: A Timely Refresher”. EcoMatcher. 9‑19‑2022.
Accessed 10‑7‑2023. https://www.ecomatcher.com/protect‑conserve‑prevent‑and‑reverse‑a‑timely‑
refresher/#:~:text=If%20conservation%20and%20preservation%20focus,recovery%20of%20a%20disturbed%20ecosystem.
¹⁵Hjerpe, Evan, Hussain, Anwar, and Phillips, Spencer. “Valuing type and scope of ecosystem conser‑
vation: a meta‑analysis.” Journal of Forest Economics, Volume 21, Issue 1, pgs 32‑50. January 2015.
Accessed 10‑7‑2023. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfe.2014.12.001
¹⁶Ibid.
¹⁷National Climate Assessment. “Fourth National Climate Assessment.” U.S. Global Change Research
Program. Volume II. 2017. Accessed 10‑6‑2023. https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/#sf‑1
20
exists with a topic like this. Phil‑focused affs may be a way to counteract negative coun‑
terplans. Since the aff concerns the protection of public lands, the only way to satisfy
a given philosophy that emphasizes the value of public lands and waters is to ban ex‑
traction that damages it. Frameworks concerning property rights don’t come into play,
since the topic already centers on leasing lands instead of owning them.
One of the more prominent philosophies that this topic could concern is the idea of eco‑
centrism. Generally, our understanding of the value of nature takes an anthropocentric
stance: the idea that nature matters because it is significant to people. Ecocentrism, on
the other hand, claims that ecosystems have value because the various plants, animals,
and even nonliving environments have interests. It’s not necessarily saying that they
have the same agency to act as humans, but that they have a legitimate interest in not
being destroyed by humans. The aff could potentially use this as a framework for why
it is important to leave public lands alone, for the interests of ecosystems that would be
damaged by fossil fuel extraction.
A less radical case can be made with a biocentrist approach, focusing on the interests
of solely living things such as animals and/or plants. While they aren’t moral agents
the same way humans are, a biocentric approach considers them moral subjects equal
to humans. It may seem similar to the philosophy of ecocentrism, but the key differ‑
ence is that biocentrism only considers the interests of living biological things, while
ecocentrism considers the whole of an ecosystem as having interests and not just the
components that make up the ecosystem. Additionally, some forms of ecocentrism
consider non‑living things to have equal interests to the living components of ecosys‑
tems. Fossil fuel extraction degrades the environment, causes a loss of biodiversity, and
harms the plants and animals who rely on the land, which links into the frame. There
have been several studies that support the idea that animals can feel pain.¹⁸ Arguments
about biocentrism can also be persuasive in tandem with utilitarianism if you take an
anthropocentric approach: where the value of animal and plant life matters insofar as
it’s important to humans.¹⁹ While I find biocentrism and ecocentrism to be compelling
and unique frames to use, they can seem unintuitive. It invites a debate about when
human pain is equal to animal pain, and vice versa.
A Deep Ecology framework may be more of a critical approach to the topic. The ideas
behind deep ecology rely on an intrinsic value in nature. Humans benefit from it, but
nature itself – whether that’s plants, humans, animals, or even full ecosystems – has an
¹⁸Earnshaw, Gwendellyn Io. “Equity as a paradigm for sustainability: Evolving the process toward inter‑
species equity.” Animal L. 5 (1999): 113. Pg 122.
¹⁹Ibid.
21
equal right to exist and live well. Deep ecology is a concept at odds with util, which is of‑
ten characterized as a primarily anthropocentric frame. One way to connect the idea of
deep ecology with intuition judges might connect to is to emphasize the self‑realization
that comes with conservation. Connecting with nature is something all humans should
strive to do, therefore it must be protected to foster a sense of personal fulfillment. Cou‑
pled with offensive arguments regarding renewable incentives, a strong case can be
made using radical environmental ethics.²⁰
2.3 Neg arguments
Fortunately, the climate debate doesn’t always go to the affirmative: there is some
ground in the literature for the negative to make arguments that climate change can
be worsened by banning extraction. First, shifting extraction out of the United States
just means oil, gas, and coal are going to be extracted from outside of the U.S. or shifted
onto private lands, where extraction restrictions may be less environmentally friendly.
Global consumption of fossil fuels will continue even with a ban, so it’s better to pro‑
duce it domestically and promote U.S. leadership in the energy market. America is not
currently the largest oil and gas producer, but allowing fossil fuel extraction empha‑
sizes U.S. leadership in reducing emissions and increasing innovation, technology, and
environmental benefits.²¹
One negative link argument centers on researching and developing fossil fuels to be
more efficient. Banning the extraction of fossil fuels on federal public lands makes it
much more difficult to develop extraction technology that is environmentally friendly.
Most private oil companies use a lot of federal public lands and waters for on and off‑
shore drilling. Using federal lands and waters provides an incentive to develop tech‑
nology that’s more efficient, cheaper to produce, and more environmentally friendly.
Technology would preferably be developed in the United States where companies have
access to public lands. Fuel could be exported or reproduced in developing countries
that depend on fossil fuels to industrialize.²²
²⁰Kenney, Douglas S., Carter, Gabriel D., and Kerstein, Joshua M. “Values of the Federal Public
Lands.” Natural Resources Law Center, University of Colorado School of Law. 1998. pg. 29‑34.
https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1038&context=books_reports_studies
²¹Ibid. (Justnets 2022)
²²Holden, John, et al. “Fossil Energy”. Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center. Chapter 4. No date.
22
2.3.2 Economy
The negative also has a lot of opportunities for arguments about the economy as well.
The neg can argue that uprooting the fossil fuel industry has a significant impact on the
domestic economy. Restricting extraction could uproot jobs and funding for schools,
hospitals, public services, conservation, preservation, and anything else that the federal
government pays for with the money earned from leasing.²³ This seems to be one of the
strongest negative arguments. A phase‑out or a ban on extraction would likely lead to
job loss, an increase in the cost of imported fossil fuels, and a decrease in both the na‑
tional GDP and the GDP of states that rely on fossil fuel extraction, such as Wyoming or
New Mexico. This is a link‑level argument that could be used in tandem with a political
argument, backlash, instability, or economic decline.²⁴ Additionally, the negative can
argue that the economic impacts of banning fossil fuel extraction hurt the least well‑off
the most. Lower‑income households devote the most amount of their paycheck out of
any income group towards paying for transportation fuel and energy in their homes.
An increase in the cost of importing fossil fuels or transitioning from them would im‑
pact the least well‑off the most.²⁵ The transition from fossil fuels is incredibly difficult
considering how much of the economy relies on them.²⁶
2.3.3 National Security
Another argument I came across is the idea that relying on fossil fuel imports threat‑
ens U.S. national security. It creates a dependency upon external sources for energy,
whereas using federal public lands is more stable for the United States because inter‑
national affairs have less of an impact on drilling. If there is an oil price shock, the im‑
pact is much more significant when fuel is imported rather than produced domestically.
This is because there are a lot more external factors to consider: global transportation
Accessed 10‑6‑2023. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/fossil‑energy
²³Loris, Nick. “TESTIMONY: What More Public Lands Leasing Means for Achieving U.S. Climate
Targets”. 12‑2‑2021. Accessed 10‑5‑2023. https://www.c3solutions.org/policy‑paper/testimony‑what‑
more‑public‑lands‑leasing‑means‑for‑achieving‑u‑s‑climate‑targets/
²⁴Hedden, Adrian. “Ban on federal oil and gas leasing could cost New Mexico, U.S.
economies billions”. New Mexico Oil & Gas Association. 12‑18‑2020. Accessed 10‑7‑2023.
https://www.nmoga.org/ban_on_federal_oil_and_gas_leasing_could_cost_new_mexico_u_s_economies
_billions
²⁵Trisko, Eugene M. “Energy Expenditures by American Families”. American Coalition for
Clean Coal Electricity. June 2016. Accessed 10‑7‑2023. https://www.americaspower.org/wp‑
content/uploads/2016/06/Family‑Energy‑Costs‑2016.pdf
²⁶Gross, Samantha. “Why are fossil fuels so hard to quit?” Brookings Institute. June 2020. Accessed
10‑7‑2023. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why‑are‑fossil‑fuels‑so‑hard‑to‑quit/
23
is much more complex than domestic, political implications, and global market stabil‑
ity in general. The economy is at risk when oil prices shock and rise quickly when it
relies on imports of fuel. Keeping the fuel that the U.S. relies on as a domestic product
means there is more stability and security around our use of it, regardless of whether
it’s environmentally efficient or not.
2.3.4 Counterplans
Another strength the negative has on this topic is the potential for counterplans. There
are many ways to reduce a quarter of the U.S.’s emissions, so the aff must answer the
question of why that strategy has to prohibit extraction on federal lands and waters. I
didn’t delve as deep as I could into what specific counterplans the negative has available
simply because there are so many. Competition is a concern, but when an aff isn’t clear
why the aff is the only way to solve it, it opens up many possible negative strategies
for alternatives. There are several alternatives the neg could use as a counterplan to
banning fossil fuel extraction: diverting attention to biofuels, carbon capture technology,
and incentivizing the development of renewable energy, wind, and solar. These all
have various answers (remittances, for example) but I think the biggest issue with the
negative is just competition.
A possible counterplan for the negative is also to simply pause new leases, not ban
current leases. This could be a good response to affirmative conservation arguments:
pausing leasing for a year, for example, means federal policy and market conditions
could shift enough that land is less attractive for oil and gas companies to lease again.
This means naturally, land could be conserved instead of extracted from.²⁷ It also acts
as a signaling mechanism for markets. It shows distributors of fossil fuels that the U.S.
is serious about reducing emissions and allows for space to invest in alternative energy
sources. This could potentially mean an easier transition to renewable energy since
instead of making companies drop everything and immediately shift, there is space to
shift manufacturing.²⁸ Just ending new leasing, not banning all current leases, would re‑
duce global emissions by 280 million tons annually in time for the U.S.’s climate goals.²⁹
²⁷Ibid. (Hjerpe et al, pg. 21)

²⁸Ibid
²⁹Ibid. (Eisenberg 2019)
24
2.4 Conclusion
I can see there is a very real possibility for these debates to get wrapped up in minute
details of when the aff is implemented and who can access impacts. This particular
topic analysis was bottom‑up research, which is how I’d encourage you to continue your
delve into the topic. Take the issues addressed here and supplement them with generic
impacts or even more in‑depth research. Don’t take this as the ceiling for arguments,
either: there are incredibly persuasive arguments that I did not focus my research on,
and arguments you may not be compelled by that have whole paragraphs in this analy‑
sis. I’d advise you to let the literature guide your strategy instead of the arguments you
think would be strategic. Best of luck debating!
25
3 Topic Analysis by Jacob Palmer
Jacob Palmer is a policy debater for Emory University who has found success on
the collegiate circuit reading both policy and critical positions. He has competed at
the National Debate Tournament and qualified for elimination rounds at both ADA
and CEDA nationals. Jacob currently coaches the debate team at Durham Academy,
where he also debated in high school. His students have championed the NCFL grand
national tournament, made it to deep out rounds at NSDA nationals, competed in
finals of the NC state tournament, and championed TOC bid tournaments. Jacob
has expertise in traditional debate, policy argumentation, and k debate. He is also a
VBI alum, attending the camp twice as a student.
3.1 Topic Overview
3.1.1 Debating a Climate Topic Today
The November/December topic is “Resolved: The United States ought to prohibit the ex‑
traction of fossil fuels from federal public lands and waters.” Climate and energy topics
are particularly valuable and offer us an opportunity to engage one of the most press‑
ing challenges of our time – climate change. An alarming scientific consensus supports
global warming.¹ The extraction and burning of fossil fuels is a significant contributor to
greenhouse gas emissions, which trap heat in the Earth’s atmosphere, leading to rising
global temperatures, melting ice caps, and extreme weather events.
Lincoln Douglas debaters have seen climate and energy topics for years, but this one
seems particularly important. This past year has consistently shown that climate change
is not some distant or theoretical disruption far away on the horizon. For many of us,
¹Ramanujan, Krishna. “More Than 99.9% of Studies Agree: Humans Caused Climate Change.” Cornell
Chronicle. October 19, 2021. https://news.cornell.edu/stories/2021/10/more‑999‑studies‑agree‑humans‑
caused‑climate‑change
26
the climate crisis is here. For those of us in the Northeast and Upper‑Midwest, the sum‑
mer started with yellow skies, filled with wildfire smoke that was fueled by increasing
heat and dryness.² Down south, the Gulf Coast saw record‑breaking ocean tempera‑
tures that turned the bays into hot tubs, threatening the diverse local marine life.³ On
the west coast, Southern California saw tornado warnings and floods brought by Tropi‑
cal Storm Hilary. As the threat approached, the National Hurricane Center even issued
a tropical storm watch for California for the first time in its history.⁴ Outside the con‑
tinental United States, Hawaii witnessed disaster as Maui burned, creating one of the
deadliest wildfires in US history.⁵ These crises are all connected, and similar crises will
likely continue to occur until meaningful action is taken.
As the global community grapples with the existential threat of climate change, shift‑
ing the United States’ stance on fossil fuel extraction becomes not just important but
imperative. The extraction of fossil fuels from federal lands and waters has stood at the
center of debates over climate policy for decades, and for good reason. Emissions from
coal, oil, and natural gas that have been extracted on federal lands account for nearly a
quarter of the total United States emissions since 2005.⁶ How we effectively deal with
these emissions from federal lands and waters has become increasingly contentious in
politics with each recent administration forwarding a series of contradictory policies,
overturning the rules of the prior administration. In 2016, the Obama administration
made a valuable first step, ending its land leasing for coal extraction. However, the fol‑
lowing Trump administration reversed the moratorium and started leasing out more
land once again. Now, with the Biden administration, there is a new set of regulations
that have protected some areas of wilderness while still allowing new extraction projects
in others.
For the Biden administration, the most contentious projects on federal public lands and
waters are now in a new resource frontier ‑ the Arctic. Earlier this year, President Biden
²Zhong, Raymond and Delger Erdenesanaa. “The Crises of Heat and Smoke Share
a Common Thread: Climate Change.” The New York Times. June 28, 2023.
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/28/climate/heat‑smoke‑climate‑change.html
³Tabuchi, Hiroko. “101°F in the Ocean Off Florida: Was It a World Record?” The New York Times. July
26, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/26/climate/florida‑100‑degree‑water.html
⁴Karlamangla, Soumya. “Tropical Storm Hilary Hits California.” The New York Times. August 21, 2023.
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/21/us/california‑tropical‑storm‑hilary.html
⁵Piper, Imogen, Joyce Lee, Elahe Izadi, and Brianna Sacks. “Maui’s Unmanaged Invasive
Grasslands Strengthened the Lahaina Fires. The Washington Post. September 2, 2023.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/interactive/2023/lahaina‑wildfires‑invasive‑grass‑
destruction
⁶Gabbatiss, Josh. “One Quarter of US Emission Since 2005 Come From Fossil Fuels on Public Lands.” Car‑
bon Brief. April 21, 2022. https://www.carbonbrief.org/one‑quarter‑of‑us‑emissions‑since‑2005‑come‑
from‑fossil‑fuels‑on‑public‑lands/
27
forwarded a new set of protections for the Arctic prohibiting drilling in 13 million acres
of wilderness in the National Petroleum Reserve. He has also forwarded other regula‑
tions that have ended all drilling leases in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Both of
which are valuable steps towards stronger environmental protections. President Biden
has also, however, approved the controversial Willow Project, a lease for oil drilling
on federal land in northern Alaska.⁷ Because of the size of the untapped reserves the
Willow Project would extract from, many environmentalists have called it a “carbon
bomb.”⁸
Within this topic, there are many valuable positions for either side that will lead to pro‑
ductive debates. This topic will force us to engage the complexities of environmen‑
tal conservation, economic development, and energy policy. Affirmatives will have
to confront difficult questions about whether we can transition to renewable energy
sources swiftly enough to meet our energy demands, how we can ensure a just transi‑
tion for communities dependent on the fossil fuel industry, and what role the govern‑
ment should play in regulating industries for the greater good. Negatives will similarly
have to confront what it means to continue relying on fossil fuels and how we can avoid
the pitfalls of the gradual reduction mindset that has stalled progress on climate change
for decades.
The affirmative will generally be able to argue that a prohibition on fossil fuel extraction
from federal public lands and waters is essential for environmental conservation. Pro‑
hibiting fossil fuel extraction would mark a significant shift in our climate policy and be
a meaningful move to combat climate change. By safeguarding federal lands and waters,
the nation would preserve biodiversity, protect ecosystems, and maintain carbon sinks,
contributing to global climate resilience. Further, affirmatives will be able to argue that
limiting fossil fuel extraction would incentivize the development and utilization of re‑
newable energy sources. This shift can drive innovation and reduce dependence on
finite resources, thus fostering sustainable economic growth.
Negatives will generally be able to argue that we should prioritize economic consider‑
ations or at least find a better balance between economic concerns and environmental
concerns. The negative side will be able to argue that the fossil fuel industry is essential
for the US economy, providing jobs, revenue, and energy security. Thus, prohibiting
⁷Puko, Timothy. “What is Willow? How an Alaska Oil Project Could Affect the Environ‑
ment.” The Washington Post. April 22, 2023. https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate‑
environment/2023/03/17/willow‑project‑alaska‑oil‑drilling‑explained/
⁸Freidman, List. “Biden Administration to Bar Drilling on Millions of Acres in Alaska.” New
York Times. September 6, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/06/climate/biden‑drilling‑alaska‑
wildlife‑refuge.html
28
extraction might lead to high oil prices, economic downturns, job losses, and energy
shortages, adversely impacting both national and local economies. Because the affirma‑
tive must forward an absolute prohibition, the negative will also be able to argue that
instead of a complete ban, stringent regulations within the fossil fuel industry would suf‑
ficiently mitigate environmental impacts while still allowing the development needed
for a smoother transition to a greener economy.
3.2 Defining the Topic
3.2.1 Prohibitions and Restrictions
Before delving into debates surrounding the prohibition of fossil fuel extraction from
federal public lands and waters, it is essential to understand the precise definition of
each element of the resolution. Each term has important implications for what affirma‑
tives and negatives may argue, and a nuanced understanding is essential for construct‑
ing strong, topical arguments.
The most important term to understand for this topic is “prohibit.” This is a fairly ab‑
solute term that requires the total elimination or outlawing of an activity. In legal liter‑
ature, this term is often contrasted with the term “restrict.”
In their plain, literal meanings, “to prohibit” is defined as “to officially refuse to allow
something,”⁹ and “to restrict” is defined as “to limit something and reduce its size or
prevent it from increasing.”¹⁰ Even these definitions based on common usage place
prohibitions as more absolute than restrictions. To say something is prohibited is to
take a firm stance that does not allow exceptions. On the other hand, to say something
is restricted is to take a weaker stance that allows for exceptions.
This distinction is reflected in the law. Mahimna Dave of the Jus Corpus Law Journal
illustrates this distinction writing:
Under the Customs Act, 1962, the definition for ‘prohibited goods’ is
strongly drafted with no scope of exception and carries a penalty in the
form of confiscation of goods […] Sections 3 to 5 of the Foreign Trade
⁹Cambridge University Press. “Prohibit.” N.D. Accessed September 14, 2023.

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/prohibit
¹⁰Cambridge University Press. “Restrict.” N.D. Accessed September 14,2023.
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/restrict
29
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 are not so strongly worded and
carry the scope of an exception. […] For example, the export of human
skeletons is prohibited […] In contrast, export of cattle, which is restricted
suitable as per the ‘ITC‑ HC’ list, is allowed¹¹
This distinction is going to be meaningful for debates on the topic. Affirmatives on this
topic must take an absolute stance that bans all fossil fuel extraction on federal public
lands and waters. The negative, on the other hand, will be able to make arguments
about restricting, but not banning or prohibiting, the extraction of fossil fuels through
strict regulations.
3.2.2 Federal Public Lands and Waters
The term “federal public lands and waters” speaks to the nation’s vast expanses of
forests, mountains, deserts, and coastal ecosystems that are protected by the federal
government. This is a more precise term than many may expect when first reading the
topic. The words “federal” and “public” may seem redundant, but together they create
a very specific vision for what affirmatives must defend.
While all federal public lands and waters are federal, not all federal lands and waters
are necessarily designated as public lands. The term federal lands and waters refers to
any areas owned or managed by the federal government. ¹² In the United States, this in‑
cludes lands managed by various federal agencies like the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM), the National Park Service (NPS), the US Forest Service (FS), the Department of
the Interior (DOI), and the US Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS). The Department of De‑
fense also controls a large amount of federally owned land, which it uses for military
bases, training ranges, and more.
Federal public lands and waters, on the other hand, refers explicitly just to those federal
lands and waters that have been designated for public use, access, and enjoyment.¹³
¹¹Dave, Mahimna. “Difference Between Prohibited and Restricted Goods in

Light of the Customs Act, 1962.” Jus Corpus Law Journal. February 9,
2022. https://www.juscorpus.com/difference‑between‑prohibited‑and‑restricted‑
goods/#:~:text=The%20Cambridge%20Dictionary%5B5%5Ddefines,set%20by%20law%20on%20someth
ing%E2%80%9D.
¹²Vincent, Carol Hardy, Laura A. Hanson, and Lucas F. Bermejo. Federal Land Ownership: Overview and
Data. Congressional Research Service. February 21, 2020. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R42346.pdf
¹³Bureau of Indian Affairs. “Federal Land Cooperative and Collaborative Partnerships
with Tribes Background Documents.” United States Department of Interior. N.D.
Accessed October 7, 2023. https://www.bia.gov/guide/federal‑land‑tribal‑partnership‑
30
These areas are held in trust by the government for the benefit of the general public in
places such as in national parks and wildlife refuges. These areas are not only owned
by the federal government but are also managed in a way that is supposed to ensure
public access and, often, environmental preservation.
The distinction between federal lands and waters and federal public lands and waters is
a significant one for the debates we will have surrounding environmental policies. Some
literature will generally talk about federal lands and waters, which may include federal
lands and waters that are not public and thus outside the scope of the topic. For example,
areas of protected wilderness that are explicitly not open for public access are not within
the topic. Federal public lands and waters are also of unique importance within discus‑
sions of environmental conservation and environmental protection because of their nec‑
essarily public nature. Policies and decisions concerning these federal public lands and
waters directly impact recreational activities, biodiversity conservation, and the overall
relationship between the government and its citizens. Therefore, understanding this
distinction is crucial when debating environmental conservation, land use, and natural
resource management.
3.3 Affirmative Ground
3.3.1 Protecting the Environment
The most fundamental argument for the affirmative is that ending fossil fuel extrac‑
tion on federal public lands and waters is necessary to conserve the environment and
prevent further catastrophic warming. A prohibition would prevent further fossil fuel
extraction in some of the nation’s largest reserves left, representing a meaningful step
toward climate goals. A prohibition on resource extraction would also help protect the
environment in a number of more localized ways as well, such as by preventing further
pollution or spills. The government currently leases out public lands through the Bu‑
reau of Land Management (BLM) and leases out waters through the Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management (BOEM). Drilling for oil beneath the ocean floor, fracking bedrock
for oil and gas, and mining the Earth for coal all leave environments poisoned. The
intricate balance of ecosystems can be preserved by leaving these ecologically sensitive
areas untouched.
documents#:~:text=Federal%20public%20lands%20consist%20of,managed%20by%20American%20
Indian%20Tribes.
31
A prohibition of fossil fuel extraction could catalyze a shift toward renewable energy
sources. By limiting the availability of fossil fuels, the energy market would have a
stronger incentive to create cheaper renewable energy sources to fill the gap left by keep‑
ing fossil fuels in the ground. Solar, wind, hydroelectric, and geothermal energy are all
sustainable, environmentally friendly, and renewable sources of energy that we have
yet to fully capitalize on. A shift towards these energy sources would not only reduce
our nation’s carbon footprint but also foster economic growth by creating jobs in the
renewable energy sector.
In addition to the pragmatic arguments the affirmative can forward for protecting the
environment, there are also some more philosophical perspectives the affirmative can
pull from. While the more philosophical ground on this topic overlaps pretty heavily
with the core policy ground, since both are deeply concerned with climate change and
sustainability, the more philosophical perspectives on the topic can offer the affirma‑
tive some more unique angles to discuss climate change and sustainability than a more
traditional utilitarian policy perspective. For example, there are some Kantian authors
that offer a distinct perspective on sustainability, arguing that nature has inherent value
and ought to be protected for its own sake.
Another set of more philosophical literature that exists for this topic is the currently de‑
veloping set of writing about climate justice. Authors writing from this philosophical
perspective focus on the ways environmental problems and forms of structural violence
often intersect, recognizing that there are some groups that are historically affected more
by climate change than others such as women, communities of color, and indigenous
communities. The authors writing about climate justice are not monolithic and offer
some super diverse backgrounds, discussing climate justice from a wide intersectional
set of perspectives. For example, some authors in this body of literature take a more gen‑
eral approach that places climate change in discussions of structural violence wholisti‑
cally, while others place their discussion of climate justice within more specific critiques
of various systems of power like capitalism or coloniality.
These authors that place climate justice within larger systemic critiques are often con‑
cerned with the history of fossil fuel production and the creation of the fossil‑fuel based
economy. One author of particular importance here is Olúfẹ́mi Táíwò. They point out
that the bulk of the fossil economy, which emerged in the US and Britain during the
18th and 19th centuries, was initially centered on textile production which, particularly
at the level of industrial production, was only made economically viable through chat‑
tel slavery on cotton plantations in the United States. Táíwò thus characterizes climate
32
justice and the mitigation of climate change as a form of reparations.
3.4 Negative Ground
3.4.1 Avoiding Market Volatility
The best negative arguments on this topic simply argue that the extraction of fossil fuels
from federal public lands is good. The fossil fuel industry is a substantial contributor to
the US economy and US security. A sudden ban on extraction could thus be devasting,
not only impacting the energy sector but the broader economy and the nation’s secu‑
rity. These concerns are particularly salient nowadays with the energy market being
uniquely volatile from geopolitical tensions and the war in Ukraine. The instability in
Eastern Europe and compounding sanctions between nations have created huge fluctu‑
ations in demand and shocks to supply. The coal, oil, and natural gas in federal public
lands might therefore be needed to stabilize the price of energy and keep energy costs
low.
The stability of the energy supply is a matter of paramount importance, as it underpins

nearly all aspects of modern life, from powering homes and industries to supporting
transportation networks. Fossil fuels are known for their reliability and availability, pro‑
viding a consistent energy source even in adverse conditions. Relying solely on renew‑
able energy sources, which can be intermittent and location‑dependent, may jeopardize
energy security and leave the nation vulnerable to disruptions in the energy market.
Similar to the affirmative, there are also a number of more philosophical angles the
negative can use to approach this topic. Although many of the authors concerned with
climate justice argue we ought to move away from fossil fuels, many of them are also
deeply concerned with how we ensure our transition away from fossil fuels is done
in just and equitable way. One area of particular concern for these authors is energy
poverty, a form of inequality where a household has no or inadequate access to energy
or energy related services such as heating, cooling, or lighting. Within the context of
this topic, some researchers find that although renewable sources of energy are great at
reducing emissions, they do so at the expense of increased energy poverty. Fossil fuels
may be bad for the environment, but they are cheap. And when people are concerned
about the day‑to‑day costs of living, the added costs of renewables can become a life‑
threatening issue.
33
It is also important to note that many of those against a prohibition do also recognize
concerns about climate change and the environment. Few authors say we should just
keep on with the status quo. This, however, is not necessarily a problem for the negative
since the affirmative must defend an absolute prohibition. The negative, rather than
arguing for a complete ban, can argue for stringent regulations within the fossil fuel
industry.
Those regulations may make a steadier transition that balances long‑term goals for sus‑
tainability with short‑term goals for the nation’s economic and energy security. Many
authors characterize a rapid transition away from fossil fuels as unpractical and infea‑
sible. They argue that while renewable energy sources are promising, the transition re‑
quires significant time, investment, and infrastructure development. By advocating for
regulations, the negative will be able to forward a clear and viable strategy for creating
new energy infrastructure, while avoiding the risks of energy shortages, economic dis‑
ruptions, and job displacements created by a prohibition on fossil fuel extraction. These
authors advocate for a gradual transition that allows for a smooth and economically sus‑
tainable shift toward renewable energy sources, ensuring that the nation’s energy needs
are met without compromising its stability.
3.5 Closing Notes
3.5.1 Caring for Oneself and the Community
Before ending this topic analysis, I want to take one moment to sort of step back and just
to reflect on what it means to debate this topic. As stated in the introduction, this topic
centers around climate change, an urgent and often distressing impact that many of us
have recently either been directly impacted by or seen others we care about impacted
by. When engaging a debate topic of this magnitude, it is only natural that there might
be strong emotions or anxieties.
Learning about climate change and discussing its impacts can be a sort of double‑edged
sword. While it is important to create awareness about climate change and find solu‑
tions to global warming, it can also be distressing to research and discuss. It is important
recognize that or many of us a form of “climate anxiety” is natural and often accompa‑
nies discussions on environmental issues.¹⁴ I hope that we as a debate community can
¹⁴Volpe, Allie. “Anxious About Climate Change? You’re Not Alone.” Vox. July 2, 2023.
https://www.vox.com/even‑better/23778284/tips‑cope‑climate‑anxiety
34
recognize the uniquely taxing nature of research for this topic and approach our debates
with some care for each other and ourselves. I am hopeful that we can find some solidar‑
ity as a community and support each other by acknowledging the shared concerns and
fears that might exist. Debate itself might even offer us a constructive channel for man‑
aging these anxieties. By researching, understanding, and articulating the complexities
of climate‑related issues, I am optimistic that we will be able to find some hope in the
litany of options we have for sustainable policies, conservation efforts, and responsible
resource management.
35
4 Affirmative Evidence
4.1 Climate Change
4.1.1 Emissions
Fossil fuels extracted on public lands and waters have contributed to a quarter of US
emissions.
Gabbatiss, 22 – climate and energy policy journalist; BSc in zoology from the University
of Bristol
[Josh Gabbatiss, “ ‘One quarter’ of US emissions since 2005 come from fossil fuels on
public lands,” Carbon Brief, 4‑21‑2022, https://www.carbonbrief.org/one‑quarter‑of‑us‑
emissions‑since‑2005‑come‑from‑fossil‑fuels‑on‑public‑lands/, accessed 9‑10‑2023; AD]
Emissions equivalent to nearly a quarter of the US total since 2005 have come from fossil
fuels extracted on the nation’s public lands and waters, according to recent analysis.
The study, published in Climatic Change, assesses the volumes of greenhouse gases
generated by extracting and burning coal, oil and natural gas from regions owned by
the federal government.
It also estimates how much this will change over the next decade, concluding that “min‑
imal” reductions to these emissions are expected by 2030, the date by which the US has
committed to cutting its emissions to 50‑52% below 2005 levels.
This analysis was conducted before the Biden administration’s latest announcement that
it will open up new federal lands to drilling amid growing pressure to address rising
fuel costs.
The study’s lead author tells Carbon Brief that unless the government introduces new
policies such as a carbon fee added to these fossil fuels, emissions from this sector could
remain high long into the future.
36
Federal emissions
The study assesses the “lifecycle” emissions from coal, oil and natural gas produced
on US federal lands and waters between 2005 and 2019. This includes everything from
methane leaking out of pipelines to carbon dioxide (CO2) from burning coal.
On average, these emissions amounted to 1,408m tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e)

per year – equivalent to around 23% of domestic US emissions across this 15‑year period.
Study author Laura Zachary, an energy analyst at Apogee Economics and Policy tells
Carbon Brief that this includes both fuels that are used in the US and those that are
exported abroad – although previous research has shown that only 4% of the lifecycle
emissions are produced outside the US. Only domestic emissions count towards the
nation’s climate goals.
These values were calculated using data on production and consumption of fossil fuels
available from the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the US Energy Informa‑
tion Administration (EIA) and the US Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR).
The researchers then used a combination of EIA’s projections and a machine‑learning

approach that enabled them to forecast future trends for coal, oil and gas production
across public lands and waters, and work out how much emissions they would generate.
As the coloured area of the chart below shows, emissions from these fossil fuels have
fallen since 2005, mainly due to a decline in coal use, which is shown in dark grey. (The
light grey area in the chart indicates total historical US emissions, for comparison, while
the red line shows emissions from the energy sector alone.)
Most of this drop took place between 2010 and 2016 when gas rapidly replaced a lot of
coal in the US power sector.
[Figure Omitted]
Since then, emissions from this sector have been fairly stable. The study’s modelling,
shown by the dotted lines in the chart above, predicts “minimal additional emissions
reductions stemming from fuels produced on federal lands and waters”. The findings
suggest they will fall by just 6% between 2019 and 2030.
The researchers conclude that given the “aggressiveness” of the Biden administration’s
upcoming climate target – a 50‑52% reduction in domestic emissions by 2030, compared
to 2005 – the government “should consider how policies directed at federal lands and
waters fit into their broader climate strategy”.
37
‘Meaningful reductions’
An argument frequently advanced in favour of drilling on public lands is that stopping

it would simply shift extraction to other areas.
The paper argues that, on the contrary, reducing federal activities would drive “mean‑
ingful emissions reductions even after accounting for partial shifts in production to non‑
federal lands”. Dr Brian Prest, an economist at thinktank Resources for the Future, who
was not involved in the study, explains to Carbon Brief:
“It’s textbook economics. Reducing the supply of a product reduces the amount of that
product ultimately consumed…Shifting production – or what economists call”leakage”
– partially offsets the direct effect, but the offset is not one‑for‑one.”
This has been supported by a federal court ruling as well as research. For example,
a 2018 paper suggested that a ban on new and renewed fossil fuel leases on US pub‑
lic lands and waters could cut global CO2 emissions by 280MtCO2 annually by 2030,
equivalent to around 5% of US emissions.
Dr Peter Erickson, climate policy programme director at Stockholm Environment Insti‑

tute US, who authored that study, tells Carbon Brief that despite these results – and
the likes of the International Energy Agency (IEA) suggesting no new oil or gas fields
are needed to limit warming to 1.5C – such scenarios rely primarily on reductions in
demand.
As such, he says the relatively small dip expected in US federal fossil‑fuel emissions
“doesn’t necessarily indicate that federal lands policy is incompatible with ambitious
climate goals”.
Nevertheless, he notes that the sheer scale of fossil fuels contained in US federal lands
means targeting their supply could still make good climate policy.
38
Reducing emissions is urgent – and every source is significant.
Pleune et al, 20 – Associate Professor of Law (Research) & Wallace Stegner Center Fellow
at the S.J. Quinney College of Law
[Jamie Pleune, John C. Ruple, and Nada Culver, “A Road Map to Net‑Zero Emissions
for Fossil Fuel Development on Public Lands,” Utah Law Digital Commons, 9‑1‑
2020, https://dc.law.utah.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1222&context=scholarship,
accessed 9‑12‑2023; AD]
There Is Scientific Consensus About the Urgency of Reducing GHG Emissions
Climate change is happening;14 it is worse than we expected;15 and it will get even
worse if we fail to act decisively. 16 These facts prompted the IPCC to issue a special
report emphasizing the importance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C.17 Summariz‑
ing the best available science, the IPCC recognizes that human activities have already
caused 1°C of global warming, and will likely reach 1.5°C within the next few decades.18
On the current global emissions trajectory, warming will reach at least 3°C by the end
of the century.19 Allowing global warming to exceed 1.5°C will likely cause irreversible
harm to planetary functions that support ecosystems, biodiversity, and human civiliza‑
tions.20
Increasing the atmospheric concentration of CO2 (and other heat‑trapping gases, like
methane) caused this rise in temperature.21 Between 1958 and 2019, the average an‑
nual CO2 concentration skyrocketed from 315 parts per million (ppm) to more than
400 ppm.22 According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the concentration
of CO2 has increased 46% from pre‑industrial levels, and the concentration of methane
has increased 165% during this time. 23 Continuing to increase GHG emissions will fur‑
ther degrade atmospheric composition and exacerbate climate change. A global path‑
way, with no or limited overshoot of 1.5°C, would require a 45% decline in global an‑
thropogenic GHG emissions by 2030, reaching net zero around 2050.24 “This equates
to a remaining carbon budget of less than 10 more years of emissions at their current
level.”25
The observed and forecasted negative effects of climate change are externalities that
will amplify the longer they are ignored, which has implications that BLM should con‑
sider during the fossil fuel permitting process.26 In other words, there is no time to lose
in moving toward net‑zero emissions in order to achieve a 1.5°C emissions pathway.
Along that pathway, every source of GHG emissions is significant.
39
Gas and oil emissions are rising, and coal still makes up over half of all emissions
on public lands.
Moser et al, 15 – Former Research and Advocacy Associate with the Public Lands Project
at the Center for American Progress
[Claire Moser, Joshua Mantell, and Nidhi Thakar, “Cutting Greenhouse Gas from
Fossil‑Fuel Extraction on Federal Lands and Waters,” Center for American Progress,
3‑19‑2015, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/cutting‑greenhouse‑gas‑from‑
fossil‑fuel‑extraction‑on‑federal‑lands‑and‑waters/, accessed 10‑3‑2023; AD]
Increases in estimated emissions from natural gas liquids and onshore oil
Even as estimated emissions from fossil fuels extracted on public lands have seen mod‑
erate decreases, it appears emissions from onshore oil and natural gas liquids have in‑
creased by more than 20 percent. Specifically, estimated emissions of onshore oil in‑
creased 22 percent from 2010 to 2012, and estimated emissions from onshore natural
gas liquids increased more than 25 percent during this period.
Coal extraction is more than half of estimated greenhouse gas emissions on public lands
Despite the slight overall decreases in production—and therefore emissions—in recent

years, estimated emissions from the use of federal coal is still one of the largest sources
of potential GHGs from federal lands. As depicted in Figure 3, in 2012, coal from federal
lands was the source of more than half of all estimated emissions from fossil‑fuel pro‑
duction on federal lands—totaling 57 percent. Coal from federal lands was responsible
for an estimated 769 MMTCO2e of emissions in 2012, which is the equivalent of annual
emissions from more than 161 million cars on the road.
While accounting for more than half of all estimated emissions, coal production on fed‑
eral lands occurs in a few key western states. In 2012, coal production in Wyoming, Col‑
orado, and Montana contributed 93 percent of all estimated emissions related to coal
produced from federal lands. Table 1 provides an overview of the estimated emissions
from coal extracted on federal lands by state.
40
Methane emissions are especially concerning.
Moser et al, 15 – Former Research and Advocacy Associate with the Public Lands Project
at the Center for American Progress
[Claire Moser, Joshua Mantell, and Nidhi Thakar, “Cutting Greenhouse Gas from
Fossil‑Fuel Extraction on Federal Lands and Waters,” Center for American Progress,
3‑19‑2015, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/cutting‑greenhouse‑gas‑from‑
fossil‑fuel‑extraction‑on‑federal‑lands‑and‑waters/, accessed 10‑3‑2023; AD]
Reducing methane pollution from energy development on public lands and waters
Methane emissions are particularly concerning because methane is a much more pow‑
erful GHG: Over a 100‑year period, the effect of methane is 34 times greater per metric
ton than that of carbon dioxide and even greater in the near term. According to the EPA,
29 percent of all U.S. methane emissions come from natural gas and petroleum systems,
and 10 percent come from coal mining in the United States.
In October 2014, CAP and TWS both released reports analyzing the emissions of
methane from different phases of the production and processing of fossil fuels on pub‑
lic lands and waters. Both reports explored the significant uptick in industry‑reported
data disclosing emissions from venting and flaring of natural gas over a five‑year
period, from 2008 to 2012, and also discussed recent literature showing even higher
levels of methane released from fugitive emissions, or the unintentional leakage of
methane during production, transportation and distribution activities.
The Bureau of Land Management, or BLM, is currently in the process of proposing regu‑
lations to curtail the waste of natural gas resources through venting and flaring activities
on public lands. A groundbreaking, independent technical analysis estimated that up
to 50 percent of wasted methane can be captured cost effectively. Taxpayers deserve a
strong rule that updates venting and flaring practices to ensure these preventable emis‑
sions are reduced. The BLM should also look to curb fugitive emissions from produc‑
tion and delivery systems through better and more accurate monitoring, accounting,
and curtailment.
Increasing ‘wasted’ gas from venting and flaring
Policymakers should be concerned about the practices of venting—directly releasing

natural gas into the atmosphere, which primarily emits methane—and flaring—burning
natural gas to release into the atmosphere, which primarily emits carbon dioxide. These
practices waste natural gas that could be captured for consumption or sale and add
41
significant levels of GHGs to the atmosphere. In 2010, the Government Accountability

Office, or GAO, found that more than 40 percent of vented and flared natural gas could
be “economically captured” with currently available technology.
Oil and gas companies operating on federal lands and waters are required to report vol‑
umes of natural gas vented and flared to DOI’s Office of Natural Resources Revenue, or
ONRR. A variety of factors, including the continued use of out‑of‑date monitoring sys‑
tems, make accurate accounting of venting and flaring volumes a significant challenge.
ONRR collects the only industry‑reported data available, although an independent au‑
dit found that these data likely underestimate total volumes because they do not include
all sources of emissions. Nevertheless, based on these industry data collected through
the Oil and Gas Operations Reports, or OGOR, estimated methane emissions from re‑
ported venting and flaring on public lands and waters have more than doubled between
2008 and 2013.
Following the October 2014 reports, CAP and TWS asked Stratus Consulting to provide
additional analysis of the industry data in the OGOR reports and to compare trends in
estimated emissions from reported venting and flaring volumes onshore with venting
and flaring volumes offshore.
This new breakout of onshore and offshore methane emission estimates, based on
industry‑reported data, provides additional insights that are relevant to policymakers.
Of particular note, estimated emissions based on reported volumes from offshore areas
jumped dramatically between 2009 and 2011. This increase coincides in time with
the implementation of a 2010 DOI rule requiring that offshore oil and gas operators
install meters to record volumes of gas released through venting and flaring, and an
additional requirement that operators submit OGOR data parsed out by volumes of gas
vented or flared. These data suggest that metering results in higher and presumably
more accurate reporting of vented and flared gas. It is also worth noting that, even with
meters in place, methane pollution from venting and flaring from offshore operators
rose an estimated 19 percent between 2012 and 2013.
Unlike the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement, however, the BLM does
not require all producers to install meters to monitor the volume of gas that is vented or
flared and to ensure the accuracy of reporting to government regulators. But presuming
that companies are complying with federal laws and regulations that require them to
provide accurate information to the BLM, then it is estimated that methane pollution
from venting and flaring on federal onshore leases increased 51 percent between 2008
and 2013. This increase appears to be consistent with a recent EPA report that states
42
venting and flaring of associated gas across federal, state, and private lands has risen in
recent years.
Because the BLM does not currently require meters, which would aid in independently
verifying third‑party data, there are still large uncertainties related to the total volume
of gas that is being wasted through venting and flaring. Still, it is clear that the volume
of wasted gas is high and that the resulting methane pollution is a major problem that
is rightly being addressed as part of the Obama administration’s “Strategy to Reduce
Methane Emissions.” As part of this larger strategy, the BLM is currently developing
a rule to reduce methane emissions from the venting and flaring of oil and natural gas
on public lands. The rule is a critical piece of the larger climate change puzzle; it is a
needed step to better account for and reduce overall methane and GHG emissions from
federal lands and waters.
Largest source of methane pollution remains unaddressed
Although wasted gas from venting and flaring practices continues to contribute to GHG
pollution, fugitive emissions from the production, processing, and distribution of fossil
fuels from public lands remain a much more significant source of methane. As noted by
CAP and TWS in previously issued reports, methane pollution released from fugitive
emissions at the well site, or upstream; during processing, or midstream; and in storage,
transmission, and distribution processes, or downstream, is significantly higher than
the overall amount of methane released from venting and flaring of natural gas and oil.
The amount is at least 3.5 times more than methane emitted from the combustion of ex‑
tracted fossil fuels from public lands. The lack of a consistent and accurate process for
measuring or reporting fugitive emissions has resulted in great uncertainty in account‑
ing for these emissions. In fact, the extreme range of estimated fugitive emissions—
200,000 metric tons to more than 8 million metric tons of methane—illustrates this un‑
certainty.
Nevertheless, even the lowest estimates of methane from fugitive emissions are well
above the highest estimates of methane pollution from other sources related to fossil‑
fuel extraction, emphasizing that fugitive emissions are a real problem. It is critical
that the Obama administration take action to address this significant source of methane
pollution.
43
4.1.2 Prohibition Solves
Prohibition solves – it would reduce global CO2 emissions by 280 million tons
annually by 2030.
SEI, 18 – international non‑profit research and policy organization that tackles environ‑
ment and development challenges
[Stockholm Environment Institute, “Opening public lands and waters to fossil fuel ex‑
traction could have major climate consequences,” SEI, 2‑22‑2018, https://www.sei.org/about‑
sei/press‑room/public‑land‑extraction‑climate‑consequences/, accessed 9‑10‑2023; AD]
The study – published today in Climatic Change – found that a ban on new and renewed
leases for fossil fuel production on U.S. public lands and waters could reduce global
CO2 emissions by 280 million tons annually by 2030. That is equivalent to about 5% of
U.S. emissions, a reduction that would represent substantial progress toward U.S. and
global climate goals.
These findings highlight flaws in federal environmental reviews that often simply as‑
sume that every barrel of oil not produced in the U.S. will be produced elsewhere. The
study comes as the Interior Department considers opening up most federal waters in
the Atlantic, Pacific and Arctic to new drilling.
“Our models show that each barrel of U.S. oil left undeveloped leads to about a half‑
barrel drop in global oil consumption,” said Pete Erickson, an SEI senior scientist who
co‑authored the study. “In the long term, the smart choice –for the climate and the
economy – is to phase down oil and gas production, not ramp it up.”
SEI researchers specifically examined the policies proposed in the “Keep It in the
Ground Act,” as introduced in Congress in 2015 and 2016. The latest version was
introduced at the beginning of the current Congress by Sens. Jeff Merkley (D‑Ore.) and
Bernie Sanders (I‑Vt.).
The study confirmed that the bill’s policies would have a substantial benefit in reducing
global emissions – and thus help meet the Paris Agreement goal of keeping warming
below 2°C.
Key findings include:
Restricting future lease issuance and renewal could lead to a 37 percent reduction in
U.S. federal fossil fuel production in 2030.
44
That decline would lead to slightly higher fuel prices – prompting added production
from other sources – but the net effect would still reduce CO2 emissions by 280 million
metric tons in 2030.
Limiting new federal coal leases would cost about ~$20 per ton of CO2 in 2030, well
within the range of costs associated with other options for reducing emissions.
Limiting new federal oil leases would help limit carbon lock‑in. Most oil extracted from
federal lands comes from large, capital intensive offshore oil fields that – once built – will
continue pumping oil almost regardless of price. For that reason, limiting new offshore
oil could protect against future economic losses and ‘stranded assets’.
State‑level action in Western States could yield global climate benefits. The study’s re‑
sults show that limiting oil and coal production in a half‑dozen states would effectively
limit global CO2 emissions.
The findings could also help inform the environmental review of projects that affect
future fossil fuel supply. Currently, reviews under the National Environmental Policy
Act often assume that any oil not produced in the U.S. would be produced elsewhere.
But SEI researchers found that assumption is not supported by economic principles. In
other words, every ton of coal or barrel of oil left in the ground would result in a drop
in global consumption and a decrease in greenhouse gas emissions.
“Our findings help cast aside the irrational belief in perfect substitution or, as some have
called it, ‘whack‑a‑mole’. In most cases, leaving coal or oil resources undeveloped will
lead to global CO2 benefits,” said Michael Lazarus, co‑author of the study and director
of SEI’s U.S. Center.
45
4.1.3 Fossil Fuel Leasing Prevents Renewables
Fossil fuel extraction on public lands is preventing a shift to renewables.
Rowland‑Shea and Mirza, 22 – Director for Public Lands at American Progress; Re‑
search Associate at American Progress
[Jenny Rowland‑Shea and Zainab Mirza, “The Oil Industry’s Grip on Public Lands and
Waters May Be Slowing Progress Toward Energy Independence,” Center for American
Progress, 7‑19‑2022, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the‑oil‑industrys‑grip‑
on‑public‑lands‑and‑waters‑may‑be‑slowing‑progress‑toward‑energy‑independence/,
Lands without potential for oil are standing in the way of renewables
Given the urgent need to transition the U.S. economy away from fossil fuels, the nation’s
public lands can and should be used to strengthen its domestic energy supply in ways
and places that make sense. In much of the western United States, that means solar,
wind, and geothermal energy. Unfortunately, the prioritization of oil and gas leasing
on lands that have no or low potential to produce oil and gas may be standing in the way
of progress. For example, in a 2015 Resource Management Plan regarding oil and gas
development in White River, Colorado, the BLM determined that “renewable energy
projects could be incompatible with oil and gas activities and future development could
be precluded by oil and gas activities.”5
CAP’s analysis overlays federal lands in six western states with little to no potential
for oil and gas with U.S. Department of the Interior maps of solar energy variance ar‑
eas,6 lands with potentially developable wind resources,7 and geothermal favorability
areas.8 More than three‑quarters of lands hosting these renewable energy resources are
situated on lands that are not likely to have oil and gas resources but are still open for oil
and gas leasing. This imbalance held essentially true across resource types: 77 percent
of solar, 72 percent of wind, and 83 percent of the studied geothermal favorability areas
are located on lands with low or no potential for developing crude oil. (see Table 1)
[Table 1 Omitted]
There is significant overlap between lands with high renewable resources and lands
with low or no oil potential in nearly every western state analyzed. Nevada, in par‑
ticular, is notorious for speculative and low‑potential oil and gas leasing.9 In the state,
all three of the renewable resources examined had a more than 80 percent overlap with
46
lands that have little to no potential for oil development. Moreover, although Nevada is
considered one of the top states for solar potential—hosting more than 9 million acres of
BLM‑administered lands with potential for utility‑scale solar development—more than
7 million acres of these lands are still prioritized for oil development; a whopping 41
million acres with geothermal availability overlap with lands with low to no oil poten‑
tial.
The prioritization of oil and gas leasing on lands that have no or low potential to produce
oil and gas may be standing in the way of progress.
Of course, not all lands should be used for energy development—be it oil or
renewables—and the concept of balance with recreation, wildlife, conservation,
and subsistence needs must be met. However, to meet President Joe Biden’s climate
goal of reaching net‑zero carbon emissions by 2050 and to break the economy’s ties
to oil price volatility, the United States will need to site renewable energy projects
on an estimated 145 million acres, much of which will need to be public lands and
waters.10 The country is well under that target, and the prioritization of the oil and gas
industry—even when the potential for oil and gas is low—is just one factor standing in
the way.
47
90% of BLM (Bureau of Land Management) land is locked‑up for fossil fuel leasing.
Eisenberg, 19 – Former Associate Advocate at the NRDC
[Jacob Eisenberg, “Public Lands’ Fossil Fuels & Climate Change,” Natural Resources De‑
fense Council, 2‑12‑2019, https://www.nrdc.org/bio/jacob‑eisenberg/public‑lands‑fossil‑
fuels‑climate‑change, accessed 10‑4‑2023; AD]
Federal Fossil Fuels
The fossil fuel industry has already stockpiled decades worth of reserves. Yet the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) has made 90% of the 248 million acres of land it manages
and we all own available for oil and gas leasing; and the Trump administration is work‑
ing overtime to open our oceans as well, regardless of the climate crisis or any demon‑
strable need. For example, only a third of the ocean area leased for offshore drilling is
producing. Similarly, the majority of land leased by BLM is not producing. However,
those lands and waters remain locked‑up, held to pad companies’ valuations.
These are lands and waters that should instead be managed for the entire nation, not
just for the benefit of interests of select private fossil fuel companies. These lands can be
better utilized to advance the development of environmentally responsibly sited clean
energy, the promotion of natural carbon capture, and put towards conservation and
recreation to ensure future generations of Americans and wildlife can enjoy our natural
resources as we do. To this end, the U.S. should end new fossil fuel leasing on federal
lands to ensure our public lands stop working against our public interest.
48
4.1.4 Renewables Shift Possible
Renewables are cost competitive with fossil fuels – decreasing prices and federal tax
credits.
Springer and Daue, 20 – Post‑Doctoral Associate at MIT Climate & Sustainability Con‑
sortium; Assistant Director for Energy & Climate at The Wilderness Society
[Nikki Springer and Alex Daue, “Key Economic Benefits of Renewable Energy
on Public Lands,” Yale Center for Business and the Environment, May 2020,
https://cbey.yale.edu/sites/default/files/2020‑05/Key%20Econ%20Ben%20of%20Renewable
%20Energy%20on%20Public%20Lands.pdf, accessed 10‑4‑2023; AD]
RENEWABLE ENERGY IS NOW COST COMPETITIVE WITH FOSSIL FUELS
Stemming from both rapid technological advancement and the investments and incen‑
tives provided by federal and state governments, the cost of renewable energy continues
to decrease, and new wind and solar power plants are now often less expensive than
new coal and natural gas power plants.
Lazard, a leader in analyzing the levelized cost of energy (LCOE), reports that the cost
of both utility‑scale PV solar and onshore wind on the global market continues to de‑
cline.16 In their unsubsidized LCOE comparison, Lazard reported that the 2019 unsub‑
sidized cost of utility‑scale PV crystalline was $₃₆‑$44/MWh, utility‑scale PV thin film
was $₃₂‑$42/MWh, and wind was $₂₈‑$54/MWh, while comparative cost for coal was $₆₆‑
$152/MWh and natural gas combined cycle was $₄₄‑$68/MWh.17 Lazard reports that the
unsubsidized cost of geothermal energy was $₆₉‑$112 (see Figure 6).18
In addition, it is becoming increasingly common that energy generation from new wind
and solar projects is even less expensive than energy from existing coal plants, partic‑
ularly in areas with the most abundant wind and solar resources. The addition of the
federal renewable electricity production tax credit (PTC) and federal business energy
investment tax credit (ITC) in place for the next few years makes replacing existing coal
with renewables even more financially attractive.
49
There are significant growth opportunities for renewables on public lands.
RENEWABLE ENERGY ON PUBLIC LANDS HAS SIGNIFICANT OPPORTUNITY

FOR GROWTH
While renewable energy development on public lands has increased significantly in re‑
cent years, it still only accounts for a relatively small portion of the total renewable
energy generated in the United States.
The combined wind, solar, and geothermal generation capacity on public lands
accounted for less than five percent of all wind, solar, and geothermal capacity in the
U.S. in 2019.
Despite these numbers, there is great potential for growth in renewable energy on pub‑
lic lands. The 700,000 acres of DLAs that the BLM has already designated can accom‑
modate hundreds more utility‑scale solar and wind projects with tens of thousands of
megawatts of potential capacity, and the BLM is designating additional DLAs in regions
with high solar energy potential like southern Nevada and in regions with high wind
energy potential like southern Utah. Though the BLM has not established a program
for designating geothermal DLAs, the BLM has designated some priority development
sites and there are public lands with high geothermal energy potential in several regions
in the west.
Facilitating increased responsible renewable energy development on public lands via

the strategies described at the end of this report will help support and expedite growth
in our overall renewable energy portfolio. These efforts should be paired with serious
investments in rooftop solar, energy conservation, and energy efficiency to achieve a
sustainable clean energy economy.
50
Studies prove that renewables are economically viable and avoid blackouts.
Jacobson et al, 22 – professor of civil and environmental engineering at Stanford Uni‑

versity and director of its Atmosphere/Energy Program
[Mark Z. Jacobson, Anna‑Katharina von Krauland, Stephen J. Coughlin, Frances C.

Palmer, and Miles M. Smith, “Zero air pollution and zero carbon from all energy at
low cost and without blackouts in variable weather throughout the U.S. with 100%
wind‑water‑solar and storage,” Renewable Energy, Volume 184, 2022, Pages 430‑442,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960148121016499?via%3Dihub,
4. Conclusions
In this study, grid stability in the presence of 100% clean, renewable (zero air pollu‑
tion and zero carbon) energy for all purposes is examined in six isolated states (Alaska,
California, Florida, Hawaii, New York, and Texas), six grid regions in the U.S., and the
CONUS. The study finds that all states and regions can maintain grid stability (avoid
blackouts), despite variable and extreme weather, while providing 100% of their all‑
purpose energy with WWS. The advantage of avoiding both air pollution and carbon
is the elimination of about 53,200 U S. air‑pollution‑related deaths and millions more
illnesses per year (Table S21) in 2050.
The private energy costs per unit energy in California, New York, and Texas are lower,
but the costs in Florida are slightly higher, when these states are interconnected with
the West, Northeast, Midwest, and Southeast grids, respectively, than when they are
islanded. Similarly, annual costs in the well‑interconnected CONUS are less than those
summed among all isolated CONUS grid regions. Whereas interconnecting regions
increases long‑distance transmission costs, it reduces annual energy costs by reducing
storage and excess generation nameplate capacity. The reductions in both also reduce
shedding and land requirements. However, each state and region is large enough to
provide its own reliable, low‑cost electricity and heat for all energy purposes.
This study finds that a 100% WWS system can avoid winter blackouts, such as one that
occurred in Texas during 2021, and summer blackouts, such as one that occurred in Cali‑
fornia in 2020. Part of the reason is due to a change in the demand structure arising from
the transition to WWS. The rest is due to a change in the supply and storage structures.
The costs of keeping the grid stable in Texas and California are lower when these states
are interconnected with the Midwest (MRO) and West (WECC) grids, respectively, than
51
when the states are islanded. Since Texas is currently isolated, interconnecting it with
MRO could reduce its transition cost.
The results here indicate that no batteries with more than 4‑h storage are needed.
Long‑duration electricity storage is obtained by concatenating batteries with 4‑h
storage. However, batteries with 8‑h to 62‑h storage may provide a more optimal ratio
of peak storage capacity to peak discharge rate.
Because excess electricity that would otherwise be shed is used to produce heat, cold,
and green hydrogen, the electricity waste and cost per unit energy in a system that uses
excess WWS to produce heat, cold, and green hydrogen are less than those in a system
that sheds all excess WWS.
The upfront capital cost of a 50‑state U.S. transition is �~$8.9 trillion if the CONUS is
well‑interconnected and �~$10.95 trillion if the 50 states are divided into eight isolated
grids. If TRE and MRO are merged to TXMRO, and if this plus the remaining seven
grid regions are isolated, the capital cost is ~$10.3 trillion. The 2050 aggregate annual
private and social energy costs of transitioning the U.S. to 100% WWS for all purposes
are 63 (43–79)% and 86 (77–90)% lower, respectively, than not transitioning. Much of
the private cost reduction is due to the substantial (57%) reduction in end‑use energy
requirements in the WWS case. The rest is due to the smaller reduction in the cost per
unit energy. The social cost reduction is aided by the elimination of most health costs
(~$700 billion/yr) and climate costs (~$3600 billion/yr) from U.S. emissions (Tables 4 and
S20). Whereas the social cost of a transition is ~$146 ($₁₁₉‑$257)/tonne‑CO2e‑eliminated,
that of not transitioning is ~$1060 ($₁₀₁₅‑$1300)/tonne‑CO2e‑retained (Table S21).
Transitioning from BAU to WWS results in capital cost mean payback times of 5.7 and
1.5 years due to annual private and social energy cost savings, respectively. Thus, WWS
pays for itself quickly. Subsidies are not needed for the payback but are crucial for
speeding the transition.
A transition also creates 4.7 million more long‑term, full‑time jobs than lost across the
U.S. and requires only �0.29% and 0.55% of U.S. land area for footprint and spacing,
respectively, for new energy technologies. The sum is less than the 1.3% occupied by
the fossil fuel industry today.
The feasibility of transitioning individual U.S. regions and states in isolation, each with
different WWS resources and weather conditions, suggests that small and large coun‑
tries alike can transition as well. Indeed, this has been found in many previous studies
[20,21,[28], [29], [30], [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], [40]]. Every country,
52
though, has its own social, political, and economic challenges. Social and political forces
may be the most difficult to overcome. However, if they are overcome, a transition will
provide energy security for generations to come.
53
4.1.5 Renewables Solve Econ
Renewables increase economic growth by promoting capital investment, creating

jobs, and reducing emissions.
CAPITAL INVESTMENT
The development and construction of renewable energy infrastructure on public lands

represents a significant capital investment in our nation’s overall portfolio of modern
infrastructure. Capital investment, often via private industry and bolstered by federal
incentives, helps move our nation forward and ensures decades of use and value from
these projects.
Capital development costs (not including land acquisition costs) were calculated on a
pertechnology basis using per‑MW cost multipliers sourced from the EIA as detailed in
Appendix 5. EIA data on capital cost multipliers were only available back to 1996, so
capital cost estimates for projects constructed prior to 1996 are not included here. Con‑
verting these figures to 2019 dollars estimates that capital costs spent on federal lands
for renewable energy development since 1996 total ~$10,017,835,875 for solar projects,
~$2,062,176,690 for wind projects, and ~$1,089,526,088 for geothermal projects, for a com‑
bined total of ~$13,169,538,653 (see Figure 9).
JOB CREATION
Renewable energy growth is directly tied to new job opportunities. A 2017 report from
the Environmental Defense Fund calculated that renewable energy jobs have experi‑
enced an overall compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of close to 6% since 2012, com‑
pared to CAGR of ‑4.25% for fossil fuel extraction over the same time period.29 A retro‑
spective analysis by the White House Council of Economic Advisers in 2016 found that
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 supported approximately 900,000
job‑years in clean energy from 2009‑2015.30 Job‑years are full‑time jobs multiplied by
the number of years they exist. For example, a full‑time construction job that lasts for
54
two years is two job‑years, and a maintenance job that lasts for 30 years is 30 job‑years.
Renewable energy jobs offer individuals and communities several important benefits.
First, these jobs, particularly those in construction, installation, and facility operation,
are domestic and cannot usually be outsourced. They are also location‑based, and often
bring jobs to rural areas where there are few other viable employment options. This
translates to competitive vocations for local residents, as well as an influx of college‑
educated workers. This dynamic can lead to an overall economic boost for rural com‑
munities. While the majority of renewable energy jobs are temporary positions for the
construction of these facilities, they nonetheless provide valuable, technology‑based
skillsets and place‑based employment in areas often lacking other competitive opportu‑
nities. Skills and experience gained from the construction of renewable energy facilities
helps individuals reinvigorate their careers and returns money to local markets. In ad‑
dition, as the renewable energy industry grows, short‑term construction workers are
able to move from project to project in regions with ongoing development, much like
other construction‑based industries.
Additionally, in many of the counties where renewable energy development is taking

place, unemployment rates tend to be higher than in more urbanized areas. For ex‑
ample, the 2017 Bureau of Labor Statistics Local Area Unemployment Statistics Map
showed that unemployment in Kern County, CA was 8.6%, more than twice the na‑
tional average, and Nye County, NV was 5.9%.31 Renewable energy jobs typically pay
above‑average wages, and in many cases involve union workers. In addition to com‑
petitive wages, renewable energy developers often offer employment benefit packages,
providing much‑needed services to rural families, such as health care, retirement sav‑
ings, and company investment options, benefits that may not typically be provided by
the jobs common to rural areas.
This report estimates the number of temporary construction and long‑term operations
and maintenance jobs directly related to solar, wind, and geothermal projects operating
on BLM lands (see Figure 10). Job estimates were created using the formulas below. The
number of workers necessary for a particular job site will vary in conjunction with many
other factors, including the terrain, the local workforce, the permitting requirements,
etc. The following estimates use nationwide averages that may be higher in areas where
there is not a local available or trained workforce or where weather, terrain or permitting
makes it more time consuming to construct or operate a project.
Wind32
55
Jobs/MW for wind project construction = 0.7 – 0.9
Jobs/MW for wind project operations and maintenance = 0.06 – 0.08
Solar
Jobs/MW for utility‑scale solar PV project construction = 2.4233
Jobs/MW for utility‑scale solar PV project operations and maintenance = 0.02734
Geothermal
Jobs/MW for geothermal project construction = 3.1 35
Jobs/MW for geothermal project operations and maintenance = 1.1736
Based on these formulas, the renewable energy projects operating on public lands have
created the jobs shown in Figure 10.
The three operating concentrating solar projects on public lands created 2,850 construc‑
tion jobs and 148 operations and maintenance jobs.37
In total estimates, the renewable energy projects operating on public lands in 2019 cre‑
ated the following jobs:
• Total construction jobs from wind, solar, and geothermal projects: 12,343 – 12,560
• Total long‑term operations and maintenance jobs from wind, solar, and geothermal
projects: 1,785 – 1,807
GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION
The avoided carbon dioxide gas (CO2) emissions from renewable energy use when com‑
pared to electricity generation from the burning of fossil fuels also offers economic ben‑
efits. As detailed in Appendix 7, through 2019, the solar projects operating on public
lands have resulted in an estimated total of 11.39 million metric tons of avoided CO2
emissions. This is roughly equivalent to taking over 2.4 million passenger vehicles off
the road for one year.38 While estimates of the avoided CO2 emissions from the wind
and geothermal projects operating on public lands were not readily available, they have
also contributed significant benefits in avoided CO2 emissions.
The Social Cost of Carbon (SCC) is a leading tool for quantifying the climate impacts
of proposed federal actions. As described by the National Academies of Sciences, Engi‑
neering and Medicine, the SCC is “an estimate, in dollars, of the long term damage
caused by a one ton increase in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in a given year; or
viewed another way, the benefits of reducing CO2 emissions by that amount in a given
56
year. The SCC is intended to be a comprehensive estimate of climate change damages

that includes, among other costs, the changes in net agricultural productivity, risks to
human health, and property damages from increased flood risks.”39 The current cen‑
tral estimate of the social cost of carbon (SCC) is roughly ~$50/metric ton in 2019 dollars.
Using this estimate, the cumulative total estimate of the avoided CO2 emissions from
solar projects operating on public lands have a SCC value of over ~$544 million through
the end of 2019 (see Appendix 7).
57
That’s proven by current projects in Nevada.
SPOTLIGHT ON NEVADA
The presence of geothermal, solar, and wind development in Nevada makes the state a
good choice for a state‑specific look at key economic benefits from renewable energy de‑
velopment on public lands. Nevada benefits from excellent renewable energy resources,
a growing in‑state market for renewable energy from utilities and major electricity users
like casinos and data centers, and proximity to the high‑demand California market.
In 2019 there were 26 utility‑scale solar, wind, and geothermal projects operating on
public lands in Nevada with a total generation capacity of 1,327 MW. This includes five
PV projects with a total generation capacity of 529 MW, one concentrating solar project
with a generation capacity of 110 MW, one wind project with a generation capacity of
151 MW, and 19 geothermal projects with a total generation capacity of 537 MW.
LR2000 reports included the following total solar and wind rental payments and
megawatt capacity fees collected by the BLM in Nevada through December 31, 2019,
converted to 2019 dollars:
• Solar energy development: ~$11,911,685
• Wind energy testing: ~$4,174,356
• Wind energy development: ~$5,346,123
• Total wind energy fees: ~$9,520,479
• Total solar and wind energy fees: ~$21,432,164
The BLM also collected ~$5,835,000 in competitive bids to develop solar energy on lands
in the Dry Lake Solar Energy Zone during the competitive auction on June 30, 2014,
which is equivalent to ~$6,298,431 in 2019 dollars.40 This results in a total of ~$27,730,595
in total Nevada solar and wind energy revenue through 2019, in 2019 dollars.
58
A total of ~$146,156,125 in federal geothermal revenue from Nevada has been collected
by the Office of Natural Resource Revenue, in 2019 dollars.
Based on these data, geothermal energy revenue collected between 1982 and 2005
in Nevada included ~$8,266,817 distributed to the state of Nevada and ~$8,266,817
retained by the federal government in 2019 dollars. Geothermal energy revenue col‑
lected between 2006 and 2019 in Nevada included ~$32,405,623 distributed to counties,
~$64,811,245 distributed to states, and ~$32,405,623 retained by the federal government
in 2019 dollars.
The total cumulative solar, wind, and geothermal energy revenue collected in Nevada
through 2019 was ~$173,886,720 in 2019 dollars.
Using the estimates described earlier in this report, in 2019 dollars, capital costs for
projects operating in Nevada were ~$1,983,717,287 for solar projects, ~$433,852,584 for
wind projects, and ~$716,780,507 for geothermal projects, for a total of ~$3,134,350,378.
Rents, royalties, and capital costs for projects operating in Nevada total ~$3,308,237,098.
Using the estimates described earlier in this report, the total estimates for jobs created
by solar, wind, and geothermal projects operating on public lands in Nevada are 4,101
– 4,131 construction jobs and 691 – 694 operations and maintenance jobs. Solar PV and
concentrating solar project construction jobs in Nevada total 2,330 and operations and
maintenance jobs total 54. Wind project construction jobs in Nevada total 106 – 136 and
operations and maintenance jobs total 9 – 12. Geothermal project construction jobs in
Nevada total 1,665 and operations and maintenance jobs total 628.
59
4.1.6 AT: Perfect Substitution
Their perfect substitution arguments are wrong – decreasing leasing forces

fossil‑fuel producers to turn to more expensive alternatives, which lowers
fossil‑fuel consumption and makes renewables cost competitive.
Sarinsky and Howard, 21 – senior attorney at the Institute for Policy Integrity and an
adjunct clinical professor at New York University School of Law; Economics Director of
the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University School of Law
[Max Sarinsky and Peter Howard, “Yes, Curbing U.S. Fossil Fuel Extraction Does Re‑
duce Climate Pollution,” 11‑29‑2021, https://www.theregreview.org/2021/11/29/sarinsky‑
howard‑curbing‑fossil‑fuel‑extraction‑reduce‑climate‑pollution/, accessed 9‑10‑2023;
AD]
With experts worldwide calling on governments to transition away from fossil fuels to
prevent catastrophic levels of climate change, the Biden Administration is in the midst
of reconsidering the federal government’s oil, gas, and coal leasing programs. Reforms
to these programs could bring U.S. energy policy closer in line with climate reality by
reducing the extraction of fossil fuels from public lands.
Predictably, the fossil‑fuel industry and its allies have opposed these reforms. These
groups have dredged up old government analyses to argue that restricting domestic
energy supply will shift production overseas, purportedly removing business from the
United States while doing nothing to solve the climate problem. The logic goes that,
because fossil fuel extraction will continue in other countries, the United States should
keep making money from extraction while the world burns.
This argument has been coined by experts as “perfect substitution.” But this climate
nihilism has been widely debunked for violating basic economics.
Federal courts have repeatedly rejected analyses that relied on perfect substitution to
justify irresponsible levels of extraction. Policymakers should not take the argument
seriously but should instead be guided by rigorous science and economics in shaping
domestic policies to reduce emissions and address climate change.
The notion of perfect substitution violates basic supply‑and‑demand principles. Fossil‑

fuel companies want to extract from federal lands mainly because it is a cheap supply
option. If such leasing became less available, fossil‑fuel producers would have to turn
to more expensive alternatives, causing fossil‑fuel consumption to fall and renewable
60
substitutes to become more competitive.
Given its vast market power, the federal government could level the playing field for
sustainable fuels if it prioritized conservation, recreation, and renewable energy pro‑
duction on federal lands and waters rather than tying up so much land in fossil‑fuel
extraction.
That is why, after the federal government justified coal leasing in 2010 on the grounds
that it would have no climate impacts due to perfect substitution, a federal appeals
court unanimously rejected the approval. The three‑judge panel, including one judge
appointed by President Ronald Reagan, described perfect substitution as “irrational”
and “contrary to basic supply and demand principles.”
The argument should have died there, but it did not. With perfect substitution off
the table, the U.S. Department of the Interior developed an economic model—known
as MarketSim—finding near‑perfect substitution. Using this model, the Interior De‑
partment concluded that, although reducing extraction on federal lands does reduce
consumption, this reduction is exceedingly small due to substitution effects. Using
this model, the Obama, Trump, and now Biden Administrations have moved forward
with major extraction plans after the Interior Department claimed that these fossil‑fuel
projects would barely budge—or, in many cases, even decrease—total greenhouse gas
emissions.
But two federal courts recently rejected major leasing plans relying on this model, which
was based on several faulty inputs.
For instance, in Center for Biological Diversity v. Bernhardt, the defendants’ envi‑
ronmental impact statement, which was based on the MarketSim model, completely
ignored impacts on foreign energy consumption, falsely assuming that consumption
abroad would be unaffected by a reduction in global supply. As the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained last year, this error helped produce the model’s
“counterintuitive result.”
Although the Interior Department has recently attempted to correct the error identified
by the Ninth Circuit, the MarketSim model suffers from other key shortcomings that
overstate substitution effects. Most notably, the model effectively disregards the long‑
term growth of solar and wind energy by assuming that global oil and gas consumption
would continue unabated for the next 70 years.
This premise is incompatible with global efforts to mitigate climate change. In essence,
the government assumed that nothing would be done to combat climate change and
61
then used that premise to justify climate‑damaging policies. This self‑fulfilling pes‑
simism is not a reasonable basis for government decision‑making.
To be fair, reductions in domestic fossil‑fuel supply do result in partial substitution, be‑

cause additional supply from other locations meets demand. But that substitution is far
from total: research shows that the effect is only about 50 percent, meaning that elim‑
inating one barrel from domestic oil supply decreases global supply by roughly half a
barrel. And this 50 percent figure could be further reduced through border adjustments
or other efforts to account for climate change in U.S. trade policy.
Although reducing domestic fossil‑fuel extraction will not solve climate change by itself,
it can make a tangible dent in global emissions. This maxim is more broadly true of U.S.
climate leadership. History shows that American policies to reduce climate pollution
drive real climate progress by spurring reciprocal foreign emission reductions.
For instance, Obama‑era climate policies helped to prompt China’s most meaningful
climate commitments. And after the Biden Administration committed to halve U.S.
emissions by 2030, many countries—including Japan, Canada, and Brazil—significantly
strengthened their own pledges.
In contrast, when America abdicated its climate leadership during the Trump Adminis‑
tration and rolled back key measures to reduce emissions, a period of little international
progress ensued.
A recent study shows that every ton of climate pollution that the United States pledged
to reduce has resulted in foreign nations pledging to reduce their emissions by over six
tons in return. When the United States transitions away from fossil fuels, geopolitical
and market adjustments make clean energy more competitive globally.
As the Biden Administration moves ahead with plans to overhaul federal fossil‑fuel leas‑
ing, it should be guided by the best evidence on fuel substitution and climate change.
The Administration must throw out the economically flawed, judicially rebuked substi‑
tution model previously used to justify leasing and replace it with an evidence‑based
model that properly accounts for the true impact of domestic climate action.
In short, the Biden Administration must reject the tired arguments of the fossil‑fuel
industry and proceed with ambitious reforms that meet the climate crisis’s urgent de‑
mands.
62
4.1.7 Legal Obligation
The BLM (Bureau of Land Management) has a legal obligation to address climate
change.
BLM Is Legally Obligated to Address Climate Change, Including in Leasing and Permit‑
ting
FLPMA establishes a standard of care for BLM’s management of federal land. BLM
must make “judicious use” of federal lands without “permanent impairment” to the
productivity and quality of the environment.27 BLM “shall, by regulation or otherwise,
take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands.”28
Congress requires BLM to manage for a multigenerational investment horizon, employ‑

ing a balance that “will best meet the present and future needs of the American peo‑
ple.”29 Congress also identified discrete ecological values that should not be perma‑
nently impaired. For example, FLPMA’s statement of purpose instructs BLM to pro‑
tect “the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmo‑
spheric, water resource, and archeological values.”30
Notably, the list of assets to be stewarded by BLM includes “atmospheric values.”

Congress understood at least some of the risks and challenges of anthropogenic climate
change when it used those words. Nine years before FLPMA was passed, the Johnson
Administration issued a White House report detailing the risk of global warming
caused by fossil fuel emissions and predicting now familiar impacts: melting of the
Antarctic ice cap, rising of sea level, and warming of sea water.31 When Congress
included “atmospheric values” in the list of resources that BLM must protect, it had
already received evidence that fossil fuel development could threaten everything that
depends on a safe and stable atmosphere.
More importantly, Congress understood that there would be multiple, unforeseen chal‑
lenges in striking the right balance of multiple uses. Congress defined “multiple use”
63
to include a “combination of balanced and diverse resources that takes into account the
long‑term needs of future generations.”32 This broad language granted BLM regula‑
tory flexibility to respond to new scientific evidence and the changing societal needs.
As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized when interpreting the Clean Air Act, even if the
Congress that drafted FLPMA “might not have appreciated the possibility that burning
fossil fuels could lead to global warming, they did understand that without regulatory
flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific developments would soon render [the
Act] obsolete.”33 Broad language “reflects an intentional effort to confer the flexibility
necessary to forestall such obsolescence.”34
Regardless of whether Congress explicitly understood that continued fossil fuel devel‑
opment would permanently impair atmospheric values and harm future generations,
FLPMA’s broad language reflects an intentional effort to confer flexibility necessary to
respond to changing circumstances and scientific developments. Scientific consensus
regarding climate change indicates that adhering to a 1.5°C carbon budget is necessary
to avoid permanent impairment to the atmospheric composition and to other natural
systems that support civilization, and to forestall widespread extinctions. Congress
instructed BLM to respond to changing circumstances by managing with a multigener‑
ational horizon.35 The sweepingly broad language used by Congress in FLPMA grants
BLM the regulatory flexibility to fulfill its statutory mandate by responding to the new
circumstances presented by climate change and to alter its oil and gas leasing practices
to utilize federal resources in a manner “that will best meet the present and future needs
of the American people.”36
64
Fossil fuel development violates that obligation.
Unbridled Fossil Fuel Development Violates FLPMA’s Standard of Care
BLM has acknowledged that increasing GHG emissions may permanently impair eco‑
logical systems, including the atmosphere. 37 In January 2016, BLM completed a scop‑
ing report on the federal coal leasing program.38 The scoping report summarized the
scientific consensus, including recent studies that “confirm and further strengthen the
conclusion that greenhouse gases endanger public welfare, and emphasize the urgency
of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.”39 BLM acknowledged that the atmospheric
composition “may be approaching a critical climate threshold beyond which rapid and
potentially permanent—at least on a human timescale—changes . . . may occur.”40
Abrupt and irreversible ecological impacts, including species extinctions, “are expected
to be exacerbated by climate change.”41 Finally, BLM acknowledged that without miti‑
gation, GHG concentrations will climb to ever‑increasing levels.42
These studies illustrate that exacerbating climate change will violate BLM’s statutory
duty to manage various resources “without permanent impairment of the productivity
of the land and the quality of the environment.”43 “Crossing a critical climate thresh‑
old” that compromises atmospheric stability will permanently impair the atmospheric
values upon which current and future generations depend. Similarly, changes result‑
ing in widespread extinction constitute permanent impairment because extinction is
irreversible. Additionally, widespread extinctions damage the productivity of the land
because the land cannot produce or rely upon extinct species. Exacerbating the risk of
these types of harms by allowing increased fossil fuel development without mitigating
GHG emissions does not meet BLM’s statutory duty to establish “coordinated manage‑
ment of the various resources without permanent impairment of the productivity of the
land and quality of the environment.”44
Despite acknowledging the risks of unabated GHG emissions, BLM continues to ignore
the massive combined effect of its permitting decisions. BLM administers oil and gas
leases covering 25.5 million acres and these lands include more than 96,000 producible
65
oil and gas wells.45 In producing more than 274 million barrels of oil, 3.3 billion cubic
feet of natural gas, and 302 million tons of coal each year,46 the combined effects of
BLM’s management decisions significantly affect U.S. and global emissions, a fact that
BLM has avoided acknowledging formally.47
BLM’s current approach to oil and gas leasing, which often allows an unmitigated in‑
crease in GHG emissions, is inconsistent with FLPMA’s mandate to avoid permanently
impairing ecological values, including the atmosphere. It also violates BLM’s duty to
manage resources with a multigenerational investment horizon. Although agencies
have broad discretion in how to respond to climate change, that discretion does not
extend to whether to address climate change. The science of climate change is not a pol‑
icy preference—it is part of a body of evidence that arises in the context of every fossil
fuel permitting decision.
A comprehensive and insightful review of climate‑related cases between 2015 and

2020 published by the nonpartisan Environmental Law Institute reveals that “vast
judicial agreement exists on the causes, extent, urgency, and consequences of climate
change.”48 This observation “holds true across U.S. federal and state courts, across
different types of proceedings, and across jurisdictions,” including international
jurisdictions.49 The report takes care to point out that even the parties, including
government agencies like BLM, appeared to agree on basic climate science, even if
they disagreed on the legal implications.50 Where agencies under the Trump Admin‑
istration are reversing Obama‑era policies on climate change, courts have reminded
the agencies that inconvenient facts survive changes of administration. “An agency
cannot simply disregard contrary or inconvenient factual determinations that it made
in the past, any more than it can ignore inconvenient facts when it writes on a blank
slate.”51 Agency decisions that “simply discarded prior factual findings related to
climate change” have been found arbitrary and capricious.52
It does not matter that BLM discussed the risks of “crossing a critical climate thresh‑
old” in the context of coal mining, rather than oil and gas development. The same facts
apply to any fossil fuel. From tar sands to oil shale to oil and gas development, the scien‑
tific studies referenced in BLM’s scoping report were the preeminent studies reflecting
the most current scientific understanding of a global problem that is urgent and ubiq‑
uitous and caused by a class of fuel. In the scoping report, BLM properly recognized
that these studies forecast a risk of permanent impairment caused by crossing a critical
climate threshold. More recent studies, like the IPCC special report emphasizing the im‑
portance of limiting global warming to 1.5°C, further strengthen BLM’s recognition in
66
the scoping report that exacerbating climate change may cause abrupt and irreversible
changes, including widespread extinctions.
A hallmark of administrative law is the requirement that agencies engage in “reasoned

decisionmaking.”53 As the Supreme Court recently pointed out, “the Government
should turn square corners in dealing with the people.”54 One of those square corners is
the requirement to “examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation
for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.”55 Whether GHG emissions come from coal mining or oil and gas development,
the relevant data indicate that continuing to increase GHG emissions exacerbates the
risk of crossing a critical climate threshold and causing permanent impairment to the
quality of the environment and the productivity of the land. Ignoring this relevant data
when making permitting decisions is arbitrary and capricious.
67
4.1.8 Promises
Biden has promised to take bold climate action, including ending fossil fuel
extraction on public lands.
Ritzman, 22 – lands, water and wildlife director for the Sierra Club’s Our Wild America
campaign
[Dan Ritzman, “End Fossil Fuel Leasing on Public Lands,” The Progressive Magazine, 2‑
9‑2022, https://progressive.org/op‑eds/end‑fossil‑fuel‑public‑lands‑ritzman‑220209/, ac‑
cessed 10‑3‑2023; AD]
With our planet and communities at stake, now is the time to put an end, once and for
all, to fossil fuel extraction on public lands. The science is clear: to fight the climate
crisis, we must dramatically reduce carbon pollution. And, to reduce carbon pollution,
we need to stop it at the source.
Fossil fuel extraction on public lands accounts for nearly one quarter of all U.S. green‑
house gas emissions. Ending fossil fuel leasing on public lands will help prevent climate
disaster and improve the health of our planet and our communities.
Biden has the power to put an immediate end to oil and gas leasing on public lands.
But sadly, in the face of climate catastrophe, President Joe Biden has remained consis‑
tently inconsistent on his policy towards oil and gas leasing. He’s blocked drilling in
the Arctic Refuge and near Chaco Canyon National Park and pledged to put an end to
it everywhere, while simultaneously selling new leases and approving new drilling.
On the campaign trail, Biden had a bold plan to end leasing of fossil fuels on public
lands. And yet, he has approved more oil and gas permits per month than Trump did
in any given year during his presidency.
Last year, Biden went to Scotland and told the world that the United States vowed to
be a leader on climate, only to return home and hand 80 million acres of public waters
in the Gulf of Mexico to fossil fuel companies. At the time, the administration asserted
that it was forced to hold the sale due to a court ruling on Biden’s executive order that
paused new oil and gas leasing on federal lands.
This claim was explicitly contradicted by a U.S. Department of Justice brief filed prior
to the lease sale. Additionally, instead of proceeding with new lease sales while appeal‑
ing the case, the Justice Department could have sought a stay of the lower court ruling
pending appeal.
68
Regardless of what is happening in the courts, Biden has the power to put an immediate
end to oil and gas leasing on public lands. At any time, he could declare a climate
emergency and use executive powers to put an end to federal fossil fuel leasing and
extraction.
In January, in a case brought by Sierra Club and its allies, the Gulf of Mexico oil and gas
sale was overturned by a federal judge who ruled that the administration didn’t fully
consider climate change impacts. Instead of appealing this decision, Biden should meet
the moment with action and choose to use his executive power, along with the court’s
backing, to say “no” to new fossil‑fuel extraction and “yes” to the health and well‑being
of our communities.
In Scotland, Biden told his fellow world leaders that his administration is committed to
addressing the climate crisis with “action, and not words.” Now it’s time to see whether
these bold words had meaning and if he’s willing to prioritize the U.S. public over oil
CEOs.
69
4.2 Structural Violence
4.2.1 Laundry List
Fossil fuels perpetuate environmental racism by creating sacrifice zones, curtailing

democratic spaces, and contributing to climate change that disproportionately
impacts marginalized populations.
Donaghy et al, 23 – Senior Research Specialist at Greenpeace USA
[Timothy Q. Donaghy, Noel Healy, Charles Y. Jiang, and Colette Pichon Battle,
“Fossil fuel racism in the United States: How phasing out coal, oil, and gas can
protect communities,” Energy Research & Social Science Volume 100, June 2023,
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214629623001640, accessed 9‑10‑
2023; AD]
2. Fossil fuel racism
This unequal distribution of pollution has long been recognized by low‑income commu‑
nities of color across the U.S. [2], [16]. Since the early 1980s the environmental justice (EJ)
movement has challenged the unfair distribution of and exposure to various environ‑
mental hazards [17]. The movement has also forced national leaders and the public at
large to place greater focus on the ways in which race and class intersect with our cap‑
italist economy and political systems, and has challenged the structure, funding, and
priorities of largely white‑led environmental organizations.
The EJ movement has also sparked an interdisciplinary field of study that seeks to doc‑
ument these unequal patterns of pollution and to understand the social, economic and
political forces that give rise to them. This extensive literature has found that “in general,
ethnic minorities, indigenous persons, people of color, and low‑income communities
confront a higher burden” of pollution [5]. Although this multitude of studies varies by
geography, type of environmental hazard, and statistical method, the ubiquity of this
key finding has been described as a “stylized fact of social science” [6].
An early debate in the EJ literature revolved around whether race or income was the
best predictor of exposure to pollution. Addressing this question drove improvements
in analytical methods, both by moving beyond “spatial coincidence” methods for an‑
alyzing polluting facilities [18], and by taking advantage of richer datasets (for both
emissions and populations) and more sophisticated exposure modeling to better char‑
70
acterize health risk [19]. This generation of studies broadly concluded that, while race
is a ubiquitous factor driving pollution disparities [20], both race and socioeconomic
factors are crucial for understanding patterns of pollution [3], [4], [21], [22].
This technical finding has been summarized as the “effects of race and ethnicity persist
even when controlling for income — and that income effects persist even when control‑
ling for race and ethnicity” [23]. However, recent work has moved beyond this debate
[19], [24], [25] by rejecting the “analytical separation of racism and capitalism” [26]. Crit‑
ical environmental justice studies emphasize the inherently intersectional nature of the
problem and how “multiple social categories of difference are entangled in the produc‑
tion of environmental injustice, from race, gender, sexuality, ability, and class to species”
[10].
With debates about the existence of environmental injustice largely settled, the field
turned to deeper investigations of the social [24], economic and political drivers of that
injustice. Scholarship has sought to situate EJ in the context of racialized capitalism
and settler colonialism. Critical EJ studies emphasize the role of the state as a driver of
environmental violence, linking it to critical race theory [27], [28]. Researchers [27], [29],
[30] have theorized environmental racism as a constituent element of racial capitalism—
a system that relies on the exploitation of racialized people for capitalist accumulation
[31].
To give one example, another early debate in the literature turned on whether pollut‑
ing facilities were sited inequitably, or whether post‑siting demographic change was re‑
sponsible for the observed inequities [32]. A broader understanding of this question has
been gained by placing it within the history of persistent racist and discriminatory poli‑
cies [25] in housing, lending, and urban planning policies, including through a process
known as redlining [33].2 As we discuss in later sections, historically redlined neighbor‑
hoods have more oil and gas wells [34], higher air pollution levels [35], less green space
[36], hotter temperatures [37], and other impacts.
EJ studies have also analyzed a variety of pollution sources (e.g. incinerators, landfills,
hazardous waste sites, industrial TRI reporters, etc.) and pollutant types (e.g. criteria air
pollutants, air toxics, lead found in water pipes, contaminated soil or old paint). Critical
EJ has extended the EJ concept as broadly as the definition of “the environment” itself,
encompassing disparities in policing, labor rights, health care, reproductive rights, ac‑
cess to nature, access to housing and transit, noise and light pollution, and more. Indeed,
Bullard defines environmental racism broadly as “any policy, practice or directive that
differentially affects or disadvantages (whether intended or unintended) individuals,
71
groups or communities based on race or color” [38].
In this paper, we argue that a focus on a specific subset of pollution sources (namely
each stage of the life cycles of coal, oil, and gas) is a useful and coherent topic for deeper
analysis. We term this particular focus as “fossil fuel racism” and position it as a subset
of environmental racism (see Fig. 1). Key to tackling fossil fuel racism, is greater recog‑
nition of the politics, power dynamics and political economy of fossil fuel supply chains
which addresses underlying root causes, rather than simply identifying the unequal or
unjust consequences of fossil fuels.
[Figure 1 Omitted]
A narrow focus on carbon emissions ignores the “systems and structures which are
actively protecting and promoting climate destroying industries” [39]. Tackling fossil
fuel racism requires the “the definition of an adversary” [40] and bringing those respon‑
sible for injustices to the fore. But shifting that focus upstream to fossil fuels directs
“analytic and eventual political attention” to those systems, and to the actors who orga‑
nize and benefit from ongoing extraction [11]. As Healy & Barry [41] state, such a shift
“draws new focus on the traditionally overlooked elements of the fuel cycle” such as the
ecological damage and human impacts of extractivism (Fig. 2). We identify three key
components of “fossil fuel racism.”
[Figure 2 Omitted]
[Figure 3 Omitted]
2.1. Fossil fuels require ‘sacrifice zones’ which disproportionately impact Black, Brown,
Indigenous and poor people
First, environmental racism is rooted in long histories of oppression and dispossession

of communities of color and Indigenous peoples produced through settler colonialism,
slavery and racial capitalism [27], [29]. European countries and their industrial offspring
were built on the wealth of extractive colonialism which they used to industrialize and
build the fossil fuel economy [42], [43], [44]. Racial capitalism, state‑backed segregation,
and the displacement of Indigenous nations were central to the consolidation of the U.S.
as a global fossil fuel powerhouse. As such, violence, genocide, colonialism were central
rather than peripheral to the birth of the fossil fuel economy [45]. The fossil fuel industry
and fossil fuel interests are also credibly linked to having an outsized influence on U.S.
foreign policy [46]. Oil has been linked to between 25 % to 50 % of interstate wars that
have occurred since 1973 [47].
72
Essential to the development of the fossil fuel economy have been the creation of sites
of concentrated harm. Pulido [29] outlines that, in general, manufacturing and industry
require ‘sinks’ — typically land, air, water, or racially devalued bodies where pollution
can be deposited. More specifically, fossil fuels require “sacrifice zones” [48] – places
that are heavily polluted or damaged by industry activities, and whose inhabitants are
subject to elevated health risks, for the “supposed greater good of economic progress”
[49]. The global fossil fuel industry creates multiple such sacrifice zones, often geograph‑
ically distant from each other, but linked together by global fossil fuel supply chains.
The creation of these zones often entails the physical displacement of populations and in‑
flicts the “slow violence” of landscape destruction, water contamination and livelihood
disruption on local communities [50]. The life cycle impacts of fossil fuel supply chains
include the poisoning of air, land, and water, forcible displacement from ancestral lands,
violation of treaty rights, explosions, industrial accidents, exposure to significant health
hazards, degraded lands, and social unrest long after extraction ceases [14].
Kojola & Pellow [27] argue that framing environmental injustices as violence draws at‑
tention to the role of an unjust state and corporate policies and practices who prioritize
the health and wellbeing of highly valued populations at the expense of racially deval‑
ued communities where pollution can be deposited. As one example, Mansfield [51] ar‑
gues that particulate matter air pollution is a form of racialized violence and that dereg‑
ulatory actions to benefit “fossil fuel and petrochemical interests,” also represented a
“mechanism of structural racism.”
In the U.S. context, the location of sacrifice zones in Black, Brown, Indigenous and poor
communities is a direct consequence of the nation’s history of the theft of Indigenous
land, slavery, Jim Crow segregation, and racial capitalism.
2.2. Disproportionate and racialized impact of climate change
Second, fossil fuels are the primary cause of global climate change. Although GHG emis‑
sions are globally mixed, the impacts from climate change are unevenly felt. Globally,
the people and communities most vulnerable to climate‑related impacts and disasters
are those living in the global south, low‑lying coastal zones, small island nation states,
agricultural‑dependent nations [52], and especially those living in poverty. Even under
the best‑case scenario, hundreds of millions will face food insecurity, forced migration,
disease and death. Climate inaction would be “disastrous for the global economy and
pull vast numbers into poverty” [53]. Despite this, Global North nations are responsi‑
ble for 92 % of excess CO2 emissions [44] and the world’s poorest are responsible for
73
far fewer emissions than the wealthiest [54]. Racial capitalism helps explain why Black,
Brown, Indigenous and poor communities can be sacrificed, and why more than 30
years of international climate negotiations have so far failed to curtail fossil fuel produc‑
tion [42].
Climate change is also triggering mass forcible displacement of peoples via typhoons
and hurricanes as well as long‑term environmental changes triggered by rising sea lev‑
els, rising temperatures, water shortages, and desertification [55]. Much like air pollu‑
tion risk, climate change impacts will also be unevenly and inequitably shared within
nation states. In the U.S, the Southeast region will see the most severe future climate
impacts [56], and in Section 7 we discuss in more detail how those impacts will dispro‑
portionately harm Black, Brown, Indigenous and poor communities.
2.3. Fossil fuel industry curtailment of democratic spaces
Third, as a result of the centrality of energy to the modern economy, fossil fuel corpora‑
tions are among the most profitable in history, and have amassed considerable economic
and political power. Like many corporate actors, fossil fuel corporations have sought
to exercise their political power to extend their continued dominance and profitability
[46].
Some fossil fuel corporations have pursued strategies focused on steering political de‑
bate and public opinion, with the goal of obtaining favorable regulatory and legislative
outcomes. Fossil fuel corporations and industry groups knew about the realities of cli‑
mate change [57] and air pollution [58] as far back as the 1960s and ’70s, but they have
actively opposed and worked to block stronger climate and pollution policies. This
opposition has come in the form of lobbying [59], campaign contributions [60], funding
research and advocacy [61], and deploying rhetorical strategies emphasizing doubt and
uncertainty [62].
Other fossil fuel corporations have adopted the strategy of funding advocacy organi‑
zations that push gerrymandering efforts or laws designed to suppress voter turnout
[63]. Such initiatives particularly impact communities of color, which tend to vote for
candidates and policies that prioritize environmental protection and climate action [64].
Fossil fuel interests have also pushed for laws that would greatly increase penalties on
climate protesters [65].
Other researchers have noted the troubling financial and political connections between
fossil fuel industries and far‑right authoritarians, both in the U.S. and around the globe.
Malm [66] warns of the dangers of “fossil fascism” and demonstrates the interrelations
74
of racial capitalism, fossil fuel extraction, nationalism, and white supremacy.
Throughout this paper we prefer the phrase “Black, Brown, Indigenous and poor” to col‑
lectively describe the communities that are disproportionately impacted by fossil fuel
racism. In the chapters that follow we summarize a wide range of studies where differ‑
ing demographic terms are used to report results. To maintain accuracy when summa‑
rizing these results we mirror the terms and language used in the underlying study.3
75
4.2.2 Coal
Coal mining causes premature deaths and displaces indigenous peoples.
Healy et al, 19 – Associate Professor of Geography, Salem State University
[Noel Healy, Jennie C. Stephens, and Stephanie Malin; “Fossil fuels are bad for your
health and harmful in many ways besides climate change,” Conversation, 2‑7‑2019,
https://theconversation.com/fossil‑fuels‑are‑bad‑for‑your‑health‑and‑harmful‑in‑
many‑ways‑besides‑climate‑change‑107771, accessed 10‑8‑2023; AD]
Coal
More than 2,000 miners across Appalachia are dying from an advanced stage of black
lung disease. This illness, also known as coal workers’ pneumoconiosis, comes from
inhaling coal mine dust.
And thousands of coal miners have died horrible deaths from silicosis after inhaling tiny
silicon particles in mines. And the communities where oil and gas is being extracted are
exposed to water and air pollution that endangers their health, such as increasing the
risk to certain childhood cancers.
Even living near coal mines or coal‑fired power plants is a health hazard.
A team of Harvard school of public health scientists estimated that 53 premature deaths
per year, 570 emergency room visits, and 14,000 asthma attacks annually could be at‑
tributed to pollution from a coal power plant in Salem, Massachusetts, one of the sites
we studied.
What’s more, the people living within 30 miles of the coal plant, which was replaced
with a natural gas‑burning power station in 2018, were between two and five times more
likely to get respiratory problems and other illnesses than those living farther away do.
But what we call the “hidden injustices” tied to Salem’s coal plant didn’t stop there.
The plant burned coal imported from La Guajira, Colombia, that was mined from Cer‑
rejón, one of the world’s largest open‑pit coal mines. That same mine has displaced
thousands of indigenous people through physical force, coercion and the contamina‑
tion of farmland and drinking water.
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4.2.3 Natural Gas
Natural gas extraction leads to chemical exposure, pollution, and serious accidents.
Natural gas
As coal plants shut down, more natural gas is being burned. That should be cleaner and
safer – right? Not exactly.
First, the methane and other greenhouse gases that leak from natural gas pipelines and
other infrastructure mean that using gas warms the climate nearly as much as coal does.
Second, fracking, horizontal drilling and the other so‑called unconventional methods
for extracting natural gas and oil are introducing new dangers. There is growing evi‑
dence that living close to fracking sites causes various public health complications in‑
cluding: increased risk of birth defects, certain cancers, asthma and other respiratory
ailments, earthquakes, and occupational health and safety problems like exposure to
crystalline silica, a type of sand used during fracking.
Many of the Pennsylvanians we interviewed for our study told us that they feared for
their health due to their potential exposure to the chemicals and toxicants used in frack‑
ing. Other research indicates that living near fracked natural gas wells can increase the
probability of skin and respiratory conditions.
At every stage, natural gas operations can pollute water, air and land, harming ecosys‑
tems.
In California, a catastrophic natural gas leak at Aliso Canyon storage well in 2016
spewed as much pollution as some 600,000 cars would over a year. Hundreds of
neighboring residents experienced nausea, headaches and other health problems.
Natural gas is also highly flammable. Two serious accidents in January 2019, the deadly
gas explosions at a bakery in Paris and the more than 89 people killed in Tlahuelilpan,
Mexico, highlighted how risky natural gas can be.
77
Here in the U.S., a series of deadly explosions and gas‑fueled fires in September 2018
in the Merrimack Valley in Massachusetts intensified debates over the future of natural
gas.
78
4.2.4 Oil
Oil spills cause serious pollution and health hazards, especially on indigenous
lands.
Oil
Despite global reliance on oil and petroleum products like plastics, oil extraction,
whether through traditional drilling technology or fracking, is dangerous. Its distribu‑
tion by pipelines, trains and trucks is also risky.
Decades of oil spills in Nigeria’s oil‑rich Niger Delta has made the region one of the
most polluted places on earth. And the mining of Canada’s tar sands has desecrated
land belonging to First Nations, as most of the indigenous people of Canada are known.
In addition to the environmental devastation of massive oil spills like the Exxon Valdez
and BP’s Deepwater Horizon Gulf oil spill of 2010, these leaks can cause pollution and
serious health hazards.
79
4.2.5 Indigenous Activism
Indigenous groups are calling to prohibit fossil fuel extraction on public lands due
to its detrimental impacts on local populations.
Gladstone et al, 21 – Media and Public Relations Director at Food and Water Watch
[Seth Gladstone, Taylor McKinnon, Aisha Dukule, Jeremy Nichols, and Collin Rees,
“Millions of Americans, Hundreds of Groups Support Halting Fossil Fuel Leasing,
Permitting on Public Lands, Oceans,” Center for Biological Diversity, 1‑25‑2021,
https://biologicaldiversity.org/w/news/press‑releases/millions‑americans‑hundreds‑
groups‑support‑halting‑fossil‑fuel‑leasing‑permitting‑public‑lands‑oceans‑2021‑01‑25/,
WASHINGTON— Environmental justice, Indigenous, climate and conservation groups

from across the country announced today that in recent years they’ve delivered millions
of petitions and public comments, and letters from hundreds of organizations, support‑
ing a halt on new fossil fuel leasing and permitting on public lands and oceans.
The Biden administration is expected to order a leasing ban on Wednesday.
President Biden has promised to ban new leasing and permitting activities. Calls to ban
fracking on federal lands ramped up in 2013 and expanded to oppose all new fossil fuel
leasing in 2015. Nearly every acre of federal lands leased for oil and gas by the Trump
administration is under some form of legal challenge, and many lease sales have been
overturned by the courts.
Millions of people have spoken out from all corners of the United States where federal
fossil development is harming public health and worsening the climate and extinction
crises.
In December nearly 600 groups, representing millions of Americans, sent the Biden tran‑
sition team a draft executive order outlining how the next Interior secretary could im‑
plement the president’s directive.
Statements from communities and groups fighting federal fossil fuel plans across the
country:
“Too many federal lease sales have already sacrificed the Greater Chaco region for short‑
term profit,” said Daniel Tso, Navajo Nation Council delegate and chair of the Health,
Education and Human Services Committee. “Local Navajo communities, through little
or no ‘meaningful consultation,’ have consistently borne too much of the environmental
80
and social impacts from federal oil and gas leasing. As a result, Navajo Nation commu‑
nities in northwestern New Mexico have suffered increased coronavirus morbidity, a
methane cloud visible from space, and some of the worst air quality in the U.S. There
has to be a balance point: people over money. I welcome an end to federal fossil fuel
leasing and the necessary transitions to more sustainable economies for the Navajo Na‑
tion.”
“The waters of the Gulf of Mexico are being polluted, which is throwing all life out of
balance. Rapid expansion by the fossil fuel industry threatens our coastal communities
and our ways of living,” said Juan Mancias, tribal chairman of the Carrizo Comecrudo
Tribe of Texas. “The Deepwater Horizon disaster showed the damage even a single spill
can do to our waters and the environment — it’s time to end new leases for oil and gas.”
“We need to end Arctic oil drilling, both offshore and on federal lands,” said Dune
Lankard, executive director of Native Conservancy in Alaska. “Like many Alaskans
who were devastated by the Exxon Valdez oil spill, as an original Native inhabitant,
commercial and subsistence fisherman, I intimately understand how dirty and danger‑
ous all oil drilling is. Here we are 30‑plus years later and our fisheries and wildlife have
never fully recovered from the Exxon spill. It’s time that we as a human race unite and
come together, and take care of our planet, including our communities, wildlife, climate
and keep this oil in the ground.”
“For too long, Appalachian Ohio has been a sacrifice zone, making the Ohio River one
of the most contaminated bodies of water in the country. The fracking boom in this area
has degraded the environment and has threatened the health and safety of its residents
with pollution, gas leaks, and explosions, while failing to deliver the economic benefits
the industry promised,” said Becca Pollard with Keep Wayne Wild in Ohio. “Halting
new fossil fuel leasing on public land, and on the Wayne National Forest, is a major step
toward protecting the ecology, air, water and scenic beauty of the Wayne National Forest
and surrounding communities. An end to fracking on public lands in the watershed
and across the country will cause an immediate increase in water, soil and air quality
and the overall health of the streams, forests and wildlife of the region. We eagerly
await additional measures that will end this harmful mineral extraction in the region
altogether.”
“The extraction of fossil fuels has had a devastating impact on public lands, destroying
and fragmenting wildlife habitats and causing catastrophic declines for species like the
greater sage grouse,” said Erik Molvar, executive director of Western Watersheds Project
in Laramie, Wyoming. “Climate change and direct habitat loss are the twin causes of the
81
current biodiversity crisis, and we should seize the opportunity to make public lands
an oasis for native wildlife by keeping fossil fuels in the ground on federal lands and
mineral estates.”
“Climate pollution is warming and drying the Colorado River to the detriment of peo‑
ple and endangered species alike,” said John Weisheit, conservation director of Living
Rivers in Moab, Utah. “A ban on new federal fossil fuel leasing is a critical step toward
protecting the river that is literally the lifeblood of the American Southwest. The Col‑
orado River’s future will turn on our ability to shift to low‑carbon, low‑water energy
systems, so the dangerous policies of the last administration must be changed with ur‑
gency and vigor.”
“The North Fork Valley in Southwest Colorado is in the middle of a climate hotspot
warming faster than the global average and has been calling for no new oil and gas
leasing of our surrounding public lands and watershed for over a decade. 53,000 no‑
leasing public comments were submitted to the Bureau of Land Management in 2016,
and ignored when the BLM approved the Uncompahgre Resource Management Plan
in April 2020 to open up 95% of BLM lands and minerals to oil and gas leasing,” said
Natasha Léger, executive director at Citizens for a Healthy Community in Paonia, Col‑
orado. “A ban on new fossil fuel leasing and permitting on public lands is critical to
our hard‑fought efforts to preserve vital local ecosystems necessary for a resilient and
livable future.”
“The Obama‑Biden ‘all of the above’ energy strategy included leasing over 5 million
acres of public lands for fracking and drilling, and Trump only made things worse,” said
Thomas Meyer, national organizing manager at Food & Water Watch. “The American
people heard Biden’s commitment to ban fracking on public lands, and they gave him
a mandate to act. If President Biden really plans to listen to the science and ‘build back
better,’ then banning fracking on public lands should be at the top of his to‑do list.”
“We’re in a climate crisis and can’t afford one more acre of public land being committed
to destructive fossil fuel development,” said Taylor McKinnon, a senior campaigner at
the Center for Biological Diversity. “There are already more fossil fuels being developed
in the world than can be safely burned. It’s time to stop expanding fossil fuel extraction
and begin phasing it out altogether. We’re looking forward to President Biden taking
this important first step.”
“For years, people across the country have demanded action to halt fossil fuel leasing,”
said Nicole Ghio, Friends of the Earth senior fossil fuels program manager. “The Biden
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administration must keep its promise to end new drilling on public lands and build a
just transition that serves workers and communities.”
“It’s critical for President Biden to take swift action to not only end the sale of pub‑
lic lands for fracking, but undo the damage done by the Trump administration,” said
Jeremy Nichols, climate and energy program director for WildEarth Guardians in New
Mexico. “With record legal challenges, the federal oil and gas program is nothing but an
injustice. President Biden needs to put public lands to work for people and the climate,
not for the fossil fuel industry.”
“The climate math is simple — we’re in a hole, and we need to stop digging,” said Collin
Rees, senior campaigner with Oil Change International. “Climate leadership in 2021
means keeping fossil fuels in the ground and investing in an equitable transition for
communities and workers. Joe Biden needs to Build Back Fossil Free and ending oil
and gas leasing on public lands and waters would be a very good early step.”
“The arrival of Biden’s administration brings us hope that our country will adopt poli‑
cies that lead us to a safer and more livable environment for all Americans, but especially
for those of us who live, study and work in environmental justice communities. We can‑
not wait anymore, we are choking with smoke from wildfires, we have thousands of oil
rigs in our backyards and leaking storage tanks poisoning us with benzene and other
toxins,” said Cesar Aguirre, a community organizer with the Central California Envi‑
ronmental Justice Network and a resident of Bakersfield in Kern County. “Millions of
people living in California have been the target of irresponsible administrations — fed‑
eral and local — that deny the climate crisis and continue gambling our health on the
fossil fuel industry, especially in Kern County. We are ready for a change under Biden’s
leadership.”
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4.3 Other Environmental Impacts
4.3.1 Air Pollution
Burning fossil fuels emits air pollutants that create health and environmental
hazards.
UCS, 16 – national nonprofit organization founded more than 50 years ago by scien‑
tists and students at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; includes 250 scientists,
analysts, policy experts and strategic communicators
[Union of Concerned Scientists, “The Hidden Costs of Fossil Fuels,” 8‑30‑2016,

https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/hidden‑costs‑fossil‑fuels, accessed 10‑8‑2023; AD]
Air pollution
Burning fossil fuels emits a number of air pollutants that are harmful to both the envi‑
ronment and public health.
Sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions, primarily the result of burning coal, contribute to acid
rain and the formation of harmful particulate matter. In addition, SO2 emissions can
exacerbate respiratory ailments, including asthma, nasal congestion, and pulmonary
inflammation [37]. In 2014, fossil fuel combustion at power plants accounted for 64
percent of US SO2 emissions [38].
Nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions, a byproduct of all fossil fuel combustion, contribute
to acid rain and ground‑level ozone (smog), which can burn lung tissue and can make
people more susceptible to asthma, bronchitis, and other chronic respiratory diseases.
Fossil fuel‑powered transportation is the primary contributor to US NOx emissions [39].
Acid rain is formed when sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides mix with water, oxygen,
and other chemicals in the atmosphere, leading to rain and other precipitation that is
mildly acidic. Acidic precipitation increases the acidity of lakes and streams, which can
be harmful to fish and other aquatic organisms. It can also damage trees and weaken
forest ecosystems [40].
Particulate matter (soot) emissions produce haze and can cause chronic bronchitis, ag‑
gravated asthma, and elevated occurrence of premature death. In 2010, it is estimated
that fine particle pollution from US coal plants resulted in 13,200 deaths, 9,700 hospi‑
talizations, and 20,000 heart attacks. The impacts are particularly severe among the
84
young, the elderly, and those who suffer from respiratory disease. The total health cost
was estimated to be more than ~$100 billion per year [41].
Coal‑fired power plants are the largest source of mercury emissions to the air in the
United States [42, 43]. As airborne mercury settles onto the ground, it washes into bodies
of water where it accumulates in fish, and subsequently passes through the food chain to
birds and other animals. The consumption of mercury‑laden fish by pregnant women
has been associated with neurological and neurobehavioral effects in infants. Young
children are also at risk [44].
A number of studies have sought to quantify the health costs associated with fossil fuel‑
related air pollution. The National Academy of Sciences assessed the costs of SO2, NOx,
and particulate matter air pollution from coal and reported an annual cost of ~$62 bil‑
lion for 2005 —approximately 3.2 cents per kilowatt‑hour (kWh) [45]. A separate study
estimated that the pollution costs from coal combustion, including the effects of volatile
organic compounds (VOCs) and ozone, was approximately ~$187 billion annually, or
9.3 cents per kWh [46].
A 2013 study also assessed the economic impacts of fossil fuel use, including illnesses,
premature mortality, workdays lost, and direct costs to the healthcare system associated
with emissions of particulates, NOx, and SO2. This study found an average economic
cost (or “public health added cost”) of 32 cents per kWh for coal, 13 cents per kWh for
oil, and 2 cents per kWh for natural gas [47]. While cost estimates vary depending on
each study’s scope and assumptions, together they demonstrate the significant and real
economic costs that unpriced air emissions impose on society.
Fossil fuel transportation emissions represent the largest single source of toxic air pol‑
lution in the U.S., accounting for over a third of carbon monoxide (CO) and NOx emis‑
sions.
85
4.3.2 Water Use
Fossil fuel extraction causes freshwater depletion and thermal pollution that harms
biodiversity.

Water use
Across the United States, the demand for electricity is colliding with the need for healthy
and abundant freshwater. Nationwide, fossil fuel and nuclear power plants have been
found to withdraw as much water as all farms and more than four times as much as all
residences. More than 80 percent of this power plant cooling water originates in lakes
and rivers, directly impacting local ecosystems and often competing with other uses,
such as agriculture and recreation. As of 2008, about 20 percent of U.S. watersheds
were experiencing water‑supply stress. Power plants substantially contributed to the
water stress in one‑fifth of these watersheds [48].
Power plants that return water to nearby rivers, lakes, or the ocean can harm wildlife
through what is known as “thermal pollution.” Thermal pollution occurs due to the
degradation of water quality resulting from changes in water temperature. Some power
plants have large impacts on the temperature of nearby water sources, particularly coal
plants with once‑through cooling systems. For a typical 600‑megawatt once‑through
system, 70 to 180 billion gallons of water cycle through the power plant before being
released back into a nearby source. This water is much hotter (by up to 25°F) than when
the water was initially withdrawn. Because this heated water contains lower levels of
dissolved oxygen, its reintroduction to aquatic ecosystems can stress native wildlife,
increasing heart rates in fish and decreasing fish fertility.
86
4.3.3 Fossil Fuel Waste
Fossil fuel waste harms public health and fragile ecosystems.

Fossil fuel waste
Although fossil fuels contain large amounts of energy, they’re rarely found in a pure,
unadulterated state. Instead, they are typically refined and purified into a usable form,
leaving excess waste material that requires disposal. The handling and disposal of this
waste results in costly environmental and community health challenges.
Coal waste
Coal is known for being a dirty fuel, not just because of its high carbon content compared
with other fossil fuels but also because it contains a large amount of toxic heavy metals
and other chemicals.
If the coal contains high levels of sulfur—as does most coal from the eastern US—it
must be cleaned and refined before it’s burned in a power plant. This process involves
crushing and washing the coal to remove waste materials. The purified coal is then
transported to its final destination, leaving behind coal slurry, a watery waste that con‑
tains arsenic, mercury, chromium, cadmium, and other heavy metals. As much as 50
percent of pre‑processed coal materials can end up as highly toxic waste [49].
Others harmful materials remain as excess waste when the coal is burned. After com‑
bustion, the material left behind is known as coal ash, consisting of fly ash and bottom
ash. Fly ash is the material that is captured by pollution control equipment in the coal
plant’s smokestacks. If the plant does not have pollution control equipment, this waste
is emitted directly as air pollution. Bottom ash is the substance that remains at the bot‑
tom of the furnace. Both fly ash and bottom ash contain large amounts of toxic heavy
metals and require careful—and costly—disposal.
Coal slurry (pre‑combustion waste) and coal ash (post‑combustion waste) are stored in
large reservoir impoundments. There are over a thousand coal slurry impoundments
87
and coal ash waste sites in the US, many of which contain hundreds of millions of gallons
of waste [50, 51].
If the reservoirs are unlined (as are at least 42 percent of US coal combustion waste ponds
and landfills) or if lined reservoirs are not properly maintained, harmful chemicals can
leach into surface and groundwater supplies. The presence of toxic heavy metals in
drinking water has been found to cause cancer, birth defects, reproductive disorders,
neurological damage, learning disabilities, and kidney disease [52].
The EPA has identified 53 coal ash ponds that are classified as a “high hazard”, mean‑
ing that a failure at one of these impoundments would cause serious property damage,
injuries, illness, and death [53]. Over the last several decades, there have been several
dozen spills at such reservoirs in Appalachia, including the 2000 Martin County Coal
Company spill, the 2008 Tennessee Valley Authority spill, and the 2014 Duke Energy
Dan River Spill [54].
Oil and gas wastewater
When oil and gas are extracted, water previously trapped within geologic formations is
brought to the surface. This “produced water” can carry with it dissolved solids, heavy
metals, hydrocarbons, and naturally occurring radioactive materials in quantities that
make it unsuitable for human consumption and difficult to dispose of safely [55]. Ex‑
traction companies often temporarily store this water in open‑air pits with impermeable
liners to avoid seepage, but heavy rain can cause these pits to overflow. Covered hold‑
ing tanks offer a more secure temporary storage option [56].
Oil and gas wastewater can also impact aquatic wildlife. Oil and grease leaked into wa‑
ter systems can adhere to fish and waterfowl and destroy algae and plankton, disrupt‑
ing the primary food sources of fragile aquatic ecosystems. And heavy metals in the
wastewater can be toxic to fish, even in low concentrations, and may be passed through
the food chain, adversely affecting humans and larger animals [57].
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4.4 Economic Growth
4.4.1 Costs of Emissions
The costs of emissions on public lands are high and projected to increase.
Ratledge et al, 22 – Research Fellow at the University of Colorado’s Mortenson Center

in Global Engineering & Resilience
[Nathan Ratledge, Laura Zachary, and Chase Huntley, “Emissions from fossil fuels pro‑
duced on US federal lands and waters present opportunities for climate mitigation,” Cli‑
matic Change 171, 11 (2022), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10584‑021‑03302‑
x, accessed 10‑3‑2023; AD]
Historic emissions (2005–2019) averaged over 1,400 MMTCO2e annually (Fig. 1a and b),
equivalent to roughly 23% of total US emissions (US Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) 2021). Over this 15‑year period, total federal lands emissions declined by 22%.
Emissions associated with federal coal led the decline, falling by 38%, and natural gas
emissions dropped by 37%. Federal oil emissions, however, rose by 60% due to onshore
and offshore production growth, offsetting some of the declines in the coal and gas
sectors.
The estimated costs to society from these historic emissions averaged ~$57 billion per
year in 2020 dollars, more than 5 times the average federal mineral revenue collected
per year (US Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) 2021). Altogether, federal
emissions for years 2005 through 2019 carry a cumulative cost of more than ~$850 billion.
Looking forward, our model finds modest changes to total future federal energy pro‑
duction by 2030 (Fig. 1a), decreasing by just 5% between 2019 and 2030. Coal continues
its decline, losing 23% of federal production by 2030. Declines in onshore gas produc‑
tion are partially offset by increases in offshore gas, − 22% and + 15% respectively. Both
onshore and offshore oil are expected to continue growing at 8% and 24% respectively,
contributing an additional 190 million barrels per year by 2030.
Total emissions associated with the extraction and combustion of these fuels drop from
1,550 to 1,130 MMTCO2e between 2005 and 2030, 27%. However, the majority of these
emissions reductions occurred between 2005 and 2019. We find that emissions are pro‑
jected to fall only 6.4% between 2019 and 2030, from 1,208 to 1,130 MMTCO2e.
Continuing their historic declines, coal emissions are predicted to decrease by another
89
21% below 2019 by 2030, an additional 114 MMTCO2e. Future emissions from off‑
shore gas increase by nearly 9 MMTCO2e, while onshore gas emissions decrease by
47 MMTCO2e in our projections. Federal oil emissions increase by a combined 75
MMTCO2e in our model, nearly canceling out the bulk of the reductions from the coal
sector’s projected decline. Dropping federal coal and onshore gas production are not
surprising given the continuing declines in coal demand and a presumed decline in
onshore federal gas production, as new US gas production will likely come more from
non‑federal lands.
The annual cost to society of future federal fuel emissions are substantial. We compute
the annual cost ranges from ~$55 to ~$76 billion per year between 2020 and 2030, for an
aggregate cost of ~$602 to ~$830 billion. Added to the historic costs, we find the social
cost of emissions from fuels produced on federal lands and waters between 2005 and
2030 could be over ~$1.6 trillion.
When looking at the 2005 to 2030 trend lines we note that the majority of emissions
reductions were made between 2010 and 2016, when natural gas began rapidly replacing
coal in the electricity sector, due in part to the falling costs of natural gas (Marsters et
al. 2017), and before unconventional oil development had begun to grow on federal
lands. Based on the EIA’s projected data, and without new policies or market shifts,
our modeling predicts minimal additional emissions reductions stemming from fuels
produced on federal lands and waters. This thesis is reinforced in the federal fuels case
because some of the cheapest fuels in the US lie under federal lands, they are effectively
subsidized with leasing and production fees that have not been updated in decades, and
many already‑leased parcels have ample future supply (US Government Accountability
Office 2019).
90
4.4.2 Fossil Fuels Unsustainable
Fossil fuels are financially unsustainable because of their low energy return on
investment – that causes economic stagnation.
Ahmed, 20 – investigative journalist, author and academic; editor of INSURGE Intelli‑

gence
[Ahmed, Nafeez Mosaddeq, “The Rising Costs of Fossil‑Fuel Extraction: An Energy

Crisis That Will Not Go Away,” Wiley Online Library, 7‑22‑2020, https://onlinelibrary.
wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/ajes.12336, accessed 10‑3‑2023; AD]
Section One: Energy Return on Investment as an Economic Fundamental
The economic boom of the past two centuries relied on readily accessible fossil‑fuel
sources. The extraction of that fuel required very little energy input compared with
its high energy output. The resulting energy surplus facilitated nearly continuous eco‑
nomic growth. The most energy‑rich and accessible fossil fuels have been extracted,
and the world has begun an energy descent pathway. As a result, economic growth is
faltering and cannot be sustained.
The viewpoint expressed in that short summary of the energy descent pathway is a
world apart from the mainstream economic theories that have guided policymakers.
So, a brief explanation of the guiding economic principles of energy descent is in order.
The views expressed here are strongly informed by researchers working under the
rubrics “biophysical economics” and “ecological economics.”1 A key concept for this
discussion is “energy return on investment” (EROI), an idea pioneered by Charles
A. S. Hall and explored at length by Hall and Klitgaard (2018). (Some authors prefer
“EROEI” or “energy return on energy invested,” which clarifies that energy, not money,
is the investment metric here.) The concept is rooted in biology and ecology. All living
creatures require energy in usable forms, and getting that energy also requires an
expenditure of energy. It is essential that the energy returned from the effort is greater
than the energy expended in the effort. For example, a fox needs to catch and eat
another animal. But if the fox continually expends more calories chasing rabbits than
it gets from eating the ones it catches (an EROI below 1), then that fox will not survive.
Extending the analysis one small step, a family of foxes needs to gather enough energy
cumulatively to more than cover their energy expenditures in raising fox kits to an
age when they can gather their own food. The need for an EROI above 1 is just as
91
important for human societies, although the energy system dynamics can become very
complicated.
Because the concept of EROI is fundamental to biophysical economics and is fundamen‑

tal to so much of the analysis in this article, I will review the basics of this theory here,
and then discuss refinements to the theory, where needed, later in this article and in the
article following this one (Kreps 2020).
EROI is a simple ratio, and does not in itself indicate anything about the amount of
energy produced. An oil field that produces 1 million barrels of oil a day could have
the same EROI as a single oil well producing 1,000 barrels a day. That EROI could be
high or low or in‑between.
EROI indicates the ratio between the total energy output of a source—for example, an oil
well or a whole complex of wells—and the amount of energy expended in drilling and
operating the wells (the energy investment). As a ratio, EROI is sometimes specified
as “10:1” or “10 to 1,” but the concluding “1” is often assumed and EROI values are
referred to simply by values such as “30,” “15,” or “2.5.”
In the example above, if the whole field and the single well each had an EROI of 10, then
for each 10 barrels of oil output, the energy equivalent of one barrel of oil was invested to
drill the wells and keep them operating. Therefore the net energy output would be nine
barrels of oil—9/10 or 90 percent of the total energy output. The net energy output is the
part that can fuel other economic activity, and the net energy output—also sometimes
referred to as energy surplus—drops dramatically for EROI values under 10. This is
often illustrated in a simple graph (Figure 1) known as the “energy cliff,” a concept first
introduced by Euan Mearns (2008) as a “net energy cliff.” The key relationships to keep
in mind are these:
The Energy Cliff Note: The “energy cliff” refers to the rapid drop‑off in net energy out‑
put for low energy return on investment ratios (with lower EROI values at the right side
of the graph). The net energy output is 98 percent of total energy output when EROI is
50, and 90 percent when EROI is 10, but net energy output plummets for EROI values
less than 8. At the far right edge of this scale, an EROI of 1 means the total energy output
= energy investment, leaving a net energy output of 0.
As shown in Figure 1, when EROI is very high—anywhere from 50 down to about 10—
net energy output (shown as dark blue) is, by far, the biggest share of total energy output.
The consequence is that, in societies with high‑EROI energy systems, the energy sector
uses only a small proportion of its own energy output, and almost all the output of this
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sector is net energy output, or energy surplus for other economic activities.
Energy provisioning systems with extremely high EROI were a very recent develop‑
ment in human history. Both our global economic systems and our dominant economic
theories have been developed during this brief period of very high EROI. As we dis‑
cuss in subsequent pages, both the onset of high‑EROI values and the gradual decline
of EROI in recent decades have had and will have major economic implications.
Economic Orthodoxy as an Artifact of a High‑EROI Economy
During long periods of history when agrarian societies dominated, farmers relied on
high levels of skill and soil fertility to harvest food‑energy in excess of energy expended
in growing the crops. Energy use took the forms of people’s dietary consumption,
the consumption of crops by animals raised for pulling plows and carts, and biomass
burned for cooking or heating.
The EROI in such societies was low, estimated by one Cornell University researcher as
ranging from 1.1 to 1.6 (Staniford 2010). Taking the mid‑point of that range—an EROI of
1.35—we can calculate both energy invested and net energy. Total energy is 1.35 times
energy invested. Taking total energy output as 100 percent, invested energy can be
calculated as 100/1.35 or 74.1 percent, leaving 25.9 percent as net energy. The proportion
available as net energy thus ranges from 9.1 percent of the total (for an EROI of 1.1) to
37.5 percent (for an EROI of 1.6 percent). Thus, the majority of labor was devoted to
producing (through farming and forestry) the energy required simply to maintain the
agrarian labor force (the “energy sector”). A small surplus—from 9.1 to 37.5 percent of
the total—supported others: priests, royalty, soldiers, artisans, and toolmakers.
A further consequence of low‑EROI economies was that most people received their sub‑
sistence directly from their own work, as there was little surplus to support buying and
selling in markets:
The small energy surplus that could be extracted from solar flow produced only a small
economic surplus. This small surplus was exchanged infrequently. What we know as
the marketplace was not a part of daily life for most in the medieval era and before.
(Klitgaard 2013: 279)
In contrast, the discovery of ways to extract and to use fossil fuels led to economies
based on very high EROI. Hall and Klitgaard (2018) cite a range of EROI estimates for
fossil‑fuel extraction in the second half of the 20th century, ranging from 80 for some
coal resources, to the high 60s for some conventional oil and gas resources (Hall and
Klitgaard 2018: 398–399).
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In a society running on such high‑EROI resources, a small number of people employed

in energy procurement can provide a large energy surplus that can fuel many other eco‑
nomic sectors. The goods and services produced with this surplus can be exchanged
in the market, which thus can assume a very prominent role. As Klitgaard (2013: 278)
explains, currently dominant economic theories were conceived during this brief period
of extraordinarily high energy availability and rapidly growing surplus. Historian Tim‑
othy Mitchell (2013: 123, 124) further explains that today’s widely accepted view of the
economy only took hold in the mid‑20th century, at a time when EROI levels were at
a historical peak and fossil‑energy resources seemed, to many people, practically inex‑
haustible:
John Maynard Keynes, the economist who played a leading role in devising the post‑
war apparatus for tying the value of money to the movement of oil, helped formulate
and describe another innovation of the mid‑twentieth century: the modern apparatus
of calculation and government that came to be called “the economy.” … In the era
that Keynes’s thinking helped to define, the supply of carbon energy was no longer a
practical limit to economic possibility. What mattered was the proper circulation of
banknotes.
Until around 1950, biophysically‑oriented economists were able to raise concerns about
resource exhaustion in economic discussions. After that, they lost the battle for influence
to the price theorists. Mitchell (2013: 132) summarizes these trends:
Many economists were concerned to measure the exhaustion of the earth, … [but after
1950] economics became instead a science of money; its object was not the material forces
and resources of nature and human labour, but a new space that was opened up between
nature on one side and human society and culture on the other—the not‑quite‑natural,
not‑quite‑social space that came to be called “the economy.”
The overwhelming emphasis on market exchange was crystallized in three letters: GDP
or gross domestic product—the sum of all goods and services bought and sold, as mea‑
sured in currency. Everyone—financiers, politicians, and voters alike—“knows” that in
a healthy economy, the GDP is always growing.
But this economic orthodoxy is a poor framework to explain what is actually happening
in the world, for many reasons, including the following two.
First, bank notes and the money supply can grow infinitely—but physical resources
and the carrying capacity of our ecosystems do not. The fixation on the measurement of
productive activity in monetary terms has fed a widespread belief in both the possibility
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and necessity of infinite economic growth.
Second, the simple‑minded emphasis on the market value of energy resources drasti‑
cally underestimates the foundational role of those resources in the economy. As long
as energy resources remain cheap (and as long as we do not count the social and envi‑
ronmental externalities), orthodox economics measures the energy sector as a small part
of the overall economy. But that misses the point, say Hall and Klitgaard (2018: 77):
Curiously, energy’s low price is the reason for its importance, not its unimportance. For
200 years the economy has received huge benefits from energy without having to divert
much of its output to get it. This is because basically we do not pay nature for energy,
but only the cost of exploiting it.
When the best energy resources are exhausted and it takes substantially more resources
and workers to secure adequate energy supplies, then there will be less energy surplus
and fewer workers to grow other sectors of the economy. This is summed up by finan‑
cial analyst Tim Morgan (2016: 137) as “energy sprawl”:
In physical terms, the infrastructure required to access energy and deliver it to where
it is needed is going to expand exponentially. At the same time, the proportion of GDP
absorbed by the energy infrastructure is going to increase as well, which means that the
rest of the economy will shrink. … Far from being a prediction, energy sprawl describes
what is already happening.
Declining EROI and the End of Economic Growth
Energy historians who have studied economies in terms of EROI have documented a
significant drop in EROI since a high point in the 20th century. Hall and Klitgaard
(2018: 97) conclude that “[i]n the case of petroleum from the United States … the EROI
has declined from at least 30 to 1 in 1970 to 18 to 1 in the late 1990s.” Tim Morgan (2016:
128) adds:
We are now experiencing a sharp deterioration in the availability of surplus energy, a

trend evident in a decline in the global average EROEI [energy return on energy in‑
vested] to about 13:1 [in 2013] from 23:1 in 2000 and 37:1 in 1990.
At this juncture it is important to make clear the difference between “peak oil” and “peak
EROI.” The key is recognizing that not all of the energy “produced” by our energy sec‑
tors is useful to us. The only part of energy output that is useful is the part that is in
excess of the energy inputs. Theoretically, fossil‑fuel extraction could expand into more
and more difficult areas and continue to grow until it was producing vast amounts of en‑
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ergy output that just equaled the energy inputs. In that absurd situation, fossil‑fuel out‑
puts would be at an all‑time high, but the net outputs or usable energy surplus would be
zero. Nevertheless, it is possible to operate individual projects with negative net energy
(EROI less than 1) with an energy subsidy from elsewhere. Such projects can currently
exist, but an entire civilization that operates with negative net energy would collapse
quickly.
In our current world, fossil‑fuel energy output is still growing, so we have not reached
“peak oil” in terms of total output. But if the above‑cited analysts are correct that we
have reached “peak EROI,” then the useful energy surplus has either stopped growing,
or it is growing at a slower pace than the extractive industry requires to produce this sur‑
plus. In other words, the effects of a declining EROI are currently being masked by the
high influx of capital into projects to extract oil and gas from marginal sources. Because
the world petroleum market is increasingly dependent on difficult‑to‑extract resources,
including shale oil and gas, tar sands, and deep‑water, offshore wells, it seems reason‑
able to expect average EROI ratios to continue dropping. We will look at this trend and
its implications through a survey by Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed and through a look at
the brief history and uncertain future of fracking in the United States.
Section Two: Consequences of the Depletion of Conventional Fossil Fuels
Ahmed (2017) looks at major changes in oil production both in terms of the dramatic ef‑
fects in specific countries and in terms of impact on the global economy. For decades we
have heard about the vast and cheap oil resources in the Middle East, but Ahmed (2017:
50) finds that several countries in the region have already passed their peak production,
with drastic consequences.
Prior to the onset of war, the Syrian state was experiencing declining oil revenues, driven
by the peak of its conventional oil production in 1996. Even before the war, the country’s
rate of oil production had plummeted by nearly half, from a peak of just under 610,000
barrels per day (bpd) to approximately 385,000 bpd in 2010. (Ahmed 2017: 50)
The drop in fiscal revenues forced steep cuts in social services, which combined with
severe environmental pressures to make life intolerable for much of the population.
Turning to Yemen, Ahmed (2017: 53) found a parallel situation in which a decline in oil
revenues is undermining the capacity of the state to serve citizens:
Around 2001, Yemen’s oil production reached its peak, since then declining from 450,000
barrels per day (bbd), to 259,000 bpd in 2010, and as of 2014 hitting 100,000 bpd. … This
has led to a drastic decline in Yemen’s oil exports, which has eaten into government rev‑
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enues, 75% of which had depended on oil exports. … The decline in post‑peak Yemen
state revenues has reduced the government’s capacity to sustain even basic social in‑
vestments.
Likewise, in Egypt, Ahmed (2017: 64) discovers that energy descent is the culprit behind
social and political fragmentation: “The unsung villain of political turbulence in Egypt
is the peak of its conventional oil production.” From 1993 to 2009, Egypt’s oil production
dropped by about 24 percent, while the annual increase in domestic oil consumption
was about 3 percent. Again, the resulting revenue crunch for the Egyptian government
led to damaging social service cuts for the population.
This region, in Ahmed’s terms, is suffering simultaneous “environmental system desta‑

bilization” and “human system destabilization.” The result for millions of inhabitants
has been hellish, and the turmoil has reached far beyond individual nation‑state bor‑
ders.
On a global scale, oil production in Syria, Yemen, and Egypt was never a large part of
world trade. The same cannot be said of Saudi Arabia. Ahmed (2017: 57) cites one
study that predicts a peak in Saudi oil production by 2028. A peak in Saudi production
is just part of a bigger problem for the global economy because the steadily increasing
internal consumption of oil in Saudi Arabia will mean Saudi oil exports drop faster than
its production drops. By the early 2030s, Ahmed writes, net oil revenues for the Saudi
regime may decline to zero. With the country 80 percent dependent on imported food,
this would mean a severe internal crisis. Externally, this would also mean that there
would be little of the low‑cost, high‑EROI Saudi oil on the world market.
Countries like China and India, whose economies have continued to grow rapidly up
to now, will compete for that oil with an increasingly needy Europe: “Around 2000,
Europe produced up to 25% of its own oil, but today this has declined to 13%” (Ahmed
2017: 77).
The projections of future oil demand presume, of course, that the world community
continues a pattern of delaying serious climate action and continues to rely on fossil‑
fuel energy sources. It is unknown whether or when intensifying ecosystem crises will
shake the hegemony of the fossil‑fuel interests. Likewise, it is unknown how long a
sufficient number of people will be able to afford increasingly expensive fossil energy.
In economic terms, there is no “demand” for things that people simply cannot afford.
We will touch on these questions later in this essay and in the following article (Kreps
2020).
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First, though, we will look at a country that has been one of the globe’s biggest oil pro‑
ducers, biggest consumers, and biggest importers—a country whose boosters now like
to call “Saudi America.”
The Unsustainable Economics of Saudi America
In just over 10 years, the rapid growth of shale oil and gas became one of the biggest
business stories in the United States. The fuel in shale deposits is referred to as “tight
oil” and “tight gas” because it must be freed from shale rock layers through hydraulic
fracturing—“fracking.” The shale revolution boosted U.S. petroleum production dra‑
matically, giving rise to the nickname “Saudi America” and to claims that the United
States was becoming “energy independent.” The following discussion summarizes the
view that the shale revolution is a case of turning to much lower EROI oil than the U.S.
and world economies used in the past century. In biophysical economics terms, “low
EROI” is another way of saying “high cost.” Thus, the shale revolution cannot produce
a large net energy surplus for the United States, no matter how high total energy output
might become.
The shale revolution also highlights a scenario where the true, high cost of a resource
in EROI terms may not be reflected in its market or financial price, at least in the short
term. This is vividly illustrated by the drastic plunge in the market price of oil in the
COVID‑19 pandemic; this was caused by a temporarily dramatic mismatch between
market demand and the current supply of oil, but the low price does not at all reflect
the high energy cost of producing much of that oil supply.
At the outset of this discussion, however, it is important to note that accurate estimates of
the EROI of shale oil and gas are particularly hard to establish, for several reasons. The
fracking boom—particularly fracking for oil—has happened primarily in areas where
conventional oil was discovered and tapped decades ago. Some of the required infras‑
tructure was already in place; and, furthermore, the fracked oil and gas may be com‑
bined with conventional petroleum in production reports.
To estimate the EROI of an oil or gas well, or of a field of wells, requires data on all
the energy inputs. For fracked wells, that would require good data on the energy to
prepare drill pads and sometimes new roads to the pads; energy to drill the well; energy
to truck hundreds of loads of water and specialized sand to the well; energy to force
water, sand, and chemicals into the well at high enough pressure to fracture the shale;
energy to haul away the contaminated water that comes back up; and energy to truck
the oil to collection points. (The thousands of scattered wells do not facilitate collection
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by pipeline.)
These energy investments have been managed by many different companies working
as contractors in a fast‑moving business environment, so data collection is a challenge.
As for the energy return part of the ratio, that too is a fast‑moving target.
In contrast to production in major conventional oil fields, where a well might yield ap‑
proximately the same number of barrels each year for decades, it quickly became clear
that fracked wells deplete far more rapidly—70–90 percent within three years. Produc‑
tion can only be maintained by drilling new wells continuously, but frackers keep trying
new drilling techniques, and move to areas that may or may not be “sweet spots.” So a
figure as basic as “average output per well per year” is hard to nail down.
It is possible to estimate that the overall EROI of U.S. petroleum extraction has been
dropping during the same period that the fracking boom developed, but it is much
harder to pinpoint how much of the decline in EROI is due to the growing proportion
of fracked resources. We may not have good answers on the EROI of fracked oil and
gas until the fracking boom is over.
There is indirect evidence, however, to suggest that the fracking boom is producing poor
returns—evidence from financial reports and markets that should, over the longer term,
reflect falling energy return on investment.
Cambridge University economist Helen Thompson looked at this evidence with a view
to answering two big questions: Why did global oil production increase only slowly
from 2000 to 2008 in spite of a record oil price spike? and Why did the fracking boom
occur only after the 2008 financial crash, and then continue in spite of dramatic swings
in oil prices?
Thompson (2017: 18, 20) notes that the George W. Bush administration “appeared from
the onset to conceive of oil supply as an urgent strategic problem.” But in spite of dele‑
gating Vice‑President Dick Cheney to chair a task force on this problem, and in spite of
rapid price increases that should have led to a boost in supply, “the Bush, Jr. adminis‑
tration’s energy strategy did little to increase the supply of oil over the first eight years
of the twenty‑first century.”
Central bankers in Western nations were preoccupied after 2008 with maintaining
steady economic growth and staving off inflation. The rapidly climbing price of oil
made this difficult, if not impossible. High oil prices stifled economic growth, but even
high prices for oil were not enough to make the exploitation of unconventional oil
profitable.
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The problem went deeper than financial markets. The problem was as deep as geology.
In order to significantly expand production, oil companies needed to turn increasingly
to bitumen sands, shale oil, and deep‑water offshore resources.
Thompson (2017: 48) writes that shale oil “has heavy extraction costs and requires con‑
tinuous capital investment and ongoing drilling to prevent rapid decline since each in‑
dividual well produces only a small amount of oil.” Mere high prices were not enough
to spark a significant growth in fracked oil production: “it is dependent on high prices
and cheap credit” (emphasis added).
Before the new “Saudi America” (the name for the U.S. fracking boom) could be born,
difficult geology needed a partner in improbable finance: the zero‑interest‑rate policy
(ZIRP) that came into being following the financial crash and subsequent recession of
2008. Thompson (2017: 49, 50) writes:
Without the extraordinary monetary expansion over which Western central banks have
presided since 2008 the post‑crisis world as we have known it would be unrecognizable,
and the rise of non‑conventional oil production would not have been possible. … QE
[quantitative easing] and ZIRP hugely increased the availability of credit to the energy
sector. ZIRP allowed oil companies to borrow from banks at extremely low interest
rates, with the worth of syndicated loans to the oil and gas sectors rising from ~$600
billion in 2006 to ~$1.6 trillion in 2014. Meanwhile, in raising the price and depressing
the yield of the relatively safe assets central banks purchased, QE created incentives
for investors to buy assets with a higher yield, including significantly riskier corporate
bonds and equities. … This rise of high‑yield bond funding for the energy sector tied the
shale boom from the outset to financial dynamics in which the incentives for investment
were out of proportion to the risks entailed.
The long‑sought boom in U.S. oil production did not mean, however, that ZIRP had
solved the Western economic crisis. In the years since 2008, GDP growth has remained
sluggish while income inequality has grown more extreme (Oxfam 2019). Though the
new monetary policies led to asset inflation and wealth accumulation by the rich, “the
general consequences of QE and ZIRP have been deep and profound not least for sav‑
ings, pension prospects, and the distribution of wealth” (Thompson 2017: 50).
These policies resulted in a big flow of oil—but not a flow of profits. Thompson (2017:
73) thus concludes:
By the second quarter of 2015, more than half of all distressed bonds across investment
and high‑yield bond markets were issued by energy companies. Under these financial
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strains, a wave of shale bankruptcies began in the first quarter of 2015, and by the end of
the year, 42 U.S. oil and gas companies had filed for bankruptcy with total outstanding
debt of ~$17.2 billion.
Business journalist Bethany McLean reports similar findings. In an interview in Fortune,

she clarified the financial failure of the shale revolution. As McLean explained:
[The shale oil industry] as a whole, has yet to make money. There are a bunch of reasons,
from low interest rates to a belief that returns lie ahead, why Wall Street has continued
to throw capital at fracking companies. But you can’t be sure that will continue forever.
It’s unclear how much oil and gas companies would produce if they could only reinvest
their own cash flow, let alone if they had to produce a decent return for shareholders.
(Gallagher 2018)
McLean (2018: 17) concurs with Thompson: “If it weren’t for historically low interest
rates, it’s not clear there would even have been a fracking boom.” To reinforce this view,
McLean (2018: 54–55) cites the findings of investment consultant David Einhorn:
Einhorn’s firm had looked at the financial statements of the sixteen largest publicly
traded frackers, which included companies like Pioneer and EOG. Einhorn found that
from 2006 to 2014, the fracking firms had spent ~$80 billion more than they had received
from selling oil and gas. Even when oil was at ~$100 a barrel, none of them generated
excess cash flow—in fact, in 2014, when oil was at ~$100 for part of the year, the group
burned through ~$20 billion.
McLean (2018: 89) concluded: “In its current financial form, the industry is still unsus‑
tainable.”
Analysts Sanzillo and Williams‑Derry (2018: 2, 12) found that after about 10 years of the
fracking boom, petroleum producers were bleeding wealth:
In financial terms, the oil and gas industry is weaker than it has been in decades. In the
past several years, oil industry financial statements have revealed significant signs of
strain: profits have dropped, cash flow is down, balance sheets are deteriorating and
capital spending is falling. … The S&P 500 as a whole has dramatically outperformed
the oil supermajors, as well as indices of smaller companies that produce and transport
oil and gas in North America.
In short, the asset inflation that resulted in a post‑2008 bull market did not extend to the
stock of petroleum producers, who were pouring money into extraction ventures with
a low EROI.
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In sum, quantitative easing and zero‑interest‑rate policy made fracking possible, but
cheap credit did not make fracking profitable. Sanzillo and Williams‑Derry (2018: 23)
suggest another mechanism that could be keeping the whole unprofitable game in mo‑
tion.
From a financial perspective, public policy designed to induce more drilling is really
little more than publicly subsidized speculation, and can be challenged as such.
Subsidizing Losers
A 2014 study of subsidization of fossil fuels found that such subsidies recently rose
substantially in two countries, China and the United States (Stefanski 2014: 15, 20–21).
Since the 1990s, “fossil fuel subsidies [in North America] exploded, and the region be‑
came the second highest subsidizing region after East Asia.” Subsidies to fossil fuels in
the United States went “from almost nothing in 1991 to 170 billion dollars or 87% of all
subsidies in the Americas in 2010.”
Subsidies could play a crucial financial role in allowing the U.S. oil boom to continue.
At the 2017 market price of US~$50/barrel, “tax preferences and other subsidies push
nearly half of new, yet‑to‑be‑developed oil investments into profitability, potentially
increasing U.S. oil production by 17 billion barrels over the next few decades” (Erickson
et al. 2017: 891, 896). The projects that would be profitable only if current subsidies
continue include roughly half of those in the largest shale oil areas and most of the
deep‑sea sites in the Gulf of Mexico.
If the shale‑oil industry requires vast amounts of cheap credit at low interest, plus public
subsidies, and still cannot turn a profit on a consistent basis without high oil prices, does
it have much of a future? The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) certainly
thinks so. For the past few years, energy analyst J. David Hughes has published book‑
length studies of the EIA’s annual forecast for the shale oil and gas industries. Hughes
(2019: x) notes: “The EIA’s reference case is widely used by industry and government
as an authoritative forecast of what to expect for long‑term energy supply.” The EIA’s
reference case forecasts for U.S. oil production have risen each year since 2016, and the
latest forecast shows daily production rising until 2031, remaining nearly stable for an‑
other 10 years, and then dropping gradually from 2040 to 2050, though it will still be
higher than current production. (See Figure 2.)
Leaving aside the climate time bomb represented in this projection, is this economically
plausible? Based on analysis of a data set that includes county‑level drilling and pro‑
duction figures for the past several years for 13 shale plays in the United States, Hughes
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(2019: xi) finds that nine of the EIAs play‑level projections are “extremely optimistic,”
three are “highly optimistic,” and one is “moderately optimistic.” The degree of opti‑
mism is clear:
The EIA’s reference case cannot deliver its forecast production requirement by 2050 if
production from plays is limited to the EIA’s estimated proven reserves plus unproven
resources. The overall forecast falls short by nearly ten billion barrels of oil, or 10% of
the required production volume. (Hughes 2019: xi)
In addition, the EIA forecast shows shale production continuing at a high level past 2050.
This implies that the industry will recover 100 percent of the known oil that is currently
technically and economically recoverable, plus 100 percent of the oil resources that are
known or are thought likely to exist and that are thought to be technically recoverable
even if not yet economically recoverable, plus much more.
What would be the cost of this project? Hughes (2019: xi) looks at several scenarios for
meeting the EIA’s figures for cumulative production by 2050, and the lowest‑cost alter‑
native would involve more than 1.1 million new wells in shale plays at a cost of ~$7.5
trillion. This cost averages to ~$220 billion every year from 2017 to 2050. Beyond the
~$7.5 trillion for shale, an additional ~$2 trillion would need to be invested in conven‑
tional wells, both onshore and offshore.
In spite of the high cost of the shale oil projects, the EIA projection indicates that two‑
thirds of cumulative U.S. oil production over the next three decades will be shale oil, as
shown in Figure 3. Hughes portrays this as unlikely from the standpoint of geology and
technical capabilities. If the boom did continue according to the EIA forecast, it would
involve a massive and sustained program of well drilling and well servicing of a very
different nature from the “drill once, collect oil and profits for decades” pattern of major
conventional oil fields.
Would the EIA’s sustained boom be financially viable, if oil prices rapidly rose to
US~$100/barrel and stayed that high or higher through the coming decades, as shown
in Figure 2? Based on recent history, Helen Thompson (2017: 84) concludes:
The evidence from what has happened between 2011 and 2016 is that there is now no
possibility of an equilibrium price that would simultaneously keep large‑scale shale pro‑
duction viable, allow sufficient market share for conventional oil producers, and allow
Western and emerging market economies to grow at the rates to which their govern‑
ments aspire.
That is the Catch‑22 for a growth‑dependent economic system in an era of high‑cost,
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low‑EROI fuels. Low market prices for energy allow consumers to buy lots of goods
and services, and the economy can grow, except that unconventional oil producers lose
money on every barrel, go bankrupt, and threaten the stability of the financial system.
High market prices for energy allow oil and gas companies to make profits on unconven‑
tional resources, meet interest payments, and possibly even pay down some loans. But
economic growth declines because reduced consumer spending on non‑energy items
translates into sluggish production.
In concluding this article, we will shift the focus from the United States back to the globe,
looking at the rising costs of petroleum through another lens. Figure 4 shows the wide
gap between global oil production and new discoveries over a 25‑year period. The right
axis shows the annual expenses for developing new extraction projects.
Figure 4 highlights the predicament faced by societies reliant on petroleum. It has been
decades since we found as much new conventional oil in a year as we burned. Thus, the
supplies of cheap oil are being steadily depleted. The trend has not been changed by the
fracking boom in the United States, which involved unconventional oil resources that
had been known for decades and that are costly to extract. Yet while natural capital in
the form of conventional oil reserves is dwindling, the financial capital at play has risen
steeply. In the 10‑year period from 2005, upstream capital spending nearly tripled from
~$200 billion per year to almost ~$600 billion, while oil production climbed only about
15 percent, and there was no consistent growth in the discovery of new conventional
oil.
For all the investment capital and labor it uses, the shale industry has yet to demon‑
strate that it can produce profits. The evidence from financial markets, then, is that
“energy sprawl” is already evident as the world turns to fossil fuels with lower EROI:
producing the amount of oil demanded by the world economy now takes much more
effort and expense. Although the fracking boom has enabled the United States to top
up otherwise declining oil output, this has come at a high cost. The expansion has re‑
quired quantitative easing and a zero‑interest‑rate policy, which have distorted finan‑
cial markets. In addition, a boost in public subsidies has left less budgetary room for
other needs—which illustrates that even if market prices for biophysically costly fuels
are kept artificially low through subsidies, low‑EROI fuel sources nevertheless reduce
the true surplus available for societal uses.
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4.4.3 Uncompetitive Leasing
Fossil fuel leasing on public lands is uncompetitive.
Hein, 18 – Natural Resources Director at NYU School of Law’s Institute for Policy In‑
tegrity
[Jayni Hein, “Federal Lands and Fossil Fuels: Maximizing Social Welfare in Federal En‑
ergy Leasing,” Social Science Research Network (SSRN), 2018, https://www.zbw.eu/econis‑
archiv/bitstream/11159/320027/1/EBP07541659X_0.pdf, accessed 10‑4‑2023; AD]
1. Uncompetitive Leasing
The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1976
require that federal oil, gas, and coal leases be offered competitively.54 In 2013, GAO
found that approximately 90 percent of all federal coal lease sales since 1990 attracted
only one bidder.55 This is likely the result of a structural issue: coal companies fre‑
quently nominate tracts for lease adjacent to their existing coal mines and operations.
While this may be efficient from a private company perspective, it all but ensures that
there will be minimal competition for new coal leases from different companies, for
whom the cost to mine the lease would be much greater. In addition, the Energy Pol‑
icy Act of 2005 increased the amount of land that can be added to an existing coal
lease through noncompetitive lease modification from 160 acres to 960 acres.56 BLM
approved 45 lease modifications from 2000 to 2013.57
Low competition is not unique to federal coal; about 40 percent of oil and gas leases in
effect as of 2015 were issued noncompetitively, for the minimum bid price of ~$2 per
acre.58 Further, all onshore coal, oil, and gas leasing is done by application, which al‑
lows private companies to design lease boundaries.59 Leasing by application permits
companies to decide where and when it is privately optimal to locate a mine or well site,
rather than where it is socially optimal, which may be very different, given environmen‑
tal externalities and other factors.
Pursuant to OCSLA, offshore leasing must be done competitively, as well.60 But Interior
commonly offers large regions of the Outer Continental Shelf for lease in single auctions
in a practice known as “area wide leasing”; in a 2015 lease sale in the Western Gulf of
Mexico, for instance, BOEM offered more than 4,000 tracts for lease; 33 tracts were bid
on, and 33 total bids were received.61 Uncompetitive auctions for oil and gas leases may
indicate that the government is offering too many tracts for lease at once.
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4.4.4 Stagnant Bids & Royalty Rates
Bids and royalty rates remain stagnant, which prevents the government from
gaining from fossil fuel leasing.
tegrity
2. Stagnant Minimum Bids and Royalty Rates
Given the lack of robust competition for federal fossil fuel leases, the method Interior
uses to set minimum bids, rental rates, and royalty rates determines whether taxpay‑
ers receive a fair return. However, minimum bids have failed to even keep up with
inflation.62 Royalty rates have likewise remained stagnant, and, in some cases, have
not changed since the passage of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920.63 Rental rates have
likewise failed to keep pace with inflation.64
Interior, through BLM, allocates onshore oil and gas leases for a primary term of 10
years, and coal leases for a primary term of 20 years, through a bidding process.65 A
bid is a one‑time payment made to the federal government by the lessee at the time
leases are granted. Leases grant the exclusive right to explore, develop, and produce
fossil fuels for a specific initial period.
The Mineral Leasing Act, as amended, gives the Secretary of Interior authority to set the
national minimum bid for onshore oil and gas leases at ~$2 per acre or greater.66 Interior
has allowed the minimum bid for onshore oil and gas to remain at ~$2 per acre since
1987.67 The minimum bid for coal leases has been set at ~$100 per acre since 1982.68
Accounting for inflation, alone, would more than double the minimum bid for coal to
~$247 per acre.69 All leases offered at auction that do not receive any bids are offered the
following day in a noncompetitive sale for the minimum bid price.70 Ideally, the starting
bid at an auction should be set at a level to ensure a fair return for U.S. taxpayers.
For both coal and offshore oil and gas leases, Interior also formulates an estimate of
the “fair market value” of every lease offered for sale. Interior’s fair market value cal‑
culations are confidential and are only used to evaluate the bids received during lease
106
sales.71 The winning bid is the highest bid that meets or exceeds the tract’s presale es‑
timated fair market value.72 Interior relies on two approaches to measure “fair market
value.” The first approach uses comparable lease sales and prior bids paid in similar
mineral rights transaction to assess whether a bid is adequate.73 The second approach
uses projected revenue from the resource over time, under realistic conditions.74 How‑
ever, because many leases are uncompetitive, relying on comparable lease sales may
perpetuate a pattern of accepting low bids. Further, coal sold overseas often sells at
a higher price, yet BLM does not consistently account for export value when estimat‑
ing coal’s fair market value.75 In addition, as discussed in Part II, infra, these two ap‑
proaches do not account for the option value, or informational value of delay, of leasing
these tracts at a later point in time when their value may be greater, or their environmen‑
tal costs may be lower, due to better technology, infrastructure, or pollution mitigation
techniques.
When a lessee successfully extracts mineral resources from federal land, the federal gov‑
ernment is entitled to a royalty on the production. Royalties account for approximately
80 percent of all federal revenue from oil, gas, and coal leases.76 The royalty rate is a
percentage of the value of production; the royalty owed is the volume of production,
times the unit value of production, times the royalty rate.
The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 sets a floor for onshore oil and natural gas royalty rates
at no less than 12.5 percent of the value of production.77 BLM issued a new regula‑
tion in 2016 allowing it to set royalty rates for competitive leases at or above 12.5 per‑
cent, whereas before its regulations set 12.5 percent as a flat rate for all leases.78 BLM
postponed this regulation in June 2017, walking back its flexibility to set higher roy‑
alty rates for new and modified leases.79 A federal district court vacated the agency’s
postponement of the regulation in October 2017,80 but BLM has since issued a notice of
proposed rulemaking to formally suspend it.81 For non‑competitive leases, the royalty
rate is fixed by statute at 12.5 percent.82 The Mineral Leasing Act and the Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act set a royalty rate floor for coal production at 12.5 percent of
the gross value of the coal produced from surface mines, but allowed the Secretary to
set a lower rate for coal produced from underground mines.83 The current royalty rate
for coal produced from underground mines is 8 percent.84 Interior has the authority
to increase the royalty rate for new coal leases, as well as leases that are modified or
renewed.85
For offshore oil and gas leases, OCSLA provides that Interior must set royalties at or
above 12.5 percent.86 Interior increased the royalty rate for new offshore leases in the
107
Gulf of Mexico from 12.5 percent to 16.67 percent in 2007, and again to 18.75 percent
in 2008.87 Interior made this change in response to technological improvements that
made exploration and production more efficient, increased oil and gas prices, and the
competitive market for offshore leases.88 Interior Secretary Ken Salazar said increasing
the offshore rate was necessary to ensure that “the American taxpayer is getting a fair
return for the oil and gas that the American people own.”89 Interior estimated that the
offshore royalty rate change would increase oil and gas revenues by ~$4.5 billion over
the next 20 years.90
According to some estimates, if onshore federal oil and gas royalty rates were the same
as the offshore 18.75 percent rate, the U.S. government would collect an additional ~$730
million each year.91 Many energy‑rich states in the United States set royalty rates for
fossil fuel production on state lands at between 15 and 20 percent.92 For example, some
oil and gas leases on Texas State University lands use rates of 25 percent;93 in addi‑
tion, private royalty rates in states like Texas and Oklahoma range from 18.75 percent to
more than 20 percent.94 A 2008 Government Accountability Office report found that the
United States receives one of the lowest overall “takes” worldwide for oil, gas, and coal
leases.95 This is so, even though the United States is an attractive place to do business
given its relative political stability, abundant mineral reserves, and ample infrastructure,
including oil rigs, refineries, pipelines, and railways.96
108
4.4.5 Externalities
Fossil fuel leasing ignores the costs of externalities – it prioritizes short‑term

benefits at the expense of long‑term ones.
tegrity
3. Ignoring the Cost of Production Externalities
Interior’s planning processes and lease terms do not account for the externality costs of
oil, gas, and coal produced on federal land. In 1920, when Congress first set minimum
royalty rates at 12.5 percent for federal oil and natural gas production, legislators did
not understand the direct link between producing, transporting, and burning fossil fu‑
els, all of which emit greenhouse gases, and climate change, with its effects on human
and environmental health and wellbeing. Today, the connection is clear; scientific un‑
derstanding of the environmental impacts of fossil fuel production has advanced and
economic tools to measure the cost of these impacts, such as the Social Cost of Carbon
and Social Cost of Methane, have been used by several federal agencies to measure the
costs and benefits of proposed regulations.97
Because environmental externalities vary with the amount of fossil fuels that are pro‑
duced, these costs could theoretically be recouped through the royalty rate (as opposed
to minimum bids which are paid prior to actual production). In this manner, the roy‑
alty rate can be used as type of Pigouvian tax: a tax levied on an activity that generates
negative externalities.98
This Article focuses its recommendations on “upstream” externalities that stem directly
from production on federal lands at the mine or well site, as opposed to “downstream”
externalities from coal, oil, and natural gas combustion. Many upstream externalities
are not addressed by existing regulations and therefore represent uncompensated social
and environmental costs. Further, by focusing recommendations on upstream external‑
ities, this Article avoids any potential “double counting” of greenhouse gas emission
costs that could come into play if other regulations, like EPA’s Clean Power Plan, target
downstream combustion emissions.99
109
The oil and gas industry is the nation’s largest industrial source of methane pollu‑
tion.100 The United States loses at least 1 to 3 percent of its total natural gas production
each year when methane, a potent greenhouse gas, is leaked, flared (burned), or
vented to the atmosphere during natural gas and oil production and distribution.101
Oil and gas production also contributes to smog, particulate matter emissions, and
hazardous air pollution.102 Injection wells used to dispose fracking wastewater can
induce earthquakes.103 Wildlife habitat is impaired by drilling infrastructure. Oil and
gas production use large quantities of fresh water, which is an externality in regions
without efficient water markets.104
Vented and flared methane is also a waste of a valuable resource: natural gas.105 The
Mineral Leasing Act directs Interior to “use all reasonable precautions to prevent waste
of oil or gas developed in the land,”106 yet taxpayers lose as much as ~$23 million in
royalty revenue from fugitive methane emissions each year.107 In November 2016, BLM
finalized a rule governing venting and flaring on federal lands, which was expected to
reduce methane emissions by 41 to 60 percent.108 However, BLM has since stayed im‑
plementation of this rule;109 and even with the new standards in place, some methane
and carbon dioxide would still be released into the atmosphere.110
Coal mining accounts for about 10 percent of domestic methane emissions.111 Unlike
for oil and gas, BLM does not regulate methane emissions from coal production. Coal
mining also emits other air pollutants and has the potential to pollute waterways and
sensitive habitat with acid mine drainage and other byproducts. It also uses a significant
amount of water for dust control, extraction, and processing.112
For offshore oil and gas development, environmental externalities include the risk of
oil spills arising from accidents; improper treatment and disposal of produced wastew‑
ater; air pollution, including methane emissions and hazardous air pollutants; and habi‑
tat disruption, including seabed impacts and marine mammal ship‑strike mortality.113
Other externalities include negative effects on commercial fisheries, subsistence fishing,
and tourism if there is a large offshore oil spill, as witnessed with the BP Deepwater
Horizon disaster.114
The transportation of coal, oil, and gas also results in externalities, including green‑
house gas and particulate matter emissions, rail congestion, fatalities, noise, and con‑
gestion.115 In fact, up to 70 percent of all rail traffic in the United States is dedicated to
shipping coal.116 Offshore, transportation of oil by barge increases the risk of oil spills,
and also contributes greenhouse gas emissions.117
110
Failure to account for the externality costs of fossil fuel production through regulation,
lease‑specific mitigation requirements,118 or adjustments to fiscal lease terms means
that the public bears the burden of mitigating and adapting to such costs, including
greenhouse gas emissions—the effects of which will continue to be felt decades from
now. As a consequence, the market price of fossil fuels is less than the socially opti‑
mal price, which leads to inefficiently high levels of extraction. In other words, failure
to account for the environmental costs of production prioritizes short‑term fossil fuel
industry profits over long‑term public welfare.
111
4.4.6 Royalty Rate Loopholes & Deductions
Royalty rate loopholes and deductions distort the energy market by subsidizing
uneconomical production.
tegrity
4. Royalty Rate Loopholes and Deductions
Relevant to the question of whether royalties are properly structured to ensure a fair
return is how royalties are calculated, including whether any deductions or loopholes
affect the overall return to the public. Coal, oil, and gas lessees can apply for a royalty
rate reduction if the current royalty rate imposes economic hardship that would other‑
wise result in abandoning the lease, or in less than full recovery of the resource.119
Royalty rate reductions occurred on approximately 36 percent of coal leases offered for
sale since 1990.120 The Government Accountability Office found that the reported rate
that lessees pay ranged from 5.6 percent for federal leases in Colorado to 12.2 percent
in Wyoming.121 The lower reported rates were largely a function of rate reductions.
Lessees are also allowed to deduct transportation and washing costs from the sale price
upon which federal royalties are calculated, which reduces incentives for companies
to find the most efficient mode of transportation.122 These royalty rate reductions and
deductions distort the energy market by subsidizing coal, oil and gas production, even
when production may be uneconomical.
112
4.4.7 AT: Lost Revenues
The benefits of reducing climate change overcompensate for lost revenues.
Raimi et al, 23 – senior research associate at Resources for the Future, a nonprofit re‑
search institution focusing on energy and climate issues
[Daniel Raimi, Emily Grubert, Jake Higdon, Gilbert Metcalf, Sophie Pesek, and De‑
vyani Singh, “The Fiscal Implications of the US Transition Away from Fossil Fuels,”
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Volume 17, Number 2, 7‑24‑2023,
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/725250, accessed 9‑12‑2023; AD]
Before detailing revenue replacement options, it is worth considering the scale of po‑
tential fiscal losses against the scale of climate impacts. Energy‑sector greenhouse gas
emissions averaged 5,117 million metric tons of CO2 equivalent in the United States
from 2015 to 2019 (EPA 2021). Using the US Interagency Working Group’s 2021 cen‑
tral estimate for the social cost of carbon (SCC) of ~$51 per metric ton, these emissions
roughly translate to annual damages of ~$261 billion. These damages would be much
higher under alternative estimates of the SCC appearing recently in the climate eco‑
nomics literature (e.g., Daniel, Litterman, and Wagner 2019; Carleton et al. 2020; Bressler
2021; Rennert et al. 2021). And climate damages are far from the only harmful external
effect associated with fossil fuels; these include air pollution that damages health and
contributes to premature mortality (Jaramillo and Muller 2016; Vohra et al. 2021), water
pollution and site contamination (Herlihy et al. 1990; Jackson et al. 2014; Raimi et al.
2021), and more.
This example, however, is far from a comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of
implementing climate policy. Such analyses consistently find that mitigating emissions
to prevent high levels of warming will yield net societal benefits (e.g., Carleton and
Greenstone 2021; Rennert et al. 2021). A more direct comparison would be to weigh the
public revenue losses from climate policy against the public revenue losses from failing
to enact climate policy (see appendix).
Still, regardless of the benefits to society from addressing climate change, reductions
in public revenues from fossil fuels will create fiscal challenges concentrated in certain
regions. For major oil‑ and gas‑producing regions, our results suggest that revenue
may remain substantial for decades, providing a window for policy makers to invest
energy revenues into savings funds, update fiscal policies, and seek to diversify regional
economies. For states and communities reliant on coal, the implications are far starker.
113
Policy makers have numerous options to address these revenue shortfalls, many of
which are technically straightforward and economically efficient but challenging to im‑
plement, primarily for political reasons (Rabe 2018). In the following sections, we assess
options that are directly related to the energy system, followed by a second economy‑
wide set of options.
114
Fiscal policies can guarantee a just transition away from fossil fuels.
Raimi et al, 23 – senior research associate at Resources for the Future, a nonprofit re‑
search institution focusing on energy and climate issues
[Daniel Raimi, Emily Grubert, Jake Higdon, Gilbert Metcalf, Sophie Pesek, and De‑
vyani Singh, “The Fiscal Implications of the US Transition Away from Fossil Fuels,”
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Volume 17, Number 2, 7‑24‑2023,
https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdf/10.1086/725250, accessed 9‑12‑2023; AD]
Energy‑Related Fiscal Options
Clean energy has the potential to replace some of the revenues that will be lost from
the decline of fossil energy. For example, personal and corporate income taxes from
clean energy industries such as wind and solar may grow to rival those from coal, oil,
and natural gas. As noted earlier, numerous recent studies have estimated that net
employment would increase substantially in a rapid shift to clean energy (e.g., Larson
et al. 2020; Pai et al. 2021). However, renewable energy employment currently pays
considerably less than most jobs in coal, oil, and natural gas (NASEO and EFI 2020),
and future clean energy jobs may not match the geographic distribution or skill sets of
current fossil fuel workers.
It is possible that the production and refining of minerals and other materials critical
to clean energy deployment could help replace declining fossil revenues (IEA 2021b).
Future studies could evaluate the extent to which these activities might support local
and regional tax revenues as well as employment.
Clean energy development on public lands, including the production of critical miner‑
als, will also contribute new revenues, although fossil fuels currently generate orders of
magnitude more. In 2020, wind leases on federal lands generated just ~$5.5 million (Of‑
fice of Natural Resource Revenue 2021), though this number will almost certainly grow
substantially in the future. However, clean energy also receives large subsidies, which
may limit its capacity to be a major source of net revenue. The US Treasury projects that
federal clean energy tax credits will cost ~$265 billion from fiscal year 2022 to 2031 (US
Department of the Treasury 2021).
Petroleum product taxes could be replaced by a tax applied to vehicle miles traveled
(VMT). A VMT tax could account for the weight of the vehicle, type of road used, and
other factors to account for multiple externalities (e.g., pollution, congestion, and acci‑
dents) and address the regressivity of current tax policies for electric vehicles (Davis
115
and Sallee 2020; Shaffer, Auffhammer, and Samaras 2021). However, VMT taxes face
political hurdles, including the challenges associated with raising any new taxes in the
United States, along with concerns about privacy and distributional impacts (Raschke,
Krishen, and Kachroo 2014).
As a tool to replace declining revenue, VMT taxes are quite appealing. The Congres‑
sional Budget Office (2019) estimates that a ~$0.05‑per‑mile tax levied on commercial
trucks would raise ~$12.8 billion annually, and a back‑of‑the envelope calculation sug‑
gests that a ~$0.01 tax applied to each passenger vehicle would have raised ~$28.5 billion
based on VMT in 2017 (FHWA 2019). On average, drivers would pay a similar level of
tax per mile driven, and revenues would total ~$40 billion, roughly equal to current fed‑
eral revenues from this source (see appendix). States could take a similar approach by
“piggybacking” their own VMT tax atop a federal one, as they do today for petroleum
products.
In the near term, governments could raise additional revenue by updating leasing terms
so producers of coal, oil, and natural gas on public lands would pay higher royalty rates
or other fees such as “carbon adders,” raising additional revenue and potentially reduc‑
ing emissions (Prest 2021). Most evidence suggests that higher severance tax rates have
modest effects on oil and gas production (Yücel 1989; Chakravorty, Gerking, and Leach
2011; Anderson, Kellogg, and Salant 2018; Rao 2018) and typically increase government
revenue even if they decrease production (Brown, Maniloff, and Manning 2020). How‑
ever, two key factors constrain this approach. First, it may not be possible to amend
existing leases, and, second, future fossil fuel production will need to decline to address
climate change, reducing the tax base.
Another approach to raise revenue would be to eliminate direct subsidies for fossil fuel
producers (Metcalf 2017; Aldy 2021), which would raise an estimated ~$35 billion from
2022 to 2031 (US Department of the Treasury 2021). States could also eliminate tax pref‑
erences, such as Texas’s reduced severance tax rate for “high‑cost” natural gas wells
(Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts 2021a). States may also consider new taxes on
clean energy sources, though such efforts risk slowing the transition to clean energy.
As noted earlier, some US states have seeded permanent funds with fossil revenues, us‑
ing interest earnings to support government operations. Expanding these funds could
enhance fiscal stability. At their current level, however, the revenues generated by trust
funds in states such as Alaska, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Wyoming are unlikely
to cover the losses associated with a rapid energy transition. In addition, the interest
generated from permanent funds is already being used to fund current services (or, in
116
Alaska, annual payments to residents).
For the local governments that rely heavily on property taxes applied to fossil fuels,
clean energy technologies offer a new potential source. However, localities are limited
in their ability to construct fiscal policy because states often adopt laws and rules that
require uniform application across localities. For example, some states exempt certain
renewable energy sources from local property taxes (California State Board of Equaliza‑
tion 2021; Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts 2021b). This may spur deployment but
fails to raise revenue. In addition, the regions where fossil fuels provide the bulk of the
local tax base are not necessarily the same regions where clean energy technologies will
flourish.
Broader Fiscal Policy Options
At the federal level, policy makers have a variety of nonenergy tools to address short‑
falls and could assist states through transfers. Important considerations include the eco‑
nomic efficiency of the tax, revenue stability, whether revenues move in tandem with
the broader economy, the tax incidence (who pays), administrative requirements, and
more. For a detailed discussion of these issues, see the appendix.
From an economic efficiency perspective, perhaps the ideal approach would be a price
on greenhouse gas emissions, which would accelerate the energy transition and raise
hundreds of billions in revenue to support multiple objectives, including support for
public finances (Barron et al. 2018; Hafstead 2019, 2021). Another approach would be a
value‑added tax (VAT), a form of consumption taxation that has long been favored by
tax experts and is common in most of the world (Metcalf 1995; Graetz 2002).
If carbon pricing or a VAT is not viable for political or other reasons, one option would
be raising income taxes, which account for more than half of total federal revenues. Re‑
cent proposals to increase taxes on corporations, capital gains, and other sources were
projected to raise more than ~$200 billion in additional revenue per year (OMB 2021).
Compared with the federal government, states and localities have less policy flexibility
due to balanced‑budget requirements (Clemens and Veuger 2020) and constraints on
local property taxes (Preston and Ichniowski 1991). Because the federal government
does not face these constraints, federal policies that have the effect of reducing fossil fuel
revenues could be tied to financial transfers that help cover state and local shortfalls, as
proposed in recent legislation (Barrasso 2021).
States may also consider broader fiscal policy reform. One way to assess the capacity
for states to raise additional revenue is through assessing existing tax effort, which can
117
generally be understood as the share of revenue that governments could raise relative to
the revenue they do raise (Tannenwald 1999). On average, the 10 states with the highest
dependence on fossil fuel revenues (see table 2) have lower property tax effort, individ‑
uals’ income tax effort, and corporate income tax effort than other US states (though,
on average, they also have higher sales tax effort; see appendix for details). This is con‑
sistent with decades of evidence on US state governments showing that higher natural
resource revenues lead to lower tax rates for residents (James 2015). It also implies that
some states may be able to increase tax rates on sources such as property and income
without substantially deterring economic growth.
However, such efforts would be politically challenging and could run the risk of induc‑
ing tax‑averse individuals and businesses to migrate out of state. In addition, down‑
turns in fossil fuel activity in these states would likely reduce earnings for individuals
and businesses, at least in the near term, which would reduce the tax base and further
erode revenues. Taken together, these challenges suggest that transfers from the federal
government to fiscally dependent states and communities will likely be necessary to
sustain those communities during a transition away from fossil fuels. If new economic
sectors do not emerge to replace the tax base in the longer term, states and communities
heavily dependent on fossil fuel revenues will likely face a future of higher tax rates or
fewer public services.
118
4.5 AT: Energy Independence
4.5.1 Doomed/Renewables Solve
Energy independence is doomed, AND renewables are preferable to fossil fuels.
Rowland‑Shea et al, 22 – director for Public Lands at American Progress
[Jenny Rowland‑Shea, Sally Hardin, and Miriam Goldstein, “5 Reasons Why the United
States Can’t Drill Its Way to Energy Independence,” Center for American Progress,
3‑10‑2022, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/5‑reasons‑why‑the‑united‑states‑
cant‑drill‑its‑way‑to‑energy‑independence/, accessed 10‑8‑2023; AD]
Industry CEOs are profiting hand over fist while average families suffer
Meanwhile oil and gas executives are raking in windfall profits while consumers suf‑
fer at the pump. Last year, four of the major oil companies—Shell, Chevron, BP, and
ExxonMobil—posted record profits, totaling ~$75 billion. In the fourth quarter alone,
ExxonMobil was bringing in ~$97 million dollars in profit every day.
The reason that U.S. oil companies haven’t increased production is simple: They
decided to use their billions in profits to pay dividends to their CEOs and wealthy
shareholders and simply haven’t chosen to invest in new oil production. According
to Bloomberg, “U.S. oil companies generally have been reluctant to pump more,
preferring to steer cash flows back to investors instead of spending it on new drilling
that could flood the world with cheap crude.”
The oil industry is sitting on 10 years’ worth of unused leases
The oil industry already has at least 10 years’ worth of unused leases at its disposal.
They are only producing oil or gas on roughly half of the area they have already leased.
There are nearly 14 million acres onshore and more than 9 million acres offshore that
are currently under lease but are not being used for oil production. At least one‑quarter
of these unused leases are sitting on lands that the Bureau of Land Management has
deemed to have a medium or high potential for oil. What’s more, only 10 percent of
U.S. oil and gas production occurs on federal lands and waters, limiting the federal
government’s ability to impact leasing decisions—the other 90 percent is done on state
and private resources.
New oil projects won’t bring down prices or increase supply in the short term
119
Nothing on the industry wish list is a silver bullet to solve the short‑term crisis. Accord‑
ing to the Government Accountability Office, on average, it takes more than four years
for companies to begin producing on the federal lands they lease. Offshore production
takes even longer, as it takes at least two to three years to build the needed rigs. This
delay is not due to drilling permit review, which—at most—takes fewer than 200 days.
Even oil and gas industry executives themselves are saying it: Launching more oil and
gas projects now will have no effect on short‑term global energy markets.
The United States is now in the era of extreme fossil fuel energy: The opportunities
that exist for big new oil projects are not fast, not safe, and are not long‑term solutions.
Projects such as ConocoPhillips’ Willow in the Western Arctic; calls to drill the Arctic
National Wildlife Refuge; or ultradeep offshore drilling are several years if not a decade
away from producing oil and only set the country up to continue on the unstable path
of a fossil‑fuel‑dependent future.
The bottom line is that investments today—whether in fossil energy or renewables—are

about our energy systems in a decade. Now is the time to invest in the energy system
that will make the United States truly energy independent.
Renewables are winning the free market
For the long‑term transition, the market is pointing away from new drilling investments
and toward renewables. Take this latest example: In November 2021, the Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management held the largest oil and gas lease sale to date and offered 80
million acres in the Gulf of Mexico. The sale has since been rejected by the courts, but
the sum of high bids was ~$192 million—just ~$25 per acre—and about 97 percent of
the bids were uncontested. Compare that to 488,000 acres in the New York Bight region
offered for potential wind energy development in February, which drew competitive
winning bids from six companies totaling approximately ~$4.37 billion—about ~$9,000
per acre.
120
4.6 AT: Alternatives
4.6.1 Can’t Solve Climate
The climate crisis requires a complete ban on leasing – US production on leased

lands is set to consume half of the oil and gas budget by 2030.
Fischer and Timmons, 19 – Climate & Energy Program Attorney at WildEarth

Guardians; Staff Attorney at WildEarth Guardians
[Rebecca Fischer and Daniel Timmons, “Law Journal Library,” 49 Envtl. L. Rep. News &
Analysis 10741 (2019), https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/elrna49
&div=85&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals, accessed 10‑4‑2023; AD]
IV. The Realities of the Climate Crisis
Unfortunately, the current state of the climate crisis makes it impossible for the United
States to keep global warming limited to levels recommended by scientists while leas‑
ing new fossil fuels. Indeed, if Interior were to properly implement Hein’s concept of
maximizing social welfare in its decisions, it would necessarily conclude that new fossil
fuel leasing must be halted, and existing leases must be phased out. Federal fossil fu‑
els emit a significant portion of global greenhouse gas emissions, 24 and allowing new
leasing could use up all of the United States’ remaining carbon budget to keep warming
below 2.0°C.25 Furthermore, the dramatic increase in projected impacts between warm‑
ing of 1.5°C and 2.0°C described in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s
(IPCC’s) recent special report should compel action to limit warning to 1.5°C.26 ’us, In‑
terior must stop new leasing and phase out existing federal fossil fuel leases to limit the
consequences of climate change.
The U.S. role in the global climate crisis is undeniable. The United States is the largest
historic carbon emitter in the world 27 and the second largest current carbon emitter in
the world.28 As of 2014, emissions from federal fossil fuels were approximately 23.0%
of the United States’ carbon emissions. 29 If federal greenhouse gas emissions were
their own country, they would be ranked 5th globally.30 And, the U.S. entrenchment
in fossil fuels is increasing. As Hein notes, the United States is now the world’s largest
producer of crude oil and natural gas, 31 and the third largest producer of coal.3 2
The Paris Agreement, of which the United States is still a part of until 2020,3 3 commits
countries to “[h] olding the increase in the global average temperature to well below
121
2°C above pre‑industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to
1.5°C above pre‑industrial levels. ’34 This commitment has given rise to the concept of
carbon budgeting, where remaining global carbon emis sions are calculated based on
the 1.5’C and 2°C warming limits.35 Apportioning this global carbon budget by country
provides the United States with a finite range of allowable carbon emissions.3 6
To date, our world has already experienced approximately 1.0°C of global warming
above pre‑industrial levels.37 This means that our world can experience no more than
0.5°C of additional warming. According to the IPCC, “[g]lobal warming is likely to
reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at the current rate.138 Put
another way, the world has 12 years to cut global greenhouse gas emissions by 45% from
2010 levels and must zero out emissions by 2050 in order to limit warming to 1.5C.39
Limiting warming to the limits outlined by the Paris Agreement is critical. 40 Even al‑
lowing warming of 2.0°C above pre‑industrial levels, as compared to 1.5°C, will expose
10 million more people to flooding as a result of sea level rise, greatly increase habitat
loss for all species, kill off more than 99% of coral reefs, reduce fisheries, limit agricul‑
tural yields, and leave several million more people susceptible to poverty.41
Unfortunately, greenhouse gas emissions from unleased federal oil, gas, and coal could
push the United States beyond a carbon budget tailored to limit warming to 2.0°C. 42 For
example, a 2015 report estimates that potential emissions from unleased federal fossil
fuels equal 319 to 450 gigatons (Gt) of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2 e).4 3 The U.S.
carbon budget has been calculated as between 85 to 356 Gt of CO2e based on a 2.0°C
warming limit.44 Keeping global warming to 1.5°C will require even further reductions
to this budget.
In addition, already‑leased federal fossil fuels could by themselves consume the United
States’ remaining carbon budget.
With the United States having failed to take any significant action to limit GHG emis‑
sions since 2015 and “leased federal fossil fuels represent[ing] 30 to 43 Gt CO2 e,”‘45
this amount could easily consume the United States’ existing carbon budget based on a
1.5°C warming limit.
Indeed, reports have found that the world’s currently operating fields and mines could
fully exhaust carbon budgets based on a 1.5°C warming limit.46 And even if production
were to stop in all of these fields, rapid expansion of U.S. oil and gas production from
already leased lands is set to consume half the global oil and gas budget by 2030.47
The bottom line is, if we want to keep the United States’ contribution to global climate
122
change in line with levels recommended by the IPCC, we cannot allow new coal or oil
and gas leasing on federal lands.
In sum, while Professor Hein presents a moderate, cautious approach to reform, the
climate crisis demands much more. However, if Interior were to honestly evaluate the
social welfare costs of fossil fuel leasing as Hein suggests, in the current climate crisis
this would compel a dramatic and much‑needed end to new federal leasing activities
and phaseout of existing leases.
123
4.6.2 AT: Agency Decision‑Making
Agency decision‑making fails – agencies are subject to regulatory capture.
Fischer and Timmons, 19 – Climate & Energy Program Attorney at WildEarth

Guardians; Staff Attorney at WildEarth Guardians
[Rebecca Fischer and Daniel Timmons, “Law Journal Library,” 49 Envtl. L. Rep. News &
Analysis 10741 (2019), https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/elrna49&
div=85&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals, accessed 10‑4‑2023; AD]
V. The Political Challenge
Professor Hein focuses on agency‑level reforms that would not require congressional
action, likely a wise choice given political gridlock in Washington. Professor Hein, how‑
ever, underestimates the political challenge of implementing technical reforms through
Interior staff. Past practice suggests that, to the extent that substantial discretion re‑
mains with agency staff, it will generally be exercised on behalf of the agency’s fossil
fuel industry ‘clients,’ not the American people. Professor Hein notes that “potential reg‑
ulatory agency ‘capture”’ may have contributed to the agency’s past non‑competitive
leasing practices, 48 but largely ignores the implications of this for implementation of
needed reforms.49
While an honest accounting of social welfare should lead to radical changes in the fed‑
eral fossil fuel programs, we unfortunately doubt Interior’s ability to make such an ac‑
curate accounting, which could jeopardize the agency’s historically close relationship
with the fossil fuel industry. Thoughtfully designed regulatory reforms along the lines
suggested by Professor Hein could still lead to marginal reductions in federal leasing.
But unless Interior can be relied upon to fully and accurately account for the social costs
of its fossil fuel programs, the impacts of the proposed reforms will remain modest. In‑
stead, to stop future federal fossil fuel leasing activities‑as needed to avoid catastrophic
climate change‑a clear top‑down policy mandate is likely needed. We must “keep it in
the ground.”
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5.1 Climate Change
5.1.1 Imports Substitute
Reducing domestic fossil fuel extraction will shift production elsewhere – oil is too
valuable.
Gross, 20 – the director of the Energy Security and Climate Initiative and a fellow in
Foreign Policy
[Samantha Gross, “The United States can take climate change seriously while leading
the world in oil and gas production,” Brookings, 1‑27‑2020, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the‑
united‑states‑can‑take‑climate‑change‑seriously‑while‑leading‑the‑world‑in‑oil‑and‑
gas‑production/, accessed 9‑10‑2023; AD]
Oil supply can be easily replaced; reducing demand reduces emissions
These seemingly disparate issues come together around one idea. The world needs
to transition away from fossil fuels, at least those burned without carbon capture and
storage, to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. This is a given, as carbon dioxide
produced during fossil fuel use is the driving force behind our changing climate. The
need to phase out fossil fuels leads some environmentalists to call for a reduction or
elimination of U.S. oil production.
This point of view makes a certain kind of sense. If fossil fuels aren’t produced, they
won’t be used. However, the objection to individual oil production projects misses a
key reality in today’s world: oil is plentiful. Describing the Willow project as a “carbon
bomb” assumes that if the Willow project does not happen, no other producer will pick
up the slack. But that assumption is wrong. Instead, the avoided U.S. production would
be added to the global market by producers in some other country. The United States
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5 Negative Evidence
would lose the security benefit of producing the fuel domestically without a reduction
in global greenhouse gas emissions.
Pushing for reductions in U.S. oil production is like squeezing a balloon — the produc‑
tion will “pop out” somewhere else.
As long as there is demand for the oil that the project aims to produce, someone will
produce it. If not at this project, then at another. If not in the United States, then some‑
where else. Pushing for reductions in U.S. oil production is like squeezing a balloon —
the production will “pop out” somewhere else. Oil is plentiful and easy to move around
the world, meaning that production is fungible.
In this environment, certain projects gain attention and opposition because of their lo‑
cation or the public profile of the companies involved, while other expansions of fossil
fuel production fly under the radar. High‑profile projects by oil companies that are
household names gain attention, whereas national oil companies operating in far‑flung
regions get little to no attention when they decide to increase production. For example,
the Tilenga project in Uganda11 and the Eridu project in Iraq12 will come online soon
and will produce roughly 190,000 and 250,000 barrels of oil per day, respectively. The
latter is about 40% more than the Willow project.13
On the demand side, oil is primarily used in transportation. Globally, transportation

accounts for about 53% of oil demand,14 while in the United States the total is even
higher at 67%.15 Technologies to replace oil are still not widespread but are most ad‑
vanced in the light vehicle market (cars, SUVs, and pickup trucks), which accounts for
about one‑third of global oil demand.16 In the light vehicle market, electric vehicle sales
are growing rapidly, but from a small base. In 2022, 14% of cars sold worldwide were
electric, including 29% in China and 8% in the United States.17 Nonetheless, there are
only 26 million electric vehicles on the road today globally, of 1.4 billion light vehicles.
In other parts of the transportation sector, such as road transport of freight, aviation,
and maritime shipping, electric vehicles are much less feasible and replacements for oil
are further away.18
Norway leads the world in electric vehicle penetration but also provides an example
of how hard it will be to replace oil in transport, even on the roads. More than 20%
of Norway’s auto fleet is now battery powered and as a result, gasoline use has fallen
by 37% since 2013.19 This is great but given the difficulty of using electric vehicles for
heavier modes of transport, diesel still accounts for 43% of Norway’s on‑road driving
distance.20
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5 Negative Evidence
In a world where oil is abundant and the technologies to replace it still have a long way
to go in terms of market penetration, policies that focus on reducing oil demand by
driving innovation and adoption of new technologies are likely to be most effective. We
can also rethink the design of our communities and how and when we move, reducing
the demand for transportation and making more efficient modes of transport — like
buses and trains, biking, or walking — more workable and attractive. Such changes
take time and investment but could also improve the quality of life in our communities.
Relevant policies like zoning are set at the local level, but that allows for innovation and
demonstration of success.
Although activists claim that the Biden administration has undermined its own climate
policies by approving drilling projects, keeping oil production at home as long as the
United States has oil demand is the more effective strategy.21 Calls on the political right
for endless oil production, a lack of regulation of U.S. oil production, and no policies
to reduce oil demand are also clearly wrong‑headed. Overall, climate policies that rec‑
ognize that oil demand must decline, but will not do so overnight, will deliver better
results overall, in terms of reducing emissions with minimal economic pain. It is time
for realism and pragmatism in climate policy.
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5 Negative Evidence
Reducing US oil production increases oil imports, which net increases emissions.
Foreign Policy
The case for continuing U.S. oil and gas production
Eliminating U.S. oil production faster than U.S. demand declines would result in addi‑
tional oil imports. (The United States has so much natural gas production and resources
that large‑scale natural gas imports are difficult to imagine.) Oil is a fungible commod‑
ity, produced in countries around the world with varying levels of environmental stan‑
dards and GHG emissions.
Upstream emissions from oil and gas—those that occur in production, transportation,
and refining—vary greatly across sources of crude oil. The highest 10% of production
in terms of GHG emissions has emissions more than 4 times those of the lowest 10%.
The U.S. average crude oil, at 89 kilograms of carbon dioxide equivalent per barrel (kg
CO2e/bbl), has lower upstream emissions than the global average of 95 kgCO2e/ bbl.1
These distinctions are small when one considers the challenge of deep decarbonization,
but as the world strives to reduce emissions overall, using the lowest‑emissions sources
of crude oil can help.
One could argue that reducing U.S. oil and gas production would increase global oil
and gas prices and thus decrease their use globally. This might be true for a while,
but the global oil market has a history of strong price swings, as high prices bring out
more production that sends prices crashing down again. It’s unlikely that decreased U.S.
production would keep prices high enough for long enough to significantly decrease
global demand.
Climate change and GHG emissions are global problems—the measure that matters is
global emissions, no matter where in the world they occur. Moving production and
re‑arranging markets to reduce the emissions within or attributable to the United States
doesn’t help if we merely export those emissions to other places.
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5 Negative Evidence
5.1.2 Renewables Impossible
Renewables cannot meet current global oil demand.
Foreign Policy
Even in scenarios with ambitious climate action, the world will still need more oil
More than 70 countries have set a target date for net‑zero greenhouse gas emissions,
covering about 76% of global emissions, for years ranging from 2045 to 2070.22 How‑
ever, most countries with net‑zero targets have not yet established policies that will
allow them to reach that ambitious goal. This is not surprising, since technologies to
decarbonize some energy uses are not yet proven, and others, like electric light vehicles,
require investments from individual users and additional infrastructure to support their
use. But this disconnect between goals and policy adds great uncertainty to long‑term
investment decisions in the energy industry.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) publishes scenarios for future climate action
and energy supply and demand. These scenarios cover a range of possible futures to
help governments and energy companies make decisions in an uncertain environment.
Three IEA scenarios represent increasing degrees of climate action and decreasing levels
of certainty in their implementation.
The Stated Policies Scenario includes current and announced climate and energy poli‑
cies, based on sector‑by‑sector and country‑by‑country assessments of governments
around the world.23
The Announced Pledges Scenario goes further, assuming that governments around the
world meet their commitments, including Nationally Determined Contributions and
longer‑term net zero targets, as well as targets for access to electricity and clean cook‑
ing.24
The Net‑Zero by 2050 Scenario is the most ambitious and the least likely. It establishes
a pathway for the entire world’s energy system to achieve net‑zero emissions by 2050,
including those countries without net‑zero commitments and those with commitments
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5 Negative Evidence
with end dates after 2050. It also assumes that universal access to electricity and clean
cooking are achieved by 2030.25 The world is far from this path today.
In both the Stated Policies and Announced Pledges scenarios, global oil demand in 2030
cannot be met by currently producing oil fields. Global oil demand today is about 102
million barrels per day (mb/d). The Stated Policies Scenario estimates roughly steady
oil demand in 2030 while the Announced Policies Scenario estimates that oil demand
will fall to 93 mb/d by 2030. But supply from existing fields is forecast to fall by 18 mb/d,
leaving a gap in supply under any realistic oil demand scenario.26 For comparison pur‑
poses, the Willow project in Alaska is planned to produce 180,000 barrels per day at its
peak (or 0.18 mb/d),27 and total U.S. oil production today is 12.7 mb/d.28
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5 Negative Evidence
Renewables shift is impossible – certain fossil fuel qualities can’t be replicated.
Foreign Policy
[Samantha Gross, “Why are fossil fuels so hard to quit?,” Brookings, 10‑17‑2019,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/why‑are‑fossil‑fuels‑so‑hard‑to‑quit/, accessed
9‑12‑2023; AD]
Wind and solar power aren’t everything – the remaining challenges
“Electrify everything” is a great plan, so far as it goes, but not everything can be easily
electrified. Certain qualities of fossil fuels are difficult to replicate, such as their energy
density and their ability to provide very high heat. To decarbonize processes that rely
on these qualities, you need low‑carbon fuels that mimic the qualities of fossil fuels.
The energy density of fossil fuels is particularly important in the transportation sector.
A vehicle needs to carry its fuel around as it travels, so the weight and volume of that
fuel are key. Electric vehicles are a much‑touted solution for replacing oil, but they are
not perfect for all uses. Pound for pound, gasoline or diesel fuel contain about 40 times
as much energy as a state‑of‑the‑art battery. On the other hand, electric motors are
much more efficient than internal combustion engines and electric vehicles are simpler
mechanically, with many fewer moving parts. These advantages make up for some of
the battery’s weight penalty, but an electric vehicle will still be heavier than a similar
vehicle running on fossil fuel. For vehicles that carry light loads and can refuel often,
like passenger cars, this penalty isn’t a big deal. But for aviation, maritime shipping, or
long‑haul trucking, where the vehicle must carry heavy loads for long distances without
refueling, the difference in energy density between fossil fuels and batteries is a huge
challenge, and electric vehicles just don’t meet the need.
Industrial processes that need very high heat — such as the production of steel, cement,
and glass — pose another challenge. Steel blast furnaces operate at about 1,100° C, and
cement kilns operate at about 1,400° C. These very high temperatures are hard to achieve
without burning a fuel and are thus difficult to power with electricity.
Renewable electricity can’t solve the emissions problem for processes that can’t run on
electricity. For these processes, the world needs zero‑carbon fuels that mimic the prop‑
erties of fossil fuels — energy‑dense fuels that can be burned. A number of options exist,
but they each have pros and cons and generally need more work to be commercially and
environmentally viable.
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5 Negative Evidence
Biofuels are a possibility, since the carbon released when the biofuel is burned is the
same carbon taken up as the plant grew. However, the processing required to turn
plants into usable fuels consumes energy, and this results in CO2 emissions, meaning
that biofuels are not zero‑carbon unless the entire process runs on renewable or zero‑
carbon energy. For example, the corn ethanol blended into gasoline in the United States
averages only 39% lower CO2 emissions than the gasoline it replaces, given the emis‑
sions that occur from transporting the corn to processing facilities and converting it to
fuel. Biofuels also compete for arable land with food production and conservation uses,
such as for recreation or fish and wildlife, which gets more challenging as biofuel pro‑
duction increases. Fuels made from crop waste or municipal waste can be better, in
terms of land use and carbon emissions, but supply of these wastes is limited and the
technology needs improvement to be cost‑effective.
Another pathway is to convert renewable electricity into a combustible fuel. Hydrogen

can be produced by using renewable electricity to split water atoms into their hydrogen
and oxygen components. The hydrogen could then be burned as a zero‑carbon fuel,
similar to the way natural gas is used today. Electricity, CO2, and hydrogen could be
also combined to produce liquid fuels to replace diesel and jet fuel. However, when we
split water atoms or create liquid fuels from scratch, the laws of thermodynamics are
not in our favor. These processes use electricity to, in effect, run the combustion process
backwards, and thus use large amounts of energy. Since these processes would use vast
amounts of renewable power, they only make sense in applications where electricity
cannot be used directly.
Carbon capture and storage or use is a final possibility for stationary applications like
heavy industry. Fossil fuels would still be burned and create CO2, but it would be cap‑
tured instead of released into the atmosphere. Processes under development envision
removing CO2 from ambient air. In either case, the CO2 would then be injected deep
underground or used in an industrial process.
The most common use for captured CO2 today is in enhanced oil recovery, where pres‑
surized CO2 is injected into an oil reservoir to squeeze out more oil. The idea of captur‑
ing CO2 and using it to produce more fossil fuel seems backwards — does that really
reduce emissions overall? But studies show that the captured CO2 stays in the oil reser‑
voir permanently when it is injected in this way. And if enough CO2 is injected during
oil production, it might make up for the combustion emissions of the produced oil, or
even result in overall negative emissions. This won’t be a panacea for all oil use, but
could make oil use feasible in those applications, like aviation, where it is very hard to
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5 Negative Evidence
replace.
Carbon capture is today the cheapest way to deal with emissions from heavy industries
that require combustion. It has the advantage that it can also capture CO2 emissions
that come from the process itself, rather than from fuel combustion, as occurs in cement
production when limestone is heated to produce a component of cement with CO2 as a
by‑product.
When considering how carbon capture might contribute to climate change mitigation,
we have to remember that fossil fuels are not the ultimate cause of the problem — CO2
emissions are. If maintaining some fossil fuel use with carbon capture is the easiest way
to deal with certain sources of emissions, that’s still solving the fundamental problem.
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5 Negative Evidence
5.1.3 Renewables Bad – Resource Wars
Increasing dependency on renewables causes global war due to high value targets,
territorial conflict, and leverage.
Hatipoglu et al, 20 – PhD in Political Science at Penn State
[Emre Hatipoglu, Saleh Al Muhanna, Brian Efird, “Renewables and the future of geopol‑
itics: Revisiting main concepts of international relations from the lens of renewables,”
Russian Journal of Economics, Vol. 6, Issue 4, 12‑14‑2020, https://rujec.org/article/55450/,
Freeman and Bazilian (2018) also point out three distinct ways the increasing reliance
on REE can trigger tensions that may escalate to military conflict. First, at the intrastate
level, producer countries with weak institutions are vulnerable to insurgents capturing
their resources. Recalling the DRC‑cobalt example, research has shown that not only the
government, but also various warring factions have used cobalt mines to finance their
insurgency (Kisangani, 2003). Second, at the international level, states may compete to
establish hegemony over global “resource commons.” Despite decades‑long debates,
the international community is still struggling in reaching a global consensus on how
to demarcate continental shelves and exclusive economic zones into the deep sea (Nel‑
son, 2009; Charney, 1996), resulting in frequent ship seizures even amongst close allies
(Gibler and Little, 2017). The current standoff between Turkey and other littoral states
in the Eastern Mediterranean over potential off‑shore natural gas reserves illustrates the
most recent geopolitical tension relating to such issues of demarcation (Stocker, 2012).
The increasing demand on REE can result in such tension over territory, onshore and
offshore. Similar to current tensions regarding the demarcation of sea shelves that are
believed to possess natural gas reserves, we may see tensions over arid, non‑habited ar‑
eas or off‑shore sectors due to wind and solar (and possibly wave) energy potential be‑
tween claimant states. For instance, the increasing demand for lithium has rekindled the
historical debate regarding the territorial and water access rights of Bolivia, Chile and
Argentina over the Atacama Desert, which holds the world’s largest reserve of lithium
(Rossi, 2019; López Steinmetz and Fong, 2019). Local conflicts on such “off‑shore bor‑
ders,” such as the recent series of rows the U.S. federal government has had with various
individual littoral states in the Atlantic about off‑shore wind farm permits, may also be
foreshadowing how securing territorial rights to areas with renewable potential could
lead to conflict.
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5 Negative Evidence
Finally, supplier states may use dependency on these minerals as leverage to extract
concessions from importer countries. As previously mentioned, REEs play a critical
role in the manufacturing of wind turbines, solar panels and high‑capacity lithium‑ion
batteries. The availability of these products is critical towards the establishment of a re‑
newable energy infrastructure. The last couple of decades have witnessed certain coun‑
tries leverage their oligopolistic positions as producers of REE to improve their stature
in the international arena. This type of behavior has been quite reminiscent of OPEC
members using global dependence on their oil reserves as leverage in foreign policy.
For instance, with the new millennium, China has adopted the policy of internalizing
the value chain in the renewable technology production as much as possible. Instead of
selling REE in bulk as raw materials to world markets, China has increasingly sought to
move downstream, hence export more value‑added products (e.g. exporting high‑tech
magnets instead of raw neodymium). This change in policy reverberated throughout
global value chains and led to small to medium‑size crises between advanced indus‑
trial countries such as Japan, the US and Germany (Ting and Seaman, 2013; Humphries,
2012).
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5 Negative Evidence
Resource curse is well‑established, and causes civil and international wars.
REE and the natural resource curse. The natural resource curse has been a well‑
established danger for certain countries to miss opportunities for export‑led growth
and fall into a development trap due to the abundance of natural resources that keep
prices high (see, inter alia, Sachs and Warner, 2001; Robinson et al., 2006). Since relying
on non‑taxed revenue for government spending, these states often are also unable to
develop institutions to foster such healthy and sustainable growth. States that have
experienced such resource inflow before the consolidation of their political regimes
have especially been susceptible to natural resource curse (Bayulgen, 2010). Increasing
reliance on REE export revenue may create such pitfalls for exporting states, especially
for those who may experience a considerable surge in REE production should they
tentatively conclude their domestic political problems, such as a post‑conflict DRC
or Bolivia. The failure to strengthen the state institutions due to this resource curse
may possibly lead to a relapse of civil conflict. A security‑related implication of the
resource‑curse at the international level also deserves mention. States deriving most of
their budgetary income from non‑tax resources tend to follow more aggressive foreign
policy, especially those led by “revolutionary” leaders geared towards changing the
institutional structure of their states (Colgan, 2011). Similarly, the budgetary freedom
REE revenue bestows may motivate certain states to pursue a more aggressive foreign
policy.
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5 Negative Evidence
5.1.4 Renewables Bad – Interdependence
Interdependence creates leverage opportunities that facilitate escalation, proven by

Ukraine.
How does renewable energy fit into what we already know about how economic in‑
terdependence, and energy relations in particular shape relations between two states?
The current rise of renewables highlights two distinct ways in which states relate to
each other: (i) instantaneous transfer of energy, i.e. electricity, and (ii) a reliance on
technology and raw material transfer. Both processes bring about challenges to the ex‑
isting global governance schemes on energy and trade, and perturbate existing power
relations between states. Trade in electricity, and what renewables produce, is funda‑
mentally different from trade in other forms of energy sources. Due to limited storage
technology, the trade of electricity should be immediate; electricity that is not consumed
on the spot is instantly “spoiled.” In this respect, renewable energy differs from conven‑
tional hydrocarbon resources that can be stored. Inventories of hydrocarbons, such as
the Strategic Petroleum Reserve of the US, have been used to smooth out disturbances
to the market (Considine, 2006; Leiby et al., 2019). Unexpected events can also be ad‑
dressed by redirecting oil and LNG tankers. For instance, facing low demand due to a
warmer than expected winter in the region, Korea Gas Corporation diverted three LNG
tankers en route to Korea to northwest Europe (Kravtsova and Chung, 2019). Without
gargantuan leaps in battery storage technology, such smoothing out of disruptions to
the trade of renewable energy is simply not possible in the short term. Lead times re‑
quired to bring energy projects online point to another challenge trading of renewable
energy posits in the medium term. The advent of shale gas and oil have substantially
decreased the time needed to bring wells online, often as low as 90 to 180 days (Hiller,
2019). Major photovoltaics (PV) and wind power installations on the other hand, mainly
due to “not in my back yard” (NIMBY) attitudes, require longer lead times to start pro‑
ducing electricity (World Energy Council, 2016). Furthermore, renewable investments
are more capital intensive (Best, 2017), requiring more sophisticated financing schemes
with often the need to establish partnerships beyond borders.
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5 Negative Evidence
3. Trade in renewable energy and challenges to global governance
Not surprisingly, the abovementioned properties of renewable energy create challenges

for its global governance. A global regime, defined as a “[set] of implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules, and decision‑making procedures around which actors’ expec‑
tations converge in a given area” (Krasner 1982, 185), for energy has hardly been es‑
tablished (Florini and Sovacool, 2009; Goldthau and Witte, 2010). While one can argue
about the existence of an “oil regime” along the IEA‑OPEC axis, the tools and concepts of
this regime do not easily translate into the governance of interstate relations instigated
by the trade of renewable energy. As mentioned above, interstate trade of renewable
energy raises challenges for which no off‑the‑shelf solution exists. Pricing (immediate,
next‑hour and next‑day) remains a salient issue. Even now, national and sub‑national
grids, operating under a national legal system and its coercive mechanisms still have
a difficult time interpreting and meeting contractual obligations in electricity trading
(Bower and Fuentes, 2014; Siosansi, 2011). Contracts of larger magnitudes under the aus‑
pices of international law may create conflicts between states that are more intractable
in nature. For example, how to price base‑load, variable‑load and peak‑load supply
may lead to various conflicts amongst contracting parties.
Another potential challenge relates to secondary mechanisms contingent on sustained

flow of energy from an exporter to an importer. Global carbon caps and emissions
trading is one such mechanism. If carbon caps and pricing become meaningfully ad‑
hered to in the global economy, many countries will rely on low or zero‑carbon elec‑
tricity imports. Unexpected constraints in the supply of this low‑carbon electricity by
the exporter may lead to considerable geopolitical tensions. Being targeted with eco‑
nomic sanctions, unplanned growth in energy consumption crowding out exports, or
geographical trends cutting into renewable production may lead to such constraints.
An exporter country may, due to such unforeseen circumstances, choose not to meet its
contractual obligations and reduce the amount of electricity available to its client coun‑
tries. Such trade conflicts borne out of unexpected lapses in the supply of low‑carbon
electricity can reverberate into other aspects of the importing country’s industry (such
as additional carbon costs reflecting on manufactured products), and hence carry the
potential to escalate into geopolitical conflicts.
The presence of intermediary countries poses a physical risk against ensuring the contin‑
uous transmission of renewable energy across borders. Since electricity must physically
travel continuously from its start to its end point, any intermediary state can easily break
the connection, and gain significant geopolitical leverage over both the originator and
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5 Negative Evidence
end‑consumer states, with notable security and economic implications. Without effec‑
tive dispute resolution mechanisms, these conflicts can escalate into military hostilities
in a bid to secure energy flow, income or both. The role intermediary states have played
in recent conflicts regarding the transport of gas can be illuminating for such risks be‑
holding the trade of renewable energy. Being dependent on the Soviet legacy pipeline
to relay its gas to world markets, Turkmenistan consistently complained that Russia re‑
stricted Turkmen access to global gas markets. Ukraine, in turn, occasionally threatened
to cut off supplies of Russian gas to Europe and Turkey to extract political concessions.
It is important to note that these gas conflicts remain salient in the world agenda despite
increasing dominance of LNG, which is turning gas into an increasingly fungible good
and weakening the political leverage intermediary countries for gas transit can impose.
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5 Negative Evidence
5.1.5 Renewables Bad – Cyberattacks
Renewables pose threats to cybersecurity through digitalization.
4.2. Cybersecurity
Cyber warfare and cyber management have increasingly become a global concern, and
with the upcoming adoption of 5G wireless technologies systems allowing the Internet
of Things (IoT) to unleash its full potential, this concern is due to only grow further in
the future. Cyber warfare also poses a major risk for electricity grids, of which we have
already witnessed numerous cases in the past, leading to large scale power outages.
According to the European Commission’s Smart Grids Task Force, a modern digital
society’s energy infrastructure is among the most critical and complex, and it “serves
as the backbone for its economic activities and for its security” (European Commission,
2018).
Amongst the most notable cyber‑attacks on electricity infrastructure in the recent past
was the December 2016 malware attack on regional power stations in Ukraine, leading
to a loss of electricity for over 225,000 people for many hours (Kshetri and Voas, 2017).
The most notable of such malware targeting electricity infrastructure is Stuxnet, first
discovered in July 2010, considered to be the first cyber warfare weapon with the ability
to target control systems used in power plants. Black and Veatch, an infrastructure
engineering and construction consultancy firm, ranked cybersecurity as the third most
pressing issue facing electricity utilities, behind only aging infrastructure and an aging
workforce. According to Henry Harji, the firm’s Director of Business in Asia, smart
grids and IoT technologies are “introducing new interdependencies and vulnerabilities
across utilities’ entire asset and distribution portfolio” (Black and Veatch, 2017).
Further amplifying the issue is that utilities’ communication protocols are generally
standardized across the industry, where “malware used against one type of industrial
control system can simply be ‘tweaked’ to attack a power grid” (Kshetri and Voas, 2017).
Utilities’ existing equipment is generally expensive to replace, however the increasing
implementation of renewables will likely offer enough of an incentive for them to justify
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5 Negative Evidence
the upgrade to new and more secure equipment. However, the increasing implemen‑
tation of renewables will likely also lead to, and require, increased digitalization, thus
increasing the risk of a cyber‑attack once again despite the more secure upgraded equip‑
ment.
The U.S. Department of Commerce’s NIST (National Institute of Standards and Tech‑
nology) report for Smart Grid Cybersecurity guidelines states that while increased dig‑
italization is essential, it will introduce “new interdependencies and vulnerabilities to
potential attackers and unintentional errors” (NIST, 2014) Amongst the essential func‑
tions at risk are: electricity supply and transmission, electricity transmission and dis‑
tribution stability, communication between systems/equipment, and backup systems
(Dagoumas, 2019). Additionally, cyber‑attacks could not only affect utilities, but mar‑
ket participants as well. This becomes increasingly important with the deployment of
distributed generators to utilize renewables, such as the use of residential solar panels,
as well as the risk of personal data breaches.
The integration of renewable energy into electricity grids poses a very serious question
regarding a nation’s energy infrastructure and its vulnerability to cyber‑attacks. Fu‑
ture technologies create a catch‑22 situation as digitalization and inter‑connectivity will
likely lead to an upgrade in equipment that is more secure, yet inter‑connectivity may
also lead to increased inter‑dependence and thus pose a higher cyber‑risk. Furthermore,
cyber‑attacks also raise the issue of non‑state actors conducting what may be interpreted
as acts of war against nation states, similar to large scale terrorist attacks, with numer‑
ous powerful hacktivist groups operating worldwide. Further research is needed to
adequately assess not only the technological impacts of renewable integration into elec‑
tricity grids, but the geopolitical risks that such an integration poses as well.
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5.2 Economy
Fossil fuels are key to economic growth – all alternatives fail.
Ridley, 15 – current Wall Street Journal reporter and former Economist science writer
[Matt Ridley, “Fossil Fuels Will Save the World (Really),” WSJ, 3‑13‑2015, https://www.wsj.
com/articles/fossil‑fuels‑will‑save‑the‑world‑really‑1426282420, accessed 9‑12‑2023;
AD]
The second argument for giving up fossil fuels is that new rivals will shortly price them
out of the market. But it is not happening. The great hope has long been nuclear energy,
but even if there is a rush to build new nuclear power stations over the next few years,
most will simply replace old ones due to close. The world’s nuclear output is down
from 6% of world energy consumption in 2003 to 4% today. It is forecast to inch back
up to just 6.7% by 2035, according the Energy Information Administration.
Nuclear’s problem is cost. In meeting the safety concerns of environmentalists, politi‑

cians and regulators added requirements for extra concrete, steel and pipework, and
even more for extra lawyers, paperwork and time. The effect was to make nuclear plants
into huge and lengthy boondoggles with no competition or experimentation to drive
down costs. Nuclear is now able to compete with fossil fuels only when it is subsidized.
As for renewable energy, hydroelectric is the biggest and cheapest supplier, but it has
the least capacity for expansion. Technologies that tap the energy of waves and tides
remain unaffordable and impractical, and most experts think that this won’t change in
a hurry. Geothermal is a minor player for now. And bioenergy—that is, wood, ethanol
made from corn or sugar cane, or diesel made from palm oil—is proving an ecological
disaster: It encourages deforestation and food‑price hikes that cause devastation among
the world’s poor, and per unit of energy produced, it creates even more carbon dioxide
than coal.
Wind power, for all the public money spent on its expansion, has inched up to—wait
for it—1% of world energy consumption in 2013. Solar, for all the hype, has not even
managed that: If we round to the nearest whole number, it accounts for 0% of world
energy consumption.
Both wind and solar are entirely reliant on subsidies for such economic viability as
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they have. World‑wide, the subsidies given to renewable energy currently amount to
roughly ~$10 per gigajoule: These sums are paid by consumers to producers, so they
tend to go from the poor to the rich, often to landowners (I am a landowner and can
testify that I receive and refuse many offers of risk‑free wind and solar subsidies).
It is true that some countries subsidize the use of fossil fuels, but they do so at a much
lower rate—the world average is about ~$1.20 per gigajoule—and these are mostly sub‑
sidies for consumers (not producers), so they tend to help the poor, for whom energy
costs are a disproportionate share of spending.
The costs of renewable energy are coming down, especially in the case of solar. But even
if solar panels were free, the power they produce would still struggle to compete with
fossil fuel—except in some very sunny locations—because of all the capital equipment
required to concentrate and deliver the energy. This is to say nothing of the great ex‑
panses of land on which solar facilities must be built and the cost of retaining sufficient
conventional generator capacity to guarantee supply on a dark, cold, windless evening.
The two fundamental problems that renewables face are that they take up too much
space and produce too little energy. Consider Solar Impulse, the solar‑powered airplane
now flying around the world. Despite its huge wingspan (similar to a 747), slow speed
and frequent stops, the only cargo that it can carry is the pilots themselves. That is a
good metaphor for the limitations of renewables.
To run the U.S. economy entirely on wind would require a wind farm the size of Texas,
California and New Mexico combined—backed up by gas on windless days. To power it
on wood would require a forest covering two‑thirds of the U.S., heavily and continually
harvested.
John Constable, who will head a new Energy Institute at the University of Buckingham
in Britain, points out that the trickle of energy that human beings managed to extract
from wind, water and wood before the Industrial Revolution placed a great limit on
development and progress. The incessant toil of farm laborers generated so little surplus
energy in the form of food for men and draft animals that the accumulation of capital,
such as machinery, was painfully slow. Even as late as the 18th century, this energy‑
deprived economy was sufficient to enrich daily life for only a fraction of the population.
Our old enemy, the second law of thermodynamics, is the problem here. As a teenager’s
bedroom generally illustrates, left to its own devices, everything in the world becomes
less ordered, more chaotic, tending toward “entropy,” or thermodynamic equilibrium.
To reverse this tendency and make something complex, ordered and functional requires
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work. It requires energy.
The more energy you have, the more intricate, powerful and complex you can make a
system. Just as human bodies need energy to be ordered and functional, so do societies.
In that sense, fossil fuels were a unique advance because they allowed human beings to
create extraordinary patterns of order and complexity—machines and buildings—with
which to improve their lives.
The result of this great boost in energy is what the economic historian and philosopher
Deirdre McCloskey calls the Great Enrichment. In the case of the U.S., there has been
a roughly 9,000% increase in the value of goods and services available to the average
American since 1800, almost all of which are made with, made of, powered by or pro‑
pelled by fossil fuels.
Still, more than a billion people on the planet have yet to get access to electricity and to
experience the leap in living standards that abundant energy brings. This is not just an
inconvenience for them: Indoor air pollution from wood fires kills four million people
a year. The next time that somebody at a rally against fossil fuels lectures you about her
concern for the fate of her grandchildren, show her a picture of an African child dying
today from inhaling the dense muck of a smoky fire.
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5.2.2 Costs of Ban
Bans are too costly and foreclose the use of fossil fuels that make economic and
environmental sense.
Lynch, 21 – Distinguished Fellow at the Energy Policy Research Foundation and Presi‑
dent of Strategic Energy and Economic Research
[Michael Lynch, “Don’t Ban Fossil Fuels: Absolutism In Climate Change Policy Is A
Vice,” Forbes, 3‑24‑2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaellynch/2021/03/24/dont‑
ban‑fossil‑fuels‑absolutism‑in‑climate‑change‑policy‑is‑a‑vice/?sh=52aa0c582541,
One aspect of the debate over climate change policy centers on calls to ban the usage of
fossil fuels, which is popular in some quarters but extremely questionable as effective
policy. As Roland Geyer pointed out in the Guardian recently, the world has used up
most of its carbon budget if it wants to meet the target of keeping global warming to
1.5 degrees C. Therefore, a ban would only partially reduce GHG emissions and at an
exorbitant costs.
And among the emissions targets and goal, a number of cities are turning to bans on cars,
or at least gasoline powered cars, and natural gas heating in buildings. Utilities wanting
to switch to natural gas run into opposition on the grounds that reducing emissions is
not enough, they must be completely eliminated.
This is reminiscent of nothing so much as those nuclear power protestors in the 1970s
who insisted that no level of radiation was safe and therefore nuclear power plants,
which emit minute amounts, should be banned. Most abandoned that argument upon
discovering that radiation is omnipresent, and impossible to avoid: power plant emis‑
sions would make a negligible difference.
Similarly, switching to renewables or even nuclear doesn’t eliminate emissions, only

reduces them—and sometimes not all that much. The manufacture and construction
of wind turbines and solar power, as well as their maintenance, requires significant
amounts of energy even if they do not require ‘fuel’ per se. Which beggars the question:
if the approach taken to fossil fuel consumption is that no greenhouse gas emissions are
permissible, why shouldn’t renewables also be banned?
Geyer correctly notes that bans were imposed on lead in gasoline and CFCs with a high
degree of success, and argues that same could be done with fossil fuels overall. But the
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cost‑benefit equation is very different from substituting ethanol for lead as an octane
enhancer or the varied substitutes for CFCs as refrigerants and industrial cleansers. (He
remarks that renewables are cheaper than fossil fuels and that lifetime costs for electric
vehicles are lower than for petroleum fueled vehicles, which is highly questionable but
the subject for another day.)
The reason why this matters is that some uses of fossil fuels are harder to eliminate
than others and, indeed, some can be beneficial to the climate. The U.S., despite the
past administration’s opposition to climate change policy, has seen large reductions in
CO2 emissions because of switching from coal to gas in power generation. Indeed, gas
power enables higher reliance on renewables because it provides backup for a highly
unreliable resource.
Further, there remains a huge amount of coal being burned around the planet (includ‑
ing in the U.S.), and much of it could be displaced by natural gas relatively quickly.
Stranded gas in eastern Siberia, the Caspian area, and even the Middle East would be
shipped to east and south Asia; indeed, LNG all the way from America is often a cost‑
effective way to reduce GHG emissions in Asia.
Pre‑industrial greenhouse gas emissions were approximately 440 gigatonnes of CO2

equivalent a year, primarily from natural sources, most of which was offset by natural
processes. Human caused emissions add about 30 gigatonnes CO2 equivalent a year. A
small portion of that is from agriculture, land use, etc., rather than fossil fuel consump‑
tion. This is not to imply that those emissions are trivial or irrelevant, but to put the
impact of a ban in context. Similarly, the fact that more methane emissions come from
agriculture and wetlands than the oil industry doesn’t mean the industry shouldn’t min‑
imize emissions.
Too much of the climate policy debate centers on posturing, that is, proposals that are
superficially appealing but not very effective, or not cost‑effective. Completely banning
fossil fuels is akin to earlier proposals to ban disposable diapers, which initially ap‑
pealed to many but were quietly disappeared as the relative environmental impacts of
cotton and disposal diapers became clear. Unfortunately, many energy decisions face
loud opposition from citizen groups who are concerned about climate change but seem
not to have a thorough understanding of the complexities of emissions.
The role of climate change policy should be to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in
the most cost‑effective manner (economic efficiency is just as important as energy ef‑
ficiency), not to pretend that the elimination of one source will somehow be a solution.
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This is especially true given that some reductions will be very cheap (even profitable)
but as complete zero emission (from one source) are approached, costs will rise very
steeply. ‘First, do no harm’ is the physicians creed, but perhaps should be added the
optometrists’ maxim, ‘Better now, or better now.’
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5 Negative Evidence
Bans decrease jobs, tax revenues, and GDP.
AP, 20 [Associated Press Via Quickwire, “ ‘Biden ban’ on federal oil and gas leasing
could cost New Mexico, U.S. economies billions,” Albuquerque Journal, 12‑18‑2020,
https://www.abqjournal.com/business/what_s‑open/biden‑ban‑on‑federal‑oil‑and‑
gas‑leasing‑could‑cost‑new‑mexico‑u‑s‑economies/article_cd38d203‑1b9e‑5728‑bdd9‑
5025481afd66.html, accessed 10‑8‑2023; AD]
In a letter sent to the Biden administration on Dec. 15, the groups pointed to the ongoing
threats climate change pose to the world exacerbated by fossil fuel development.
“Climate change represents an existential threat to the United States and the planet. The
climate crisis is already causing devastating impacts from more destructive hurricanes
and wildfires, rising seas, increasing heatwaves, droughts, and floods, imperiling food
and water security, and the causing the collapse of ecosystems,” read the letter.
“Because fossil fuels are responsible for 75 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions and
over 90 percent of carbon dioxide emissions, it is the policy of the Biden administra‑
tion to immediately cease the expansion of fossil fuel development and implement a
managed decline of fossil fuel extraction on public lands and waters.”
But such actions could devastate the economies of western states like New Mexico that
rely heavily on oil and gas extraction, per data from a recent Wyoming Energy Authority
study conducted the University of Wyoming and cited by the New Mexico Oil and Gas
Association (NMOGA) and Western Energy Alliance.
How would this impact jobs, GDP and tax revenues?
The move would cost 72,818 jobs per year, totaling in ~$19.6 billion in lost wages and
cause an overall economic decline of ~$43.8 billion, the study showed.
Tax revenues would drop by up to ~$10.8 billion in New Mexico, North Dakota, Utah,
Wyoming, Colorado, Montana, California and Alaska, read the study, by the end of
Biden’s first term – states that make up 75 percent of U.S. onshore fossil fuel production.
By 2040, such policy would cause the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to decline by
~$670.5 billion and see up to 351,000 jobs lost across the west, the study read.
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That destroys the economies of western states.
AP, 20 [Associated Press Via Quickwire, “ ‘Biden ban’ on federal oil and gas leasing
could cost New Mexico, U.S. economies billions,” Albuquerque Journal, 12‑18‑2020,
https://www.abqjournal.com/business/what_s‑open/biden‑ban‑on‑federal‑oil‑and‑
gas‑leasing‑could‑cost‑new‑mexico‑u‑s‑economies/article_cd38d203‑1b9e‑5728‑bdd9‑
5025481afd66.html, accessed 10‑8‑2023; AD]
Long‑term impact on New Mexico’s economy
In New Mexico, that would mean ~$207.7 billion in GDP lost in the next 20 years, per
the study, with 36,217 jobs lost between 2021 and 2024 along with ~$12.5 billion in oil
and gas investments and ~$16.9 billion in production.
The state would lose ~$6.3 billion in tax revenue in the next four years, ~$22.1 billion in
GDP and ~$9.8 billion in wages.
NMOGA Executive Director Ryan Flynn said proposal to ban or restrict oil and gas
develop on federal land would be irresponsible to the needs of New Mexico and stymie
funding to public services such as education while also increasing the U.S.’ reliance on
foreign energy sources which Flynn argued were not as stringently regulated.
“Any proposal restricting oil and gas development on federal lands would devastate
New Mexico and result in the elimination of thousands of jobs, massive cuts in support
for public education, and a greater reliance on foreign energy imports,” he said.
“Our state depends on oil and gas to fund schools, put teachers in classrooms and help
our young children learn.”
Flynn argued the industry was already cutting its impact on pollution using market‑
driven solutions, and that increasingly restrictive government policies would imperil
New Mexico’s main economic driver.
“We are committed to doing our part to reduce emissions and protect the environment,”
he said. “But we cannot slap thousands of New Mexicans with proposals that destroy
jobs and ravage communities.”
Katherine Sgamma, president of the Western Energy Alliance said a halt on federal land
development would only satisfy the demands of “radical” environmentalists and the
Alliance would sue if such policy was enacted.
“He’s (Biden) calculating that he won’t pay a political price while satisfying radical cli‑
mate activists, but he would be sacrificing the livelihoods of thousands of westerners
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throughout many sectors of the economy,” Sgamma said. “If he makes good on a Biden
ban, the Alliance will be in court within hours.”
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5.2.3 Energy Prices
California proves that restrictions on fossil fuels increase energy prices.
Tubb, 22 – former research fellow for energy and environmental issues at The Heritage
Foundation
[Katie Tubb, “Biden’s Radical, Anti‑Fossil Fuel Energy Policy Costs Americans Dearly,”
Heritage Foundation, 6‑28‑2022, https://www.heritage.org/energy‑economics/commentary/bidens‑
radical‑anti‑fossil‑fuel‑energy‑policy‑costs‑americans‑dearly, accessed 10‑8‑2023; AD]
From Counterfactual to Historical Reality
The pattern for Biden’s radical energy policies has long been used by California and
Europe, where residents are not considering counterfactual “what if” scenarios but the
reality of these policies that have been on the books for years now.
There are reasons why Californians today are paying ~$6.27 for a gallon of regular
gasoline—~$1.27 more than the national average—and pay billions more per year than
if they were paying the national average price for gasoline.
California requires a boutique blend of gasoline to meet its own climate and environ‑
mental regulations and heavily regulates the refineries that produce fuel. It is also work‑
ing to restrict and eventually eliminate oil and gas production in the state and it severely
restricts pipelines, forcing the state to rely on expensive, heavily regulated domestic
shipping.
Its Low Carbon Fuel Standard is designed to penalize conventional gasoline and diesel
and subsidize alternative fuels. And it is requiring an increasing number of trucks and
all new passenger vehicles sold in the state to be zero‑emission vehicles by 2035.
If California’s policies sound vaguely familiar, they should. The Biden administration
is working in effect to nationalize California’s energy and climate policies.
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Europe also proves.
Tubb, 22 – former research fellow for energy and environmental issues at The Heritage
Foundation
[Katie Tubb, “Biden’s Radical, Anti‑Fossil Fuel Energy Policy Costs Americans Dearly,”
Heritage Foundation, 6‑28‑2022, https://www.heritage.org/energy‑economics/commentary/bidens‑
radical‑anti‑fossil‑fuel‑energy‑policy‑costs‑americans‑dearly, accessed 10‑8‑2023; AD]
Similarly, for well over a decade, Europe has unnecessarily rejected proven technolo‑
gies like hydraulic fracturing to access cleaner natural gas energy resources; heavily
subsidized less efficient, less reliable wind and solar energy technologies; and taxed or
eliminated the use of natural gas, coal, oil, and, in some cases, nuclear energy.
This is in addition to a regional carbon tax and plans to build out a financial taxonomy
system to force banks and other private financing away from fossil fuels and toward
green energy.
The combination of decreasing domestic production of useful sources of energy while

heavily subsidizing inherently intermittent resources has left Europeans with a costly
and fragile energy sector and exposed Europe to greater risk both in energy markets
and political independence.
Years of such policy left Europe flat‑footed without alternatives to Russian energy im‑
ports, consequently disrupting global oil markets during the current Russian‑Ukrainian
War and contributing to the high global prices Americans are paying.
Unfortunately, it is the clear and demonstrated aspiration of too many European politi‑
cians and the Biden administration along with them to prevent new infrastructure for
oil, gas, and coal production to be built and “locked in” for decades of usefulness. In‑
stead, they prefer to wring out what’s left of existing production and rely on imports
while also forcing their economies onto more costly, less reliable green energy alterna‑
tives.
But here, Biden is attempting to engage in his own alternative history—a counterfactual
scenario that is just as fictional. High gasoline prices are just part of his “incredible
transition” away from the fuel that supplies 35% of Americans’ total energy needs and
90% of Americans’ transportation fuel needs.
Despite the onset of renewable energy technologies, global demand for oil and gas
hasn’t changed much and doesn’t look like it will in the near future. Rather than the
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administration’s vendetta against oil, this is an energy asset to be incredibly thankful

for, as the alternative has proved to be devastating poverty.
Biden’s radical energy policy is reality‑defying and based on an anti‑fossil fuel fiction
that is causing unnecessary hardship and costing Americans dearly.
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5.2.4 AT: Finite Resource
We’re not running out of fossil fuels – stable consumption levels and shale oil
revolution.
Ridley, 15 – current Wall Street Journal reporter and former Economist science writer
[Matt Ridley, “Fossil Fuels Will Save the World (Really),” WSJ, 3‑13‑2015, https://www.
wsj.com/articles/fossil‑fuels‑will‑save‑the‑world‑really‑1426282420, accessed 9‑12‑2023;
AD]
The environmental movement has advanced three arguments in recent years for giving
up fossil fuels: (1) that we will soon run out of them anyway; (2) that alternative sources
of energy will price them out of the marketplace; and (3) that we cannot afford the
climate consequences of burning them.
These days, not one of the three arguments is looking very healthy. In fact, a more real‑
istic assessment of our energy and environmental situation suggests that, for decades to
come, we will continue to rely overwhelmingly on the fossil fuels that have contributed
so dramatically to the world’s prosperity and progress.
In 2013, about 87% of the energy that the world consumed came from fossil fuels, a
figure that—remarkably—was unchanged from 10 years before. This roughly divides
into three categories of fuel and three categories of use: oil used mainly for transport,
gas used mainly for heating, and coal used mainly for electricity.
Over this period, the overall volume of fossil‑fuel consumption has increased dramati‑
cally, but with an encouraging environmental trend: a diminishing amount of carbon‑
dioxide emissions per unit of energy produced. The biggest contribution to decarboniz‑
ing the energy system has been the switch from high‑carbon coal to lower‑carbon gas
in electricity generation.
On a global level, renewable energy sources such as wind and solar have contributed
hardly at all to the drop in carbon emissions, and their modest growth has merely made
up for a decline in the fortunes of zero‑carbon nuclear energy. (The reader should know
that I have an indirect interest in coal through the ownership of land in Northern Eng‑
land on which it is mined, but I nonetheless applaud the displacement of coal by gas in
recent years.)
The argument that fossil fuels will soon run out is dead, at least for a while. The collapse
of the price of oil over the past six months is the result of abundance: an inevitable con‑
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sequence of the high oil prices of recent years, which stimulated innovation in hydraulic
fracturing, horizontal drilling, seismology and information technology. The U.S.—the
country with the oldest and most developed hydrocarbon fields—has found itself once
again, surprisingly, at the top of the energy‑producing league, rivaling Saudi Arabia in
oil and Russia in gas.
The shale genie is now out of the bottle. Even if the current low price drives out some
high‑cost oil producers—in the North Sea, Canada, Russia, Iran and offshore, as well
as in America—shale drillers can step back in whenever the price rebounds. As Mark
Hill of Allegro Development Corporation argued last week, the frackers are currently
experiencing their own version of Moore’s law: a rapid fall in the cost and time it takes
to drill a well, along with a rapid rise in the volume of hydrocarbons they are able to
extract.
And the shale revolution has yet to go global. When it does, oil and gas in tight rock
formations will give the world ample supplies of hydrocarbons for decades, if not cen‑
turies. Lurking in the wings for later technological breakthroughs is methane hydrate,
a seafloor source of gas that exceeds in quantity all the world’s coal, oil and gas put
together.
So those who predict the imminent exhaustion of fossil fuels are merely repeating the
mistakes of the U.S. presidential commission that opined in 1922 that “already the out‑
put of gas has begun to wane. Production of oil cannot long maintain its present rate.”
Or President Jimmy Carter when he announced on television in 1977 that “we could use
up all the proven reserves of oil in the entire world by the end of the next decade.”
That fossil fuels are finite is a red herring. The Atlantic Ocean is finite, but that does not
mean that you risk bumping into France if you row out of a harbor in Maine. The buffalo
of the American West were infinite, in the sense that they could breed, yet they came
close to extinction. It is an ironic truth that no nonrenewable resource has ever run dry,
while renewable resources—whales, cod, forests, passenger pigeons—have frequently
done so.
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5.3 Grid Stability
5.3.1 Electricity Shortages
Fossil fuels are key to grid stability – shifting away causes electricity shortages.
Perry, 21 – American economist, a professor of economics and finance in the School of

Management at University of Michigan–Flint, and scholar at The American Enterprise
Institute
[Mark J. Perry, “Fossil Fuels Are Essential, Despite Renewable Energy Zealotry,” Amer‑
ican Enterprise Institute ‑ AEI, 7‑21‑2021, https://www.aei.org/op‑eds/fossil‑fuels‑are‑
essential‑despite‑renewable‑energy‑zealotry/, accessed 9‑10‑2023; AD]
Anyone who thinks that the most important environmental task of the next few years
is to reduce the use of fossil fuels must take no comfort in recent energy trends.
The Biden Administration – despite its opposition to domestic drilling – is pressuring

OPEC to pump more oil and provide price relief at the gas pump. Global natural gas
demand and prices are on the rise and coal prices have recently spiked to record levels.
For energy sources that are supposed to be in their decline, fossil fuels remain absolutely
essential to our nation’s economy and security. Oil, coal, and natural gas provide the
large majority of the nation’s energy, supplying 81 percent of U.S. energy demand in
2020.
No energy source has been more maligned or written off than coal but coal has increas‑
ingly provided an essential insurance policy for a sometimes overwhelmed energy grid,
not something that should be cast aside.
Coal is currently helping shield the Midwest and other regions from electricity short‑
ages. According to Argus, in June, coal generation on the PJM grid, the nation’s largest
which extends from Pennsylvania to parts of Illinois, hit a three‑year high. Coal genera‑
tion in the Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) rose 37 percent in June
and 42 percent in the Southwest Power Pool (SPP).
Rising natural gas prices have shifted energy market share back to coal, with the coal
fleet providing an important price shock absorber for the nation’s utilities and their
consumers. If more coal plants are pushed into early retirement, that energy balance
and fuel flexibility will go with them.
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Balance on the energy grid matters as does fuel security. As this past year has demon‑
strated, with rolling blackouts in California, the near‑collapse of the Texas power grid
in February, and the threat of capacity shortfalls from the Pacific Northwest all the way
to New York, the reliability of the nation’s electricity supply is getting more problem‑
atic by the month. While no one fuel source is a cure‑all to energy reliability challenges,
the months of fuel kept on‑site at coal plants is a welcome hedge to the just‑in‑time fuel
delivery at natural gas plants or from wind and solar generation.
Last winter, when bitter cold locked up natural gas infrastructure and wind turbines
across the Midwest, it was our coal capacity that came to the rescue – much of it in coal‑
mining states. It is troubling that the Biden administration fails to grasp the importance
of coal and would like to see it disappear in the next few years. If you think there’s a
well‑designed plan to replace coal and the reliability it provides, think again.
The U.S. Energy Information Administration reports that the vast majority of new power
capacity added to the grid this year – nearly 40 gigawatts – will be windmills and solar.
Increasing reliance on intermittent renewable power will exacerbate reliability concerns,
especially if these additions come in place of the dispatchable power provided by tradi‑
tional, on‑demand sources of generation.
As reliability challenges become more severe across the country, it’s increasingly clear
that renewable energy generation additions should come on top of existing coal and
natural gas capacity, not in place of it. Pushing more coal capacity and its fuel security
off the grid and replacing it with sources of power that are useless at night or when
there is no wind is a recipe for a potential catastrophe.
What is critical for our energy future is a reliable and affordable supply of power that
doesn’t take a backseat to renewable energy zealotry.
Frequently ignored or overlooked is the fact that fossil fuels remain the nation’s energy
lifeblood and will serve as the dominant energy sources to power our vehicles, heat
and light our homes, and fuel the growing economy for many decades into the future.
Mandating the closure of reliable operating power plants or making it more expensive
and difficult to produce the fuels we need in the future is denying reality and putting
the American economy at great risk.
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5.4 Energy Independence
5.4.1 Energy Independence
Energy independence is high now due to fossil fuel production.
Clemente, 19 – Principal at JTC Energy Research Associates, LLC

[Jude Clemente, “The U.S. Dominates New Oil And Gas Production,” Forbes, 12‑8‑2019,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2019/12/08/the‑us‑dominates‑new‑oil‑and‑
gas‑production/?sh=73fc99081cce, accessed 10‑8‑2023; AD]
The American fracking for oil and natural gas boom will continue on through the 2020s.
And why not? Since fracking took off in 2008, we have more than doubled our proven
oil reserves to ~65 billion barrels. Natural gas reserves have surged over 80% to ~430
trillion cubic feet. Already the largest oil and gas producer, the U.S. is set to increase its
share of ~17% of global oil production and ~23% of gas. In the 2020s, the U.S. is set to
supply over 60% of new oil and gas (see Figure below).
This is according to experts at Rystad Energy, “an independent energy consulting ser‑
vices and business intelligence data firm” based in Norway. Rystad says the U.S. shale
industry will continue to mount production even if prices drop. The reality is that oil
and gas companies already have. Oil prices have been sliced in half since the triple‑
digits seen in mid‑2014, yet U.S. crude oil production has still jumped over 50% to nearly
13 million b/d. For 2019 alone, the weekly oil rig count has plummeted 25% to 663 rigs as
of Friday, yet weekly output has risen another 1.2 million b/d. Natural gas prices have
fallen 17% this year and gas rigs are down 34%, yet gas U.S. output has still risen over
10%.
As companies focus on “cash flow discipline and free cash flow generation,” Rystad
says that even with an 11% reduction in shale oil investments next year, U.S. tight oil
production alone will be closing in on 11 million b/d by 2022, up from 9.1 million b/d
this month. This jump in shale output comes even as WTI prices fall to ~$54 in 2020 and
2021. For natural gas, although the associated gas supply coming from the Permian will
help keep U.S. prices low, another 10% rise in U.S. shale gas output to above 100 Bcf/d
is to be expected over the next two years. This means that we will soon be producing
50% more gas than Russia, just having passed it in 2009.
Indeed, Rystad’s bullish outlook for U.S. shale is hardly alone. The Paris‑based Interna‑
tional Energy Agency reported in November that the U.S. will supply 85% of the new oil
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and 30% of the new gas through 2030. The current bear oil and gas market will not last
forever ‑ nothing ever does. Surviving through the pain of lower pricing, the industry
has so sharpened its knife that higher prices will offer drastically easier times.
Ultimately, 1) oil having no significant substitute, 2) gas rising toward being 50% of
all U.S. power capacity, and 3) a surging export complex to export both fuels ensure
that our massive resource base will be developed. Simply put, those pushing divest‑
ment should realize that it obviously cannot work: divestment does nothing to reduce
demand.
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Our fossil fuel output is key to counter Putin’s strategy of energy domination.
Clemente, 19 – Principal at JTC Energy Research Associates, LLC
[Jude Clemente, “The U.S. Dominates New Oil And Gas Production,” Forbes, 12‑8‑2019,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2019/12/08/the‑us‑dominates‑new‑oil‑and‑
gas‑production/?sh=73fc99081cce, accessed 10‑8‑2023; AD]
So when looking at the individual U.S. state level, the ongoing rise of our shale oil and
gas output is staggering. All presidential candidates should think about this: in the
2020s, the state of Ohio alone is expected to add as much oil and gas to global supply as
Russia (see Figure below). This is our greatest geopolitical leverage and not‑so‑secret
weapon: shale not only made us the world’s largest oil and gas producer but will make
us the largest seller in just a few years. Next year, the U.S. Department of Energy reports
that we will become a net exporter of oil on an annual basis for the first time ever.
Vladimir Putin knows that U.S. shale production and surging associated exports are
throwing a big wrench into his grand strategy of energy domination. Russia’s position
as the largest oil and gas exporter rakes in over ~$300 billion each year. No wonder then
that Putin has been funding NGOs whose job is to persuade governments to stop shale
development. “Without Fracking For Natural Gas, The U.S. Loses And Putin Wins,”
making anti‑shale positions the real “Russian collusion” story.
The clear reality of mounting global demand for oil and gas explains why Russia
is advancing oil and gas interests with China, the Middle East, Latin America, and
Africa. Further, Rystad reports that Russia’s Gazprom (+1,200,00o boepd) and Beijing’s
PetroChina (+ 730,000 boepd) were easily the two largest suppliers of new oil and
gas from 2014 to 2018. We unquestionably must counter this or we will be handing
irreplaceable and growing markets to rivals.
As for the “end of shale,” be….very careful with that. You should know that not even
the industry itself ever saw the revolution coming in the first place. I really do think,
however, that the next energy revolution could be CO2‑EOR, for which we have literally
hundreds of billions of barrels of oil in mature fields primed for development, while
also storing CO2 safely in the ground to cut emissions. Now yielding ~450,000 b/d, the
industry itself does not promote CO2‑EOR nearly enough. But to its credit, the Natural
Resources Defense Council calls CO2‑EOR a win‑win‑win for our environment, energy,
and economy.
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5.5 Backlash
5.5.1 Public Opinion
Most Americans aren’t ready to stop using fossil fuels – they’d backlash.
Kennedy et al, 23 – senior researcher at Pew Research Center
[Brian Kennedy, Cary Funk, and Alec Tyson, “What Americans think about an
energy transition from fossil fuels to renewables,” Pew Research Center Science &
Society, 6‑28‑2023, https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2023/06/28/what‑americans‑
think‑about‑an‑energy‑transition‑from‑fossil‑fuels‑to‑renewables/, accessed 9‑13‑2023;
AD]
Most Americans think the U.S. should prioritize the development of renewable energy
over fossil fuel sources. At the same time, most say they are not ready to stop using
fossil fuel energy sources altogether. And a sizable share think the U.S. should never
stop using fossil fuel sources.
Renewable sources, such as wind and solar, are expected to make up a growing share
of the U.S. energy supply relative to fossil fuel sources such as oil, coal and natural
gas in coming years. Last year renewable energy sources, including wind, solar and
hydropower, generated more electricity than coal in the U.S. Legislation passed during
the Biden administration, such as the Inflation Reduction Act, are expected to increase
the pace of an energy transition.
In the new survey, 67% of Americans say the U.S. should prioritize developing alterna‑
tive energy sources, such as wind, solar and hydrogen technology, while 32% say the
priority should be expanding the exploration and production of oil, coal and natural
gas.
While the public prioritizes renewable energy development, just 31% say they are ready
to phase out the use of oil, coal and natural gas completely. A much larger share (68%)
say the U.S. should continue to use fossil fuels, alongside renewables, as part of the mix
of energy sources the country relies on.
The roughly two‑thirds of Americans who support using a mix of renewables and fossil
fuels are closely divided over whether the U.S. should ever stop using oil, coal and
natural gas: 32% of Americans favor a mix of sources now but think the U.S. should
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eventually stop using fossil fuel energy sources, while 35% favor using a mix of sources
now and say the U.S. should never stop using oil, coal and natural gas.
Republicans and Democrats offer very different views on what role oil, coal and natural
gas should play in the country’s energy landscape.
An overwhelming majority of Republicans and Republican leaners (87%) think the U.S.
should use a mix of fossil fuel and renewable energy sources. Looking ahead, 57% of
Republicans believe the U.S. should never stop using oil, coal, and natural gas.
In contrast, most Democrats and Democratic leaners think the U.S. should end the use
of fossil fuels, but there are some differences in views over the timeline.
About half of Democrats (48%) are ready to phase out fossil fuels now; another 35%
think they should be part of the mix currently, but that the country should eventually
stop using them. A relatively small share of Democrats (15%) say the country should
never stop using oil, coal and natural gas.
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5.6 Selling Land
5.6.1 GOP Sells Land
Republicans have passed legislation that makes it easier to sell federal lands to skirt
climate regulations.
Ludwig, 23 – staff reporter at Truthout
[Mike Ludwig, “House Republicans Just Made It Easier for Congress to Give Away
Public Lands,” Truthout, 1‑10‑2023, https://truthout.org/articles/house‑republicans‑
just‑made‑it‑easier‑for‑congress‑to‑give‑away‑public‑lands/, accessed 10‑4‑2023; AD]
Republicans approved new House rules on Monday making it easier for lawmakers
to cede federal public lands to state and local governments without accounting for the
costs to taxpayers. Conservationists warn that cash‑strapped cities and states could then
sell off natural areas that were previously protected to private developers and extractive
industries.
Passing a rules package for House business was the next step toward legislation for the
Republican majority after a difficult week of wrangling to elect House Speaker Kevin
McCarthy. The 55‑page rules package is the result of weeks of negotiation between
McCarthy and a faction of ultra‑conservatives who used the GOP’s slim majority to
squeeze out a number of concessions and create a painful spectacle on the House floor
last week, when McCarthy was finally elected after 15 rounds of voting.
Some of the rule changes were expected, including new rules curbing McCarthy’s power
and making it easier for lawmakers to demand spending cuts and launch partisan inves‑
tigations into the Biden administration. However, Democrats say new rules barring the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) from calculating the value of federal public lands
given away by Congress is a throwback to a previous Republican majority that pandered
to anti‑government extremists in mostly Western states.
Rep. Raul Grijalva of Arizona, the ranking Democrat on the House Natural Resources
Committee, said Republicans are making it easier to “cheat American taxpayers and
give away our public lands for nothing in return.”
“This is Republicans doing the bidding of anti‑public lands extremists — a consistent

theme we’ve seen when they were in charge before, and one I’m afraid we’ll see a lot
more of in the next two years,” Grijalva said in a statement Friday.
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Under previous House Rules, the CBO was required to calculate the cost to taxpayers of
any legislation that would transfer public lands to state, local and tribal entities. Public
lands create a variety of revenue from fossil fuel development, grazing and logging,
for example. This revenue is often used to manage public lands across the country,
from vast prairies and mountain ranges to smaller patches of wilderness often used for
recreation.
The new rule from Republicans waives this requirement, declaring that any transfer of
public lands by Congress does not create any new “budget authority.” As a result, CBO
reports on legislation that would cede public lands and waterways would not include
an estimate of the cost to taxpayers, which must be offset by spending cuts elsewhere
under separate House rules aimed at cutting taxes and spending.
“It’s an artificial contrivance that sort of deems the giving away of public lands as budget‑
neutral so they can avoid their own procedural handcuffs,” said Brett Hartl, government
affairs director at the Center for Biological Diversity, in an interview.
House Republicans instituted a similar rule in 2017 after securing a majority. Three
weeks later, Republicans from Western states introduced legislation that would have
ceded 3 million acres of federal public lands to states. The bill was quickly withdrawn
after lawmakers faced backlash from constituents, who worried the change would limit
access to natural areas for hunting, fishing and other pastimes. As he withdrew the bill,
former Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R‑Utah) posted a photo of himself wearing hunting gear
and assuring his constituents that “I’m a proud gun owner, hunter and love our public
lands.”
At the time, Republicans were under pressure from anti‑government ranchers and ac‑
tivists epitomized by Cliven Bundy, the extremist who sparked an armed standoff with
federal police in 2014 over cattle grazing on public lands. Bundy and his heavily armed
followers believed it was their religious or civic duty to defend against the “tyranny” of
the federal government by resisting its control over publicly held territory in Nevada.
While Bundy and his gun‑toting posse may have been outliers, Hartl said the new House
rule for calculating the value of public lands represents the wishes of a “very vocal mi‑
nority.”
“It shows the ideological position of these House Republicans, which is generally that
public lands are worthless, they don’t believe in them, and they want to be living in a
world where they are either run by the state or handed over to extractive industries,”
Hartl said.
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However, Hartl said the debate over public lands is not just an issue in Western states,
where ranchers and fossil fuel companies have long lobbied for cheap access to fed‑
eral public lands. People across the country use and enjoy federal lands, from national
forests to wildlife preserves, Hartl pointed out.
Republican legislation to cede public lands would face opposition in the Senate, but the
change could make it easier to hide riders in omnibus legislation without triggering a
cost‑benefit analysis from the CBO. Grijalva, who chaired the House Natural Resources
Committee under the Democratic majority, said Democrats will be on the lookout.
“We’ve seen Republicans struggle to count to 218 — and now they’re ordering
Congress’s accountants to cook the books for them,” Grijalva said. “This is not good
economic or environmental policy.”
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Biden could support it – he’s just as pro‑leasing as Trump.
Marcetic, 21 – Jacobin staff writer and the author of Yesterday’s Man: The Case Against
Joe Biden
[Branko Marcetic, “Joe Biden Is Almost as Pro‑Drilling as Trump,” Jacobin, 6‑3‑

2021, https://jacobin.com/2021/06/joe‑biden‑climate‑policy‑drilling‑trump, accessed
10‑4‑2023; AD]
On one of his first days in office all the way back in January, Joe Biden signed an execu‑
tive order pausing new oil and gas leasing on public lands. His administration framed
the move as an attempt to “restore balance on public lands and waters” and “invest
in [a] clean energy future,” with the president himself saying that “we can’t wait any
longer.”
“It’s not time for small measures,” he said before signing. “We need to be bold.”
An avalanche of coverage ran with this framing, using the freeze as part of the basis
to declare the Biden administration not just a sharp break from Donald Trump’s four
years but a radical, transformational new frontier in US policymaking. It was a “stark
contrast” from Trump’s actions laying out a “historic vision for how the United States
can once again become a global climate leader,” wrote the press, a “sweeping assault
on climate change” that showed he was “serious about cutting the country’s outsized
contribution to global warming.”
Yet despite the undoubted symbolic power of Biden’s order, in its more than three
months in effect, it’s done little to slow the stream of fossil fuel drilling on public lands.
According to statistics from the Bureau of Land Management, from the start of February
to the end of April, the administration approved 1,179 drilling permits on federal lands,
not far from the four‑year high of nearly 1,400 approved over a similar three‑month
period at the end of Trump’s term.
Meanwhile, according to numbers from the Bureau of Safety and Environmental En‑
forcement numbers, that same February‑to‑April period saw 207 offshore drilling per‑
mits approved. This is compared to the 249 offshore permits approved over the three
months to Trump’s final day in office.
This isn’t totally surprising. When they weren’t loudly whining about the supposed
damage Biden’s lease moratorium would do, the fossil fuel industry privately wiped
their collective brow that that was as far as he was willing to go, since, as one industry
insider told the Financial Times, “leases are already plentiful — it’s the permitting that
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matters.” As S&P Global Platts Analytics stated at the time, “the order won’t impact US
crude oil and gas production much in the near term because existing leases and drilling
permits are not impacted and big producers have ample inventories of undrilled well
permits.”
Biden’s move was blunted in advance by not just a surge of more than three thousand
applications for drilling permits just before he took office but by the fact that “the oil and
gas industry has stockpiled millions of acres of leases on public lands and waters,” in
the words of the Department of the Interior. As of March, more than half of the twenty‑
six million acres of federal lands leased to fossil fuel companies was sitting idle and not
yet producing oil or gas, while the figure was nearly 80 percent for the twelve million
acres of public waters.
And in any case, “older leases are responsible for most production and revenues on
public land,” as the Center for American Progress explained in March. That report,
ironically, defended Biden’s pause on the grounds that it wouldn’t do a whole lot to
slow production and admonished the industry for “sitting idle” on, and “not creating
any revenue or jobs” from, unused leased land they’d acquired from Trump’s mass sell‑
off of public lands.
“President Biden needs to fulfill this basic promise of candidate Biden and stop oil and
gas drilling on public lands,” says Mitch Jones, policy director at Food and Water Watch,
who warns this would simply be a “bare minimum.”
Ambitions to Fail
Environmental groups were aware at the time of the largely symbolic nature of Biden’s
order and had hoped it signaled more ambitious, wide‑ranging actions to come. Af‑
ter all, neither Biden’s campaign climate plan nor the 2020 Democratic platform made
any mention of stopping leasing but rather pledged to ban the very permits he’s now
approving at a rate rivaling Trump’s.
There’s no question Biden is doing more on the climate crisis than any president in
history. But when the last holder of that title brags about turning the United States into
the world’s biggest oil and gas producer, that’s not saying much.
The Biden administration’s inadequacy on climate is drowned out by celebratory head‑
lines and news segments that treat the president as if he’s already won a war he’s barely
bothering to fight.
“Unfortunately, because Biden looks bold in comparison to past presidents, especially
the last one, he gets a pass from many people in the environmental movement on his
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actual record,” says Jones. “Of course, the planet doesn’t recognize the low bars set
by political precedent and the lack of ambition of the established political and media
leadership.”
Unfortunately, the Biden administration’s handing out of drilling permits is far from
the only sign it’s not taking climate science seriously.
Biden’s infrastructure bill — another subject of lavish praise for the administration and
acknowledged, as one commentator put it, to be “the country’s one shot to pass mean‑
ingful climate legislation in the next few years, if not in the next few decades” — under‑
spends on climate by trillions of dollars over its eight‑year time span. His latest budget
significantly increased climate spending to ~$36 billion, which sounds impressive, until
you remember that experts are calling for roughly ~$1 trillion of annual climate spend‑
ing for a decade to prevent unspeakable catastrophe. The promise of climate spending
worth 1 percent of GDP per year pales in comparison to the 5 percent urged by the
Roosevelt Institute, let alone the 37.5 percent of GDP spent by the US government on
defense in the final year of World War II.
Despite signing executive orders meant to mandate a “government‑wide approach to

combat the climate crisis,” the administration is fighting environmental groups to keep
alive a controversial Trump‑era Alaskan drilling project set to produce one hundred
thousand barrels of oil a day for thirty years, rendering Biden’s climate goals irrelevant.
For all the praise his early cancellation of the Keystone Pipeline received — which, in‑
stead of a bold new step, simply rewound Trump policy back to the status quo when
Obama left office — in office, he’s firmly behind keeping the similar Dakota Access
Pipeline flowing. And he’s already made a mockery of his own lease moratorium, is‑
suing dozens of leases on federal lands in May that had been sold off by Trump in his
final weeks as president.
Report after report after report has warned that if climate change and overexploitation of
natural resources aren’t urgently checked — not some, half, or most of the way, but all of
the way — there is a good chance our civilizations will begin to unravel in our lifetimes,
as civilizations have tended to do throughout history when put under extreme environ‑
mental pressures. Ours might be the first to actually have the knowledge, technology,
wealth, and foresight to avoid this grim outcome. And yet the Biden administration
— potentially this decade’s last chance for the United States to take action on the issue,
given political realities — is not really even trying.
That’s not a shock: Biden, after all, only got to the point he’s at now because of relentless
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pressure from the bottom up. What’s less excusable is the failure by liberal institutions
to hold him to account for this planned failure, as the reality of his administration’s
inadequacy on climate is drowned out by celebratory headlines and news segments
that treat the president as if he’s already won a war he’s barely bothering to fight.
The administration is due to put out its report about the lease moratorium this summer.
But there’s no indication of when we’ll see an end to the moratorium on truth‑telling
about Biden’s climate policy.
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5.7 Reforms
5.7.1 Regulations Solve
Regulating fossil fuels solves climate change while preventing imports from
displacing domestic production.
Foreign Policy
Actions to take in the United States
The United States can get serious about climate change as the world’s largest oil and gas
producer by involving energy companies in the transition, regulating oil and gas pro‑
duction to minimize GHG emissions, and enacting policies that reduce GHG emissions
at home and abroad.
Include energy companies in the low‑carbon transition
Vilifying all fossil fuel companies is likely to be counterproductive. Clearly some com‑
panies are more constructive in their climate strategies than others; misinformation cam‑
paigns have no place in today’s political debate. Some companies have more to lose or
gain in a low‑carbon world. Nonetheless, many fossil fuel companies understand that
climate change is an existential risk to their business model and want to remain viable
businesses as the world moves toward a low‑carbon energy system. The comparison of
fossil fuel companies to tobacco companies is particularly frustrating. Unlike tobacco,
the modern economy was built on fossil fuels, and replacing them and the trillions of
dollars of associated infrastructure will take time.
I am not saying that we should turn climate policy over to the industry, but instead rec‑
ognize that energy companies have a role to play in the energy transition. For example,
some skills and technologies developed in the oil and gas industry are also useful in
clean energy, such as offshore construction skills applied to offshore wind energy or
knowledge of the subsurface applicable to geothermal energy production and carbon
storage. The skill necessary to operate and balance an electricity grid will become ever
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more important as the share of intermittent renewable power generation increases. The
energy industry has extensive experience in financing and developing large, long‑lived
projects. Energy companies are repositories of the knowledge needed to achieve a clean
energy transition and eliminating them from the process because of a misguided notion
of “purity” could do more harm than good.
Strictly regulate U.S. oil and gas production
Regulation of U.S. oil and gas production is crucial for the United States to reduce its
GHG emissions. Overall regulation of the industry must consider local air and wa‑
ter pollution and community impacts, but two areas are particularly important for the
climate—methane emissions and flaring.
Methane is the primary component of natural gas. However, when it is emitted into the
atmosphere, it is a particularly potent GHG, with 28 to 36 times the warming power of
carbon dioxide, although with a much shorter lifetime in the atmosphere.2 Minimizing
methane releases is one of the most important things we can do in the short term to slow
climate change.
Natural gas is the lowest‑carbon fossil fuel—it can have climate benefits when substi‑
tuted for higher‑carbon fuels like coal or oil. Its lower carbon content also makes car‑
bon capture and storage easier, a useful quality as the world strives for deeper decar‑
bonization. The low cost of U.S. gas production has greatly reduced coal use in the U.S.
power sector, with important climate benefits. The United States is also a net exporter
of natural gas, through pipelines and liquefied natural gas (LNG), and in many cases
this exported gas substitutes for higher‑carbon fuels abroad. However, these climate
benefits disappear if too much methane is emitted during the production, processing,
transportation, and use of the gas.
Methane emissions are particularly concerning at the wellhead when the gas is pro‑
duced. Advancing technology has made it easier and cheaper to identify leaks, but the
current administration is in the process of rolling back Obama‑era rules requiring leak
detection and repair and other technologies to reduce methane emissions during pro‑
duction. Five oil‑ and gas‑producing states (California, Colorado, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
and Wyoming) have methane emissions regulations of their own and New Mexico is
in the process of developing regulations. However, other important oil and gas states,
notably including Texas, lack methane emissions regulations. Federal rules for leak de‑
tection and repair throughout the natural gas value chain are needed to ensure that
natural gas fulfills its promise as the lowest‑carbon fossil fuel.
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Flaring is another avoidable source of GHG emissions in oil and gas production. Natu‑
ral gas is often produced along with oil, but in some cases there is neither infrastructure
nor economic incentive to transport the gas away from the well for sale. In these cases,
the gas is burned, or flared, at the wellhead. (Flaring is safer and better from a climate
perspective than releasing the gas directly, as it converts methane to carbon dioxide, a
much less potent GHG.) Natural gas prices are very low in the United States and natural
gas infrastructure has not kept up with the rapid expansion of oil production in some
areas, resulting in a 50% increase in flaring in 2018 compared to the previous year.3 U.S.
producers are making their money from oil, and in some cases the associated gas is not
worth enough to justify shipping it to market. However, flaring all this gas is terribly
wasteful. In Texas in 2019, enough gas was flared to meet residential natural gas de‑
mand within the entire state. Flaring is regulated at the state level and Texas has never
turned down a request to flare.4 However, the United States must eliminate routine gas
flaring to reduce its GHG emissions and avoid wasting fuel. Regulators can require
that wells be connected to gas infrastructure before production is allowed, even if the
economics do not justify shipping the gas to market.
Increasing capacity to export LNG could help in this regard, by providing an outlet for
plentiful U.S. natural gas to be sold abroad, rather than wastefully burned here.
Enact policies to reduce GHG emissions at home and abroad
To prevent the worst impacts of climate change, the United States must reduce GHG
emissions across the entire economy. A number of policies will likely be needed, as the
challenges are different in different sectors. My Voter Vital on climate change summa‑
rizes potential policies, from carbon taxes to encouraging the use of alternative fuels to
direct regulation of emissions.
The important point here is the emphasis on reducing emissions. Policies that reduce
demand for fossil fuels must focus on reducing GHG emissions as well. For example,
U.S. policies that require blending corn ethanol into gasoline reduce oil demand, but
have a negligible impact on GHG emissions. We must focus on the root cause of the
problem.
Because fossil fuels are widely used and traded globally, reducing U.S. domestic supply
is unlikely to have much effect on global GHG emissions. However, the United States
is the world’s second largest GHG emitter and 77% of U.S. GHG emissions come from
fossil fuel combustion.5 Significantly reducing U.S. demand for fossil fuels, and eventu‑
ally eliminating their combustion without carbon capture and storage or use, is an action
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that will move the needle on climate change. Strong and consistent climate policy will
also send the right signal to the energy industry to shape its future investments.
The United States can also provide leadership and technical assistance to help other
countries transform their energy systems and reduce GHG emissions. The United
States can end its own subsidies for fossil fuel production and consumption and
help other countries do the same. A transition to lower‑carbon energy in the United
States and other wealthy countries can create markets and economies of scale for
low‑carbon technologies, bringing down costs for all, as Germany is working to do
with its Energiewende. U.S. laboratories and universities are the envy of the world
and research undertaken here can provide solutions to global challenges. Finally,
the Paris Agreement includes the goal of “making finance flows consistent with a
pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate‑resilient development.”6
The United States can provide direct assistance to countries that need it, perhaps by
returning to its commitment to provide an additional ~$2 billion to the Green Climate
Fund. Furthermore, the deep and liquid U.S. capital markets might be even more
important in providing a source of financing, especially as U.S. investors look for
greener investments.
The United States can be a leader in improving, then winding down fossil fuel produc‑
tion
The United States has an opportunity to lead the world in improving the performance
of the fossil fuel sector and in winding down the sector when the time comes. Trans‑
forming the global energy sector, with its trillions of dollars of associated infrastructure,
will take time. Some uses of fossil fuels, such as in heavy transportation and industry,
may never be phased out and instead their emissions may be captured or offset. In the
meantime, the United States can demonstrate how to produce fossil fuels as cleanly as
possible and encourage other producers to do the same. The United States can also
work toward greater accountability for GHG emissions in oil and gas production.
Eventually, U.S. oil and gas production will decline as global demand for these fuels
declines. U.S. production is competitive at today’s demand and price levels, but the
United States does not produce the cheapest or lowest‑GHG oil and gas—that distinc‑
tion belongs to producers in the Middle East. At some point, U.S. oil and gas will no
longer be competitive in a lower‑carbon world.
A key action for the United States should be to work with the communities most affected
by the upcoming decline—those where fossil fuels are currently produced. Communi‑
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ties will need economic development to replace the revenue and jobs that fossil fuels
provide. Large industries have come and gone in our country before; we must learn
from past experiences to lessen the impacts of the energy transition on those with the
most to lose and orient economic development toward new industries. A transition is
already occurring today in communities reliant on coal, and the trend will continue over
time as the economy uses less oil and gas. Convincing citizens that the transition to a
lower‑carbon economy will be fair and just will help create the political imperative for
action.
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5.7.2 Royalties/Bonds Solve
Increasing bonds and royalties for fossil fuel companies discourages oil production
without prohibiting it altogether.
Davenport, 23 – New York Times Reporter covering energy and environmental policy
with a focus on climate change
[Coral Davenport, “Biden Administration Moves to Raise the Cost of Drilling on Federal
Lands,” The New York Times, 7‑20‑2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/20/climate/biden‑
drilling‑federal‑lands.html, accessed 9‑12‑2023; AD]
The Biden administration on Thursday proposed a rule that would raise the royalties
that fossil fuel companies pay to pull oil, gas and coal from public lands for the first time
since 1920, while increasing more than tenfold the cost of the bonds that companies must
pay before they start drilling.
The Interior Department estimated that the new rule, which would also raise various
other rates and fees for drilling on public lands, would increase costs for fossil fuel
companies by about ~$1.8 billion between now and 2031. After that, rates could increase
again.
About half of that money would go to states, approximately a third would be used
to fund water projects in the West, and the rest would be split between the Treasury
Department and Interior.
Interior officials characterize the changes as part of a broader shift at the federal agency
as it seeks to address climate change by expanding renewable energy on public land
and in federal waters while making it more expensive for private companies to drill on
public lands.
“The Interior Department has taken several steps over the last two years to ensure the
federal oil and gas program provides a fair return to taxpayers, adequately accounts
for environmental harms and discourages speculation by oil and gas companies,” said
Laura Daniel‑Davis, the Interior Department’s principal deputy assistant secretary for
land and minerals management. “This new proposed rule will help fully codify those
goals and lead to more responsible leasing and development processes.”
Oil and gas companies forcefully opposed the changes, which could take effect as soon
as next year.
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“Amidst a global energy crisis, this action from the Department of the Interior is yet an‑
other attempt to add even more barriers to future energy production, increases uncer‑
tainty for producers and may further discourage oil and natural gas investment,” said
Holly Hopkins, a vice president at the American Petroleum Institute, which lobbies for
oil and gas companies.
Environmental groups applauded the move, although many also called on the Biden
administration to clamp down on drilling.
“The Biden administration is recognizing that over a century of business as usual by

the oil and gas industry is incompatible with a world being ravaged by climate change,
a crisis induced primarily by the industry itself,” said Josh Axelrod at the Natural Re‑
sources Defense Council, an advocacy group. But he added, “we can’t continue to lease
our public lands for fossil fuels while facing climate and biodiversity emergencies.”
Some of the changes were mandated by the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, which directs
the Interior Department to increase the royalty rates paid by companies that drill on
public lands to 16.67 percent from 12.5 percent, and to increase the minimum bid at
auctions for drilling leases to ~$10 per acre from ~$2 per acre, among other provisions.
The 12.5 percent royalty rates have been in place since 1920.
The law also orders the agency to set a minimum rental rate of ~$3 per acre on public
drilling leases in the first two years after a lease is issued, rising to ~$15 per acre after 10
years, and to establish a new fee of ~$5 per acre for companies to formally register their
interest in leasing public land for drilling.
But the Interior Department’s new rule would go even further than Congress required:
It would dramatically raise the cost of the bonds that companies must guarantee to pay
to the federal government before drilling on public lands, which has not increased since
1960. The department wants to use those funds to remediate damage left by abandoned
uncapped oil and gas wells, so that the cost is borne by companies rather than taxpayers.
The new rule proposes to increase the minimum bond paid upon purchasing an indi‑
vidual drilling lease to ~$150,000 from ~$10,000. The cost of a bond required upon pur‑
chasing a drilling lease on multiple public lands in a state would rise to ~$500,000 from
~$25,000. The changes would eliminate an existing national bond under which compa‑
nies can pay ~$150,000 as insurance against damaged, abandoned wells anywhere in
the country.
The new rule would also require the agency to prioritize approvals of new permits in
areas where drilling is already taking place, as opposed to more pristine lands.
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The huge increase in bond payments responds to years of efforts by environmental ad‑
vocates and fiscal watchdog groups that have urged the government to enact policies
that shift the burden of paying to clean up so‑called orphan wells from taxpayers to the
oil and gas companies that drill the wells and later abandon them.
“This is a huge step in the right direction,” said Autumn Hanna, vice president of the fis‑
cal watchdog group Taxpayers for Common Sense. “Taxpayers have been losing for so
long — we were just giving these assets on federal lands away, and industry hasn’t been
paying the reclamation cost of damaging them. Leaving these rates to sit untouched for
decades when the oil industry has changed so much is just super egregious.”
The Interior Department estimates that there are 3.5 million abandoned oil and gas wells
in the United States. When oil and gas wells are abandoned without being properly
sealed or capped, which can happen in cases when companies go bankrupt, the wells
can leak methane, a powerful planet‑warming pollutant that is a major contributor to
global warming.
A 2021 infrastructure law provided for ~$4.7 billion to cap orphan wells, but, the Interior
Department wrote, “this proposed rule aims to prevent that burden from falling on the
taxpayer in future years.”
“Up until now it’s like BP could get a ~$150,000 blanket bond for 3,000 wells, but those
bonds don’t come close to remedying the situation,” Gwen Lachelt, executive director
of the Western Leaders Network, a conservation group, said in an interview last year.
“And the state agencies just haven’t had the money to do this.”
The changes “end the madness of companies leaving this mess behind and taxpayers
holding the bag,” she said.
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5.7.3 Ending Fossil Fuel Subsidies Solves
Fossil fuel subsidies create market distortions and negative externalities – we

should abolish those instead.
Urpelainen and George, 21 – Former Expert at the Brookings Center on Regulation and
Markets; Former Graduate Research Assistant at the Initiative for Sustainable Energy
Policy, Johns Hopkins University
[Johannes Urpelainen and Elisha George, “Reforming global fossil fuel subsidies:
How the United States can restart international cooperation,” Brookings, 7‑14‑2021,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/reforming‑global‑fossil‑fuel‑subsidies‑how‑the‑
united‑states‑can‑restart‑international‑cooperation/, accessed 10‑8‑2023; AD]
The Trouble with Fossil Fuel Subsidies
The sheer scale of subsidies makes them an important pillar of the fossil fuel industry.
The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) found that production
subsidies by the G20 countries averaged ~$290 billion annually during 2017‑2019. Of
this amount, almost 95% went towards oil and gas, with a relatively small amount ear‑
marked for coal. Similarly, in 2019, global consumption subsidies stood at around ~$320
billion. Once more, oil subsidies were the largest component, followed by electricity,
natural gas, and then coal. While these subsidies have declined over the past several
years—consumption subsidies were over ~$500 billion in 2013—they are still far higher
than they should be.
These subsidies are problematic for four key reasons. First, they create market distor‑
tions by artificially lowering the price of fossil fuels, which leads to overconsumption,
particularly in energy and capital‑intensive industries like power and transport. A 2014
study estimated that global fuel subsidies generated ~$44 billion in deadweight loss
each year; over 70% of this came from the four countries with the largest fuel subsidy
expenditures (Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Iran, and Indonesia).
Second, production and consumption subsidies create negative externalities. These sub‑
sidies increase the use of fossil fuels, which causes a range of adverse environmental and
health impacts. Externalities due to air pollution from fossil fuels range between ~$2.6
trillion to ~$8.1 trillion globally and are felt most acutely in developing and emerging
countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and India.
Third, consumption subsidies have also been ineffective in alleviating inequity. Since
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these subsidies typically do not vary by income, most of the benefits are accrued by
wealthier households that already have high consumption levels. In Indonesia, for ex‑
ample, the World Bank found that the richest decile of households consumed 40% of
subsidized gasoline, while the poorest decile consumed less than one percent. Instead
of subsidies, other policies such as direct benefit transfers have been found to be more
effective in achieving developmental objectives.
Finally, subsidies are not the best use of public finances, which can be better directed
towards sectors like social protection, healthcare, education, and the environment. The
IEA found that 17 out of a sample of 40 countries spent more than two percent of their
GDP on consumer energy subsidies in 2017. In Malaysia and Indonesia, government
spending on subsidies exceeded that of social programs and services.
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Reforming fossil fuel subsidies solves climate change.
Urpelainen and George, 21 – Former Expert at the Brookings Center on Regulation and
Markets; Former Graduate Research Assistant at the Initiative for Sustainable Energy
Policy, Johns Hopkins University
[Johannes Urpelainen and Elisha George, “Reforming global fossil fuel subsidies:
How the United States can restart international cooperation,” Brookings, 7‑14‑2021,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/reforming‑global‑fossil‑fuel‑subsidies‑how‑the‑
united‑states‑can‑restart‑international‑cooperation/, accessed 10‑8‑2023; AD]
Restarting Global Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform: An Agenda for the Biden Administration
Bold action by the Biden administration to address subsidies sends a strong and credi‑
ble signal that the United States is invested in the clean energy transition. Successfully
working to dismantle these subsidies also allows the United States to rejoin global cli‑
mate action by leading fossil fuel subsidy reform at the global level.
Toward this end, the G20 provides a promising platform to reinvigorate subsidy reform.
It includes some of the largest subsidizers, such as Russia and Saudi Arabia, and was
also one of the first international groups to highlight the importance of phasing out and
rationalizing inefficient fossil fuel subsidies during the Pittsburgh Summit in 2009. The
G20 reaffirmed this decision in 2013 at the St. Petersburg Summit. In response, some
member countries including the United States, China, Germany, and Mexico published
peer reviews while others, like Saudi Arabia and India, implemented price rationaliza‑
tion and subsidy cuts.
Unfortunately, without clear commitments or strategies, the G20’s initiatives have not
been very effective. In the ten years hence, the absolute value of subsidies remains high
at ~$584 billion and the group’s efforts have stalled. But now, with the United States’
return to the fray, it can direct the G20 to push for a far more coordinated and effective
transition away from fossil fuels.
Because of President Biden’s ambitious plans to reduce domestic production subsidies,

the United States is for the first time in a position to lead by example. It will be acting
in accordance with a recommendation by Professor Lord Nicholas Stern, where he calls
on the G7’s leadership to promote structural policies and targets that encourage the
phaseout of fossil fuels by 2025.
To do this, the United States must first establish a working group of G20 members that
can collectively drive subsidy reform. A key opportunity for this is the G20 Heads of
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State and Government Summit that is being held in Rome at the end of October. This
convening will be important in determining global strategies for economic recovery and
growth, and the United States can call for the creation of a working group as part of the
meeting’s agenda. The working group would be responsible for creating frameworks
for monitoring and accountability through multilateral peer review processes, knowl‑
edge sharing, and transparent reporting initiatives.
Second, the United States can also ramp up its involvement in the Paris Agreement on
Climate Change by proposing linkages between subsidy reform and countries’ Nation‑
ally Determined Contributions (NDCs). In fact, considering the growing global atten‑
tion to climate change, linking a G20 reform effort to countries’ climate pledges will
go a long way in promoting credibility. In 2019, it was found that only 14 countries
pledged to reform fossil fuel subsidies in their NDCs even though around 80 countries
had some kind of subsidy in place. Even after revising their NDCs in 2020, there was
no increase in ambition for subsidy reform, and two countries backtracked on commit‑
ments. Only a few countries like Colombia, Ethiopia, and Singapore outlined strategies
for using revenues from reducing fossil fuel subsidies to meet their NDCs.
The United States has also failed to include subsidy reform in its revised NDC commit‑
ments; however, if it can remedy this over the next few months, it will serve as a strong
signal of climate commitment and encourage other G20 members to do the same. When
doing so, the United States can also utilize and advocate for strategies that improve the
effectiveness of commitments. The Baker Institute for Public Policy at Rice University
lays out some best practices that the United States can promote:
Implement full reforms in a sequence of gradual steps, with an overall timeline of five
to ten years for subsidy phaseout and clear targets for each step.
Employ specific language in the NDCs that clearly indicate which fuels are being tar‑
geted and what benchmark will be used to evaluate progress.
Where possible, codify reform pathways in regulation or legislation to prevent backslid‑
ing.
Use direct cash transfers instead of subsidies to maintain benefits for low‑income
groups.
Ensure transparency in price‑setting, central government budgeting and the accounting
of subsidies.
To further support this, the United States can organize review meetings and create an
independent task force that helps G20 countries frame and implement their NDCs and
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structure reporting frameworks for accountability. In leading this initiative, the United
States benefits by having a more robust subsidy phaseout and showcasing its ability to
drive international change. These efforts are different from those in the past because
the Biden administration can now credibly commit the United States to a rigorous peer‑
review process and strengthen commitments over time, giving other member countries
the confidence to do the same.
Lastly, the United States can go beyond the G20 and take on a more active role in the
efforts of Least Developed Countries’ (LDCs) efforts to dismantle fossil fuel subsidies.
They can do this by providing LDCs with technical assistance to develop subsidy phase‑
out plans or legal and regulatory structures to sustain reform. Additionally, the United
States can also help LDCs access financing for mitigating the short‑term consequences
of reform. One strategy for doing so involves subsidy phaseout and reform catalyst
(SPARC) bonds. These bonds can be issued on behalf of an LDC, with repayment based
on savings from subsidy removal. These bonds provide LDCs with sufficiently large
short‑term resources, while also making it costly for them to renege on phase‑out com‑
mitments. The United States can act as a guarantor, buyer, or donor to LDCs hoping to
implement subsidy phaseouts using SPARC bonds.
U.S. government agencies already advocate for eliminating fossil fuel subsidies in their
Economic Growth Policy and incorporate this in the programs they fund. Among them,
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is a strong candidate for pro‑
moting fossil fuel subsidy reform. Fossil fuel subsidy reform is seen as a powerful tool
to sustainable growth, and USAID has conducted subsidy reform peer review assess‑
ments for Peru, the Philippines, and Vietnam. USAID also builds awareness by con‑
ducting workshops on transitioning to market‑based pricing and strategies for moving
away from subsidies. Based on their experience and reach, USAID is a strong candidate
for promoting international interventions.
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5.7.4 Carbon Capture & Storage
Achieving emissions reductions goals requires increasing investment in CCS.
Righetti et al, 21 – Occidental Chair in Energy and Environmental Policy at the School
of Energy Resources and the Haub School of Environment and Natural Resources and
a Professor at the University of Wyoming College of Law
[Tara Righetti, Jesse Richardson, Kris Koski, and Sam Taylor, “The Carbon Storage
Future of Public Lands,” Pace Environmental Law Review, Volume 38 Issue 2, May
2021, https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1847&context=pelr,
Achieving CO2 emission reduction goals will either require extensive investments in car‑
bon removal technologies to decarbonize electric generation, transportation fuels, and
industrial sources or near cessation of their use. As professor Kalen writes, a “deeply
decarbonized future will require either effective carbon capture and storage capacity for
natural gas plants . . . or removing natural gas as a fuel source by roughly 2030.”1 Recog‑
nizing the unlikelihood of the latter, organizations such as the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) acknowledge
that reaching international energy and climate goals will likely require “Carbon Cap‑
ture Utilization and Storage” (CCUS).2 Specifically, the IEA has indicated that achieving
the Paris Agreement’s climate goal of 1.5°C “will almost certainly require some form of
carbon removal.”3
Geologic storage of carbon dioxide (CO2) is among the core decarbonization technolo‑
gies considered in proposals to stabilize the atmosphere.4 Several intensive—or deep—
negative emissions technologies, such as direct air capture and net negative generation,
rely on geologic storage to permanently remove CO2 from the atmosphere.5 The In‑
ternational Standards Organization (ISO) standard for geologic storage defines “geo‑
logic storage” as “long‑term containment of CO2 streams in subsurface geological for‑
mations.”6 CCUS technologies capture CO2 and inject it underground for permanent
storage.7 Opportunities to capture CO2 from anthropogenic sources include fossil‑fuel
fired power plants,8 closedloop industrial facilities,9 and biofuels facilities.10 CO2 can
also be captured through direct air capture technologies and sequestered using geo‑
logic storage.11 As such, geologic storage holds the potential to significantly impact cli‑
mate reduction goals by decarbonizing fossil and bioenergy generation12 and facilitat‑
ing negative‑emissions technologies. The Union of Concerned Scientists has recognized
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that “[n]atural gas with [carbon capture and sequestration] . . . could be a contributor
to a net‑zero world.”13
Use of CCUS technology, with accompanying federal pore space utilization, could also
be a means to aid a just transition for areas which rely heavily on fossil fuels. Facilities
which rely on fossil fuels can be retrofitted with CCUS technology, “preserv[ing] em‑
ployment and economic prosperity in regions that rely on emissions‑intensive industry,
while avoiding the economic and social disruption of early retirements.”14 Retrofits
may permit important baseload energy sources to continue operating without jeopar‑
dizing emissions reductions goals. Retrofitting of existing coal‑ and gas‑fired power
plants is expected to have “a small to negligible impact on . . . operational flexibility,”
potentially even “increas[ing] short‑term flexibility.”15 In its April 2021 initial report,
President Biden’s Interagency Working Group on Coal and Power Plant Communities
and Economic Revitalization identified retrofitting traditional energy generation and in‑
dustrial facilities with carbon capture technologies as among key opportunities to create
good‑paying jobs in energy communities.16
CCUS development thus far has not kept pace with what is necessary to achieve climate
goals. In 2009, the IEA indicated that 100 large‑scale CCUS projects would need to be de‑
veloped between 2010 and 2020 to reach climate goals, yet only 13% of the target storage
capacity has been satisfied as of September 2020.17 This shortfall results largely from
commercialization issues related to the high costs of installing the necessary infrastruc‑
ture for CCUS and the lack of sufficient incentives to reduce CO2 emissions.18
Federal funding has supported technology advancements and may aid in reducing costs
of development, ensuring that emerging technologies become commercially feasible.19
The federal government has provided significant support—over five billion in funding—
for carbon storage activities since 2010.20 Recent support includes appropriations for
carbon capture retrofits as part of the Rural Electrification and Telecommunications
Loans Program,21 extension of the 45Q tax credit,22 which provides tax credits for per‑
manent sequestration of CO2 as part of geologic storage or CO2‑ Enhanced Oil Recovery
(EOR), and a funding opportunity announcement from the Department of Energy (DOE)
for over ~$100 million in cost‑shared CCUS research and development.23 The Energy
Act of 2020 included further federal support for CCUS and direct capture projects.24 Al‑
though Division S of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2021 directed the Council
of Environmental Quality and other agencies to review federal regulations and evaluate
the “improvement of permitting process for carbon dioxide capture and infrastructure
projects,”25 until very recently most federal efforts have focused on commercial aspects
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of CO2 storage and on research and development for carbon storage technologies.
United States laws and regulations currently address numerous aspects of carbon stor‑
age. A report from the Global CCS Institute currently lists the United States as a “Band
A” country, meaning that it has “CCS‑specific laws or [other] laws that are applicable
across most parts of the CCS project cycle” and that “[l]egal and regulatory models
in [the United States] are sophisticated and address the novel aspects of the CCS pro‑
cess.”26 Most significantly, injection wells for CCUS are permitted according to Class
VI of the Underground Injection Control (UIC) Program under the Safe Drinking Water
Act.27 Of the various classes of injection activities authorized under the UIC program,
Class VI is the most stringent and includes comprehensive performance requirements,
as well as more extensive monitoring, verification, and reporting.28 CCUS projects are
also subject to the Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Reporting Program requirements of the Clean
Air Act.29 These examples, however, represent the exception, rather than the rule. The
majority of laws in the United States laws do not directly address carbon sequestra‑
tion, much less handle the process in a sophisticated manner.30 For example, Profes‑
sor Arnold W. Reitze Jr. observed that none of the potentially relevant statutes for
onshore geologic CO2 storage present a clear regulatory framework for geologic CO2
storage, and some, especially the Endangered Species Act (ESA), may operate to ban
carbon sequestration in certain areas.31 Similarly, researchers at the Sabin Center for
Climate Change Law at Columbia University noted the lack of laws specifically regu‑
lating offshore CO2 sequestration.32 These commentators describe existing laws as con‑
fusing, sometimes overlapping, and marred by frequent shortcomings, which, in some
instances, may prevent rather than encourage CCUS.33 Although recently enacted34
and proposed legislation endeavors to streamline the project review and permitting pro‑
cesses across multiple agencies, the legislation fails to comprehensively address land
management aspects of carbon storage activities on federal land.35
The lack of specific statutes and regulatory programs regarding federal pore space uti‑
lization presents a significant hurdle to the development of geologic storage projects. A
recent report by the Congressional Research Service acknowledged that issues relating
to geologic sequestration and EOR include “liability and property rights issues,” such
as long term stewardship and the need for policies regarding ownership of pore space
property rights.36 Although a 2010 report by the Interagency Task Force on CCS recog‑
nized that the use of federal pore space in lands owned in fee simple might streamline
leasing and limit conflicts between uses, the report also identified concerns including
underground migration of injected CO2 beyond federal boundaries and additional reg‑
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ulatory requirements such as compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).37 These concerns, and the absence of clear laws or regulations addressing these
issues, provide an opportunity for federal lawmakers and agencies to address the issue.
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Public lands are important for CCS due to their high storage capacities.
Righetti et al, 21 – Occidental Chair in Energy and Environmental Policy at the School
of Energy Resources and the Haub School of Environment and Natural Resources and
a Professor at the University of Wyoming College of Law
[Tara Righetti, Jesse Richardson, Kris Koski, and Sam Taylor, “The Carbon Storage
Future of Public Lands,” Pace Environmental Law Review, Volume 38 Issue 2, May
2021, https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1847&context=pelr,
II. STORAGE SPACE IN PUBLIC LANDS
Geologic storage requires a significant amount of subsurface land capable of securely

containing CO2. Sequestration requires rock formations with both adequate storage
capacity and trapping mechanisms to contain the injected CO2 and prevent migration
out of the storage complex.38 The storage unit must include both the legal ownership
right to inject in the pore space as well as sufficient porosity for injection activities and
confining strata that assure containment of CO2.39 The ISO standard for geologic stor‑
age requires reservoirs with an adequate primary seal and secondary barriers to CO2
leakage.40 Potential storage complexes include deep saline aquifers, coal seams, and de‑
pleted oil or gas fields, some of which have already demonstrated their ability to contain
gaseous substances for millennia.41
Pore space can be understood as the voids within rocks, soils, and geologic formations
that collectively form a potential storage resource or reservoir. Pore spaces may be oc‑
cupied by gasses, fluids, or brines, but additional storage capacity may be achieved
through increases in pressure or by removal of existing substances. North Dakota and
Wyoming state law, respectively, define pore space as “a cavity or void, whether nat‑
urally or artificially created, in a subsurface sedimentary stratum”42 and “subsurface
space which can be used as storage space for carbon dioxide or other substances.”43
No federal definition of pore space exists within federal land management statutes or
regulations.
Geologic storage requires a property right to utilize the pore space. Within this context
of property rights, gaps regarding the extent of federal pore space ownership remain.
However, the importance of pore space to various uses of federal land is well recog‑
nized. For example, the amount of pore space is one of the properties considered when
determining reservoir heterogeneity for the Alaska National Petroleum Reserve,44 com‑
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paction in surface mine reclamation,45 and screening sites for a nuclear waste reposi‑
tory.46
A significant amount of storage capacity exists within the United States. In 2007, the
DOE estimated that the United States had adequate geologic storage sequestration ca‑
pacity for more than 3,300 billion metric tons of CO2.47 In 2012, pursuant to the Energy
Independence and Security Act, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) and the
United States Department of Interior, together with other state and federal agency part‑
ners, conducted a national assessment of geologic storage resources for CO2.48 This
report estimates as much as 470,000 megatons of technically suitable storage capacity
exists in the United States, enough for 3,000 metric gigatons of CO2.49 The USGS esti‑
mates that federal lands overlay roughly 130 million acres of this usable pore space.50
The vast majority of this 130 million acres comes under the authority of either the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM)51 or the Forest Service.52 Various other agencies, including
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and Department of Defense, manage a small
portion.53 Altogether, about 18% of pore space available for geologic CO2 sequestration
is overlaid by federally owned land, not accounting for split estate lands where feder‑
ally owned minerals underlie privately owned surface estates.54 Pore space interest in
federal land represents a significant opportunity for carbon containment. Although ge‑
ologic uncertainty results in large ranges, data produced by the National Energy Tech‑
nology Laboratory indicates that federal lands may include enough capacity to store
between twenty‑five and seventy‑three years of CO2 storage for the entire United States
energy sector based on 2009 levels.55
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5.7.5 NEPA
NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act) should guide decision‑making on

leasing – that would require the Interior to exert more control over leasing to run a
competitive program that benefits the public.
tegrity
B. Leasing Plans and Programmatic Environmental Impact Statements
Interior should develop multi‑year plans for leasing and corresponding programmatic
EISs prepared pursuant to NEPA to guide its decision‑making. Yet as described in Part
I, supra, Interior does not prepare regular strategic leasing plans or programmatic EISs
for its onshore oil, gas, or coal leasing programs. This has resulted in uncompetitive
programs that do not adequately serve the public interest.
NEPA requires federal agencies to take a “hard look” at the environmental conse‑
quences of a proposed activity before taking action.140 Agencies are required to
prepare EISs for all “major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment.”141 EISs must contain, among other elements, a statement of the
purpose of and need for the action, and a discussion of alternatives to the proposed
action.142 Alternatives analysis is the “heart” of the environmental review process.143
Programmatic EISs, which are subject to the same requirements as EISs, assess the
environmental impacts of proposed policies, plans, programs, or projects for which
subsequent actions will be implemented.144 Programmatic EISs can frame the scope
of subsequent project specific federal actions, identify geographically bounded areas
within which future proposed activities can be taken, identify broad mitigation or con‑
servation measures that can be applied to subsequent projects and their NEPA reviews,
and analyze feasible alternatives to the way current programs are managed.145
One model for how Interior can instill more rationality into its lease planning process
is BOEM’s five‑year planning process for offshore oil and gas leasing. The Outer Conti‑
nental Shelf Lands Act requires BOEM to prepare a five‑year Program that establishes
a schedule of oil and gas lease sales in planning areas of the U.S. Outer Continental
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Shelf.146 The Program specifies the size, timing, and location of potential leasing activ‑
ity that the Secretary of the Interior determines will best meet national energy needs. Be‑
cause the implementation of the five‑year Program will have significant environmental
and social effects, BOEM also prepares a programmatic EIS for each proposed Program,
as required by NEPA. BOEM’s programmatic EIS analyzes the potential environmen‑
tal impacts of the activities that may result from the lease sale schedule as identified in
BOEM’s Draft Program; considers a reasonable range of alternatives to the proposed
lease sale schedule (including a “no sale” option); and identifies opportunities for miti‑
gation.
Interior’s decision to initiate a programmatic EIS for the federal coal program in 2016
is another example of the type of analysis that can and should be done regularly to de‑
termine whether taxpayers are receiving “fair market value” and whether the program
is aligned with climate change or other environmental goals. Prior to 2016, the last
time that the federal coal program was reviewed was 1986.147 Such a review should be
done far more frequently than every 30 years in order to keep pace with environmental
knowledge, changes in the energy market, new technology, and more.
Interior should exert more control over where, when, and on what terms any leasing
occurs, in order to run a more competitive program that appropriately balances fed‑
eral land uses and provides maximum net benefits to the American public. Preparing
strategic plans and programmatic EISs on a regular schedule would enable Interior to
better weigh the trade‑offs between competing uses of federal lands, as it must do under
its “multiple use” mandate; analyze viable leasing alternatives and their environmental
and social impacts; monitor changing market conditions; and evaluate lease timing and
fiscal terms in order to manage a program that best serves the public interest.
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The Interior can use a cost benefit analysis to calculate the social benefits of leasing.
tegrity
C. Calculating the Net Social Benefits of Leasing
Key to maximizing social welfare, Interior should not lease any fossil fuels to private
companies for extraction unless the social benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Inte‑
rior can determine whether this is the case by conducting a cost‑benefit analysis of its
leasing programs that accounts for the externality costs of production.
Cost‑benefit analysis has limitations. It requires assigning monetized values to non‑
market benefits and costs, which can be difficult or even impossible in some cases (such
as valuing the loss of a species). Moreover, in some cases, a policy may be desirable even
if the quantifiable benefits to society do not outweigh its costs, particularly if there are
ethical or equity concerns. The use of cost‑benefit analysis in environmental policy has
been criticized on these and other grounds.148 Despite these critiques and limitations,
cost‑benefit analysis can provide a useful framework for comparing the social costs and
benefits of proposed agency actions. This is especially true in light of advancements in
calculating environmental costs, such as the Social Cost of Carbon.149 Where, as here,
federal agencies are directed by statute to manage federal fossil fuels in order to earn
“fair market value” for the public, they can improve their decisionmaking by using bal‑
anced cost‑benefit analysis that accounts for social and environmental costs and benefits,
as well as “economic,” or market based, costs and benefits.
BOEM’s practice of calculating the “net social value” of offshore leasing in each area of
the Outer Continental Shelf before keeping that area in its final program is a good start‑
ing point for illustrating how balanced cost‑benefit analysis can be applied to fossil fuel
leasing decisions. OCSLA requires BOEM to balance economic, environmental, and so‑
cial values when managing offshore oil and gas leasing.150 To help fulfill this mandate,
the agency calculates the projected net benefits of leasing in each identified offshore
region, as compared to not offering any tracts for lease in that region.151 The D.C. Cir‑
cuit Court of Appeals has upheld BOEM’s methodology for calculating net social value,
which uses a cost‑benefit analysis that begins by calculating each planning area’s “net
economic value” (the market value of expected resources less the cost of production and
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transportation) minus environmental and social costs.152 BOEM then compares the net
benefits of producing oil and gas from the program areas to the net benefits of the “no
leasing” alternative to calculate the incremental net benefits, if any, of including each
area in the program.153
BOEM’s net benefit analysis is a useful starting point, but it should not be the end point.
Notably, in its Proposed Final Offshore Leasing Program for 2017–2022, BOEM’s net
benefit analysis did not account for the cost of greenhouse gas emissions from oil and
natural gas production, transport, processing, and consumption.154 BOEM did analyze
life cycle greenhouse gas emissions and their costs, but it never factored these costs into
its net benefits calculation, as it ultimately concluded that greenhouse gas emissions in
the lease sale and “no action” scenarios would be very similar, due to energy substitu‑
tion.155 However, BOEM’s model of the world oil market found that the “no action”
alternative would decrease global carbon dioxide emissions by up to 2.3 billion metric
tons over the duration of the 2017–2022 OCS Leasing Program156: this is more than
the annual CO2 emissions from the entire U.S. transportation sector.157 This finding
makes sense as a matter of supply and demand: decreasing global oil supply should
lead to higher global oil prices, and consequently less oil consumption and greenhouse
gas emissions.158 Thus, BOEM arguably did not complete its “net benefits” analysis
for the 2017–2022 Program, from the perspective of both upstream and downstream
greenhouse gas emissions.
In order to provide “fair market value,” federal leasing should provide net benefits to
taxpayers. And ideally, leasing decisions should be calibrated to maximize net bene‑
fits. Through a programmatic EIS or separate planning process, Interior should explore
how to account for the social and environmental costs of fossil fuel production through
adjustments to federal lease fiscal terms, such as royalty rates. A royalty payment that
targets the negative externalities not addressed by other policies (such as direct regu‑
lation limiting greenhouse gas emissions or an economy‑wide carbon tax) would, in
theory, allow the public to enjoy maximum net benefits from extraction by requiring
private firms to internalize negative externalities and align their incentives with those
of the government. These potential reforms are discussed in Part IV, infra.
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5 Negative Evidence
Several economic tools exist to calculate these benefits.
tegrity
D. Economic Tools: The Social Cost of Carbon, Energy Substitution Analysis, and Op‑
tion Value
There are several economic tools at Interior’s disposal in managing fossil fuel leasing for
the benefit of the public. These tools include the Interagency Working Group’s Social
Cost of Carbon and the Social Cost of Methane.
The Social Cost of Carbon is a widely accepted methodology used by multiple federal
agencies to quantify the costs of climate pollution for the purpose of designing federal
rules and programs. The Social Cost of Carbon quantifies the economic damages asso‑
ciated with a small increase in carbon dioxide emissions, conventionally one metric ton,
in a given year.159 The Social Cost of Carbon was designed by an Interagency Working
Group comprised of economic and scientific experts from the White House and multiple
federal agencies.160 It used the latest peer‑reviewed science and economic models.161
EPA’s Social Cost of Methane builds on this framework and is also based on the latest
peer‑reviewed science and economic models.162 While the Trump Administration dis‑
banded the federal Interagency Working Group and withdrew its technical documents
“as no longer representative of governmental policy,”163 the Social Cost of Carbon and
the Social Cost of Methane remain the best meth ods available to analyze the social cost
of greenhouse gas emissions.164 In the absence of any better metric, Interior should con‑
tinue to use these economic tools when preparing EISs, conducting net benefits analysis,
and making policy decisions that rest, at least in part, on the social cost of greenhouse
gas emissions.
Another tool in Interior’s planning arsenal is energy substitution analysis. This method
would enable the agency to model alternative leasing scenarios and potential changes to
its programs, such as adjustments to fiscal terms. In its NEPA analysis, Interior should
analyze the effect of each alternative, including the “no action” alternative, on energy
markets and greenhouse gas emissions, including upstream and downstream emissions.
In line with recent case law, federal agencies must disclose the upstream and down‑
stream greenhouse gas emission effects of actions that require NEPA review.165 Fur‑
193
5 Negative Evidence
ther, a growing number of federal courts have held that agencies must conduct proper
energy substitution analysis in NEPA reviews.166
Economists measure how coal, natural gas, and other fuels act as substitutes in the elec‑
tricity market by analyzing “cross‑price elasticity,” that is, how responsive producers
are in swapping inputs when relative prices change.167 Conducting proper substitution
analysis in a leasing plan or EIS is critical to analyzing potential environmental impacts,
and ultimately, to selecting the most efficient alternative. For example, increasing the
federal royalty rate for coal would be expected to lead to some substitution of natural
gas and renewable energy for coal (as well as some substitution of coal produced on pub‑
lic lands to coal produced on private lands) in the overall energy mix, as well as greater
energy conservation. This, in turn, should reduce total greenhouse gas emissions. In‑
terior can choose from several sophisticated models in order to conduct substitution
analysis and evaluate the effect of different leasing policies and royalty rates on the
energy market. These models include ICF International’s Integrated Planning Model
(“IPM”);168 the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s National Energy Modeling
System (“NEMS”);169 and BOEM’s MarketSim model, which it uses to analyze lease
sale scenarios in its five‑year planning process.170 Each of these models has benefits
and drawbacks; generally, there is a tradeoff between model transparency and model
complexity.171
Interior has been inconsistent in conducting substitution analysis in some of its prior
EISs and leasing plans. For example, in its 2010 EIS for the Wright Area coal leases,
located in the Powder River Basin, BLM reasoned that if it were to select the “no ac‑
tion” alternative (not leasing the coal), other coal mines would increase production to
entirely replace all 2 billion tons of coal anticipated from the leases.172 As a result, it pre‑
dicted that the amount of coal burned in the United States—and the resulting carbon
dioxide and methane emissions—would be identical whether or not the leases were ap‑
proved.173 BLM’s “perfect substitution” assumption was questionable in light of the
economic principles of supply and demand, as well as the empirical state of knowl‑
edge concerning the U.S. coal market. In September 2017, the 10th Circuit Court of Ap‑
peals found BLM’s “perfect substitution” assumption to be arbitrary and capricious, as
it lacked support in the record and was contrary to basic economic principles.174 Other
federal agencies, however, including the Surface Transportation Board and the State
Department, have properly analyzed the effects of their energy management decisions
in NEPA reviews, and have had those decisions upheld by federal courts.175
Finally, Interior should use available techniques to estimate option value, or the infor‑
194
5 Negative Evidence
mational value of delaying irreversible decisions, such as when and on what terms to
sell non‑renewable resources to private companies. Interior holds—on behalf of the
American public—perpetual options to develop or lease oil, gas, and coal tracts; it must
decide when and where exercising those options will be most opportune.176 When the
federal government sells a private lessee the right to develop a tract, it extinguishes the
perpetual option that the government holds on behalf of the American people, and sells
a time‑limited option, valid for the duration of the lease term. Interior does not account
for the lost value of its perpetual option in the price of its leases. This failure to account
for option value in minimum bids and internal fair market value calculations systemati‑
cally undervalues public resources and contributes to leasing too much coal, oil, and gas
too early, and at too low of a price.177 Indeed, energy companies routinely account for
option value with respect to resource prices, which explains their longstanding practice
of stockpiling leases, yet waiting years to begin production.178
While private companies have an incentive to account for some price uncertainty in their
lease purchase decisions—and therefore, the government would receive some compen‑
sation for price uncertainty through lease bids if it held truly competitive auctions—
Interior does not address the full spectrum of uncertainty that is relevant from a public
perspective. Specifically, Interior’s planning processes, minimum bids, and internal
“fair market value” assessments omit environmental and social cost uncertainty. The
environmental, social, and economic uncertainties associated with natural resources ex‑
traction are many, and include:
• resource prices, which are impacted by global energy markets, among other factors;
• the magnitude of risk from externalities, such as carbon dioxide, methane, and partic‑
ulate matter emissions;179
• the development of pollution prevention or capture technologies;
• competing uses of federally‑owned lands, such as the potential and need for more
renewable energy production; and
• coal, oil, and natural gas reserve estimates, which may affect the longterm availability
and price of resources.
BOEM recognized the utility of option value in its offshore leasing plan for 2017 to 2022.
Specifically, BOEM noted that: (i) environmental and social cost uncertainties can affect
the size, timing, and location of offshore leasing; (ii) option value can be a component
of the “fair market value” of a lease; and (iii) BOEM can raise minimum bids, rents, and
royalties for leases to account for option value.180 Nevertheless, BOEM stopped short
195
5 Negative Evidence
of quantifying the option value associated with offshore leasing. However, the agency’s
qualitative assessment of option value and its acknowledgement that option value is a
component of fair market value is an important policy shift that should be extended to
all federal leasing. These uncertainties should be accounted for when evaluating which
parcels to offer for lease, and in determining fair market value for tracts. BLM, unlike
BOEM, fails to address environmental and social option value in any manner, either
qualitatively or quantitatively.
These economic methods, together with increasing scientific and technical understand‑
ing of the externality costs of fossil fuel production, enable Interior to account for costs
that have historically been omitted from its decision‑making. While BOEM has em‑
ployed more of these planning and economic methods in its offshore leasing plans than
BLM has for onshore leasing, both agencies should instill more rationality into the leas‑
ing process in order to maximize social welfare.
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5 Negative Evidence
The Interior should create strategic leasing plans based on whether they earn fair
market value for taxpayers.
tegrity
A. Interior Should Prepare Strategic Leasing Plans and Evaluate Whether Its Current
Leasing Programs Earn “Fair Market Value” for Taxpayers, by Conducting Cost‑Benefit
Analysis
In order to manage a federal fossil fuel leasing program that better serves American
taxpayers, Interior should prepare strategic plans for leasing and regularly evaluate po‑
tential reforms that have the potential to increase social welfare.
Such strategic plans can be modeled on BOEM’s five‑year plans for offshore leasing and
should be structured to harmonize with any existing Regional Management Plans. In
fact, these regional plans should “tier to” strategic plans and provide information on
region‑specific energy needs and environmental considerations. These strategic plans
should be accompanied by regular programmatic EISs that evaluate the environmental
and social effects of alternative leasing scenarios. This analysis is critical to answering
two important questions: does leasing now, pursuant to existing fiscal terms, serve the
public interest? And, can Interior make adjustments to lease timing, size, or fiscal terms
that would increase social welfare?
In its strategic planning process, Interior should evaluate whether it earns “fair mar‑
ket value” for taxpayers as required by FLPMA and OCSLA by analyzing the revenue
and other benefits of leasing, as compared to the costs, including social and environ‑
mental costs. Interior should use the Social Cost of Carbon and Social Cost of Methane
in this analysis. Pursuant to executive orders and legal precedent, if the full benefits
of production are accounted for in such an inquiry (such as bonus bids, royalty rev‑
enue, and state tax revenue), the full suite of social and environmental costs must be
accounted for, as well.283 Executive Orders 13,563 and 12,866, OMB Circular A‑4, and
EPA’s guidelines for economic analysis all indicate that benefits and costs should be
treated in parity, because where all benefits and costs can be quantified and expressed
in monetary units, cost‑benefit analysis provides decision makers with an indication
of the most efficient alternative, that is, the alternative that generates the largest net
197
5 Negative Evidence
benefits to society.284 Relevant environmental and social costs include upstream and
downstream greenhouse gas emissions (methane and carbon dioxide), transportation‑
related externalities (including particulate matter emissions, public fatalities, noise, and
congestion), and habitat effects. To the extent that some of these costs and benefits are
not quantifiable, they should be analyzed qualitatively.285
The result of this analysis would provide a baseline against which to measure potential
royalty rate increases; increases to minimum bids; and other policy changes, such as
tailoring fossil fuel production to meet any climate goals or ceasing to issue new leases
altogether. As a starting point, Interior should adopt BOEM’s practice of making a “net
social value” determination before proceeding with leasing in any area. This would
shine light on relative externality and other costs associated with production in certain
regions, which in turn, could affect where, when, and on what terms Interior chooses to
lease. From a social welfare maximization perspective, Interior should seek to provide
maximum net benefits to the public.
198
5 Negative Evidence
The Interior can maximize net benefits via accounting for the social costs of
emissions.
tegrity
B. Interior Should Analyze Optimal Fiscal Terms for New Leases, Including Social Cost
of Carbon or Social Cost of Methane Royalty “Adders,” Among Other Changes Geared
to Maximizing Net Benefits
Interior should comprehensively review its royalty rates for coal, oil, and gas leases in
order to assess how an increase in royalty rates might affect total revenue, externality
costs, and better meet the mandates of its governing statutes. Interior should consider
increasing minimum royalty rates above current levels to account for foreseeable envi‑
ronmental and social costs of production, which currently impose uncompensated costs
on the public. The goal is to identify an alternative that maximizes net social benefits.
Environmental and social externalities from fossil fuel production vary with the amount
of the resource produced; therefore, these costs are best recouped through royalties. A
royalty rate that would lead to a more socially optimal level of extraction would ac‑
count for the cost of unregulated externalities, including carbon dioxide and methane
emissions. In considering adjustments to royalty rates, Interior may wish to focus on
externalities associated with “upstream” production on federal lands, as opposed to
downstream combustion. This is because production externalities are within Interior’s
jurisdiction, as they occur on public lands and are closely tied to its statutory mandates
to prevent “undue waste”286 and undue degradation of lands.287 By contrast, adjusting
royalty rates to account for downstream combustion emissions may present somewhat
greater legal risk for Interior, and the agency may run into potential issues with “double
counting” the cost of combustion emissions if those emissions are addressed by other
policies or regulations.
For these reasons, a study that I co‑authored quantified and applied an “upstream” So‑
cial Cost of Methane adder that accounted for federal coal production methane costs.
It used data on fugitive methane emissions from coal mines (which are currently un‑
regulated) and applied the Social Cost of Methane to calculate a surface mine methane
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5 Negative Evidence
adder of approximately ~$1 per metric ton of coal (or ~$0.90 per short ton), and an un‑
derground coal adder of ~$8.79 per metric ton (~$7.97 per short ton), as underground
coal mining emits more fugitive methane.288 It then calculated revised royalty rates that
would incorporate this methane adder. Using average surface and underground coal
prices in the relevant states, the adder would increase royalty rates from 12.5 percent to
18.7 percent for surface‑mined coal, and from 8 percent to 28.7 percent for underground
coal.289
This royalty rate adder would have yielded approximately ~$2 billion in additional roy‑
alty revenue between 2009 and 2013 for federal coal production in four western states:
Wyoming, Colorado, Montana and Utah.290 Moreover, this royalty rate increase would
have provided up to ~$2.9 billion in net social benefits, accounting for both increased
revenue and decreased externality costs from coal mining.291 Pursuant to existing reg‑
ulations, this higher royalty rate could be applied to new leases, modified leases, and
lease extensions.292 And because the Social Cost of Methane rises over time, as methane
is a stock pollutant, the royalty rate should also increase over time in order to recoup
methane externality costs.293
A separate independent study examined the effect of policy scenarios that would in‑
crease the federal coal royalty rate or decrease production through a tonnage produc‑
tion cap. The study found that phasing in a lifecycle carbon dioxide royalty adder set at
20 percent of the Social Cost of Carbon—approximately ~$15.30 per short ton in 2016—
would add nearly ~$3 billion in royalty receipts by 2025.294 Introducing this higher roy‑
alty rate, phased‑in over 10 years, would also reduce overall carbon dioxide emissions,
with or without the Clean Power Plan in place.295 Thus, both total financial returns and
net social welfare would increase with a higher royalty rate.
Interior should also consider adjusting the fiscal terms of leases to account for the trans‑
portation externalities associated with transporting oil, gas, and coal long distances
from the point of production to end users. Rail transportation, which is used to move ap‑
proximately 70 percent of all domestic coal,296 causes multiple externalities including
greenhouse gas emissions, particulate matter emissions, increased fatalities, and more.
Interior should quantify these costs, and consider charging lessees for them through
royalty rate adders.297 Even without any royalty rate adjustment, these transportation
externalities jus tify changing or eliminating existing regulations that generously subsi‑
dize coal, oil, and gas transportation.
Each of these modeled reforms would induce some substitution of renewable energy
and natural gas for coal, as well as increased energy conservation, resulting in a net
200
5 Negative Evidence
decline in greenhouse gas emissions. Yet in all of the externality adder case studies de‑
scribed here, total royalties would increase over the non‑adjusted royalty base cases,
while coal production would decline.298 As such, these royalty rate adjustments would
result in significant net benefits to the public. Ramping coal production down (as op‑
posed to raising the royalty rate) would achieve similar greenhouse gas emission bene‑
fits, but with diminished revenue for states and the federal government.299 This illus‑
trates one of the primary benefits of fiscal reform, as opposed to setting a cap on federal
fossil fuel production: the additional revenue generated from royalty reform would go
both to the federal government and to fossil fuel‑producing states and communities,
which can use this revenue for environmental mitigation, adaptation, education, and
infrastructure investment.
Finally, the White House Council of Economic Advisers analyzed an optimal royalty
rate from the perspective of maximizing the financial return to taxpayers, as opposed to
maximizing social welfare. The study concluded that a policy goal of maximizing the
return to taxpayers (leaving aside any environmental benefits) would require royalty
rates of 304 percent (equal to approximately a ~$30 per short ton royalty charge on Pow‑
der River Basin coal), which would curtail future federal coal production by more than
half from projected levels (partially offset by increased production from other regions)
while increasing revenue by ~$2.7 to ~$3.1 billion when fully phased‑in by 2025.300
Interior should analyze and model these or similar alternative royalty rate scenarios
in future strategic plans and environmental reviews.301 This analysis would provide
decisionmakers and the public with an alternative that moves towards maximizing so‑
cial welfare, and better upholds Interior’s statutory man dates to harmonize production
with preservation. Economic and scientific understanding of the social and environ‑
mental costs of fossil fuel production has markedly improved in the 95 years since the
passage of the Mineral Leasing Act. By increasing royalty rates to recoup at least some
of the social and environmental costs of fossil fuel production, Interior can significantly
increase revenue for states and the federal government, while simultaneously reducing
greenhouse gas emissions.
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5 Negative Evidence
For each scenario, the Interior should model energy substitution and climate effects.
tegrity
C. For Each Alternative Scenario, Interior Should Model Energy Substitution and Cli‑
mate Effects
Interior should model its selected alternatives’ energy production, climate, revenue, and
other effects, including downstream greenhouse gas emissions. As part of this analysis,
it should analyze the substitution effects among coal, natural gas, oil, and renewable
energy sources (on public and private lands) that result from changes in leasing policies,
including royalty rates.302
It is well settled that coal competes directly with natural gas, nuclear, and renewable
energy resources in the generation of electricity. Conducting substitution analysis in an
environmental review process is critical to properly analyzing environmental impacts,
and, ultimately, to selecting the most efficient alternative. Interior should model each al‑
ternative scenario’s energy market and greenhouse gas emission effects, which requires
accounting for the substitution effects induced by each alternative, as well as increased
energy conservation.
In fact, the 2017 decision by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, discussed in Part II,
supra, highlighted the importance of conducting proper substitution analysis for fos‑
sil fuel leasing decisions and their underlying NEPA analysis.303 As a result, Interior
cannot make unsupported assumptions about the climate effects of its leasing decisions
and must conduct proper substitution analysis in EISs.
As highlighted in Part II, supra, Interior can choose from several models to evaluate
the effect of different leasing policies and royalty rates on the energy market and total
greenhouse gas emissions. Further, these models can be tailored to adjust baseline sce‑
narios to align with any remaining U.S. climate change goals.304 Given its capacious
statutory mandates, Interior has the au thority to manage federal fossil fuel production
to help meet potential national climate change goals and commitments. As the stew‑
ard of public lands for present and future generations, Interior has the duty to “take[
] into account the long‑term needs of future generations for renewable and nonrenew‑
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5 Negative Evidence
able resources,” and to manage federal lands “without permanent impairment of the
productivity of the land and the quality of the environment.”305 FLPMA also provides
that federal lands are to be used only for the advancement of the national interest,306
and that “public lands be managed in a manner that will protect the quality of scientific,
scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and
archeological values; that, where appropriate, will preserve and protect certain public
lands in their natural condition . . . .”307
In light of this authority, Interior should analyze production scenarios in its planning
and environmental review processes that would tailor federal production to any remain‑
ing U.S. climate change goals. For example, the government could set a national “carbon
budget” for federal lands, based on what is needed to meet its climate change goals, and
adjust leasing policies for fossil fuels in order to meet that budget. This could be done
through an escalating royalty rate designed to decrease federal coal and oil production
over time— which would also provide revenue benefits—or through a production cap
or moratorium.308 These options should be analyzed through a programmatic environ‑
mental review process and appropriately modeled in order to compare their net effects.
Ultimately, Interior will need to weigh the tradeoffs of each alternative, and steer the
leasing program to a system that best complies with its dual mandate and earns fair
market value for taxpayers.
203
5 Negative Evidence
The Interior should curb royalty reductions and loopholes.
tegrity
D. Interior Should Curb Royalty Rate Reductions and Loopholes, Which Impair a Fair
Return to Taxpayers
Relevant to the question of whether federal leasing is structured to ensure a fair return
is how royalties are calculated, including whether any deductions or loopholes affect
the overall return to the public. Interior should eliminate its existing royalty relief reg‑
ulations, as they provide improper incentives to companies and hinder the receipt of a
fair return.
Under current law, the Secretary of the Interior has discretion to reduce or waive roy‑
alties “whenever in [his or her] judgment it is necessary to do so in order to promote
development, or whenever in [his or her] judgment the leases cannot be successfully op‑
erated under the terms provided therein.”309 Pursuant to its current regulations, BLM
has discretion to grant royalty rate reductions if three requirements are met: (i) the roy‑
alty rate reduction encourages the greatest ultimate recovery of the resource; (ii) the rate
reduction is in the interest of conservation of the resource; and (iii) the rate reduction
is necessary to promote development of the resource.310 The second of these require‑
ments appears to conflict with the first and third; it is unclear how reducing royalties
would advance resource conservation.
Interior should eliminate, or at least amend, its royalty rate reduction regulations. Rate
reductions that are “necessary to promote development” of the resource amount to a
subsidy for fossil fuels; the government should not be in the business of supporting
uneconomical production from public lands, especially at a loss to taxpayers. This reg‑
ulation is at odds with managing federal fossil fuel programs to maximize the net return
to taxpayers, and threatens the efficacy of any future royalty rate adjustments.
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5 Negative Evidence
The Interior should evaluate bidding reforms to secure fair market value and
strategically time fossil fuel lease sales.
tegrity
E. Interior Should Evaluate Bidding Reforms That Can Help Secure Fair Market Value
for Taxpayers, and Consider the Alternative of Delayed Lease Sales in NEPA Analysis
At the lease sale stage, Interior should be compensated for the estimated market price of
the resource to be leased, as well as the option value of mining or drilling. Furthermore,
Interior should consider the alternative of delaying lease sales in its NEPA “alternatives
analysis” for proposed lease sales.
Minimum bids should be raised to account for inflation and the option value of leasing,
in order to serve as a floor price for fair market value, as originally intended. Account‑
ing for inflation, alone, would raise minimum bids across Interior’s programs.311 Inte‑
rior’s minimum bid and fair market value appraisals also fail to account for the option
value of fossil fuel leasing, which is the value of waiting for more information on en‑
ergy prices and extraction risks before deciding whether and when to lease the public’s
non‑renewable energy resources to private companies.312 As the D.C. Circuit recently
affirmed, there is “a tangible present economic benefit to delaying the decision to drill,”
and failing to account for this value undervalues public resources.313
Option value is relevant for both Interior’s planning processes and its minimum bids
and internal “fair market value” assessments. First, option value should be part of the
planning process, to determine when and where to lease tracts. Interior can look to
BOEM’s final 2017–2022 program for offshore leasing as a starting point. BOEM uses a
hurdle price analysis to account for economic uncertainty, and qualitatively considers
environmental and social option value when determining when and where to lease.314
Second, option value should be a component of minimum bids and bid adequacy pro‑
cedures. Both BLM and BOEM should evaluate how to incorporate option value into
minimum bids for coal, oil, and gas leases. Interior can draw from economic litera‑
ture on option value in oil drilling, for example, and augment the existing research by
providing research funding or organizing working groups to evaluate methods to use
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5 Negative Evidence
option value for leasing. Government agencies play an important role in quantifying
new categories of costs and benefits.315 Indeed, the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Center for
Sustainable Economy v. Jewell suggests that academic advancements in option value
research could even compel BOEM and BLM to quantify the option value associated
with their leasing practices.316 While developing such a methodology will have a dis‑
crete upfront cost, once created, this methodology could be used in future government
natural resources leasing decisions and could earn the American public significant net
benefits from more optimal timing, location, and lease terms.
Third, even setting aside any formal or quantitative use of option value, Interior should
consider the alternative of delaying or strategically timing fossil fuel lease sales when
it prepares its “alternatives analysis,” pursuant to NEPA. Considering a delayed lease
sale alternative would require Interior to assess the potential effects of leasing fossil
fuels later, when resource prices may be higher, pollution mitigation techniques may
be better, or more infrastructure is in place that would reduce transportation costs or
externalities, among other possible changes.
Finally, Interior should consider taking steps to make leasing more competitive, such as
by moving to a market‑based system of leasing that would pit bidders against one an‑
other across tracts, based on the quantity of oil, gas, or coal that they seek to produce in
a practice called inter‑tract bidding.317 Alternatively, Interior could simply offer fewer
tracts for lease at once and eliminate practices like area‑wide leasing, which it uses in
offshore auctions. This would help to increase competition for leases offered at each
auction.
In short, Interior’s leasing programs should be structured to provide net benefits to tax‑
payers by accounting for environmental costs. Structuring its programs in this way
would require more analysis through environmental reviews and ongoing planning
processes. However, the resulting programs could provide substantial net benefits to
taxpayers, and best effectuate Interior’s statutory mandates. While partisan politics has
been an impediment to a comprehensive legislative response to climate change, the re‑
forms suggested in this Article can be implemented at the agency level pursuant to
existing discretionary authority, and have the potential to earn more revenue for fossil
fuel producing states and the federal government, while also reducing greenhouse gas
emissions.
206

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Resolved: The United States ought to prohibit the extraction of

fossil fuels from federal public lands and waters.

November/December 2023 Lincoln‑Douglas Brief*

1 Topic Analysis by Amadea Datel 6

2 Topic Analysis by Leah Willingham 16

3 Topic Analysis by Jacob Palmer 26

4.3.3 Fossil Fuel Waste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

5 Negative Evidence 125

5.7 Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170

1.2 Interpreting the Topic

1.2.2 Extraction of Fossil Fuels

1.2.3 Federal Lands and Waters

1.3 Aff Arguments

1.3.1 Climate Change

1.3.2 Economic Growth

1.3.3 Environmental Racism

1.3.4 Legal Obligations

1.4 Neg Arguments

1.4.1 Perfect Substitution

1.4.2 Economic Growth

1.4.3 Grid Stability

1.5 Concluding Thoughts

Leah Willingham is a freshman at Michigan State University studying Interna‑

2.1.2 Interpreting the Topic

2.1.3 Defining the Topic

2.2 Affirmative Arguments

2.2.1 Climate Change

⁵Cambridge Dictionary. “Prohibit”. Cambridge University Press. No Date. Accessed 10‑3‑2023.

¹⁰Ibid. (Kusnets 2022)

Conservation arguments can focus on protecting indigenous lands as well. Emissions

2.2.3 Ecocentrism and Biocentrism

2.3 Neg arguments

2.3.1 Climate Change

2.3.3 National Security

²⁷Ibid. (Hjerpe et al, pg. 21)

3.1 Topic Overview

3.1.1 Debating a Climate Topic Today

3.2 Defining the Topic

3.2.1 Prohibitions and Restrictions

⁹Cambridge University Press. “Prohibit.” N.D. Accessed September 14, 2023.

3.2.2 Federal Public Lands and Waters

¹¹Dave, Mahimna. “Difference Between Prohibited and Restricted Goods in

3.3 Affirmative Ground

3.3.1 Protecting the Environment

justice and the mitigation of climate change as a form of reparations.

3.4 Negative Ground

3.4.1 Avoiding Market Volatility

The stability of the energy supply is a matter of paramount importance, as it underpins

3.5 Closing Notes

3.5.1 Caring for Oneself and the Community

4.1 Climate Change

On average, these emissions amounted to 1,408m tonnes of CO2 equivalent (MtCO2e)

The researchers then used a combination of EIA’s projections and a machine‑learning

An argument frequently advanced in favour of drilling on public lands is that stopping

Dr Peter Erickson, climate policy programme director at Stockholm Environment Insti‑

Reducing emissions is urgent – and every source is significant.

There Is Scientific Consensus About the Urgency of Reducing GHG Emissions

Despite the slight overall decreases in production—and therefore emissions—in recent

Methane emissions are especially concerning.

Increasing ‘wasted’ gas from venting and flaring

Policymakers should be concerned about the practices of venting—directly releasing

significant levels of GHGs to the atmosphere. In 2010, the Government Accountability

Largest source of methane pollution remains unaddressed