1999 - Shiffer - Behavioral and Evolutionary

Some Relationships between Behavioral and Evolutionary Archaeologies
Author(s): Michael Brian Schiffer

Source: American Antiquity , Oct., 1996, Vol. 61, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 643-662
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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SOME RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN BEHAVIORAL
AND EVOLUTIONARY ARCHAEOLOGIES
Michael Brian Schiffer
Diversity in archaeology's social theories is desirable, but factioning of the discipline into antagonistic, paradigm-based
camps undermines the scientific enterprise. In order to promote efforts at building bridges between different theoretical pro-
grams, this paper examines relationships between behavioral archaeology and evolutionary (selectionist) archaeology.
Potential common ground is brought to light, incompatibilities are critically examined, and possible synergies are explored.
It is concluded that there is no fundamental reason why these two programs cannot work in concert to achieve the goal of
explaining behavioral (or evolutionary) change in human societies. Whether productive relationships can be established
between other programs remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis.
La diversidad de teorias sociales en arqueologia es necesaria, pero la partici6n de la disciplina en facciones antagonisticas
basadas en paradigmas sabotea la empresa cientifica. Para promover esfuerzos destinados a crear puentes entre programas
teoricos distintos, este articulo examina las relaciones entre arqueologia conductual y arqueologia evolucionista (selec-
cionista). Se resaltan las areas comunes, se examinan criticamente las incompatibilidades, y se exploran posibles sinergias.
Se concluye que no existen razonesfundamentales por las que estos programas no puedan trabajar en concierto para alcan-
zar la meta de explicar cambio conductual (o evolutivo) en sociedades humanas. La posibilidad de que se establezcan rela-
ciones productivas entre otros programas queda por determinarse caso por caso.
Science consists in grouping facts so that gen- ologies, will struggle to win followers and alter
eral laws or conclusions may be drawn from disciplinary practice (see discussions in
them
Wandsnider 1992). As a result, archaeologists may
-Charles Darwin, The Autobiography of need to become accustomed to an abundance of
Charles Darwin, 1809-1882, p. 70 seemingly incompatible social theories, contribut-
ing to the "thousand archaeologies" I previously
S ince the early 1970s, processual archaeol- welcomed (Schiffer 1988:479). Although diversity
ogy's social theory (sensu Schiffer 1988)in social theory is desirable (Knapp 1996), divi-
has suffered many indignities at the hands ofsion of archaeology into antagonistic camps,
critics (for useful discussions, see Lamberg-seemingly incapable of engaging each other in dis-
Karlovsky 1989; Preucel 1991; Trigger 1989; cussions of substantive issues, diminishes the
Yoffee and Sherratt 1993). Even so, processual- integrity of the discipline as a scientific enterprise.
ism-albeit now in many varieties-remains well An alternative pattern of communication can
entrenched in everyday practice, and it is doubtful be envisioned. Instead of caricaturing, misrepre-
that any competing program will be able to dis-senting, or summarily dismissing rival programs,
lodge it and achieve a comparable position of archaeologists might make a diligent effort to
dominance. For the foreseeable future, then, understand
a each other's social theory-maybe
multitude of minority programs, including behav-even build some intellectual bridges. Perhaps
ioral, evolutionary, cognitive, and Marxist archae-because their positions on significant issues of
Michael Brian Schiffer * Department of Anthropology, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721
American Antiquity, 61(4), 1996, pp. 643-662.

Copyright ? by the Society for American Archaeology
643

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644 AMERICAN ANTIQUITY [Vol. 61, No. 4, 1996
social theory lie between today's theoretical

ioral archaeology crystallized as an explicit pro-
extremes, some behavioral archaeologists gramarein the early 1970s at the University of
Arizona
eager to hold discussions with practitioners of (for a history, see Schiffer 1995a).
other programs (Walker et al. 1995:8); Confronted
many even then by a plethora of competing
papers in Expanding Archaeology (Skiboarchaeologies,
et al. J. Jefferson Reid, William Rathje,
and I offered a framework of four interdependent
1995), for example, initiate promising dialogues
(e.g., McGuire 1995; Nielsen 1995; O'Brien and
strategies for reintegrating the discipline (Reid et
Holland 1995b; Orser 1995; Senior 1995; al. 1975; Schiffer 1976:Chapter 1). The founda-
Wylie
tion
1995). Similarly, in the context of historical of this framework is a new definition of
case
archaeology as "the study of the relationships
studies, I have already exploited common ground
between human behavior and material culture in
between behavioral and postprocessual archae-
all times and all places" (Reid et al. 1975:864).
ologies for explaining instances of behavioral
The discipline, we maintained, had outgrown its
change pertaining to portable radios (Schiffer
traditional
1991) and early electric automobiles (Schiffer et boundaries and was reconfiguring as a
al. 1994). Surprisingly, both studies alsonew science-a behavioral archaeology.
have
Behavioral archaeologists, depending on their
evolutionary features in that they treat, diachroni-
cally, the interplay between variation andinterests,
selec- ask idiographic (historical) or nomo-
thetic
tion processes (more on this below). Although (general) questions about the relationships
between people and artifacts (Reid et al. 1975;
handling unconventional subjects, the portable
radio and automobile researches nonethelessSchiffer
raise 1975a). Although behavioral theorists
hopes that additional work along these linestend to privilege nomothetic questions (e.g.,
might
Schiffer 1975a, 1976, 1988, 1992), if only to
lead eventually to a more integrated discipline
(see also Duke 1995). make up for their profound neglect elsewhere in
An explicit experiment in communication,thethis
discipline, much behavioral archaeology has
been idiographic. Behavioralists emphatically see
paper examines some relationships between behav-
no conflict
ioral and evolutionary archaeologies (both are between history and science (Reid
1995;
defined below). That there may be important Schiffer 1995b).
rela-
tionships between these two programs has already its brief existence, behavioral archaeol-
During
ogy's main nomothetic contributions have been to
been suggested by several evolutionists (O'Brien
the realms of reconstruction theory and method-
and Holland 1995a: 178-179, 193, 1995b; O'Brien
ological
et al. 1994). Needless to say, the structure and con-theory (sensu Schiffer 1988). This should
not
tent of the following discussions reflect but one be surprising given that processual archaeol-
behavioral archaeologist's perspective. ogy had failed to lay a firm foundation for infer-
ence; without the tools for creating a behavioral
The relationships examined between evolution-
past,
ary and behavioral archaeologies are of three kinds.the prospects for a behavioral archaeology
First, areas of potential common ground are seemed
set bleak. In view of the improvement of
forth; possible shared tenets turn out to be surpris- in recent years, however, some behav-
inference
ingly numerous and significant. Second, theioralists
paper now assign to the creation of social the-
ory a higher priority (Schiffer 1992, 1995b;
treats the assumptions of evolutionary archaeology
Walker et al. 1995). Although progress remains
that seem incompatible with behavioral principles.
modest,
It is suggested that some evolutionary positions are behavioral archaeology nonetheless
offers a distinctive conceptual framework that can
insupportable and, more importantly, are actually
inform the development of new social theory.
peripheral-if not detrimental-to evolutionary
Behavioralists seek to explain variability and
archaeology. And third, possible synergies between
the two programs are explored. I begin with change
a brief in human behavior by emphasizing the
overview of both programs. study of relationships between people and their
artifacts. By focusing on people-artifact interac-
Behavioral Archaeology tions, behavioralists have crafted a framework of
concepts, principles, and procedures for investi-
An outgrowth of processual archaeology, behav-

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Schiffer] RELATIONS BETWEEN BEHAVIORAL AND EVOLUTIONARY ARCHAEOLOGIES 645
gating human behavior whenever and wherever areitcreated that can initiate further change
processes. As a result, much behavioral change
occurs. (For an introduction to behavioral archae-
ology, see Schiffer [1995c]; for a concise codifi-
occurs in response to the (often unintended) conse-
cation of fundamental tenets, from which much of
quences of previous artifact and activity replace-
this section is adapted, see Schiffer [1995d]; ments
for (Schiffer 1979, 1992:Chapter 7).
recent developments, see Longacre and Skibo Change processes, which involve selection
between alternative artifacts or alternative activi-
[1994] and Skibo et al. [1995].) In the following
synopsis, I highlight the tenets of behavioral
ties, entail compromises among performance
archaeology most relevant for engaging the characteristics
evo- and interactions (McGuire and
lutionary program. Schiffer 1983; Schiffer and Skibo 1987); patterns
As the name implies, behavioralists lay stress
in these compromises are influenced by specific
on studying behavior: what people actually did or
behavioral factors of lifeway and social organiza-
do (Nielsen 1995; Reid 1995; Walker et al. 1995).
tion (McGuire and Schiffer 1983; Schiffer 1992;
The basic units of behavior are activities, defined
Schiffer and Skibo 1987, 1997). These compro-
mises can be illuminated, in the case of artifact
as the interaction between elements (e.g., human,
artifact, animal), at least one of which is an by use of performance matrices, which fur-
types,
energy source (Rathje and Schiffer 1982:Chapter
nish explicit comparisons in relation to activity-
3; Schiffer 1992; Schiffer and Skibo 1997). Thus,
specific performance characteristics (Schiffer
artifacts are an integral part of human activities,
1995b; Schiffer and Skibo 1987).
from a marriage ceremony to rebuilding a diesel Far from being autonomous, individual activi-
engine. After all, a white wedding gown ties
is asin a behavioral system (e.g., a society) are
essential to a traditional church weddingconnected,
as directly or indirectly, to all other activ-
wrenches are to tearing down an engine; in ities
the by movements of people and artifacts. The
absence of either, crucial interactions wouldstructured
be relationships between activities estab-
adversely affected. lish the causal pathways along which behavioral
The artifacts (and even people) taking part inchanges
an travel (Schiffer 1979; Schiffer and Skibo
1997). Change processes can also restructure
activity have, by virtue of their material composi-
tion and form, specific properties that affect their
relationships between activities.
suitability for interacting in particular ways. These
The life history of artifacts (and of people) is a
activity-specific capabilities are known as perfor-
favored framework for organizing behavioral
mance characteristics and can pertain to any studies
kind (Rathje and Schiffer 1982:Chapter 4;
of interaction-mechanical, thermal, visual, etc.
Schiffer and Skibo 1997; Walker 1995; Walker et
(Nielsen 1995; Schiffer and Skibo 1987, 1997).al. 1995). Life histories based on groups of
Activities are usually carried out, often recur-
related activities or processes (e.g., procurement,
rently, by people in behavioral components-a manufacture, and use) are known as flow models
society's units of organization. Behavioral compo-
(Schiffer 1972, 1976), whereas those focused on
nents, such as households and communities, individual
con- activities are termed behavioral chains
sist of people, places, and artifacts (Rathje(Schiffer
and 1975b, 1976). Developmental cycles
Schiffer 1982:Chapter 2; Schiffer 1992:Chapter 1).
(Goody 1971), another organizing framework, are
Because each kind of artifact tends toward the definable stages of existence in the life histo-
uniqueness in its set of properties and performanceries of behavioral components (Rathje and
characteristics, there are few true "functionally
Schiffer 1982:Chapter 4; Reid and Shimada 1982;
equivalent" artifact types (Schiffer 1979).
Rock 1974).
Activities, which vary in energy sources, other ele- Behavioral archaeology's basic concepts and
ments, and interaction patterns, also usually lackprinciples establish a basis for formulating
exact functional equivalents (Schiffer 1979). Thus,
researchable questions about variability and
when one kind of artifact replaces another in an change. Above all, this theoretical framework
activity or when one kind of activity replaces emphasizes that behavioral or societal change is
another in a behavioral component, "disjunctions"
change in activities.

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The explanation of behavioral variability and O'Brien and Holland 1990:45). The term
1993:27;
change depends on having available countless
"selectionist" also identifies the process-natural
new experimental laws and theories; the fashion-
selection-that these latter archaeologists believe
ing of these principles, while an effort still
to in
be its
most important for explaining evolutionary
infancy (Schiffer 1995b), has enjoyed some suc- In this paper, selectionist and evolutionist
change.
cess (contra Dunnell 1992a, 1992b). are used interchangeably.
Behavioralists, however, cannot supply off-the-Evolution for the selectionist is the differential
shelf answers to explanatory questions. Rather,
persistence of discrete variants (Dunnell 1980:38).
we have a framework that, when realized Commonly,
through variants are alternative varieties of an
varied research strategies-e.g., experimental
artifact class that are winnowed over time by
archaeology, ethnoarchaeology, prehistory,selection
histor-processes. Selectionists stress that arti-
ical archaeology, and history-can contribute,
fact variants can affect the biological fitness of
principle by principle, to building a newhuman
behav-organisms; artifacts having such effects are
ioral science (Walker et al. 1995). "functional," whereas artifacts neutral with respect
to fitness are "stylistic" (Dunnell 1978a, 1980).
Evolutionary Archaeology However, many selectionist studies focus on the
"replicative
Evolutionary archaeology has its proximate roots success" of artifact types rather than
on the reproductive success of individuals
in the writings of Robert C. Dunnell, especially
(Leonard and Jones 1987:214; O'Brien and
his 1980 paper in Advances in Archaeological
Method and Theory (see also Dunnell Holland
1978a, 1990; but see Neff 1992:156). The con-
1982, 1989). Beginning in the mid-1980s,cept of extended phenotype (Dawkins 1982),
contri-
which readily encompasses human activities and
butions to the literature of evolutionary archaeol-
ogy have come from many investigators, artifacts
some of(Jones et al. 1995; Neff 1992; O'Brien
and Holland 1995b; O'Brien et al. 1994), permits
whom, especially in the context of case studies,
are elaborating and broadening the programselectionists
(e.g., to integrate evolutionary concerns
the papers in Teltser 1995a). Although thewith the reality that the archaeological record is
discus-
sions below treat mostly Dunnell's seminal for-artifacts, "the hard parts of the behavioral
mainly
mulation of evolutionary archaeology,segmentrecentof phenotypes" (Dunnell 1989:44).
contributions-some seemingly more behav- Explanation consists in showing how specific
ioral-are also consulted. factors of the selective environment-usually the
natural environment-were responsible for the
The evolutionary program rests on the claim
differential
that Darwinian theory has not been properly or persistence of competing variants
(Leonard and Reed 1993:650). The selectionist,
widely applied to cultural phenomena (Dunnell
1980). This contention, however, does not sitthen,
well strives to account for the unique contin-
gency-bound successes and failures of artifact
with the processual archaeologists who also con-
classes (and other traits of the extended human
sider themselves to be evolutionists or regard their
phenotype) in the history of a locality or region
work as evolutionary (for examples of the latter,
(Dunnell 1980:39; Neff 1993:28).
see Johnson and Earle 1987; Sanders et al. 1979;
A distinction of signal importance is that
Spencer 1990). Similarly, archaeologists whose
research is informed by behavioral ecology orbetween
evo- processes of variety-generation and vari-
ety-selection (Dunnell 1980:39), evolutionists
lutionary ecology also wear the Darwinian mantle
(e.g., Bettinger 1991; O'Connell and Hawkes emphasize the latter, showing little interest in
1981, 1984; Simms 1987). Perhaps appreciatinginvestigating the sources of new variants.
Selectionists take pains to distinguish their pro-
that their program is but one of several maintain-
gram from others in archaeology that are seem-
ing an evolutionary stance, proponents of evolu-
ingly evolutionary. For example, neoevolutionary
tionary archaeology have taken recently to calling
themselves "selectionists" (e.g., Graves andstage models, which posit transformations of entire
Ladefoged 1995:160; Jones et al. 1995:16; societies from tribe to chiefdom or chiefdom to
Leonard and Reed 1993:648; Neff 1992:179, state, are dismissed as Spencerian or Lamarckian,

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RELATIONS BETWEEN BEHAVIORAL AND EVOLUTIONARY ARCHAEOLOGIES 647
Schiffer]
not Darwinian (e.g., Dunnell 1980:40). Similarly, 3. In the explanation of variation and change,
the adaptive-systems models built by processual- culture is not treated as a causal agent (Braun
ists and sometimes by behavioralists are also heav- 1991:427; O'Brien and Holland 1992:37;
ily criticized as being non-Darwinian because they Ramenofsky 1995:137; Schiffer 1995a; Walker et
conflate variety-generation and variety-selection al. 1995:2-4). The adjective "cultural" merely
processes (e.g., Leonard and Jones 1987:200-201). means learned, as in cultural transmission;
These "adaptationist" scenarios assume that sys- human, as in cultural phenomena; or societal, as
tems change as a result of people intentionally in cross-cultural regularity. Selectionists should
solving problems, steering their behavior in ways take no exception to this statement, but some
that are "adaptive," such as intensifying subsis- behavioralists might be rather reluctant to jettison
tence in response to demographic or environmental anthropology's most sacred cow.
stress. In recent case studies, however, some osten- 4. The phenomenological world of interest is
sibly selectionist models closely resemble adapta- variation and change in human behavior or soci-
tionist scenarios (e.g., Graves and Ladefoged 1995; eties. Despite Dunnell's (1980:48) occasional
Leonard 1989; Leonard and Reed 1993). When acknowledgment that "human behavior" is "the
processualists and behavioralists use these latter principal subject matter," some selectionists may
case studies to obtain a quick peek into the evolu- contest this tenet, which is expressed in systemic-
tionary program, they are apt to become confused, context terms, because they believe that their
wondering what is different or distinctive about realm is the archaeological record (Teltser
selectionism. 1995b:3). Operating analytically in the systemic
context, however, requires behavioral reconstruc-
In Search of Common Ground
tion or inference, which in the abstract is anath-
ema
Because neither evolutionary archaeology to many selectionists (e.g., Dunnell 1978a,
nor
behavioral archaeology is a homogeneous1978b,
pro- 1989, 1992a, 1992b). In practice, however,
gram, the search for common ground between selectionists make behavioral inferences and seek
them is an exercise fraught with peril. to explain change in systemic-context phenomena
Practitioners of each will doubtless take excep-(see "On Behavioral Inference" below). As this
tion to some statements enumerated in this sec- becomes generally appreciated, selectionists may
tion. Nonetheless, the identification of widely-if
accept variation and change in human behavior or
not universally-shared assumptions, tenets, and societies as the focus of inquiry.
principles establishes a starting point for further5. Evolutionary change is regarded as the dif-
discussions. The following 11 statements repre- ferential persistence of discrete variants.
sent a first approximation of the common ground.Selectionists insist that all change be treated in
this way, because any other move forsakes a
1. That both programs espouse a scientific
epistemology is an uncontroversial claim: we are Darwinian perspective (Dunnell 1980). Doubtless
influenced by selectionists, some behavioralists
scientists striving to explain empirical phenomena
by explicitly employing well warranted theories have come to appreciate the value of treating
and laws. Because scientific activity involves not
change as the differential persistence of discrete
variants (e.g., Schiffer 1991; Schiffer and Skibo
only the explicit use of theories and laws but also
their origination and evaluation, behavioralists 1987, 1997; Schiffer et al. 1994); yet, the possi-
have been energetic in establishing new princi- bility is kept open that other kinds of change also
occur-perhaps even some that are transforma-
ples; selectionists, however, have been disinclined
thus far to ask or answer nomothetic questions tion-like.
(see discussions below). 6. To explain evolutionary change, the investi-
2. Scientists are also permitted to pose histori-
gator situates the competition between alternative
cal questions. Both programs attach importance variants within a specific selective environment,
to these questions and emphasize that scientific showing how the replication (or reproduction) of
methods are appropriate for evaluating our tenta-each kind of variant was favored or disadvantaged
tive answers-i.e., models and hypotheses. by virtue of its properties and performance char-

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acteristics (e.g., Maxwell 1995; Neff 1992, 1993;

(e.g., Dunnell 1989:39; Teltser 1995b:6) and also
O'Brien et al. 1994). In accounting for differential
seems compatible with behavioral archaeology.
persistence in these terms, specific historical
Behavioralists might add that explanations for
explanations offered by selectionists and behav-
variety-generation and variety-selection processes
ioralists converge-at least structurally-to a require different bodies of theory (for
are apt to
further
considerable extent (compare, for example, Braun discussion, see "Seeking Synergies"
1983; O'Brien et al. 1994; Schiffer and Skibo
below).
1987), as can data requirements (O'Brien and
Holland 1995b). Incompatibilities
7. Behavior and artifacts are part of the human
Although the common ground between evolution-
phenotype. So long as behavior is defined as
ary and behavioral archaeologies may be appre-
activities (specific matter-energy interactions
ciable, there are also some formidable
between people, artifacts, etc.), this statement
incompatibilities. Surprisingly, the selectionist
should be acceptable to most practitioners in both
tenets that cannot be assimilated by behavioralists
programs (compare O'Brien and Holland
have1995
nothing to do with evolutionary theory per
with Walker et al. 1995). se. Indeed, a case can be made that these selec-
8. Artifacts play diverse roles in activities,
tionist positions are also at odds with modern evo-
involving performance-based interactions ofbiology. The argument developed in this
lutionary
many kinds (Braun 1995; Nielsen 1995; Schiffer section is simple: the parts of selectionism that
and Skibo 1997). This statement is the stock and
behavioralists find most unpalatable are without
trade of the behavioralist but should occasion few foundation, and, moreover, these ideas actually
objections from selectionists. undermine efforts to establish an evolutionary
9. In comparison with genetic transmission of archaeology.
variation, cultural transmission involves different
Theory and Model Building in Science
processes and mechanisms, and their understand-
ing may require new laws and theories (Dunnell From a behavioral perspective, it appears that
1978a: 198, 200). To behavioralists, this statement selectionists have unusual views about theory and
is self-evident, but selectionists have been slow to model building. For example, according to
follow up its implications with appropriate nomo- Dunnell (1989:36), one grand theory generates all
thetic research. of a field's hypotheses and links all of its explana-
10. The life-history framework is useful for tions (Dunnell 1982:5). Apparently, then, evolu-
sorting out some causes of variation. In behav- tionary theory alone can solve archaeology's
ioral archaeology, studying the life histories of myriad explanatory problems. Although a few
artifacts, people, and behavioral components is fields do have grand theories, such as Darwinian
fundamental (Rathje and Schiffer 1982; Schiffer evolution in biology and general relativity in
1992), and new applications appear frequently physics, these theories are but a tiny part of the
(e.g., Schiffer and Skibo 1997; Walker 1995). nomothetic products of those sciences-the part
Implicitly selectionists employ this framework in most visible to people on the outside. On the
their recognition, for example, that lithic blanks, inside, as textbooks and journal articles demon-
preforms, and bifaces were not competitive vari- strate, are countless other theories and experimen-
ants but stood in ontogenetic (developmental) tal laws (sensu Nagel 1961; see also Salmon
1982), many-if not most-exhibiting indepen-
relations to one another. There is also interest in
dence from the grand theory. Even in biology,
tracking the life histories of phenotypic features
(O'Brien and Holland 1992:52). Whether selec- explanations for mitosis and DNA replication are
tionists are willing to extend the life-historynot deducible from evolutionary theory, and in
physics general relativity cannot explain
framework to other classes of variants (e.g.,
behavioral components) remains to be seen. thermionic emission or the effects of doping on
semiconductors. Each of these phenomena is
11. It is important to distinguish between vari-
ety-generation and variety-selection processes. made intelligible by process-specific principles.
This tenet is widely championed by selectionistsThe actual structure of theory in any science, then,

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is a multitude of principles-ranging from simple

ment's operation is based on principles other than
to complex, concrete to abstract, and narrowthetokinetic theory. In addition, from the kinetic
broad-that often deal with unrelated phenomena.
theory one can deduce neither mercury's coeffi-
(On the structure of theory in archaeology,cient
see of thermal expansion nor a gas's infrared
Schiffer 1988.) emission spectrum. In short, scientific theories do
Another curious view is that laws and theories not articulate immediately with the empirical
are true by definition. Dunnell (1982:16) argues world (Sober 1984:73); interposed between theo-
that ries and observations are rules of correspondence,
Laws, or theoretical laws, are rational, lower-level principles, and measuring instruments
ideational constructs that ultimately are deduc-that are based on still other theories and laws
tions ... from primitive definitions. They are(Nagel 1961; Tschauner 1996).
always true by virtue of their construction and
are not contingency bound.
Failure to appreciate the complex, principle-
rich apparatus that links theories to observations
The example he provides, d = vt (distance can lead to unhelpful advice on building archae-
ological theory and models. To wit, Dunnell
equals velocity times time), does conform to these
criteria because, in fact, it is not a scientific(1980:88)
law asserts that a theory's variables "can-
or theory at all, but a mathematical law (onnot
thebe defined in behavioral terms." Going fur-
distinction, see Salmon 1982). The position that
ther he claims, "If archaeologists are going to
theory is immune to empirical falsification employ evolutionary theory, they must rewrite it
(Dunnell 1982:16) manifestly contradicts scien-in terms of variables that are empirical in the
tific practice; as Sober (1984:82) notes, "theoret-
[archaeological] record" (Dunnell 1980:88). If
ical claims ought to be testable." The most this recipe were followed literally, then a theory
abstract and general theories, of course, may be be precluded from implicating mecha-
would
difficult to test--even today, Einstein's theory of and processes, which are decidedly behav-
nisms
ioral phenomena unobservable in the static
general relativity is still undergoing evaluation-
yet they are potentially testable (Nagel 1961).
archaeological record. At best, archaeologists
would be reduced to crafting relationships
Finally, I note that the concept of"true by defini-
tion" is itself problematic (e.g., Sober 1984:62).
between measurements on sherds, chips of stone,
In view of the contention that theories are def-
and so on-scarcely the stuff of theory (but see
initionally true, it is surprising that theoriesO'Brien
are and Holland 1992); at worst, archaeolo-
also said to have a substantial empirical content.
gists would be operating in the murky world of
According to Dunnell (1989:44), a discipline's merged systemic and archaeological contexts (on
grand theory must "generate its own data" and the
the necessity of keeping these contexts conceptu-
ally and analytically distinct, see Reid 1985,
units specified in the theory must be "directly
measurable in the phenomenological world"1995). In the final analysis, evolutionary theory
(Dunnell 1982:7, 1994:34). A view more gener-
itself cannot be rewritten in archaeological-con-
ally held in science is that the entities, mecha-
text terms: sherds were not part of anyone's phe-
nisms, or processes postulated by a theory have
notype (unless reused), yet a cooking pot-a
no immediate empirical content, for they are often
systemic-context entity operationalized through
behavioral inference-was.
unobservable. To operationalize or test a theory,
one employs appropriate units and instruments
The selectionist prohibition against framing
models and theories in behavioral terms is out of
for measuring the variables that it implicates.
These instruments (and the rules of correspon-step with practice in modern evolutionary biol-
dence that link them to the theory) involveogy.stillIn the latter discipline, theories and models
other laws and theories. For example, in testing
incorporate behavioral variables on a wide range
the kinetic theory of gases, which involves invisi-
of systemic phenomena, such as predator-prey
ble entities called molecules, one has to measure
interactions, mating patterns, foraging behavior,
a gas's temperature. Temperature can be mea- and maintenance of territories, none of which is
sured, for example, with a mercury thermometerempirical in the paleontological and paleoenvi-
or infrared thermometry; in either case the instru-
ronmental records. It could not be otherwise; after

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all, "behavior is at once cause and consequence of

evolutionary." Behavioral reconstruction is not
evolution" (Plotkin 1988:8). science (Dunnell 1980:78, 1982:20, 1989:43,
In accord with evolutionary biologists,1992a:87),
and in but a purveyor of "just-so stories"
(Dunnell 1982:20) that should be abandoned
contrast to the selectionist position, behavioralists
maintain that theories, models, and (Dunnell explana- 1989:45).
tions-even those offered by selectionists-must The decisive dismissal of inference contradicts
be framed in behavioral terms. Ironically, many thoughtful works in archaeological episte-
support
for this claim can be found in Dunnell's (1989)
mology (e.g., Fritz 1972; Patrik 1985; Salmon
own effort to build an evolutionary model. 1982;
InSchiffer
that 1976; Sullivan 1978; Wylie 1985)
paper he seeks to explain the selection for and"waste"
also ignores the countless, well-established
behavior, specifically the Woodland mortuaryinferences that have greatly enhanced the under-
cults of the eastern United States that leftstanding
behind of past societies worldwide. What is
obtrusive burial mounds. The variables more,and para-modern evolutionary biology could not
meters of the model include "mean carrying exist without paleoenvironmental and paleoeco-
capacity," "no change or difference in subsis-
logical reconstruction, not to mention a host of
inferences about the behavior of particular taxa.
tence," "populations in equilibrium at different
Because selectionist models are actually
sizes," "shortfalls in productivity," "intensifica-
tion" of subsistence, "waste-type behavior,"expressed
andin behavioral terms, they do require
"mortuary cult" (Dunnell 1989:48). To my inference
knowl- (see also Wylie 1995:207-208).
edge, survey archaeologists never encounter Evidence
a car-that supports this latter claim can be
rying capacity or a waste-type behavior, found
norindo Dunnell's (1989) own explanatory sketch
excavators uncover a productivity shortfall dealing orwith
a "waste" behavior. When treating
mortuary cult. In every instance, thesespecifics
variables of the Woodland case, he is forced to
and parameters are more-or-less behavioral operationalize
(i.e., the model by means of behavioral
systemic context), not-as Dunnell (1980:88) inferences.
pre- Dunnell does not himself construct
scribes-written in terms "that are empiricaltheseininferences
the from archaeological evidence,
record." Other selectionist models invoke vari- but relies mainly on reconstructions proffered by
ables and parameters that are equally systemic other investigators, as in "the nonagricultural sta-
(e.g., Graves and Ladefoged 1995; Leonard 1989;tus of the Woodland associated with the mortuary
Leonard and Reed 1993; O'Brien et al. 1994). cult" (1989:49). Sometimes, without any evi-
Despite rhetoric to the contrary, selectionists build dence or argument, he makes assertions about
models almost as behavioral as behavioralists. past behavior, such as that the mortuary cult "fre-
Because theories and models are formulated in quently entails the laborious construction of
behavioral terms, the investigator is obligated to earthen mounds and the manufacture and disposal
forge links, through measurement, to empirical of vast quantities of goods, many of which are
units in the archaeological record. This linkage costly imports" (1989:48). Dunnell's study of
process is called inference, and it brings us to a waste is indicative: every selectionist model can
second incompatibility. be shown to rest, implicitly or explicitly, on a net-
work of behavioral inferences (for other exam-
On Behavioral Inference
ples, see Graves and Ladefoged 1995; Leonard
Many selectionists deny the need for behavioral 1989; Leonard and Reed 1993; O'Brien and
inference and denigrate as unscientific the activi- Holland 1992; O'Brien et al. 1994).
ties of archaeologists who reconstruct the past. Despite the selectionists' anti-reconstructionist
These efforts are labeled "reconstructionism," rhetoric, evaluation of their models patently
which Dunnell (1978a:194) elevates to the status requires behavioral inference, and in this respect
of a paradigm, attributing its full flowering to evolutionary archaeology does not differ from
processual and behavioral archaeologies. behavioral, processual, or postprocessual archae-
According to Dunnell (1978a:195), "behavioral ologies (on the latter's dependence on behavioral
reconstructions ... cannot be the foundation of an inference, see Duke [1995], Saitta [1992], and
approach that professes to be both scientific and Tschauner [1996])-or evolutionary biology

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Schiffer]
(e.g., Thomason 1995). In view of the contradic- tional principles, he is alluding to laws of chem-
tion between their pronouncements and practice istry and physics, not behavioral laws built by
on inference (Watson et al. 1984:255-256), evo- archaeologists (e.g., Dunnell 1992b).
lutionary archaeologists cannot credibly maintain One reason for the reluctance of evolutionists to
any longer that reconstruction is defective and call attention to functional and behavioral princi-
unscientific. Indeed, until selectionists take ples may stem from a defective argument they raise
archaeological inference seriously by treating it against reconstruction. It is asserted that such prin-
explicitly and adopting modern methodology, the ciples presuppose that "behavior cannot change"
goals of their program would appear to be out of (Dunnell 1989:44; cf. Dunnell 1992a:81,
reach. Fortunately, in several recent selectionist 1992b:213; O'Brien and Holland 1995b; Neff
papers, there is modest movement toward explic- 1992). Because behavior is "continuously chang-
itly countenancing behavioral inference (e.g., ing," laws of human behavior "are structurally
Jones et al. 1995; O'Brien and Holland 1995b; impossible" (Dunnell 1992b:213). Since behav-
Teltser 1995b). ioralists above all appreciate that behaviors do
Closely related to the claims that theories and change, the ability to establish general principles
models should not be built in behavioral terms must rest on a basis other than the belief in behav-
and that reconstruction of past behavior is to ioral
be stasis.
avoided is the selectionist position on functional In their own version of uniformitarianism,
behavioralists
principles and actualistic studies, a third point of argue that certain behavioral
incompatibility. processes-such as boiling food in a ceramic ves-
sel over an open fire or disposal of secondary
Functional Principles and Actualist Studies
refuse in cities-although not universal, exhibit
Selectionists downplay the importance of func- some regularities whenever and wherever they
tional principles in specific explanations and occur
dis- (Schiffer 1975c, 1978, 1996; Skibo
1992:25-28; Walker et al. 1995). The identification
regard the actualistic sources of these principles.
Dunnell notes that ecology and evolution are dis-
of a behavioral process enables the investigator to
seek or create the "behavioral contexts" (sensu
tinct bodies of theory, the former concerned with
Walker et al. 1995:4) where nomothetic research
functional relationships and mechanism, the latter
with historical explanations (Dunnell 1980:36;
may lead to the recognition of regularities (such as
1982:12). Both bodies of theory, he does grant,
correlates and c-transforms). Boundary conditions
"are commonly intermingled in particular expla-
of behavioral processes enumerate the identical
nations" (Dunnell 1980:36, cf. 39). Indeed, spe-
characteristics among seemingly dissimilar-often
cific evolutionary explanations in biology culturally
are diverse-empirical phenomena. For
utterly dependent on functional and behavioral example, the McKellar principle specifies that in
principles supplied by actualistic studies, includ-
frequently maintained activity areas, only small
artifacts remain behind as primary refuse
ing experiments and ethology (Endler 1986; Krebs
and Davies 1981:28-29). Moreover, without prin-(McKellar 1983; Schiffer 1976:188-189,
ciples produced by functional anatomy, ethology,
1987:62-63). The behavioral process of activity-
and behavioral ecology, modern evolutionary biol-
area maintenance is bounded by the term "in fre-
ogy would be explanatorily impotent. A close
quently maintained activity areas." In these activity
examination of selectionist studies also reveals use
areas, and only in these activity areas, does this
behavioral regularity hold. It holds, however,
of many functional and behavioral principles, and
some are even explicit (e.g., Graves and despite temporal and spatial differences in artifact
Ladefoged 1995). Given that the construction of types, in kinds of activities, and in the nature of
selectionist explanations requires such principles,activity areas. (The threshold size of residual pri-
it is troublesome that nowhere in the selectionist mary refuse is expected to vary with situational
factors such as the maintenance technology
literature can one find a discussion on the place of
the archaeological equivalent of behavioral ecol-employed, permeability of the substrate, and the
ogy with its actualistic, nomothetic emphasis. nature of the refuse [Schiffer 1976:189, 1987:63].)
When Dunnell does mention the necessity of func- The concepts of behavioral process and boundary

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ary biology
conditions can help us to resolve the apparent para- precludes framing theories and mod-
dox between the constancy of behavioralels in behavioral terms, prohibits making infer-
regulari-
ences
ties (and the principles that describe them) and about
the the past, or rules out the conduct of
inconstancy of specific behaviors actualistic,
(cf. Hull nomothetic studies. These views in
1988:463). fact distance selectionism from productive
It should now be clear why the theories and research strategies, practiced by behavioralists
experimental laws yielded by nomothetic research and evolutionary biologists alike, that could
in actualistic contexts are seldom, if ever, "univer- improve the evolutionary program. Moreover, by
sal": behavioral processes can have very limited maintaining tenets that behavioralists and proces-
temporal and spatial distributions. Thus, principles sualists regard as clearly wrong, selectionists
describing these processes often exhibit a highly alienate the very archaeologists who ought to be
circumscribed generality. But this is no cause for most receptive to their insights on evolution.
concern since the behavioralist is content to devise Selectionists may be well advised to cast off the
and employ principles having quite confining conceptual baggage that has so burdened the pro-
boundary conditions-as long as they are useful gram (see also Wylie 1995).
for answering research questions.
Seeking Synergies
To achieve anything like the richly textured,
historically contingent explanations crafted by Building on the common ground between evolu-
evolutionary biologists, selectionists will need to tionary and behavioral archaeologies, and exploit-
employ countless functional and behavioral princi- ing ideas from both programs, I now attempt to
ples (see Sober 1984). What is more, to create the indicate, with examples, how the study of behav-
new principles that an evolutionary archaeology ioral (or evolutionary) change might be enhanced.
requires, selectionists will have to ask their own
Clarifying Selection Processes
nomothetic questions in making full use of the dis-
cipline's actualistic research strategies (e.g., exper- In using the term "natural selection," Darwin
imental archaeology and ethnoarchaeology-see called attention to a kind of selection different
Schiffer 1978; Schiffer et al. 1994; Skibo 1992). from that practiced, for example, by plant and ani-
In the very recent selectionist literature, some mal breeders. In natural selection, competing
investigators have begun to find roles for experi- organisms are winnowed by environmental fac-
mental and ethnoarchaeological findings (e.g., tors, such as predators and temperature extremes.
Dunnell 1995:42; Dunnell and Feathers 1991; Today the term "cultural selection" is in vogue to
Dunnell et al. 1994; Maxwell 1995; Neff designate processes internal to a human popula-
1992:150; O'Brien and Holland 1990:60, tion (e.g., Durham 1991:165), whereas natural
selection is retained for selective agents in the
1995:184; O'Brien et al. 1994). Moreover, in rec-
natural environment. Evolutionary archaeologists
ognizing that performance characteristics of arti-
fact types affect their replicative successhave in discussed the necessity of a concept like cul-
tural selection, but no consensus has emerged (for
particular selective environments, a few selection-
various viewpoints, see Braun 1995:132-133;
ists themselves are beginning to carry out experi-
Dunnell 1980:53, 63, 1989:41; Leonard and Jones
ments (e.g., Dunnell and Feathers 1991; O'Brien
1987:211; O'Brien and Holland 1992:45, 48,
et al. 1994). Perhaps one day soon selectionist
practice will include even ethnoarchaeology.1995:178; Rindos 1984, 1989).
In considering cultural selection, Dunnell
Discussion
evinces skepticism while asking,
As originally formulated, the evolutionary pro-
Is there a point in human evolutionary history
at which selection does become an internal cul-
gram contains a number of tenets that contradict
tural matter independent of environmental con-
important parts of behavioral (and processual)
straint and change becomes transformational? I
archaeologies. Try as I might, however, think
I failnot,
toor more precisely, I think it would be
appreciate why any of these ideas is necessary forto assume so [Dunnell 1980:65].
premature
an evolutionary archaeology. Nothing in
Darwinian theory per se nor in modern evolution- Internal selection is not a process Dunnell is

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Schiffer]
eager to embrace because it implies to him that cycles" of structures (David 1971), sequences of
change is transformational, no longer the differ- ceramic reuse (Deal and Hagstrum 1995), stages
ential persistence of discrete variants. However, of household development (Schiffer et al. 1981),
Dunnell furnishes no argument showing that and growth-related alterations in community
internal selection must be transformational; I sug- organization (Wills and Leonard 1994). The pos-
gest that it need not be. sible occurrence of non-ontogenetic transforma-
In demonstrating that internal selection is tions of one variant into another is, for now, best
compatible with a Darwinian view of change, one left an open question.
first needs appropriate ways to conceptualize both
Appropriate Units and Scales of Selection
the entities being selected and the selection
process. Drawing inspiration from Hull's (1988) A question following immediately from the previ-
expansive view of selection, I define a population ous discussion is, Which populations of variants
as any collection of potentially competing vari- should be the foci of evolutionary study? In selec-
ants. The differential persistence of variants is tionist archaeology, this question is framed as one
governed by the population's selective environ- of scale. Although Dunnell (1980:53) notes that
ment, which exerts selective pressures. Clearly, if selection goes on "at a variety of different scales,"
a population is internal to a human society, the he does not discuss scales other than those of the
selective environment may also be internal. For individual organism and the cultural system as a
example, the population of all condoms being whole; he also doubts that natural selection can be
offered for sale in the United States today has a effective above the individual organism (1980:55)
selective environment that includes condom-pur- until "the appearance of complex society"
chasing activities-an environment internal to (1980:66; see also Wenke 1981). In short, the
U.S. society. In contrast, a population's selective scale problem remains essentially unresolved
environment may consist mainly of external, non- (Dunnell 1989:39, 41, 1995). Another rendering
cultural processes. An example is a community's of the question is, What are the appropriate units
population of wild-animal procurement activities, of selection (Dunnell 1995; Teltser 1995b)? This
which are subject to selection, for example, by the question, too, lacks definitive answers at present,
abundance and accessibility of game. One can even in evolutionary biology (Hull 1988; Lloyd
even conceive of populations that undergo both 1988; Sober 1984; Williams 1992). It is clear,
internal and external selective pressures, such as a however, that modern evolutionary biologists
neolithic village's agricultural activities. embrace and study evolutionary change in diverse
None of these processes need be called "cul- units at many scales (e.g., Dawkins 1982:113).
tural" selection or "natural" selection. This distinc- As in evolutionary biology, one can find in
tion perhaps had utility in the nineteenth century,behavioral archaeology the employment of a
but it is not useful today in the study of cultural bewildering array of units along with analyses
phenomena. Of transcendent importance is the conducted at countless scales. This seemingly
identification of populations, consisting of discreteundisciplined approach reflects the recognition
variants, and the specific selective pressures to that the evolution of cultural phenomena occurs
which such populations are subject. Selection is simultaneously at a great many scales. This comes
selection, regardless of the cultural or noncultural about because (1) there is a vast diversity in kinds
character of environmental agents and mechanisms of units, (2) units occur in multiple hierarchies,
(Hull 1988; O'Brien and Holland 1990). More (3) units are interrelated in complex ways both
importantly, evolution remains the differential per-within and between hierarchies, and (4) there are
sistence of discrete variants; there is no theoreticalhighly varied selection processes, at many scales,
need to embrace transformational change. that affect different kinds of units differentially.
In archaeological cases, however, we will Although the units employed by behavioralists
encounter instances of transformation-like were not adopted with evolutionary questions
change. The bulk of these may result from onto- in mind, they can nonetheless be con-
explicitly
genetic processes, as in lithic reduction sequences
ceived as general kinds of systemic populations,
(Dibble 1995; Goodyear 1974), "devolutionaryparticular examples of which exhibit discrete vari-

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U.S. households are variants based on wealth,

ation; thus, they might be useful in evolutionary
studies. Provisionally I suggest that the general
richness of artifact inventory, generational com-
units of behavioral evolution-i.e., the scales at size of dwelling, degree of residential
position,
which selection takes place-are artifacts, activi-
mobility, and so forth. One can also define sub-
ties, behavioral processes, and behavioral compo-
populations of behavioral components, such as all
nents. Each of these units, of course, is actually a
corporations that manufacture radios, and delin-
eate variants
hierarchy of more specific units; the latter need to (e.g., radio-making companies dif-
be identified in particular research contexts.fering
For in size, output, variety of models
manufactured).
present purposes, I focus on the artifact (including
its constituent parts and assemblies), activity,Having
and specified provisional scales and units
several types of behavioral component. for evolutionary study, I next turn to the problem
Parts are the separately fabricated pieces of or
identifying the selective environment for any
substances of an artifact; examples include aparticular
chert unit. Because behavioralists have done
arrow point and a personal computer's (PC) much
power of their work at the scale of artifacts, espe-
transformer. The assembly is a set of parts that
cially on artifact-activity relations, the following
functions together in an artifact. An arrow discussion
and a is most applicable at that scale.
PC's power supply are examples. Assembly The
is aimmediate selective context can be
defined as all activities in the life history of a
very flexible concept that can be used to designate
the many levels lying between discrete parts and
artifact type; that is, the activities that take pla
artifacts (for another approach to subdividingduring
arti- processes of procurement, manufacture
facts and linking the latter into systems, see
transport, distribution, storage, use, maintenanc
reuse, disposal, etc. These activities exert selec-
Oswalt 1976). The artifact is the set of integrated
tive pressures, and the result is the differenti
assemblies that functions together in an activity;
examples are a bow-and-arrow and a PC. persistence of variants (O'Brien et al. 1994;
Activities are exemplified by hunting with a bow-Schiffer and Skibo 1997). The replicative succes
and-arrow and writing with a PC's word processor.
of a given variant is influenced by its activity-spe
Behavioral components, the "tangible units ofcific-i.e., behaviorally relevant-properties an
a society's social organization" (Schiffer 1992:4),performance characteristics. Selection pressure
are entities that carry out recurrent sets of activi-in the immediate selective context lead to artifacts
ties in patterned locations (Rathje and Schiffer that embody design compromises of many kinds,
1982). There are two main kinds of behavioral as in trade-offs between performance characteris-
components. The first is residentially based, andtics pertaining to manufacture, use, and mainte-
is defined by ever-larger aggregates of people; nance processes (McGuire and Schiffer 1983;
O'Brien and Holland 1990, 1992; O'Brien et al.
from least to most inclusive are households, com-
munities, regional systems, and empires (Rathje1994; Schiffer and Skibo 1987) or even between
and Schiffer 1982; Schiffer 1992:4-6). A second activities within a given process (Schiffer and
type of behavioral component, which has no resi- Skibo 1997). Compromises are necessitated
dential basis, is the task group. In task groups, because, ordinarily, no single design can maxi-
such as work parties, religious congregations, andmize an artifact's entire set of activity-specific
corporations, people come together to perform performance characteristics. An understanding of
activities such as hunting or assembling PCs the patterns in design compromises requires one
(Schiffer 1992:6); they may or may not have ded- to delve, sometimes deeply, into what can be
icated activity areas and facilities. called the extended selective context. Activities,
agents, and mechanisms that make up the
At each scale (or for each type of unit), one can
define populations of discrete variants. For exam-extended selective context are those coupled, by
ple, the population of automobiles being used inflows of energy, artifacts, or people, to activities
the United States today contains numerous vari- in the immediate selective context (on such con-
ants on the basis of manufacturer, body style, nections, see Schiffer 1979, 1992). Examples of
immediate and extended selective contexts are
engine size, type of transmission, luxury appoint-
ments, etc. Similarly, among the population of furnished below.

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Variety-Generating Processes and Stimulated

nents. This process, which is illustrated in some
Variation detail below, can be called stimulated variation
(compare to Neff's [1992:146] discussion of
The literature of selectionist archaeology is largely "directed variation" and Braun's [1991:431] con-
silent about variety-generating processes, perhaps cept of "directed innovation"). Unlike "directed
because Dunnell (1978a:197) in an early paper mutation" (Dawkins 1982:112) and "guided vari-
proclaimed "that the specific origin or invention of ation" (Boyd and Richerson 1985:94-98), which
new elements becomes a trivial inquiry." Dunnell more than flirt with Lamarckian mechanisms of
(1978a: 197) also asserted that invention "is analo- change, the process of stimulated variation in no
gous to mutation in biological systems;" thus, as a way obviates selection; after all, every variant
"random phenomenon" (Dunnell 1980:66), new produced during an instance of stimulated varia-
variants would be beyond prediction (Dunnell tion can be selected against. Selection thus retains
1980:62). Construing variety-generating processes its Darwinian role, but variety-generation
in this manner has, I suggest, hampered the study becomes central to evolutionary inquiry, the study
of behavioral evolution. of its mechanisms and processes far from trivial.
Like modern evolutionary biologists (e.g., The process of stimulated variation can help us
Nitecki 1990), archaeologists should regard varia-to reconcile adaptationist and selectionist views of
tion and its sources as subjects eminently worthy ofbehavioral change. In the adaptationist framework,
explanation. Variation in a population at one pointa changing natural environment or a growing pop-
in time is a consequence of both prior selection and ulation exerts selective pressures that are perceived
variety-generating processes (e.g., invention andas stresses or problems by a cultural system's par-
borrowing). Study of the latter is clearly crucial,ticipants (e.g., Hill 1977). Problem-solving behav-
for the creation of new variants in cultural popula- iors usually lead to an appropriate response, and
tions occurs commonly and sometimes at highthe result is a new adaptation. As selectionists have
rates. Because selection operates on variation, the pointed out, however, the adaptationist model pre-
state of variation at one point in time immediatelysumes that people enjoy a certain omniscience in
constrains the outcome of selection (cf. Dawkinsidentifying significant problems and in forecasting
1982:42-46; Neff 1992:147). Thus, one cannotthe future (e.g., Braun 1991:428, 1995:129; Neff
explain evolutionary change in specific cases with-1992:146; see also Schiffer 1979, 1992:Chapter 7).
out documenting and accounting for large andEssentially transformational, adaptationist expla-
rapid changes in the available variation. New vari-nations conflate processes of variety-generation
ants can arise through an expansion of inventiveand variety-selection (e.g., Jones et al. 1995:17-18;
activities in existing behavioral components,Rindos 1989:3).
through the proliferation of behavioral components An appreciation for stimulated variation allows
undertaking inventive activities, or both. us to assign problem-solving its proper role in evo-
An argument can be made that variety-gener- lution, that of producing new variants (Braun
ating processes work in patterned ways. Some1995:129; Rindos 1989:13-15). Variation created
processes, for example, cause inventions of a par-by this process (and certainly there are others-
ticular kind to cluster markedly in time and space.Basalla [1988]) is not directed by future adaptive
Indeed, the historical and archaeological records needs, but is shaped by contemporaneous phenom-
furnish evidence of rather dramatic-and some- ena in the selective environment, such as an artifact
times predictable-increases in the conduct of
that does not reach behaviorally significant perfor-
variety-generating activities (Hughes 1983;mance levels in an activity or an activity that does
Schiffer 1993). not effectively play its role in a behavioral compo-
One hypothesis to account for some bursts ofnent. If stimulated variation happens to furnish a
variety-generation is that information (as mattervariant that becomes fixed very rapidly, the entire
or energy) coming from changed conditions in evolutionary process may be so telescoped that it
selective contexts can stimulate an increase in appears transformational-when in fact it was not.
inventive activities of behavioral components andThe telescoping of evolutionary processes is exac-
can foster the creation of new behavioral compo-erbated, of course, by the low resolution of most

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archaeological chronologies, which makes itvariation

diffi- that derived from the immediate selec-
tive context
cult to discern rapid expansions and contractions of of radios-particularly use activities.
variation. When not utterly overlooked, suchRadios
varia-at that time were used mainly for ship-to-
tion is likely to be dismissed as mere noiseshore
thatcommunication, which was unreliable,
complicates typology-construction. Aware of this over long distances. In response to the
however,
blatant
problem, archaeologists should now diligently seekperformance deficiencies of transmitters
and receivers,
the fine-grained behavioral variation, predicted by various task groups invested
the process of stimulated variation, that our cul- in the invention of parts and assemblies
resources
ture-historical units so relentlessly obscure (see
that could raise the power of transmitters and
also Plog 1974). boost the sensitivity and selectivity of receivers.
At the present time, neither adaptationist nor This quickly expanding population of inventions
selectionist explanations furnish adequate served as the raw material for selection.
accounts of transformation-like changes in behav- Commercialization involves putting a part,
ior. In stressing that problem solving creates new assembly, or artifact into production and bringing
adaptations, adaptationist explanations are it to market. This process has both variation-
incomplete and misleading because they gloss selecting and variation-generating aspects. On the
over the false starts, partial solutions, unintended one hand, commercialization is undertaken by
consequences, and dead-ends that problem solv- task groups, such as financial and manufacturing
ing also begets. Equally unsatisfactory are selec- corporations, that rigorously winnow inventions,
tionist explanations that ignore large and rapid with only some reaching the marketplace. On the
increases in the variation available to selection. other hand, commercialization generates variation
Perhaps the process of stimulated variation can in the products available for selection by con-
contribute to building a fully general evolutionarysumer activities.
theory that assigns ample weight to both variety- Stimulated variation can also play a role in
generation and variety-selection. commercialization, as another radio example
demonstrates (Schiffer 1991). Figure 1 shows
Some Illustrations
changes in the frequency of U.S. companies man-
ufacturing vacuum-tube radios for the home mar-
To illustrate the concepts just developed, I mainly
exploit my historical research on radios, whichket from 1920 to 1955. (It is assumed that
provides some well-controlled data sets. variation in this population is directly related to
the frequency of different radios commercial-
In studies of artifacts in capitalist industrial
ized.) The graph indicates two dramatic increases
societies, it is useful to examine variety-genera-
tion and variety-selection in relation to threein variation in these behavioral components: (1)
in the early 1920s, beginning in 1922, and (2) in
processes that occur in the life history of a prod-
the late 1940s, commencing in 1946 after the war-
uct type: invention, commercialization, and adop-
caused hiatus in the manufacture of home radios.
tion (e.g., Schiffer 1991; Schiffer et al. 1994).
These processes are examined here in turn. Both episodes, I suggest, came about through
In the invention process, people create proto-stimulated variation. The first burst of variation in
theto
types of parts, assemblies, and artifacts in order population of radio companies resulted from
the to
demonstrate their performance characteristics advent of commercial entertainment broad-
casting,
financiers, entrepreneurs, and manufacturers. A in November 1920, which some entrepre-
neurs
major source of variation, invention is hardly a and manufacturers interpreted as a portent
of profits
random process; rather, inventive activities can be for firms that commercialized home
highly patterned by stimulated variation. Theseradios. The second expansion of variation
stemmed from the movement, into radio (and tele-
strong effects are often discernible as a clustering
vision) manufacture, of electronics companies
in time and space of similar inventions. For exam-
seeking new products and new markets after the
ple, just after the turn of the last century, inven-
tions proliferated in the parts and assembliescessation
that of wartime production. With pent-up
demand for consumer products after the priva-
went into radio transmitters and receivers (Aitken
1976, 1985). This was an instance of stimulatedtions of the Great Depression and World War II,

200.24.17.12 on Sun, 19 Jul 2020 23:28:21 UTC
Schiffer]
200 -
0,
cn
0.
E A
o
0
C-.
0
ct
C.
o
100 -
>C)
C)
cO
CD
a,
0 I
1920 1930 1940 1950
Figure 1. Changes in the frequency of companies i

home market, 1920-1955. Based on data in Grinder
from the time range of annual models listed.
many firms eagerlywere sold in the United States

embraced (Electronic
home-radio m
Industries Association
facture; by 1949, however, the 1970:13)-and
vast every one
majorit
newcomers had failed in the radio business. contained vacuum tubes. Late in 1954 the first
An even more dramatic instance of stimulated transistor portable radio was commercialized, and
variation during commercialization comes fromothers were rapidly brought to market. Although
the history of U.S. portable radios (Schiffer for a few years more expensive than their tube
1991). During the Great Depression, battery-pow-counterparts, transistor radios had marvelous bat-
ered sets that were designed to be easily carried
tery economy along with the cachet of "moder-
around were rare in the marketplace. In 1939 andnity." As a result, consumers quickly selected
1940, however, there was a phenomenal jump in against the tube-based portables and, in less than
the variety of portable radio models offered toseven years, only transistor radios remained on
consumers (Figure 2). The cause of this burst ofthe market (Schiffer 1991).
commercialization activity was situated in the Surprisingly, the adoption process is also an
extended selective context of radios and radio
important source of variation, as consumers
companies. To wit, with the intensification of inventors, literally playing with their new
become
toys.
warfare activities in Europe, radio makers saw an A new product is tried out in old activities
opportunity to offer a type of product thatand the possibilities of new activities are
could
allow Americans to hear war news anywhere. It
explored; the result is an expansion of activity
should be noted that this episode of stimulated variation, which can contribute to stimulated vari-
variation involved the commercialization activi- ation in processes of invention and commercial-
ties of established radio-making companies; new ization. For example, in the early 1920s, people
firms were not founded to produce portable explored the possibilities of home radios, a newly
radios (see Figure 1). commercialized product, taking them outdoors
During adoption, consumers buy and use com- and using them in diverse activity settings, from
mercialized products. Purchasing activities exertmotorcycle-police on the beat to hot-air balloon
selective pressures, and the latter can be swift races.
and These experiments were widely publicized
sure. In 1953 nearly two million portable radios in radio magazines and called attention to possi-

200.24.17.12 on Sun, 19 Jul 2020 23:28:21 UTC
120 -
100 -
I
1
03
10
.2
0 80 -
CZ
CO
60 -
0
40 -
a,
CZ
a,
La
U3-
20 -
0 1.1
1930
1920 1950
1940
Figure 2. Changes in the f

1920-1955. Based on a ca. 1
radio, the receiver must u
database employ vacuum t
bilities tion processes

for new of consumers influence the varia-o
kinds
tion in household artifact inventories.
opportunities, inven One can
responded envision
with that the latter variation
new will be acted
rad
pose communications
upon by additional selection processes, thereby g
commercialized
affecting the differential(Schiff
persistence of house-
holds. These cascading effects and complicated
Discussion
relationships of variety-generating and variety-
selecting
This framework of processes in the life history of processes ensure that both must be
a product type-invention, commercialization,
treated in evolutionary explanations.
and adoption-allows one to investigate variety-
Conclusion
generation and variety-selection in a systematic
manner. In histories of the portable radio In
(andanthe
effort to promote constructive dialogue
early electric automobile [Schiffer et al. between
1994]), different theoretical programs, this paper
has examined
the complex interaction of variety-generation and some relationships between evolu-
tionary and behavioral archaeologies, focusing on
variety-selection processes has been illuminated.
potential common ground, incompatibilities, and
The intricate connections of variety-generation
possible synergies.
and variety-selection processes establish relation-
Various assumptions, tenets, and principles
ships between units of evolution at diverse scales.
Significantly, in the evolution of culturalwere
phe-delineated that have some potential to form
nomena, selection processes at one scale can cre- ground between the two programs. The
common
statements summarizing this apparent common
ate variation at others. For example, the selection
of inventions for commercialization by financial
ground appear to be of some importance.
Tenets of evolutionary archaeology that cannot
and manufacturing corporations leads to variation
in products available in the wholesale market-
be accepted by behavioralists were scrutinized. It
place. Selection of this variation by retailing
was argued that these incompatibilities stem from
behavioral components then creates product vari-
questionable assumptions that are not, in fact, inte-
gral
ation in the retail marketplace. In turn, the to the selectionist program. Abandonment of
selec-

200.24.17.12 on Sun, 19 Jul 2020 23:28:21 UTC
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Some Relationships between Behavioral and Evolutionary Archaeologies

Author(s): Michael Brian Schiffer

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Michael Brian Schiffer

American Antiquity, 61(4), 1996, pp. 643-662.

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social theory lie between today's theoretical

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acteristics (e.g., Maxwell 1995; Neff 1992, 1993;

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is a multitude of principles-ranging from simple

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all, "behavior is at once cause and consequence of

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U.S. households are variants based on wealth,

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Variety-Generating Processes and Stimulated

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archaeological chronologies, which makes itvariation

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Figure 1. Changes in the frequency of companies i

many firms eagerlywere sold in the United States

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Figure 2. Changes in the f

bilities tion processes

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these assumptions would make evolutionary References Cited

archaeology compatible, not just with behavioral Aitken, H.

Acknowledgments. An earlier version of this paper was read at

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1987 TheinEvolution of Human Societies. From Foraging

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Skibo, W. H. Walker, and A. E. Nielsen, pp. 47-66.

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