A Commentary On The Hujjat Al-Siddiq of Nur Al-Din Al-Raniri

A COMMENTARY ON THE
J:IUJJAT AL-SIDDIQ
OF NUR AL-DIN AL-RANIRI
BEING AN EXPOSITION OF THE SALIENT POINTS OF DISTINCTION

BETWEEN THE POSITIONS OF THE THEOLOGIANS, THE PHILOSOPHERS,
.
THE SUFIS .
AND THE PSEUDO-SUFIS ON THE ONTOLOGICAL
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOD AND THE WORLD AND RELATED
QUESTIONS.
by
SYED MUHAMMAD NAQ,UIB AL-ATTAS
KUALA LUMPUR
MINISTRY OF CULTURE
MALAYSIA
1986
FIRST PUBLISHED BY THE MINISTRY OF CULTURE, YOUTH AND
SPORTS, MALAYSIA, 1986
© SYED MUHAMMAD NAQ,UIB AL-ATTAS, !9i
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IS THE LIGHT OF THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH' (THE HOLY Q,UR'AN:
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Table of Contents
Preface x1
Proem xvu
Introduction:
I. The author of the /fujjat al-$iddzq 3
II. His spiritual upbringing 13
III. His sources on �iifi doctrines and metaphysics 15
IV. His writings 24
V. His school of thought 29
VI. His influence in the Malay world 46
VII. Notes on the text of the /fujjat al-$iddzq 48
VIII. Notes on the signs and symbols used 50
Text of the /fujjat al-$iddzq 51
Translatior1 81
Commentary:
I 109
II 1�8
Ill 186
IV 199
V 226
VI 250
VII 260
VIII 265
IX 291
X 295
XI 309
XII 347
XIII 377
XIV 385
� 3�
XVI 397
XVII 402
Vlll A COMMENTARY ON THE J:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
XVIII 406
XIX 416
XX 418
XXI 426
XXII 432
Epilogue 453
Indexes:
I Names of persons mentioned m the text of the
Introduction, Translation, Commentary and
Epilogue 467
II Names of Schools, Sects, Groups 47 5
III Glossary of technical terms: in Arabic; Malay (M); .
Latin (L); and Greek (G) 483
List of works and articles cited 505
�_,.11 �_,JI AA11 �
�WI ":'J AA1 �I
�_rlJ ��')'I ,.j�I � ��I_, .;�1
Preface
On the 12th of May, 1981, a press conference was called in
Kuala Lumpur by Yang Berhormat Datuk Musa Hitam, then
Minister of Education, to announce my appointm·ent as the first
holder of the Tun Abdul Razak Distinguished Chair ofSoutheast
Asian Studies, which had just been established by the
Government of Malaysia jointly with Ohio University at Ohio
U:µ iversity, U.S.A., to perpetuate the memory of our late Prime
Minister, Tun Abdul Razak bin Dato' Hussein. In my brief
response to the Minister's speech and announcement of
appointment, I said:
It is indeed a great honour for me to be accorded the

priviledge of being the fi�st to be selected to occupy this
distinguished position, which is undoubtedly the highest
distinction Malaysia can confer on a local scholar. I am
aware that as the first holder of this Distinguished Chair,
much is expected of me that will demand my utmost
attention during my occupancy of the Chair. In order to rise
to that expectation, and by God's kind leave and generous
aid, I plan to. write a book ·during the period of my
appointment-a book that will bear testimony to the
worthiness of the Chair and that will, I hope, become an
enduring contribution to the memory of the late Tun Abdul
Razak. May I thank the Honourable Minister and all those
involved from the universities of Malaysia, the Ministry of
Education, and Ohio University who have demonstrated
their confidence in me to acquit myself well in this
undertaking.
On the evening of the same day, during the banquet in honour

of my appointment attended by the Minister of Education and
other dignitaries of State and Government, the universities of
Xll A COMMENTARY ON THE I:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ
Malaysia and other institutions of higher learning, Ohio

University, and distinguished ladies and gentlemen, I said in my
speech:
When I was informed of my selection to this distinguished

position, I began to co·nsider how best to meet this engaging
challenge of scholarship. Without hesitation I decided that
the most lasting contribution that one could make in such a
situation would be to write a book, for a book may endure
long after governments, peoples, states, and other records of
human thought and action have ceased to exist.
It has been the case with our people in the past to fail to
recognize and acknowledge those who, like Tun Abdul
Razak, contributed significantly to the life of the people, and
to our culture and civilization. In addition to this habitual
neglect, the influence of colonial · rule, through its
educational system, contributes to a considerable extent to
the rise of ignorance of our own religion and culture and
history; of our inability to recognize and acknowledge our
true leaders within the framework of our own intellectual
and religious tradition. In this situation those of no real
significance to our history and culture are magnified, while
the truly significant and really great of the past are
forgotten-buried in the debris of dubious scholarship. As an
example, let me cite the case ofl:Iamzah Fan�uri, whose great
significance to Islam in Southeast Asia, to Malay language
and literature, and to the cultural and literary history of the
Malays has only recently been brought to light by me after
nearly 400 years of neglect, now to rise again like a phoenix
from the ashes of oblivion. There was another who, like
I:Iamzah, is also inadequately assessed, to the extent that in
our times he is well-nigh forgotten. This man contributed
perhaps even more than I:Iamzah in Southeast Asia in the
spiritual and intellectual domains of religion and
metaphysics; in the realms of culture and history; and in the
development of our language and literature. He lived at a
time of religious confusion similar to that which we �
PREFACE Xlll
encounter today-a religious confusion characterized by

ignorance productive of various sorts of extremist tendencies
and deviations from the truth. But, unlike the scholars of
today, he succeeded in separating the false from the true, in
distinguishing the real from the illusory, the genuine from the
counterfeit, for he was a man gifted with wisdom and
adorned with authentic knowledge. I refer to Nur al-Din al
Raniri, who held a position of eminence at the court of Sultan
Iskandar Thani of Acheh in the first half of the 1 7th century.
The book that I have in mind will deal with one of his short
treatises on the concept and reality of existence. The treatise
to which I a.m alluding here is one of considerable
importance, although its length is of only 27 manuscript
pages of modest size. But my planned edition of the Arabic
Malay text and English translation of it, together with a full
commentary will run to several hundred pages. In the
Islamic intellectual and religious tradition, a commentary of
this nature is not merely an analysis of the general contents of
the text; rather it is an exacting line by line and word by
problematic word exposition of the explicit as well as implicit
ideas that are couched therein.
The subject-matter of the book, apart from dealing wit.h
certain aspects of Islamic religious and intellectual history,
will deal with the philosophical and metaphysical aspects
both Islamic and those derived from the Greek philosophical
tradition-which have shaped the Islamic vision of the
world and of reality and truth. The importance in our
present time of understanding this Islamic vision of the world
and of reality and truth is surely unquestionable, for it is
indeed a paramount prerequisite in shaping our philosophies
of science and of education, which the Muslim world must
formulate if it were to develop and forge ahead beyond the
horizons of that world.
The writing of a book of this nature usually and
understandably takes many years to accomplish. But I am
confident that, with God's help, I shall be able to complete it
in the two years of my appointment to the Chair.
XIV A COMMENTARY ON THE I;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ.
While I have spoken about the neglect of the past, I am not

unmindful of the increasing awareness of the present in
recognizing and acknowledging those who have served us
with signal merit. The establishment of the Distinguished
Chair is itself precisely a succinct demonstration of our
present involvement in the process of recognition and
acknowledgement. What better gesture and more apt token
of appreciation than for me to honour this Chair by
perpetuating the memory also of those others of the past to
whom our grateful recognition and acknowledgement are
due.
We must thank God for everything, but we must also
thank man; for it is through man that God grants His
abundant gifts, and we would in reality be ungrateful to God
if we do not show gratitude to man. And this is the meaning of
the words of the Holy Prophet, upon whom be peace, when
he said: La yashkur Allah man la yashkur al-nas: "He does not
thank God who does not thank man."
I thank God by Whose kind leave and unfailing help I was able
to fulfill my promise to complete my work in two years, in spite of
the many and various duties I had to attend to both at home
and abroad. The book that is now between your hands was
completed in 1983. It 'Yas in 1984 that, due to his keen interest in
my work and his high regard for knowledge, his love of truth and
dedication to the recognition and acknowledgement of the
spiritual and inteilectuai heritage of Islam in our history and
culture, Yang Berhormat Anwar Ibrahim, then Minister of
Culture, urged me to let his Ministry publish the book. For this
praiseworthy and apt gesture, to him are due my appreciation
and acknowledgement. I am indebted to the Ministry of Culture
and to the Institute for Policy Research for allocating to me a
generous grant for the publication of the book, which owing to
my frequent lecture travels abroad and other unavoidable
delays, was finally sent to the printer in May, 1985. May I also
record my grateful thanks to my wife Latifah, who not only found
the time to type the difficult manuscript in its entirety in the
PREFACE xv
midst of all sorts of duties at home, but immensely more

important, provided the loving kindness, the peace and leisure
and gave constant encouragement necessary to the
accomplishment of my task.
It is now more than 300 years since al-Raniri wrote his treatise,
and no commentary of this nature has ever been written in the
Malay world. My purpose in writing this commentary is twofold.
In the first instance, it is to demonstrate that the unity of ideas in
the world of Islam pertaining to the intellectual interpretation of
the nature of reality was not confined only to particular parts of
that world, but to the whole of it. An integrated metaphysical
system formulated to explain the nature of God, of the universe,
of man, of creation, of knowledge-in short, of reality as a
whole-was known also in the Malay world. Only that the
understanding of this integrated metaphysical system in rational
and intellectual terms had to wait till our present age, when
scientific developments in our understanding of nature have
advanced considerably, before its profound significance can be
realized. In the second instance, the vision of the nature of reality
derived from the intuition of existence as experienced by the
masters among the men of discernment can indeed be formulated
in rational and theoretical terms needed as a foundation. for an
Islamic philosophy of science. Our philosophy of science must be
based upon such a vision of Reality as verified by its experts
through the intuition of existence which I have discussed in this
commentary. This is because I believe that our lives will
inevitably become enmeshed in the net of confusion unless we
evolve a philosophical method of evaluating the validity of the
statements and general conclusions of science on the basis of
Revelation and Tradition as established not only by reason and
experience, but also as verified and made complete by higher
intuition. Science itself finds its roots in intuition, and will not be
opposed to intuition if it were true science.
29 J umad al-Akhir I 406 Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas

1 o March 1 986 Petaling J aya
Proem
Dengan Nama Allah
Yang Mahapengasih, Mahapenyayang
Segala pujian bagi Allah nan mahaesa

Yang mahameliputi semesta semua,
Yang liputanNya menyangkal bicara
Dan Yang bagiNya tiada suatu pun tara.
Mahasuci clan mahamurni
Tiada terketika mahu pun terisi;
Tiada tercurai sebarang peri
Tiada tercapai sebarang budi;
Tuhan sarwa alam berganda
Yang mengambang hebat diangkasa,
Terpamir indah terjelma nyata
Dan yang terbunyi sunyi dalam rahasia;
Yang empunya arasy yang mahatinggi
Pemilik kuasa yang mahakawi,
Yang berbuat sekehendak diri
Akan segala sesuatu mahamengetahui;
Yang menjadikan kejadian semesta
Mengadakannya daripada hal tiada
Dengan hanya titah sepatah kata
Kemudian memulangkannya kepada asalnya;
Yang memperlihatkan di alam tabii
Aneka tandaNya terlalu sani
Dari ufuk berganda ke diri insani
Menyatakan wajahNya yang mahaali;
Meskipun luhurNya jauh terala
Dari segala cita clan rasa clan indera,
Namun hampirNya begitu mesra
Lebih ak.rab dari aku clan kita.
xvm A COMMENTARY ON THE I;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
Dialah Yang memberi petunjuk kepacla hambaNya yang

terpilih niscaya menuturi arah yang lurus clan benar; Yang
memberkati mereka yang mengikrarkan keesaanNya clengan
memeliharakan baginya kalimah syahaclah clari kekabutan
bisikan syak clan waswas; Yang memimpin mereka agar
mematuhi jejak-langkah nabiNya pilihan, clan menganuti
taulaclan para sahabatnya mulia clengan mengarahkan
langkahnya ke Jalan yang benar; Yang menyatakan cliriNya
kepacla mereka yang memasangkan telinga clalam musyahaclah
clengan clhatNya clan afaalNya clan aneka sifatNya yang
mahainclah clan seni-seni; Yang mengenalkan kepacla mereka
bahawa Dia esa pacla pihak clhatNya, clengan keesaan yang
mcnafikan kemungkinan aclanya sekutu; sencliri, clengan
kesenclirian yang clikenali hanya oleh cliriNya; tunggal tiacla
berbagai tiacla berbancling tiada berlawan; mahaesa clan kaclim
tiada yang mendahuluiNya, clan tiada 'dahulu' bagiNya
melainkan yang dahulu itu la jua; kekal azali tiada bermula,
sentiasa wujud tiada yang kemudian daripadaNya, clan tiada
'kemuclian' bagiNya melainkan yang kemudian itu pun la jua;
kekal abadi tiada berkesudahan, wujud tiada hentinya, beracla
tiada akhirnya-bahkan adaNya dahulu padahal tiada sesuatu
clenganNya, clan adaNya kini seperti dahulujua; clan tiada Dia
terhenti clan tiadakan berhenti bagiNya diperikan dengan
gelaran-gelaran keagungan yang terala.
Dan salawat yang tiada berputusan serta salam yang tiada
berhabisan kepada abdi clan rasulNya junjungan kita
Muhammad, pemilik panji kepujian yang mengikrarkan hakikat
namanya sebagai mukjizat nyata yang terus berlaku; yang
Meskipun zahir bentuk basyari

Batinnya bangsa terlalu safi
Kerana peri haknya ruhani
Pernah berkata lisannya murni:
Sebagai nabi aku terkandung
Dalam rahasia di Balai Agung
Paclahal Adam masih terapung
Antara air clan tanah lempung
PROEM XIX
Meskipun rupaku anak Adam

Darjatku asal terlebih kiram
Tatkala Adam belum teringat
Tatkala Kalam belum bersurat
Dan Papantulis belum tercatat
Sudah terpandang oleh kunhi Dhat
Seri wajahku didalam mirat
Sinaran sani cahaya kamalat
Pancaran murni asma clan sifat
Rumusan seni segala makhlukat
Yang zahir pada cermin hakikat
Dalam diriku semua terlibat
yang awwal dicipta clan akhir menjelma, sehingga

kedatangannya seperti yang datang dariJ auh ditunggu-tunggu;
imam segala nabi clan khatimnya semua, laksana permata
jawhar bercahayakan air asali menghiasi gelang para ambia,
laksana mohor Raja Agung yang pertama-mula menerapkan
kalimah tawhid pada kalbu-diri Insan; yang terbit bagai bulan
purnama cahayanya indah mengusir kegelitaan malam
Jahiliyyah; yang katanya sungguh clan benar dan caranya betul
belaka; tauladan terbaik bagi anak Adam clan rahmat Ilahi bagi
sekalian alam.
Seterusnya kepada keluarganya yang dipersuci kesuciannya,
yang nasabnya tumbuh teguh dalam Sejarah, laksana pohon
yang akarnya membenam merangkum bumi clan daunnya
melambai di langit murni.
Dan kepada para sahabatnya yang bagai bintang . tetap
,,. n bertabur menghiasi langit kelam,, laksana lantera laut m.errpandu
bahtera ke pantai Salam.
Introduction
I. The author of the lfuyjat al-$iddzq li daf al-,?,indzq.
Niir al-Din Mu}:iammad ibn 'Ali ibn ljasan-Ji ibn
Mu}:iammad came from an Arab family of noble shaykhs known as
the al-Ifamid) which traced its descent from one of the ten clans of
the Quraysh. 1
1 The clans of the Quraysh were: Hashim, Umayya, Nawfal, Zuhra,

Asad, Taym, Makhzum, 'Adi, Jumah and Sahm. The Holy Prophet,
upon whom be peace, was descended from Hashim, and his descendents
from the lines of his grandsons al-1:Iasan and al-1:Iusayn are generally
known as sharifs and sayyids respectively. Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, 'Umar
ibn al-Khagab, and 'Uthman ibn 'Affiin were descended from Taym,
'Adi, and Umayya respectively; and 'Ali ibn Abi Talib was of the same
descent as the Holy Prophet. Al-Raniri mentioned in his Bustiin al
Salii/zn (ms. no. 41, University of Malaya) that the al-1:Iamid was of the
Quraysh (p. 285); however, we cannot be positive from which one of the
ten clans was the al-1:Iamid descended. This surname should not be
confused with the,al-1:Iamid, which according to the authoritative work
on the genealogy of the noble Arab families of the 1:Iac;lramawt, the
Shajarah al-Sadah al-Ashraf Banz 'Alawz (al-Rabitah al-'Alawiyyah,
Batavia (Jakarta) [n.d.] 7v.) is an offshoot of the Bin Shaykh Abu Bakr,
one of the branches of the sayyid families of 1:Iac;lramawt which trace
their descent from al-1:Iusayn. If, however, I:Iamid should read
I:Iumayd instead, it is possible to assume, on the authority of ibn
Khallikan's report that an historical writer had pointed out that the
surname lfumayd existed and was traced back to the son of 'Abd al
Ra}:lman ibn 'Awf, a close Companion of the Holy Prophet (see his
Wafayiit al-A'yiin wa Anbii) Abnii' al-,Zamiin ) edited by I}:lsan 'Abbas, Dar
al-Thaqafah, Bayriit, 1968-72, 8v., vol. 4, no. 616), that the Quraysh
clan referred to by al-Raniri was Zuhra, to which 'Abd al-Ra}:lman ibn
'Awf belonged. Another possibility, if 1:Iumayd is meant, is the more
probable ancestor being the imam Abu Bakr 'Abd Allah ibn Zubayr ibn
'Ubayd Allah al-Asadi al-}::lumaydi (d. 219 A.H.), a member of the Asad
clan of the Quraysh and a native ofMakkah (ibn Khallikan, .ibid.) vol.
4, no: 558, under al-Shafi 'i, p. 164; see also vol. 7, p. 63). He was a
4 A COMMENTARY ON· THE I;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ.
The date afhis birth is not known, but he was born in Ranir, a
famous old port in the Gujarat close to or within the district of
Surat in India probably towards the end ofthe 16th century. It is
by the name derived from his birth place that he became widely
known in the Malay world. We know nothing about his early life,
but can with reason infer, based on the fact that it was customary
for members of the sayyid families ofI:Ja<;iramawt to keep in touch
with their land of origin, that the shaykh families had likewise
maintained contact with Arabia, and that al-Raniri had most
probably studied in the I:Ja<;lramawt in his young days. He was in
fact in Makkah and in Madinah in I fow or 162 1, the year he
performed the Mijj pilgrimage. 2 It was also the custom of the
sayyid and shaykh families of the I:Ja<;lramawt to maintain contact
not only with India, where many of the saints, Sufis and scholars
who played a major role in its conversion to Islam by missionary
efforts were sayyids and s-haykhs, but also with the Malay world,
whose conversion to Islam through missionary activity was
initially their work,, and whose religious, spiritual, intellectual
and cultural development within the fold of Islamic civilization
disciple ofal-Shafi '1, the head of the legal school ( madhhab) to which al
Raniri belonged, and was famous in his time as the mujtz and traditionist
of Makkah, whose importance to the people of }:Iijaz was regarded by
some authorities as ofequal weight to that of A}:lmad ibn }:Ianbal to the
people of'lraq. G.W.J. Drewes in his 'De Herkomst van Nuruddin ar
Raniri" (BK I., 111, 1955, p. 149) also remarked that l:Iumayd could be
the reading for }:Iamid; and he referred to the Bii lf umayd, one of the
families of shaykhs in the }:Iac;lramawt, as the probable branch from
which al-Ranifi's surname could be derived. Drewes, however, did not
substantiate his conjecture by showing how the Ba }:Iumayd could be
descended from Quraysh. In any case, he decided against reading
}:Iumayd for }:Iamid, saying rightly that in his Tibyan fi Ma'rifat al
Aqyan (ms. no. 3291, Ltjden, p. 3), al-Raniri's Arabic preface in rhymed
prose (saj') shows clearly his surname rhyming with majzd, so that the
surname }:Iamid must be affirmed as the correct reading.
2
· See the biographical dictionary of scholars oflslam in India compiled
by 'Abd al-}:Iayy ibn Fakhr al-Din al-}:Iasani (d. 1923) entitled: Nuz�at
al-Khawa/ir wa Bahjat al-Masami' wa al-Nawa;;,ir, }:Iaydarabad, 7v.,
1931·-59, vol. 5, P· 3.49, no. 5 77·
INTRODUCTION 5
bears their indelible imprint. Al-Raniri's family had in fact
' maintained close contact with Pahang in the Malay Peninsula

and with Acheh in North Sumatra, which latter was in the early
16th century rising to become the centre of the Malay world.
When the Portuguese captured Malacca in 1511, Acheh had
rapidly arisen as the most important commercial centre in the
Malay Archipelago; for the Muslim merchants and traders had
moved over from Malacca in the Malay Peninsula and selected
Acheh as their bc1se in their trade with the Archipelago. Acheh
had become an important transit point for Muslim trade between
Muslim lands in the North-West, in India, and in the Far East.
Along with the merchants and traders there had come to Acheh
scholars of Islam and men of letters; and within half a century
after the fall ofMalacca, Acheh had become the most important
centre of learning, culture and commerce in the Archipelago,
replacingMalacca as the spiritual and intellectual capital of the
Malay world. 3
According to al-Raniri in his Bustan al-Sala(in, 4 there arrived in
Acheh in 1580 two scholars fromMakkah. One of them, Shaykh
Abu al-Khayr ibn Shaykh ibn 1:fajar, was the author of a book
called Al-Sayf al-(la�i' dealing with $iifi metaphysics revolving
around the problematic nature of the third metaphysical
category between being and non-being: the fixed essences, or the
permanent archetypes (al-a'yan al-thabitah). He taught
jurisprudence (al-.fiqh) in Acheh. The other, ShaykhMul_iammad
al-Yamani, taught the science of the sources ( al-�iil), that is, the
sciences relating to the Holy Qur'an; the Usage of the Holy
Prophet ( al-sunnah); the Consensus of Opinion or Agreement ( al
ijmil); and the traditions relating to the Companions (al-athar).
Between them there ensued a learned, public discussion on the
problem of the permanent archetypes, but unfortunately the
discussion ended in a deadlock without either of them reaching a
satisfactory conclusion on the matter, so that the intellectual
3 See for further details my Ranfrz and the Wujudiyyah of 17th century Acheh,
Monographs of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, no.
Ill, Singapore, 1966, p. I - I I.
4 Pages 285-286.
6 A COMMENTARY ON THE I;JUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
atmosphere generated by their debate, instead of becoming

clarified and enlightening, became much clouded by confusion.
To aggravate the confusion created, the two Shaykhs, as if_
pricked by their own sense of failure to solve the problem, sailed
away at that juncture in their pyrrhic intellectual confrontation.
It was shortly after this event, between 1580 and 1583, that al
Raniri's paternal uncle, Mu}:iammad al-1:famid, arrived in
Acheh to teach the science of the sources and other religious and
intellectual sciences such as jurisprudence, ethics, logic and
rhetoric. Due to the confusion that had been created earlier and
the unabated intellectual curiosity the debate had engendered,
his students among the courtiers and other seekers after
knowledge pressed him to teach them the Sufi doctrines and
metaphysics ( al-tarawwuf). But he was then not fully grounded in
the subject and was not prepared to teach it, and had to postpone
its teaching to another time after having studied and mastered
the Sufi doctrines and metaphysics at Makkah, whither he
journeyed after a short sojourn in Acheh. He returned to Acheh
to teach the doctrines and metaphysics of the Sufis during the
reign of Sultan 'Ala' al-Din Ri'ayat Shah ( 1589-1604), and
apparently gained a considerable measure of success m
unravelling the problem of the nature of the archetypes.
During the same period there also flourished l:famzah al
Fan�uri of Barus on the west coast of Northern Sumatra (ft. circa
1550-1600), the greatest Malay Sufi poet and the first man to set
the Sufi doctrines and metaphysics in Malay, 5 and his probable
disciple Shams al-Din ibn 'Abd Allah al-Sumatra'i (d. 16'.29), 6
who was Sh aykh al-Islam of Acheh and was a close confidant of the
Sultan. Shams al-Din advised the Sultan, who was one of his
disciples, on religious and cultural matters as well as acted on his
behalf in diplomatic and international affairs. 7 There were other
5 See my The mysticism of Jfam;:,ah .Fanrurz, University of Malaya Press,
Kuala Lumpur, 1970.
6 See Samsu'l-Dzn van Pasai, by C.A.0. van Nieuwenhuijze, E.J. Brill,
Leiden, 1945.
7 See the Hikayat Acheh ( De Hikajat Atjeh), edited, by T. Iskandar,
Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk lnstituut voor Taal-Land- en

INTRODUCTION 7
scholars and jurisprudents in Acheh at the time, among whom
was mentioned a Syrian by the name of Ibrahim ibn 'Abd Allah
al-Shami, who died there in 16'29. 8
Between 1607 and 1637, Acheh was ruled by Sultan Iskandar
Muda, a vigorous and conquering ruler who subjugated Deli
( 1610), Johore ( 1613), Pahang ( 1616), Kedah ( 1619), Perak
( 16'20), and Nias ( 1624), and attempted a reconquest ofMalacca
( 1629). 9 Through him Acheh consolidated her military as well as
commercial influence which, with the exception ofJava and the
eastern parts of the Archipelago, held sway over the Malay
world. He was credited with having brought Islamic reforms in
Acheh, promulgating statutes outlining rules and regulations to
be put into effect in making Acheh into an Islamic state. 1 ° From
Pahang he brought back with him to Acheh a young prince,
barely seven years of age, the son of Sultan A}_lmad Shah of
Pahang, whom he later married to his daughter and adopted as
his own son, groomed to succeed him as Sultan ofAcheh. 11 It was
in fact this prince of Pahang who ascended the throne ofAcheh iri
1637 as Sultan Iskandar Thani 'Ala' al-Din Mughayat Shah (d.
I 641).
There is strong evidence that between 1621 when he was at
Makkah and 1637, al-Raniri lived for a time in the Malay world,
in particular in Pahang and in Acheh. His intimate knowledge of
the Malay Annals (Sejarah Melayu), whose author Tun Seri
Lanang he most probably knew at first hand; his familiarity with
the genealogy of the Sultans of Pahang; and his mastery of the
Volkenkunde (VKI), vol. XXVI, The Hague, 1958, especially pp.

164, 203, 241 -242 of the Malay text.
8 Bustiin, p. 288; Hikayat Acheh, p. 181.
9
A Portuguese account of this disastrous invasion is to be found in C.R.
Boxer's "The Achinese attack on Malacca in 1629, as described in
contemporary Portuguese sources," in Malayan and Indonesian Studies,
ed.,J. Bastin and R. Roolvink Oxford, 1964, pp. 105-121.
10 Bustiin, pp. 287-288.
See also K.H.F. van Langen, "De Inrichting
van het Atjehsche Staatsbestuur onder het Soeltanaat", BK/ Leiden,
1888,pp. 420,422,436-447; and my Riinzrz and the Wujiidiyyah ( op. cit.),
pp. g- 11, and notes 39, 40, 42 and 43.
nBustiin, p. 289.
8 A COMMENTARY ON THE I:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ_
Malay language, literature, and literary expression could not

have been acquired from elsewhere. Furthermore, his favourable
rise and influence at the court of lskandar Thani, who elevated
him to the highest religious office in the realm, that of Shaykh al
/slam, implied a previous close relation and good standing with
lskandar Thani himself when he was Crown Prince of Acheh, or
with the royal family of Pahang. Thus in 1637, when lskandar
Thani became Sultan of Acheh, it was not the first time that al
Raniri had set foot in Acheh; only that this time it was to assume
his high office and to begin the arduous task of cleansing the
minds of the people of the corrupting effects of the
misunderstanding of the Sufi doctrines and metaphysics. Since
the time of lskandar Muda the writings of I:famzah and Shams
al-Din had become popular, and it is quite obvious that many
who claimed to be their disciples had apparently misunderstood
their original intentions with the result that what they taught had
easily degenerated into aberrations and heresy. Pseudo-$iifis and
charlatans had spread abroad incarnationistic, dualistic,
pantheistic or monistic interpretations of what they believed to
be $iifi metaphysics. But their activities were put to an abrupt
end when al-Raniri was appointed Shaykh al-Islam of the realm.
In his own words al-Raniri related how, in a debate against the
exponents of the deviating Wujudiyyah in the presence Gf the
new Sultan, which occurred soon after his arrival in Acheh in
I 637, he banished them forever:
When a group of the deviating and strayed Wujiitliyyah

from among the disciples of the misguided Shams al-Din al
Sumatra'i made their appearance, they engaged us in debate
for several days in the presence of the Sultan ... They said:
"God Most Exalted is our selves and our beings, and we are
His Self and His Being." In order to refute their erroneous
words and vain belief, I composed a short treatise in
exposition of the claim of the shadow and the possessor of the
shadow, 12 and I said to them: "You claim for yourselves
12 Thereference here is to his Nubdhahfi Da'wii al-?.,ill ma'a $ii�ibihi. See
below, p. 26; no. 5.
INTRODUCTION 9
divinity in the same manner as did Pharaoh who said: "I am
your Lord Most High," 13 -nay, you are indeed an
unbelieving people." (When they heard this) their faces
betrayed a sour expression and they bowed their heads, for
surely they were polytheists. The people of Islam
pronounced against them the formal charge of unbelief and
condemned them to death. Some of them acknowledged
unto their selves the charge of unbelief levelled against them
and repented, while others refused to repent. Yet some of
those who repented committed apostasy and fell back upon
their former belief. So the host of unbelievers were
executed. 14
Al-Raniri's vigorous polemics and prolific writings against the

type of pseudo-$iifi doctrines advocated by the deviating
Wujiidiyyah brought about a gradual process of correction in the
interpretation and understanding of the $iifi doctrines and
metaphysics. There were no earlier writings in Malay or in other
languages of the Archipelago that clarified the distinction
between the true and the false interpretation and understanding
of $:ufi doctrines and metaphysics. This remarkable fact flearly
demands our estimation of al-Raniri's great and indefatigable
effort in this respect as the manifestation of an inaugurating
movement of what we have elsewhere described as the
'intensification' and 'standardization' of the process of
islamization. 15 There were also no written expository works in
Malay or in other languages of the Archipelago on the sacred Law
of Islam governing marriage and divorce, food and drink,
worship and general social and personal ethics. The early
missionaries of Islam who came in successive waves conveyed the
teachings of Islam by oral instruction and practical application,
13 Al-Niizi'iit (79) :24.

14 Tibyiin, pp. 3-5. See also The Mysticism of lfamzah Fa�ri, op. cit, eh.
II, and Riinfrf and the Wujiidiyyah, op. cit. pp. 15-16.
16 See my Preliminary statement on a general theory of the lslamization of the
Malay-Indonesian Archipelago, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (DBP), Kuala

Lumpur, 1969, pp. 25-30.
10 A COMMENTARY ON THE l;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
and taught the people the right conduc-t in the understanding

and practice of Islam by their action and behaviour for others to
take as example to follow. In time the teachings embodied in
their words and deeds alone were of necessity forgotten by the
masses of the people, because there were no written works they
could understand which would continue to instruct and remind
them and the succeeding generations of their duties and
responsibilities after the original disseminators of the :religion
were no longer there. So in this way the understanding and
practice of Islam became gradually confused, and the generality
of the people lapsed into error and fell back upon their traditional
pagan beliefs and practices. We have only to reflect upon the
report ofShihab al-Din Al).mad ibn Majid, the master navigator
(mu' allim) who piloted Vasco Da Gama to India, on the religious
state of the people of Malacca as he witnessed it in the middle
of the 15th century (1462), to realize how true our estimate is of
the religious condition of a people left to their own devices
without written religious laws to rule and regulate their lives in
accordance with its teachings. He said, for example, that the
people of Malacca were uncultured and that it was difficult to
distinguish the Muslims from the infidels; that the Muslim men
took pagan women as wives, and Muslim women married
infidels, and that they did not treat divorce as a religious act; that
there were no laws governing marriage and divorce, and food
and drink, the Muslims ate the flesh of dogs and drank wine
openly in the market places; they were untrustworthy in their
dealings. 16 If this was Malacca in 1462, at least more than a
century after its conversion to Islam, Kedah, which was
converted to Islam in the late 15th century by a missionary
named Shaykh 'Abd Allah al-Yamani, fared far worse; for by the
1 7th century the people of Kedah had apparently lapsed into
16
See his Jfawiyyat al-lkhtirar ft' Jim al-Bi�ar, Bibliotheque Nationale,
Paris, ms. Arabe no. 2292, p. 104r. See also G.R. Tibbetts, A study of the
Arabic texts containing material on South-East Asia, Oriental Translation
Fund, New Series, vol. XLIV, published for the Royal Asiatic Society
by E.J. Brill, Leiden & London, 1979, p. 206.
INTRODUCTION I I
infidelity and paganism. Here, again, the preaching oflslam had

not been consolidated by any written work in Malay explaining
the basic essentials ofreligion that could be used as standard texts
for teachers of later generations. Indeed the main reason why in
the 17th century Acheh conquered Kedah was precisely to
reestablish Islam there. But it was in fact al-Raniri who supplied
the badly needed books in Malay on the principles of Islam; its
rules and regulations on worship, its laws regarding marriage and
divorce contained in two works entitled ,$irii! al-Mustaqzm and
Bab al-Nikii� which were sent to Kedah in about 1640. 17 It is
neither surprising nor incredible, therefore, if the chronicler who
wrote the Kedah Annals related that the conversion of Kedah to
Islam by al-Yamani took place contemporaneously with al
Raniri's presence in Acheh, and his sending of the two books for
the benefit of the people of Kedah. This anachronism can mean
only that al-Raniri's contribution to the islamizing process was
seen as of equal importance in magnitude to that of the first
missionary who brought Islam to the people ofKedah. 18 Even in
Acheh itself there were indications pointing to al-Raniri's prime
role in the islamizing process, not only through his prolific
writings whose influence spread throughout the Archipelago, but
surely also through his wise counselling of the Sultan and his
court. Indeed, one ofthe first promulgations ofthe new Sultan, as
tersely recorded in a revealing passage in the Bustan, was the
banning of the recurrence of pagan practices. 19
17 See the Hikayat Merong Mahawangsa, edited by Siti Hawa Saleh, Seri
Klasik Melayu, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur
Singapura, 1970, the text ofch. IV, especially ofp.115. This event was
also reported by T.W. Arnold, The preaching of Islam, 3rd ed., Luzac,
London, 1935, p. 375.
18 Hikayat Merong Mahawangsa, pp. 85, 115. Compare Sir Richard
Winstedt, A history of classical Malay literature, Oxford University Press,

London, 1969 (reprinted from the 2nd edition (1961), p. 164. My
interpretation above of the islamization of Kedah is a new
interpretation and clarifies for the first time the confusion in Winstedt's
account.
19 Bustiin, p. 291, the reference here is to the practice of mencelup mi ak
ny
and menjilat besi.
l2 A COMMENTARY ON THE I:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ
Before his arrival in Acheh in 1637 and during his probable

stay in Pahang, al-Raniri had written two works which he
brought along with him to Acheh. One of them dealt with a
commentary on the articles of belief derived from al-Taftazani's
important commentary on the creed of al-Nasafi; 20 and the other
a compilation of traditions of the_ Holy Prophet. 21 In 1638 he
received the command from Sultan Iskandar Thani to write his
encyclopaedic Bustiin al-Salii{fn. 2 2 Then some time between 1641
after the death of Iskandar Thani and 1644 when he returned to
Ranir, he wrote the Tibyiinfi Ma'rifat al-Adyiin 23 at the command
oflskandar Thani's queen who had then become ruler of Acheh
as Sultanah Taj al-'Alam Safiyyat al-Din Shah ( 1641 -1675).
Aside from this work he wrote during this period at least a dozen
other works, including the subject of our present commentary,
the last one written in Acheh being the Jawiihir al-' Uliimfi Kashf
al-Ma' liim. 24
In 1644 al-Raniri returned to his native Ranir, where he lived
for the next fourteen years. Al-1:fasani recorded that there he
wrote at least three works in Arabic: a refutation against those
who believed in the created nature of the Holy Qur'an; 25 another
against the zindzq, 2 6 which may be an Arabic version of the text of
the present commentary; and a large volume on the Sufi path. 27
In a copy of this last mentioned work kept in the library ofSayyid
Niir al-1:fasan ibn Siddiq l:fasan al-Qanawji, a note was written
by Shaykh Mu}:iammad ibn Abi Bakr al-1:fanafi al-A}:imadabadi
giving the date of al-Raniri's death as Saturday, the twenty
second day of Dhii al-1:fijjah in the year 1068 after the Hijrah:
Saturday, 21st September, 1658. 28
20
See below, p. 25; no. 2.
21 See below, p. 25; no. 3.
24 See below, p. 27; no. I 2. See also note 37 on p. 16 below.
25 See below, p. 28; no. I.

28 Nuz�at al-Khawii{ir, vol. 5, p. 349; P. Voorhoeve, "Korte
Mededelingen", BKI, I 15, I 959, p. go.
INTRODUCTION
I I. His spiritual upbringing.

According to his own account, al-Ranfri belonged to the
Shafi'i school of law, and adhered to the Ash'ariyyah school of
theology, and was a member of the Rifa'iyyah Order ({arzqah) of
Sufis. 29 His direct spiritual master, the Sufi shaykh who initiated
him into the Rifa'iyyah Order, was Sayyid Abu }:Iaf� 'Umar ibn
'Abd Allah Ba Shayban, whose family originated from Tarim in
the }:Iac;lramawt. Ba Shayban, like al-Ranfri, was also born in
India, and although he studied long in Arabia he finally settled in
India where he received his initiation into the same Order by his
master Sayyid Muhammad al-'Aydarus at Surat. Ba Shayban
lived mainly in Bijapur, one of the succession kingdoms of the
Bahmani kingdom of the Deccan r�led by the 'Adil Shahi
dynasty, where he enjoyed the patronage and protection of
Mu}:iammad 'Adil Shah (r. 1626-1656). He died in Bilgram in
1656. 30 Sayyid Mu}:iammad al-'Aydarus, Ba Shayban's teacher,
was born in Tarim in 1561. At the age of nineteen he left his
native land for the Gujarat, first sojourning at A}:imadabad, the
spiritual seat of his grandfather Sayyid Shaykh ibn 'Abd Allah al
'Aydarus ( d. I 582), the great Sufi and theologian of A}:imadabad.
He-later settled in Surat where he too became famous as its great
Sufi and theologian. The 'Master of Surat' ( $ii&ib Surat), as he was
known, died there in 1620. 31 From Sayyid Mu}:iammad onwards
and in an ascending order the chain of initiation into this Sufi
Order was successively linked by four generations of members of
the same family of al-'Aydarus ending with Sayyid Abu Bakr al
'Aydarus, the great saint of Aden who died there in 1509 and
whose tomb is venerated to this day. For this reason al-Ranfri
sometimes referred to himself as 'belonging to the school of al-
29
Sc1e Jfujjah, p. 2; Jawahir, p. 146;
30 Bilgram was noted for its tradition oflearned sayyids. See A.S. Bazmee
Ansari's article "Bilgram" in the Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition,
Leiden-London, 1960, pp. 1218-1219.
31
See Mu}:lammad al-Amfo al-Mu}:libbi al-Shami (d. 1699), Khularat
al-Athar ft A'yan al-Q.arn al-Hadz 'Ashar, 4v. Cairo, 1868, vol. 3, pp. 214
fol., vol. 4, pp. 26 fol.
14 A COMMENTARY ON THE J:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ.
'Aydariis' (al-' Aydariisz). In his lengthy work on Siifimetaphysics,

the Jawahir al-' Uliim fi Kashf al-Ma' liim, al-Raniri gave the line
from which he derived his spiritual teaching, the chain of
initiation (al-silsilah) starting from the Holy Prophet, upon
whom be peace, in the following descending order:
1. 'Ali ibn Abi Talib (d. 661);
2. l:fasan al-Ba�ri (d. 728);
3. l:fabib al-'Ajami (d. 737);
4. Dawiid al-Ta'i (d. 781);
5. Ma'ruf al-Karkhi (d. 813);
6. Sari al-Saqati (d. 867);
7. Junayd al-Baghdadi (d. 910);
8. Abu Bakr al-Shibli (d. 945);
9. l:famali ('Ali?) al-'Ajami;
10. 'Ali ibn al-Bariyari;
I I. Abu 'Ali Ghulam ibn Turkan;
I 2. Abu al-Fa<;ll ibn Kani}:i;
13. 'Ali (Abu al-Fa<;ll) al-Qari' al-Wasiti;
14. Man�ur al-Rifa'i (Man�u.r al-Bata'i}:ii, d. I 145, maternal
uncle of 15 below);
15. A}:imad ibn Abi al-1:fasan al-Rifa'i (d. I 182, founder of the
Rifa'iyyah Order);
16. 'Ali ibn 'Uthman (nephew, sister's son, of 15 above);
17. Mu}:iyi al-Din Ibrahim ibn al-A'rab ibn 'Ali (nephew,
brother's son, of 16 above);
18. Mu}:iammad (cousin, son of maternal uncle, of I7 above);
19. Qutb al-Din Abu al-1:fasan 'Ali ibn 'Abd al-Ra}:iman al
Rifa'i (nephew, brother's son, of 18 above);
20. A}:imad ibn Mu}:iammad ibn 'Abd al-Ra}:iim al-Rifa'i
(nephew, sister's son, of 19 above);
21. Taj al-Din Mu}:iammad (son of 20 above);
22. Sayyid al-Sharif Mu}:iammad ibn al-l:Iasan al-Samarqandi;
23. Burhan al-Din Ibrahim al-'Alawi;
24. Mu}:iammad ibn Abi Bakr al-Quja'i;
25. Shaykh Ismail ibn Ibrahim al-J abarti; 32
32 Al-Jili's sh aykh who lived at Zabid in Yaman. See Al-Insan al-Kamil,
INTRODUCTION
26. Shihab al-Din Al;mad ibn Abi Bakr al-Raddad; 33

27. Qac;li Jamal al-Din Mu}:iammad ibn Sa'id Gin al-Tabari;
28. Jamal al-Din Mul)-ammad ibn Mas'iid Abi Sakil al-An�ari;
29. Jamal al-Din Mul)-ammad ibn Al;mad Fac;ll;
30. Sayyid al-Shaykh Fakhr al-Din Abu Bakr ibn Abd Allah al
'Aydarus al-'Adani (d. 1508);
31. Sayyid Abd Allah ibn Shaykh ibn 'Abd Allah al-'Aydariis
(nephew, sister's son, of 30 above);
32. Sayyid Shaykh (ibn 'Abd Allah ibn Shaykh ibn 'Abd Allah)
$al;ib Al;madabad (d. 1582, son of 31 above);
33. Sayyid 'Abd All�h al-'Aydarus (d. 1610, son of 32 above);
34. Sayyid Jv1ul;ammad al-'Aydarus $al;ib Surat (d. 1620, son of
33 above);
35. Sayyid Abu l:faf� 'U mar ibn 'Abd Allah Ba Shayban al
Tarimi al-l:fac;lrami (d. 1656);
36. Shaykh Nur al-Din Mul;ammad ibn 'Ali al-Hamid al
Raniri. 34
III. His sources on $lfz doctrines and metaphysics.

At the beginning of the lfujjah, al-Raniri says that the contents
of the treatise were "culled from the books of the $iifis and
others." 35 Who were the $iifis and others referred to, and what
were their books? In attempting to identify them and their works,
I have relied chiefly on information given by al-Raniri himself in
two of his other works, apart from the lfujjah, which I consider to
have an important and relevant bearing on the interpretation of
the lfuyjah. These are the Tibyanfi Ma'rifat al-Adyan 36 and the
pt. II (note 66, below), p. 74.

33 GAL 11, 189 (p. 242, no. 2) d. 1418 (?).
34 ]awahir, pp. 146-147.

35 lfuyjah, p. 2.
36
Leiden text, no. 3291, Bibliotheca Lugduno-Batava, Rijks
universiteit, Leiden, also published in facsimile in Twee Maleise
Geschriften van Niiruddzn ar-Ranzrz, by P. Voorhoeve, Stichting de Goeje,
no. 16, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1955, pp. r - I 28.
16 A COMMENTARY ON THE I;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
Jawahir al-'Ulum fi Kashf al-Ma'lum, 37 both of which I have

used-particularly and chiefly the latter-as my primary
sources for the commentary on the lfujjah here presented.
Indeed, one might say that the contents of the Jawahir, the last
book he wrote while in Acheh, 38 are in fact an elaboration of
what is only briefly sketched in the lfujjah, and some of what he
wrote there is even found repeated in the later work, which
contains a more detailed exposition of the $ufi doctrines and
metaphysics, and wherein the author cited and quoted many of
the major $ufis and others and their works which served as his
chief sources on Sufism. These� in chronological order of their
authors, are:
1. Manazil al-Sa'irzn, 39 of 'Abd Allah al-An�ari al-I:Iarawi (d.

I 088); 4o
2. Al-Maq�ad al-Asnii jz shar� Asma Allah al-lfusnii 4 1 of Abu
I:Iamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111);
3. Al-Ajwibah al-Lii'iqah 'an al-Aswiilah al-Fii'iqah 4 2 also by al
Ghazali;
3i'Manuscript in the Marsden collection no. 12151, pp. 21v. -158r.,
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. For
further reference and a brief outline of the contents of the work, see
below, p. 153, note 61.
38 0n p. 158 of the Jawiihir, al-Ranir indicated that having completed
the last chapter (chapter V) of the book, he had to ('f'::i.se writing,

possibly due to ill health, and had to return to Ranir rather abruptly.
The conclusion was completed by one of his pupils.
39 ]awiihir, pp. 37, 41, 88; published by l\1u�tata al-Babi al-.i:falabi and
Sons, Cairo, 1966, 2nd printing, pp. 3-48.

40 See S. de Laugier de Beaurecueil's Khwadja 'Abdallah A�ari'; Mystique
Hanbalite, Imprimerie Catholique, Beyrouth (Recherches l'Institut de

Lettres Orientales de Beyrouth, tome XXVI), 1965. This work contains
a French translation of the works of al-An�ari including the Manazil al
Sii'irzn, but the Arabic text of this work is not complete (pp. 222-257),
yielding only Biibs 1, 2, 12, r9, 34, 47, 61, 72, 87, 88, 96, 99 and 100 of
the original 100 Biibs.
41 Jawiihir, pp. 56, 136. Published text edited by Fadlou Shehadi, Dar
al-Mashriq, Bayrut, 1971.

42 Jawiihir, p. 128. Also called Al-Ajwibah al-Gha;:iiliyyah; see C.
Brockelmann, Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur (GAL), 2v. and

INTRODUCTION
4. #ya' 'Ulum al-Dzn, 43 also by al-Ghazali;

5. 'Ara'ish al-Bayan fi lfaqii'iq al-Q,ur'iin, by Sadr al-Din
44
R iizbi}:ian Baq Ii Shirazi ( d. I 209); 4 5

6. Kitab al-Lam�ah 46 of Fakhr al-Din al-I:lirali or al-I:larali
(d. 1239); 47
7. Al-Futu�at al-Makkiyyah 4 8 of Mu}:iyi al-Din ibn 'Arabi (d.
I 240);
8. Fu�u� al-lfikam, 49 also by ibn 'Arabi;
9. Miftii� Ghayb al-Jam' wa al-Wujiid 50 of Sadr al-Din al
Qunyawi (d. 1263);
10. Tafszr al-Fiiti�ah, 51 also by al-Qunyawi;
Supplementbiinden (GALS), 3v., E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1943; 1949; 1937,

1938, 1942. GALS I, p. 755, no. 64. Another work with similar title by
ibn 'Arabi, GAL I, 446,. no. 97.
43 Jawiihir, p. 76. Published text by MuHafa al-Babi al-1:Ialabi and Sons,
Cairo, 1939, 4v.

44Jawiihir, p. 50.
45See GAL I, 414, no. 14.

46 Jawiihir, p. 6 ; the text has Lam&ah shar& Lama' iii.
8
47 The text has the name of the author as Baril_iali or Baral_iali, which I
think is a mistake for al-1:Iarali or al-1:Iirali. See GAL I, 414, no. 15;
GALS I, p. 735, no. 1.§. Al-1:Iirali's work is a commentary on the
celebrated Lama'iit of al-Iraqi, see below, note 52.
48 aw hir, pp. 31, 3 , 42, 6 ,
] ii 8 0 70, 71, 78-79, 84, 130; lfujjah, p. 10. The
full title of the work is Al-Futii�iit al-Makkiyyah fi Ma'rifat al-Asriir al
Malikiyyah wa al-Mulkiyyah, Cairo, 1911, 4v. A recent publication in 6
volumes to date, edited with introduction by Osman Yahia, revised and
forwarded by Ibrahim Madkour, Al-Maktabah al-'Arabiyyah, Cairo,
1 972-79.
49 Jawiihir, pp. 0, 109, 135;
7 lfujjah, p. 21. Text published and edited
with a commentary by Abu al-'Ala 'Afifi in 2 parts. 'Isa al-Babi al
J:Ialabi, Cairo, 1946.
50 Jawahir, p. 121; lfujjah,p. 24. Published and printed in the margin of
Shams al-Din al-Fanari's commentary on the same work entitled

Mi{ba� al-Uns bayn al-Ma'qulwa al-Mashshudfi Shar� Miftii� Ghayb al
Jam' wa al-Wujiid, Tehran, 1323 A.H./1905-6.
51 Jawiihir, p. 64. Tliis work is a long commentary on the opening
chapter of the Holy Qur'an: l'jiiz al-Bayiinfi Tafszr Umm al-Qur'iin, 2nd
ed., Hyderabad-Deccan, 1949.
18 A COMMENTARY ON THE I:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
11. Lama'iit 52 of Fakhr al-Din Ibrahim al-'lraqi (d. 1287);

12. Kitiib al-Ajwibah 53 of 'Abd Allah al-Balbani (d. 1287);
13. Sharb Maniizil al-Sii'irzn 54 by 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Qashani (d.
I 335);
14. Sharb Fu�ii� al-lfikam, 55 also by al-Qashani;
15. Shar� 1�/iliibiit, or the Sharb Mu�/alabiit Musta'milah fi Sharb
Fu�ii� al-lfikam wa Sharb Maniizil al-Sii'irzn, 56 also by al
Qashani;
16. La/ii'if al-I' liim fi lshiiriit Ahl al-llhiim 57 also by al-Qashani;
17. Kitiib al-Zubad 5 8 of Sharaf al-Din al-Barizi (d. 1338); 59
18. Matfa' Khu�ii� al-Kilam, 60 a commentary on the Fu�ii� of ibn
'Arabi, by Dawud ibn Ma}_imiid al-Qay�ari (d. 13,10), 61
19. Jam' al-Jawiimi' 62 of Abii Na�r 'Abd al-Wahhab Taj al-Din
ibn Subki (d. 1370); 63
52 Jawiihir, p. 117. Published Kulliyyiit-i 'lriiqz, edited by S. Nafisi,

Tehran, 1956 .
.53 ]awahir, p. 40. The author is also known as Aw}:iad al-Din al-Balyani
See GALS I, p. 789. This work is sometimes attributed to ibn 'Arabi, and
has been published and translated into English from the Arabic
manuscript in the Hunterian Collection, Glasgow University, by T.H.
Weir, J.R.A.S., London, 1910. Republished by Beshara Publications,
London, 1976.
54 Jawiihir, p. 43. Published in Tehran, 131 . This is a commentary on
5
al-An�ari's work cited above, no. I .
.5 5 Jawlihir, pp. 66, 89, 104. Published together with the commentary of
Bali Effendi at the bottom of the text. Mu��afa al-Babi al-I:Jalabi and
Sons, Cairo, 1966, 2nd ed. GALS I, p. 793.
56]awiihir, p. 43. See GALS I, p. 793; CALS II, p. 280. This work is
printed in the margin of al-Qashani Shar& Maniizil al-Sii'irzn, Tehran,
I :P 5, cited in note 54 above.
57 Jaw
ahir, pp. 39; 42-43, 45, 85, 88, 103; Jfujjah, p. 15; GALS II, p. 280.
See also below, p. 94, note 36.
58 Jfujjah, p. I '2. See further below, p. 93, note 33.
59GALS II, p. IOI; see below, p. 93, note 33.
60 Jawiihir, pp. 34, 60, 68, 78, I I , I I 8. The full title is Ma/fa' KhuiiiI al
5
Kilam fz Ma' anz FuriiI al-J-/ikam, Tehran, I299.
6IGALS I, P· 793.
62}awa-h.zr, p. 43.
63GALS II, p. 105, no. 14.
INTRODUCTION
2 o. Al-lnsan al-Kamil64 of 'Abd al-Karim al-Jili (d. 1403); 65

21. Al-Qjimiis al-Mu&z!66 of Mu}_lammad ibn Ya'qiib al
Firuzabadi (d. 1415); 67
22. Shar� j\;fushkiliit Futii�iit) 6 8 also by al-Jili;
23. lriPat al-Daqii'iq bi shar& Mir'iit al-lfaqa'iq69 of 'Ali ibn
A}:lmad al-Maha'imi (d. 1432);
24. lm�a(j, al-Na{z&ah, 7 0 also by al-Maha'imi;
25. Shar� Fufiif al-lfikam71 of Nur al-Din 'Abd al-Ra}:lman al
Jami (d. 1492); 72
26. Shar& Rubii'iyyat73 also by Jami, and a commentary on his
own quatrains; 7 4
27. Lawii'i&fi Bayiin Ma'ani'lrfaniyyah )7 5 also by Jami; 76
64Jawiihir, pp. 32; 47, 57, 59, 62, 67, 86, 115, 123. The full title is Al
Insiin al-Kiimil fi Ma'rifat al-Awii'il wa al-Awiikhir, MuHata al-Babi al
}:Ialabi, Cairo, 1956, in two parts.
65 See the study on al-Jili's work mentioned above in R.A. Nicholson's
Studies in Islamic mysticism, Cambridge, 1921, reprinted in 1967, chapter

II.
66Jawiihir, pp. 40; 41, 44-45,
48, 54·
67GALS JI,,£· 234, no. 5. Published with marginal commentary in 4
vols., Cairo, 1319.
68 Jawahir, pp. 37, rn6, 131. I have not been able to trace and identify
this work. See GALS II, p. 283, no. 4. It deals with the interpretation of
obscurities in the Futii�iit.
69 Jaw hir, pp. 5 ,
a 8 87; Jfujjah, pp. 13, 26; GALS II, pp. 3 rn-311, no. 2.
70 Jawahir, p. 40; lfujjah, p. 15; Tibyan, p. I 2 I.
71 Jawahir, pp. 64, 72, rn5, 132. Published and printed in the margin of
'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi's Shar� Jawahir al-Nu{ii{fz }fall Kalima! al

Fu{ii{, 2v., Cairo, 1304-1323.
72GALS II, p. 285, no. 8.
73 Jawahir, pp. 53-54.
74
Published together with his Lawa'i� (no. 27 above), and his Lawami'
Shar� Khamriyyah ibn Fiirirj, all under the title MaJmii' ah Mullii ]iimz,
Istanbul, 1309 A.H.
75]awahir, pp. 36, 51, 84-85, rn8, 116.
76
Published with a translation by E.H. Whinfield and Mirza
Mu}:iammad Qazvini based on an old manuscript printed in facsimile,
Oriental Translation Fund, New Series, vol. XVI, Royal Asiatic
Society, London, 1928. See also above, note 74.
20 A COMMENTARY ON THE J:IUJJAT AL-�rnDIQ.
28. Ashi"iit al-Lama 'at 77 a commentary on the Lama 'at of al

'Iraqi, also by Jami; 78
29. Naqd al-N�i4, 7 9 also by Jami; 8 0
30. Al-Durrah al-FiikhirahfiIfaqii'iq Madhhab al-,$ufiyyah, 8 1 also by
Jami; 82
31. Itmiim al-Diriiyah 83 of Jalal al-Din al-Suyiiti (d. 1505); 8 4
32. Al-Mulakhkha.f 85 of Abu Ya}:iya Zakariyya al-An�ari (d.
1520) ; 86
33. Majma' al-Ba�rayn, 87 a commentary on the F�u.f of ibn
77 Jmvtfhir,p-p: 42, 5-i:

78
Published in Teheran in 1303/1886.
- '
79Jawah zr, pp. 33, 85, 134, 135.
80
The full title is Naqd al-Nu�ii�fishar& Naqsh al-Fu�il�, edited with notes
and introductions in Persian and Englis� by W.C. Chittick, with a
Persian foreword by Sayyid Jalal al-Din Ashtiyani, Imperial Iranian
Academy ofPhilosophy, no. 17 Tehran, 1977. The Naqskal-Fu�i4 is ibn
'Arabi's own summary ofthe Fu�i4 and it is published in Rasii'il lbnu'l
'Arabz, in 2 parts, Da'irah al-Ma'arif al-'Uthmaniyyah, Hyderabad
Deccan, 1948. See pt. 2, tract 27.
81 ]awiihir, pp. 33, 36, 56, 63.
82 GALS II, p. 285, no. 8. Published Al-Durrat al-Fiikhirah, with Arabic
commentary by 'Abd al-Ghafiir al-Lari and Persian commentary by

'Ima.cl al-Dawlah, edited by N. Heer and A. Miisavi Behbahani,
Tehran, 1980. The precious pearl, translated with an introduction, notes,
and glossary by Nicholas Heer, together with Ja.mi's Glosses (lfawiishf)
and the Commentary (Shar&) of 'Abd ·al-Ghafiir al-Lari, State
University of New York Press, Albany, 1979. See below, p. 273, note
300.
83 awiihir, p. 42. .This work is a commentary on the Miftii& al-'Uliim of
]
Siraj al-Din AbiiYiisufibn Abi Bakr al-Sakkaki (d. 1229): GAL I, 294,
no. 16.
84 GALS II, p. 178, no. 7; see also ibid., p. 195.
85 Jawiihir, p. 30, 66, 104. This work, like al-Suyiiti's, dealt with the
Shafi 'i doctrine oflaw, and is also a commentary on al-Sakkaki's work

mentioned above. Its full title is Al-Mulakhkha� min Talkhz� al-Miftii&.
But the title mentioned by al-Raniri, judging also from quotations
cited, appears to show that the work is an abridgement ofthe technical
terms of the �ufis: Mulakhkha� al-l�!ilii&iit.
86 GAL I, 296; GAL II, 99 (44); 100(30).
87Jawa -h'zr, p.. 39.

.INTRODUCTION
'Arabi by al-SharifNa�ir al-I:Jusayni al-Jaylani (fi. 1533); 88

34. Kitiib al-Tamfid 89 of Abu Shakur al-Salimi (c. 2nd half of the
16th century); 90
35. Fat& al-MubznfiShar& al-Arba'zn 91 of Al)mad ibn Mul)ammad
ibn I:Jajar al-Haythami al-Makki (d. 1565); 92
36. /faqii'iq al-Taw&ul wa Daqii'iq al-Tajrzd93 of Sayyid Shaykh
ibn 'Abd Allah al-'Aydarus $al)ib Al)madabad (d. 1582); 94
37. Tul:ifah al-Mursalah ila al-Nabz9 5 of Mul)ammad ibn Fac;ll
Allah al-Burhanpuri ( d. I 620). 96
Apart from these authors and their works cited and quoted by
ssGAL I, 422.
89Jawiihir, p. 58: Tibyiin, p. 122. Its full title is Kitiib al- Tambzdfibayiin al
Tawbzd wa hidiiyah li kulli Mustarshid wa al-Rashid. Al-Raniri's Tibyiin has

been largely derived from this source, as Voorhoeve has shown in his
Twee Maleise Geschriften (see below p. 27, no. 8), pp. 9-15.
90:GAL I,. 419, 3 (4).
91 Jawiihir, p. 59.
92GALS II, pp. 527 and 529.
93}awa-hzr,· p. 73.
94 Al-Raniri also mentions in Jawiihir, p. 74, that the author of this work
wrote a commentary on the Al-O.J1sidah al-Mzmiyyah of 'Umaribn al

Faric;l (d. 1235) which he cites. This refers to Al-Mzmiyyah al-Khamriyyah
(GAL I, 262) which was also commented upon by al-Qay$ari, al-Jami,
and 'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi (d. 1728). Brockelmann mentions a
• work by the son of the author entitled Sharb al-Qs,.,ridah al-Niiniyyahfial
Wasiyyah (GALS II, p. 613, no. 3 (23)). The work quoted by al-Raniri is
not recorded in Brockelmann, but see 0. Lofgren in article "Aydariis" in
the Encyclopaedia ef Islam, new edition, Leiden-London, 1960, vol. I, p.
781, col. 1, no. 3. There is a work entitled /faqii' iq al-Tawbzdfisharb
Tubfat al-Murzd, and the author was 'Abd al-Qadir al-'Aydarus'
brother, Jalal al-Din Mu}:tammad ibn Shaykh al-'Aydariis (d. 1622).
GALS II, p. 618, no. 39.
95]awiihir, pp. 37, 44; lfujjah, p. 26. This work is well known in the
Malay world in the 17th and 18th centuries. It has been translated into
Malay andJavanese. A.H.Johns has made a translation of theJavanese
version· of the Tubfah and also the Arabic original. See his The gift
addressed to the spirit ef the Prophet, Oriental Monograph series, no. 1,
Centre of Oriental Studies, Australian National University, Canberra,
1965. The preface to the Arabic text is by P. Voorhoeve.
96GAL 11, 418 (2); GALS 11, p. 617, no. 2.
al-Raniri mainly in the Jawiihir and some in the lfujjah, there are
other works quoted by him whose authors have not been
identified. These are the Bustan al-Ma'rifah; 9 7 the Ma!/ab )· 9 8 the
Mukhta�ar Wa�dah; 99 the Durr al-Man;;,um. 100 In some cases he
gave the names of the authors of works cited, but I have not been
able to trace them. These are the Sharb Maniizil al-lnsaniyyah by
'Abd Allah Bastami; 101 the Kanz al-Kunuz or Kanz al-Maknuz
by 'Abd Allah ibn }:Iusayn ibn 'Ali al-'Ajalani; 1 0 2 the Al--Sayf al
Q,ii!i' by Abu al-Khayr ibn }:Iajar; 10 3 the Ma'rifat al-Nafs by
Shihab al-Din A}:imad ibn 'Abd al-Malik; 10 4 the Shams al-lthnayn
by Sayyid Ma}:imiid Kayswaraz or Kaysuraz. 1 0 5 The Maniizil al
lnsiiniyyah is attributed to ibn 'Arabi, and its commentary by
Basta.mi seems to revolve around the famous poem about the
Lofty Letters ( al-burufal-' iiliyiit), which is also dealt with at length
by al-Raniri. 10 6
Then there are other authors quoted by al-Raniri in the
Jawahir without reference to their works. They are, in
chronological order, Abu Sa'id al-Kharraz (d. 892), 10·, author of
one of the earliest treatises on Sufism: the Kitiib al-$idq; Abu al-
B,Jawiihir, p. 49.
98/bid., PP· 40, 41, 44.
99 Ibid., p. I 26.
100 Jbid., pp. 112,114,118,120,123,125,127. This could be the work
referred to in the Malay Annals (Sejarah Melayu). See 'Abd Allah ibn
'Abd al-Qadir Munshi's version of the Se.Jarah Melayu, edited by T.D.
Situmorang and A. Teeuw, Djakarta, 1958, chapter 20. An early
English translation of the Malay Annals based on an old manuscript
was done by John Leyden, with an introduction by Sir Thomas
Stamford Raffles, London, 182 1. The episode about the Durr al
Man,?:_um is on pp. 202-203. The author of the book was a $ufi Shaykh at
Makkah called Mawlana Abu Is}:laq (c. 15 century).
101Jawiihir, p. 89.
102/bid., p. 3 I.
103/bid., p. 87. See also above, p. 4.
104 Jawahir p. 65.
105/b l'd., p. 132.
106 Ibid., PP· 89-96.
107/b l'd., p. 9 I.
INTRODUCTION 23
Qasim Junayd al-Baghdadi (d. 910), 10 8 author of many early

treatises on $ufism; 109 I:Iusayn ibn Man�ur al-I:Iallaj (d. 922), 110
author of the Kitiib al-Tawiiszn in rhyming prose, and of many
Sufi poems; Abu Talib al-Makki ( d. 996), 111 author of the Qjit al
Q,uliib; Sa'd al-Din al-I:Iamawi (d. 1252 or 1260); 112 Qutb al-Din
al-Qastallani ( d. 1287), 11 3 who wrote the Al-Adwryah al-Shiijiyah
Ji al-Ad'ryah al-Kiifiyah J· 11 4 Mu'ayyid al-Din al-J andi (d. 1291), 11 5
one of the early commentators of the Fu�u� of ibn 'Arabi; 11 6 Badr
al-Din Abu 'Ali Mul).ammad ibn Burhan al-Din ibnjama'ah (d.
7 1 8 119 Others,
1 333), 11 the traditionist; 1 and Shaykh al-Wasiti.
unidPntified, are Sayyid I:Iusayn al-Shatiri, 12 0 a Sufi master of

I:Ia<;lramawti origin; 121 and Zayn al-Din al-Khafi. 122
In his Tibyiin J al-Raniri quoted Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d.
10SJbid., PP· l 16, l 19.

109 See the Rasa'il of al-Junayd in 'Ali 1:fasan 'Abd al-Qadir's The life,
personality and writings of al-Junayd, E.J.W. Gibb Memorial, London,

1976; see also the Kitab al-Luma'fial-Ta{awwufofAbu Na�r al-Sarraj (d.
988), edited by R.A. Nicholson, E.J.W. Gibb Memorial, XXII,
London, 1963.
110 Jawahir, pp. 49, 50.
Ill]bid., pp. 60, 104.
112Jbid., p. 56; GALS I, p. 803, no. 276.
ll3 Jawahir, p. 55.
114GAL I, 451, no. 36.

115 Jawahir, p. 117. Al-Raniri's quotation may be traced to al-Jami's
Naqd al-Nu�u�, p. 67, which apparently comes from the Lama'at of

'Iraqi, p. 332, Lam'ah 111. Al-Jandi was one ofal-Qunyawi's important
students.
ll6'GALS I, pp. 790, 793.
117 ]awahir, p. 43.
118 GALS II, p. 80, no. 3.
119 ]awahir, p. 109. This could be Abu al-I;Iasan 'Abd Allah ibn al-
1:fasan ibn AJ:imad al-Shafi 'i al-Wasiti who died in 1333. He wrote the
Khula{at al-lkszrjfnasab Sayy idihi al-Ghawth al-Rijilf al-Kabzr, GALS II, p.
2 I 3.
1201awa -h"zr, pp. 67, 77, 124.
121 The al-Shatiri is one of the branches of the sayyid families of
l:fa<;lramawt.
122]awahir, p. 121.
24 A COMMENTARY ON THE J:iUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
1209), 123 the great theologian and one of the leaders of the new
kalam; 12 4 Shihab al-Din Abu l:faf� 'Umar al-Suhrawardi (d.
1261), 125 and one of his well known works entitled 'Awarif al
Ma'arif; 126 'Ac;lud al-Din A}:imad ibn 'Abd al-Ra}:iman al-Iji (d.
1335), 127 author of an important work on theology: the Al
Mawaqiffi' llm al-Kalam; 128 and Sayyid al-Sharif'Ali al-Jurjani
(d. 1413), 12 ? who wrote a commentary on al-l]i's Mawaqif. 13 0
IV His writings
Since 1866, when the Dutch scholar Van der Tuuk first
published a list of al-Raniri's writings in the Bijdragen, several
other Dutch scholars have, through the years spanning over a
period of more than a century, gradually and painstakingly
added to the list, making necessary amendments and compiling
their bibliographical details in various catalogues and pub
lications thus bringing to light many of al-Raniri's writings
that were unknown to earlier scholars or were considered lost.
Chief among these scholars to whom credit is due for the most up
to-date work of compiling al-Raniri's writings and preparing
their detailed bibliographical data is P. Voorhoeve, from whose
Lijst der Geschriften van Ranzrzl- 31 the following list is compiled. 132
123 Tibyiin, p. 114.
124 See below, pp. :21:2-:213; GALS I, pp. 9:20-9:2 I.
125 Tibyiin, pp. 89, 9:2.
126 GALS I, pp. 788-789; 789, no. Published in the margin of al
Ghazali's IIJ:yii' (see note 43 above); translated from the Arabic into
Persian by Ma}:lmud ibn 'Ali al-Kashani; and from the Persian into
English by H. Wilberforce Clark, (reprint) Octagon Press, London,
1980.
127 Tib iin, p. 94.
y
12sGAL II, :208; GALS II, p. 287. Published [n.d.] by the 'Alam al
Kutub, Bayrut; Maktabah al-Mutanabbi, Cairo; and Maktabah Sa'd
al-Din, Damascus.
129 Tib iin, p. 94.
y
130 GALS II, p. 304. Shar� al-Mawiiqif, 8v., Cairo, 1325/1907.
1 3 1BK/, l l 1, pp. 15:2-161.
132 We have left out from our list the details on the many manuscripts of
al-Raniri's works listed hen: which were found in the private collections
of scholars, colonial administrators and others now kept in various
INTRODUCTION
1. $irii/ al-Mustaqzrn. This work in Malay was begun in 1634

and completed seven years later. It deals with the science of
practical judgements pertaining to religious practice (al-fiqh), but
treats only those aspects concerned with devotional duties (al
'ibiidiit). The part dealing with those aspects concerned with
practical duties (al-mu'iimalat) was treated later by 'Abd al-Ra'uf
)
al-Sinkili (d. after 1693) in his Mir at al-Tulliib. The $ira/ al
Mustaqim was printed in the margin of the Sabil al-Muhtadin of
Mu}:iammad Arsha<l in Makkah in 1892, and reprinted many
times.
2. Durrat al-Fara) id bi shar� al-'Aqii) id. Cited in nos. 3 and 8
below. A Malay translation, most probably of selected parts
adapted to the spiritual and intellectual requirements of the
people at the time, of Sa'd al-Din Mas'ud ibn 'Umar al
Taftazani's commentary on the' Aqii) id ofNajm al-Din 'Umar al
Nasafi.
3. Hadiyyat al-Jfabzb Ji al-Targhw wa al-Tarhzb. A concise
compendium ofselected traditions ofthe Holy Prophet, in Arabic
and Malay, based on the Kitiib al-Targhzb wa al-Tarhib of'Abd al
'A�im al-Mundhiri (d. 1258), GAL I) 367. Printed under the
title: Al-Fawa) id al-Bahiyah in the margin ofthe Jam' al-Fawi?id of
Dawud ibn 'Abd Allah al-Fatani in Makkah in 1893.
4. Bustiin al-Salii/zn. An encylopaedic work, the only one of
its kind in Malay, begun in 1638. The full title of the work is
Bustan al-Sala/in Ji Dhikr al-Awwalin wa al-Akhirin; 133 in seven
books (sing. biib) each consisting ofseveral divisions or parts (sing.
fa�al). Book I in I o parts deals with the creation of the world.
Printed in Makkah in 1893 under the title: Bad' khalq al-samawiit
wa al-arr/, in the margin of the Taj al-Muluk of Teungku Kuta
_
Karang. Published by R.J. Wilkinson in Singapore in 1899. Book
II in 13 parts deals with the history of the prophets and kings.
libraries of universities and academies, learned societies and museums

in Leiden, Amsterdam, Breda, Deventer, London, Oxford, Berlin,
Tiibingen, Paris, Brussels, Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur. For their
details consult Voorhoeve's Lijst) cited above, under their various
numbers respectively.
1aaBustiin, p. 5.
26 A COMMENTARY ON THE J:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
Parts 2 to IO and the beginning of part 13 were printed and

published by R.J. Wilkinson in Singapore in I goo. Part 12 on the
history of Malacca and Pahang as contained in a Pahang
manuscript, was published by R.O. Winstedt (]SBRAS, 81, pp.
39fol.) The second half of part 13 was published for the most part
in G.K. Niemann's Bloemlezing uit Maleische Geschriften, vol. II
(1907) ; R.A.H. Djajadiningrat, TBG, 57, pp. 566-576; Ph. S.
van Ronkel, BKI, 76, pp. 166-169; R.A.H. Djajadiningrat,
TBG, 69, pp. 112-134, the conclusion by Niemann. The
complete text of part 13 was published by T. Iskandar, DBP
(1966). Book III in 6 parts deals with just kings and wise
ministers. This has been considered lost, but is in fact contained
in the University of Malaya manuscript of the Bustan (Books
I-V; pp. 1-787, no. 41) which was written for Engku 'Abd al
Majid ibn Temenggong Ibrahim, the regent ofJohore, in 1816,
and which was later passed on to his son Engku 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn
'Aho al-Majid (d. 1951), the prime minister ofJohore. Book III
is contained in pp. 292-576 of this copy of the work. Book IV, in 2
parts, deals with pious kings and saints among the righteous. This
is also contained in the copy of the work cited above, in pp.
5 78-689. Book V in 2 parts deals with unjust kings and
tyrannical ministers (ibid., pp. 690-787). Book VI in 2 parts
rleals with generous anrl noble men of courage and the heroes of
Badr and Uhud. Book VII in 5 parts deals with the intelligence
and the various kinds of sciences including physiognomy and
medicine.
5. Nubdhah jz Da'wii al-Zill ma'a �'iibibihi. Polemic work in
Arabic in refutation of the claims of the pseudo-Sufis. Written
between r 637 and 1641, and cited in nos. IO and 12 below.
6. Lafa'if al-Asrar. Cited in nos. 7, 8 and 12. A work on
certain aspects of the Sufi doctrines, about which nothing further
is known.
7. Asriir al-Ins an jz Ma' rifat · al-Rub wa al-Raf? man. Begun in
1640 at the command of Sultan Iskandar Thani and completed
before 1644 during the reign of Sultanah Safiyyat al-Din Shah.
Cited in no. 12 below. Edited by Ny. Tudjimah (thesis),
Djakarta, 1961.
INTRODUCTION
8. Tibyanfi Ma'rifat al-Adyan. A general work clarifying the

distinction between the beliefs of those who possess true faith and
I .
those who deviate therefrom, as reflected in the various religious
sects and the religions. The purpose of writing the book, at the
command of Sultanah $afiyyat al-Din Shah between 1642 and
1644, was the felt need to preserve the faith of those who believe
from going astray in their belief ( Tibyan, p. 6). Printed in a
facsimile edition by P. Voorhoeve with an introduction, analysis,
and apparatus criticus in a publication of the Stichting de Goeje,
no. 16, Leiden, 1955.
9. Akftbiir al-Akhirah fz Abwiil al-Qjyiimah. A work on
eschatology written in 1642, This appears to be al-Raniri's most
popular work, translated many different times into Achehnese
and other Indonesian languages.
10. /fall al-?,ill. Cited in nos. 8 above and 12 below, is a short
treatise in Malay written between 1638 and 1644, adaptedfrom
no. 5 above. It deals with the nature of the world and its creation
according to Sufi metaphysics. Published in facsimile by C.A.O.
van Nieuwenhuijze in BK!, 104; a summary of the contents given
in his thesis (see p. 6, note 6 above) on pp. 203-206. The apparatus
criticus is given in Voorhoeve's Lijst (ibid., pp. 159-161).
11. Ma' al-lfayat li Ahl al-Mamat. In Arabic and Malay.
Cited in no. 12 below. Written between 1638 and 1644.
12. Jawahir al-' Ulum fi Kashf al-Ma'lum. In Malay and
Arabic; written between 1642 and _1644. The conclusion was
written by one of his pupils in 1665. For a brief outline of the
contents, see below, p. 153, note 61.
13. 'Umdat al-I' tiqad. A work on the articles of belief.
14. A work (title unknown) on the nature of the world before
the creation.
15. Shifii' al-Quliib. Published by C.A.O. van Nieuwen
huijze in facsimile in BK!, 104; a summary of contents in his
thesis (see p. 6, note 6 above), pp. 214-216. The apparatus criticus
by Voorhoeve in his Lijst (ibid., p. 161).
16. lfujjat al-$iddzq li daf al-<,indzq. A short treatise written
between 1638 and 1641 clarifying the distinction between the
positions of the theologians, $ufis, philosophers and pseudo-$iifis
on the problem of the ontological relationship between God and

the world. This work is the subject of the present commentary.
Printed in facsimile edition by P. Voorhoeve together with no. 8
above, with a summary of contents and notes in the same
publication cited in the case of no. 8. Printed in facsimile edition
accompanied by a romanized Malay text and an English
translation of the text with notes and a brief interpretation and
discussion of the contents by Syed Muhammad Naquih al-Attas
in Ranzrz and the Wujudiyyah (MMBRAS, no. III): see above, p. 5,
note 3.
17. Fatb al-Mubzn 'ala al-Mulbidzn. This work is only known
from a note of Van der Tuuk recording that he had seen a copy of
the work in Barus (see BKI, 107, p. 359, note 17).
18. Kifiiyat al-$aliit. Taken from no. 1 above.
1 g. It appears from a passage in the Bustan ( no. 4 above) that
al-Ranirihad written a Malay translation ofthe story oflskandar
Dhii al-Qarnayn (see R.O. Winstedt,JMBRAS, 17, III, 1940, p.
64). But see further R.O. Winstedt, A history of classical Malay
literature, 1969, p. 94.
The above list represents al-Raniri's known works in Malay
and Arabic that were written before 1644 in Acheh and in the
Malay Peninsula. After 1644, the date of his return to Ranir, at
least three works in Arabic were recorded by al-l:Iasani in his
Nuzbat al-Khawafir. 134 These were:
1. .L1l-Lama' an bi takfir man qala bi khalq al-Q,ur' an. A work
throwing some light on the charge of unbelief against one who
says that the Holy Qur 'an is c1eated.
2. $awarim al-$iddzq li qa!'i al-,?,indzq. This work seems to be
an Arabic version of the one cited in no. 16 above,
3. Rabiq al-Mubammadiyyahfi /arzq al-$ij,fiyyah. Al-Raniri did
not complete this work, which filled a large volume and which
was, according to al-l:Iasani, his most eloquent work, due to his
death in 1658. It was completed in 1659 by Shaykh $ala}:t al-Din
Ibrahim ibn 'Abd Allah by way of inclusion of a khu/bah.
134 See above, p. 4, note 2. Also Voorhoeve, "Korte Mededelingen" in

BKI, 115, p. go.
INTRODUCTION 29
V. His school of thought.

According to his own account, al-Raniri belonged to the legal
school (madhhab) of al-Shafi'i, which is established as the sole
school ofIslamic law in the Malay world. In theology he-adhered
to the school of al-Ash'ari, whose position is established among
the Sunnz Muslims and provided the foundation for the
development of their epistemology, theology, and metaphysics
including the doctrines on the articles ofbeliefand faith (' aqa'id).
In Sufism he belonged to the blend of Arab and Iranian Sufi
tradition which both traced their teachings to the school of al
Junayd of Baghdad. The 'Aydarusiyyah ta'ifah, 135 or order nf
Sufis, through which he acquired the Rifa'iyyah silsilah is ofgreat
significance in identifying his Sufi position as established upon
the Arab-Iranian tradition, which stressed the excellence of
sobriety (Ia&w) over intoxication (sukr) as a way of knowledge of
the nature ofreality, and which aligned itselfwith the sacred Law
(al-shari' ah), and hence also with the position of the theologians.
In their epistemology, the early theologians affirmed the
possibility ofknowledge and the reality ofthings, and established
sense perception and observation, reason, and authority as
sources and methods of knowledge. The later theologians, under
the influence of al-Ghazali and the Siifis, added intuition as a
further source and method of knowledge. In their theology the
Ash'ariyyah maintained the doctrine of difference (mukhalafah)
between God and the world, and the origination of the world in
time ( i&diith), and God's absolute and exclusive efficacy. The
metaphysics ofatoms and accidents formulated by al-Baqillani is
essentially anti-Aristotelian and Islamic in character. Based on
this metaphysics, the ontology ofthe theologians rejected most of
the Aristotelian Categories; and what was adopted of the
135 The 'Aydarusiyyah {ii'ifah of Tarim was founded by Sayyid Abu

Bakr ibn 'Abd Allah al-'Aydarus, the patron saint of Aden. The al
'Aydarus clan is a derivative of the Ba 'Alawi line of sayyids of
l:fac;lramawt who are descended from A}_lmad ibn 'Isa al-Muhajir (d.
345 A.H.), whose great grandfather, 'Ali al-'Urayc;li (d.:210), was a son
of the Imam Ja'far al-�adiq ( d. 148).
30 A COMMENTARY ON THE I;IUJJAT AL'.'"�IDDIQ,
categories of substance and quality became in their system atom

and accident. An abstract of twelve propositions which
summarize their atomistic metaphysics can be given as follows.
The universe is composed of indivisible atoms which are similar
to one another. They are devoid of magnitude, but when
combined they give rise to bodies. The giving rise to bodies is
called generation, while the separation of the atoms causing the
dissolution of bodies is called corruption. A void exists in which
the combination, separation, and movement of the atoms can
take place. Corresponding to the substantial atoms there exist
time atoms. Inherent in the substantial atoms are accidents,
which do not endure two atoms of time. The substantial atoms
themselves would not in their real nature endure two atoms of
time, just like the accidents which inhered in them, but God
makes the atoms endure for a given time by creating in them the
accident of duration. God creates a substance, that is, atoms
combined as a body, and simultaneously its accidents.
Immediately after its creation it is annihilated and another takes
its place, and so on for as long as God wills. Thus the nature of
Being (i.e. of existents that constitute the world) is discontinuous,
and what is called natural law is in fact God's customary way of
acting. All bodies are composed of similar atoms, the difference in
bodies is caused by the difference in their accidents. The
accidents, which are of a positive and negative kind, such as life
or death, motion or rest, composition or its opposite, and other
such accidents that logically follow from them, are superadded to
substance and accompany the body of necessity. One accident
cannot exist in another; every accident inheres in substance,
which is its substratum. Since God's customary way of acting
constitutes what we call natural law and the Divine will is not
limited by such laws, there is, with the exception of logical
contradictions, unlimited possibility in the world. The notion of
the infinite with respect to bodies and causes are all impossibe.
Since the eleven propositions summarized above in abstract are
not susceptible of proof by sense perception, and since the
testimony of the senses is not always valid, the twelfth proposition
states that the evidence of the senses cannot be accepted in the
INTRODUCTION 31
face of rational proof. The later theologians reexamined many of

the basic premises of the earlier theologians and found some of
the arguments erroneously presented and affirmed the sound
ones; and they maintained that the basic truths that underly the
arguments are not affected by the error in the arguments.
In the continuing dialogue between the theologians in general,
the philosophers and the $iifis on matters relating to
epistemology, theology and metaphysics, there were many
important points on which each group was able to learn and
benefit from one another's thought and effect corrections and
revisions so that concessions were accepted between them. But
there were still fundamental differences between them which I
have explained in the commentary. As far as epistemology is
concerned, and by the time of al-Raniri, the views of the
Ash'ariyyah theologians and the $iifis combined on knowledge is
that knowledge comes from God and is acquired through the
-<'
channels of the sound senses, true narrative, sound reason, and
intuition. This corresponds roughly to what modern Western
thinkers classify as experience, authority, reason and intuition 2.
respectively, although the meanings attached to them as
understood by the Muslim and Western thinkers do not, quite
correspond.
./
The meaning underlying the expression 'sound senses',
. ·7
.· -�
pointing to sense perception and observation is clear enough and
needs no further elaboration here. But as to reason··· being
qualified by soundness, the Muslim thinkers, particularly the
$iifis, understood reason not simply in the sense restricted to ratio;
not merely that mental faculty that systematizes anq interprets
the facts of sensible experience in logical order; or that renders
intelligible and manageable to the understanding the data of
sensible experience, or that performs the abstraction of facts and
sensible data and their relationships, and orders them in a law
giving operation that renders the world of nature
understandable. Indeed, to be sure, reason according to the
Muslim thinkers, is all this, but they say further-particularly
the $iifis-that it is also one of the aspects of the intellect and
functions in conformity with it, and not in opposition to it; and
r·� ·""''.._.................-,.,. ... --.----- ....... -·

-.--�·--v-- ....
32 A COMMENTARY ON THE J::IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
the intellect is a spiritual substance inherent in that spiritual

organ of cognition called the heart, which is the seat of intuition.
In this way and through the mediacy of intellect they connected
reason with intuition.
In the same way that they did not confine reason to ratio, they
did not restrict intuition to the direct and immediate
apprehension, by the knowing subject, of itself, of its conscious
states, of other selves, of an external world, of universals, of values
and of rational truths; but they understood by intuition
particularly the Sufis-also the direct and immediate
apprehension of religious truths, of the reality and existence of
God, of the reality ( for the Sufis alone) of existences as opposed to
quiddities-indeed, in its higher levels as experienced by the
Sufis, intuition is the intuition of existence itself. Intuition at the
higher levels does not just come to anyone, but to one who has
lived his life in the experience of religious truth by sincere,
practical devotion to God; who has understood the nature of the
Divine oneness, and what this oneness implies in an integrated
metaphysical system; who has constantly meditated upon the
nature of this reality; and who then, during deep meditation and
by God's will, is made to pass away from consciousness of his self
and his subjective states and to enter into the state of higher
selfhood, subsisting in God. When he returns to his subjective,
human condition, he loses what he has found, but the knowledge
of it remains with him. It is in the duration of his subsistence in
God, when he gains his higher selfhood, that the direct and
immediate apprehension takes place. He has been given a
glimpse of reality in that duration of coincidence with the Truth.
In his case the cognitive content of his intuition of existence
reveals to him the integrated system of reality as a whole.
As to true narrative as a channel through which knowledge is
acquired, it is of two kinds: that which is in sequence and
continuity established by the tongues of people of whom it is
inconceivable that they would agree together on a falsehood; and
that which is brought by the Messenger of God. Authority, which
is invested by general agreement in the first kind of true
narrative, and which includes that of scholars, scientists, and men
INTRODUCTION 33
ofknowledge generally, may be questioned by the methods of
reason and experience. But the authority of the second kind of
true narrative, which is also affirmed by general assent, is
absolute. Authority is grounded ultimately upon experience, by
which is meant both: that in the order of sense and sensible or
empirical reality, and that in the order of transcendental reality,
such as intuition at the higher levels.
Although there are aspects of similarity in the positions of the
theologians and the $iifis on the nature of reality, and there are
also many points on which they concurred, the fundamental
differences between them seem irreconcilable. But the position of
the $iifis, in this case of the school of the transcendent oneness of
existence (wa�dat al-wujiid), who represent ta�awwuf at its
highest intellectual and spiritual levels, is unique in that the
fundamental differences between them and the theologians, and
indeed between their two groups and the philosophers, can
indeed be reconciled if the theologians and the philosophers,
whose view of reality is generally essentialistic, were to recognize
and acknowledge the existentialistic basis of reality on which the
Sufi position is established. We have already given an abstract of
the elaborate Ash'ariyyah theory of material and time atoms,
formulated into a complete system of atomistic metaphysics to
explain the origin and nature of the universe. This theory,
particularly the renewal of accidents in the perpetual creation
and the denial of a necessary connection between cause and
effect, is also upheld by the $iifis, with whom the Ash'ariyyah
were closest in ontological outlook. The fundamental difference
between the Ash'ariyyah and the $iifis is that for the $iifis the
material atoms are not material, nor are they substances, but like
everything else they come under the category of accidents or
events that do not endure two atoms of time: they are of the
nature of little cosmos of motions that produce things. It is
important to clarify the basic matter of ontological outlook which
determined their fundamental divergence of views. This basic
matter of ontological outlook may be raised by posing the
question: Is it quiddity or is it existence that is fundamentally real?
By 'fundamentally real' is meant 'having a corresponding reality
34 A COMMENTARY ON THE J:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ_
in the external world'.

The Sufis took the same position as the philosophers and the
theologians in affirming the reality of things that constitute the
world, and hence also the reality of the world, as established, in
contradiction to the Sophists. Likewise they concurred on the
problems connected with the nature of existence in relation to
reality as known by means of rational analysis and
demonstration. They agreed that, according to the level of
knowledge based upon reason and sense perception, which the
Sufis also affirmed as valid criteria for the verification of truths
and which they themselves applied in their own investigations,
existence is a single, general and abstract concept common to all
existences that become multiple due to a rational division into
portions corresponding to things in the course of its being
attributed to quiddities; and that the meaning of 'reality', in the
sense of there being in the external world something actual to
which it corresponds, pertains only either to the existence or the
quiddity ot a thing, one of them being a secondary intelligible (i.e.
a concept of a concept) to which nothing in the external world
corresponds. Existence in this sense, they agreed, is the mental
entity having no corresponding reality in the external world.
But the Sufis attested further, in significant contrast to the
philosophers and the theologians, that in addition to existence in
the above sense, that is, as a pure concept, and as based upon
clear mystical revelation and true intuition founded upon the
authority of the Holy Qur'an and the Tradition as well as upon
reason and experience, there is another entity corresponding to it
which is not mental but real; and this other entity is the reality of
existence, by which existence as pure concept comes to inhere in
the mind as one of its effects.
Thus the position of the theologians in general and the
philosophers regarding the nature of existence and its relation to
separate, dissimilar realities in the external world which we call
'things' is that existence is a general, abstract concept common to
all existences, that is, to everything and to anything without
exception. The mind, when regarding external realities we call
'things', can first abstract them from existence, and then
INTRODUCTION 35
predicate existence of them; it therefore attributes to things what
it considers to be their property of existence, so that existence is
then regarded as something superadded to, accidental to, or
subsisting in things. In this mental process, the single, general
and abstract concept of existence becomes multiple due to being
divided into portions corresponding to things. The existences of
things are these portions; and these portions, along with the
general, abstract concept of existence which is essential to, and
inherent in them, are external to the quiddities or essences of
things and only mentally superadded to them. According to this
perspective existence is merely something mentally posited,
something purely conceptual, whereas quiddities are real and are
realized extramentally.
But according to the truer perspective of the Siifis, there is
another entity which is the reality and not the concept of existence.
Existence as reality is not something static like existence as
concept; it perpetually involves itself in a dynamic movement of
ontological self-expression, articulating its inner possibilities in
gradations from the less determinate to the more deter:minate
until it appears at the level of concrete forms such that the
particular existences, which we regard as multiple and diverse
'things' having separate, individual 'quiddities', are nothing but
the modes and aspects of the reality of existence. From this
perspective, the so-called quiddity or 'essence' is nothing more
than a mental construct, an entity in concept only and not in
reality; whereas the existence of a thing is real. The· real and true
quiddity or essence of a thing, according to the �iifis, is existence
as individuated into a particular mode. The reality of existence is
identified by the $iifis as the absolute Existence, or as the Truth.
This Reality or Truth is perpetually involved in a dynamic
existential movement of expansion, as the Holy Qur'an says:
'Every day He is involved in activity" (55:29); descending in
analogical gradations from its absoluteness to the planes of
created beings and encompassing all existents in these planes. Its
encompassing and its expansion over them is its appearance in
their multiple and diverse forms; and their multiple and diverse
forms are no other than its own limitations. of itself without
36 A COMMENTARY ON THE l;IDJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
affecting its essential oneness; for they arise out ofthe depths of its
own inner possibilities that become actualized when infused by
it. Thus the manifestations of the Reality in the realms of
contingency, in view ofthe multiplicity and diversity ofthe forms
in whose guise it appears and in accordance with their natures
and not as it is in itself, make the Reality itself increasingly
hidden.
The manifold and diverse self-manifestations ofthe Reality are
never repeated in the same forms, but in similar forms, with one
exception that will be explained in due course. These forms are
then continually appearing and disappearing in a successive
series; their appearing is their coming into existence, and their
disappearing is their return to nonexistence. The same world
which is constituted by these ephemeral forms cannot in reality
be experienced twice at two atoms of time, for at each atom of
time a new world has come into existence. Thus what is seen and
experienced is the ever new creation; and serial time is born out of
this perpetual process. The discontinuous nature of the world as it
is in itself reveals that it in each 'moment' of itself has real
existence, 'real' in the sense of 'being-subsistent' in each moment
of itself. But the world as the. mind conceives it, which in reality is
composed of myriad worlds continually appearing to the
imagination as one and the same independent, self-subsistent
world because of the continual process of the renewal of similars
involved in its creation, this world is imaginary and has no
existence except in the mind. The $iifis refer to the world as non
eternal, something that was new, that existed newly, for the first
time, not having been before, something recently originated. The
reality underlying the world is its existence in that atomic
duration.
We have said that the $iifis of this school did not deny the
realities ofthings, and in their affirmation ofrealities they made a
distinction between the Reality or Truth, theologically expressed
as God, and what is other than God. This most important point
can only be understood when we apprehend their position on the
double nature of the Divine Names and Attributes, which briefly
stated is as follows.
INTRODUCTION 37
All the Divine Names, unlimited in their number, have two
aspects: (I) they are identical with God when they refer to His
Essence, but (2) they are distinct from God when they refer to
their own intrinsic meanings. This second aspect of the Divine
Names derives such a nature because each Name has a special
meaning pertaining only to itself; and it follows that each is
distinct from the other and from God. When considered as
pertaining to itself in this way, each Divine Name is an Attribute.
By virtue of the essential property of distinctness inherent in each
Attribute, a reality from among the realities of the Divine Names
bPromes manifest in the consciousness of God. This becoming
manifest to Him in this way is its existence in His knowledge.
Realities, which are distinct from each other and from God, are
therefore constituted by the Divine Attributes.
Now the Attributes also have a dual aspect: one describes the
Divine Essence and is identical with it (because this aspect.is in
effect the first aspect of the Divine Names); the other describes
itself, or rather, it describes the Essence as qualified by it-no, as
the Essence qualifies itself by it. The former is ei.ernal; the latter is
noneternal. It is from this latter aspect of the Divine Attributes
thatthe realities of things are constituted. Realities, then, are real
essences or true quiddities whose plane of existence is in that of
the Attributes. They never become externalized, but remain
always in their interior condition in the Divine consciousness.
They are called the fixed essences or the permanent archetypes.
We said earlier that the self-manifestations of God as the Reality
are never repeated in the same forms, but in similar forms; and
that there is an exception to the internal structure of this
annihilation and renewal process which involves all things. Not
only the universe together with all its parts, but even the world of
spirits, the permanent archetypes-even the realities are
continually annihilated and renewed, continually appearing and
disappearing. But there is a decisive distinction between the
annihilation and renewal and the appearing and disappearing of
the realities and that of the world that they project. Whereas in
the case of the world it is new every moment, and each new world
is a different, though similar one in relation to the one preceding
it in such wise that the world is ever perishing; the realities are
reconstituted, reformulated, and made to appear in the same
forms or in their original identities. That is why they are referred to
as.fixed essences or permanent archetypes; for it is only because they
are thus fixed and permanently established in the Divine
consciousness that they can become intelligibles in the Divine
· knowledge; and it is only because of their fixed and permanent
nature that they can be defined as realities, for in relation to the
world that they project they are more real than the world. The
expression 'more real than the world' in the above explanation
referring to the realities alludes to their abiding nature as
conveyed by the term baqii': 'subsistent', which has been pointed
out earlier with reference to the meaning of 'real' existence. The
realm of the archetypes, then, the abode of realities, in
comparison with the present, ever-perishing world, "is better and
more abiding (abqa' (87:17).Just as the process of renewal in the
perpetual creation creates in us our notion of time, so the same
process constitutes our consciousness and identity as grounded
upon our abiding realities, for without being grounded upon
something abiding there would be no consciousness, no identity.
And in the same way the continual renewal of the realities in their
original identities constitutes the Divine consciousness. In view of
their abiding nature the realities are designated as neither eternal
(qadzm) nor noneteral (muf;dath). They are not eternal because of
their being subject to annihilation and renewal; and they are not
noneternal because of their being renewed in their original
identities; so that whereas the world is perpetually in the state of
ontological evanescence (fanii'), the realities are perpetually
regaining the state of ontological subsistence (baqii'). Now in this
analysis of the nature of the Divine Attributes, the $iifis have
given meaning to the theologians' paradoxical statement that the
attributes "are not God, nor are they other than God". The plane
of the Attributes, in which the permanent archetypes and realities
inhere, represents in the Sufi vision of reality the third
metaphysical category between existence and nonexistence.
The realities too have a dual nature: they are on the one hand
active determinants, and on the other hand passive recipients of
INTRODUCTION 39
existence. At the level of sense and sensible experience the
realities of things are the effects of the concomitants of
potentialities inherent in the interior aspect of the archetypes that
have descended to the level of empirical things. That is to say,
they are the expansion of Existence, evolving itself into particular
and individual modes, as it descends and encompasses the
archetypes, and expands over their potentialities, concomitants
and effects through the exterior aspect of the archetypes,
becoming the things that we see and behold. Thus in view of the
various degrees of descent through which the reality of existence
expands in its perpetual process of existential movement, the
ontological reality of the realities of things that are infused with it
is relative to the ontological reality of the realities in the degree
preceding them, such that they become more real as they ascend
and approach their sources in the interior archetypes, In other
words, the reality of the realities is more real at the level of the
interior archetypes than at the level of the exterior archetypes;
and similarly, it is more real at the level of the exterior archetypes
than at the level of sense and sensible experience. Yet their reality
at the level of sense and sensible experience is nonetheless real;
and the multiplicity and diversity of existents in the external
world are therefore realities, even if their being-existent is only for
an atom of time; and despite their being continually replaced by
similars, their retention of their identities is precisely due to their
realities which are permanently established as the archetypes.
Now the archetypes, as we have seen, have in themselves a
twofold aspect, since they reflect what is inherent in the original
nature of the Divine Names and Attributes. Thus the realities,
when viewed as so many predispositions of the Divine Essence are
identical with it; and when viewed as the multiple and diverse
determinations and individuations of these predispositions are
other than it; they are identical with the Essence in point of
existence and reality, but other than it in point of determination
and individuation. God as the Truth or the Reality, that is, the
absolute Existence, is then not identical with the things that we
see and behold-just as He is not identical with His Names and
Attributes when they represent His qualification of Himself in
40 A COMMENTARY ON THE J:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ
their forms; for qualified as such He is not as He is in Himself. God

as He is in Himself is above being qualified even by absoluteness,
as He is in that degree unconditioned by any condition, and
therefore unknown and unknowable except to Himself.
From the foregoing explanation it is already clear to those
possessed of understanding that the Siifis asserted that God
cannot be likened to created things; that He is neither substance,
nor body, nor accident; that He is neither in a place nor in time;
that He is not a recipient for accidents, nor is He a locus for
originated things-even though He sometimes appears as if He
were a unique 'substance' or 'substratum' in which inhere all
accidents, and at other times as ifHe were the 'accidents' inhering
in that 'substratum'.
The world, then, also has a double aspect: (I) as the mind
conceives it to be; as something having continuance in existence,
subsisting independently, and composed of quiddities to which
existence is conceptually superadded as seen from the
essentialistic viewpoint of the metaphysics of substance and
accident. This aspect of the world is based on the ordinary level of
perception and conception, and the philosophical as well as
scientific development ofit into an interpretation ofthe nature of
reality is nothing but a sophisticated elaboration of the ordinary
level of reason and experience. The world in this aspect is
essentially nothing; not only because the quiddities that are made
to comprise it are merely mental in nature, but also because it is
ever-perishing, and only the perpetual renewal of its similars
creates in the mind the notion ofits continuance in existence as if
it were a self-subsistent, independent entity possessed of being.
The other aspect of the world is: (2) as it comes into existence at
each moment of itself independent of the mind. Each moment of
itself is discontinuous, a moment which is its 'being-existent': it
only is in that atomic duration, it being replaced by another
similar to it, and that other by yet another perpetually.
Everything involved in this series of the renewal of its creation
retains its unity and identity as that particular thi ng owing to its
reality or archetype, over which and in which form Existence
expands from the level of its absoluteness to the levels of its
INTRODUCTION 41
determinations and individuations in evermore concrete forms.

The archetype itself-though it too undergoes the renewal
process-retains its original identity and remains always in the
interior condition of Being. This second aspect of the world is
real, and has itself two aspects: ( 1) as existence itself, in which
case it is the absolute Existence as it involves itself in dynamic
movement; (2) as modes of existence, in which case it is the
individuations of absolute Existence that have descended to the
level of sense and sensible experience. Thus when the $iifis
asserted that the world is of the nature of an illusion, that it is
something imagined-an assertion that has confused many,
including ibn Khaldun-they were merely referring to the first
aspect of the world: that which the mind represents to our
cognition. What the mind 'ontologizes' to be the world-that is
sheer illusion. But the second aspect of the world which, in turn,
has a dual aspect-this is the world as it really is. The $iifis
arrived at this knowledge not by means of rational analysis and
demonstration alone, but by a direct intuition of existence.
Those who have experienced the intuition of existence are of
two types. The first are those who have experienced a partial
intuition of existence, in which they directly apprehend only the
first of the second aspect of the reality of the world as I have stated
above. Because their experience has left them the apprehension
only of the absolute Existence, in which particular and individual
existences, including their own, subjective consciousness, have all perished,
they become prone, when they regain their individual
consciousness, to the denial of the reality of particular and
individual existences and the affirmation of the oneness of
absolute Existence alone. But in spite of this, however, they know
that their intuition of existence is only a partial one, and therefore
incomplete, and their denial of particular and individual
existences is only personal to them, and not meant to be
understood as corresponding to the actual nature of reality. The
second type are those who have experienced a complete intuition of
existence, in which they directly apprehend both the two aspects
of the second aspect of the reality of the world. In the duration of
their intuitive experience, they have been given a fuller glimpse
of the Reality. They witness the absolute Existence in the process of

its dynamic movement, in which its inner articulations are revealed
to them. These articulations are the appearance and
disappearance and reappearance of the modes and aspects of
absolute Existence out of the inner depths of its oneness without
that oneness being in any way affected by any change in its nature
or unity. They see with the eye of the heart as ifit were by ocular
vision, the One individuating itselfinto the Many while yet being
One; and the disappearing Many being made to reappear, some
in their original and others in similar forms. They who experience
this vision have passed away from their human, subjective
condition and have gained higher selfhood: they are at the level
of their realities in the realm of the archetypes.
It is from the experience of the second type of intuition, which
includes and is a stage beyond the first type, that the nature of
reality as an integrated system is formulated by those who have
experienced it. They affirm the existence and reality both of the
absolute Existence (God) and its modes and aspects (the world),
and distinguish the one from the other. Existence as a concept,
such as affirmed by the essentialist, can only be conceived as a
principle of unity; while essence or quiddity, which the
essentialist considered to be real, can only be the principle of
diversity. Indeed, quiddity, by its very nature, is that which
makes a thing what it is to be different from another, while the
concept of existence is common to all things. But neither the one
nor the other can be both the principle of unity and diversity
together. Only existence as reality is the principle at once both of
unity and diversity, for existence as reality is that by which things
are united in identity, and at the same time it is also that by which
things differ from one another.
The second type of the intuition of existence reveals that the
nature of reality is twofold, characterized by complementary
opposites involved in dynamic, existential movement. In
metaphysical terms, it is the dynamic movement of Existence,
described in terms of expansion and contraction or 'descent' and
'ascent', involving the One and the Many; the Absolute and the
Determinate; the Eternal and the Noneternal. In between the
INTRODUCTION 43
two complementary opposites is a third category between being
and nonbeing which is neither Eternal nor Noneternal, and this
is the realm of the Archetypal Realities. In connection with the
dynamic, existential movement of descent and ascent, or
expansion and contraction, that gives rise to the ever-new
creation, I said earlier that the nature of serial time is subjective;
and I said above that the man who experiences the intuition of
existence is at the level of the archetypal realities. Now the loss of
the subjective, human condition in the intuitive experience must
also involve the loss of serial time; and the finding of the higher
selfhood in the second type of intuitive experience involves
coming to be in a time without past or future, a time which is
something of the nature of eternity. To this refers the definition of
intuition of this type when one of the great $ufis who experienced
it said: "It is a coincidence between the two opposites."
When the $ufis say that the Truth, which is one of the Names of
God, is the reality of existence, they are speaking in metaphysical
terms referring to the Absolute as it manifests itself in all the
planes of existence. They are not implying thereby th,:i t God has
no individuality, or that He is a vast, vague, pervasive and
dynamic Being, contrary to the theological God of religion. On
the contrary, they affirm individuality of God; for it is not
inconsistent for the Absolute to have an individuation as God in
the way that He has described Himself according to His Beautiful
Names and Sublime Attributes. This individuation is at the plane
of the Divine Oneness, whose self-revealing aspect 1s
characterized by the names and attributes of divinity.
The foregoing summary of the salient features of the position of
the $ufis on the nature of reality can be traced back in its basic
form of expression to the school of al-J unayd. This school of $ufis
presented the vision of reality as they envisaged it based on the
second type of the intuition of existence. They were the true
wujiidiyyah, who affirmed the transcendent unity of existence
( wa�dat al-wujiid'). Among the notable early representatives of this
school of $ufis after al-J unayd were Abu Na�r al-Sarraj, 'Ali al
Hujwiri, Abu al-Qasim al-Qushayri and 'Abd Allah al-An�ari.
To this school also belonged al-Ghazali. But their chief exponent
44 A COMMENTARY ON THE I,IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ.
was ibn 'Arabi, who first formulated what was originally given in
the intuition of existence into an integrated metaphysics
expressed in rational and intellectual terms. Among his erudite
commentators w;ere Siifis such as $adr al-Din al-Qunyawi, 'Abd
al-Razzaq al-Qashani, Dawiid al-Qay�ari, 'Abd al-Ra}:lman al
Jami; and his doctrine of the Perfect Man ( al-insiin al-kiimil) was
developed by 'Abd al-Karim al-Jili. The philosophical
expression of the transcendent unity of existence was formulated
by Sadr al-Din al-Shirazi, called Mulla Sadra. As a $iifi, al
Raniri belonged to this school, and this becomes evident in the
present commentary.
-we mentioned earlier that the-A:sh--'-ariyyah- theologians-were
the closest to the $iifis of this school in ontological outlook. We
also pointed out that their fundamental difference, on which
other differences followed, revolved around the problem of
whether it is quiddity or it is existence that is fundamentally real.
Now the theologians generally affirmed the primacy of quiddity
or essence over existence, and their perspective on this most
important matter is therefore essentialistic. But the position of the
Ash'ariyyah was somewhat ambivalent on this matter: they
considered that essence and existence are indistinguishable. This
position cannot really be defended, as we have shown in the
commentary. It is, however, significant in showing that the
position of the Ash'ariyyah as a whole already implied the
transcendent unity of existence (wa�dai al-wujiiq) as affirmed by
the $iifis. Moreover, apart from the similarity with the position of
the $ufis in certain departments of their metaphysics of atoms
and accidents, there were similarities also in their respective
statements on the creed and the articles of belief and faith, and in
the affirmation of God's exclusive efficacy. Because of their
preponderance towards essentialism, the Ash'ariyyah had to
affirm the doctrine of God's difference from originated things.
The $iifis, since they were established in their existentialism,
maintained that God is different from originated things in point
of determination and individuation, but not different from them
in point of existence and reality; for the reality of existence can
become the principle at once both of the One and the Many,
INTRODUCTION 45
without the One becoming the Many or the Many becoming
the One. Again, the essentialistic position of the theologians
demanded the affirmation of the doctrine of creation from
nothing, denying thereby the third metaphysical category
between being and nonbeing, which is the realm of possibilities,
such as the archetypal realities affirmed by the $iifis. But since the
theologians transferred infinite possibilities to God Himself they
were in fact approaching the position of the $ufis, only that their
essentialism prevented them from arriving at the same truth.
Furthermore, the problem of determinism in human destiny can
only find its explanation in thP nature of the archetypal realities.
On the Divine Unity the Ash'ariyyah affirmed of Him real
attributes superadded to the Essence both in the mind and
externally. Thus, while they denied any compositio11 in the
Essence, they nevertheless denied an absolute simplicity in it,
such as affirmed by the philosophers. The $ufis too affirmed of
Him real attributes superadded to the Essence, but not
externally, nor yet only in the mind. We have already indicated.
this in our explanation on the double nature of the Divine Names
and Attributes and in the commentary; and have also pointed out
that for the $ufis the Attributes are manifestations of the Essence
in the external world appearing as separate and concrete
existential entities. Moreover, in terms of the degrees of the
'descent' of the Absolute in analogical gradations as formulated
by the $iifis, the Divine Unity as understood by the theologians
corresponds in the $ufi scheme to the level of wii�idiyyah in the
planes of the first and second determination and individuation,
where the Absolute as God is already invested with the names
and attributes ofdivinity. The $ufis therefore affirmed a higher,
unmanifested and hence unknown level of the Divine Unity, in
which the Essence is only known to itself.
From this summary statement of the significant similarities
and dissimilarities in the positions of the $ufis and the theologians
on the nature of reality and of God, the reason why most or all of
the Sunnz $ufis of this school also endorsed the Ash'ariyyah
theology and metaphysics should already become clear. For it is
because the $ufis considered the interpretation of the
Ash'ariyyah, insofar as it pertains to the ordinary, albeit sophisticated,

level of reason and of sense and sensible experience, to be the one that
coincided closest with the truth. The Siifis considered that the
Ash'ariyyah interpretation is true at this level, which is the level
ofthe generality ofmankind, where everyone is an essentialist in
his perception oftruth in accordance with the natural disposition
of the mind.
VI. His influence in the Malay world.

Al-Raniri was a Sufi, theologian, historian, man ofletters, and
missionary par excellence. His influence in the Malay world was
tremendous, and has never before been properly understood or
correctly assessed and acknowledged.
As far as we know at the present time, and as demonstrated in
our commentary, he was the first man in the Malay world to
clarify in Malay the distinction between the true and the false
interpretation of Sufi theosophy and metaphysics. Earlier
attempts, such as the debate of r 580 on the nature of the
archetypes followed by al-Burhanpuri's simplification of the
problem in his Tuhfah at the beginning ofthe r 7th century, did not
touch upon the philosophical crux of the matter relating to the
fundamental reality of existence as opposed to quiddity as the
basic condition [or the sound understamling of Sufi metaphysics.
Moreover, the debate: �nd al-Burhanpuri's work were in Arabic.
It is true that the interpretation ofSufi doctrines and metaphysics
was already discerned in the pioneering works of l:famzah al
Fan�uri followed by those of Shams al-Din al-Sumatra'i; but
their works did not clearly distinguish between the problem of the
Divine and the human natures; between God and the world;
between the Reality and the realities. In this respect al-Raniri
overshadowed them all. The accomplishment of such a difficult
intellectual task effected a corrective measure in the
understanding of Sufism which played a paramount role in the
process of islamization and its standardization and
intensification. Similarly, in the understanding of the articles of
belief (al-'aqii'id) and the theology ofthe Ash'ariyyah representing
INTRODUCTION 47
the Sunni world, although we know that the short creed of al
N asafi ( Mukhta�ar al-' Aqi?id) was already being taught and
studied in the Malay world at the end of the 16th century, it
would be impossible-even in Malay translation-for its
students and teachers to understand its intended meanings and
full implications without its commentary. It was al-Raniri who
first prepared a Malay translation or partial translation of the
best commentary on the creed by al-Taftazani (see above, p. 25,
no. 2; the work is now lost); and this was no simple task
considering its highly intellectual contents. Among its subjects
are the affirmation of the reality of things and the possibility of
knowiedge; the sources of knowledge; the atomistic metaphysics
of substance and accident; creation and the doctrine of perpetual
creation; the Divine attributes; belief and the various articles of
belief-which all are among the most important elements of '
islamization. Apar� from the consolidation of the sacred Law, al
Raniri's tireless efforts manifested in his prolific writings also
made a lasting impression which contributed greatly to the
dissemination of spiritual and cultural refinement (adab) in the
Malay world. In his �'iriif al-Mustaqzm, for example-a work
which has been printed many times and is still popular-al
Raniri wrote, among other subjects dealing with the basic
essentials of Islam, about rules regarding religious duties such as
ablutions, prayer, fasting, the zakiit; rules with regard to lawful
and unlawful food; on the burial of the dead; personal cleanliness
and purity such as cleaning of the teeth, cutting of nails,
defilements; on the correct form of dress. He also wrote regarding
pilgrimage, invocation, thejihiid; on moral vices and virtues; the
unlawfulness of usury; the excellence of justice, the intelligence
and the sciences. He wrote a book on laws regulating marriage
and divorce which, together with the �'iriif, exerted considerable
influence in the islamization of Kedah (see above, pp. g-II). He
compiled in Malay a concise compendium of the Traditions
which he translated from the Arabic for convenient use. He also
wrote on eschatology and comparative religion and, in addition to
$iifi theosophy and metaphysics, he directed effective polemics
against the dualism, pantheism and monism of pseudo-$iifis and
48 A COMMENTARY ON THE I;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ
extremists of various sorts. His writings in Malay on theology and

the essentials of Islam, the sacred Law governing its practical
application and the moral and ethical principles deriving from it
were the first of such writings to appear in the Malay world. He
thus set an important precedent and a worthy example for the
writers of similar works who followed after him. There can be no
doubt that no other man in the Malay world has contributed so
much in the field of Islamic knowledge and learning than al
Raniri. From the perspective of islamization, he played the
greatest role in consolidating the religion among the Malays, and
made a lasting contribution to their spiritual and intellectual
quality oflife. Al-Raniriwas one of the greatest figures oflslam in
the Malay world.
His influence in the field of Malay literature was no less
profound. His Bustiin al-Saliifzn is the largest book in Malay ever
written. Copies of parts of this encyclopaedic work have been
found all over the Malay world. A complete copy of the work has
never been found. Through this work al-Raniri exerted
considerable influence in the field of Malay letters and historical
writing. In fact he was the first writer in Malay to present history
in universal perspective and to initiate scientific, modern Malay
historical writing.
Finally, through his prolific writings in Malay, al-Raniri
contributed much to the development, modernization and
islamization of th':' Malay language as a vehicle of scientific
knowledge and learning. 136
VI I. The text of the lfUJj"at al-$iddzq li daf' al-,Zindzq.

The only known copy of the complete Malay-Arabic text of
the lfuJjat al-$iddzq is found in a manuscript of the Maxwell
Collection no. 93 in the library of the Royal Asiatic Society,
London. 137 The text referred to is on pp. I 19-145 of the
136 See the reference in note I 5 above, and further, my Islam dalam
sejarah dan kebudayaan Melayu, Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan
Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, 1972, pp. 40-50.
137 The Dutch scholar van der Tuuk mentioned this work of al-Raniri in
INTRODUCTION 49
manuscript, of which the first part contains the well-known

Malay manual on the articles of faith and some principal
religious duties entitled: Bidayat al-Mubtadzbifarj.l Allah al-Muhdz.
The date of completion of copying the text of the /-fujjat al
$iddzq is given by the copyist 'Abd al-Aziz as the 12th ofSha'ban
1186 on a Sunday afternoon, which corresponds to Sunday the
10th of November 1772.
As I pointed out earlier, the J-fujjat al-$iddiq was reproduced in
facsimile and published with a brief summary of contents and
notes in Dutch by P. Voorhoeve in 1955. 138 In 1960 I prepared a
romanized Malay edition of the text with notes and an annotated
English translation. They were subsequently published in 1966,
.
together with a facsimile of the text, an introduction� and an
interpretation and discussion of al-Raniri's refutation ofl:famzah
al-Fan�iiri and the pseudo-Siifis. 139
In the present book I have prepared my own edited
transcription of the text of the facsimile with brief notes. My
translation of the text is based on my original translation of 25
years ago, with some changes made in order to improve it. The
translation is rendered as literal as possible for the purpose of
commentary. Footnotes in the text are mostly al-Raniri's glosses,
which are indicated, and which are found on the margin of the
original copy of the text. A few brief notes referring only to
textual irregularities are mine.
BKI 1 3 ( 1866)., p. 464. He also reported seeing an Arabic text of the

work in a manuscript of the former Batavia Society. This text, long
missing, was found again ( KGB 420 Mal.) and is now kept in the library
of the National Museum at Jakarta. In comparison with the full text in
the Maxwell Collection, it seems that the copyist may have copied only
the Arabic words and their meanings from a complete Malay text
similar to that of the Maxwell text. This text is therefore incomplete and
disjointed, and cannot serve as a basis for comparison with thefull text,
except only in the case of the Arabic words. See Voorhoeve, op. cit.
(Stichting de Goeje no. 16, 1955), p. 37 (3).
138 Twee Mal-eise Geschriften van Niiruddm ar-Ranfrz, Stichting de Goeje no.
16, Leiden, Brill, 1955. See above, p. 27, no. 8; p. 28, no. 16.
139
See above, p. 5, note. 3.
VIII. Notes on the signs and symbols used.

In the text, Arabic numerals in square brackets refer to
pagination in the original copy. Roman numerals on the right
hand margin refer to the division into paragraphs for the purpose
of commentary. In the translation, Arabic numerals in round
brackets refer to pagination, and Roman numerais on the ieft
hand margin refer to the division into paragraphs in
correspondence with the text.
In the introduction, translation and commentary, a word or
words in brackets, whether Arabic, Malay or otherwise refer to a
word or words used by al-Raniri in the text or in other texts of his
works that have been consulted; or to those used among the $iifis,
theologians, and philosophers in their works. English words or
phrases in brackets refer to my own insertions.
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TRANSLATION
Proof of the Veracious

in refutation of the Zindzq
by
Al-Shaykh Nur al-Dzn al-Ranzrz
Translation
(1) In the Name ofGod,1 Most Merciful, Most Compassionate
I. Every praise be to God, to Whom all praise is due!

In the ocean of His generosity the souls are drowned,
And through His bounty He has bestowed upon them His
succour;
They are those from amongst the Prophets and the
Veracious.
II. He has established their veracity by true verification,
And by the affirmation of their faith they separated the true
from the false,
They identified their realities accurately
As even thus did they record their knowledge and clarify the
Way.
III. And so, whosoever has the fine succour of God
Follows them; and if not, he indeed becomes a follower of
the Deviator and the Zindiq.
And blessings and peace be upon the compassionate
Prophet,
And upon his Family and ( 2) his Companions who are
People of Certainty.
IV. To proceed: Thus speaks he who passes round the Cup of
the Messenger ofGod, who may God bless and give peace, the
Shaykh Nur al-Din ibn 'Ali ibn J:Iasan-Ji ibn Mu}:l.ammad
J:Iamid ofRanir and ofthe School ofal-Shafi'i: When disputation
arose among some of the muta'aHibin 2 and the mu'anidzn 3 from
--- --- -·-··-
1Throughout the translation and the commentary, the word 'God'

refers to Allah.
2 Al-Raniri's gloss (�iishiyah) on the margin of the text: (Those who
engage in) opposition toward the correction of erroneous religion.

3 Al-Raniri's gloss: (Those who engage in) the setting up of erroneous
among those who are ignorant and wicked (al-sufahiP) concerning

· the question of (God's) Being (wujud: existence) and the relation
ofthe world with the Truth (al-&aqq) Most Exalted, some ofmy
friends among the many high-ranking personages-may God
preserve them and may they, by the grace of our Master
Mu]:iammad to whom be granted the blessings and peace ofGod,
be strengthened in the religion ofIslam!-requested me (to write
a treatise clarifying the issues involved). So I now compose in
Malay this treatise, whose contents I have culled from the books
of the $ufis and others, and entitle it: Proof of the Veracious in
refutation ofthe ,Zindzq. (3) In this treatise I mention the beliefs and
teachings ( i' tiqiid) of four groups, namely: the Mutakallimin
(theologians) and the Siifis, (mystics) the Falasifah (philosophers)
and those who cleave to the doctrines of the deviating (mul&id)
Wujudiyyah (existentialists), in exposition of (their respective
positions on the question of) the relationship between God's
Being and the world, (whether His Being is) identical with it or
whether this is not so, as will be further explicated.
V. I shall now begin by elucidating the meaning of 'being'
(wujud), and that is 'essence' (dhiit); that is, the 'constituent
determinant' (keadaan) of a thing. 4 This essence is at times
perceptible to the eyes, such as the world, 5 and at times not
perceptible to the eyes, but is established by reason (' aql) and by
sacred Law (shar'), 6 or by spiritual unveiling (kashj) and tasting
( dhawq). 7 This (essence) is the Being of God.
religion.
4 Al-Raniri's gloss: i.e. the very self (diri) of a thing.
5 Al-Raniri's gloss: i.e. (the essence becomes perceptible to the ocular
vision due to) the presence (to God: �u(j,iir) of (the heart of) the true
servant (' abd) by constant rememberance (or uninterrupted
contemplation: sentiasa dengan ingat) of the Truth Most Exalted such
that he directly experiences (lit: tastes, dhawq: rasa) God's mysteries
(asrar).
6 Al-Raniri's gloss: i.e. the Words of God (firman Allah: the Holy
Qur'an), the Sayings (�adzth) of the Messenger of God, and the

Consensus ( ijma') of the learned (' ulama').
7 Al-Raniri's gloss: i.e. that which the true servant attains to, through
contemplation (mushahadah) and through Divine grace, of the self-

TRANSLATION
VI. The Mutakallimin say: There are two categories of being:

firstly, the Being of God, and secondly, the being of the world.
God's Being is Necessary Being ( wajib al-wujiid) and is self
s u bsistent (qa'im sendirinya), and the being of the world is
contingent being (mumkin al-wujiid)-that is, it is created
(dijadikan) by the Truth Most Exalted from non-existence radam)
and brought forth into external existence (wujiid kharijz).
Moreover, it is dependent (qa'im) for its existence upon the Truth
Most Exalted. Thus the reality (baqzqah) underlying the two is
different one from the other-that is to say, the ontological
condition (keadaan) is in both cases different one from the other by
virtue of the fact that the Truth Most Exalted is eternal (qadzm)
and originates creation ( menjadikan), whereas the world is non
eternal ( mu�dath) and is originated in creation ( dijadikan).
VII. It is clear from their definition that there are two
categories of being; the one, Real Being (wujiid �aqzqz), and the
other, metaphorical being (wujiid majii,(i). Metaphorical being is
a property (milk) of Real Being. If both are not different one from
the other, then they are necessarily identical. Whosoever holds
and believes that the Truth tAost Exalted and (4) the world are
identical becomes an unbeliever (kiifir), for it is evident fi:om his
words expressed to that effect that God's Being and the world are
made out to be (jadi) one reality and one being.
VIII. The $iifis say: We concur with the Mutakallimin in
what they say and believe (in this matter). According to our
definition, however, being is but one, and that is the Essence of
God Most Exalted. The world has no being and is not qualified to
be named with the name 'being', as it is pure non-being(' adam al
ma!J4). Thus when the world is pure non-being and the Being of
the Truth Most Exalted is pure being (wujiid al-ma&rf), 8 how then
can pure non-being become one being with pure being? In truth
the world is but a theatre of manifestation (ma?:,har), a shadow
(iill), a condition (milk) of the Truth Most Exalted; that is, it is
manifestation ( tajalli) of the Truth Most Exalted, by means of which

· manifestation and unveiling he gains (knowledge of) spiritual
mysteries.
8 Al-Raniri's gloss: i.e. real being itself.
.
the locus of manifestation of the Truth Most Exalted, the

reflected image like unto the form (rupa) that is seen in the
analogical mirror: the Truth Most Exalted is like the gazer into
the glass and .the world is the form seen reflected therein. So then,
the' Being of the Truth Most Exalted and that of the world are
neither different one fro·m the other, nor are they identical, for
their being different or identical necessitates the existence of two
independent (mustaqill) beings. 9 Thus when it is the Being of God
that is the one and only being, and the world has no being
whatever, there cannot then be differentiation between them.
That is the reason why we say that God's Being and the world is
one (esa). Even though the world is seen as existing concretely
(mawjud), its existence (wujiid) is not reckoned as such, for
actually it has no real being. As people say (5): "The king and his
armies are one"; even though his armies exist in large numbers,
(their existence) does not come under reckoning, the king's
existence alone comes under reckoning. Furthermore, the
similitude is like the image in the mirror and the possessor of the
image; to external perception they are seen as two existen\'.es, but
it is not said of them that they are two existences because the
existence of the image does not come under reckoning.
Question-should someone ask: "Is the image and the possessor of
that image one person or two?" Then answer: "The image and
the possessor of that image is one person only, for the existence of
the image does not come under reckoning. The image is only
the form of manifestation (ma:r.,har) of the possessor of the image.
That is why people say that the possessor of the image and the
image is one, neither two nor any other."
IX. The meaning intended by the words of the Mutakallimin
and the �ufis is in fact identical; there is no (real) difference in
(the views of) the two groups. Indeed, the view of the
Mutakallimin is based upon the proofs of reason and Tradition
( naql) . 10 They contemplated the world and perceived through
9
Al-Ranfri's gloss: Like the gazer into the glass and (the form reflected
therein as comparable to God and) the world.
10 Al-Raniri's gloss: i.e. the Words of God, the Sayings of the Messenger
of God, and the Consensus of the learned.

TRANSLATION
the ocular vision that it is existent (ada: mawjud), non-eternal

(mu�dath) and changing; and they contemplated the Being ofthe
Truth Most Exalted and perceived through the intellectual
vision (mata hati) 11 that it too is existent, enduring eternally
( qadzm). So they affirmed two existences: the one, possible
existence (jii'iz al-wujud), and the other, necessary existence
(wiijib al-wujud). Possible existence is created (makhluq), and
necessary existence is Creator (khiiliq). The relationship (nisbah)
between the two is the relationship of Creator and created. For
this reason it is said by them that the two are different (6) one
from the other, so as not to let some ofthe common people (fall
into the error of believing) that God's Being and the being ofthe
world constitute one and the same being, as is the beliefofthose
who cleave to the doctrines of the deviators and the Zindiq.
X. The �iifis too based their view upon the proofs of reason
and Tradition, and further added to these spiritual unveiling
(kashf) and direct spiritual tasting ( dhawq). They contemplated
and perceived with their intellectual vision, and they
experienced directly (rasa) with their spiritual tasting that being
( or existence) is but one, and that is the Being of God, Who
cannot be seen with the physical eyes ( mata kepala) in this abode of
the world. That which the physical eyes see is the world, which
has no being like the Being of God. So the Being of God is Real
Being and Absolute (mu{laq), and the being of the world is
metaphorical being and limited (muqayyad), a shadow (iill) and a
possession (milk) ofGod's Being. Of this shadow existence cannot
be predicated, nor can absolute non-existence ('adam mu!faq) be
predicated of it for the reason that ifwe predicate ofit existence,
then it is necessarily a partner (sekutu) 12 to God's existence; and if
we predicate of it absolute non-existence, then this non
existence is nothing at all, and yet the world is seen as existing
(ada). It is clear then that the world is the theatre ofmanifestation
(maihar) ofthe Being ofthe Truth Most Exalted. The relationship
between the Being ofGod and the world is neither one of identity
11
The term hati here is synonymous with qalb, which is the intellect ( aql)
operating at higher levels of cognition.
12 Sekutu, a word of Tamil origin, can also mean 'identical'.
88 A COMMENTARY ON THE I_IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ
nor one of difference, for the world is the form of manifestation

and the possession of the Truth Most Exalted.
XI. It is clear that from the definition of the Siifis being
(existence) and reality (7) is identical in point of meaning
(ma'nii), and that is the Essence of the Truth Most Exalted. The
meaning of 'reality', according to the definition of the $iifis, is
'that by which a thing is what it is' ( mii bihi al-sh ay'u huwa huwa), 1 3
meaning 'that from which a thing comes into being (jadi) ', and
this that is reality-like the reality of the pot is the wheel, and the
reality of the boat is the maker. The meaning of 'reality'
according to the definition of the Man#qiyyin 14 (logicians) is 'that
by which a thing comes to be what it is as rational animal is with
reference to man' (mii yakun al-shay 'u bihi ka al-l;ayawiin al-niifiq bi
al-nisbah ilii al-insiin), 15 that is, the reality of man is 'animal life
that speaks' (hidup yang berkata-kata) . 16 It is clear that according
to the definition of the Man_tiqiyyin the reality of a thing is its very
self (diri). 1 7 Th us the differences between the Mutakallimin and
the $iifis in their endeavour to affirm God's existence as well as
13 See al-Sayyid al-Sharif 'Ali al-J urjani, Kitab al-Ta'rifiit, Mu�tata al
Babi al-I:Ialabi, Cairo, 1357, pp. 80, article �aqzqat al-shay'; and 171,
article mahiyyat al-shay'.
14 The Mantiqiyyin may be distinguished from the Mutakallimin in
that their method of enquiry was through logic (manfiq). In this they
were more akin to the Falasifah, although they differed with the natural
philosophers in that they sought to comprehend things from principles.
They were interested in the idea of essence of things. To them the
existence of a thing is the thing itsel( Although the Mutakallimin also
employed logic, their method ofdiscourse was through dialectics ( kaliim).
See T.J. DeBoer, The history of philosophy in Islam, trans. E.R. Jones,
London, 1961, pp. 42-43; 72-79; rn6-128. See also al-Jurjani's al
Ta'rifiit, p. 208, article al-man/iq;
15 See Sa'd al-Din al-Taftazani, Shar� al-'Aqa'id of Najm al-Din al
Nasafi, with supercommentaries by A}:imad al-Khayali and Ibrahim al

lsfara' ini 'l�am al-Din, Dar al-Kutub al-'Arabiyyah al-Kubra, Cairo,
1335, pp. 16- l 7. The definition given here is the same as the one in the
Ta'rffot.
16
This is a Malay literal translation of al-�ayawan al-nafiq.
17 By diri here al-Raniri means mahiyyah: quiddity, or reality which has
external existence.
TRANSLATION 89
that of the world are differences in expression (lafzi) and not in

meaning (ma'uawi),just as people say 'fifteen' and 'twenty minus
five', the meaning is the same although the expression is different.
XII. When you have comprehended the beliefs and teachings
of the Mutakallimin and the $ufis, I shall now expose the beliefs
and teaching of the Falasifah. The Falasifah say: The Being of
God and that of the world are both eternal ( qadzm) since (8) it
(the world) emanates 18 from the Being of God by its own efficacy
(ta'thzr) without any act of free choice (ikhtiyiir) on God's part,
like the emanation 19 of light from the sun coming from its
essence. Now the sun has no power to prevent its light from
emanating; as long as the sun exists (ada), so will its light exist. In
like manner, so long as Gods' Essence exists so will the world
exist, neither separate nor severed apart from the Essence of God,
in eternal communion from eternity (azal) to everlastingness
(abad). 2 ° Furthermore, they say that God Most Exalted has no
power (kuasa: qudrah) over all (that which emanates from Him);
and that He has no power to bring into existence (menjadikan)
what is other than, and apart from, that which has already
emanated from Him; and that He has no power to change the
world that already is (ada). 21 They further say that the seven
layers of heaven and earth are not brought into existence by God
Most Exalted from non-existence (tiada: 'adam), and that they
endure (baqii') everlastingly (abadz'). They also say that to ask for
help from God is to esteem one's (lower) soul (nafsiin), for the
18 Literally: arises: terbit, spoken of the rising to view of something

luminous.
19 Al-Raniri's gloss: i.e. the emanation of the world from the essence (of
God) by its own power of volition, without being brought into existence
(dijadikan) by the Truth Most Exalted.
20 See 'Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdadi, Al-Farq bayn al-Firaq, Dar al-Afaq al
Jadidah, 2d. ed., Beirut, 1977, p. 346. Hereafter cited as Farq.

21 Aristotle quoted Agathon approvingly that God cannot undo things
done:
For this alone is lacking even to God,
To make undone things that have once been done.
See The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle, translated and introduced by Sir
David Ross, Oxford University Press, London, 1963, Ethics VI. 2, p. 139.
go A COMMENTARY ON THE I;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
servant ('abd) is always engulfed in His overflowing Mercy. The

purpose and benefit of worship ('ibadqh) is to make (menjadikan)
the self (diri) similar to God according as one's powers permit.
They further say that God Most Exalted is the lover ('iishiq) and
the beloved (ma'shiiq) of His Self. All such words and beliefs of
.
theirs are
.
a deviation from the truth and constitute� unbelief .
( kufr) -we take refuge in God from such!

XIII. When you have comprehended the beliefs and
teachings of the Falasifah, I shall now expose the beliefs and
teachings of the Wujiidiyyah. (g) The Wujiidiyyah are of two
groups: one, the Wujiidiyyah who affirm unity (al-muwabbidah);
and the other, the deviating Wujiidiyyah (al-mulbidah). In the
same way that the Murjiyah were of two groups: the blessed (al
marbiimah); �nd the accursed (al-mal'iinah) 22-the blessed being
all the Companions of the Messenger of God, upon whom be
peace, and the accursed being one of the seventy-two sects 23 that
have gone astray and will, moreover, inhabit Hell-so the
Wujudiyyah who affirm unity are all the Siifis-may the Truth
Most Exalted make us to be among them!, and the deviating
Wujudiyyah are all the Zindiqs-we take refuge in God from
such! The reason why the Wujiidiyyah are called 'wujiidiyyah'
('existentialists') is because their discourses, sayings, and beliefs
are centered around the Existence (wujiid) of God. Now I shall
expose the beliefs and teachings of the Wujudiyyah, both the
deviators and the affirmers of unity in order that you may make a
distinction between their respective beliefs.
XIV. The deviating Wujudiyyah say: Being is one, and that is
the Being of God. This unique Being of God does not exist (ada:
mawjiid) independently (mustaqill) for it to be distingµished ( from
the creatures) save by being contained in the creatures. 24 The
22 Al-Raniri's gloss: i.e. they are called the accursed Murji'ah because
they believe and say: ''We hope that all, even those who commit grave
-sins, will not be cast into Hell by God.
23 See Farq, p. 4. For the Murji�ah, see ibid., pp. 190-95.
24 This is apparently quoted from al-Rani6's lfa!l al-?,ill as cited in his
Jawiihir al-' Uliim Ji Kashf al-Ma' liim, p. IOI. For reference to the
Jawiihir, see below, p. 153, note 61.
TRANSLATION
creatures are God's Being, and the Being of God is the being of the
creatures. The world is then God and God is the world. In this
way they affirm God's unique Being (10) as immanent in the being
of the creatures, and they say: "There is no existent (mawjiid)
except God." Furthermore, they believe the formula: 'There is
no god but God' to mean: 'There is no being in me save God's
Being.' They desire its meaning to be: 'There is no being in me
save that God's Being is my being.' They further say that: ','We
and God are of one kind (sebangsa) and one being (sewujiid) "; and
yet further that God Most Exalted can be known in His Essence
and that His qualitative and quantitative categories
(kayfiyyat 25 and kammiyyat) 26 are clearly visible by virtue of His
being concretely existent (ada: mawjiid) temporally (pada zaman)
and spatially (pada makan).
XV. These then are the sayings and beliefs of those who are
manifestly unbelievers. Shaykh Mu}:iyi al-Din ibn 'Arabi, may
God sanctify his soul, in his book Al-Futii&at al-Makkiyyah ( The
Meccan Revelations), 27 wherein he deals with an exposition of the
beliefs of the adepts (ahl al-khawiiH), positively rejects and
invalidates the teachings of this (group of the) Wujudiyyah. He
says:
From here, then, a group has slipped from the path of truth,
and they say: "There is nothing save that which we see." So
they have made out the world to be God, and God to be the
world itself, and this (visible world) is not a spe'ctacle
(mashhad) of its own coming-into-being (kawn). They do not
possess true knowledge as verified by its experts, for if they
themselves have verified it they would not say such a thing.
The meaning is that it is from these sayings that the belief of a
25 Al-Rani"r'i'sgloss: i.e. qualitative categories refer to colour, taste,

odour, hotness, coldness, moisture, dryness, and such as are of the
nature of body (Jism).
26
Al-Ranir1's gloss: i.e. quantit-ative categories refer to bigness,
smallness, shortness, width, depth, weight and things of such nature.
27
The full title is Kitab al-Futii�at al-Makkiyyah fi ma'rifat al-asrar al
malikiyyah wa al-mulkiyyah.
group has slipped off the right path, for they say that there is no
existent (mawjiid) save that which we see. Thus they have made
out (dijadikan: ja'ala) the world to be God and God the very self
(diri) of the world. This belief is absolutely not true, for the Being
of God is that by which they (the things that constitute the world
of sense and sensible experience) _come-into-being (jadi)-that is,
God's Being is what creates (menjadikan) them. If indeed their
knowledge (ma'rifah) were true (11) they would not have said
such a thing. They are ashamed of the people of Islam, and they
fear that they might be accused of error by the majority of the
schools and by religion. If they openly declare: "We are God and
God is us" they will not be tolerated by them (the people of
Islam). So they conceal themselves behind elaborate veils so that
their evil words and deviating beliefs might not become apparent,
and then they couch their words: "God Most Exalted is ourselves
and our beings, and we are His Self and His Being" in crafty
disguise. But such ( deception) is not hidden from the
( understanding of the) wise, nor concealed from one whose
knowledge is perfect (' iirifyang kiimil).
XVI. Indeed, their words and beliefs are like the words and
beliefs of the 'Ali Ilahiyyah 28 and the Isma'iliyyah 29 of the
Rafi9iyyah, who say that the Truth Most Exalted descended and
became 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, may God glorify his countenance!
Their words and beliefs are also like those of the Jews, who say
that God's Prophet 'Uzayr (Ezra) is the son of God, as God Most
Exalted says: "The Jews say: "Uzayr is the son of God'." 30 This is
like the saying and belief of the Christians that God's Prophet 'Isa
28 Al-Baghdadi lists twenty sects among the Rafi<;liyyah. The
Sabbabiyyah (Saba'iyyah) among them started the heresy that 'Ali
was a god (pp. 15-16). The name 'Ali Ilahi refers to one of the sects of
the Rafi<;liyyah, namely the Dhammiyyah, who believed that 'Ali was
God (pp. 238-39). See further in al-Baghdadi's work, Farq, pp.
254-55, 320-22.
29 Farq, pp. 17, 39-46, 266 fol. The lsma'iliyyah comes under the
general heading of the Batiniyyah (esotericists). See also Mu}:lammad

ibn 'Abd al-Karim al-Shahrastani, Al-.'vlilal wa al-Ni�al, Dar al
Ma'rifah, Bayrut 2nd. printing, 2v. 1395/1975; vol. 1, pp. 174; 185.
309:30.
TRANSLATION 93
LJesus) is the son of God, as God Most Exalted says: "And the
Christians_say that the Messiah is the son of God." 31 ( I 2) Some of
them believe that God is one of three in a Trinity, as God Most
Exalted says: "They have become unbelievers who say that God
is one of three in a Trinity." 32 Some of them say that God's
Prophet 'Isa is in fact God. Furthermore, the Christians say that
God descended from the world of divinity (' iilam al-lahut) to the
world of humanity (' alam al-nasiit); that is, He became a body in
the corporeal world, then He returned to the world of divinity.
Such sayings and beliefs constitute unbelief, for God Most
Exalted says: "They have disbelieved who say that God is the
Messiah, son ofMary." 33 Harken! 0 wise, to God'::; Words in the
Qur'an wherein the creation ofman is mentioned in twenty-eight
places. Explanation. The author of the ,?,ubad 04 ( The Cream of
Discourse), may God sanctify his soul, says: "And God has
mentioned concerning man in twenty-eight instances, and He
says that man is created (makhliiq)." So then, there is a clear
distinction drawn between this and the saying that God is the
being ofthe creature and the being of the creature is God's Being,
and man ( I 3) is God, and the saying of the Christians that God's
Prophet 'Isa is God Himself. Such ( a distinction) is not concealed
from the learned and the wise who have faith.
XVII. Shaykh 'Ali ibn A}:lmad al-Maha'imi, may God
sanctify his soul, says in his book Ira, at al-Daqi?iq sharb Mir, at al
lfaqa,iq 35 (Sightings of Subtleties: a commentary on the Mirror of
Realities):
Whoever says that the Intellect ( al-· aql), or the Soul ( al-nafs),
319:30.
325:76.
3365:73.
34 See the Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur (GAL), C. Brockelmann, 2v .,
Leiden, Brill, 1943 and 1949; the Supplement-banden (GALS), 3v., 1937,
1938, 1942.SeeGALSll,p.113:29 (1). Under this listingthe authorwas
Shihab al-Dfo ibn Raslan al-Ramli (d. 1441). But the work cited could
also have been that of Sharaf al-Dfo al-Barizi (d.1 338), which bears the
title Kitiib al-,?,ubad, and its commentary: Khuliirah Fat� al-$amad bi shar�
al-,?,ubad ( GALS II, p. 101:6).
35 GALS 11, pp. 310-11. Al-Maha'imi died in Maha'im in 1432.
or Nature { al-tab"i' ah) -the Universals (al-kulliyyat) -and

what is below (the grade of) these, such as the Stars (al
kawakib) and the Elements ( al-' aniisir) and the animal,
vegetable, and mineral Kingdoms (al-mawatid) are God
with regard to their being His theatres of manifestation, then
he is in error in the same manner that one is in error who says
of Zayd's hand that it is Zayd, when his hand is in fact part of
the totality of his manifestation. When he is in error in
affirming the absoluteness of God in what is not God, then he
has become an unbeliever and a Zindiq. And if we say that
what is manifest in the world in its entirety is· the Existence of
the Truth and His Names, it does not in the least mean, on
account of His being in this way manifest, that His Being in
all its perfection is in each (14) of the individual things. As for
the (Sufi) saying: 'unity of existence in the world as a whole',
this does not make it permissible to posit divinity in each and
every one of the things (in creation). The discourse-that is,
of one who speaks about unity of existence in the world
together with all its parts-means that the totality of all
existences of things is one affair, and that is the manifestation
of the Truth in the world. It is not meant that each one of the
existents is that totality wherein the Truth becomes manifest
in its entirety.
Furthermore he says in his book (15) lmbar/- al-Narzbah 36 (Sincere
Advir:e): "The unity of existence is that whereby things are
actualized (tabaqquq), and this is one." The author of the Latii'if
al-l'liim 37 (Subtleties of lriformation), may God sanctify his soul,
says: "The unity of existence is that by which the reality of things
existent (mawjiid) is actualized; and that which is actualized is
never valid to be regarded as 'be-ing' except with reference to the
Truth, may He be glorified!" Thus, whosoever wishes to give an
36 Not recorded in GAL. I have not been able to trace this work.
37 1n one listing the author was 'Abd al-Razzaq al-QashanI (d. 1330),
GALS I, pp. 280; in another the author was �adr al-Din aJ-QunyawI ( d.
I 263), GALS I, pp. 807-808. The full title of the work in both cases is the
same: Lata'ifal-I' lamfi Isharat Ahl al-llham (Subtleties of Information in the
Indications of the People of Inspiration.
��- ---- - -- ----- - -- -- -- - - ---��-

TRANSLATION 95
·esoteric interpretation (ta'wzl) to the effect that God is the world

and the world is God, or that-as they say-man is God, then
he has attributed lies to the Truth Most Exalted and His
Messenger, and has upheld as true the beliefs of the Jews and the
Christians. Indeed, they believe in a very strange kind of Islam,
how they dare attempt to interpret ( the truth) esoterically with
such evil words and utterly strayed belief to the extent that they
reject the real truth-we take refuge in God from such
calumny!-a thing which even the heavens and the earth will
not suffer to listen to, as God Most Exalted says: "The heavens
are apt to split asunder and th� earth cr::ick and the mountains to
fall ( 16) apart when they heard the sayings of the Jews and the
Christians that the God who is called Merciful begat a son." 38
XVIII. When you have comprehended the sayings and
beliefs of the deviating Wujiidiyyah, I shall now clarify the
sayings and beliefs of the Wujiidiyyah who affirm unity and who
are of the $iifis-may God reckon us to be among them! The
Affirmers of Unity say: God's Being is one; neither a thing
numbered nor limited, nor a whole having constituent parts, nor
a thing compounded; neither particular nor general; neither
substance nor body-and such that are created by Him as are all
the things mentioned above. God's Being is unchanging and
never becomes (jadi) these things, for "He is now even as He
was," 39 that is to say, His existence ( ada) now is the same as it was;
'before' He brought forth (menjadikan) all things into existence,
He was not those things and, 'after' He brought them forth into
existence ( menjadikan) He does not become (jadi) similar to
(serupa), and have one and the same existence as, those things.
God's existence is in fact His Very Essence, and it never becomes
the existence· of the created things, and the existence of the
created things never becomes the existence of God. As Shaykh
38 I 9:90-9 I.
39 A tradition or saying (�adzth) of the Holy Prophet much quoted by the
�ufis, and related (riwiiyah) in connection with the tradition: "God was
and there was nothing with hi.m." Reported by al-Bukhari and ibn
I:Ianbal. See e.g.: Futii�iit, vol. 1, pp. 53 (27); 189 (240) and note; 292
(533)
_
Mu}:iyi al-Din ibn 'Arabi, may God sanctify his soul, says in.some
�f his works: "The Necessary Existence (al-wajib al-wujiid) . is
Absolute Existence (17) (al-wujiid al-mu![aq)," 40 that is, God's
existence is not determined or limited existence (wujiid muqayyad).
God's existence qualitatively and quantitatively is (un)known,
and His· Reality and Very Essence cannot be discussed and
investigated, as God Most Exalted says: "God makes you
cautious of His Self' 41 -that is, God has strutk you with awe
from attaining to knowledge of His Very Essence. The Prophet,
who may God bless and give peace, says: ''Ye are all as fools with.
respect to knowledge of His Very Essence." 42 God's Prophet
Dawiid (David), upon whom be peace, says: "Glory be to Him
Who has made the admission of man to his incapacity to thank
Him to be adequate thankfulness, just as He has made man's
admission of failure to know Him to be perfect knowledge." 43
Abu Bakr the Veracious, may God be well pleased with him,
says: "Glory be to Him Who has not vouchsafed to His creatures
any means of attaining to knowledge of Him except through
impotence to attain knowledge of Him." 44 It is therefore clear
that for the_creature (' abd) to strive to attain to perfect knowledge
4 ° Fu,riis al-lfikam, a critical edition by Abu al:.:'Ala 'Afifi, Cairo, 1946.
This edition contains two parts: pt. 1 is ibn 'Arabi's text (pp. 45-228);
pt. 2 is 'Afifi's commentary or fa'lzqiit (pp. 1-346). Unless otherwise
stated, my reference to pagination pertains to the first part (pt. 1) of the
edition. For the above citation, see pp. 49 fol; Ta'lzqiit, pp. 8-9. See
further, Futii�iit, vol. 5, p. 201 (281); vol. 3, p. 199 (1-163); vol. 2, p. 223
(317); Kitab lnshii' al-Dawii'ir, ed. H.S. Nyberg (1919), p. 15.
41
3:27; 29. For interpretation, see the Man.iizil -al-Sii'zrm of 'Abd Allah,
. al-An�ari al-Haraw1, 2d ed., Cairo, 1386, p. 143, on 'Separation'
(.inf4iil), one of the ten parts ofrealities. See also Futu�iit, vol. 2, p. 223
(317); 255 (381).
42 1 have not been able to trace this.
43 1 have not been able to trace this.
44 This saying is reported by Junayd al-Baghdadi, according to Abu
Nasr al-Sarraj in his Kitiib al-Luma' ft al-Ta,rawwuf, edited by R.A.

Nicholson, E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series, vol. XXII, London, 1963,
text pp. 36; 124; it is also recorded in 'Ali al-Hujwiri's Kash( al-Mal;Jiib,
trans. R.A. Nicholson, E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series, vol. XVII,
London, 1911, p. 284. Futii�iit, vol. 2, p. 255 (381).
_____ ________________ ____ --- ---- --- -- ----- - - --

" ., - - -- ------ -��
TRANSLATION 97
and unification ( tawfid) with respect to the Truth Most Exalted is
vain, except if and when He grants ( I 8) it. As Shaykh Shibli, may
God sanctify his soul, says to a certain man: "Knowest thou
why thy striving for unification is not valid?" The man replies: "I
know not, sire." "Tis because," Shaykh Shibli continues: "thou
seekest unification through thine self-that is, through thine own
endeavour-if thou seekest unificatio� through the grace of the
Truth Most Exalted thou wouldst assuredly attain it." 45 Herein
lies the secret of the saying of the Prophet, who may God bless
and give peace: "None knows God but God; none mentions God
but God; none sees God but God." 46 This means that the Truth
Most Exalted is not known by the creature except solely by His
grace; and the Truth Most Exalted cannot be mentioned by him
except by His grace; and the Truth Most Exalted cannot be seen
by him except by His grace alone.
XIX. The belief of the Wujiidiyyah who affirm unity
concerning the purport of the formula: 'There is no god but God'
is 'There is no existent (mawjud) except God'; that is: 'There is no
real existenc.e to anything but to God', meaning there is nothing
in .existence except He, and this is to negate any partner with
respect to His existence, ( 19) and to affirm His oneness with
respect to His existence without attributing existence tc.Y other
than He. 4 7 Verily, the existence of all creatures is nothing but a
shadow (?:,ill), and it is of a metaphorical nature (majazz). The
Primary (a,rlz) and the Real (&aqzqz) is but the Existence of God.
There is absolutely no real existence in the existence of what is
metaphorical; it is annihilated (hapus: Jana') and nothingness
(lenyap), and it is non-being ('adam) when linked to the Real, as
Shaykhjunayd, God sanctify his soul, says: "That which is non
eternal ( mu�dath) when linked to that which is eternal ( qadzm) is
45
This is cited in the Kitab al-Luma', p. 34.
46 I have not been able to trace this.
47
See Nur al-Din 'Abd al-Ra}:imanJami', al-Durrat al-Fakhirah, with an
Arabic commentary of 'Abd al-Ghafiir al-Lari' and a Persian
commentary of 'Imad al-Dawlah, edited by N. Heer and A. Musavi',
Behbahani', Tehran, 1980, pp.11-12 (25); Shar� al-Durrat (al-Lari'), p.
87 (25).
left without a trace (athar)," 48 meaning it is annihilated (Jani?:

hapus).
XX. The Affirmers of Unity obliterate (from their subjective
consciousness) during deep meditation (mushahadah) the
existence of created things and in their stead contemplate the
existence of God the Real and Absolute Existence (wujud mu#aq),
and they say (in this state): "There is no real existent (mawjud
&aqzqz) except God." From this it is clear that that which is other
than-God (ma siwa Allah) is pure non-existence (' adam al-ma&ef),
having absolutely no real being (wujud &aqzqz), for this concurs
with every saying of the spiritual knower (' arij) and verifier
(mu&aqqiq) in point of symbolic allusion (ishiiriit) and analogy
('ibariit), of spiritual tasting (dhawq), and ecstasis (wijdan). That
which is other-than-God is pure non-existence essentially (min
baythu dhiituhu) and cannot be described as 'existing-with' the
Truth Most Exalted '. ( 20) Shaykh ibn 'Ata,' Allah, God sanctify
his soul, says:
According to the People of Unity and Gnosis ( ahl al-tawbzd wa
al-ma' rifah) neither 'existence' nor 'loss-of-existence' (faqd)
may be predicated of that which is other-than-God Most
Exalted, for that which is other-than-God cannot exist with
God because God is Unique; nor may 'loss-of-existence' be
predicated of that which is other-than-God because only that
which has existed is capable of qualification by 'loss-of
existence.'
That is, that which is other than God can neithef be described as
having existence nor can it be described ias absolute non
existence, for the reason that there is nothing existing with God
other than His Essence, His existence being identical with His
Essence; and that which is other than God is not absolute non
existence because God does not bring forth into existence other
than what He brought forth. As God Most Exalted says:
"Everything is perishing save His face." 49
48
Futii�iit, vol. 1, pp. 287, 520; vol. 2, pp. 143, 175; Fu.rii.r, p. 120.
4928:88
TRANSLATION 99
And the Prophet, who may God bless and give peace, says:
"Beware!-everything save God is vain

And every pleasure is transitory ... " 50
Indeed then, ( 2 I) how entirely real is the distinction between

the words of the Siifis that the Truth Most Exalted and the world
is one, and the words of the deviating Wujudiyyah that the Truth
Most Exalted and the world is one. The purport in the words of
the Siifis is that the Truth Most Exalted alone is existent and
whose existence is His Very Essence. His existence is not inherent
in the worlcl, for according to them, "Existence is God;" and
Shaykh Mul_iyi al-Din ibn 'Arabi says in the Fu�ii� al-lfikam 51
(Bezels of Wisdom): "And true existence is in reality only God
exclusively considered as His Essence and His Very Being." 52
And he further says: "That the world is nothing but His self
manifestation ( tajallz)." 53 And further: "That the world is
imagined (mutawahham), it has no real existence." 54 All the Siifis
and the Mutakallimin are in concerted agreement in asserting
that the world together with all its parts is nothing but a series of
accidents ('arar/,), and that of which they are accidents (al-ma'riirj,:
5°Kitiib al-Luma', p. 110. Also Kashfal-Ma&}iib, p. 391. The Holy

Prophet was quoting the famous mukharj,ram poet Lahid:
Why, surely everything save God is but vanity,
And every pleasure must inescapably pass away;
And every man shall one day know what he has earned
When the account books are laid open before God.
See The Seven Odes, A.J. Arberry, London, 1957, p. 126. This verse is
found in Shar� Dzwiin Labzd ibn Rahr ah al-' Amirz, edited by I}:lsan 'Abbas,
al-Turath al-'Arabi, no. 8, Kuwayt, 1962, p. 256 (9) and (10). See Matn
al-Bukhari, with glosses by Mu}:lammad ibn 'Abd al-Hadi al-Sindi, Dar
al-Fikr, Bayrut [n.d.], 4v.; vol. 4, p. 127.
51 See above, note 39.
52Fu1ii1, p. 104
53/bid., p. 81. Al-Raniri adds that tajallzhere means His manifestation
form (ma?:,har.Nja) .
54Fu1ii1., p. 103.
the subtratum) is God. 55 The meaning of 'accident' (' ararj,),

according to their definition, (22) is: 'the accident does not
endure two units of time' 56 (al-'ararj,u lii yabqii zamiinayn); 57 and
the meaning of'that ofwhich they are accidents' ( al-ma'rurj,) is the
eternal (azali) and everlasting (abadi) Existence of God. He is the
self:.-subsistent One (qii'im sendiriNya) and He gives subsistence
(mengqiyiimkan) to other-than-He. So the world is not named with
the name 'being'; it is called 'darkness' (;;,aliilah), 'non-thing' (lii
shay'), 'nullity' ( biifil), 'imaginary' (khayiili), and of the nature of
'a mirage' (sariibz) and of 'a shadow' (;;,illz). So then, when the
state (�iil) ofthe world is such, that is, its being-existent (keadaan)
cannot be reckoned (as existence) even though it is perceptible to
the eyes, it cannot be another existence duplicating the existence
of the Truth Most Exalted. This is the reason why they (the
Affirmers of Unity) say that the Truth Most Exalted and the
world is one. They do not thereby intend to mean that the
world 58 and the Truth Most Exalted have one and the same
55
See the Lawa'i�fi bayan ma'anz 'i,janiyyah by Nur al-Din 'Abd al
Ral).man al-Jami (d. r 492). The work is in Persian and was translated
into English by E.H. Whinfield and Mirza Mul).ammad Qazwini
(Oriental Translation Fund, New Series, vol. XVI, Royal Asiatic
Society, London, r 928). The latter work contains both the translation
and the Persian text in the form of a facsimile of an old manuscript. Al
Raniri's statement refers to ibn 'Arabi's remarks on the agreement
between the �ufis and the Ash'aris regarding the nature of accidents
(see Flt.fU!f p. I 25). Al-Ja.mi's commentary on the Fu!fU!f pertaining to this
particular section (al-Fa!f!f al-Shu'aybiyyah) is found in Flash XXVI of the
Lawa'i� (pp. 29-37, Eng. trans.; 37-46, Persian text). Seep. 37 of the
Persian text and p. 29 of the English translation. See also Majmu' ah
Mulla Jamz, containing the Lawa'i�, the Shar� Ruba'iyyat, and the
Lawiimi' Shar� Khamriyyah ibn Fiirirj,, Istanbul, I309/ 189 I, pp. 27-32. Al
Raniri's glosses below ( nos. 57 and 58) elucidating the meaning of
'accident' and 'world', bear an identity with what al-Jami says in Flash
XXVI of the Lawii'i�.
56
FU!fU!f, p. I 25; Lawa'i�, pp. 37-38.
57 Al-Raniri's gloss: i.e. the accidents change, come in succession, and
disappear.
58 Al-Raniri's gloss: i.e. the reason why the world is called non-thing ( la-
TRANSLATION IOI
being and that they are united in identity. This is the reason why
they further say that the Truth Most Exalted and the world is
neither different one from the other nor united in identity, for
their being different and their being united necessarily requires
two beings. So the world is only a possession (milk) of the Truth
Most Exalted. Question-should someone ask: "Is the sun in the
heavens and the sun in the mirror one or two?" Answer' "The sun
in the heavens and the sun in the mirror is one."
Question-should someone ask: "Is it not clear from what you
say that the sun in the heavens and the sun in the mirror is one
and the same being?" Answer' "Indeed, (23) the sun in the
heavens and the sun in the mirror is never in the least one being.
This fact is not concealed from the wise who have a sharp mind,
for the existence (ada) of the sun in the mirror does not come
under reckoning, and what is reckoned (as having existence) is
the sun in the heavens. If the existence of the sun in the heavens
also exists (ada) in the mirror, then the two are necessarily
connected and united as one being. This is absurd, for were even
a part of the.sun's being, or its light, to exist in the sun reflected in
the mirror then the mirror would become heated and would burn
away. Moreover, if the being of the sun in the heavens were to
exist in the sun reflected in the mirror, then how can the
intelligence admit such a thing, for the sun in the heavens is about
thirty times the size of the earth, and the mirror is merely a
finger's length in size. How then can a mirror the size of a finger's
length accommodate the heaven's sun thirty times larger than
this earth! It is obvious that the sun seen reflected in the mirror is
the image, the locus of manifestation and the effect (bekas; athar)
of the sun in the heavens. The intention of the deviating
Wujudiyyah, when they say that the Truth Most Exalted and the
world is one is to convey the meaning that God's Being and the
world is one and the same being. Thus God is the world and the
world is God-we take refuge in God (24) from believing in such
a thing!
shay') is because it never 'is' a real thing at each and every moment of
itself, but it is a thing insofar as it is created by God.
102 A COMMENTARY ON THE l;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ
XXI. Verily, the contemplation among the knowers who are

perfect in their spiritual knowledge regarding ( the ontological ·
relationship between) the Truth Most Exalted and the world is as
said by the author of the Miftab al-Ghayb 59 ( The Key ofthe Unseen),
may God sanctify his soul:
As for the perfect who have attained maturity in spiritual
knowledge ( ahl al-tamkzn), they do not deny ( existence to) the
world as it is denied by the People of Subjective Vision 60 (ahl
al-shuhiid al-biiliyy). They neither affirm ( existence of) it as it is
affirmed by the People of the Veil (ahl al-bijab); but they
acknowledge the existence both of the Truth and the world
and they make a distinction between the Truth and what is
other-than-He.
XXII. Attention. Now you must know, 0 seeker, that ecstatic

utterances (sha/biyyat) 61 that slip from the tongues of some of the
gnostics when the state ofmystical intoxication overpowers them,
59 GAL I, pp. 807 (32)-808. The author was $adr al-Din al-Qunyaw1 (d.
1263). The full title of the work is Miftii� Ghayb al-Jam' wa al-Wujiid.
This work is printed on the margin of a commentary on it by Shams al
Dfo al-Fana6 (d. 1431) entitled Mi.rba� al-Uns bayn al-Ma'qiil wa al
Mashhiid fi shar� Miftii� Ghayb al-Jam' wa al-Wujiid, Tehran, 1323.
en Al-RanI6's gloss (to al-shuhiid): That which resides in it; it gives
benefit and causes 'ecstatic utterances' (sha/�iyyiit) which according to
the $ufis means utterances that escape from the tongues of some of the
People of God (ahl Allah) when the state of 'intoxication' (mabuk: sukr)
overcomes them. Such utterances are not in accord with religious law
and with reality. They remain in a state of subjective, human
behaviour, and their utterances occur without voluntary intention on
their part.
61 Al-RanI6's gloss: The meaning underlying the term sha/�iyyiit is, from
the point ofview oflanguage, 'to throw away' (to cast off, to get rid of, to
let off), as the boiling pot lets off its steam (buih: froth) which does not
give benefit and leaves behind what gives benefit. In like manner, the
hearts ( sing. qalb) of the People of God (ahl Allah) are like boiling pots,
and their ecstatic utterances are like the froth (steam) of their spiritual
states (a�wiil): they (the ecstatic utterances) are clearly audible (like the
bubbling), but do not give any benefit insofar as spiritual mysteries are
concerned.
TRANSLATION 103
such as "I am God" and "I am the Truth", and the like indeed
imply that the Truth Most Exalted and the creature are one
reality and one being; but God forbid that such is the real case, or
that they mean this, for their ecstatic utterances occur
unintentionally. Such utterances occur on their tongues when
they are unconscious of their subjective selves, and ( 25) freely let
slip their unburdened tongues during the state of mystical
intoxication; like those who talk in their sleep when they dream of
something they desire; and like those who become habitually
hysterical with words, 62 such as those who suffer from a mimetic
type of paroxysmal neurosis (latah). These slips of the tongue are
involuntary acts. In like manner are the People of God in their
experience of ecstatic utterances when what is seen in their vision
overpowers them, they become unconscious of their subjective
selves and of all that which is other-than-God ( ma siwa Allah), and
they are heavy with grief (mathqul) and drowned every instant of
the day and night in contemplation of the Truth 11ost Exalted.
Then in that state God's Names take effect upon their tongues in
their habitual invocation 'He is God', 'He is God', and 'He is the
Truth', 'He is the Truth', in such wise that the 'He' (huwa)
becomes transformed into 'I' ( ana). Such an occurrence is c,:1.used
by the Truth Most Exalted upon their tongues without any
freedom on their part to choose otherwise. The Siifis in their
terminology call those who express ecstatic utterances 'they
whom the spiritual state has overpowered' (maghlub al-�al), and
'they for whom the Pen is raised' (marfu'al-qalam: i.e. whom God
has caused to be exempt from the recordings of the Pen). It is
allowed to utter only such words as 'I am the Truth' and the like
to those in such a state; however, the religious Law in its literal
sense ( iahir shara') 63 prescribes that they be condemned 64 and not
62 Al-Raniri's gloss: The meaning of mystical 'intoxication', according to

the definition of the �iifis, is unconsciousness of the subjective self ( diri)
and of that which is other-than-God caused by the overpowering
coming-into-vision of the self-manifestation of the Truth Most Exalted
upon him.
63
Al-Raniri's gloss: That is, God will not punish them on the Day of
Resurrection because their ecstatic utterances come involuntarily upon
permitted to persist in such ways65 as would seem to confirm as

true the beliefs of the deviators and the Zindiqs, and to commit
acts displeasing unto the Truth Most Exalted. Indeed, the fact is
that even if ( 26) they are unconscious of their subjective selves
and overwhelmed by spiritual intoxication, their duty and
responsibility to observe (taklff) the Divine injunctions
pertaining to His commands (sing. amr) il,nd prohibitions (sing.
nahy) do not in the least fall away from them, for the Truth Most
Exalted ever prevails (qa'im) over their intellects (commanding
them to do what is right and) preserving them from committing
sinful acts and, moreover, He bestows upon them His succour
(tawfiq) so that they might persevere in the performance of
obligatory duties (farrf) in spite of their being overpowered by
spiritual intoxication and annihilation in God (Jana' fi Allah).
This, according to Shaykh Mu}:iammad ibn Faq.l Allah, 66 is what
is clearly understood from the sayings of the Knowers of God
(sing. 'arif bi Allah). 0 seeker!, the being of the Truth Most
Exalted never becomes the being of the creature, and the being of
them, and also because their tongues let slip such utterances due to the
overpowering manifestation (;:Jlhiir) of the Truth Most Exalted upon
them, similar to the case ( of the olive tree) when God Most Exalted says:
"Surely, I am God" (28:30, 19:y 2, 20:10, 27:7-9, 28:29) from the olive
tree on Mount Sinai. So one who utters shaf&iyyat is still a true believer
(mu'min) in the sight of the Truth Most Exalted.
04 ,i\J-Raniri's gloss: i.e. if not (i.e. if they do not repent) then they should
be slain.
65 Al-Raniri's gloss: i.e. all beliefs that are contradictory to God's Book
and the Sayings of the Messenger of God and the Consensus of the
Learned; or those that make lawful (&alal) what God has declared to be
unlawful (&aram); they are to be charged with apostasy and with
adhering to the beliefs of the ;;:,indzq, and if (they do) not (repent) they
should be slain.
66 Mul_iammad ibn Fac:11 Allah al-Burhanpi:iri died in 1620. He wrote
several works, the best known in the Malay world being the Tu&fah al
Mursalah ilii al-Nabiyy. See GALS II, p. 6 I7:2. A manuscript of the
Arabic text and a Malay translation of the work is in my possession.
Another copy of the Arabic text and Javanese translation, translated
into English by A.H. Johns, Oriental Monograph Series, no. I, Centre
of Oriental Studies, Canberra, Australian National University, 1965.
TRANSLATION
the creature never becomes the being of the Truth Most Exalted,
even if the creature's subjective consciousness were annihilated in
God, and even if the creature further attains to subsistence
through God (baqiF bi Allah), as Shaykh 'Ali ibn A}:imad al
Maha'imi, may God sanctify his soul, says in his book Ira) at al
Daqi?iq shar� Mir) iit al-lfaqii'iq 67 (Sightings of Subtleties: A
commentary on the Mirror of Realities):
No matter how far he gets (in his union with God), he cannot
get out of the limits of created beings, and he never attains to
the divine rank-even though he may become annihilated
in God, or subsist through Him, contrary to what some fools
1magme.
So then, whosoever ( 27) expresses ecstatic utterances believing in

the outward, literal sense what is really meant to be understood
by way of analogy, and who yet all the while is not truly
overpowered 68 by the state of spiritual intoxication as in the case
of the People of God, then he becomes a deviator and a Zindiq
and, according to the literal sense of the Law, an unbeliever in
God's sight. Such a one is condemned in this world ta be slain,
and in the Hereafter to dwell everlastingly in Hell.
Our Lord!
Let not our hearts deviate
Now after Thou has guided us,
But grant us mercy
From Thine Own Presence;
For Thou art the Grantor
Of Bounties without measure. 69
May God bless our Master Mu}:iammad, his Family and his
67
See the reference in note 35 above.
68Al-Raniri's gloss: i.e. he is conscious of his subjective self and acts
deliberately.
693:8
Companions, and an abundance of peace be upon them. By Thy

mercy, 0 Most Merciful of those that show mercy!
FINIS*
*Copyist's note follows: Completed ( copying the text) in the Year of the
Flight of the Prophet, God bless and give him peace, One Thousand
One Hundred and Eighty-six, the Year Waw ( i.e. the seventh year in the
Muslim eight-year cycle), on Sunday the Twelfth Day of Sha'ban after
the afternoon prayer. The copyist is 'Abd al-Azi:"z.
The copyist's note has been omitted in my copy of the text, in which
place I have inserted my own note and date of completion of copying his
text.
COMMENTARY
Proof of the Veracious

in refutation of the Zindzq
Commentary
I. Every praise be to God, to Whom all praise is due!
In the ocean of His generosity the souls are drowned,
And through His bounty He has bestowed upon them His
succour,
They are those from amongst the Prophets and the Veracious.
In the first part of the Arabic exordium, which is composed in

ornamental prose or saj', al-Ranfri begins in the following way:
lfamdan Li iliihin huwa bi al-/:zamdi /:zaqzq, literally: 'Praise be to a God
Who is entitled to praise', which we have translated as: 'Every
praise be to God, to whom all praise is due'. The author implies
by such construction-since the word iliih there is formed in the
indefinite singular-that there are other gods people praise and
that such praise is wrongly directed because those other gods are
not worthy of praise, or have no right to it as it is not their due.
We see in this manner of expression but another way of affirming
what is implied in the first half of the K alimah Shahadah, or the
Formula of Witnessing: La ilaha illa Allah: 'There is (in truth) no
(other) God except Allah!'. Considering the fact that the su�ject
of the treatise deals with people who set up false gods, that is,
whose god is not the One understood in tawbzd, the author's
implication referring to such people as described in what is to
follow becomes all the more clear. Just as in the first part of the
Kalimah of Witnessing the negation or denial (nafiyy: la) of any
other than the true God ( ilah) is followed by the affirmation
( ithbat: illa) of the true God (Allah), so is the indefinite notion
signified by the singular ilah here being negated or denied, and .its
definite nature affirmed by the qualification that follows: huwa
bi al-bamdi baqzq: 'Who is entitled to praise', which means: 'to
whom praise is truly due'. We say 'truly due' because in
connection with 'praise' in this context the referential object of
I IO A COMMENTARY ON THE HUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ.
the concept due, as borne out by usage, is not necessarily always

true. Furthermore, the 'praise' here means all forms of praise, so
that if we say that all praise is truly due to 'a certain God' only,
this means that no praise is truly due to a,ry other god, in such wise
that He Who is referred to as 'a God' is in fact the God. A God to
whom all praise is truly due is the God Who is the true Object of
all praise. In al-Ranfri"'s Malay interpretation of that passage
Allah is substituted for ilah, since ilah here refers to Allah, the One
and True God. Similarly the expression bamdan Li here is not the
same as "praise be to', but 'every praise be to' (Malay: segala
puji-pujian bagi), for it then conforms with 'to Whom all praise is
due'. So we see then that the phraseology is construed in this way
by the author as a linguistic device to emphasize the Uniqueness of
the True God Who Alone is the Object of all praise that truly
means praise.
We said at the beginning that there are other gods people
praise, and that such praise is wrongly directed because those
other gods are not truly worthy of praise, or have no right to it, as
praise is not their due. To put it in another way, the other gods
are in reality shuraka (sing. sharzk), 'rivals', 'associates', or
'partners' unto the true God; and as such they have no real
existence whatever except intellectually, or in the mind, and not
in reality. In reality, the 'partners' unto God belong to a class of
impossibilities, and they are possibilities only conceptually. 1 So
essentially they are no more than mental constructs, and the Holy
Qur'an calls them empty names and futile inventions, so that it
would be manifestly absurd to praise them. Now the expression
huwa bi al-bamdi baqzq-that all praise is due to Him alone
implies what has been referred to above; and by 'praise' ( al-bamd)
is meant not simply the formulas of praise that poets and
philosophers invent for God, or that we ourselves formulate; for
no matter to what lofty and beautiful formulations our thoughts
and feelings might strive to attain in rendering praises unto
God, such praises do not reach the threshold of God's sanctity,
which is too high and indeed unattainable. Only God can praise
1 See below, pp. 169-170.
--- ----------------·-- --
- ------- -------------- ----------- ····-- - - ----- - -- - -- - - - - - ... _____ __ -- - - -- - --- -- ----· -- -- ------ -- - --- - - -------- ----·---
,.
COMMENTARY III
Himself adequately; and if He had not taught us how to praise

Him by the formulas of praise that He Himself has declared for
. Himself-such as sub�iin Allah, al-�amdu Li Allah, Alliihu akbar, and
the like-and if He had not taught us His Beautiful Names and
Sublime Attributes by which He describes Himself, then we
would be rendered impotent to dPscribe and praise His
Perfection) His Beauty, His Glory and His Majesty. Seeing that
every page of the book of the universe celebrates His praise, it is
impossible to enumerate the praises unto Him. So the Holy
Prophet, peace be upon him, in allusion to this profound truth,
uttered: "I do not render praises unto Thee� Thou art what
Thine own praises declare Thee." 2
In the next line of the text reading: Fz ba�ri nawiilihi kiinat al
diiriitu gharzq( atan): 'In the ocean of His generosity the souls are
drowned', there is one word which is not familiar to many
because it is not commonly used in the way particularly as found
in the present context; and as such it needs interpretation. We
refer to the word al-diiriit which we have translated as 'the souls'
on the basis of al-Raniri's interpretation of it as al-arwii� or 'the
spirits'. The author, however, makes no further elaboration as to
how or why al-diiriit should refer to al-arwii�. In what follows we
shall elaborate upon an interpretation confirming its meaning as
referring to 'the spirits' or 'the souls', and in view of the fact
that the word represents a key word clarifying the whole line and
other words in the other lines of the text, its interpretation will
serve to throw some light on them all.
The word diiriit is here construed in the plural form: its singular
form is diirat. It is derived from the root DWR, where the medial
r
and original W can also be converted to to read D YR, and to A
to read DAR. The verb diira in its various forms and constructions
conveys many meanings, but its basic meaning-refers to someone
who, or something which went round, or circled, or revolved,
2La u�{z thana' an 'alay ka anta kama athnayta 'ala nafsika. See the full text of
the tradition from Muslim from 'Ai.shah, l�ya', vol. r, p. 300. So praise
in the true and real sense is praise which God Himself has described for
Himself
I 12 A COMMENTARY ON THE I:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
beginning at one point and returning to it again. This going

round, or circling, or revolving may well refer to physical nature
such as the firmament, or celestial sphere upon its axis; or to
logical forms such as when we speak of a 'circular' argument, or a
'pivotal' point in discussion; or to temporal events such as the
'cycles' of the days of the week, or of the months, years, centuries,
ages; or to the 'turns' of fortune; it can refer to a knowledge or a
power exercised by one over another, in which case it signifies the
'encirclement' of comprehension or power, the 'encompassing',
and similarly, the 'circumventing' of game by a hunter; it can also
refer to ideas such as the 'turning about' of thoughts in the mind,
and to the endeavour to accomplish something for which one
struggles to 'turn' in one's favour. One can also speak of a wine
cup being passed round a ring or cirlce of people as diira bayna
hum. It would seem as if all these connotations· reflecting the
various elaborations of the basic meaning of the verb diira have no
apparent conceptual connection with the signification of the
noun diiriit as souls or spirits. In connection with the basic
meaning referred to above, diirat, synonymously with dii) irah in
this case, signifies a ring or circle or halo round the moon; the
circuit of the face; the circuit of hair around the solid hoof; the
spiral of hair upon the crown of the head. Diirat further signifies a
round track of sand with vacancv in the middle. and· where
I
usually water from a torrent has collected; it is a kind of pool

where people often gather to drink. This last signification is
indeed most important for our purpose. However, before we
come to it again, we would like to explain two relevant points
which throw light upon the matter at hand.
The first point refers to the meaning of diira bayna hum
mentioned earlier, in which a cup being passed round iring or
circle of people is indicated. The significance of this point in the
interpretation of diiriit as souls or spirits as intended by the author
will become self-evident as we go along. In the exordium,
immediately after the opening rhymed prose in Arabic, al-Raniri
speaks of himself as one "who passes round the Cup of the
Messenger of God,upon whom be peace" (Yang mengidarkan piala
Rasiil Allah, Ialla Allii.hu' alayhi wa sallam). Now the Malay word he
COMMENTARY I I3
uses to indicate this 'passing round' is mengidarkan, a word which,

standing by itself without its prefix me and suffix kan, can plainly
be seen to be the af ala form of the Arabic verb dara,that is, adara
or idara, from which is derived the Malay edar or idar and the
Sundanese andjavanese ngider, meaning: to cause it (i.e. the cup
in this case) to go round and to return to its original place of
initial movement. There is definitely a conceptual connection
between al-Raniri's reference to himself as being the drinking
Cup of the Holy Prophet and his conception of the darat. What is
important in the notion of passing round the cup in a circle of
votaries is in this case not only the circular movement, nor the -
circle of people, nor the cup itself; what is important is what th'='
cup contains, and since we are referring to the Cup of the Holy
Prophet, it contains the Water of spiritual knowledge and
illuminative experience. Here we already have a clue to the
meaning of darat as a pool of water previously mentioned, as we
will elaborate in due course.
The second point, with reference to the basic meaning of dara
which signifies the revolving firmament or celestial spheres, the
rotating movement of the heavenly bodies, we find many
references in Islamic thought connecting the heavenly spheres
with souls. The Ikhwan al-Safa' ( 10th century) say that the
Universal Soul (al-nafs al-kulliyah) is the Soul of the Universe.
The human soul is but a particular manifestation of the Universal
Soul. The most perfect manifestations of the Universal Soul are
the Prophets who are sent in every circle ( dawr) or period of
history to remind the particular souls of the knowledge they once
had which they have now forgotten. The Ikhwan believe that the
heavens and celestial spheres are governed and directed as a
living, organic unity and moved by the Universal Soul. The
Universe, like man, is alive and is an organic unity-in fact for
them the Universe is like a Great Man and man is like a Small
Universe-and they set forth in great analogical detail the
corresponding relationships between macrocosm and
microcosm. The familiar saying that "love makes the world go
round" may indeed have originated with ideas such as those
propagated by the philosophers and the Ikhwan, for they say that
I 14 A COMMENTARY ON THE I;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
out of love and yearning for the Supreme Creator the Universal
Soul was made to cause the Outermost Sphere of Heaven (al-
Mu&z!) to exist, and it in turn rotated to form the sphere below it
which again in turn rotated successively in such wise down to the
Sphere of the Moon, where the Four Elements became the
underlying constituents of the Three Kingdoms of Nature, the
mineral, vegetable and animal. 3 Thus Love sets the whole
Universe in motion,· circling and revolving. The heavens and
celestial spheres describe the most perfect movement, that is to
say circular movement, and they compare the rotation of the
heavenly bodies round the Four Elements to the rotating pilgrims
round the Ka'bah 4 •
It is no doubt with reference to cosmological doctrines such as
those elaborated in the Rasii'il of the Ikhwan that Mawlanajalal
al-Din Ru.mi ( d. 1273) speaks in his celebrated Dzwiini Shamsi
Tabrzzz and Mathnawz of Love that 'sounds the Music of the
Spheres', 5 and of souls love-moved circling on in their journey of
return to God. In emulation of souls revolving for love of God
Riimi, when he was drowned in the ocean of love, used to take
hold of a pillar at his house and set himself turning round it, and
in that condition he versified and dictated his thought and
feelings. 6 As the stars.revolve, so the mystic, moved by love, feels
himself to be one with the circling stars.
Each atom dancing in the plain
Or on the air,
Behold it well, like us, insane
It spinneth there.
3 See further below pp. 402-404.

4 See the RasiPil lkhwiin al-$afa wa Khulliin al-Wafa, Dar �adir, Beyrouth
(n.d.), 4 vols., vol. II, pp. 16; 24-26; 39 fol., 456-478. See also S.H.
Nasr's An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, Cambridge, Mass.,
1964, Pt. I (Chs. I-IV) where an excellent resume of the ideas and
doctrines of the Ikhwan is comprehensively set forth.
5 See W. Hastie, The Festival of Spring. Glasgow, 1903, p. 21.
6 Related by Dawlatshah (d. 1494-5). the famous author of the
Tadhkirat al-Shu'arii ( Memoirs of the Poets) as quoted by R.A. Nicholson

in his Selected Poemsfrom the Dzviini Shamsi Tabrfz, Cambridge, 1952, p;xl.
COMMENTARY 115
Each atom, whether glad it be

Or sorrowful,
Circleth the sun in ecstacy
Ineffable.7
Earlier, Farid al-Din 'Attar (d.1229) wrote:

The whole world is a market-place for Love,
For nought that is, from Love remains remote.
The Eternal Wisdom made all things in Love;
On Love they all depend, to Love all turn.
The earth, the heavens, the sun, the moon, the stars
The centre of their orbit find in Love.... 8
According to Sa'd al-Din Mal_imiid Shabistari (d. 1320) man's

heart ( qalb) is like the central point in the Circle of Truth, with
the Outermost Sphere of Heaven as the circumference-
From every point in this circle
A thousand forms are drawn;
Every point as it revolves in a circle
Is now a circle, now a circling circumference.9
Now the Siifis generally liken the heart to the Ka'bah of their
pilgrimage as it represents the inner House of God. Just as
pilgrims rotate round the Ka'bah, so the souls of true lovers
revolve round the heart. 10
7 See A.J. Arberry, Classical Persian Literature, London, 1958, p.233.

8 From his Jawhar al-Dhiit, Kullryyiit, Teheran, 1289 (AH.) p. 23. The
translation is by Margaret Smith, Readings from the Mystics of Islam,
London, 1950, p. 85(91).
9 Gulshan-i Raz, The Mystic Rose Garden of Mal)mud Sa'd al-D1n
Shabistari. The Persian text, with an English translation and notes,

chiefly from the Commentary of Mul)ammad ibn Yal)ya al-Lal)iji, by
E.H. Whinfield, Iran-Pakistan Institute of Persian Studies, Islamic
Book Foundation, Samanabad, Lahore, 1978, reprint of the 1880
edition. Seep. 16, couplets 157-158.
10 See
further below, p. 119
I 16 A COMMENTARY ON THE J;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ
All that we have said in the foregoing, in spite of its being

merely a glimpse and a very cursory presentation of an aspect of
the Islamic view ofTruth revealed without further commentary,
is more than sufficient to demonstrate the validity of our
interpretation ofthe concept of darat in al�:Raniri's text where it is
applied to mean 'soul' as indeed relevant as such in that context
where it also means 'ring' or 'circle'. In this case it means the ring
or cirlce of true lovers of God, in which assembly the Cup-bearer
serves. We said earlier that darat also means 'ring round the
moon'. Al-qamar is the name for the moon after its second night
until the end of the month. The moon in its fourteenth night is
called al-badr; it is the full moon, and the moon in its resplendent
fullness is compared to the Holy Prophet. 'fhe ring round the
moon usually occurs when the moon is full. The moon is the
symbol ofthe Universal Man, and $ufis have identified the moon
as such with the Holy Prophet. Now it may be reminded that in
al-Raniri's text the term darat is construed in the plural form, so
that there 'rings' or 'circles' are meant to refer to 'souls'. Be that as
it may, we must not imagine, however, because the term is in the
plural form, that separate and disconnected rings or circles are
meant; rather what is meant is still a unity of rings or circles such
as described by concentric rings or circles. Now in the following
line of the text al-Raniri says that the diirii! or spirits or souls are
those ofthe Prophets and the Veracious ( al-nabiyyzn wa al-�iddzqzn)
and this phrase refers to a verse in thF Holy (b1r'an where God
says:
All who obey God and The Messenger
Are in the Company of those
On whom is the Grace of God-
Of the Prophets, the Veracious, the Witnesses and the
Righteous,
Ah! what a beautiful Fellowship. 11
This verse reveals that there are four classes of the elect in God's
sight ranked according to their respective degrees of excellence.
11 Al-Nisa, (4): 69. See also Tibyan, pp. 127-128.

COMMENTARY I I 7
First are the Prophets ( al-nabryyzn) who each has a degree of

excellence over the others, 12 foremost among them being the
Blessed Prophet Mu}:iammad; upon whom be peace. Then follow
the Veracious (al-�zddzqzn), the truthful who have the quality of
imparting and affirming truth in a very eminent degree, and
foremost among them being Abu Bakr. In this connection and in
the verse in the Holy Qur'an: Wa al-ladhzjii'a bi al-�idqi wa �addaqa
bihi 13-' And he who brings the Truth and he who confirms (and
supports) it'-'Ali ibn Abi Talib is related to have said that by
al-ladhzjii'a bi al-�idqi (he who bnngs the Truth) the Prophet is
meant; ;rnd by �addaqa bihi (he who confirms (and supports) it),
Abu Bakr, who is in fact then called al-$iddzq. The former
reference can also apply to the Angeljibra'il, and the latter to the
Holy Prophet; and it can also refer to the Holy Prophet in the
former case and all the true Muslims in the latter. It is also
important here to note the significance of al-Raniri's treatise
being entitled lfuJjat al-$iddzq, for there is no doubt that by
analogy the $iddzq refers to the verse quoted above and the one
cited before that. Then follow the Witnesses (al-shuhada'), and
they include the martyrs slain in the cause of God's religion; and
those men of true learning and knowledge-the heirs, of the
Prophets-who will all be required to be witnesses on the Day of
Resurrection, with the Holy Prophet, against the people of past
times who charged their Prophets with falsehood; and those who
while still living are present with their Lord, who witness God's
world of spirits and His world of corporeal beings, the sages and
people of spiritual discernment. Lastly follow the company of the
Righteous (al-�ali�zn), the people of incorruptible virtue and
honesty and goodness. Prophets possess qualities inherent in
other classes below them just as those below, albeit in relative
degrees, possess qualities inherent in Prophets. These qualities
refer to truth and obedience to it. These are the classes of people
graded in hierarchical order that form, as it were, the circles of
true lovers of God; and those who obey God and His Prophet will
12See for example al-Baqarah (2): 253; and Banz lsrii'zl (17): 55.
13 Al-,?,umar (39) :33.
I 18 A COMMENTARY ON THE I:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ.
gain admission to their exalted company. In the concentric

circles of spiritual fellowship graded in hierarchical order from
the Centre to the outermost circumference, the circle nearest the
Centre must be that of the Holy Prophet-the circle whose
distance from the Centre is as the Holy Qur'an says, of two bow
lengths or nearer.14
The above exposition completes the second point of our
explanation of two relevant points which throw light on the
meaning of al-diiriit as 'the souls'. There are at least three other
meanings of which each is relevant to the context, and we will
explain them all, suggesting finally one of them to be the meaning
most likely intended in the text.
In the first instance, reference should be made to the word dar
(originally dawar), which means 'a house' or 'a mansion'. As
distinguished from b ayt, with which it is synonymous, dar refers
to a large house comprising several sets of apartments and a
court. Now darat (singular of darat) also means 'a house', 'an
abode', 'a habitation', the difference with dar being that the latter
is a generic term whereas darat refers to any particular house. The
word dar is also applied to give many other connotations of place,
such as: dar al-Jana' meaning 'the abode of perishableness' (the
present world); dar al-baqa' meaning 'the abode of
everlastingness' (the Hereafter); diir al-salam meaning 'the abode
of peace' (Paradise), which refers to God's 'Abode', for al-Salam is
one of His Beaui.iful Names. Hence the word diir in the many
combinations of its usage is also applied to mean the burial
ground (al-qubur), or dar al-mawta, 'the abode of the dead' in
contradistinction with dar al-a�ya, 'the abode of the living'. Thus,
then, a particular grave can be referred to as darat, and in the plural
sense to mean 'the graves' the term al-darat can be applied. 'The
graves' bring to mind the souls (al-arwa�) that inhabit them. We
say the souls 'inhabit' them because the Holy Prophet, upon
whom be peace, used to offer a salutation when visiting the
graves of the Faithful, and he called them 'inhabitants of the
graves', and the burial ground an "Abode of the Community of
14 See al-Najm (53):9.

COMMENTARY II9
the Faithful." 15 So then, since al-diiriit means 'the graves', and

since reference to 'the graves' is in fact reference to the souls who
inhabit them, it is clear therefore why al-Ranfri substitutes the
word diiriit with arwii&.
In the second instance, the word diir is also applied to refer to
'the heart' ( al-qulb). This notion is based on a holy tradition
)
(badzth qudsiyy) which says: 'Liiyasa'unz ar4zwa lii samii zwa liikin
)
yasa'unz qalbu 'abdiya al-mu mini': 'My earth and My heaven
contain Me not, but the heart of My faithful (believing) servant
contains Me'. It is with reference to the heart that-to quote an
example-Ru.mi says, alluding to the above badzth: "In this
house is a treasure which the universe is too small to hold." 16
Here 'house' (diir or bayt) Persian: khiinah) means 'heart' (qalb);
and the $iifis often compare the heart to the 'House of Allah', bayt
Allah, the Ka 'bah. 1 7 They generally sometimes apply the term
diir to mean the heart, meaning the reality of man, the self. 18
According to al-Jurjani al-qalb means 'the reality of man' (baqzqat
al-insiin); 'the rational soul' (al-nafs al-nii/iqah), also 'the soul' or
'the spirit' (al-ru&) 19 We have said earlier that diir is a generic
term whereas darat refers to particulars. Likewise then, diir
meaning 'a soul' refers to a soul in the generic sense pertaining
to human beings; and diirat refers to a soul in the particular sense:
the soul of a believing and faithful human being. Thus al-diiriit
means, in this interpretation, 'the souls' of the believing and the
faithful, in particular those who have achieved spiritual states of
15 For dar, see ibn Man�iir's Lisan al-'Arab) Beyrouth, 1968, 15 vols: IV:
298, col. 1 Bayt is also applied to mean 'a grave' (ibid.) I: 15, col. 1). For
the signification of the verb dara explained earlier see ibid. ) IV: 295-301.
lbn Man�iir's work will hereafter be cited as LA.
16 See Selected Poems from the Dzvani Shamsi Tabrzz ) edited and translated
with an introduction, notes and appendices by R.A. Nicholson,
Cambridge, 1952, pp. 58-59, XV: 3. Hereafter .cited as Dzwan.
17 See above, p. 115.
18 See Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, The Mysticism of lfamzah
Fan,riirz, Kuala Lumpur, 1970, pp. 8�9 note 18, the references to the
Gulshan-i Raz and MathnawzofShabistari and Riimi respectively. Also
J:Iamzah's rumah as dar.
19 Al-Ta'rifiit Cairo, 1938/1357, p.
) 156. Hereafter cited as Ta'rifiit.
the highest degree such as those referred to in the text as the

Prophets and the Veracious ( al-nabiyyzn and al-fiddiqin); and
hence al-Raniri substitutes it with arwii�.
In the third instance, diirat, as we have previously mentioned,
means 'a pool'; it refers to a round tract of sand with vacanc_y in
the middle where water from a torrent has collected, and
sometimes people sit and drink there. It is a place in which water
collects, or a place where water stagnates, and as such diirat is
synonymous with �aw tj, and ba�rat. The close conceptual
similarity with bawtj, is significant here, for al-lfawtj, according to
the Islamic eschatological context, is 'the Basin', 'the Pond', 'the
Pool', 'the Tank' of the Holy Prophet (bawtj, al-rasul), where his
Community will gather to drink on the Day of Resurrection. In
Sufi literature it is well known that 'raindrops' that merge with
'the Ocean' symbolize 'the souls' returning to their Fount of
Origin, the Absolute Being. 20 So too, by analogy, 'pools' are like
the 'raindrops'. Al-diiriit as 'the Pools' refers to the souls of the
Prophets and the Veracious mentioned in the text. Their being
'drowned' in the ocean of God's generosity (fi babri
nawiilihi...gharzqatan) means their being abundantly bestowed
spiritual knowledge (water), since water generally, even in
dreams as ibn Sirin tells us-symbolizes spiritual knowledge.
'The Pools' are pools of clear drinking water, so that they offer the
thirsty to drink from them, and the drinking is the imbibing of
spiritual knowledge-the knowledge of truth of the highest
degree of certainty. Now the terms nawiil, ni( mah andjud occurring
in the expressions Jz babri nawalihi; an( ama( alayhii,· bi jiidihi in the
text all have significant conceptual connections with water and
thirst and drinking, as for example: taniiwala in the expression
taniiwala mii'a al-bawtj, means 'he reached, and drank of, the water
of the drinking tank ( or pond or pool); na( iimah in ibn al-na( amati
means, among others, 'the drawer of water who is at the head of
the well', and well is birkah, a term which is also synonymous with
darat, babrat and bawtj,; al-na( a'im, the name of the Nine Stars of
Sagittarius conveys the idea of drinking;}iida with many infinite
20 See for example Dzwiin, XII, 49.

COMMENTARY I2I
nouns, among them jud, means among other meanings, 'it

rained copiously'. 21 Finally the word ba�r which occurs in the text
means 'a great sea', 'an ocean'. In this brief exposition we have
isolated three important elements in the various meanings
significant in our interpretation, and they are the notions of water )
thirst and drinking. And the souls of the Prophets and the
Veracious are like pools whose waters are the repositories of
spiritual knowledge which those who thirst after it seek and find
through God's fine succour ( al-tawfiq al-raqzq). It is not
insignificant to the interpretation given above, which is borne out
by the entire Arabic exordium, that al-Raniri should style
himselfas 'he who passes round the ring the Cup of the Messenger
of God' for he is passing round the ring, as it were, droughts of
spiritual knowledge. Now, the soul itself is likened to a living,
endlessly plying Fountain or Pool whence "each pretty brook
goes brimful to the main", 22 as Rumi says:
Every form you see has its archetype in the placeless world;
If the form perished, no matter, since its original is everlasting.
Every fair shape you have seen, every deep saying you have
heard,
Be not cast down that it perished; for that is not so.
Whereas the spring-head is undying, its branch gives water
continually;
Since neither can cease, why are you lamenting?
Conceive the Soul as a fountain, and these created things as
nvers:
While the fountain flows, the rivers run from it.
Put grief out of your head and keep quaffing this river-water;
Do not think of the water failing; for this water is without
end. 23
21 For all these terms which we have conceptually connected with diirat
here, see LA III: 137, col. 1; IV: 44, cols. 1-2, 45, cols. 1-2; VII: 141,
cols. 1-2; XII: 583, cols. 1-2.
22 See
Nicholson's rendering in verse of the following poem quoted from
Rumi's Dzwiin (Appendix II: XII, 343).
2 3Dzwiin, XII, 47.
And the souls or spirits of the Prophets and the Veracious-the

Saints of God-through absorption ( istighraq), or being
'drowned', in the Ocean of God's generosity (jz ba�rz nawiilihi
gharzqatan), which is the Fount of spiritual energy, are revived
and strengthened for their task "of pure ablution round earth's
human shores"." 24 As Riimi, in the Mathnawz, 25 says:
There is a Water that flows down from Heaven

To cleanse the world of sin by grace Divine,
At last, its whole stock spent, its virtue gone,
Dark with pollution not its own, it speeds
Back to the Fountain of all purities;
Whence, freshly bathed, earthward it sweeps again,
Trailing a robe of glory bright and pure.
This Water is the Spirit of Saints.

Which ever sheds, until itself is beggared,
God's balm on the sick soul; and then returns
To Him who made the purest light of Heaven.
We have said earlier that each of the three meanings of al-darat

given and interpreted above is relevant to the context and we
promised to s11ggest one of them to bf:' the meaning most likely
intended in the text. Having briefly expounded them, however,
we must conclude, as reason demands, that to suggest only one of
the meanings is now manifestly unnecessary; for all three meanings
and the previous one referring to al-diiriit as 'the rings' or 'the circles',
in fact refer to one and the same referent; the souls of the Prophets
and the Veracious, and all of them are eminently relevant to the
context as a whole. Be that as it may, we cannot fail to see that the
most relevant of all, in point of the imagery couched in the line of
the text and its conceptual interrelations with specific terms that
occur in various lines of the text, is the meaning of al-diiriit as 'the
pools'. But all meanings here collectively point to one fact, for the
21 See Nicholson, Riimz, Poet and Mystic, p. 41, note I.

25 V, 200.
COMMENTARY 123
term al-diiriit as here applied is pregnant with meaning at once

rich and profound. And so al-Raniri the author, also knowing
this, interprets it simply by substituting it with al-arwiib.
Be that as it may, there is, however, another explanation in
connection with the word al-diiriit as found in the text. In the
Djakarta copy of the text, to which reference has already been
made, 26 which is incomplete but where only the. Arabic words
are found, the word clearly inscribed in our text as al-diiriit is there
written as al-dharriit, meaning 'the atoms'. If the word in that
copy of the text is the correct one, then the word al-diiriit in our
text is simply the copyist's error for al-dharriit; and this may
happen when the c;lot of the letter dhiil in dharriit is mistaken for an
alifhastily scribbled, such that-since the tashdzd for the letter ra'
is not inscribed-it reads diiriit instead of dharriit. If this is so, then
the first two lines of the saj' in the text should read:
lfamdan li ilahin huwa bi al-bamdi baqzq

Fz babri nawalihi kanat al-dharratu gharzq
Now this is exactly the same as the half-verse in the first mi�ra' of
the opening ruba'zinjami's Persian work, the Sharb Ruba'iyyat, 27
where we find the identical lines in Arabic-Persian:
lfamdan li ilahin huwa bi al-bamdi baqzq

Dar babr-i nawalish hamah dharrat gharzq . . . 28
It is now obvious that al-Raniri has taken Jami's opening half

verse and translated the Persian line into Arabic to form an
Arabic saj' of his own. The subsequent lines in al-Raniri's saj' do
not quite follow the rest of the half-verse in Jami's ruba'z. Now
that we have established al-dharrat to be the word intended
instead of al-dariit, it would appear as though our interpretation
of al-diirat in the foregoing pages pas become superfluous. But
26
See above, p. 48 note 137.
27
See above, p. 19 (2(?), note 74.
28 Page 42 of the Istanbul edition.
such is not the case, for aside from the fact that we have to explain
away the meaning of the word al-diiriit, which is clearly written in
the text, and to demonstrate that its meaning runs in harmonious
conformity with the rest of the text and even clarifies the other
key words that follow therein in a way that illuminates one of the
most fundamental truths in the Sufi vision of spiritual reality, the
word al-diiriit in effect comes to the same meaning as al-dharriit
or rather, it describes what is intended by al-dharriit. It is indeed
not impossible that al-Raniri-despite the testimony of the
Djakarta text to the contrary-has changed the word al-dharriit
in Jami's text to read al-diirat in his, just as he has changed the
intention of the rest of the latter's quatrain in order to compose a
rhymed prose of his own in an exordium that reflects in summary
form the whole of his treatise. It is not necessary here to show how
this can be possible as it is not relevant to our commentary of the
text, and what is now relevant is to show how al-dariit comes to the
same thing as al-dharrat, and to prove that our commentary on al
diiriit applie:s equally to al-dharrat, and is therefore not irrelevant
to the text-on the contrary, it is eminently relevant to it.
We have already shown in the foregoing pages that al-darat
refers to something which went round, or circled, or revolved in
the manner of the atoms: al-dharrat. It also refers, we said, to the
cycle in which something is involved, beginning from an initial
place of movement and returning to it again. In this case, al-dariit
refers to the souls or spirits ( al-arwaM that were once i11 a pre
existent state in the interior condition of Being, then becoming
human in the state of external existence, and afterwards
returning to their original state of interior existence in the realm
of the Unseen, thus describing a full cycle of existential
movement. These spirits, that involve themselves in this
ontological cycle ( al-diirat), are like the atoms ( al-dharrat) circling
round the Sun of Being, their Source of existence. Now the word
dharriit is derived from the word dharr; and it has, among its many
conceptually related meanings, come to mean atoms because
dharr refers to minute indivisible particles that are compared to
the eggs of the smallest of ants. Hence it also refers to seeds
capable of producing offspring, of man, animal, or plant. The
COMMENTARY 125
human progeny is described by the word dhurrfyyahJ which is also

derived from dharr. 29 In order to understand the meaning of al
dharrat according to the interpretation of the Siifis in the context
discussed, we must refer to a passage in the Holy Qur'an where
God says:
When thy Lord drew forth from the Children of Adam
from their loins-their descendents ( dhurriyyatahum), and
made them witness unto themselves (saying): "Am I not your
Lord?" -They said: "Yes indeed! We do witness." 30
Al-J unayd, in explanation of this passage, says:
In this verse God tdls you that He spoke to them at a time

when they did not exist, except insofar as they existed for
Him. This existence is not the same type of existence as is
usually attributed to God's creatures, it is a type of existence
which only God knows and only He is aware of. God knows
their existence, embracing them, sees them in the beginning
when they are non-existent and oblivious of their future
existence in this world ... 31
In this explanation, al-Junayd is referring to the pre-existent

state of the human souls or spirits as a collective whole. Among
these, however, are some who are singled out-such as the spirits
of the Prophets and the Veracious, the Saints of God-·-as the
elect among His servants. This he says in another place:
Now God has the elect among His worshippers and the
chosen of those whom He has created. These are those whom
He has chosen to be His saints and to be the recipients of His
graciousness. He has thereby separated them from the mass
29 0n the word dharr and derivatives, see L.A. J /VJ p. 304, cols. 1 and 2.
30 Al-A'riif (7): 172.
31 Kitab al-Fanii', in Ali Hassan Abdel-Kader's The life personality and
J
writings ofal-JunaydJ London, 1976, p. 32 ofthe Arabic text. The English
translation is on p. 153.
I 26 A COMMENTARY ON THE I;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ
of mankind unto Himself ... In their timeless existence before

Him and in their state of unity with Him, it is He who has
granted them their being. When He called them and they
answered quickly, their answer was a gracious and generous
gift from Him, it was His answer on their behalf when He
granted them their being, their function being that of
interlocutors. He gave them knowledge of Him when they
were only concepts which He had conceived. He then wishes
it, and made them like seeds ( dharr) which He transformed at
His will into human seeds and put them in the reins of Adam
32
With reference to the seeds or minute particles that are

collectively called dharr, the singular form is dharrat, and its plural
is dharrat. Al-dharrat, then, refers to some of the dhurriyyat of Adam:
the Prophets and the Veracious who are all Saints of God
according to their various degrees of excellence, one over the
other. When they appear in human form and partake of existence
in this world they are yet
... capable of abstraction from it and can abide with God.
When they are completely imbued with the divine qualities,
freed from the shackles of time, and have something of the
nature of eternity, aii these qualities dominate them when
God desires their abstraction from this world so that they can
abide with Him in the next, and He can instruct them to
know His unseen, and so that He can show them the hidden
corners of His knowledge aud can grant them union with
Him.
Their union with Him can take place only after their absence
from this world and their presence with Him-that is, after they
experience, by God's grace, a loss of their individual
consciousness and a return to their higher selfhood, the state they
were in before they became outwardly existent. Then again God
a2Kitiib al-Mzthiiq, op. cit., pp. 40-41/160-161.

COMMENTARY 127
separates them from Himself by returning to them their

individual consciousness, making them once more aware of their
wordly existence-
... they are dazzled by the sight of the emanations from Him,
but with the passing of the faculty of rational perception,
their individuality passes too, and so He removes them from
this world. He grants perfection to their Fanii' by granting
them the state of Baqii' and perfects this Baqii' after Fanii' by
Fanii'. 33
One who belongs to this order of spiritual existence knows that

true unification ( taw�zd), even in his worldly existence,
... consists in existence without individuality before God

with no third person as intermediary between them, a figure
over which His decrees pass according as He in His
omnipotence determines, and that one should be sunk in the
flooding seas of His unity, completely obliterated both from
himself and from God's call to him and his answer to God. It
is a stage where the devotee has achieved the true realization
of the Oneness of God in true proximity to Him. He is lost to
sense and action because God fulfils in him what He has
willed for him. This implies that in his final state the
worshipper returns to his first state, that he is as he was before
he existed.34
Our interpretation. of what al-Junayd · says in these long

quotations will be given in its due place. 35 Suffice it for us to
corn;.:lude here, and with reference to the last sentence in the last
quotation above, that the dharriit of the �iifis are none other than
the diiriit �s we have interpreted; they are those �ho are involved
in the cycle of existential movement, beginning from an initial,
3
30p. cit., p. 41/161-2.
34 Risiilahfi al-Taw�fd, op. cit., pp. 56-57/177.
35
See below, pp. 131-147.
I 28 A COMMENTARY ON THE IJUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
pre-existent state and returning to that original state while yet in

this world.
II. He has established their veracity by true verification,

And by the affirmation of their faith they separated the true
from the false.
They identified their realities accurately
As even thus did they record their knowledge and clarify the
Way.
Then in the following line al-Ran"iri says: Fa baqqaqa baqqahum

baqqa al-tabqzq. Now baqqaqahu signifies �addaqahu, meaning: 'he
verified it', and baqqaqahu also means �addaqa qa'ilahu, 'he proved
the sayer of it to be true', and so also does baqqaqa, like �addaqa,
mean 'he said, "this thing is the truth". So then, fa baqqaqa
baqqahum baqqa al-tabqzq, very literally translated means: 'And so
he said, "this thing is the truth" to their truth by true
confirmation', or 'And he verified their truth with true
verification', or simply and more plainly 'And he actualized their
truth completely'. God is the subject of baqqaqa, so that the 'he'
there is He Who effects through the spiritual faculty of truth
that is, the baqq in the person that confirms for him the truth, and
duty to that truth, and obligation to act in accordance with that
truth-in them-that is, those from amongst the Prophets and
the Veracious-that which is indubitably true with a
confirmation that is also indubitable. It is Gad who established
for them their veracity, and not them through their own efforts,
for the Musiim who has spiritual insight knows that it is always
God Who confirms the truth for him, particularly when the truth
in question is spiritual truth; and the fact of emphasis on truth made
clear in our very literal translation above only serves to
emphasize the point that Prophets and the Veracious are •not
philosophers, who rely merely on their rational faculties, in
investigations on matters that are spiritual. So it is God who has
bestowed His succour upon them, as the preceding line says. In
fact what is said in the preceding line about 'succour' ( tawfiq) is
COMMENTARY 129
another proof of the truth of what we say. The verb waifaqa has
the same construction as �addaqa and baqqaqa 36 and all of them do
indeed belong to the same semantic field. We say waifaqahu Allah
meaning: 'God directed him to the right course', or 'God made
him to take the right course'. Tawfzq refers to 'right' and 'wrong',
and 'true' and 'false'-that is, baqq and biifil-and hence also
signifies a kind of legal document in which the right and the
wrong and the true and the false of the matter in dispute are set
forth.37• In the ordinary sense of tawfiq as a legal document, it is
meant to signify the proving of the righteousness and
truthfulness of a righteous and truthful person who has been
charged by others of wrongfulness and falsehood. But in the sense
here meant it signifies the aid of God, His succour, bestowed
upon the Prophets and the Veracious, whose message has been
rejected as false by the unbelievers, and confused and falsified
and made wrong by those who have strayed from the Right Path,
such as those against whom al-Raniri was disputing. The
conceptual structure of tawfzq reveals that the recipients of tawfzq
are veracious and righteous people who are involved in dispute
and engaged in argument and are in a state of need for succinct
proofs, for verification of truths. So it follows that in the case here of
the Prophets and the Veracious, God, having bestowed upon
them His tawfiq, established for them the truth (i.e.: lfaqqaqa ...
baqqa al-talyqzq, so that their veracity became truly confirmed in
them, and their faith affirmed. In this condition-the condition
of the affirmation of their belief and faith-they were able to
separate the true, or truth, (baqq) from the false or falsehood
( bafil): wa mayyazii al-baqqa min al-biifili bi al-ta�dzq.
The 'truth' here discussed is the truth of Islam, both as a
religious monotheism and as the religion's sole, authentic
philosophical counterpart, or metaphysical complement which is
the system describe'd as ta�awwuf, which projects the Islamic
vision of Reality and Truth as tawbzd, or the Unity of God, of the
36 See LA, X: 383, col. 1; 49, col. 2.

37
See E.W. Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, Beirut, 1968, 8 vols; vol. 2:590,
col. 3.
Absolute Being and Existence. In both contexts, the religious and

the metaphysical, the expression ta�dzq in the phrase ... bi al-ta�dzq
refers to the affirmation of belief and faith together, that is, to
zmiin, or the becoming true to the trust with respect to which God
has confided in one, by a firm believing in the heart, not by
profession of belief with the tongue only, without the assent of the
heart. Now in the religious context, and with reference to the
generality of people, the concept 'belief implies that what is
believed in is not verifiable by sense experience. Indeed, 'belief
necessarily means that the object of belief is unseen and is not
subject to public verification in the empirical sense; otherwise, if
the object is seen and can be susceptible of public verification, the
notion of 'belief cannot be applied to it for it would then be an
object of recognition rather than belief. For the generality of the
people belief in the articles of faith in Islam is ultimately based on
accepting on trust the veracity of the report conveyed and
enacted by the Holy Prophet, on whom be peace! The Holy
Prophet, however, based the veracity of his belief in the report he
brought and acted upon on certain knowledge gained through
personal spiritual experience. Among his followers throughout
the ages, there have always been the relatively few who through
God's guidance and succour have attained to various levels of
that Knowledge, to which the highest belongs to the Holy
Prophet alone. The relatively few referred to here are known as
the �iddzqiin, the Veracious, whose knowledge confirmed the
truth uf taw�zd as revealed in what the Holy Prophet brought by
<-lirect experience. 38 It is clear that although the generality of the
people base their belief on authority, that authority itself bases its
belief on direct experience, so that in reality, such belief, whether
as held by the generality of the people or by the relatively few, is
ultimately based on knowledge gained through direct
experience. Indeed, the 'firm believing' in the heart which
characterizes zmiin, and by which one becomes true to the trust
38
See, for example, the early account of ta,rawwuf in Abu Na�r al
Sarraj's Kitab al-Luma' fi al-Ta,rawwuj, ed. R.A. Nicholson, London,
1963, Arabic text pp. 58-59. Also al-Ghazali, lbya' vol. IV, p. 240.
COMMENTARY
which God has confided in one, is clearly not the kind that can be
confused with that which is based on the mere will to believe. It is
rather that which is based on knowledge gained through direct
experience.
It becomes obvious from this that in Islamic metaphysics
epistemology and the epistemological process is quite different
from that understood in Western philosophy. The heart ( al-qalb),
in which occurs the 'firm believing' which characterizes zmiin and
which confirms and affirms the truth by ta�dzq, is an aspect of the
soul ( al-nafs); it is the spiritual organ of cognition by which the
soul perceives spiritual truths. It is also the intellect ( al-' aql)
operating at a higher, spiritual level of experience. 39 Since man is
equipped with physical as well as spiritual faculties, it means that
his experiential existence must encompass both the physical and
the spiritual levels.
In the view of man at the physical level, or at the everyday,
ordinary level of reason and sense experience, the world appears
to him as composed of so many variegated forms, each separated
from the other by its own, individual shape, size, colour and
character, its own delimitation and determination as such, so
that each appears to him as an independent, self-subsistent object,
or entity possessed of individual reality or essence. In this view of
reality at this level of experience, the phenomenal world, in
which man himself is included, presents itself as a world of
multiplicity, wherein all cognitive and volitive processes occur
within the necessary framework of the subject-object dichotomy.
Experience which operates at this level must involve
separatedness everywhere and in all things; and for this reason
the men of spiritual experience and discernment call this
condition that of 'separation' (jarq)-to be sure, that of the 'first
separation' ( al-farq al-awwal).
Calling this condition of separatedness at this level of
experience as that of the 'first separation' means that there is a
39
See al-Ghazali, I�yiP, vol. III, pp. 3 fol., also Ma'iirfj al�Q,udsfz Madiirij
Ma'rifat al-.Nafs, Dar al-Afaq al-Jadidah, Beirut, Lebanon, 1978 (3rd.
pr.), pp. 15-18.
132 A COMMENTARY ON THE l:{UJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
possibility for man-depending upon his religious and spiritual

state of affairs, and upon God's grace-to transcend it and then to
return to it, so that for him his experience of the phenomenal world
after his return to it would then become a condition of the 'second
separation' ( al-farq al-thanf). Indeed, for such a man, and
although the same world of multiplicity in separatedness
confronts him again, that world is no longer seen as the same as
that which he knew before, at the stage of the 'first separation'
which is common to all, for during his transcending of it he
experiences a verification of its true nature, he has attained to
certain knowledge of its real nature in such wise that he now, at
the stage of the 'second separation', sees it in an altogether
different light. This state of transcending the 'first separation'
involves a transformation in the man, without which he would
continue to be bound to the ordinary level of experience in his
existence.
The 'separation' that we are discussing conveys in fact two
connotations. The first refers to the 'separation' of God or the
Absolute from the world of creation in the manner as conceived
by man. We say 'in the manner as conceived by man' because in
reality there is no such 'separation'. Thus the condition of
'separation' is a condition made necessary by human experience
at the ordinary level, in which his faculties of cognition and
volition perform their normal functions. The fact that this
condition is called that of the 'first separation'-apart from
implying the possibility of a further condition known as that of the
'second separation' as we have pointed out-implies also a
condition prior to it, in which there was no such separation. The
terms 'first' and 'second' prefixed to 'separation' refer to the
human condition at different levels of experience. In the same
way, the term 'prior' prefixed to 'separation' also refers to man
though not, to be sure, to the human condition. It refers to man
in the spiritual condition, that is, to his pre-existent soul before he
became man as human being. This condition of 'pre-separation'
is alluded to in the Holy Qur'an:
'When thy Lord drew forth from the Children of Adam-

COMMENTARY 1 33
from their loins-their descendents, and made them witness

unto their selves (declaring): "Am I not your Lord?"-they
said: "Yea! we do witness."' 40
Here the souls of mankind were made to 'witness' (ashhada) unto

their selves the actuality of God's Lordship in the sense that they
actually know by direct experience and vision (shuhiid) the Reality and
Truth that is revealed to them. In this way they had sealed a
Covenant with God recognizing and acknowledging Him as
their Lord (rabb), that is, their Abs9lute Possessor, Owner,
Creator, Ruler, Governor, Master, Cherisher, Sustainer. Such
recognition and acknowledgement, which is the fundamental
basis of religion in Islam, entails consciousness of the distinction
between their Lord and their selves. This consciousness of
distinction between Lord and slave (' abd), however, occurred
within the spiritual context of 'union', and not the human
context of 'separation'. We will have recourse to elaborate upon
this subject again in due course. The second connotation refers to
'separation' in the consciousness and experience of separatedness
everywhere and in all things that make up the world of
phenomena, as we have explained.
The view of man at the physical, or everyday, ordinary level of
reason and sense experience, in which things that make up the
world of multiplicity take their concrete, �eparate forms and
realities, is the view of the generality of the people ('awiimm). They
see only the reality of the multiplicity before them, and nothing
beyond that. However, among people adhering to this common
view of reality are those who attained to a higher degree of
perception of truth. They recognize that what appears before
them is not the sole reality, and that there is another, entirely
different reality beyond, which they conceive theologically as
God, Who is separate from the world and Whose relationship to it
is that of Creator without any 'inner connection' between Him
and His creation. A further extension of this dualistic view of
40 Al-A'riif (7): I 72
I 34 A COMMENTARY ON THE J:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ
reality is the view among philosophers and theologians that the

external things of the world that comprise the world together
with all its parts possess cores of self-subsistent, substantial
realities or essences, quiddities which become subjects of our
knowledge because of their being qualified by their inherent
property of existence. The existence of an object is seen as a
quality or property of its essence or quiddity, as ifits essence could
subsist by itselfprior to its existence. In this view, a real distinction
was made between essence and existence; the former conceived
ontologically as real substance, the latter as a mere accident of
real substance.
The view of reality based on the ordinary level of reason and
sense experience, and the philosophical development that
evolves from it, has undoubtedly led philosophical speculations
to the preoccupation with things and their essences at the expense
of existence itself. Islamic metaphysics and philosophy do not
make a real distinction between essence and existence-that is to
say, it posits such distinction only in the mind, and not in the
extra-mental reality itself. In the extra-mental reality itself, and
particularly as seen from the perspective of the position of the
$ufis, what is seen as the 'existence' of so many variegated
essences is in fact the determination and delimitation into
particular forms of the all-embracing and pervasive Existence
Itself, so that it is Existence (wujiid) that is the real essences of
things; and what is mentally or conceptually posited as essences or
quiddities (miihiyyiit) are in reality accidents (a'riit/,) of existence.
As demonstrated by the Holy Prophet's supreme experience
and by what he brought, all knowledge comes from God, and is
interpreted by the soul through its spiritual and physical,
faculties. Epistemologically knowledge, with reference to God as
being its Source of origin, is the arrival (huJiil) in the soul of the
meaning ( ma' na) of a thing or an object of knowledge; and with
reference to the soul as being its interpreter, knowledge is the
arrival ( wuJiil) of the soul at the meaning of a thing or an object of
knowledge. Thus, at the rational and empirical level of ordinary
experience, in which the subject-object dichotomy prevails and
imposes its condition upon cognition and volition; in which the
COMMENTARY 1 35
ego-consciousness of the subject necessarily confronts the

multiplicity of external objects of reason and sense experience,
knowledge refers to the soul's intussusception of the meanings of
such objects and not of the objects themselves. There is, as we have
said, another level of experience; and even at this higher,
spiritual level, reason and experience remain as valid channels by
which knowledge is attained, only that they are of a
transcendental order. At this level the rational has merged with
the intellectual, and the empirical with what pertains to
authentic spiritual experiences such as 'inner witnessing'
(shuhiid), 'tasting' (dhawq), 'presence' (�u{jur) and other
interrelated states of trans-empirical awareness ( a�wal). At this
level knowledge means 'unification' (tawful) of the soul with the
very Truth that underlies all meaning. Here the soul not only
understands, but knows reality and truth by real and direct
experience. Real and direct experience consists in union of the
knower and the known.
We have pointed out in the case of one who transcends the
stage of the 'first separation', that such a one must first undergo a
transformation. The transformation pertains to the su�iect's ego
consciousness. Knowledge as union of the knower and the �nown
can only happen when the knower's ego-consciousness, or
subjective consciousness, has 'passed away' (Jana) ). Since the
myriad and variegated forms, clearly defined as so many
independent objects comprising the world of multiplicity, is seen
as such by the knowing subject, the 'passing away', of the
subjective consciousness necessarily involves the 'passing away'
also of the forms that define the world into a multiplicity of
objects. For it is the subjective condition that imposes upon the
knower the forms that define the multiplicity of phenomena into
separate objects of cognition and volition. But at the same time,
the passing away of the forms is not altogether a subjective affair;
for the multiplicity of existents represented by the myriad forms
are themselves discontinuous in their existence, so that the forms
are continually perishing. Thus Jana)) when it occurs, occurs both
subjectively and objectively; it involves both the psychological
and the ontological conditions of existence. The 'passing away' of
the subjective consciousness does not necessarily entail-at least

at the initial stage-the annulment ofawareness in the subject of
the distinction between his selfas the seer ( niiiir) and the object as
the seen (maniiir); the subject here is still aware ofhis selfin being
able to distinguish the seeing subject and the object seen. 41 So the
subject-object relation still holds at this initial stage of fanii',
although the transformation that he experiences, both in himself
and in the multiplicity of objects, of necessity renders it to be not
quite the same condition of dichotomy as the subject-object
relation in the stage ofthe 'first separation', wherein all things are
involved in the sway of conditions at the normal, everyday level
of experience. Were it not for the subject's continued awareness
of his self at this initial stage offanii', then such experience would
not result in the attainment ofcertain knowledge (ma'rifah) ofthe
true nature ofthings as he reflects and contemplates upon it later,
when he returns to the sobriety of his normal, phenomenal
consc10usness.
At the initial stage of the 'passing away' of his subjective
consciousness, then, the knower is able to 'witness' the 'passing
away' ofthe forms that define the multiplicity ofphenomena into
separate objects. What the knower as seer sees is the 'gathering
together' (jam') of the myriad forms of the phenomenal world
into a single, unified Reality. This 'inner witnessing' is the seeing
and experiencing of Multiplicity (kathrah) gathePed together into
Unity ( wa�dah). The tremendous inner turmoil that accompanies
this overpowering vision is at the same time heightened by God's
revelation of Himself ( tajallz) in the knower by means of one of
His Names (asma') or Attributes (Jifat). God or the Absolute Being
in all the forms (sing. �iirah) of manifesta tion is 'the Truth' ( al
&aqq). It is in fact God's self-revelation in the man that brings
about the state offanii'-that makes him naught and deprives
him of his individual existence. Ultimately, when the human
light is extinguished and the creaturely spirit passes away, there
41Cf. ibn 'Arabi, Fu{U{ al-lfikam, edited with a commentary by A. 'A.

'Affifi, Cairo, 1946, p. 91.
COMMENTARY 1 37
'.
would not even be a trace of consciousness left in the ego of its
passing away. The man has at this stage 'passed away from the
passing away' ifanii' al-Jana'). In exchange for what God has
d·eprived him of, God puts in the man, without incarnation
(buliil), a spiritual substance (latifah) which is of His Essence
( dhiit) and is neither separate from Him nor joined to man. God's
revelation of Himself is made to that spiritual substance, named
the Holy Spirit ( al-riib al-qudus), for He is never revealed except to
Himself. We call that substance 'a man' because it is an exchange
for what God has deprived of the man, taking the man's place
instead of the man. At this stage the subject-object dichotomy no
longer exists. 42
If the experience offanii' ceases at this stage because the man's
spiritual capacity and preparedness cannot withstand it, and
when later the man, regaining his phenomenal consciousness,
returns to the level of the human condition in which the wor!d of
multiplicity again confronts him in its myriad forms, his
reflection and contemplation of the experience he has undergone
might, in tht; absence of God's guidance, convey to him the
erroneous conviction that the world together with all its parts is
nothing but sheer illusion. Due to his own imperfect spj.ritual
state, and to his incomplete experience of the 'unveiling' (kaslif),
he might then believe that the separate and multiple things are
mere figments of the imagination; that these particulars in
existence are really what the mind conjures up, and that in
reality there is no particularization in existence. He will believe
that everything is in reality God in the pantheistic or even
monistic sense. He thinks that God is the world and the world is
God, and his self is God and God is his self. Swayed by his own,
subjective vision, he has become one of those who, like him, have
slipped from the Right Path and fallen into the abyss of error and
heresy. People such as these, or rather those who only understand
it intellectually without any real .experience offanii' or kasfif, are
42Cf. 'Abd al-Kar1m al-Ji'li'; Al-lnsan al-Kami!, 2v., Cairo, 1956, vol. 1, p.
62.
I 38 A COMMENTARY ON THE I_IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ
the ones al-Raniri refutes in this treatise, calling them by names

indicative of subtle deviations from the truth (i.e. mul�id
zindzq).
But not all those who experienced incomplete 'unveiling'
become involved in error and heresy. Those whom God guides on
the right course are aware of the incompleteness of their vision of
Reality and Truth which they witnessed during this state of
'unveiling'; and they are aware also that the 'unveiling' itself is
only an initial one, an incomplete one. While they are prone to
the urge to affirm the oneness aspect of reality only, in harmony
with the reality of their experience of Unity, they nevertheless
confirm the truth of religion as brought by the Holy Prophet, and
accept the experience of the Veracious as a truer and higher
degree of spiritual attainment and discernment than theirs. They
also confirm in their works the sunnah of the Holy Prophet, and
they acknowledge in their selves the religious distinction between
'Lord' (rabb) and 'slave' ('abd) and act in accordance with its
necessary requirements. In the classification of mankind into
spiritual degrees, they are to be distinguished from the generality,
whose characteristic condition we have already described, as
belonging to a higher class. In the spiritual hierarchy of man,
they are known as the 'elect' (khawii+r) amongst God's servants
and are among the saints ( awliya) or 'friends of God'.
In their spiritual condition, they have realized in their selves
the true experience of what is called 'poverty" ([aqr), or that
'anxious need' or condition of being in 'utter want' that stirs
intense agitation and anxiety of vital magnitude, that is born out
of the experience of Jana' followed by fan�' al-Jana'. In their
'passing away' they 'witnessed' the complete annulment of all
phenomena in such wise that only Go� remains; and in their
'passing away from the passing away' they experienced their own
complete annulment; so that when they regain their individual
existence and phenomenal consciousness, the realization of the
truth that only God remains conveys such a tremendously awful
awareness of utter dependence for their existence and
consciousness upon God alone. They know, by what has been
realized for them, the nothingness of all things as things-in-
COMMENTARY 1 39
themselves, and they know also, by what has been realized in

them, the nothingness of their selves as their own selves, and so
what they now know is that all 'other' (ghayr) than God, all 'that
which-is-other-than-God' (mii siwa Alliih), only appears to subsist
by 'borrowed' existence. Just as the debtor, borrowing an
indefinitely extended loan lives by it, and for that living depends
solely on his creditor, realizes his dire need and anxiety for the
creditor's continued maintenance of the loan; even more so
nay, immeasurably more crucial in its awful totality-when in
this case the debt is that of existence itself, existence not only in this
phenomenal world, but in that spiritual world also, to which all
must in the Pnd return. They who know this condition of being
reduced to the station of dire need of God and anxiety speak of
such 'poverty' as "a blackened face in both worlds" ( i.e. a al-Jaqr
sawiid al-wajhjf al-diirayn n ). So the self devastating consciousness
in true 'poverty' is realized when one knows by direct experience
that only God remains, as the saying puts it:" Idhii tamma al-faqrfa
huwa Alliih)) _"When poverty is complete it is indeed God."
The highest class in the classification of mankind into spiritual
degrees consists of the 'super elect' ( khawiiH al-khawa�I). The
experience of fanii\ in their case, does not cease at the stage of
Janii) al-fanii\ as is the case with the 'elect' ( al-khawiiH). The man
whose spiritual condition is perfect and mature, and who is under
God's guidance, being a recipient of His aid (tawfiq), will be
resuscitated, while still in that state, even before he regains his
normal condition of phenomenal consciousness, from the utter
oblivion of Jana) al-Jana) . What he has actually experienced in
that state is the reality and truth that underly the meaning of the
words of the Holy Prophet: ''Kana Alliihu wa lii shay) a ma'ahu) '_
"God was, and there was nothing with Him." This saying does
not refer to the period of pre-creation when God alone "existed";
it means that God has been, is, and will continue to be alone, as
He was ( Huwa al-iina kamii kiina). All phenomena are in themselves
really nothing; they are in a constant state of perishing (fiin), in
which no two instants of time measure a process in their
perishing, as their perishing is not a 'process' happening to the
same phenomena. As one series of phenomena is made naught,
another resembling them take their turn, and so on, so that in

reality 'only God remains'. This is the eternal order of Being, and
hence He always is as He was, with nothing subsisting besides
Him. The manner of God's 'remaining' is not static; He is forever
in some 'operation' (sha'n): producing, bringing to naught the
production, and reproducing. So He is, as it were, the
'Substratum' which makes possible the appearance and
disappearance of all phenomena in continuous series. Having
been resuscitated from the state of 'passing away from the
passing away', what he 'witnesses' next is the final 'unveiling'.
We have said that in the initial 'unveiling' he 'witnesses' the
'assembling together' (jam') of all forms of the phenomenal world
into a single, unified Reality. He sees with a spiritual vision as if it
were by ocular vision all Multiplicity gathered together into
Unity. In other words, he sees the 'perishing' of all phenomena
and the 'remaining' of the Reality underlying them. Now in the
final 'unveiling', he 'witnesses' the single, unified Reality again
taking the myriad forms of the phenomenal world without itself
becoming multiple. He sees with a spiritual vision the Unity
individuating itself into Multiplicity without impairing its
original Unity, and yet 'connecting' or 'relating' the Multiplicity
with itself in such wise that, although the Unity takes on the
forms of Multiplicity, it still distinguishes itself from the latter. In
other words, he sees the inner articulations of the Unity, in which
the Unity is neither joined to nor separated from the Multiplicity,
and which goes on in continuous operation. This continuous
operation of Unity articulating itself into Multiplicity and back
again into Unity as witnessed by the spiritual adept is called the
'gathering of gathering' (jam' al-jam'). In this state, which is no .
longer the same state as the previously experiencedfana' but the
final stage of it, the man realizes his true Selfhood and 'subsists' in
God ( baqa'). His experience offana' al-Jana' is what the masters of
spiritual experience and discernment call 'absorption' (istighraq),
to which, as we have already pointed out, al-Raniri" refers when
he speaks of the dharrat or darat-the souls of the Prophets and the
Saints among the Veracious-as being 'drowned' (gharzqatan:
the word gharzq. is derived from the same root as istighraq) in the
COMMENTARY
Ocean of God's favour and bounty. In his experience of the

'gathering' 43 and then, after utter oblivion (istighriiq), the
'gathering of gathering', God, out of His favour and bounty has
revealed to him, as it were, a fragmentary vision of the
continuous operation of His self-manifestations and
determinations and particularizations that appear as the forms of
the sensible world. We say that his vision of Multiplicity in Unity
and Unity in Multiplicity is 'fragmentary' because when God
gives him back his subjective consciousness and he regains his
individual existence and consciousness of phenomena, he knows
that what he has 'witnessed' was a 'fragment', so to speak, of the
continuous series ofself-determinations and particularizations of
the absolute Unity. His remembrance, reflection and'
contemplation of that vision at this stage constitute that
Knowledge in him whose reality and truth of its certainty is
established by direct experience ( �aqq al-yaqzn). His exper'ience of
baqii' or 'subsistence' in God necessarily does not cease, for it
would not be a 'subsistence' ifit were temporary. We speak ofthe
vision as 'fragmentary', so that it is the 'witnessing' ofit (i.e. of the
'gathering of gathering') that is temporary; but the subsequent
knowledge of it is permanent. His return to individual existence
and phenomenal consciousness is accompanied by a condition of
recovery as iffrom a state ofintoxication (sukr), ofinsensibility; a
condition of alertness, wakefulness and clarity. "All men are
asleep", said the Holy Prophet, "only when they die do they
wake up" ( Al-niisu niyiimun fa idhii miitu intabahu). 44 We must
interpret the words 'when they die', in this case as having a double
meaning: one to physical death and the other meaning when they
'die' to self, to subjective consciousness of the self, and not to
physical death; for the Holy Prophet also said, with reference to
dying to self as we mean here: "Die before ye die" ( Miitii qabla an
43 Al-Raniri's Malay translation of al-jam' is menghimpunkan, which

means 'gathering'. See Jawiihir, p. g 1.
44 Cf Fu,ru� al-lfikam, p.
. 159. See also Futu�iit, IV, p. 457:637. ///, p. 285
(250); p. 285 (250); p. 285 (251); p. 286 (251).
tamiitii), that is, 'die to self before ye actually die physically.' 45 So,
in this case, the man's condition of alertness and clarity, of
wakefulness, on returning from the experience of the 'gathering
of gathering' (previous to which he has in fact 'died' to self), is
called ra&w: 'sobriety'. Although from the point of view of his
individual existence he is the same man, yet he is no longer in fact
the same man. That former selfwas 'dead', he has 'died' before he
actually died, and he has regained, in that dying, his higher
Selfhood and subsists in God. He has returned, in recollection, to
that state ofwakefulness when his true Self, his soul, had seen God
in clarity, and had declared "Yea!" to God's "Am I not your
Lord?" So now he 'lives in God', confirming and affirming what
he as his true Self had witnessed unto itself on the Day of Alastu.
Although he now sees the sensible world of multiplicity
confronting him again, although 'separation' again comes into
force, yet it is no longer for him the same world as the one he knew
before; for he now knows that the myriad forms that constitute the
Multiplicity are in reality so many different aspects of'the Truth'
(al-&aqq) Who 'clothes' Himself in their guises; are so many
manifestations and determinations and particularizations of the
Absolute Being Who, as the Reality underlying the sensible
world, is called 'the Truth'. He also knows that the separate
things considered independently are nothing in themselves, and
the certainty of this truth is borne out in his experiences of the
'gathering' and of 'utter oblivion'. But considered as so many
particular determinations and self-revelations of the Truth, the
separate things of the sensible world are no mere illusion; they do
exist and posses ontological status. They are 'theatres of
manifestation' (sing. ma;:,har) that determine the particular forms
of self revelations of the Truth. Thus this stage of returning to the
45 Shabistari says that death occurs to man in three sorts: the one
occurring to him every moment; the death of the conscious ego; the
death compulsory on him. La!iiji, commenting on this, says that the first
is the new creation (which we will explain in due course); the second is
death to the world, as in accordance with the tradition: "Die before ye
die;" the third is the separation of the soul and body. See Gulshan,-i Raz,
p. 65, couplets 664-665.
COMMENTARY 143
r ,
conditon of 'separation' is called the 'second separation' (al-farq

al-thani), and it is sometimes also called the 'separation after
gathering' or the 'separation after union' (al-farq ba'd al-jam').
Speaking of the same experience as we have outlined here, al
Ghazali, alluding to the people of the 'second separation', that is,
the elect and the super-elect, says:
... the Gnostics (al-'arifiin) rise from the plain of metaphor
(majaz: i.e. from the level of the phenomenal things, whose
ontological status is merely that of a 'metaphorical
existence', that is, to which existence is not literally
applicable, or of which existence cannot really be
predicated) to the pinnacle of reality (baqzqah); and they
compiete their ascent and perceive through direct ocular
vision ( al-mushiihadah al-' iyaniyyah) that there is nothing in
existence but God Most Exalted, and that every thing
perishes save His Aspect (wajh: lit. Face), 46 not because it
perishes at one particular moment, but rather because it is
perishing eternally and everlastingly, since it cannot be
conceived otherwise. For everything other than He, when
considered in itself, is pure non-being (' adam mabr/-); an9- when
considered from the' standpoint of the existence which it
receives from the First Truth ( al-awwal al-baqq), is seen as
existent-not in itself, but solely from the standpoint ofthe
Originator of its existence-so that the sole existent is the
Aspect of God Most Exalted. Everything thus has a double
aspect: an a&pect unto itself, and an aspect unto its Lord; in
respect of itself it is non-existent (' adam), in respect of its Lord
it is existent (mawjiid). Therefore there is no existent save God
Most Exalted and His Aspect, and hence 'every thing is
perishing save His Aspect', eternally and everlastingly.
These Gnostics have no need to await the rising on the Day of
Resurrection to hear the Creator's call: "To whom is the
sovereignty this Day?-to God, the One, the Irresistible!",
because this call peals endlessly in their ears. Nor do they
46 Al-Qur'an: al-Q,a,ra;r (28):88: Kutlu shay'in hiilikun illii wajhahu.

understand by their saying 'God is Greater' ( Alliihu akbar)

that He is 'greater' than others. God forbid! For there is
'with' Him no other in existence for Him to be greater than it.
None has the rank of 'withness' {al-ma'iyyah) with Him, but
only that of 'consequentialness' ( al-taba'iyyah); indeed, none
has existence at all save through the aspect that follows from
Him, so that what exists is only His Aspect. Now it is absurd
that He should be 'greater' than His own Aspect. The
meaning is rather that He is much Greater than to be called
'greater' by way of relation and comparison-too Great
indeed for anyone, be he prophet or angel, to comprehend
the real nature of His Greatness. None knows God with real
knowledge of Him but God, for every known comes within
the circumsective sway of the Knower, and this is the very
negation of Majesty and Greatness ...47 The Gnostics, (on
their return) after their ascent to the empyrean of reality
confess in concerted agreement that they saw naught in
existence save the One Truth. Among them, however, are
those who attain to this state through illuminative knowledge
or gnosis (' irfiin 'ilmi), and others through direct experience
or immediate tasting (dhawq). The (forms of) Multiplicity
pass away from them (i.e. their vision) in its totality. They
were drowned in the absolute Unity, and their intelligences
were effaced in it, and they became therein as those utterly
bewildered. No capacity remained in them; neither to recall
aught other than God, nor to recall even their own selves, so
that nothing wos with them save God. They became
intoxicated with an intoxication in which the sway of their
intelligences vanished ... Then when their intoxication
abated, and they returned to the sway of the intelligence,
which is God's balance-scale upon earth, they knew that that
(experience of absorption in the absolute Unity) had not
been actual union ( ittibiid), but only something resembling
union ... Now this state, when it prevails, is called in relation
47Mishkat al-Anwar, ed. Abu al-'Ala 'Affiri, Cairo, 1383/1964, pp.

55-56. My translation.
COMMENTARY 1 45
to him who experiences it, 'annihilation' (janii'), nay,

'annihilation of annihilation' (janii' al-Janii'), for he has
become extinct to his own self and extinct to his own
extinction; for he becomes unconscious of his self in this state
and unconscious of his own unconsciousness, since were he
conscious of his own unconsciousness he would be conscious
of his self. In relation to the one immersed in it, the state is
called in the language of metaphor 'union' ( itti�iid), or in the
language of reality 'unification' ( tawfid). 48
We said earlier that the condition of a 'first separation' not

only involves the possibility of a condition of a 'second
separation', but also a condition prior to it of a 'pre-separation'.
We said further that this condition of'pre-separation' occurred in
the spiritual context of 'union', when the souls of mankind
confirmed and affirmed their individual and collective Covenant
(mzthiiq) with God, recognizing and acknowledging Him as their
Lord. Their recognition and acknowledgement of that supreme
truth indeed involve some sort of 'separation'-that is, some
consciousness of distinction between Lord and slave, between
Creator and creature. This means that even in the spiritual
context some form of subject-object relation still holds, setting a
limitation to man's cognition. God cannot be known to man in
His Essence because, as such, He is beyond all determinations
into particular entities (i.e. lii ta'ayyun). He can thus be known
only in a limited way when He manifests Himself to the perfect
man through some definite Name or Attribute. And when He
manifests Himself in this way, He always reveals Himself as the
Lord; and knowing Him as'Lord' is the ultimate kind of knowing
God possible for man. It is true that the perfect man knows about
God in a way that seeks to encompass the profounder mysteries of
His Being and Existence such as that which he can infer
intuitively from his reflection and contemplation of what has
been given to him in his spiritual experiences. But all that
knowledge ultimately has its source and basis on the knowledge
of the Self and of the Lord. The Holy Prophet said: "He who
48 Ibid., p. 57. My translation.
knows his self knows his Lord", and he means by 'self the true
Self, so that what he said means: "he who knows his true Self (by
realization in the final stage ofJana) , that is, the stage of baqii))
knows his Lord (through being that Self, who already knows God
as Lord when that Self sealed the Covenant with God
recognizing and acknowledging His Lordship)."
Thus the term 'separation', in its three senses meant in this
exposition, always involves a subject-object relation. But the
degrees of separateness in the relation is by no means the same in
'pre-separation', 'first separation' and 'second separation'. When
we speak of 'pre-separation', we do not mean that there was
absolutely no 'separation' in that spiritual condition, for since the
capacity of the souls to recognize and acknowledge their Lord
necessarily involves discernment of distinction on the part of the
souls between their Lord and their Selves, the distinction
discerned implies the persistence of a 'separation' in their
condition. However, the 'separation' involved here is discerned
in the context of 'union', which is no other than that of
'subsistence' in God (baqa'). From the point of view of the stage of
the 'first separation', the 'separation' that we have just described
between the Self and the Lord is not a 'separation'; it is a 'union',
and hence in that sense it describes a condition or stage of 'pre
separation'. In the case of the 'second separation' the 'separation'
involved is not the same as that in force in the 'first separation'.
The condition of the 'second separation', when looked at from
the point of view of the 'first separation', involves both 'union' and
'separation'. It is 'union' in one sense and 'separation' in another,
since on the one hand it involves the spiritual condition of the
man who has transcended himself in Self realization, and on the
other hand it also involves the physical condition of that man
who has returned to phenomenal consciousness. The man sees on
the one hand the Multiplicity in the Unity and on the other hand
the Unity in the Multiplicity. This is why the masters of spiritual
experience and discernment call such a man the 'possessor of two
eyes' (dhii al-'aynayn). 49 It were as though the man, having
ple division ofhuman perception oftruth as we have explained

49 The tri
COMMENTARY 1 47
transcended his phenomenal self by being transported into

another condition in the state of Self realization, there saw what
he as that Self has always seen; and now upon his return to
normal consciousness, seeing things as they were before, he yet
continues to see them as they really are, 50 that is, as they exist in
reality seen by his true Self. Thus, although both the stages of
'pre-separation' and 'first separation' are common to all
mankind, even if the former refers to the spiritual condition and
the latter to the physical, the stage of the 'second separation',
which only the relatively few among mankind attain to, is in fact
more akin to that of 'pre-separation'.
In the same way that, in the condition of'pre-separation', the
man as his true Self subsists in God, so even in his physical
condition, the man who is at the stage of the 'second separation'
has realized his true Self and spiritually subsists in God. And in
his phenomenal existence, he constantly confirms and affirms the
reality and truth of his Lord, as in his original Covenant, in true
submission as enacted in Islam. 51 His ta�dzq is of that higher
degree of zmiin that characterizes the level of 'excellence' ( il;siin)
whose nature is indicated by the Holy Prophet in a l;adzth related
by 'Umar ibn al-Khat.tab and transmitted by Muslim and Abu
Hurayrah, when he said of il;siin: "that thou should worship God
as if thou sawest Him ...'' ( an ta' buda Alliiha ka' annaka tariihu ... ) .
Indeed, the man at the stage of the 'second separation', which is
that of baqii', sees God everywhere in his spiritual vision, so that for
him is realized the full meaning ofthe text: 'Wheresoever ye turn
in the foregoing pages is upheld by all �ufis. See, for exampleJami in his
Naqd al-Nu�u� Ji shar� Naqsh al-Fusu�, edited with notes and
introductions in Persian and English by W.C. Chittick, Persian
foreword by SayyidJalal al-Din Ashtiyani, Tehran, 1977; p. 142, note
147. See also Sayyid J:Iaydar Amufi. Jami' al-Asrar wa Manha' al-Anwar,
bound together with his Risiilah Naqd al-Nuqiidfi Ma'rifah al-Wujiid, eds.
H. Corbin and Osman Yahia, Tehran, 1969/1347, pp. 112-113 p 220
50 1 allude here to the Holy Prophet's prayer: "Alliihumma arinzal-ashyii'a
kamii hiya."-"O God! Show me things as they really are".

51 Cf. al-Attas,lslam, The concept efReligion, Kuala Lumpur, 1976, pp. 7;
11-12; 18-20.
there is the Presence of God' (fa aynamii tuwallii fa thamma

wajh Allah. 52
At this stage of our commentary, let us return again to Riimi's
verse in the Mathnawz, previously quoted in connection with our
interpretation of the meaning of al-Ranir'i's dharrat or darat. 53 It
will now become clear that Ru.mi is there speaking about the type
of experience that we have been describing in the foregoing
pages. Like pure water from Heaven, the spirit of the saints flow
into the world of sin, where it spends its whole stock and loses its
virtue through being polluted by foreign elements. Now the
"world of sin" refers to the world of individual existence (wujiid),
or the corporeal world in which the soul or spirit or true Self takes
its human form and is enveloped by the subjective self or ego that
confronts other myriad forms of phenomena. The ego
consciousness and phenomenal forms are as 'veils' (sing. &ijiib)
that conceal the Truth and create 'forgetfulness' (ni.ryiin: ghaflah)
of the soul's true identity and purpose. Alluding to this meaning
of 'sin' (dhanb) as individual existence (i.e. wujiid 'ayni), the
woman saint of Ba�rah, Rabi'ah al-'Adawiyyah (d. 801) 54 is
related to have told a man who said that he had not sinned since
God created him: "Thine existence is a sin with which no other
sin can be compared" (wujiiduka dhanbun liiyuqiisu bihi dhanbu). 55
Then the water, having exhausted itself until "beggared" returns
52 2: 115. See also RasiPil al-J unayd, Risiilah no. 10.

53 See above, p. 122, the verse referred to in note 25 and quoted in that
page.
54 See Shams al-Din ibn Khallikan's Wafayat al-A'yan, no. 231, vol. 2,
pp. 285-288. Wafayat al-A'yan wa Anba' Abna'. al-Zaman, ed. Il:isan

'Abbas (indices Wadad al-Qac;l'i and 'Izz al-Din Al:imad Musa), 8 vols.
Dar al-Thaqafah, Beirut, 1968-1972.
55 1n the Kashf al-Ma�jub, al-Hujwiri" quotesJunayd as having cited this
(p. 297). The word wujuduka there appears as �ayiituka, but the
connotation is the same in either case. l;lamzah al-Fan§iiri, the Malay
$ufi of Northern Sumatra (c. 1550-1600), also quotes the text in his
Asriir al-' A rifin, p. 61; and in his al-Muntahz, p. 118. See al-Attas, The
mysticism of lfamzah Fa�urz, Kuala Lumpur, 1970, pp. 369,457; also al
Attas in the article on l;lamzah Fan§iiri in the Penguin Companion to
Literature, vol. 4, Aylesbury, Bucks, 1969, p. 249.
COMMENTARY 1 49
to the Fountain of all purities. The saint, after undergoing the

process of purification by Jana', is reduced to poverty, or faqr, in
the utter oblivion ofJana' al-Jana', in which his condition is as of
absorption, or istighraq, in the Ocean of Divine grace. Having
been thus 'freshly bathed", he is resuscitated and regains his
original state of purity in the condition of baqa'. Then he returns
earthward to his phenomenal consciousness, in the stage of the
'second separation', to cleanse the world of sick souls by God's
grace and succour, that is, to impart his knowledge to others ofhis
experience.
Finally, to return to the real meaning of al-Rarrfri's text: fa
baqqaqa baqqahum baqqa al-tabqzq, it is now clear that he is there
referring to those who have attain Pel to baqa' in the stage of the
'second separation', whose truth or real knowledge ( i.e.
baqqahum) God has verified in them by making them actually
experience it (i.e. baqqaqa •.. baqqa al-tabqzq). Now their truth
(baqq) then refers to the knowledge whose real content is truth of
the highest degree of certainty (baqq al-yaqzn), because it is gained
by direct experience. Since the term baqq there is construed in the
singular form, whereas it in fact refers to the plural (i.e. to hum),
the truth meant must be the same kind of truth for all 0£ them,
and that is: the Reality that Existence is the Multiplicity in the
Unity, and the Unity in the Multiplicity. It is certain knowledge
of the structure of this Reality and Truth gained by means of
direct experience that made it possible for them not to deny
existence to the world together with all its parts and regard them
all as sheer illusion, but to affirm instead both the Existence of God
Who, as the absolute Reality underlying all creation is called
'the Truth', and the existence of the creatures, not to be sure, as
independent, separate, self-subsistent entities or essences, but as
so many particularized forms of the determinations or
individuations ( ta' ayyunat) and manifestations of the Truth
( tajalliyat) in the context of the transcendent Unity of Existence
(wabdat al-wujiid). 56 In this way they were able to distinguish
56
Because this intuition of the Unity of Existence is gained spiritually it
is only in that transcendent state that Existence is seen as a Unity.
So wa�dat al-wujfid really means Transcendent Unity of Existence.
between the true vision of reality (�aqq) and the false vision of
reality ( ba/il). Now the term ba/il here conveys two connotations:
the one refers to the ontological value ofthings, whether they are real
or not; the other refers to belief concerning the ontological value
of things, as to whether they are real or not, and its consequent
projection as a religious or theological belief. 57 In the first case,
and with reference to the Veracious or the Saints, we have already
said that for them the things in creation are real when considered
in relation to their metaphysical Source; they are not real only
when they are considered in themselves as self-subsistent
entities-they have no existence of their own since they have no
being (ma' diim, sing.' adam.) 58 It is in this last sense that things are
ba!il because they give a false impression of being; otherwise, in
the first sense, they are real ( �aqq). In the second case, and still
with reference to the Veracious and the Saints, they know by
experience that the knowledge of God is in reality knowledge of
the Self as a form of the direct self-manifestation of God by means
of one of His Names or Attributes. The Self is not God as the
Absolute, but it is aparticularizedform of the Absolute. So he who
knows his Self is he who knows it to be a particularized form of the
Absolute, and as such it knows God as the Absolute. The World
together with all its parts, including man, also in reality consists
of particularized forms of the Absolute. Thus, knowing God as
the Absolute by being one of the particularized forms of the
Absolute, involves knowing also the other particularized forms of
the Absolute, such as the essential nature of things that constitute
the world together with all its parts, including other selves. This
knowledge is only possible at the ontological level of God as the
Absolute; beyond that level, that is, the ontological level of God
in His Essence, further knowledge is not possible for man. At that
57 The term ba!il conveys two connotations, referring to the ontological

and theological domains respectively, because it is the contrary of the
term �aqq, which means both 'reality' and 'truth', pertaining on the one
hand to the ontological domain, and on the other to the theological
domain, which includes the religious and ethical aspects of human life.
58 See Ta'rifat, p. 243 (in the list of technical terms used by ibn 'Arabi in
the Futii�at al-Makkiyyah).

COMMENTARY
level God is known only to Himself. We discern here that some

form of subject-object relation between man and God is
maintained; the dichotomy between Creator and creature,
between Lord and slave is still intact. This is the true (baqq)
metaphysical vision of Reality; and the religious and theological
expression of belief and practice enacted in Islam is in fact the
system atic formulation of that truth in terms of devotional
confirmation (faith) and affirmation (works) that God has
revealed for the right guidance and salvation of mankind. The
false ( bafil) metaphysical vision of Reality, on the other hand,
either denied existence to the wnrld togethn with all its parts, or
affirmed its existence as independent, self-subsistent entities,
leading in either case to pantheism with its extreme immanence;
or to a type of theism tending toward extreme transcendence; or
to monism and the obliteration of the real distinction between
God and His creatures; or to dualism which admits in any
domain two independent and mutually irreducible substances.
The above explanation conveys the meaning of their distinction
between truth (true) and falsehood (false) as intended by the
text: wa may_,va:di al-�aqqa min al-biifili bi al-ta,fdzq .
We noticed earlier on that the term baqq signifies both reality
and truth, pertaining on the one hand to the ontological domain,
and on the other to the theological domain which includes the
religious and ethical aspects of human existence. From the point
of view of ordinary language, the word baqq signifies somethi ng
established, fixed, constant and permanent, and it does not admit
of denial or negation. Semantically, baqq signifies a judgement
(bukm) conforming with reality or the real situation. This
judgement involves statements, or uttered words or propositions,
religious beliefs, religions and schools of thought. The exact
opposite of baqq here is bafil. There is another word which also
signifies 'truth', and is in a sense synonymous with baqq, and that
is �idq, which is derived from the same root as the term $iddzq in
the title of al-Raniri's treatise here discussed, and also the term
ta�dzq. However, there is a distinction between baqq and �idq, in
that the latter refers to truth involving only statements, or
propositions, or uttered words. The exact opposite of �idq is kidhb,
1y2 A COMMENTARY ON THE I:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
which means 'untruth' or 'lie'. Whereas �aqq signifies conformity

with reality or the real situation, �idq signifies the judgement
concerning that conformity; whereas �aqq refers more to the
reality, �idq refers more to the judgement. 59 The word �aqq
basically signifies a suitableness to the requirements of wisdom or
justice. Now we understand by 'justice' (i.e. 'adl) a harmonious
condition of things or affairs being in their right places. By
'wisdom' (i.e. �ikmah) we mean the knowledge given by God, by
which the recipient is able to effect correct judgements as to the
right places ofthings and affairs. Thus when we speak ofthe truth
ofa matter as the suitableness ofa fact or a reality to a judgement,
we mean by thatjudgement that which is derived from wisdom.
Truth or baqq is then a suitableness to the requirements of the
right places of things and affairs as known by true judgement.
The notion of'right places' involves necessity for things or affairs to
be in that condition. Ontologically, things and affairs are in their
right places, but man commits errors of judgement concerning
them and creates conditions of 'injustice' (::,ulm). But when the
truth of the matter is revealed to him, such as revealed, for
example, in religion, it then becomes incumbent upon him to
guide his conduct so as to conform to that truth. By his conformity
to that truth he is also in fact putting himself in his 'right place'.
Recognition ofthe truth in both domains, the ontological and the
theological necessitates in one the conduct that conforms with
that truth. Thus, baqq also signifies 'duty' or 'obligation' that
binds in accordance with the requirements of reality and truth. 60
In the next two lines of the text, reading: wa baqqaqii
baqa' iqahum bi al-tadqzq' and fa barraru 'ulumahum wa b ayyanu al
f arzq, meaning: "They identified their realities accurately'-'As
even thus did they record their knowledge and clarify the Way',
we notice some resemblance in phraseology and construction
between Ja baqqaqa baqqahum previously interpreted, and Ja
59 Cf. Ta'rffat, p. 94 (in Flugel). See also al-Taftazani's commentary of

the Aqzdah of al-Nasafi, op. cit., pp. 15- 16.
60 See above, p. 12. For the concepts of justice ('adl),
wisdom (�ikmah),
injustice (?,ulm), truth (.fidq) and lie or untruth (kidhb), see my Islam, pp.
23-24, 25-27.
COMMENTARY 1 53
baqqaqii baqif iqahum)· only that in the latter case the act of
verification and identification refers to the plural, and what is
verified and id�ntified refers to distinct realities. The word baqifiq
is the plural form of baqzqah ) meaning 'reality'. The distinction
between baqzqah and baqq) based on what we can glean from the
foregoing explanation of the meaning of the text, is that the
latter, or 'truth', refers to the ontological situation ) or order) or
system ) the knowledge of which is based on direct experience and
vision as 'witnessed', in this case, during the final 'unveiling' in
the context of the 'gathering of gathering', and in the condition of
'subsistence' in God, in which condition Multiplicity is seen as
Unity, and Unity as Multiplicity. lfaqzqah ) or 'reality\ however,
refers t0 the ontological structure) the knowledge of which is based
on the same experience, revealing the very nature, or being, or
essence (' ayn) of each thing that has been determined and fixed
permanently as such. What they in that condition identified as
their baqifiq refers not only to their own, individual realities or
essences, but includes also the realities or essences of everything
that is manifested in the phenomenal world together with all its
parts. In the terminology of ibn 'Arabi, the baqifiq here refers to
the Fixed Essences, or Permanent Archetypes ( al-a'yiin al
thiibitah), about which we shall now give a brief explanation.
God in. His Essence (al-dhat) is only known to Himself, for
considered in such isolation He is unconditionally transcendent.
Man's knowledge and cognition-even if he were a complete
and perfect man who had attained to the highest degree of
spiritual realization-can never reach Him. Considered in this
way, God is eternally unknown and unknowable except to
Himself.
When considered as the Truth or Reality (al-baqq), He is the
Absolute Being or Existence ( al-wufiid al-muflaq). His Being, while
designated as 'absolute', yet transcends all qualifications and
relations and limitations that define the condition of
absoluteness, for absoluteness is a condition that is mentally
posited in the degrees of intelligible and external existence. 61
61
See al-Raniri's Jawahir al-'Uliim fi Kashf al-Ma'liim (Bezels of
1 54 A COMMENTARY ON THE I;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ
Strictly speaking, even the designation 'God' here is

inappropriate, since as God He is in a sense already conditioned
by determination and qualified by relation between Him and the
creatures. 62 Moreover His Oneness, at the stage of being God,
already includes the forms of potential Multiplicity (i.e. oneness
at the stage of wii�idiyyah), whereas considered as Absolute Being
He demands that Absolute Oneness wherein no trace of the
initial stirrings of Multiplicity are discernible ( i.e. oneness at the
stage of a�adiyyah muflaq). We designate Him as 'Absolute' and
predicate of Him 'Being' only because such designation and
predication imply the utmost unconditionality; and they convey,
in the first instance, the notion of an absoluteness beyond the
absolute, and in the second instance, the notion of a being
transcending even the qualification of 'being', and yet because
that being is the Source of all existence and makes everything
existent which would otherwise be nothing at all, such a being
must necessarily be posited as having being through itself. His
Being is necessary (wajib) on account of His Essence; and His
Essence is identical with His Being or Existence. 63 Similarly, the
Knowledge in the Unveiling of the Known), m.s. p. 29r. This work, of which I
am preparing an edition and commentary, is one of the manuscripts
contained in the Marsden Collection, texl Hu. 12151; pp. 21v-158r.,
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, London.
The work is divided into seven parts: the first part contains an
Introduction furnished with relevant quotations from the Holy Qur'an,
the Holy Traditions anrl Traditions of the Holy Prophet and other
Muslim sources; the second to the sixth parts contain chapters I to V of
the work dealing with expositions on I; Being or Existence identified as
the Truth; II: The Divine Attributes; III: The Divine Names and
Qualities; IV: The Fixed Essences or Permanent Archetypes; V: The
Exterior Essences; the seventh part contains a Conclusion on
Invocation and Vigilance, and includes al-Raniri's chain of �iifi
masters from whom he derived his teachings (silsilah). As this work will
be frequently consulted in our present commentary it will be cited as
Jawahir.
62 C
f. Fufuf, pp. 81; 90-91; 91-92; 119.
63 Cf. 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Qashani's Commentary on the FufUf Shar� al
,
Q_,iishanz ( alii FU{Uf al-lfikam, Cairo, I 32 I A.H., p. 3
COMMENTARY 1 55
pronoun 'He' (huwa), being a pronoun of absence, is meant to

indicate the absence from our vision and cognition of He Who is
referred to as such.
The Divine Essence, forever isolated in unconditional
transcendence, is like the Hidden Treasure (kanz maklifi,yy)
desiring or loving to be known; 64 and He makes Himself known
by a repeated process of a continuous series of 'descents'
( tanazzulat) and 'determinations' ( ta' ayyunat), each never
repeating itself, in various universal and particular forms at
various ontological degrees or 'planes' (maratib or martabat), each
form peculiar to each plane, from that of the Absolute Being
considered in His self-manifesting, or self-revealing aspect to that
of the world of sense and sensible experience, the world of
empirical things. In a famous commentary on the Fu�ii� al-lfikam
by the celebrated �iifi poet and scholar, Niir al-Din 'Abd al
Ral_iman Jami ( d. 1492), he describes what is explained in the
foregoing paragraphs thus:
The Real Being is One alone, at once the true Existence

and the Absolute. But He possesses_ different degrees.
In the first degree He is unmanifested and unconditioned
and exempt from all limitation and relation. In this aspect
He cannot be described by epithets or attributes, and is too
holy to be designated by spoken or written words; neither
does tradition furnish an expression for His Majesty, nor has'
reason the power to demonstrate the depth of His perfection.
The greatest philosophers are baffled by the impossibility of
attaining to knowledge of Him; His first characteristic is the
lack of all characteristics, and the last result of the attempt to
know Him is stupefaction.
The second degree is the self display of Very Being in an
epiphany containing in itselfall the active, necessary, and
divine manifestations, as well as all the passive, contingent,
64 We allude here to the famous Holy Tradition in which God says:

'Kuntu kanzan makh.fiyyanfa a�babtu an u'rafa,fa khalaqtu al-khalqa li kay
u'rafa.' 'I was a Hidden Treasure and I loved to be known, so I created
the Creation that I might be known.'
156 A COMMENTARY ON THE J:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ_
and mundane manifestations. This degree is named the

"First Emanation" ( ta' ayyun-i-awwal) becaus.e it is the first of
all the manifestations of the Very Being; and above it there is
no other degree than of the "Unmanifested" (!ii ta'ayyun).
The third degree is named the "Unity of the Whole
Aggregate" ( abadiyyat-i-jam'), which contains in itseif aii the
active and efficient manifestations. It is named the degree of
"Divinity" ( iliihiyyat).
The fourth degree is the manifestation in detail of the
degree named Divinity; it is the degree of the names and the
theatres wherein they are manifested. These two last named
degrees refer to the outward aspect of Being wherein
"necessity" ( wujiib) is a universal condition.
The fifth degree is the "Unity of the Whole Aggregate",
which includes all the passive manifestations whose
characteristic is the potentiality of receiving impressions, i.e.
passivity. It is the degree of mundane existence and
contingency.
The sixth degree is the manifestation in detail of the
preceding degree; it is the degree of the sensible world. These
two last degrees refer to the exterior of the intelligible world,
wherein contingence ( imkan) is one of the invariable
qualities. It consists of the revelation of the Divine Mind to
Himself under the forms of the substances of the
contingent. 6 5
$ufi metaphysics, particularly as formulated and systematized
by ibn 'Arabi, distinguishes five ontological planes. 66 The extent
to which ibn 'Arabi's formulation and systematization of the
metaphysical world view as envisaged through ta�awwuf have
impressed themselves upon all subsequent metaphysical thinking
65Lawa'i�, XXVI; trans. from the Persian by E.H. Whinfield and Mirza
Mu}:lammad J5,.azvini, Oriental Translation Fund Series, vol. XVI,
Royal Asiatic Society, 1928. Whinfield's translation as above is on pp.
25-27; the Persian text to which it refers is on pp. 32-35 of the facsimile
of the manuscript. See also Jami's Naqd al-Nurii.f, op. cit., pp. 29-30.
66Jami's references to six 'degrees' (maratib) does not contradict the five
ontological planes ( harj.arat).

· COMMENTARY 1 57
in Islam can easily be seen when we take as an example the
earliest known work in Malay, wherein the same formulation and
systematization is briefly sketched. l:famzah Fan�iiri, a Malay
�iifi poet of Barus in northwestern Sumatra, who flourished in the
mid-sixteenth century, speaking on ibn 'Arabi's concept of
Divine self-manifestations (tajalliyiit), says:
Know that the innermost Essence ( kunhi dhiit) of the Truth,
Glorious and Most Exalted, is called by the People of the
Path (ah! al-suliik) non-determination (la ta( ayyun). lt is called
non-determination becaus.e our intelligence ( budi: ( aql) and
skill in verbal exposition ( bicara: kaliim), knowledge (ilm) and
gnosis (ma( rifah) are unable to reach it. Let alone our
knowledge and gnosis, even the Prophets and the Saints are
struck with awe of It. Hence the Prophet (God bless and give
him peace!) said: "Glory be to Thee!, we cannot really know
Thee." 67 And the Prophet (God bless and give him peace!)
said further: "Contemplate upon God's Creation, and not
upon His Essence." 68 This is why the People of the Path call
this (Essence) non-determination, meaning: non-manifest
(tiada nyata) syn. !ii tajallf).
The first degree of determination is fourhold: Knowledge
(
( ilm), Existence (wujiid), Vision or Presence (shuhiid) and
Light (niir). All these four are called the 'first determination'
( ta( ayyun awwal), for by virtue of Knowledge, the Knower ( al
(
iilim) and the Known (al-ma( Him) become manifest; by virtue
of Existence, That which causes (potential existences) to be
drawn fourth from non-existence (yang mengadakan) 69 and
67 See 'Abd al..:Wahhab al-Sha 'rani, Al-Anwar al-Qudsiyyahfi bayan A dab

al-( Ubiidiyyah) Cairo, 1373/1954, 2v. in 1 (on the margin Al-Tabaqat al
Kubra), vol. 2. p. 93.
68 See Abu }:Iamid al-Ghazali's Jawahir al-Quran ) Dar al-Afaq al
Jadidah, Bayrut, 1398/1978, p.24. See also ibn 'Arabi's Al-Futii�at al
Makkiyyah, edited by 'Uthman Ya}:tya, Cairo, Al-Maktabah al
'Arabiyyah, vol. II (1392/1972), p. 255 (381); and vol. IV (1395/1975),
p. 217 (291).
69 'Potential existences' refer to the essences of possible things in the
that which comes into _existence ( as concrete external

existents (yang dijadikan) become manifest; by virtue of
Vision, the Se�r and the Seen become manifest; by virtue of
Light, the Illuminator and the Illuminated become manifest.
All these-the Knower and the Known, the First (al-awwal)
and the Last (al-akhir), the Outwardly Manifest ( al-:;,ahir)
and the Inwardly Hidden (al-bafin)-acquire their names in
the degree of the first determination.
The Known is called by the People of the Path the Fixed
Essences or Permanent Archetypes ( al-a'yan al-thabitah).
Some call it the Intelligible Forms (al-1uwar al-'ilmiyyah),
some call it the Realities of Things ( baqii'iq al-asfryii); and
others call it the Relational Spirit (rilb it/,iifi) 70. All these are
the 'second determination' (ta'ayyun thiinf). The human spirit
( rilb insiinf), the animal spirit ( ( rill} bayawanf), the vegetal
spirit (rub nabatz) are the 'third determination' ( ta'ayyun
thalith).
The 'fourth' and 'fifth' determinations ( ta' ayyun rabi' and
ta' ayyun khamis) are determinations ad irifinitum, encompassing
the realm of physical things (jasmanf) in its entirety,
comprising the created world together with all its parts.
Determinations never cease to occur, and are without
limit; but Knowledge, Existence, Vision and Light are never
separate from them all, for without these four the possessor of
these determinations would find self-determination
impossible. For this reason the People of the Path say that the
being of the world together with all its parts is the Being of
God. The world's being, though perceived as existing, yet
does not possess independent existence, for it derives its
existence from the Determinate Being (wujild muta'ayy in).
Divine knowledge. They subsist in the interior condition of being and

are not 'existent' in the concrete sense. 'Non-existence' here does not
mean utter privation of existence, for the essences of possible things are
realities subsisting in the Divine consciousness as 'intelligible forms' in
His knowledge.
70 'Relative spirit': spirit as determined in various individual and
particular forms.
COMMENTARY 1 59
Our lack of awareness ( of the real situation) makes us believe

that the world has independent existence.
The first determination may be called both Transcendent
One (a�ad) or Immanent One ( wii�id). When we regard the
Essence by Itself It is called a�ad J but when we regard the
Essence together with all Its Attributes and Names then It is
called wa�idJ for a�ad is wa�id encompassing the world
together with all its parts from its beginning to its end. 71
The ontological planes constitute an organic system, for anything

appearing in one plane finds its corresponding reality in the
planes above it, each in a form belonging exclusively to each
plane. The five ontological planes outlined in the above
quotation can be summarized into a basic structure of three
varying level: 72
I. The level of Absolute Being. The Absolute Being has two
aspects, the 'interior' (al-bafin) and the 'exterior' ( al-iahir). The
interior aspect is the self-concealing aspect characterized by
absolute oneness (a�adiyyah muflaqah) wherein no trace of
multiplicity is discernible. The exterior aspect is the self
manifesting aspect characterized by oneness (a�diyyah) wherein
the inclination towards self-manifestation is initiated by the act
of desiring or loving to be known. 73 Both the terms 'interior' and
'exterior' pertain to the Divine Essence. Now this exterior aspect
of Absolute Being is in turn the interior aspect of the stage of
71 My translation. See my general commentary on I:Iamzah Fan�iiri's

prose works in al-Attas, The mysticism of ljam;::,ah Fan�iirzJ Kuala
Lumpur, 1970. This work contains two parts; Part I: A comprehensive
and detailed account ofl:Iamzah Fan�iiri's mystical ideas and teachings
(pp. 3-201); Part II; An annotated romanized Malay edition of the
texts of I:Iamzah's three prose works and an annotated English
translation of the texts (pp. 205-472). For the above quotation see p..
315--316 (text); 435-436 (translation). The work from which the
quotation is cited is called Shariib al-'Ashiqzn (The Drink of Lovers).
72Jawa-h"zrJ p. 53.
73 See above, note 64. Love (�ubb), as will be referred to again later, is
the principle of ontological movement. See also above, pp. 113-115.
JawiihirJ p. 78.
ontological evolvement that immediately follows, namely that

of unity (wiibidiyyah) wherein the inner articulations that are
comprised in the unity are discernible as the forms of potential
multiplicity. This is the stage of unity in multiplicity, which
corresponds to that of the Divine Names and Attributes ( al-asmil
wa al-rifat). Only at this stage is the Absolute Being accessible to
human cognition, and is described by His Names and Attributes
as God. The Absolute Being has now 'descended' to the
ontological plane of the 'first determination' ( ta' ayyun awwal).
II. The level of the Fixed Essences or Permanent Archetypes.
The stage of the Divine Names and Attributes (wiibidiyyah),
which is the exterior aspect of Absolute Being, is at this second
level the interior aspect of the permanent archetypes. When the
Absolute Being, in His self-manifesting, exterior aspect of oneness
at the ontological plane of the 'first determination' contemplates
Himself, He is conscious of His own 'essential perfections'
(kamaliit dhatiyyah). These essential perfections are also the
essential forms (ruwar) of the Divine Names. The fixed essences
or permanent archetypes are identified as the essential perfections
in the Divine consciousness. They are, as it were, 'ideas' or
'intelligibles' in the Divine knowledge, and they are thus also
called the Intelligible Forms ( al-ruwar al-' ilmiyyah). The
archetypes or essences are qualified by being 'permanently
subsistent' and 'fixed' (thiibitah) because they subsist permanently
( i.e. baqaJ) in the Divine consciousness and knowledge, and they
remain therein unaltered in their nature and unmoved from their
interior and intelligible condition. Moreover, because of their
continuance ( baqiiJ ) in the Divine consciousness they are realities,
to be sure, realities of things (baqa'iq al-ashyii'). This level
corresponds to the descent of the Absolute to the ontological
planes of the second and third determinations.
III. The level of partly spiritual and partly corporeal things;
the empirical things which constitute the world of sense and
sensible experience. This level corresponds to the descent of the
Absolute to the ontological planes of the fourth and fifth
determinations.
Since we are here concerned specifically with an exposition of
COMMENTARY 161
the nature of the 'realities' (�aqii'iq), we shall concentrate our

attention on the second level summarized above-the level of
the permanent archetypes which represent their immediate
metaphysical ground.
In his exposition on the nature of the permanent archetypes, 74
al-Raniri, like l:famzah Fan�iiri before him, and following ibn
'Arabi's interpretation, says that the archetypes are the Realities
of Things ( �aqii'iq al-ashyii') in the Intelligible or Cognitive
Presence ( al-�arj,rah al-' ilmiyyah). The term �arj,rah, meaning
'presence', refers in ibn 'Arabi's metaphysical world view to
an ontclogical state; so that here it means an ontological state in
the world of intelligibles. These are subjective to God, or present
to Him in His knowledge as 'ideal realities'. The realities of
things are in that context not 'existent' (mawjiidah), but remain
in a state of being 'non-existent' (ma'diimah) in the consciousness
and knowledge of the Truth Most Exalted. The reference to
their being not 'existent' means their being not 'caused to
emerge' ( i.q.. abraza) to a state of exterior manifestation (;;,iihir) in
the form of concrete, individual existence ( al-wujiid al-' aynz);
however, they nevertheless possess ontic reality and subsist
( biiqiyah) in the interior condition ( bufiin) of Being. They are
'affairs', or 'states of activity', or 'predispositions' (shu'iin)
inherent in the Divine Unity (al-wa�dah), and being in the
interior condition is their essential state. That which evolves from
them becoming outwardly manifest as 'exterior essences' ( al-a'yiin
al-khiirijiyyah), are their 'forces' conforming with their natures
( abkiim), and 'effects' ( iithiir), and 'necessary repercussions' or
concomitants (lawiizim) resulting from causes that have their
Source in the Very Being of the Truth, since there is no existent
there other than the Truth. By virtue of their subsistence in non
existence, and of their potential role in the ontological
evolvement to follow, the realities of things are also called
Possibles (mumkiniit). 75
74Jawiihir, eh. IV (pp. 7 5- IOO).

750p. cit., p. 7':Y· 'Possibles' here do not mean the same thing as the
philosophers' notion of objective possibility, as we shall explain later in
our comments on the philosophers.
1fr2 A COMMENTARY ON THE I_IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
In the metaphysical system peculiar to the $iifis, the

permanent archetypes are known under many names applied to
correspond to classes belonging either to the Divine Attributes or
to the Divine Names. 76 Due to their numerous appellations as
listed by al-Raniri, 77 we shall not repeat them all here. Suffice it
to mention as an example only two of them already familiar to us,
belonging each to an Attribute and a Name: shu'un refers to the
class belonging to Attributes; al-a'yiin al-thiibitah refers to the class
belonging to Names. 78
According to al-Raniri, quoting one Sayyid I:Jusayn al
Shatiri, a $iifi master of I:Jac;lramawti origin, the known in
God's knowledge, which are in a state of non-existence (' adam),
that is, as ibn 'Arabi means, they have no external, concrete
existence but exist only as intelligibles in the knowledge of
God-receive the 'overflowing' (jayef) or 'effusion' or
'emanation' of the Truth Most Exalted as He manifests Himself
by means of what in the next stage only become known as
Attributes, which are inherent in the Mystery ofthe Unseen (ghayb
al-ghayb)-that is, in the interior aspect of Absolute Oneness
which remains forever unknown and unknowable except to the
Essence. Every such thing, which is a particular facet of Himself
and which presents Him in a particular mode or individuation,
subsequently becoming known as an Attribute-one among an
infinite number-is called after the Quranic expression 'an
affair', 'a mode of be-ing', 'a predisposition' (shii) n) pl. of mult:
shu'un) 79 of the Essence; and each is different from the other by
means of which the Absolute Being manifests Himself yet again in
a different form. The form manifested by this particular facet and
particular mode, describing Him irr that guise, is an Attribute,
and it is distinct from the Being of God. 8 ° For it to be 'distinct'
from the Being of God does not mean that it is something that has
.r· czt., pp. 75.

76Q11i
.
77 0ip. czt., pp. 75-76 .
78 Op. cit., pp. 75 (shu'iin); 76 (al-a'yiin al-thiibitah).
79Qur'iin, 55:29.
BOJ
awa-h'zr, p. 77.
COMMENTARY
an independent being or reality apart from God. It means rather

that it is neither the same as nor different from the Being of God,
for on the one hand it is the same as the Being of God and on the
other hand it is not the same as the Being of God. It is something
which has a double structure which when viewed in relation to
God is identical with God, and when viewed in relation to its
own, intrinsic structure is not identical with God, nor with each
of the infinite number of Attributes. Viewed in this second
manner, it has its own peculiarity; its own distinguishing feature;
its own essential property which makes it distinct from each other
and from the Being of God. (i.q. mzzah; in Malay: beza). The
explanation for this lies in the double nature of the Divine
Names. 81 All the Divine Names notwithstanding the fact that
some are contraries of others, are identical with the Very Essence
itself when they refer to the Essence. But since each of the Divine
Names is in reality a special aspect or particular form of the
Essence in the variety and multiplicity of its manifestations, each
when pointing to its own, intrinsic meaning is describing only
that special aspect or particular form, and is not then identical
with the Absolute Essence, and each is not identical with the rest
of the infinite number of Divine Names. Thus every. Divine
Name, while being on the one hand identical with God and so
with the other Divine Names is, on the other hand, an
independent meaning in itself. 82 Jami says it in another way:
The attributes are distinct from the Real Being in thought,

but are identical with Him in fact and reality. For instance,
the Real Being is omniscient in respect of His quality of
knowledge; omnipotent in respect of His power; absolute in
respect of His will. Doubtless, just as these attributes are
distinct from each other in idea, according to their respective
meanings, so they are distinct from the Real Being; but in fact
and reality they are identical with Him. In other words,
there are not in Him many existences, but only one sole
81]awahir, pp. 71-72.

s2Furur, PP· 79-80.
existence, and His various names and attributes are merely

His modes and aspects ... 83
When considered by itself independently of the Essence, in the

manner described in the latter case, a Divine Name is regarded as
an Attribute. When it is stated that the Essence or Absolute Being
manifests Himself in different forms, and that the forms
manifested are His particular facets and modes describing Him,
as Attributes of the Essence, each distinct from the others and
from His Being, we mean by 'distinct', therefore, what we have
just explained. 84 In this manner and by each self-manifestation,
and by virtue of the essential property of distinctness inherent in
each Attribute, a reality from among the realities of the Divine
Names becomes manifest ( ,?,iihir) and exists in the Divine
knowledge. The form of each reality is called 'quiddity'
(miihiyyah), or a 'fixed and permanent essence' ('ayn thiibit). 85 A
reality, then, is a form of a Divine Name, which form is
manifested in the Divine consciousness.
This 'descent' towards self-manifestation is an event which
occurs in the ontological plane of unity in multiplicity
(wii}Ji,diy_yah), and which corresponds to the first self-manifestation
(tajalli'; and the first determination or individuation (ta'ayyun) of
Absolute Being. The emanation referred to at the beginning of
this explanation is called 'the most holy emanation' ( al-fayrj, al
aqdas). Love (/:,,ubb) is the principle of ontological movement
having its source in the Essence; it is the medium by means of
which is activated this first and most holy emanation. 86 The
contents of the emanation are known as the 'primordial
potentialities' ( isti' dad a�li), which constitute the inherent,
essential properties of the fixed and permanent essences or
archetypes indwelling in the Divine knowledge. The term
saLawii'i�, XV. p. 14/18.

84 ]awiihir,
pp. 56-57.
85 0p. cit., p. 83. This is the real quiddity, not the mentally posited
quiddity.
86 Jawiihir, pp. 77;78. See also Jam'i, Naqd al-Nur,4, p. 42.
COMMENTARY
isti'diid (in Malay: kelengkapan), which we have here translated

as 'potentialities', means more precisely 'preparedness', for they
refer to distinct essential properties that determine the ultimate
nature and destiny of a reality or thing in which they inhere, so
that the reality or thing will actualize in itself, as it unfolds from
non-existence to existence, what the determining essential
properties have prepared for it to actualize. The primordial
preparedness emanated into each archetype or fixed essence
determines the ultimate nature and destiny of the archetype in
such wise that it will actualize in the stages of ontological
evolvement that follow what has already been prepared for it to
actualize. Seen from the point of view of the realities themselves,
and in relation to what is above them, that is, to the most sacred
emanation of the Absolute Being, the permanent archetypes are
so infinitely many passive recipients (sing. qiibil) of their own
determined natures and destinies; and since this decisive event
occurs in the interior condition of non-existence as we have
explained, and the actualization of their ultimate natures and
destinies in the exterior condition of existence is not yet then a
realized event, we see the permanent archetypes as so infinitely
many potentialities and possibilities of exterior being and existence.
However, when seen from the point of view of what is below
them, that is, of their separate evolvement as exterior archetypes
or essences (al-a'yiin al-khiirijiyyah), that unfold themselves in the
following stages of ontological descent into more and more
concrete forms-that is, when seen from the point of view of their
actualized natures and destinies-the permanent archetypes or
fixed essences are indeed so infinitely many active determinants
(sing.fii'il) of the nature and destiny of each and every thing in
existence. They are here no longer seen as potentialities and
possibilities of being and existence; on the contrary, they are the
actualities and necessities of being and existence. From this point of
view, seen from below, as it were, in their active, actual and
necessary aspects, the permanent archetypes project a further
emanation of the Absolute Being called 'the holy emanation' (al-
fayrj, al-muqaddas), whose contents, corresponding to the demands
of the primordial preparedness or potentialities contained in the
higher, most holy emanation, are the inseparable and necessary

consequences, concomitants or effects (lawazim) and attendant
repercussions (tawabi') that follow from the primordial
preparedness inherent in each of the archetypes. 87
We have said that the Divine Names and Attributes possess
forms (-fuwar, sing. ,fiirah) indwelling in the Divine knowledge or
consciousness. Considered in themselves and their particular
modes as distinct from the Absolute Being and from each other
the forms are established realities, or fixed essences, or
archetypes. Ontologically the Archetypes are as universals in
relation to particulars, and the entire process of ontological
descent of the Absolute Being is but a process of the individuation
of universals into particulars. The universals ( kulliyyat) are
quiddities or realities (mahiyyat); the particulars (juz'iyyat) refer
to concrete and individual realities actualized in external
existence ( huwiyyat). 88 The archetypes, as we have pointed out,
never leave their condition of being interior; they remain in the
plane of the Unseen (al-ghayb) as intelligibles existing eternally a
parte ante (qadzm) in the Divine consciousness. As quiddities they
are the universal forms of the Divine Names, and through them
the first most holy emanation is effected as the first self
manifestation (tajallf) of Absolute Being. They are therefore also
the 'loci' nr the 'theatres of self-manifestation' (sing. ma:;,har)
which receive the emanation and which the Absolute Being effects
through the Names al-awwuL, 'the First', and at-bafin, 'the
Inwardly Hidden'. Correspondingly, and in the lower stages of
ontological descent of Absolute Being towards determination and
iudividwHion into ever more concrete forms, the exterior
archetypes (al-a'yan al-kharijiyyah) become the loci or theatres of
self-manifestation, receiving the second holy emanation ( i.e. al
fayd al-muqaddas) which the Absolute Being effects through the
87 Op. cit., pp. 78;82. For a definition of thefayq al-aqdas and thefayq al
muqaddas, see Ta'rifiit, pp. 176- I 77.
88 lt must be borne in mind, however, that the 'universals' here are
really particulars without exception, and must not be confused with the
Platonic universals.
COMMENTARY
Names al-iikhir, 'the Last', and al-:{,iihir, 'the Outwardly

Manifest.' Thus the Names 'First' and 'Inwardly Hidden' belong
to the interior world of intelligible existence; and the Names
'Last' and 'Outwardly Manifest' belong to the exterior world of
concrete and individual existence. 89 From this brief explanation
we derive the conclusion that there are two kinds of self
manifestations of the Absolute Being (i.e. tajalliyiin). The first kind
refers to the most holy emanation, and it is an interior kind of self
manifestation of the Essence to itself in the world of the Unseen
(' iilam al-ghayb). The second kind refers to the holy emanation,
and it is an exterior kind of self-manifestation of the Absolute in
the forms of the permanent archetypes as projected Ly the
exterior archetypes in the forms of thf' visible world (' iilam al
shahiidah). Ibn 'Arabi calls the first kind of self-manifestation the
"self- manifestation in the invisible" (tajallz ghayb); and he calls
the second kind the "self-manifestation in the visible" (tajallz
shahiidah). 90 The first kind is interior, essential (' aynz or dhiitf); the
second kind is exterior, sensible (shuhiidf); sometimes the second
kind is referred to as existential (wujiidf) or ontological. 91
The Divine Names are as causes whose effects are the
existences in the intelligible and external worlds. They are
divided into two categories opposed to each other; the one gives
impression or produces effect ( ta'thzr), assuming the part of active
agent (filil); the other receives the impression given and the
effect produced, playing the role of passive recipient ( qiibil).
Since the archetypes are the forms of the Divine Names (�uwar al
asmii') they too reflect this double aspect of being on the one
hand the active, and on the other the passive, principles of being
and existence. Considered purely as archetypes (a'yiin), the
permanent archetypes play the part of active principle in
relation to the next stage of ontological descent of the Absolute
Being, that is, to what is 'below' them, or rather to their exterior
aspect, the exterior archetypes, which assume the role of passive
89
Jawiihir., pp. 77-79;82.
soFU.fU.f,
- p. I 20.
91J awa-h·zr, p. 53.
principle. 92 Considered as realities (baqa'iq), the permanent

archetypes as the realities of things (baqa'iq al-ashya') are the
active principle in relation to the realities of the exterior
archetypes (baqa'iq al-a'yan al-kharijiyyah) which are the
recipients of the existential principle, that is, the holy emanation
(al-Jaytj, al-muqaddas) of the Absolute Being, that issue forth
through them. 93 Following ibn 'Arabi, al-Raniri also calls the
permanent archetypes the Essences of Possible Things ( a'yan al
mumkiniit); 94 and the Possible Things ( al-mumkinat) here refer to
the realities of things. 95 The words 'possible things' in the
phrase 'essences of possible things' apparently seem to refer to the
world of empirical things. In reality, however, they do not refer
to the world of empirical things, for the mere fact of the latter's
being concretely existent demonstrates its necessity to exist as it is
rather than its possibility; since if its being concretely existent were
only possible it need not have now been concretely existent. In his
analysis of the concept of the 'possible' al-Raniri follows al
Ghazali, who divides the modes of being or existence-called al
(anarir al-(uqiid in Muslim philosophy-into three categories:
necessity ( wujiib); impossibility ( imtinil); and possibility ( imkiin). 96
Al-Ghazali himself in this connection seems to have followed the
philosophers, namely their chief, ibn Sina. 97 But it must be borne
in min<i that al-Ghazali, speaking on behalf of the theologians,
maintains that the modalities of being are intellectual
judgements only; that is, they are logical and not ontological
categories. As a Sufi, however, al-Ghazali affirms the 'realities'
(baqa'iq) which have the character of objective possibility,
though again, not quite the same as the philosophers' notion of
objective possibility. In al-Raniri's analysis he says that as the
.
9 2Q
'P· czt., p. 8 2.
93 See above, p. 16
5.
94}awa-hzr,' p. 8o.
95
See above, p. 161.
96
Jawahir, p. 77. See the Tahiifut al-Falasifah, ed. Khwajah Zadah,
Cairo. I 321, p. 19.
97 See the Ishiiriit wa al-Tanbzhiit,
vol. III; p. 19; Danishnama-i 'alii'z,
Parvez Morewedge; New York, 1973; pp. 47-48; 316.
COMMENTARY 169
essences of possible things, the archetypes belong to one of the

existences known ( al-ma'liimiit). In the first category is necessity as
a mode of being or existence. Necessity as a mode of being or
existence here refers to two ontological categories: the one
pertains to a being whose existence is necessary by itself, and this
is the absolutely absolute Existence (wujud muJlaq) which is the
Necessary Existence of the Absolute Being or the Truth Most
Exalted; the other pertains to a being whose existence is necessary
by other than itself, and this is the concrete existence of the world
of empirical things, whose existence is made necessary by the
Existence of the Absolute. The second category (imtinil) refers to
the mode of being or existence pertaining to the purely absolute
non-existence (' adam muJ!aq). This category does not refer to
something that is existentially possible, nor to something that can
be actualized. It refers to a concept which can have syntactical
meaning and can be formulated by means of proper expressions
in language-what al-Raniri calls lafzz-but which cannot
otherwise exist in actuality. One example is a simultaneous
merging of two things opposed to one another in one and the
same place, such as 'a round square'; another is an associate, or
rival, or partner of God (sharzk). 98. Its very nature requiresnon
existence, as it is something existentially impossible (mumtani').
The third mode of being or existence (imkiin) pertains to pure
non-existence (' adam mabr/,). The term 'adam refers to non
existence in the sense of something not being concretely and
individually existent, but whose existence or subsistence as
something real in the interior condition is nonetheless admitted.
This is somewhat like objective possibility. The qualification
mabr/,, meaning 'pure' or 'sheer', serves to convey the judgement
that the existence of a reality in the interior condition remains
purely in the state of not being existent and cannot be essentially
actualized. What is actualized are its forces (abkiim), and effects
( iithiir), and necessary repercussions or concomitants (lawiizim),
externalized in accordance with its preparedness or inherent
98
See Jawahir, p. 77; Tahafut, p.20.
potentialities ( iti' dad a�lz). 99 Thus what is in the condition of pure

non-existence remains in the mode of possibility ( imkiin); it is the
same as possible existence (wufiid mumkin). 100 All these modes of
being or existence are in fact intellectual judgements; although if
there were no intellects to judge them as such, the objects of the
judgement would not necessarily cease to exist, for in some cases
they would still remain in existence. In the category of the
impossibles (mumtani' iit), for example, the partner, or associate,
or rival of God (sharfk) is a pure impossibility� for it only exists in
the intellect; if there were no intellects to perceive and judge it as
such, its existence would no longer be possible. It is by nature
conceptual, existing in the mind and in expression only. Hence its
impossibility is absolute. But according to al-Raniri, there is
another class of impossibles that are not merely conceptual in
nature, and this class refers to realities, each established ( thiibit) in
itself (fi nafs al-amr), such as those forms of the Divine Names that
come under the circumspective sway of the principal Name, the
Inwardly Hidden ( al-biifin), which remain eternally in the
Unseen (al-ghayb), forever concealed from outward existence in
the interior condition ( bii/inah). They are contraries of those
forms of the Divine Names that come under the circumspective
sway of the principal Name, the Outwardly Manifest ( al-:;:,iihir),
which are evolved into exterior manifestation in existence. Being
the reverse of the exterior forms, it is not possible for the interior
forms to receive the emanation-that is, in this case, the most
holy emanation-that would evolve them into exterior
manifestation. 101 The distinction between this class of
impossibles-that is, what refers to the' adam mutlaq, or absolute
non-existence-and the class whose mode of being or existence is
designated as pure non-existence, or' adam ma&tf,, is that the latter,
being the forms of the Divine Names that come under the
99
See above, pp. 161-165.
100
Possible existence is for the theologians what is already actualized or
realized, not what still remains in some objective state of possibility, as
the philosophers and the $iifis maintain.
101
See Jawiihir, p. 80
COMMENTARY 1 71
circumspective sway (�ay/ah) of the principal Name, the

Outwardly Manifest, can receive the most holy emanation that
would evolve them into exterior manifestation; whereas the forms
of the former, which are by nature inwardly hidden, cannot
receive the emanation that could evolve them to outward
manifestation. Only the possibles (mumkinat), which are the forms
of the Divine Names that come under the sway of the principal
Name, the Outwardly Manifest, receive the emanations, both the
most holy and the holy, that evolve them to outward
manifestation and external existence. (See the schema on page
I 72).
As to the essences of the possible things, ( al-a'yan al-mumkinat)
they are divided into two categories; the substantial
(jawhariyyah), and the accidental (' ararj,iyyah). We noted earlier
that the permanent archetypes or fixed essences reflect in their
nature the double aspect of the Divine Names as active agent
(ja'il) and passive recipient (qabit) of existence. 102 Considered as
the essences of the possible things, the permanent archetypes
point to their contents, which are divided categorically into
substance (jawhar), and accident (' ararj,). The substances, by
virtue of their independent self-subsistence in relation Jo the
accidents, are designated as the 'followed' (matbil); whereas the
accidents, by virtue of their dependence upon the substances, are
correspondingly designated as the 'follower' (tabi'). When
substances exist as intelligibilia in the mode of intelligible
existence (wujud 'ilmz), they take the forms of pure intelligences
('uqul), and pure souls (nufiis)-that is, intelligences and souls
from which all material forms and bodily relations are subtracted
(sing. mujarrad); and when they exist as sensibilia in the mode of
concrete, individual existence (wujud 'aynz), they take the forms of
simple bodies (ajsam basz!). When substances and accidents exist
together in composite form (murakkab), they comprise the Three
Kingdoms of Nature (mawalzd al-thalathah); the animal,
vegetable, and mineral worlds. Every one of the substances and
accidents is deployed in such a way that together they all fall

I 72 A COMMENTARY ON THE l;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
Schema of the Ontological Descent of Absolute Being
The Essence
I
r The Absolute Being {
Interior
Exterior
Existence I I Non-manifestation
L The Divine Oneness {

Interior
Exterior
I
I The Most Holy Emanation
J}
Interior
I
The Divine Unity -{ 1 st Determination
Exterior
+
Interior
The Names &
l
Exis tence II { '.;md Determination
Attributes
Exterior
Interior
-{ t
The Permanent 3rd Determination
Archetypes
Exterior
I
II The Holy Emanation
r Interior
1 The Exterior Archetypes 4th Determination

I L Exterior
Existence III
t
L The World of Empirical
Things
r Interior
5th Determination
L Exterior
COMMENTARY 1 73
under a classification into three graded genera (ajnas: sing.jins):

the lofty ( 'aliyah); the intermediate ( mutawassi/ah); and the lowly
( safilah). Every genus is further classified into various grades, each
according to its capacity and requirement as a 'theatre' of
manifestation (ma;;,har; i.e. of the Absolute Being) which receives
the emanations that would evolve it to actualization according to
its inherent capacity and requirement and to the sway-that is,
the manifesting power that brings it into concrete, external
existence-of the Divine Name which exercises circumspection
over it. The Divine Names are in this respect themselves classifieJ
according to different degrees of rank corresponding to the
differences in the capacities and requirements of the substances
and accidents which make up the variegated and myriad things
of the empirical world. 103 Thus the highest genus graded as
'lofty' come� under the circumspective sway of the principal
Names 'the First' ( al-awwal); 'the Inwardly Hidden' ( al-ba/in);
'the Outwardly Manifest' (al-;;,ahir); and 'the Last' (al-akhir); the
genus graded as 'intermediate' comes under the circumspective
sway of the Names lower in degree of rank than the principal ones
above; and the lowesl genus graded as 'lowly' comes under the
circumspective sway of the Names even lower in degree of rank
than the ones above them. In this way the Divine Names exercise
their circumspective sway according to their respective orders of
rank over the various genera of the realities, from the highest
grade down to the various species ( anwii': sing. naw') at the lowest
grade, while yet being influenced also by the corresponding
capacities and requirements of the realities themselves, each
according to its own inherent potentiality or preparedness. The
ontological order of the three graded genera, according to al
Raniri's formulation, corresponds respectively to: ( 1) the World
of the Permanent Archetypes (' alam al-a'yan al-thabitah), or the
World of the Divine Ideas, in which the self-manifestation of the
Absolute to the Absolute gives rise to the forms of all possible
103
See Furii{, pp. 79; 152. Hence the �ufi saying that God manifests
Himself in accordance with the nature of the locus in which He is
manifested.
I 74 A COMMENTARY ON THE 1:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
existents making their appearance in potentia in the consciousness

of the Absolute; (2) the World ofSpirits ('alam al-arwaM; and (3)
the World of Sense andSensible Experience ('alam al-shahadah).
The brief exposition on the nature of the essences of the
possible things and their evolvement and actualization as the
world of sense and sensible experience may be outlined in
schematic form as shown on page 175.
It must be noted that general terns such as genera, species,
differentia and the like including universals as used by the $iifis
are not to be understood according to their meanings in the
Greek philosophical tradition. The $iifis understand them not
merely as names or concepts, but as realities or real entities
(ma'iinz). The universals, not quite the same as the Platonic
universals, are real entities, so that as such-even if they assume
the character of universals in some respects-they are without
exception particulars or individual essences ( a'yiin).
When the theatres of manifestation belong to the species of
simple bodies, for example, the Divine Names that exercise their
actualizing powers over them operate in particular ( khiiH) and
determined (mu'ayyan) forms. In the case of composites, each one
of the forms so composed becomes a theatre of manifestation of a
combination of Divine Names acting together as a unity
corresponding to the particular !!ature of the composite form. In
the case of individuals (ashkha1), in particular those that possess
self-consciousness, the highest class bf:'ing man, each is a theatre
of manifestation (maihar) of a combination from amongst the
combination of Divine Names that operate in composite forms.
In the case of man, and in particular those who are guided on the
right course in true religion, each becomes a theatre of the 'subtie
manifestations' (raqa'iq: sing. raqzqah) that impart to him the
knowledge of Divine mysteries (asrar) that guide him in the
successive stages of his journey to the Truth. In this manner, from
the loftiest heights of the ontological planes down to the lowest
levels of being and existence, from the 'universals' to the
particulars, the Divine Names accomplish their purpose, in
realizing or actualizing all possible existences that dwell in
potentia in the Divine consciousness, in an eternal, dynamic
COMMENTARY 1 75
I The Essences of the Possible Things
Substances Accidents
Classified into three graded genera:

the lofty; the intermediate; the
lowly; under the circumspective
sway of the Divine Names: the First;
the Inwardly Hidden; the Outwardly
Manifest; the Last rf'spectively,
and Names below these in degree of
rank, each degree corresponding
to each grade in successive order.
The three grades correspond
respectively to
I. the World of Archetypes;
II. the World of Spirits;
III. the World of Sense and
Sensible Experience.
I
II
Intelligibilia Sensibilia
Intelligible Concrete
Existence Existence
Pure Intelligences I
Simple Bodies
I
and Souls
I
Composites
I
III
I
Animal (Genus) Vegetable Mineral
I
Species
I
Species Species
I I I
Kinds Kinds Kinds
and and and
Individuals Individuals Individuals
I 76 A COMMENTARY ON THE J:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ
process. 104
The eternal, dyanmic process referred to here pertains to ibn
'Arabi's conception of perpetual creation, which is a central
feature in Islamic metaphysics and which has subsequently
established itself in all aspects of ta�awwuf The idea of a perpetual
creation is based on Quranic sources, and ibn 'Arabi particularly
refers to one where God says: "But they are in doubt regarding a
new creation" 105 The allusion to a new creation (khalqJadzd) not
only refers, according to ibn 'Arabi, to the resurrection as it is
initially conveyed by the text, but indeed also to God's 'renewal
of creation at every breath' ( taJdzd al-khalqbi al-anfiis). The Breath
of God or the Breath of the Merciful (nafas al-Ra�miin) is God's
creative act by which he bestows existence on the creatures. At
each breath God creates the universe together with all its parts
and then annihilates it; at the very moment of its annihilation, He
creates another universe similar to the one annihilated to take the
latter's place, and at that very moment the new creation is again
annihilated and another similar one takes its place, and so on
indefinitely. When we say:" ... and then annihilates it," we are
not thereby referring to a temporal sequence in the process of the
renewal of creation. There is no time interval between one new
creation and the next, though yet each new creation, each
universe or \•.1orld, is discontinuous ::md isolated in itself. We are
in fact experiencing a different world at each moment of its
creation, but we are nnaware of this because of our own
involvement in the process, and because of the rapid, non
temporal succession the process involves. Indeed, what we call
'consciousness' arises out of this process; and the loss of subjective
consciousness that characterizes the state of Janii', the total
oblivion offanii' al.Jana' that follows, the resuscitation and return
104 Jawahir, p. 80. On the nature of substance (jawhar) see also Ta'rffat,
pp. 83-84. The raqa'iq that al-Raniri speaks ofrefers to the class that al
J urjani calls the raqzqah al-nuzul-the spiritual subtlety (latifah al
ru�aniyyah) that 'descends' upon the devotee (' abd) and becomes a
medium by which the' abd draws near to the truth. See Ta'rffat, p. I I 7.
1o5 50: 15: Bal hum fz labsin min khalqin jadzd.
COMMENTARY 1 77
to the stage of the 'second separation' that characterizes baqa'

these trans-empirical states of awareness which we have already
described in the preceding pages refer to no other than the perfect
man's 'participation' in what goes on 'between' one new creation
and the next. It is his involvement in a 'coincidence'-and here
al-Raniri's expression: al-tawfzq al-raqzq, also applies-between
the two. In the duration 'between' one new creation and the next
he 'witnesses' as in a glimpse what I have calie<l the 'fragmentary'
vision of reality and truth. 106
The eternal dynamic process by which God goes on
manifesting Himself in a new creation occurs through the
operation of the Divine Name:. i_hat are opposed to one
another. 107 Ibn 'Arabi's formulation of this conception is given in
the Fu�ii� in the chapter on the Prophet Shu'ayb, 108 which Jami
explains and which is quoted by al-Raniri, in the following
way:109
The Shaykh (may God be well pleased with him) says in

the FaH i Shu' aibz, that the universe consists of accidents all
pertaining to a single substance, 110 which is the Reality
underlying all existences. The universe is changed and
renewed unceasingly at every moment and at every breath.
Every instant one universe is annihilated and another
resembling it takes its place, though the majority of men do
not perceive this, as God most glorious has said: "But they are
in doubt regarding the new creation." 111 ... But the men
gifted with spiritual intuition see that the Majesty of the
"Truth", most glorious and most exalted, reveals Himself at
106 See above, pp. 139-141.

107 See above, pp. 162-164; 167.
i08 Fu,rii,r, pp. 119-126.
109 Lawa'i&, XXVI; pp. 29; 31-33 (Whinfield's translation). The
Persian text is on pp. 37; 40-41.

110 The word which Whinfield translates as 'substance here is '
' ayn. In
order to avoid semantic confusion with jawhar, the meaning of
'substance' here should in fact refer to 'essence'.
111 See Jawiihir, pp. 108-109.
I 78 A COMMENTARY ON THE J:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
every breath in a fresh revelation, and that He never repeats

the same revelation; that is to say, He never reveals Himself
during two consecutive moments under the guise of the same
phenomena and modes, but every moment presents fresh
phenomena and modes112 ••. The root of this mystery lies in
the fact that the Majesty of the "Truth" most glorious
possesses "names" opposed to one another, some being
beautiful and some terrible; and these names are all in
continuous operation, and no cessation of such operation is
possible for any of them. Thus, when one of the contingent
substances, 113 through the occurrence of the requisite
conditions, and the absence of opposing conditions, becomes
capable of receiving the Very Being, the mercy of the
Merciful takes possession of it, and the Very Being is infused
into it; and the Very Being thus externalized, through being
clothed with the effects and properties of such substances,
presents Himself under the form of a particular phenomenon.
Afterwards, by the operation of the terrible Omnipotence
which requires the annihilation of aii phenomena and ail
semblance of multiplicity, this same substance is stripped of
these phenomena. At the very moment that it is thus stripped
this same substance is reclothed with another particular
phenomenon, resembling the preceding one, through the
operation of the Mercy of the Mercifill One. The next
moment this latter phenomenon is annihilated by operation
of the terrible Omnipotence, and another phenomenon is
found by the mercy of the Merciful One; and so on for as long
as God wills. Thus it never happens that the Very Being is
revealed for two successive moments under the guise of the
same phenomenon. At every moment one universe is
annihilated and another similar to ,it takes its place ...114
112 z ., p. 110,· see a lso pp. 6o- 6 2.

1-b·d
113 'Contingent substances' (qaqa'iq imkaniyyah) here refers to the
essences of possible things ( a'yiin mumkiniit).
114 For al-Qashani's explication of the same passage in the Fu�ii�, see his
commentary (second edition, 1386/1966) pp. 185-186.Jawahir,p. 110.

COMMENTARY 1 79
It were as if the Absolute Being, as tht One Substance (' ayn

'(l)ii�id) and the Truth that pervades and underlies all creation,
were like the incessantly flowing ink that traces out the words of
the Divine Names; each word being incessantly erased and
reformulated in different guise in such wise that the Absolute
Being is eternally engaged in describing Himself to Himself by
writing out the infinite possibilities within His consciousness. To
this eternal process of the manifestation of the Essence to Itself
refers God's Words in the Holy Qur'an: "Say: 'If the ocean were
ink wherewith to write out the Words of my Lord, sooner would
the ocean be exhausted than would the Words of my Lord, even if
we added another ocean like it for its aid.'" 115 Other Quranic
passages alluding to the continuous annihilation of all
phenomena, and to the faniP -baqiP structure of the process
previously described, may be cited from the Surah al-Q,a.fa�:
"Everything is perishing (hiilik) save His Face (wajh)"; and the
Surah al-Ra�man: "Everyone on it is perishing (fen) and there only
remains (yabqii) the Face of your Lord, the Possessor of Majesty
an Honour."116 The discontinuous nature of the world as here
conceived reveals that it in each moment of itself has no
'existence' in the real sense-that is, in the sense that it subsists in
each moment of itself. Its existence as such is momentary, and the
world 'appears' to the mind as subsistent only because of the
process of the renewal of similars involved in its creation. But the
fact that it has no existence in the real sense does not mean that it
is illusory or that it is a sheer illusion. Indeed its momentary·
existence has an· ontological status, the more so when the
semblance of continuity is attained by its continuous renewal.
For this reason also the Siifis refer to the World as 'non-eternal'
(mu�dath)-that is, something that was new, that existed newly,
115 18:109; Jawiihir, pp. 80-81. For the analogy of the ink and letters,
see Jawahir, p. 93.
11 28:88 and 55:26-27; see also the Tafszr al�Q,ur'iin al-Karzm attributed
6
to ibn 'Arabi and believed to be the work of his great commentator al
Qashani, Dar Yaq?ah al-'Arabiyyah, first edition, Bayrut, 1387/1968,
2v., vol. II, pp. 240 and 274 respectively.
for the first time, not having been before, something recently
originated, so that they see the world as 'ever-new'. At each
moment ofits renewal the succeeding world is not the same thing
as the preceding one, but a new thing every moment appearing
and disappearing in an eternal process. The process in itself may
be described as the same throughout, but the 'contents' of the
process-that is, the worlds in which the process involves and by
which the process is involved-are not the same, every one of
them at each consecutive moment of its renewal is similar to the
other (shabzhiin), and since every single manifestation in the
process is new, ever manifestation is different from the other
(ghayriin) . 117 In this way, and due to the fact that all are involved
in the continuous process of renewal, there is no real being or
existence to anything but to God alone, hence only His Face
remains (yabqii). According to al-Qashani, the annihilation and
renewal process involves all things; not only the universe together
with all its parts, but even the world of spirits and the permanent
archetypes-even the realities (�aqii'iq) are continually
annihilated and renewed, continually appearing and disappear
ing. But there is a decisive distinction between the annihilation
and renewal and appearing and disappearing of the realities and
that of the world that they project. Whereas in the case of the
world it is new every moment, and each new world is a different
though similar one in relation to the one preceding it in such wise
that the world is ever perishing, the realities are reconstituted,
reformulated, and made to reappear in the the same forms. 118
That is why they are referred to as 'fixed' or 'permanent'
(thabitah); for it is only because th'ey are thus fixed and
permanently established in the Divine consciousness that they
can become intelligibles in the Divine knowledge; and it is only
because of their fixed and permanent nature that they can be
defined as 'realities', for in relation to the world that they project
they are more real than the world. It is in this sense that the
realities are considered as 'substances' in relation to the world of
117 Fu.fil.f, P: 124.

118 Shar�, (al-Qashani") p. 237. See also the Futu�at I, p. 204:290A.
COMMENTARY 181
'accidents'. In connection with what is said above, Jami says:
The real substance of everything always abides, though

concealed in the inner depths of the Very Being, while its
sensible properties are manifest to outward sense. For it is
impossible that the Divine "Ideas" in the intelligible world
should be susceptible of evanescence, as that would involve
atheism ...119
The expression 'more real than the world' in the above

explanation, applied as referring to the realities, alludes to their
abiding nature as conveyed by the term baqa', and which we have
already pointed out earlier with reference to the meaning of'real
existence'. In connection with this spiritual state of existence, the
Holy Qur'an says that "the Hereafter is better and more abiding
( abqa) ". 120 Thus in spite of their being continually annihilated
and renewed, of their being made to appear and disappear in
continuous manner, the realities are more abiding than the world
because-unlike the world-they are renewed in the same
forms, or in their original identities.Just as the process of renewal
in the perpetual creation constitutes our consciousness and
identity grounded upon our abiding realities, for without being
grounded upon something abiding, there would be no
consciousness of identity, so the continual renewal of the realities
constitutes the Divine consciousness. In view of their abiding
nature as we have described them, the realities are designated as
neither eternal ( qadzm) nor non-eternal ( mu&dath). They are not
eternal because of their being subject to annihilation and
renewal; and they are not non-eternal because of their being
renewed in their original forms; so that whereas the world is
119 Lawa'i�, XXII, p. 24/31. The 'real substance of everything' refers to

the realities (text: �aq zqah/�aq ii'iq ); and the 'sensible properties' to their
effects (text: athiir) and forces (a�kiim). 'Divine Ideas' refers to the
Intelligible Forms (text: .ruwar i'ilmiyyah) that abide in the Divine
knowledge or consciousness. This passage is quoted by al-Raniri in
Jawahir, p. 85; see also ibid; p. 98.
12087: I 7.
perpetually in the state of ontological Jana', the realities are

perpetually regaining the state of ontological baqa) .
The meaning of 'their realities' (�aqiliqahum), then, in the
passage: 'they identified their realities accurately', is such as we
explained in the foregoing pages. To sum up, they refer to the
fixed essences or permanent archetypes; with regard to their
nature they are intermediate between existence and non
existence, and in the framework of the five ontological planes
they occupy an intermediary position between the two
emanations of Absolute Being, which coincide with the two self
manifestations (tajalliyan); with regard to their subsistence in the
ontological order, they are neither eternal nor temporal; with
regard to their ontological relations with what is 'above' and
what is 'below' them, they are on the one hand passive and on the
other active principles of being and existence; from the point of
view of scholastic philosophy they are 'universals' by which
particulars become individualized; as the essences of possible
things they are on the one hand substances and on the other
accidents; with regard to their mode of being they are on the one
hand necessary and on the other possible. In terms of being
essences (a'yan) they are quiddities (mahiyyat) whose effects
( athar) produce the world of spirits (' alam al-arwab), the world of
images ('alam al-mithal), the world of bodies ('alam al-ajsam), the
sensible world or the world of sense ('alam al-�iss) and the mental
world or the world of the mind ('alam ai-dhihn) all in descending
order respectively. 121 When al-Raniri speaks of the Prophets and
the Veracious as having 'identified their realities accurately,'
their 'identification' (i.e. �aqqaqii) means their 'verification'
( ta�q:zq), by way of spiritual intuition based on direct experience
( dhawq), of their own realities. The man who transcends his self
and realizes his true self in the manner we have described,122
and who achieves this state is in fact at the ontological plane of
the Divine Names and Attributes; for his true self is none
other than a particularized manifestation of the Absolute in the
121 Jawiihir, pp. 82-85.

122 See above, pp. 149-153.
COMMENTARY
form of one of the Divine Names. For such a man, the knowledge
of his �aqq or 'truth'-that is, of his true self-is knowledge of a
particularized form of 'the Truth' or al-lfaqq) by which God as
the Absolute in all the forms of manifestation is called. The
knowledge of his self in this state comes about through his
acquisition of what ibn 'Arabi calls his 'pure intellect' (' aql
mujarrad), or intellect free from all bodily and physical connections,
which not only discloses to him his own reality, but also the
realities of the things of nature as they are. 123 In this way they
were able to identify their realities 'accurately' ( bi al-tadqzq), that
is, down to their minutest details, analysing them to their bare
essentials, as it were, until that point where no further divisibility
or analysis is possible, in a manner such as we have attempted to
convey-at least in an abridged form-in the preceding pages.
Having identified their realities and the realities of things in their
entirety, they recorded in the same analytical way the knowledge
they have gained (fa� arrarii 'uliimahum), the knowledge of reality
and truth; and by means of that knowledge they were able to
clarify the Way (wa bayyanii al-!arzq), 124 that is, the Way of religion
(Malay:jalan agama) referring to Islam. Clarification of the Way
of religion here means reconfirmation and reaffirmation of the
truth of revealed religion (i.e. Islam) as coinciding with the truth
of spiritual experience. In other words, the identification of the
shari' ah and the l:zaqzqah as the exterior and interior aspects of the
Islamic revelation usually outlined in the vertical hierarchy of
Shari: ah-Tariqah-Ma'rifah-lfaqiah ) the first being the exterior and
the latter three the interior aspects of the same revelation. The
'truth' here meant, then, is the truth seen as coinciding, of Islam
as a religious monotheism on the one hand, and its philosophical
counterpart or metaphysical complement as conceptualized and
formulated by the system described as ta�awwuf on the other. 125
123
Fu,rii�, p. 187.
124 The expression b ayyana al-!arzq has the same meaning of huda or
'guidance'. It means guiding on the road and leading one until one
reaches the goal. q.v. L.A. art huda, vol. XV, pp. 353, col. 2 fol.
125
See above, p. 129- I 30.
Elsewhere I have defined ta�awwuf as 'the practice (a'mal) of the

shar'i' ah at the station ( maqam) of excellence ( ibsan) . 126 This
definition is based on the badzth in which the Holy Prophet, peace
be upon him, said of i&siin: "... that thou shouldst worship God as
if thou sawest Him ...'' ( an ta'buda Alliiha ka annaka tariihu). 12 7 The
worship or 'ibadah that is referred to is in this station of excellence
complemented by knowledge based on the vision of reality and
truth as 'seen' by the spiritual organ of cognition which is at the
centre of man's consciousness (i.e. thefu'iid or qalb). The vision of
reality and truth seen here ultimately refers to man's primordial
state when God made him to witness unto his self the reality and
truth of God's Lordship when He said: "Am I not your Lord?"
(alastu bi rabbikum). Man's response in recognition of that reality
and truth is his unconditional acknowledgement, confirmed
within his self in his saying: "Yea!" (balii). This ack
nowledgement comes about through direct experience of
what is seen ( q.v. shahida). This is the original witnessing (shuhiid),
in the stage of 'pre-separation', to which state the man of
excellence returns, at the stage of the 'second separation', in
recollection or remembrance (dhikr). 128 Out of the knowledge
thus gained, ta�awwuf conceptualizes and formulates the inner
dimension of Islam, reflecting the interior, metaphysical vision of
reality and truth. The theological conceptualization and
formulation of reality and truth as manifested in the form of a
religious monotheism represents the exterior dimension of Islam.
The exterior dimension of Islam projects the vision of reality and
truth as the Oneness of God ( al-tawbzd); while the interior
dimension describes the same vision in terms of the metaphysics
126 S.N. al-Attas, Islam and Secularism, Kuala Lumpur, 1978, p. 115.
127
See above, p. 147. Al-Bukhar1 (vol. I. pp. 18-19), Kitiib al-Iman.
128
Dhikr at this stage does not mean the ordinary remembrance in
which not all parts of the man are involved. It refers rather to ibn
'Arabi"'s meaning of the term as total remembrance that consumes the
whole man. To such a man God is like an intimate Companion with
Whom he sits (jalzs) and on Whom his whole attention is fixed. See the
Fu,rii,r, pp. 168-169. Jawiihir, p. 142, where the prophetic holy tradition:
'I am the companion of him who recollects Me', is quoted.
COMMENTARY
of the transcendent Oneness of Absolute Being and Existence

(wabdat al-wujiid). There is no conflict between the interior and
the exterior dimensions, since they both represent the inner and
outer aspects of Islam, and since the former is the source of what is
projected in the latter. Now religion is best defined as submission to
God, 129 so that the very name of the religion of Islam is itself the
definition of religion. The basic essentials or elements of religion
( arkan al-dzn) as enacted in Islam, according to the same badzth
narrated by 'Umar ibn al-Khatµib and transmitted by Abu
Hurayrah and Muslim, are three, namely: sincere and complete
submission (islam), true belief and faith (zmiin); and genuine
devotion of the highest degree of excellence ( ibsiin). Before these
basic essentials can be instituted in religion as submission to God,
the chief prerequisite is that man must realise the real distinction
that exists between God and man; the subject-object relation
between man and God must be maintained; the dichotomy
between Creator and creature, between Lord and slave must be
kept intact. In other words, man must recognize and acknowledge
God's lordship (rubiibiyyah). The true metaphysical vision of
Reality must confirm and affirm the above-mentioned real
distinction if the religious and theological expression of belief and
faith and practice in Islam were indeed the systematic
formulation of that truth in terms of devotional confirmation
(faith) and affirmation (works) that God has revealed for the
right guidance and salvation of mankind. In their clarification of
the way of religion, then, the Prophets and the Veracious neither
denied existence to the world together with all its parts, nor
affirmed their existence as independent, self-subsistent entities;
for they knew that such denial and affirmation would lead in
either case to pantheism with its extreme immanence; or to a type
of theism tending toward extreme transcendence; or to monism
and the obliteration of the real distinction between God and His
creatures; or to dualism which admits in any domain two
independent and mutually irreducible substances. Instead, they
acknowledged the existe.nce of the world together with all its
129 See my Islam, passim; esp. note 26, p. 15.

parts and the existence of God and. made a real distinction

between God and what is 'other' than God ( ma siwa Allah); and in
the case of man, whether it be the Perfect Man in the cosmic or
individual sense, or mankind in general, they affirmed a real
distinction between G0d and man by decisively acknowledging
God's necessity ofexistence (wujub al-wujiid), which entails God's
possession of certain attributes not found in His creatures, such
as, among others, eternity ( qidam) and sempiternity ( abadiyyah).
For this reason al-Raniri then says, concluding this prefatory part
of the exordium:
III And so, whoever has the fine succour of God

Follows them; and if not he indeed becomes a follower of
the Deviator and the ,?_indzq .
. And blessings and peace be upon the compassionate
Prophet,
And upon his Family and his Companions who are People
of Certainty.
By 'the fine succour of God' (al-tawfiq al-raqzq) is meant the

subtle manifestation that dt:>scends into the heart or spiritual
cognition, imparting knowledge whereby God aids His servants
to the right course. 130 The true servant of God would assuredly
heed the indication of guidance as His succour (tawfiq) and
follow the Way of religion ( i' tiqad) as clarified by the Prophets
and the Veracious. But ifhe is not a sincere servant ofGod, and is
inclined not to follow the Prophets a11d the Veracious in true
130 See above, p. 176, with reference to the raqzqah (pl. raqii'iq); in
particular the raqzqah al-nuziil (note 104). Tawfiq is also God's aid by
which one comes to be in a situation of coincidence between the
transcendent reality and the immanent reality; between the
metaphysical truth and the theological or religious. truth; between
what is apparent and what is hidden in the interpretation ofreality and
truth, such that one comes to recognize and acknowledge the reality
and truth of both aspects of the same thing.
COMMENTARY
religion, then he would most certainly become identical with the

Deviator ( al-mul&id) and the ,?,indzq ( al-,?,indzq). We have already
explained the meaning of tawfiq in the preceding pages, 131 and in
addition to what we have mentioned, tawftq conveys the meaning
of 'agreement' or 'coincidence' with what is right or true
(&aqq) . 132 In this case it means God's making His sincere servant
to arrive in agreement with what is truf' in the matter of religious
belief ( i' tiqiid). The root from which the word i" tiqiid is derived
means basically 'to bind', and the binding refers to a covenant,
so that the word appears to be synonymous with the Latin word
religio, from which the word 'religion' is derived. But i' ii<j iid refers
more to the articles of religious beliefs, doctrines or tenets to
which one's heart or mind is firmly 'bound' rather than to
religion in the proper sense, which embraces not only beliefs but
also actions and feelings, and the concept of which is in Islam
conveyed by the term dzn. So i' tiqiid refers to a binding to the
truth as formulated in the form of a covenant instituted in the
sacred Law (sharr ah). This truth is ultimately none other than
the recognition and acknowledgement of God's Lordship
(rubiibiyyah), which is arrived at through Divine guidance
(hidiiyah; hudii). God is called al-Hiidz because He is One Who
enlightens His true servants and makes known to them the Way to
know Him until they acknowledge His Lordship. Tawfiq is
Divine assistance in the arrival by which one coincides with the
truth in particular matters of religious beliefs, and hence it also
means 'success'; hidayah is Divine guidance in the arrival of
enlightenment and spiritual cognition of Him by which one
recognizes and acknowledges His Lordship. 133 In the case of
those who are not inclined to follow the Prophets and the
Veracious, they are no longer in agreement or coincide with what
is right or true, as they have let their own, subjective
131
132 The word muwiifaqat, which is derived from the same root, conveys
this idea.
133
0n the meanings of tawfiq and hidqyah, see LA, vol. X, pp. 382, col. 2;
383, cols. 1 and 2; vol. XV, pp. 353, col. 2ff.
188 A COMMENTARY ON THE I.fUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
interpretation of the matter become their guide. They are no

longer recipients of tawfiq, as they have allowed themselves to
stray away from the right and true Way of religion, and have
thereby deviated from the truth. Their deviation from the truth
means their introduction of what does not belong to the truth;
and this is called ill;iid. The root word laf;ada basically conveys the
sense of something that declined or deviated, like the arrow that
declined and fell short ofits target, or anything that swerved and
inclined away from the right course. In its religious application to
man, the mulbid is one whose actions, beliefs and feelings, and
whose words deviate from what is right and true. This
application finds its origins in Quranic usage, where an example
of such deviation ( ill;iid) is given in the case of the profanation of
the Sacred Mosque by the Jahiliyyah before and during the rise of
Islam; 134 and in the case of the perversion of truth in God's
Words by those who make the meaning of the Words ( ayat) to
deviate from its true sense or intention ( al-ladhzna yulbiduna Ji
ayiitinii) . 13 r, To this latter case Muslims later referred the
Esotericists ( al-Bafiniyyah), who had latent tendencies to interpret
the texts of the Holy Qur'an esoterically (ref. ta'wzl) in a
symbolical and allegoristic manner to the extent of negating the
exoteric interpretation (tafszr), leading to the abandonment of the
Way of religion as prescribed by the sacred Law (shari'ah). 136 In
134See 22:25 ( ... wa manyuridfihi bi il�adin bi ,?:,ulmin). AccordiDg to al
Baghdadi (Farq, p. 270) the Baramikah also atten-1pted a profar.. ation of
the Ka'bah in the time of al-Rashid. They attempted to put into
practice what would amount to the Zoroastrian fire worship within the
Ka'bah.
13aSee 41:40
136The term Bafiniyyah as applied in the 11th and 12th centuries (A.C.)
already included the Isma'iliyyah as well as the Qaramitah, the
Khurramiyyah, Babakiyyah, Mu}:lammirah, Sab'iyyah and
Ta'limiyyah. See further al-Baghdadi, Al-Farq bayn al-Firaq (3rd ed.,
1977, Bayriit), pp. 265-299; al-Shahrastani, Kitub al-Mila! wa al-Nil;al
(2nd ed. 1395/1975, Bayriit, 2v.), vol. 1, pp. 168; 191-198. Shahrastani
says that in Khurasan, the name Mul}:lidah, besides Ta'limiyyah, was
also applied to the Batiniyyah, while in 'Iraq the Batiniyyah were
known also as Qaramitah and Mazdakiyyah; and they all in fact
. referred to the Isma'iliyyah (p. 192).
COMMENTARY 189
reality, however, and with reference to tajsfr and ta'wu, Islam

itself does not consider ta'wzl reprehensible when it is applied in
conjunction with tafszr, and when its true meanings find
confirmation in the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah. But the Batini
application of ta'wu was itself a deviation from the correct
method as understood in Islam, 137 as they were wont to connect
the meanings in their interpretation of the Holy Qur'an and the
Sunnah to the meanings found in the deviant interpretations
surreptitiously spread abroad by certain religious movements
during the early periods of the Islamic era which referred back to
the religions of pre-Islamic Persia, such as Zoroastrianism ( al
Majils), Manichaeanism ( al-Miinawiyyah), and Mazdakism ( al
µ a;::,dakiyyah) . 138 The term mulbid by itself (Pl. maliibidah) conveys
the sense of deviation in a vague sort of way, without clarifying
the inner nature of the deviation. But its application in
connection with the Ba#niyyah, particularly the Isma'iliyyah,
which harked back to the religions of ancient Persia, clarified
more precisely the kind of deviation involved-the subtle,
137
See, for example, al-Jurjani, Ta'rlfat, pp. 49; 52. See also my work
entitled The Concept of Education in Islam, (ABIM) Kuala Lumpur, 1980,,�
pp. 4-6.
138 For the knowledge of these religions and their systems, the Fihrist of
Mu}:iammad bin Is}:iaq (987-8 A.C.) and the Athiir al-Biiqiyah of al
Biriini (973-1051), apart from those mentioned in note 136, form the
recognized and reliable sources. To this should be added lbn Wa<;li}:i al
Ya'qiibi's (goo) Ta'rfkh (History). The Fihrist has been edited and
translated intoGerman byG. Fliigel (Mani, seine Lehre und seine Schriften,
Leipzig, 1862; see also his edition of 1871-2); .the Athiir has been
translated into English by C.E. Sachau (Chronology of Ancient Nations,
London, 1879); al-Ya'qiibi's work has been edited by Houtsma (2v.,
Leiden, 1883/1969). Relevant accounts and quotations, drawing from
. the above sources, can be found in E.G. Browne's Literary History of
Persia (Cambridge, 1902), 4v., reprinted 1951-56; vol. 1, pp. 154-172;
308-336; 391-415. Iqbal has written a resume of their metaphysical
systems based on the above sources in his The development ofmetaphysics in
Persia, (London, 1908); see pt. 1, eh. I of the book, where he treats of
Persian dua],ism. See also Shahrastani's account of the magians (al
MaJiis), Kitiib al-Mital, pp. 233-255 (vol. 1). See also Tibyiin, pp.
19--20.
190 A COMMENTARY ON THE I:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ
masquerading kind which sought to undermine the teachings of

the original. Just as the Manichaeans had the predilection for
interpreting the scriptures of other religions (e.g. Christianity and
Zoroastrianism) in accordance with their own ideas by somewhat
gnostic methods as formulated in the ,(end, so the Isma'i1iyyah
interpreted Islam according to their own ideas, which are based
on Manichaean teachings, by similar gnostic methods which
they called ta'wzl. The bare essentials of Manichaeanism revolved
around an absolute dualism of Light and Darkness, Ahuramazda
and Ahriman, God and Satan; each an eternal, self-subsistent
entity existing independently of the other. It was the mixture of
Light and Darkness that produced Man and the World; and it
was the powers of Darkness that assumed the role of active
principle in that production. The World being essentially evil,
Man's salvation consisted in renunciation of the World. The
religion of Mani appeared on the world scene more than two
centuries after Christianity; and while it attempted at a synthesis of
Christianity and Zoroastrianism, :rvianichaeanism really became
an antithesis of both, and was vehemently persecuted by both
sides for its deviation. The essence of its deviation, then, is the
dualism. The process by which this deviation was effected was the
Manichaean 'esotericization' of the meanings in the scriptures of
other religions. In the case of the Avesta, the original text of the
Zoroastrian scripture, its interpretation was effected by an
accompanying translation and commentary in the Pahlawi
language called the Zend. The Manichaeans traditionally
followed the Zend in preference to the sacred text of the Avesta,
and by the Zend they meant the book of Mani, just as Mazdak
later also referred to his own book called Zend, and for this reason
the term ,(endik was originally applied to denote them and their
dualism. In the 8th century, the application of the Arabicized
form ,(indzq (pl. zaniidiqah) was widespread due to the rampant
emergence of various kinds of Persian heresies; and the term was
then meant to denote not only the adherents of religious and
metaphysical dualism, but included also the pantheists, monists
and atheists, both of the religious or theological and the
philosophical or metaphysical kinds. The reason why the term
COMMENTARY
,Zindzq came to denote a broad variety of religious and

philosophical systems originally revolving around dualism was
probably because religious monotheism could not be reconciled
with philosophical or metaphysical dualism, as in the case of
Zoroastrianism; and the problems that such dualism created
ultimately led to absolute dualism, as in the case of
Manichaeanism; and to the various kinds of pantheism and
monism, as in the case of Hinduism; and atheism, as in the case of
Buddhism. Moreover, since the terms mul&id and zindzq were
applied specifically to denote the Isma'iliyyah, and since their
doctrines at the time represented a kind of synthesis of Greek
philosophy, with its dualism of God and Matter,
Manichaeanism, with its dualism of God and Satan,
Christianity, rationalism, pseudo-Sufism, various forms of
Persian heresies, and reincarnationism, it becomes obvious that
the terms mul&id and zindzq were meant to denote not only the
adherents of dualism, but included also those whose beliefs
embraced the various elements in the synthesis. It is clear from
the above explanation that the concept of il&ad is in fact the
antithesis of tawflq, and that it leads to the sort of deviation
denoted by the term zandaqah, referring to the deviator from right
religion; the impugner of religion; the believer in no religion; the
believer in the eternity of the world; the non-believer in the
Hereafter; the non-believer in God (with reference to His
Lordship (rubiibiyyah), and hence to His Commands and
Prohibitions as set forth in the sacred Law, so that the non
believer might abandon the Way of religion and become a
believer in no religion); the non-believer in God's Unity (al
taw&zd); and the concealer of unbelief by the outward show of
belief. 139 Indeed we shall see, in this very treatise, that the ,Zindzq
portrayed by al-Raniri faithfully conforms with the traits listed
above.
But to proceed with our commentary-in the third line al
Ranfri refers to the Holy Prophet as 'the compassionate Prophet'
13
9
See also LA. X, p. 147, col. 1 and al-Tahanawi, Kashshiif, III, p. 617
(Persian text); IV, p. 843 (Persian text).
(al-nabiy al-shafiq). This reference alludes to a relevant and

significant ayah in Siirah al- Tawbah or al-Bara'at to the following
effect:
Now has come unto you a Messenger from amongst

yourselves: it grieves him that you should suffer adversity:
ardently anxious is he after you (�ar4un 'alaykum): to the
Believers he is most kind and merciful. 140
Now when the Arabs say: �arz�un 'alaykum, that expression means,
according to al-Azhari, 'to be extremely anxious for your own
good; your benefit, profit and welfare'. 141 'Compassion'
according to general English usage, means 'pity inclining one to
spare or help'; and 'pity' means 'feeling of tenderness aroused by
person's distress or suffering', so that compassion really means a
feeling of tenderness aroused by a person's distress or suffering
which inclines one to spare or help the person. 142 Supposing the
person towards whom the compassion is directed were not
distressed or suffering, wouid there really be for him compassion?
According to the above definition there would not really be
compassion, since compassion can only be aroused when there is
distress and suffering. There is nothing amiss in the above
definition of compassion, only that it needs further elaboration.
For there to be a feeling of compassion, the one who feels it must
actually know-at least through hearing or sight-the distress or
suffering experienced by the one to whom that feeling is inclined.
If the former does not hear, or see, or hear of the distress or
suffering, he would not know it and compassion would not arise
in him for the other. There is, however, another possibility in
which compassion can arise even if there were actually no sign of
distress or suffering in the one to whom it is directed. Supposing
the doctor knows that a person is going to die soon, and the
person himself does not yet know it-the feeling of compassion
1409:128.
141 L.A. VII, p. col. 1.
11,
142 We have based this definition upon what is derived from the Oxford
Dictionary.
COMMENTARY 1 93
for him can indeed be aroused in the doctor. Thus the element of
knowledge inherent in the concept of compassion does not have
to mean knowledge of the actual event, but equally knowledge of
the impending event. In the latter case it refers to foreknowledge;
and in this case there is added to the concept of compassion as
formulated in the above definition another inherent element
which is fear. Fear in the sense of 'painful emotion caused by
impending danger or evil'; and 'anxiety for the safety of the one
whom the danger or evil is impending'. So when we say that
compassion really means 'a feeling of tenderness ...', the meaning
of tenderness here includes the sense of fear explained a hove. In
the case of the Holy Prophet, the compassion meant as conveyed
by the word shefzq includes both its senses: of that based on
knowledge of the actual event; and of that based on
foreknowledge of the ·impending event. This is clear from the
events relating to the Holy Prophet's expedition to Tabuk (630),
which is the subject of the Siirah here cited, entitled Repentance
(tawbah) or Immunity ( bari? at). This Surah deals with the
unreliable behaviour and treachery of the pagans, hypocrites and
unbelievers toward the believers, and with what is expected of
the believers with regard to their behaviour toward God and His
Messenger. It declares jmmunity from God, His Messenger and
the believers to the pagans, hypocrites and unbelievers who
persistently violated the conditions of the treaties with them
against the believers' firm adherence to them. It also grants time
for repentance to the evildoers and to those who waver or fail in
their duty to God and His Messenger but who at last turn to Him.
It enjoins the believers to associate with the righteous and the
veracious (al-Iiidiqzn), and to fight the unbelievers with firm
resolve; to make sacrifices; to study, understand and propagate
the religion. The last section of the Siirah tells of the Holy
Prophet's great anxiety for both believers and hypocrites, and
reveals his forgiving and merciful nature. Thus in the ayah cited
above, the passage: 'it grieves him that you should suffer
adversity' ('azzzun 'alayhi mii 'anittum), the meaning refers to the
difficulty for the Holy Prophet (in bearing the heavy burden of
grief-'azzzun 'alayhi) to know that both believers and hypocrites
19 4 A COMMENTARY ON THE I;JUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
should be in distress (mii 'anittum); that is, in the case of the

believers their distress or suffering of adversity is known to the
Holy Prophet as an actual event; and in the case of the hypocrites
their suffering is known to the Holy Prophet as an impending
event after they die and in the Hereafter, as God has promised
them a painful chastisement. The Holy Prophet's grief is his fear
for their safety, both here (believers) and in the- Hereafter
(hypocrites); and so another passage immediately follows: 'most
anxious is he after you' ( barz�un 'alaykum), emphasizing his
compassion-his feeling or fear-tenderness aroused by their
(both believers and hypocrites) distress and suffering (actual and
impending) inclining him to spare (hypocrites who may repent,
like those who waver and fail in their duty) and help them ( all:
believers, hypocrites and even unbelievers, so that they might
avert the suffering in the Hereafter). The word barzr occurs only
once in the Holy Qur'an; and it is around this word that the
meaning of shafzq revolves, as is indicated hy ihn Sayyidih's
definition of al-Shafzq. 143 Our identification of al-Shafiq as
applied to the Holy Prophet with what is intended by the ayah
cited is not only based on the identity of shafiq with barzr, which is
in itself true and, therefore already sufficient for our purpose; but
in addition, the subject matter of the whole siirah and that single
word, which occurs only once in the whole Revelation, is of
significance in the understanding of what al-Raniri had in mind
vis-a-nis his own treatise. His own action against the deviators
among the wujiidiyyah demonstrated this, in that he accorded
them time in which their immunity (barii) at) from retaliation was
assured; during which time they were expected to respond
positively to the call to repentance (tawbah), failing which their
immunity would be withdrawn and retaliation against them
would take effect.
The 'Family' ( al) of the Holy Prophet refers to his Household
(ahl al-bayt) whose members comprise, specifically, Fatimah his
daughter; 'Ali his son-in-law and cousin; al-I:fasan and al
I:fusayn their sons and his grandsons. The fact of the ahl al-bayt is
143 LA. X) p. 180, col. I: Al-Shafiq: al-niiri�u al-�arz{ 'ala {ala� al-man{U�
COMMENTARY 1 95
established upon Quranic evidence and by the words (i.e.:

badzth) of the Holy Prophet himself. In the Surah entitled Al
'Jmran (The Family of 'Imran) we find the following ayah:
If anyone disputes in this matter with you, now after (full)

knowledge has come to you, Say: "Come! let us gather
together-our sons and your sons, our women and your
women, ourselves and yourselves: then let us earnestly pray,
and invoke the curse of God on those who lie!" 144
It is transmitted by Muslim that Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqa� told that

when this ayah came down: "Let us call our sons and your sons
..." God's Messenger called 'Ali, Fa#mah, al-J:Iasan and al
J:Iusayn and said: "O God, these are the members of my
family." 145 Then in the Surah al-A�zab (The Confederates):
Verily God only wishes to remove all abomination from you,

Members of the Family, and to make you pure and
spotless. 146
It is transmitted, again by Muslim, that 'A'ishah told that the

Holy Prophet went out one morning wearing a striped cloak of
black goat's hair. Al-}:Iasan ibn 'Ali came and he took him under
it, then al-}:Iusayn came and went under it along with him, then
Fatimah came and he took her under it, then 'Ali came and he
took him under it. Then he said: "God only wishes to remove all
abomination from you, Members of the Family, and to make you
pure and spotless." 147
The 'Companions' (a��ab) refers to the Companions (�ahabah)
of the Holy Prophet. In the early periods of Islam, the term
1443:61.
145
Mishkat al-Ma�abzfJ of al-Baghawi (d. 516) as revised by al-Tabrizi
( completed 737). See the English translation with explanatory notes by
James Robson, Lahore, 1963-65 (rep.); 4v., pts. I-XVIII, vol. 4, p.
1 349·
146 33:33.
147
M"ZShk-at, VOl . 4, p. I 349·
referred to all those who enjoyed intercourse with the Holy

Prophet. Later it was extended to include all those who were
children at the time of the Holy Prophet and who had seen him.
Taking this latter application of the term into consideration, ibn
al-Athir said that the last of the �a&abah was 'Amir ibn Wathil al
Kinani, who died shortly after 100 A.H. Their number is said to
have been I 44,000. The Companions have been classified
according to their order of historical precedence as follows: those
who first embraced Islam and those who did not delay till the
Holy Prophet had established his mission; those who embraced
Islam soon after the Holy Prophet had established his mission;
those who migrated to Abyssinia; those who took part in the first
Covenant of 'Aqabah; those who took part in the second
Covenant of 'Aqabah; the Muhqjiriin and the An�ar; those who
fought atBadr; those who embraced Islam between the events of
Badr and Hudaybiyyah; those who took the oath of fealty at
Hudaybiyyah; those who embraced Islam at the Treaty of
Hudaybiyyah and before the conquest of Makkah; those who
embraced Islam at the conquest of Makkah; those who were
children and had seen the Holy Prophet. This classification,
however, does not take precedence over the one based on
excellence in their degrees of rank according to their inherent
qualities. It is established by the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jami/ah that
the 'Rightly-Guided Successors' (al-Khulafa' al-Rashidiin) belong
to the highest rank after the Holy Prophet, and these, each
according to his degree of excellence, are four respectively: Abu
Bakr, then Umar, then 'Uthman and then Ali. After them come
the Ten who have been promised Paradise (al-'Asharah al
Mubashsharah bi al-Jannah), and they consist of the four already
mentioned including six others, namely: Tal}:ia, al-Zubayr, 'Abd
al-Ra}:iman ibn 'Awf, Sa'd ibn AbiWaqqa�, Sa'id ibn Zayd, and
Abu 'Ubaydah ibn al-Jarra}:i. After them follow the Muhiijiriin
(Emigrants) and the An�ar (Helpers), followed by those who
fought at theBattle ofBadr (al-Badriyyiin), and so on. 148 We said
ibn al-Athir's (d. 630) comprehensive work Usd al-Ghiibah fi

148 See
Ma'rifat al-$a�iibah, Cairo, 1286, 5v., vol. 3, p. 97; vol. 5, p. 233.

COMMENTARY 1 97
that the highest rank accorded to men after the Holy Prophet is
that held by the four Rightly Guided Successors to the leadership
of the Muslim Community. What are the types of moral and
spiritual qualities possessed by men that could raise them to such
heights? By what moral and spiritual criteria are they measured?
To answer these questions, let us refer to the Siirah al-Jfujurat
where God says, alluding to the Companions:
And know that among you is God's Messenger. Were he, in

many matters, to follow your (wishes), you would certainly
fall into misfortune. But God has endeared the Faith to you,
and has made it beautiful in your hearts, and He has made
hateful to you unbelief, wickedness and rebellion. Such
indeed are those who are rightly guided. 149
Here we see that 'the rightly-guided' (al-rashidun) refers to those

to whom God has endeared faith (�abbaba ilaykum al-zman); in
whose hearts He made the faith beautiful (zayyanahufi qulubikum);
to whom He made hateful unbelief, wickedness and rebellion
(karraha ilaykum al-kufr wa al-fusiiq wa al-"i[JJ an). Now the Holy
Prophet is reported to have said: "Make use of my sunnah and the
sunnah of the rightly guided successors after me!" 150 We know
that the appellation 'rightly guided' there refers to the four
mentioned, but generally it is also applicable to any other of the
leaders (sing. imam) who followed the same course as the four. 151
Razin transmitted that 'Umar told he heard God's Messenger
say he had asked his Lord about disagreement among his
Companions after his death and received the revelation: "Your
Companions, Mu}:iammad, are to My estimation in the position
of the stars in the sky, some stronger than others, but all having
Another account based to some extent on the above work is Abu al
Fida's Mukhta-rar ta'rzkh al-Bashar, first published in Istanbul, 1869-70,
2v. See also the Mishkiit, vol. 4, p. I 345. See also al-Tahanawi, Kashshiif,
III pp. 807-809.
149 49-:-7.
150 'Alaykum bi sunnatz wa sunnat al-khulaja' al-riishidzn min ba'dz-as
reported in LA. III, p. r 75, col. 2.
151 Loc. cit.
light. So I consider him who holds to anything about which they

disagree to be rightly guided." He also told that God's Messenger
said: "My Companions are like the stars, so whichever of them
you copy you will be guided." 152 Just as stars in their varying
magnitudes all possess light and are as beacons that guide the
traveller in the night, so the Companions in their varying degrees
of moral and spiritual qualities all possess rushd-that
perseverance in the right way, the way of truth, that
continuance in the state of grace accompanied by that self
restraining firmness of attitude toward unbelief, transgression and
disobedience. Thus the Companions are the People of Firmness
in belief and faith (zmiin) whom al-Ran:iri calls the Ahl al-Wathzq
(Malay: yang amat kepercayaan). The expression: yang amat
kepercayaan' here does not mean: 'very reliable and trustworthy';
it means, rather, 'very believing and faithful', literally: 'believing
and having faith to an eminent degree'. This expression is al
Raniri's translation of the word wathzq. Wathzq here means the
'being firm, solid and strong' that is synonymous with mul;kam. 153
The subject of this firmness, solidity and strength is belief and
faith in the Truth which has been entrusted to them by God; and
here, again, the belief and faith is confirmation and affirmation of
the Truth. This means the same thing as being certain in their
belief and faith, for certitude consists in the firmness by which the
heart (al-qalb) adheres to that which it knows, and fully grasps it,
and is of such a nature so as to exclude all possibility of the
opposite. For this reason we have translated ahl al-wathzq and yang
amat kepercayaan as 'People of Certainty'. Wathzq, according to ibn
Man�u.r citing ibn al-A'rabi, also refers to the firm covenant (al
' ahd al-wathfq) which is conveyed by the term mzthaq, a word
derived from the same root wathiqa.1 54 From this it becomes clear
that the People of Certainty, or the People of Firmness in their
.152Mishkat, vol. 4, pp. 1319-1320. This tradition is also cited in the

Kitab al-Luma', pp. I 19-120.
153 LA, X, pp. 371, col. 1. See further below, pp. 383 fol. with reference
to al-Razi's interpretation of the meaning of al-rasikhiin .ft al-'ilm.
154 Loe. cit., cols. I and 2.
COMMENTARY 1 99
belief and faith, are people who, being perpetually in a state of

grace, continually confirm and affirm their Covenant with God
(al-mzthaq); and hence they become the paragons of purity in true
religion.
IV To proceed: Thus speaks he who passes round the Cup of

the Messenger of God, who may God bless and give peace,
the Shaykh Niir al-Din ibn 'Ali ibn I:fasan-ji ibn
Mu}:iammad I:famid of Ranfr and of the School of Shafi'i:
When disputation arose among some of the muta'affibzn and
the mu' iinidzn from among those who are ignorant and
wicked concerning the question of (God's) Being, and the
relation of the world with the Truth Most Exalted, some of
my friends among the many high-ranking personages
may God preserve them, and may they, by the grace of our
Master Mu}:iammad, to whom be granted the blessings and
peace of God, be strengthened in the religion of
Islam!-requested me (to write a treatise clarifying the
issues involved). So I now compose in Malay this treatise,
whose contents I have culled from the books of the $iifis and
others, and entitle it: Proof of the Veracious in refutation of the
,?,indzq. In this treatise I mention the beliefs and teachings of
four groups, namely: the Mutakalliniin and the $iifis, the
Philosophers and those who cleave to the doctrines of the
deviating Wujiidiyyah in exposition of ( their respective
positions on the question of) the relationship between God's
Being and the world, whether (His Being is) identical with
it, or whether this is not so, as will be further explicated.
We have already given a biographical sketch of al-Raniri in

our Introduction to this book; and we have explained the
significance of'passing round the Cup of the Messenger of God',
in the beginning of our commentary on the text; so that there is no
need of repetition here. The 'high-ranking personages' which he
refers to are the dignitaries in the court of Sultan Iskandar Thani
of Acheh ( 163 7-1641). In explaining the terms muta'a,Hibzn and
mu' iinidzn, it is necessary first to explain the meaning of the term

sufahii', which we have rendered as 'those who are ignorant and
wicked', for this latter term has a wider field of application in
which the former two are included. In this way the precise
meanings of the former two can become clarified. First of all, the
context of discussion here pertains to the Islamic conception of
God and His relationship to Man and to the World. Safih refers to
a person who has the quality termed safah, and this is synonymous
withjahl and means 'a deficiency in intellect or understanding',
in other words 'ignorance'. In this state a person may be induced
to act unreasonably and unlawfully; and when he in this state
and with reference to the truth acts unlawfully he does so not
merely through ignorance of the law, or of what is lawful, or of
the truth, but to wilful disobedience of the law, or rebellion against it,
or r(fjection of the truth. In the Holy Qur'an, those who reject the
religion of the Prophet Ibrahim, on whom be peace, are referred
to as those 'who debase their souls with folly' -man safiha
nafsahu. 155 The phrase sa.fiha nafsahu signifies also 'he lost his own
soul', and according to the commentators it has the same
signification as sajfaha nafsahu-'he made his soul to be lost'. It is
comparable with Jahila nafsahu, and synonymous with it. For
example, in the phrase safiha al-baqq, or sajfaha al-baqq, meaning
'he made the truth, or what is right, to be foolishness; the
meaning is identical withjahila al-baqq,: 'he ignored the truth, or
what is right' and 'he regarded the truth, or what is right, as
foolishness or ignorance'. Safih also means jahil, 156 as al-Raniri
himself shows in his Malay rendering ofsufahii, by segalayangjahil.
Nowjahl, or ignorance, is the contrary of'ilm, or knowledge; and it
is of two kinds: the simple, which simply means voidness of
knowledge ef what should be known; and the compound: which
means decisive belief not agreeable with the fact or reality; the believing a
thing to be different from what it is, the doing ef a thing in a manner
differentfrom that in which it ought t be done. 157 In the context we are
1552:130.
156For safah and its various relations see LA, XIII, 497-498.
157LA, XI, pp. 129-130.
COMMENTARY 201
discussing, it is too clear to need demonstration to assert rightly

that the sufahiP, or segalayangjiihil, among whom are included the.
muta'aji,bzn and the mu'iinidzn, are people who are not simply
guilty of the simple, 'innocent' kind ofignorance, or deficiency of
intellect or understanding, but are rather those guilty of wilful
and deliberate rejection of what is the fact, the real, the right, and
the truth. The muta'aHibzn are also referred to by al-Raniri in the
text as the Ahl al-Ta'fzb, in which case it would refer to the
infinitive noun of the second form of the verb 'afaba, meaning to
signify people who bound their bodies with pieces of a garment or
cloth in a peculiar way by reason of hunger or, in other words,
people who bound their bellies with a stone under the bandage,
and who consequently made themselves hungry and lean. 158 In
this case he might have been referring to the type of false devotees
whom I:famzah al-Fan�uri, almost a century earlier,
contemptuously referred to as being in the habit of making
themselves 'hungry and lean' -Lapar dan kurus. 159 But reference
to the Ahl al-Ta'aHub-in spite of the text-could well be
intended, and indeed almost certainly so in view of the form
muta'aHib alluded to in the Arabic text; in which case he means to
refer to 'extremists' or 'fanatics', since either 'extremists' or
'fanatics', with their inherent pejorative connotations, is here
meant. Their extremism or fanaticism, as al-Raniri explains in a
clarificatory note on the margin of the text, takes the form of
'opposition towards the correction of erroneous religion'
memantah kepada memenarkan agamayang salah,- obstinate refusal to
accept correction in their erroneous beliefs and practices. As for
the mu'anidzn, the term next mentioned by al-Raniri, his
clarificatory note on the margin of the text says that it refers to
'the setting up of erroneous religion'-menegakkan agama yang
salah, that is, as against the true and right religion (Islam). Hence
the muta'aI1ibzn have in common with the mu'iinidzn the fact of
opposition, disobedience and rebellion; of deviation from the
LA. I, p. 603-604, cols 2, I.

15s
See my The mysticism of lfam;:;ah Fan�iirz, Kuala Lumpur, 1970, pp.

159
17-18.
truth, of obstinate rejection of the true and right way of religion.

With reference to such people-such as those whom al-Raniri
means when he calls them as being among the sufahif-the Holy
Qur'an, speaking of the true sufaha': ala innahum hum al-sufaha'
(2:13), says that they are hypocrites (2:8; 14); who deceive only
themselves: wa ma yakhda'una illa arifusahum (2:9); in whose hearts
is a disease: fi quliibihim mararj,un (2:10); who are false to
themselves: kanii yakhdhibiin ( 2: 1 o); who are the true mischief
makers on earth: alii innahum hum al-mufsidiin (2:11-12); who,
when called to believe the truth as others believe, would consider
the truth to be falsehood, and the true believers to be fools: qalii
anu'minu kamii iimana al-sufahii' (2:13); who are insincere in conduct
to the extent of actual duplicity (2:14); who make a mockery of
the truth ( 2: 1 5); and have bartered guidance for error: ulii' ika al
ladhzna'shtarawii al-r/,aliilata bi al-hudii (2:16); who have lost true
direction (2: 16); who are deaf, dumb, and blind and who will not
return to the right path: {ummun bukmun 'umyunfa hum liiyarji'un
( 2: 1 8); who are the rejectors of truth: al- kiifiriin ( 2: 1 g). All these
blameable qualities peculiar to the sufahii' in this context reveal
their nature as morally corrupt; they are sinful, ungodly,
mischievous, bad, harmful, evil in principle as well as in practice;
they are-to describe them in a single English word in which the
above connotations inhere-wicked The word muta'affibzn in al
Raniri's text and his explanation of it as referring to the Ahl al
Ta'fib and not necessarily to the alternative Ahl al- Ta'affUb,
could well have referred to the lean and hungry people who
bound their beiiies or bodies with pieces of a garment in a
peculiar way, or to people who bound their heads with
turbans, 160 or to those who affected poverty, since being poor is
also conveyed as one of its meanings. 161 In any case, taking
ta'aHub to be the proper form meant, the term muta'aHibzn taken
by itself is not definitive enough in its connotation, unless due
consideration be given to the conceptual context set by the term
sufaha' which qualifies it; and that was indeed the reason why al-
16o LA, I, p. 602.

161 LA, I, p. 604.
COMMENTARY
Raniri found fit to insert a clarifica.tory note on the margin of the

text explaining that the Ahl al- Ta' .{ib were people who opposed
the correction of erroneous beliefs and practices. Taking into
consideration what has been said above, we conclude that the
muta' aHibzn were extremists or fanatics who grouped together and
defended their group vehemently against attempts at correction
of their beliefs and practices; who identified themselves by way of
uniform apparel which included turbans; and who in their ways
affected straitened circumstances in the form of poverty. 162 With
reference to the concept of safih, al-Raniri not only considered it
synm1ymous withjahil, but connected it with the zindzq as well, as
evidenced Gum his interpretation of al-Maha'imi's words quoted
later on in the treatise. i 63 Indeed, the muta' aiiibzn, already
included among the sufaha', were in fact also the zindzqs to whom
the title of the treatise alludes; for the zindzq in the title of the
treatise, in character and quality, is the exact opposite of the
iiddzq: instead of possessing true knowledge, they are really
ignorant in the compound sense; instead of confirming the Truth
which God has established and affirming real Faith, they are
obstinate in their rejection of the Truth and wickedly endeavour
to set up what is in reality false. In fact the same applied ta, the
mu' anidzn who-it is possible to conceive-might not necessarily
belong to a group different from the muta' aHibzn in the sense that
the latter appellation is simply meant to be a description of the
external characteristics of the group, while the former defines the
nature of their internal qualities. Al-Raniri explains that the
mu' anidzn are people who set up erroneous religion. Now in the
text the word which we have read as menegakkan: 'to set up
something so that it stands erect', might conceivably be also read
meneguhkan: 'to make something firm, strong and secure.' This is
so because the word is spelt in Arabic letters mzm-niin-giif-(waw ( or
qiif)-kiif-niin. Ifwaw is intended instead of qiif, then we should add
162 Indeed, this description fits in well with certain similar groups we
find today!
163 Page 26 of the text:" ... khiliifa mii tawahhama ba'rj,u al-sufahii": " . . .
bersalahan dengan yang dii 'tiqiidkan setengah jiihil yang zindzq."

:204 A COMMENTARY ON THE I;IVJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
another letter: ha' after it so that it reads: meneguhkan; if, on the

other hand qiifis intended instead ofwaw, then we should add the
two dots over the letter which looks like waw there. Since the
letters in question often resemble one another in their written
form, we have decided that here it is qiif that is intended, only
that the two dots are missing and should be inserted accordingly
so that the word reads: menegakkan. Our conjecture is not simply
an unfounded guess, or even a guess based on the morphological
structure of the word, for we will demostrate in what follows that
the semantic structure coincides with the facts in the context.
Menegakkan corresponds far more truly to what the mu' iinidzn were
doing; that is, the setting up of erroneous religion. When you
make something teguh (meneguhkan), something firm, and
strong and secure, the thing made such is alreadyfixed or established.
When you make something tegak (menegakkan), on the other hand,
you are in the process of setting up, of erecting, of fixing, of
establishing the thing you want to establish. The mu' anidzn were
in fact only in the process of trying to establish what they wanted
to establish, since they among themselves were still disputing the
matter at hand ( takhalafa), so that what they wanted to establish
was not yet established. Menegakkan, then, is prior to meneguhkan,
and menegakkan was what they strove to do. Furthermore, what
they were striving at to make tegak, to erect, was agama yang
salah-erroneous religion or erroneous beliefs, and it is in reality
not permissible to speak of 'establishing (meneguhkan) erroneous
religion', for what is erroneous (salah) cannot be made firm,
strong and secure ( teguh), just as what is biitil or false, by its very
nature, cannot be made firm, strong and secure, so that to speak
in this way would be a contradiction in terms. Elsewhere al
Raniri, speaking of the Sultan of Acheh at the time, refers to him
as" ... yang mendirikan Agama Allah dengan keteguhan ...": one "who
firmly established the Religion of God ...164 Now this brief
quotation in fact realizes the truth of what we say about the
relational meanings of menegakkan and meneguhkan respectively.
Mendirikan means 'to make something stand', 'to establish'.
164 Tibyiinff Ma'rifat al-Adyan, p. 4.

COMMENTARY
Menegakkan is a final phase of mendirikan, for it is as we have said a

process of setting up, of fixing, of establishing-and more
precisely, oferecting. Mendirikan implies that its object is already
tegak (erect), and conversely menegakkan implies that its o�ject is
not quite terdiri (stood) as yet. After mendirikan something then the
process of making it firm and solid and strong and secure,
meneguhkan, can begin. It should now be clear that the mu'iinidzn
could not have meneguhkan agama yang salah, for apart from the
reasons already stated, to say now that they did so would involve
the equalization of the values of error and rectitude, which is
absurd. Now that we have established the general description of
the mu'iinidzn, we shall proceed to define more precisely the
nature of their error or deviation in religion. The verb 'anada
basically means that one 'declined' or 'deviated'. Its infinitive
noun 'iniid, and also mu'iinadah, refers to one who 'acted with
opposition'; who 'contended vehemently in debate, obstinately
refusing to admit the truth'. The idea of obstinacy is stressed in
the act of mu'iinadah, and in particular the obstinacy in unbelief
with regard to truth and rectitude. Ibn Man�ur cites the case of
Abu Talib who while he knew and affirmed the truth yet refused
to follow the Holy Prophet, and scorned to do so because people
might say that he followed his own brother's son. 165 In the Holy
Qur'an the people of'Ad and Thamud were referred to as being
obstinate transgressors (' anui), and so were people who opposed
truth and rectitude, and those who indulged in obstinate
disobedience and cast doubt and suspicion on true belief,
including those who set up another god and stubbornly refused to
heed the signs of God. 166 Disputing with another without
knowledge of the truth and falsity of one's own arguments and of
the arguments of one's opponent also constitutes mu'iinadah. It
becomes increasingly clear, · if we analyze the underlying
elements in the conceptual structure of mu'iinadah, that the
inherent elements of contention and obstinacy are of the type
165 LA, III, p. 307, vol. 2. For other derivations from 'anada see also p.
308, col. 2.
166 See 11:59, 14:15, 50:24, and 74:16 respectively.
that finds support in the misuse of logic and rhetoric. In its higher
levels of application it would become confused with wisdom, and
hence would mislead the generality of people. In this connection
we may recall the ancient philosophical movement begun in
Greece by men of pseudo-science who came to be called
'Sophists' (Greek: sophistiii). The leader of this movement was
Protagoras of Abdera (480-410 B.C.), and the other chief
protagonists included Gorgias ofLeontini (483-375), Hippias of
Elis and Prodicus of Iulis. In their misleading but persuasive
· method of logic and rhetoric, they propagated an ethical and
epistemological relativism and made man the measure of all
things (Protagoras); they taught that nothing exists, and that if
something exists, it could not be known, and that if it could be
known, it could not be communicated to others (Gorgias);
religion is a deception invented by the strong to subdue the weak,
and hence prayer is superfluous (Gorgias and Prodicus); law and
its usage is merely something conventional created by human
society and depending for its validity on a particular time and
place (Hippias). They cast doubt on knowledge and the
possibility of knowledge and initiated a thorough-going
philosophic scepticism. 167 In Islam the sophistai became known as
the sujasta, and their various schools the siifasta'iyyah. Al
Baghdadi (d. 1037/8) was one of the earliest authorities to write
about them and to identify them into three groups. 168 Al-Nasafi
(d. r r 42) also referred to them in his 'Aqa'id; and a!-Taftazani"'s
(d. 1387/8) commentary on it mentioned the names of the three
groups and gave a resume of their beliefs. 169 The same but
slightly elaborated account can be found in Tahanawi's Kashshiif,
the article on sophistry-safsatah, which is derived mainly from
6 For the Sophists, see Zeller, Outlines ef the history of Greek philosophy,
1 7
London, 1950 (2nd. repr.), pp. 75�93; Windelband, A history of

philosophy, New York, 1953 (10th. repr.), pp. 67fol., 73fol., 88fol.
168 Al-Baghdadi's
account of the Sophists is given in his Kitiib Uriil al
Dzn, Istanbul, 1928, which Wensinck, discusses in his The Muslim creed,
Cambridge, 1932, pp. 251fol., 263. See also Farq, 347 fol.
169 Taftazani, pp. 20-23, 31· (Shar� al-<Aqii'id al-.Nasafiyyah); see also al
Jurjani's Ta< rifiit, pp. 163-164; 200.

COMMENTARY 207
the above two works and from al-l}i's Mawiiqif and the
commentary on it by al-Jurjani. 170 Al-Raniri mentioned the
three groups, giving a brief exposition of their beliefs in his
Tibyiin 171 • The names of the three groups mentioned are: (1) al
'iniidiyyah; (2) al-'indfyyah; and (3) al-la adriyyah. The expression la
adrz means 'I do not know', and the lii adriyyah are people who say
that they do not know whether or not a thing has real existence.
They are in doubt about the real existence of things and are in
doubt even of their own doubt. They are therefore people who
deny the possibility of knowledge, and are properly called
Agnostics. As to the· second appellation, the word 'indz means
'accordmg to me', or 'to my opinion'; and the' indiyyah are people
who say that there is no objective truth in knowledge; all
knowledge, they say, is subjective, and the truth about anything
is only one's opinion of it. In this sense they are epistemological
Subjectivists. Finally, in the case of the third group called the
'iniidiyyah, which means 'the Obstinate', they refer to people who
deny the realities of things (l;aqii'iq al-aslryii'), and maintain that
what we call 'things' (aslryii') are mere fancies (awham) and
figments of the imagination (khayaliit). In a sense, the 'inadiyyah
are closer in ideas to the 'indiyyah than to the la adriyyah although
in fact all the three groups have in common the denial of
objective knowledge. The beliefs of these three groups, which
form the basic elements of the beliefs of the Sophists, are in direct
opposition to Islam because Islam affirms knowledge and
realities. We can see how such beliefs represent fundamental
deviations from Islam, and how their consequences would result
in deviations in religion. From this brief explanation it is clear
that the mu'iinidzn referred to by al-Raniri are Sophists of the
'iniidiyyah brand, to which category often belong the pseudo
Sufis, such as those refuted in this treatise. Their setting up of
erroneous religion means, in this case and in accordance with the
logical development of their beliefs, their pantheistic or monistic
interpretation and propagation of the religion among the people.
170 Tahanawi, Kashshiif, vol. III, pp. 665-666.

171 See ibid., pp. 24-25.
We shall have recourse to refer to them again in the appropriate

sections.
In his words: " ... the question of (God's) Being, and the
relation of the world with the Truth Most Exalted ... ", al-Ranfri
means by ft babthi al-wujiid (the question of (God's) Being): pada
memithlkan wujiid Allah; and by wa nisbati al-'alam bi al-baqq ta'ala
(and the relation of the world with the Truth Most Exalted): pada
menisbatkan 'alam dengan lfaqq Ta'ala. Both words memithlkan (for
babth) and menisbatkan (for nisbah) include within their respective
connotations the meaning of identity-relation. For the word nisbah,
in addition to meaning relation, also means resemblance or
similarity; 172 and likewise mithl, in addition to meaning an
analogue, a like, also means a similarity, a likeness, a resemblance, in
like manner as nidd and badal, and also shabah. 173 The words we
have translated as 'the question of (God's) Being, and the relation
of the world with the Truth Most Exalted' must therefore be
interpreted as already implying the identity-relation of the world
with God; for the muta' aiiibzn and the mu' anidzn were disputing
the problem of difference or identity in the nature of the
relationship between the world and God, and they held that the
Being of God, and the world is identical.
As we can see, the subject matter of the treatise impinges upon
various aspects of religinn: of theology and the articles of belief; of
metaphysics and philosophy, which both have a bearing upon
theology and the creed since these discipliues treat of the same
subjects; of innovation and deviation resulting from confusion
and ulterior motives. It is quite natural therefore that al-Ranfri
should first mention the theologians or Mutakallimiin.
The appellation Mutakallimiin here refers to the schools of
Sunni theologians who employed the science of formal logic as
dialectic (kalam) in defence of Islamic theology against the
encroaching rationalism of the Mu'tazilah and the Philosophers,
172LA, I, p. 756, col. 1.

173LA, XI, p. 6m, col. 1; see also ibid., vol. Ill, p. 420, col. 2; vol. XI, p.
48, col. I. Memithlkan in this context discloses the attribution oflikeness
to God, in contradiction to the Quranic dictum that 'there is none like
unto Him' (laysa ka mithlihi shay') -42: I I
COMMENTARY 209
and the antrhopomorphism of the extremists among the

adherents of traditionism. According to ibn Khaldun, the science
of kaliim originated out of exegetical pressure connected with the
J
interpretation (tafszr and ta wzl) of ambiguous and
anthropomorphic passages in the Holy Qur'an, that is, those
passages usually referred to by the Holy Qur'an itself as the
mutashiibihiit, or those not clearly intelligible. 174 But the founder
of the science of kaliim as developed into a theological method and
perfected by the Mutakallimun was Abu al-f:Iasan al-Ash'ari (d.
320 A.H.), who at one stage of his intellectual life upheld the
views of the Mu'tazilah. Earlier, the Mu'tazilah had initiated
kaliim as a rationalistic method of discussion and disputation
revolving around the problem of interpretation of the obscure
and anthropomorphic references to God in the Holy Qur'an; and
they discussed and disputed such problems as those pertaining to
the Divine Qualities or Attributes ( al-�ifat), the nature of the
Divine Speech (kaliim Alliih), the Vision (ruya) of God in the
Hereafter. They denied the Attributes, and also the Beatific
Vision, and they held the Holy Qur'an to be created. Moreover,
they affirmed a power ( qadar) in man to determine his actions in
the sense of free will, and they attributed incumbency upon God
to do what is advantageous to man. 175 When al-Ash'ari
renounced his adherence to the Mu'tazilah, he proceeded to
apply the kaliim in a most devastating manner against them, and
to establish it henceforth as a valid science of dialectic in the
service of theology. 176 No doubt there were other contemporary
theologians who made use of kaliim, such as Abuja'far A}:imad al
Ta}:iawi (d. 331) and Abu Man�ur al-Maturidi (d. 333), but none
with such intellectual efficiency and potency, and profound
174 See the Muqaddimah (trans. by F. Rosenthal, Bollingen Series XLIII,

New York, 1958, 3v.) 2nd part of 2nd. ed. 1980, vol. III, pp. 34 fol; 55
fol. See also Mital pp. 103-108.
17 See al-Baghdadi, Farq, pp. 93-169; 195-219; al-Shahrastani, Kitab
5
al-Milal, I, pp. 43-107.

176 See his Kitiib al-Lumafz al-radd 'alii Ahl al-,<aygh wa al-Bida', Beyrut,
1953, (Imprimerie Catholique, trans. by R.J. McCarthy), Arabic text,

pp. 1-83; trans. pp. 5-116.
grasp of the total situation as was demonstrated by the

theological genius of the time. Al-Ash'ari not only wielded the
kaliim against the rationalistic Mu'tazilah, but also vindicated it
in the face of calumniation by the representatives of a rigid
traditionism who made ignorance their capital. 177 'Abd al-Qahir
al-Baghdadi ( d. 429) formulated the epistemological aspect of the
theology of the Mutakallimun, 178 while the metaphysical aspect
was refined by Abu Bakr al-Baqillani of Baghdad (d. 402). The
Ash'ari metaphysics of atoms and accidents formulated by al
Baqillani is essentially anti-Aristotelian and Islamic in character.
Based on this metaphysics the ontology of the Mutakallimun
rejected most of the Aristotelian Categories (maqiiliit); 179 and
what was adopted of the categories of substance (jawhar) and
quality (kayf) became in their system atom (jawhar) and accident
('arar/,). The Jewish philosopher Musa ibn Maymiin
(Maimonides: d. 601) has given us a summary of the atomistic
metaphysics of the Mutakallimun in twelve propositions. 180 An
abstract of the twelve propositions can be given as follows. The
universe is composed of indivisible atoms (sing. jawhar fard)
which are similar to one another. They are devoid of magnitude,
but when combined they give rise to bodies (ajsiim). The giving
rise to bodies is called generation (tawallud), while the separation
of the atoms causing the di'ssolution of bodies is called corruption
177 See his Risiilah lstihsiin al-Khawef.,fi' llm al-Kaliim, pp. 87-97 (Arabic
text); r 19-134 (trans. Ref. note 176 above. See also ibn 'Asakir's
account of al-Ash'ari in the same work.
178 Cf. his Kitab U�iil al-Dzn, Istanbul, 1928 on the 'Roots of
Knowledge'.
179
The reference here is to the Ten Categories (al-maqiiliit al-'Asharah):
substance (ousza: Jawhar); quantity (poson: kammryyah); quality (poion:
kay.fiyyah); relation (prosti: i{jiifah); place (Pou: ayna); time (Pote: matii);
posture ( kezsthai: waef.,'); possession (echein: milk); action (poien: anyaf al,
.fi'il); passion (piischein: anyanfa'il, in.fi'aL). Seejurjan1, Ta'rifat, p. 243;
Tahanawi, Kashshaf, vol. V, p. I 211. See further, Soheil Mushin Afnan,
Wa;:,hah Namah Falsafi (Qamiis Falsafi Farisz-'Arabz): A philosophical
lexicon in Persian and Arabic, Bayrut, Dar al-Mashriq, 1969, p. 246,
cols. 1 & 2.
180 Guide to the Perplexed, op cit., eh. 73, first part, pp. 120-133.
COMMENTARY 211
(jasiid). A void ( al-khalii') exists in which the combination

( ijtimii'), separation (iftiriiq), and movement (barakah or intiqiil) of
the atoms can take place. Corresponding to the substantial atoms
there exist time atoms. Inherent in the substantial atoms are
accidents, which do not endure two atoms of time. The
substantial atoms themselves would not in their real nature
endure two moments or atoms of time, just like the accidents
which inhered in them, but God makes the atoms endure for a
given time by creating in them the accident of duration ( baqii').
God creates a substance, that is, atoms combined as a body, and
simultaneously its accidents. Immediately after its creation it is
annihilated and another takes its place, and so on for as long as
God wills. Thus the nature ofbeing is discontinuous, and what is
called natural law is in fact God's customary way of acting. All
bodies are composed of similar atoms, and since there exists
nothing but substance and accident, the difference in bodies is
caused by the difference in their accidents. The accidents, which
are of a positive or negative kind, such as life or death, motion or
rest, composition or its opposite, and other such accidents that
logically follow from them, are superadded to substance and
accompany the body of necessity. One accident cannot exist in
another; every accident inheres in substance, which is its
substratum (maball). Since God's customary way of acting
constitutes what we call natural law and the Divine Will is not
limited by such laws, there is with the exception of logical
contradictions unlimited possibility in the world. The notion of.
t�e infinite with respect to bodies and causes are all impossible.
Since the eleven propositions summarized above are not
susceptible of proof by sense perception, and since the testimony
ofthe senses is not always valid, the twelfth proposition states that
the evidence of the senses cannot be accepted in the face of
rational proo( In their theology the Mutakallimun maintained
the doctrine of difference (mukhiilafah), between God and the
world, and the origination of the world in time (mubdath) and
God's absolute and exclusive efficacy. One of the last great
representatives of the Ash'ari school of Mutakallimun of the
period was Abu al-Ma'ali al-Juwayni (d. 478), the Imam of the
212 A COMMENTARY ON THE I:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ.
Two Sanctuaries ( imam al-�aramayn) and teacher of al-Ghazali,

the most original thinker and greatest theologian Islam has
produced. The school of this period, that is, from al-Ash'ari to al
Baqillani, is called the 'early school' ( al-awwaliin) of theologians
who developed the dialectical method and by means of which
established Islamic theology upon the firm bases of Islamic
religious tradition (naql) combined with reason (aql) and the
consensus of the learned in the Muslim Community (ijmii'). But
by the time of al-J uwayni, theological and metaphysical
controversies had become more complicated because of the
assimilation and dissemination of Aristotelian and other
philosophical ideas initiated chiefly by Muslim philosophers such
as Abu Na�r al-Farabi ( d. 339) and particularly Abu 'Ali ibn Sina
(d. 420). It was no longer possible to defend the theology, or raise
its intellectual level to the requirements of the time without
meeting the philosophers on their own ground and in language
and method they could appreciate. To this great task Abu
!:famid al-Ghazali ( d. 505) applied and acquitted himself with
singular distinction. Al-Ghazali initiated a new movement in
theology (kaliim) by introducing the philosophical method as well
as the metaphysics of the $ufis as based on spiritual insight (kashf)
and direct spiritual experience (dhawq) in the interpretation of
Islamic theology in addition to reason, tradition, and consensus.
The school of Mutakallimun that developed out of this new
movement, of which Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606) was another
leader, became known as the 'later' school (al-muta'akhkhirun) as
distinguished from the earlier counterpart. The new movement,
or the later school of theologians with al-Ghazaff and al-Razi as
their leaders, is characterized by their employment of formal
logic as derived mainly from philosophical discussions on physics
and metaphysics and as distinct from philosophy as a separate
discipline. They maintained that formal logic is only an
instrument for correct thinking and formulation of proof in
argument as distinguished from philosophy, which they were
inclined to reject as a valid discipline in the quest for theological
truths. With this method of logic they reexamined many of the
basic premises of the earlier theologians and found some of the
COMMENTARY 213
arguments to be valid while most others not so. They rejected the
arguments erroneously presented and affirmed the sound ones;
and they maintained that the basic truths that underly the
arguments are not affected by the error in the arguments. By the
time of 'Abd Allah al-Bay9aw1 (d. 685) and his student 'Abd al
Ra}:iman al-1]1 (d.756), however, theology as developed by this
new movement became confused with philosophy and the two
disciplines were no longer distinguishable. 181
We have outlined above a gist of the historical development of
kalam as theology; highlighting the metaphysical aspect of
Islamic theology because that is the aspect that concerns us 111ust
in this commentary. When al-Raniri refers to the Mutakallimun
he really means the earlier school (al-awxalun) of al-Baqillani
going back to al-Ash'ari. In reply to the views of the Philosophers
on the eternity of the world and other related beliefs, however, al
Raniri makes use of the arguments of the recent school of the
Mutakallimiin (al-muta' akhkhiriin), chiefly, as construed by al
Ghazaff and al-Razi
Then he mentions Siifis. The term �ujz has been applied to
denote three groups, and such application demonstrates
confusion in the estimation of people generally in recognizing the
true identity of the Sufi. This is understandable because
recognition of their true identity involves knowledge not
accessible to the generality of people. Because of this we say that
181 Apart from the works ofal-Ash'ari, al-Baghdadi, al-Shahrastani, ibn

Khaldun, al-Jurjani, al-Tahanawi, and Maimonides already cited in
this section, the following works have been consulted: al-Mawiiqif of
'Adud al-Din al-lji, and the commentary ofit by al-Jurjani, the Kitiib al
Fi�al ofibn }:Iazm; the Risiilah ofal-Qushayri; the Ta&iifut al-Faliisifah;
Maqasid al-Faliisifah; al-lqti�iidfi al-I' tiqad; l&ya' 'Ulum al-Dzn; Mishkat
al-Anwar, all by al-Ghazali; the Kitab al-Arba'zn and· the Mu&aHal ofal
Razi; The development ef Muslim theology, by D.B. Macdonald ( and also
his article on Kaliim and the article on Allah in the E.I.); The Muslim
creed, by A.J. Wensinck; The Shar& al-'Aqii'id al-Nasafiyyah of al
Taftazani; Islamic occasionalism, by M. Fakhry; Free will and predestination
in early Islam, by M. Watt; the Reconstruction efreligious thought in Islam, by
M. Iqbal; the Wafayat al-A'yan of ibn Khalliqan.
the term 1lfz has been applied to denote three groups:
I. the Siifis proper (sing. 1'iifi'};

2. The aspirants toward the attainment of the condition of the
Siifis proper (sing. muta�awwij);
3. the pseudo-Siifis who only make outward show in imitation
of the Siifis to conceal personal motives and wordly
ambitions (musta1wif).
The above description is found in the Kashshij of al-Tahanawi,

where the Sufi is further defined as one who has lost consciousness
of the subjective self or ego, and subsists in God (al-ladhz huwa
fiinin bi nafsihi biiqin bi Alliihi ta'iilii); who is liberated from the
nature of things (as aprehended by the ego) and is in continuous
rapport with the Reality of Realities (mustakhla1 min al-!abii) i'
mutta1il bi al-baq'fqat al-baqa'iq). 182 This definition in reality
amounts to the same as ours, namely that the �iifi is one who is in
the condition of the 'second separation'; who belongs to a group
which we designate as the people of the 'second separation'. We
have here underlined the basic characteristic of this group of
people, and we have already given a rather extended explanation
of their condition in the previous pages so that it is not necessary
to repeat it here. 183 However, we may loosen slightly the
confining limits of this definition of the Sufi to include one who
has not attained to the stage of the 'second separation', but v.:ho
has experienced loss of consciousness of the subjective self (fanii) )
and has been 'gathered up' in the utter oblivion of absolute Unity
(Janii) al-Janii) and jam'); but who returns to his subjective
consciousness without witnessing the subsequent event of the
'gathering of gathering' (jam' al-jam'), of the articulations of the
Unity into Multiplicity and back to Unity again. In other words,
one who sees only the Unity of the One without the Many, and
who is thus inclined to stress that Unity in his state and to deny
the Many, but who is nevertheless aware of his incomplete state
182 Vol. IV, p. 839. See also Kash] al-Ma�jub, pp. 34-35.
183 See above, pp. 131-148.
COMMENTARY 215
and who, in which awareness, goes on affirming and confirming

the truth of revealed religion (Islam) as coinciding with the
higher and superior state of the 'second separation' in such wise
that he is preserved from error and deviation. The Siifis proper,
then are of two classes: those who attained to the highest stage of
spiritual experience, the superelect ( khawaJJ al-khawaJJ); and
those who attained to a partial stage of the highest spiritual
experience, the elect ( khawaJJ). 184 The criterion by which is
measured their <legrees of rank in the spiritual hierarchy is the
Jana' -baqa' experience. 18 5 Below the class of the 'elect' are those
still on the way, as it were, who persevere in the way in the sincere
hope of attaining to the higher states of spiritual progress. To this
group belongs the muta1awwif each 2.ccording to his degree of
attainment in the various spiritual levels ofthe journey unto God.
The method ofjourneying unto God is called ta1awwuj, which we
have already defined as the practice of the sacred Law of religion
in the station of excellence ( a' miil al-shari' ah ft maqam al-ibsiin). 18 6
The last group called the musta�wif consists of pseudo-Sufis. Riimi
alludes to them when he distinguishes the true Sufis from the
false:
What makes the Sufi? Purity of heart;
Not the patched mantle and the lust perverse
Of those vile earth-bound men who steal his name ... 187
184 In the Kitiib al-Luma', al-Sarraj uses the terms khusiis and khusiis al
khusiis for the elect and the super-elect respectively. He also refers to the
Holy Qur'an (35:32), saying that the ayah alludes to these two classes of
people (see op. cit. p. 337).
185 Al-Ghazaff says that there are two channels by which knowledge
based on such experience is attained; either it is by means of the

experience of 'spiritual tasting' (balan dhawqiyyan); or by means of an
illuminative cognitive experience ('irfanan 'ilmiyyan) Mishkat al-Anwar,
p. 57.
186 See above, p. 184 and note 126.
187 Mathnawz, V. 358. This emphasis on purity of heart as distinguished
from outward appearance in the judgement of men of truth refers back

to the badzth: "La an?,ur ila ruwarikum wa inna-ma an?,iir ilii quliibikum wa
a'malikum"-"l do not look at your outward forms, but only at your
hearts and your works."
They are people who disguised their inward evil with a show of
outward piety. The pseudo-$iifis include deviators from among
some of the khawiiJJ and some of the mutaiawwif. By 'some of the
khawiiil we refer to those whose subjective inclinations in
interpreting the spiritual states experienced by them led to their
belief that God is everything in the pantheistic or monistic senses;
that God is the world and the world is God, and the individual
self is God; that the world together with all its parts is nothing but
sheer illusion. 188 They also include those who never experienced
the spiritual states, nor who are among some of the khawiiJJ, but
who arrive at such beliefs by mere speculation. In the Persian
section of al-Tahanawi's explanation on the term al-taiawwuf, the
pseudo-$iifis are enumerated as falling under eleven sub-groups,
namely: the Jfubbiyyah; the Awliyii'iyyah; the Shamriikhiyyah; the
lba�iyyah; the Jfaliyyah; the Jfuliiliyyah, the Jfiiriyyah; the
Waqifiyyah; the Mutajahiliyyah; the ,Mutakasiliyyah; and the
llhamiyyah. 189 Al-Raniri gives exactly the same list in his Tibyan,
adding a further two to the list: the Wujiidiyyah and the
Mushabbihah or Mujassimah. 190 Among the authorities cited by al
Raniri for his list of the pseudo-$ufis (Malay: qaumyang ber0ufi-lifi
dirinya-al-Raniri: Tibyan, pp. 86, 94) are al-Jurjani's
Commentary on the Mawaqif of al-1ji and al-Suhrawardi's
'Awarif al-Ma'arif. 191 Accordiug to al-Raniri, the eleveu sects,
each according to their peculiaritif's ) are involved in major
deviations such as, among their most characteristic ones as
betrayed in their very names, their rejection of religious laws
188 See the explanation above, pp. 137-138.

189 Kashshiif, vol. IV, p. 481. The text has]ubbiyyah for the name of the
sub-group first mentioned.
190 Tibyan, pp. 86-88 (Ffubbiyyah); 88 (Awliya'iyyah); 88-89
( Shamrakhiyyah); 89-90 ( Iba�iyyah); lfaliyyah); go ( lfiiriyyah);
(Waqi.fiyyah); 90-91 (Mutajiihiliyyah); 91 (Mutakasiliyyah); (llhamiyyah);
91-92 (lfuliiliyyah); 93-112 (Wujiidiyyah); 112-121 (Mushabbihah or
Mujassimah).
191 Other authorities cited are al-Ghazali, al-Razi, al-Nasafi and al
Maha'imi. Shahab al-Din Suhrawardts work mentioned is also found

in the margin of al-Ghazali's I�ya' (see vol. 2, pp. 2foll., eh. 6, where the
author deals with the Q_alandariyyah, Maliimatiyyah and others).
COMMENTARY 2I7
embodying God's commands and prohibitions (sing. amr and

nahy) and their claim to being exempt from such laws; their
repudiation of prayer and their contention that contemplation
alone is sufficient instead; their communism pertaining to women
and property resembling that taught by Mazdak; their
encouragement of licentious behaviour, and of music, song and
dance in their rituals; their claim that saints are more excellent
than prophets in the spiritual hierarchy; their pretence at falling
into trances during which they imagine having intercourse with
dark eyed houris; their agnosticism and materialism; their belief
in incarnation and the transmigration of souls; their emulation of
laziness as a way of life, encouraging begging and soliciting alms
and charity; their assertion that the Holy Qur'an is a veil
concealing the Truth, resulting in their neglect of the reading of
it-and so on. The chief deviation which characterizes them all
is their antinomianism. As to the Wujiidiyyah and the Mushabbihah
or Mujassimah, their deviation consists of the more theological
and metaphysical kinds. 192 Our earlier statement that the
Isma'iliyyah derived some influence from pseudo-Sufism 193 is
exemplified by these types, who are in reality not Siifis. The Siifis,
who are the khawiis,s, al-khawiis,s, including some of the khawiis_s.,
exist with God on account of their unawareness of their own
existence except in God; their first stage is the imbibing of right
knowledge, their intermediate stage is the performance of true
action, their last stage is the receiving of spiritual gifts from God.
In their journey unto God they ever endeavour to sacrifice their
selves in order to attain to His Presence, in such wise that they so
cherish intimacy with their Object of worship that they leave
off being engrossed with what is lost to existence. 194
192 W e have explained the nature of some of this above, pp. 186-191.
We shall mention more below in the appropriate section.
193
See above, p. 191.
194 Among the early, authoritative works on tas,awwuf and the Siifis are
the Risiilah of Abu al-Qasim al-Qushayri, Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi,

Bayriit, 1957; the Kitiib al-Ta'arruf li Madhhab Ahl al-Tas,awwuf of Abu
Bakr al-Kalabadhi, ed. Taha 'Abd al-Baqi Suriir, Cairo, 'Isa al-Babi al-
1:falabi, 1966. ( An English translation of the Kitiib al-Ta'arruf by A.J.
Next he mentions the philosophers (Jalasifah). Al-Shahrastani

lists the philosophers under several headings, and classifies them
according to their various systems. The list and the classification
includes both the Greek and Roman thinkers and the systems
they erected, and the Islamic thinkers who introduced their ideas
and assimilated them into their own systems. He divides the
Greek and Roman philosophers into ancient (al-mutaqaddimun)
and modern or recent (al-muta' akhkhirun). Among the ancients
are the Seven Sages (al-bukamii' al-sab' ah): Thales of Miletus (ea.
600 B.C.); Pythagoras of Samos (580-500); Anaximenes of
Miletus (ea. 560-500); Anaxagoras of Klazomene (500-after
430); Empedocles of Agrigentum (490-430); Socrates of Athens
(469-399); and Plato, also of Athens (427-347). Then follows
the school of Plato represented by the philosophers of the
Academy. Among the philosophers who pondered the problem
of the original ground of things are included the gnomic and
cosmogonic poets, such as Solon and Homer; then the Stoics (ahl
al-riwaq or ahl al-maial or al-miiallah: lit. 'people ofthe porticoes')
founded by Zeno ofElea (340-265) and led by Chrysippus ofSoli
(280-209). Among the moderns or recent philosophers is
Aristotle ofStagira (384-322), leader ofhis school in the Lyceum
known as the Peripatetic school of philosophers. After them he
Arberry ( The Dnctrines of the $iijfs), Cambridge University Press,

Cambridge, 1935); the Kashfal-Maf;Jiib of 'Ali al-Hujw"iri (op. cit); the
Kitab al-Luma' of Abu Na�r al-Sarraj ( op. cit.); the Maniizil al-Sii'irzn of
'Abd Allah al-An�ari. This l::tst has been the subject of many
commentaries. Al-Ghazali's Mishkiit al-Anwar ( op. cit) may be included
here. For the more intellectual expression of tas_awwuf along
metaphysical and philosophical lines, see the works ofibn 'Arabi and his
commentators, cited in the present book, including those of I:Iaydar
Amuli; and the works of Mulla $adra and his chief commentator Hadi
Sabzawari. For $adra's Kitiib al-Asfiir see the interpretation from the
philosophical point of view by F. Rahman, The Philosophy ef Mullii
$adrii, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1975; for
Sabzawar1's Ghurar al-Farii'id, see T. lzutsu's excellent exposition in
Sharl;,-i Man;,iimah, eds. T. lzutsu and M. Mul)aqqiq, Tehran, 1969, and
also lzutsu in The Concept and Reality ef Existence, Keio Institute of
Cultural an Linguistic Studies, Tokyo, 197 I.
COMMENTARY 219
lists Plotinus of Lycopolis ( 204-269 A. C.), and the Neo

Platonists down to Porphyry ofTyria (ea. 230-300). The Islamic
philosophers, who are included among the recent philosophers,
are listed after the Neo-Platonists and include Ya'qub ibn Is}:i.aq
al-Kindi" (d.ca. 873 A.C.); A}:i.mad ibn al-Tayyib al-Sarakhsi (d.
899); Abu Bakr Thabit ibn Qurrah al-l:farrani (d. 901); l:funayn
ibn Is}:i.aq (d. 910); Abu al-l:fasan Mu}:i.ammad ibn Yusuf al
' Amiri (d. 922); Abu Zayd A}:i.mad ibn Sahl al-Balkhi (d. 934);
Abu Sulayman Mu}:i.ammad ibn Ma'shar al-Muqaddasi (10th
cent.) Talhah ibn Mu}:i.ammad al-Nasafi (d. 943); Abu Na�r
Mu}:i.ammad ibn Mu}:i.ammad ibn Tarkhan al-Fara.bi (d. 950);
Abu Zakariyya Ya}:i.ya ibn 'Adi al-Saymuri (d. 974); Abu
Sulayman al-Sijistani (d. 985); 'Isa ibn 'Ali ibn 'Isa al-Wazir (d.
1001); Abu 'Ali A}:i.mad ibn Mu}:i.ammad ibn Miskawayh (d.
1030); Abu al-Faraj ibn al-Tayyib (d. 1043); and lastly their
scientific head, Abu 'Ali al-l:fusayn ibn 'Abd Allah ibn Sina (d.
1037).195
The list of Islamic philosophers cited apparently at random by
al-Shahrastan1 can in fact be construed as consisting of
representatives of the various groups within the Islamic
philosophical tradition. First we have al-Kindi and his school
which included, among others, al-Balkhi and al-Sarakhsi, and al
'Amiri, a student of al-Balkhi They preoccupied themselves with
logic, metaphysics, natural sciences, history and ethics, and with
commentaries upon the works of Aristotle. The Aristotelian
195 Al-Milal,II, pp. 58-158; 159-231. For a in.ore detailed and up-to
date account of the Greek and Roman philosophers mentioned by al
Shahrastani, see Th. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, trans. G.G. Berry,
London, 1914; E. Zeller, Outlines of the history of Greek philosophy, revised
by W. Nestle and trans. by L.R. Palmer, 13th ed., London, 1931, repr.
1948 and 1950; W. Windelband, A history· of philosophy, trans. by J.H.
Tufts, 2nd ed., rnth printing, N.Y., 1953, pt. I: 'The philosophy of the
Greeks', pp. 27-154; and pt. II: 'The Hellenistic-Roman philosophy',
pp. 155-262; J.P. Lynch, Aristotle's School, University of California
Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1972. For the Islamic
philosophers, see. F. E. Peters, Aristotle and the Arabs, New York,
London, 1968. M. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Edinburgh,
1962; T.J. de Boer, The History of Philosophy in Islam, trans. E.R. Jones,
London, 1961.
tradition as derived from Alexandria continued at Baghdad; and

the Peripatetic school of Baghdad produced al-Farabi and one of
his students, al-�aymuri, who became the teacher of all the
philosophers who flourished in Baghdad at the turn of the
eleventh century, which included al-Sijistani and, later, ibn al
Tayyib who belonged to the Medical Circle. As to the Islamic
philosophers of the Platonic tradition, we know that among them
are included al-Kindi, al-I:Iarrani, al-Sijistani, ibn Miskawayh,
and al-Farabi, their scientific head. 196 The Aristotelian and
Platonic traditions within the various schools of Islamic
philosophers seem to have become confused one with the other,
so that we find merged into each the elements of the other. This
confusion seems mainly to have been the product of the
mediating influences exerted by Neo-Platonism, through which
both the traditions were imparted to the Muslims, and by whose
elements both became impregnated. In spite of that, however,
the Islamic philosophers recognized the difference between the
two traditions, which revolved not only around the philosophical
method, but also around the problem of the eternity of the world
affirmed by the Aristotelians. With regard to Pythagorean and
Neo-Platonic influences in Islamic philosophy we cite as example
the Encyclopaedia (rasa'il) of the Brethren of Purity ( ikhwan al
�afa') of Ba�rah, of whom al-Muqaddasi is considered to be an
important member, and one of the writers who collaborated in
the production of the Rasa'il. 197• With respect to other aspects of
196 See Peters, op. rit., pp. 156-179; 181-183; see also the Appendix:
Sources for the History of the Aristotelian tradition in Islam, pp
239-293; the Encyclopaedia of Islam (new ed.), the articles 'Aflatun' pp.
234-236, vol. I) and 'Aristutalis' (pp. 630-633, vol. I) both by R.
Walzer; R. Klibansky, The Continuiry efthe Platonic Tradition in the Middle
Ages, London, 1939, pp. 14-18; F. Rosenthal, 'On the Knowledge of
Plato's Philosophy in the Islamic World', Islamic Culture !XV, pp.
387,422; M. M. Sharif, ed., History of Muslim Philosophy, 2v. Wiesbaden,
1963; Alfarabi's Philosophy ef Plato and Aristotle, translated with an
introduction by Muhsin Mahdi, Cornell University Press, Ithaca-New
York, 1969.
197 See Rasii'il, vol. I, p. 5; for a resume of their philosophy, see S.H.
Nasr, Islamic cosmological doctrines, pp. 25-95.

COMMENTARY 221
the Bii/iniyyah movements, in particular the lsmii'zliyyah, al-Nasafi

is reckoned as the founder of Isma'ili philosophy.1 9 8 Thus al
Shahrastani's list is meant to be understood as alluding to the
philosophers considered as representing the various schools
within the Islamic philosophical tradition, namely: the
translators and commentators of Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus
( al-sh aykh al-yunanl); the Aristotelian Neoplatonists; the
Pythagoreans; and the esoteric movements that have absorbed
the various hermetic and gnostic elements ofNeoplatonism. The
list-to be sure-refers to the philosophers of the East, and not of
the West within that tradition; 199 and ,vhen the termfaliisifah
(sing.faylasilf) is used especially after the i.ime of Abu l:famid ibn
Mu}:iammad al-GhazaE ( d. I I I I) it generally r<"frrs to those of
the East, and in particular to ibn Sina who is considered their
chief, and whose philosophy represents the .kind of rationalism
which is considered as opposed to the epistemological bases of
Islamic theology. 200
In his Tahiifut al-Faliisifah, al-Ghazali summarizes the views of
the philosophers in general, both the ancients and the moderns,
into twenty problems, of which three are considered against the
teachings of Islam:
1. The eternity a parte ante (Prob. I) and a parte post (Prob. II)
of the world;
2. The denial of God's knowledge of particulars (Probs. XI
and XIII);
3. The denial of the resurrection of bodies (Prob. XX). 201
198 See W. Ivanow, A guide to lsmaili literature, London, 1933, pp. 35-36;
S.M. Stern, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University
of London, XXIII, pp. 78-80.
199 I.e. as represented by the Peripatetic philosophers of the Spanish
school such as ibn Bajjah (d. 1138); ibn Tufayl (d. 1185); and ibn Rushd
(d. 1198).
200 See Mila!, II, pp. 158-159.
201 See Tahiifut al-Faliisifah, bound together in a single volume with the
Tahiifut of ibn Rushd, Khwajah Zadah, Cairo, 1321, pp. 6-19; 20-23;
50-52; 52-53; 53-57; and 91. In Kamali's translation of the Tahiifut,
(Pakistan Philosophical Congress, no. 3, Lahore, 1963) pp. 13-53;
Connected with (I) above are other problems pertaining to the

Divine Will and Creation (Probs. III and IV). Al-Raniri's brief
reference to the philosophers and his short summary of their
views alludes to (I) above, and also to the related problems (i.e.
Probs. I-IV). In it he further refers to what al-Ghazali discusses
in Problems V, VI, XIV and XV; 202 all of which will be treated
when we comment on that particular section of the treatise.
Lastly, he mentions the Deviating Wujiidiyyah. In his Tibyiin,
al-Raniri quotes from a work of al-Qunyawi or al-Qashani
entitled La/ii' if al-I' liim, saying that the People of Unity ( ahl al
waf.zdah) are divided into two groups. The first group maintains
that Being is one, and that is the Being of God. What is other than
the Being of God is in reality devoid of being and even of
becoming, so that all existents (mawjiidiit) are in fact God's Being.
In this way God is identified with the world together with all its
parts. The second group holds that Being is divided into two: Real
Being ( wu:fiid l:zaqzqz) and imaginary being ( wujiid khqyiilz). The
Being of the Truth Most Exalted is Real Being and Absolute; the
being of the world is imaginary. The Truth Most Exalted is that
existent that is unseen; the world is that existent that is seen
although it has no real being. Thus the being of the world
together with all its parts is like that of an imaginary form seen in
a mirror having no existence in itself except as a reflected image
of the imagination. This second group represents the view of the
true �iifis and People of God (ahl Alliih). 203 Now, when they say
that the being of the world together with all its parts is
'imaginary', we must understand that what they mean by
'imagination' (khayiil) is not quite what that word normally
conveys to the general speakers of English. For in English the
word conveys the meaning of something totally unreal,
something illusory; a subjective construct and a mental creation
having no reality whatsoever in the extra-mental sphere of
54-62; r43-r49; r53-r62; and 249. See also ibu Rushd's Tahiifut al
Tahiifut (trans. S. van den Bergh, Oxford University Press, London,
r954, 2v.).
202 /fujjah, p. 8.
20a Tibyiin,
PP· 95-97.
COMMENTARY 223
human existence. But such is not ,,vhat they intend when they say
that the world is of the nature of kh ay al, or that its being or
existence is khayiilz. 204 The explanation for this lies in the fact
that the world may be regarded in two different ways: if it is
regarded as a self-subsistent entity existing independently-a
view generally held by the common people-then such a view of
the world is in fact imagination, and such a world is in reality
imaginary; but if the world is regarded as depending for its
existence upon God, Whose Being underlies all existence, and
Who is the Source of all existence, then it has a certain reality, a
certain ontological status, since it is in this sense inseparably
related to the Real, in like manner that a shadow is something
distinct in itself, but inseparably related to the possessor of the
shadow. Just as to regard the shadow as self-subsistent and
existing independently of its possessor would be tantamount to
being imaginary, for it is in reality impossible for the shadow to be
without being inseparably connected with its possessor, so when
one regards the shadow as inseparably related to its possessor, the
shadow is no longer seen as imaginary or illusory, and it is seen
rather as the indicator ofits possessor which communicates to the
seer the possessor's existence. The shadow, though unreal in itself
is, when regarded in relation to its possessor, relatively real; and
its reality consists in its designative and communicative nature.
Thus according to this view the world has reality in its symbolic
nature. Another important point about their meaning ofthe term
khay iil is that the imagination is a certain faculty of the soul
having a double function: either misleading, or leading man
aright in the apprehension of realities. If it is made to preoccupy
itself solely with the world of sense and sensible experience, then
it leads man astray by bringing about the sort of sheer illusion
which we designate as 'imaginary'. But if it is made to interpret
the world of sense and sensible experience as reflecting the more
real world in the ontological plane above it known as the World
of Images (' iilam al-mithiil), then it leads man aright by bringing
204 IbnKhaldun ( Muqaddimah, III, pp. 86; go fol.) has not conveyed the
Sufi conception of khayiil in its true sense.
about the correct vision ofthe realities ofthings as they are in the
various levels of the ontological planes. 205 'Imagination',
understood in this sense, is comparable to the dream
phenomenon. In the dream state we are not conscious ofit being
a dream, and we believe the dream to be a reality. When we wake
up, however, we know it to be only a dream and think the reality
to be what is experienced in the waking state. Now, supposing
this waking state is itself a dream from which we will wake up at
death, then the waking up at death will reveal the true reality of
existence. 206 So the dream, even in this state of existence in the
world of sense and sensible experience, is not entirely illusory, is
not utterly unreal, for it is made of such stuff on which reality
itselfis reflected, albeit in a dim and hazy sort ofway. Yet even as
a mirage it is based on something real, and is not totally without
foundation. In like manner the greater dream which we call the
waking state is also not a mere figment, but a phenomenon
adumbrating something real. Seen in this way the world of sense
and sensible experience is a form of existence that needs
interpretation, and in its symbolic nature lies its ontological
truth. 207
Thus, what the true People ofUnity (i.e. the $iifis) are saying is
that the world together with all its parts has being, even though it
Le that its being is symbolic in nature; and that God's Being must
205 See above, pp. 159-160; 182. See also the Furus, p. 104, etc. On this
aspect of�ufi epistemology and psychology, see A.E. Affifi's The mystical
philosophy of Muhyid Din lbnul Arabi, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1939, eh. III, IIB (d & e); see also Affifi's commentary on
the Fu,riis, p. 74; al-Qashani's commentary, p. 133; T. Izutsu's J;ey
philosophical concepts in Sufism and Taoism, Tokyo, 1966, 2 pts., pt. I, eh. I.
See also H. Corbin, Mundus lmaginalis or the imaginary and the imaginal,
Golgonooza Press, Ipswich, 1976; by the same author, Creative
imagination in the Sufism of lbn 'Arabi, Princeton and London, 1969;
L' Imagination creatrice dans le Soufism d' lbn 'Arabi, Paris, Flammarion,
1958, p. 5; L' Homme de Lumiere dans le Soufism lranien, Presence, Paris,
1971, pp. 19, 67fol., 72, 89, I 17, 123, 153.
206 We allude here to the tradition that "all men are asleep and only
when they die do they wake up"-see above, p. 141.

207 See Fa,ril.f, pp. 99-102/105-118. See also above, pp. 139-143.
COMMENTARY 225
be distinguished from it and must not be identified with it. The

deviationists among the People of Unity ( i.e. the pseudo-$iifis), on
the other hand, believe that God or the Truth Most Exalted does
not exist or become existent except by being immanent, in the
sense of permeating and being contained, in the being of the
created things. The created things according to them are the
Very Being of the Truth itself, and the Very Being of the Truth
constitutes the very being of the created things. They affirm
oneness of reality (wa�dat al-baqzqah) in the variegated
multiplicity of the created things and God, and they say there is
no existent except God. 'fhey have thPreby rnnfused God's Being
and the being of the created things and identified them as one
and the same reality. In this way they have completely ignored
the real distinction $iifis make in the gradations in the various
degrees ( maratib-martabcit) of the self-evolvement and self
manifestations (lajalriyat) of Absolute Being, 208 as equally as they
have ignored the real distinction affirmed by the Siifis in each of
the five ontological planes wherein the self-determinations
(la' ayyunat) of Absolute Being take place. 209 Theologically, they
have confused the Nec�ssary Being (wajib al-wujiid) and the
contingent being (mumkin al-wufiid) in mutual identity. They
have failed to recognize that the created things are temporally
originated (badith) and hence not to be identified with God, Who
is eternal ( qadzm) and Whose Being is their metaphysical Source.
Moreover, in identifying the One with the Many they have
ascribed an augmentation in His Oneness. Philosophically, they
are either absolute monists, or pantheists (al-Ittibadiyyah), in that
they affirm the world to be entirely illusory, or that they affrm
some form of dualism in which the one substance effects a union
(ittibad) with the other in the sense of being mixed, the one with
the other (mukhalatah)-and in the case of man, in the sense of
incarnation (buliil). 210
208See above, pp. 155-156.

209See above, pp. 157-160.
210 Tibyiin, pp. 93-95. Ibn Khaldiin is mistaken when he attributes this
sort of beliefs to the true �iifis ( Muqaddimah, III, p. 83).

V I shall now begin by elucidating the meaning of 'being'

(wujiid), and that is: 'essence' (dhiit); that is, the 'constituent
determinant' (keadaan) of a thing. This essence is at times
perceptible to the eyes, such as the world, and at times not
perceptible to the eyes, but is established by reason (' aql) and
by sacred Law (shara'), or by spiritual unveiling (kaslif) and
tasting (dhawq). This (essence) is the Being of God.
When he says here that 'being' is 'essence', meaning 'existence'

is 'essence', al-Raniri is referring to being at the level of the
absolute, that is, the level of pure indetermination. The majority
of$iifis hold that the Truth Most Exalted is Absolute Being (wujiid
muflaq), and not parfrcular being ( wujiid khaH). For the
philosophers and the theologians the expressions 'absolute' and
'particular' applied to being here refer to two distinct concepts;
absolute being, or being qua being, is a general concept that
applies to all existents and essences, whereas particular being,
which refers to substance (jawhar) and which belongs to one ofthe
ten Aristotelian categories, applies to a distinct existent and
essence. Thus we must understand being qua being as meant by
the $iifis expressed by the term 'absolute being'-which is not a
substance and is not applicable in terms of the ten categories-to
refer not to a concept, but to a reality, to an ontological state of
pure transcendence (munazzah), a state of being that is in reality
transcendent even from being qualified by absoluteness (iflaq); for
such qualification is in fact already a condition that limits being
to a particular determination (ta' ayyun), and is as such a
limitedness (taqyzd) among the states of being limited that is
mentally posited (i'tibarz) in the various degrees of intelligible
and external existence. The Truth Most Exalted when
considered solely in His Essence is then transcendent from all
qualifications, limitations, conditions and determinations from
and to all eternity, that is, a parte ante ( azalz) and a parte post
( abadz). In this sense we may say that He is transcendent even
from being conditioned by transcendence, so that He is pure
Indeterminate Existence. Qualifications, limitations, conditions
COMMENTARY 227
and determinations only pertain to created things ( makhliiqiit). 211

The meaning of 'being' (wujiid) as elucidated in the first
sentence in the text reveals that wujud refers to both 'being' and
'existence'. The distinction between being and existence as a
concept is, as ibn Sina has shown, 212 that whereas 'being' is the
most abstract, general concept, 'existence' can be conceived of as
being actualized in individual and particular things. As regards
wujud in the sense meant by the Siifis as the reality of 'being', it
refers here to 'absolute being', having no source for its being other
than itself, and hence it is its own 'essence'. This is what al-Raniri
means when he s::=ivs that 'bein!!' is 'essence'.
; LJ
Now by 'essence' (dhiit) here is also meant the 'constituent

rleterminant' (keadaan) of a thing, which in his gloss al-Ranirisays
means the 'very self (diri) of a thing. The term diri in al-Raniri's
writings and in those of his predecessors, notably J:Iamzah al
Fan�iiri, is also applied to translate the Arabic nafs: soul or self;
' ayn: entity or real essence; huwiyyah: individual self or
individuality; miihiyyah: essence or quiddity-and can mean any
one qf these, or indeed all together as combined in the meaning of
the term �aqzqah: reality. In other words, we must here
understand that the absolute, indeterminate Being, wpen it
'descends' or limits and determinates itself intrinsically. as
particular existences, is the reality, the very self of that particular
'thing' which is in reality an intrinsic limitation of Being or
Existence. Here by 'essence' is then meant 'a mode of existence'.
In Malay the meaning of ada-the basic word whose affixed
form keadaan is the subject of the present discussion-has a very
close semantic relationship with the Malay word isi; and this can
be established by the fact that in the Malay (Austronesian)
family of languages the two words ada and isi have been
interchangeably applied to mean the same thing, namely:
'existence'. For example, in Malay, Toba-Batak, Javanese, isi
means 'content'; in Tagalog isi means 'occupation' (of space or
place); in Ngaju-Dayak isi means 'flesh' or 'meat' (the same
211
Jawiihir, pp. 29-30.
212Metaphysica, eh. I I.
meaning is conveyed in Malay); in Hova isi means 'existence'; 213

in Malagasy i.ry means 'existence'; 214 and in Mantra issi means
'existence'. 215 In Hova, Malagasy and Mantra the meaning of isi
as 'existence' is synonymous with the Malay ada. The word isi in
Malay basically conveys the meaning of 'content'. Other
meanings such as 'flesh', 'meat', to 'fill' or 'occupy' a place or
space refer to the basic meaning of 'content'. An important
element in the conceptual structure of isi in Malay is that the
'content' meant is of a corporeal, tangible or material nature as
opposed to the abstract. In the case of ada it conveys basically the
meaning ofsomething 'existent' in the sense of the Arabic mawjiid.
The concept of something existent conveyed by ada, like that of
content conveyed by isi, refers to concrete existence. Bearing in
mind the close semantic relationship between ada and isi, the
word ada considered in its original sense as reflecting the Old
Malay vision of being resembles the Parmenidean corporeality,
or to pleon, filling space, that is, the 'full'. This space-filling is
being; it is all that 'is' and all that 'is-not' is empty space, or to
kenon. 216 Now in Malay the word tiada, a compound of the words
tidak and ada: 'no thing' or 'not existing', corresponds to the
Parmenidean to kenon and to me on. 217 But the resemblance
between the �1alay ada and the Parmenidean to pleon is limited
only to the first part of the P21_rmenidean conception of being, and
does not resemble Parmenides' philosophical abstraction all the
213 Cf. 0. Dempwolff, Ve rg leichende Lauthlehre des Austronesischen

Wortschatzes, 3v., Berlin, 1934-38, vol. r, p. 49, and vol. 3, pl. 70.
214 Cf.
R.P. Abinal and R.P. Malzac, Dictionnaire Malagache-Francais,
Paris, I 955, p. ?84.
215 Cf. H. llorie, 'An account of the Mantras, a savage tribe in the Malay
Peninsula', in Miscellaneous Papers relating to Indo-China and the Indian

Archipelago, ed. R. Rost, London, I 887, 2nd series, vol. I, pp. 286-307.
See pp. 303-304. See also the Tfrdschrift voor het Bataviaasche Genootschap
(T.B.G.). vol. X (196r), pp. 413-443.
216 Windelband,
p. 37. According to Zeller, Parmenides' concept of to
kenon is derived from part of the Pythagorean doctrine, namely that
which they call the 'unlimited', or apieron (Zeller, pp. 36; 49-52).
217 F
or Parmenides, 'non-being' or to me on, means accordingly to kenon,
that is, empty space.
COMMENTARY
way. Ada generally translates the Arabic kiina, and this is found
consistently in al-Raniri's and al-Fan�iiri's writings not only in
the form kiina, but also in its various conjugated forms such as
kuntu, kuntum, kunnii,yakun and takun, with the exception of the
imperative kun and the formyakun which is generally translated
by the Malayjadi and its derived affixed forms. In spite of the fact
that ada generally translates kiina, it is not, as such, and in its
affixed form keadaan, applied to mean kawn, whose equivalent is
in factjadi, corresponding to the Greek genesis, which conveys the
meaning of 'becoming', or 'coming-into-being'. 218 Ada in the
writings of al-Raniri and his $iifi predecessors is mawjud, which is
understood in two different senses:
(i) as being exterior (;:,iihir), in which case it refers to the

phenomenal world, or the world of sense and sensible
experience-the world of empirical things. Even then the
sense of mawjiid meant here is not only the basic one of
concrete existence, but refers as well to the relational,
metaphysical mawjiid, which includes within its meaning,
when it refers to the phenomenal world, the sense of
existential movement which creates out of itself a world.of
continuous annihilation and :rehabilitation; illusory when
viewed in itself since it is continuously annihilated; real
when viewed as dependent upon its metaphysical Source
which continuously rehabilitates it; it refers not only to the
existent things, but also to the continuous flow of Existence
that produces the things existent;
(ii) as being interior (biitin), in which case it refers to the
permanent and transcendent dynamic principle
underlying (i) above, and this refers to that metaphysical
Source, that is, the Truth Most Exalted.
218
Compare A.M. Goichon's La Philosophie D'Avicenne et son Influence en
Europe Medievale, Paris, 1951, pp. 6 I -63. In the English translation by
M.S. Khan ( The Philosophy ofAvicenna and its Influence on Medieval Europe),
Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, 1969, pp. 51-53. See also
below, p. 234.
230 A COMMENTARY ON THE J:1UJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
Thus ada understood as 'exterior' conveys both the basic and

relational meanings of mawjud; whereas understood as 'interior'
ada conveys only the relational meaning, which in turn is
· understood in two senses:
(i) as individual substance (huwiyyah) corresponding to the

Aristotelian to on:
(ii) as quiddity (mahiyyah) corresponding to the Greek to ti en
. .
eznaz.
Mahiyyah is a compound of the Arabic words ma (what is) and hiya
(it). 219 In a badzth of the Holy Prophet, in which he who may God
bless and give peace is reported to have said: "O God, show me
things as they really are" (Allahumma arinz al-ashya'a kamii hiya),
ma hiya refers to the realities (baqa'iq) of things; things as they
really are in themselves-their real essences. We are of the view
that the concept mahiyyah as developed later by the philosophers
is ultimately derived from this �adzth. In Sufi literature in Malay
ada also translates mahiyyah and huwiyyah, both key elements in the
conceptual structure of wujud and mawjud. 220 In point of fact,
�aqzqah, mahiyyah, and huwiyyah all refer to the same reality, that
is.., to that which constitutes the identity of a thing: the real
essence ((ay n), or very self (nafs: diri) of a thing. 221
Keadaan, then, is understood in two different senses. The first
sense, which bears considerable affinity with the basic sense of
'condition', or 'state of affairs', is that which refers i.o existential
mode or condition, not to Being or Essence in its absolute
transcendence. In this first sense, and in the relational,
metaphysical context pertaining to Absolute Being as it involves
219 See al-Tahanawi, Kashshiif, V, pp. 1313-1316.

22 °For a semantic analysis of the concepts of wujiid, ada, and diri in �ufi
literature in Malay, with particular reference to the writings of al
Fan�iiri, see my The mysticism of lfnmzah Fansiirz, Kuala Lumpur, 1970,
eh. V.
221 See further, for example, definitions of the technical terms of the
�iifis and the Mutakallimun in al-J urjani, Ta'rifiit, pp. 235-236; al
Taftazani, Shar� al-'Aqii'id, pp. 16-17; al-Tahanawi, Kashshiif, V, pp.
rn84-rn85.
COMMENTARY
itself in ontological descents (tanazzuliit), it refers to the

ontological states (shu'un) of Absolute Being, and to its self
manifestations ( tajalliyat) and determinations and particulari
(
zations· in entified forms (ta ayyunat). Keadaan in this first sense,
and in relation to natural categories, also has a close conceptual
connection with the Artistotelian category of 'condition' or
'possession' (echein). This is so because the basic word ada is here
understood as synonymous with the Malay prefix ber, meaning
'to have', that is: the condition of possession, over which the
possessor exercises complete command and authority, and from
which the possessor is inseparable. 222 The Malay prefix ber is
literally equivalent to the Arabic lahii, meaning 'he has', or 'to
have'; and tht' Arabic dhii, meaning 'owning something', or
'ownership'. Ada in this sense is technically equivalent to the
Arabic milk and the Latin translation of milk: habere, which are
the terms applied respectively to translate the Greek echein. In
point of fact, both lahii and dhii mean the same thing as milk, and
have been applied to refer to the category of 'possession', which
denotes the relationship a body has to the covering it has over
the whole of its extension, or over a part of it, such as, for
example, the clothing one has on and which one carries wherever
one goes, in contrast with the house one has which one does not
so carry about. Thus keadaan in this sense and as pertaining to
'condition' or 'mode of existence' has, in the metaphysical
context reterred to above, a conceptual affinity with milk, or
'possession', as we shall see in the relevant section. 223
In a work by 'Ali ibn A9-mad al-Maha'imi entitled lm�iirj, al
Na{f�ah, dealing with an interpretation of the technical terms
employed by ibn 'Arabi, the author says that existence (wujud) is
God Most Exalted, Who is the very self (nafs) of the series of
coming-into-being of the things of creation (akwiin al-khalq), and
222
As in the case of the possessor and its shadow; the shadow is
something distinct in itself, yet it is inseparable from its possessor-see
above, p. 223. See also Hamzah Fan{iirz, p. 164, note 80.
22 3 S
ee b e 1ow, p. 2 63-26 5. Cf. Jawa-h zr,
. p. 41.· " ... ma( na- ( ayn pada
makhluq itu milk . . . "
Who is for them their general accident ('araef 'amm). 224 What is
meant by 'a general accident', or 'araef 'amm, refers to a
categorical universal (kullz maqul) pertaining to a series of
singulars ( afrad) predicated of one single reality ( � aqzqah
wabidah). 225 The word amm here refers to a universal, all
comprehensive occurrence; that God as the Absolute Existence
is, as it were, the 'Substratum' which unites in Himself the
combination of accidents comprising the world of created things
in its totality. As such a substratum He is the One Reality
underlying all existent things; and in this guise Jami refers to Him
as the Truth ( al-baqq), the single Substance or Essence (' ayn
wiibid) Who causes all the accidents to exist: 226
... when one comes to define the nature of existing things

these definitions include nothing beyond "accidents". For
example when one defines man as a "rational animal"; and
animal as a "growing and sentient body, possessed of the
faculty of voluntary movement"; and body as a "substance
possessing three dimensions"; and substance as an "entity
which exists per se and is not inherent in any other subject";
and entity as an "essence possessed of reality and necessary
being''-all the terms used in these definitions come under
the c:ategory of "accidents", except this vague essence which
is discerned behind these terms. For "rational" signifies an
essence endued with reason; "that which is growing" signifies
an essence endued with the faculty of growth; and so on. This
vague essence is, in fact, the "Truth", the Very Being who is
self-existent, and who causes all these accidents to exist.
Earlier, we have explained that all phenomena-in this case
224 ]awiihir, p. 40: « ... al-wujiid huwa Allah ta'iilii nafs akwiin al-khalq wa
'araq 'iimm la-hum ...'' The 'araq 'iimm corresponds to the fifth predicable
or universal in the Porphyrian theory of universals ( al-alfii,f:. al-khamsah;
al-kull-iyyiit al-khamsah).
225 Seejurjani, Ta'rifiit, p. 154; Tahanawi, Kashshij, IV, p. 986-989.
226 Cf. Lawii'i�, p. 33-34/42-43. See also al-Qashani, Shar�, p. 187 with
reference to the Fu,rii,r, pp. 1 25- I 26.

COMMENTARY 2 33
they are the accidents 227 that comprise the world of created
things in its entirety-are in themselves really 'nothing', that is, the
world qua world is essentially non-being ('adam) because it is in a
constant state of perishing, a state which we have defined as that
of ontological Jani?. Since the accidents do not abide for two
moments of time, but are ever continually annihilated and
renewed, no two movements of time measure a process in their
perishing, and their perishing is not a 'process' occurring to the
same set of phenomena. As one series of phenomena is made
naught, another resembling them, or similar to them, take their
rise, and so it goes on repeated in this way so that in reality only
God remains. 22 8 What remains is the Substratum referred to
above. 2 2 9 The world qua world, at each moment of itself, has no
'existence' in the real sense; that is, at each moment ofitselfit does
not 'subsist' to the extent that 'existence' can truely be predicated
of it.. At each moment of itself it reverts to non-existence and it
appears as subsistent or having continuance in its existence only
because of the continuous process of renewal involved in its
creation. Thus what really 'appears' is not the world at its
moment of itself, but the series of similar worlds following upon
one another giving a semblance of existence and continuity,to an
apparently single self-same world. But there is another aspect of
the world that partakes of reality; and this is that aspect of the .J
world qua mode of existence, which at each moment of itself has
real existence because its very essence is existence as individuated
into multiple an diverse forms. Only when the world of created
things is viewed as so many particular determinations and
modifications and limitations of the Absolute Being manifesting . )
itself in the guise of phenomenal forms does the world at each

I
·"-
�·.
moment of itself possess relative 'existence', seeing that what
227 For the Siifis the world of created things is composed of accidents
(a'riir!) only. The theologians and the philosophers maintained that the
world is composed of composites of substance (jawhar) and accident.
228
See above, pp. 138; 176-182.
229 By 'substratum' here is not meant a real substratum or locus for
accidents, but an apparent substratum appearing as if it were real.

2 34 A COMMENTARY ON THE I:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ
underlies it and makes it possible to exist as such is no other than

that Single Reality (&aqzqah wabidah) which always abides as the
One Substance ('ayn wabid) by which the world of created things
occurs as a 'general accident'. The true referent of the general
accident is then that of which it is an accident, that is, its
substratum ( al-ma'rii{j,). 230 The coming-into-being of the world at
each moment of itself is a kawn; the series of coming-into-being of
similar worlds are the akwan. Al-Raniri translates the series of
coming-into-being as keadaan. 231 He has also applied the term
keadaan to translate the Arabic kii'in, which refers to the ontological
ground of the coming-into-being of the world of sense and
sensible experience. An example of this is found in his quotation
of a passage from ibn 'Arabi's Futiibat on the definition of verity
( baqq) where al-ka'in al-thabit is identified as keadaan yang thabit. 232
Now earlier in the Jawahir he has translated kana as ada in the
badzth: "Kana Allah wa la shay'a ma'ahu" andjunayd's comment
on it: "Wa huwa al-an kama kan": "God was and there was nothing
with Him; and He is now even as He was." 233 Kana here is meant
to be understood as divested of any temporal signification, so that
it invariably refers to what 'is'. In the same sense, the word ka'in
in the expression al-kii'in al-thabit means 'isness' or, more fully,
'the permanent isness'; and it refers to that which is perpetually
existent (al-mawjiid al-da'im, Malay: mawjiid yang senetiasa), which
is that verity or truth-reality (baqq) that underlies all things of
which existence (wujiid) is predicated and by which a thing is
verified or actualized ( ma bihi al-tabaqquq Ii al-shay') as having a
self (nafs), an essence (dhat), or as being a real entity ('ayn). 234
Thus al-Raniri says that the reality of a thing is its very self. 235
23°Cf. I:Iaji Mulla Ha.di Sabzawari's Shar&-i Ghurar al-Fara'id, better

known as the Shar&-i- Man.:;:,iimah, ed. M. Mohaghegh and T. lzutsu,
Tehran (1348), 1969, text, p. 62. See above, notes 224 and 229.
231 Jawahir,
p. 40, margin.
232/bid., p. 42.
233/bid., p. 29.
234/bid., p. 40.
235 /bid., p. 41: ... &aqzqat sesuatu sh
ay ' itu dirinya.
COMMENTARY 2 35
This is the second sense in which keadaan is understood, and it

corresponds to the sense in which ada (ii) above is meant.
When al-Raniri says that 'being' or 'existence, (wujiid) is
'essence' ( dhiit), and that 'essence' refers to God's Being, he is
affirming what all �ufi masters have affirmed: that in God 'being'
or 'existence' and 'essence' are identical. That the essence of God
can be no other than His existence is first philosophically
formulated by ibn Sina in his theory of the Necessary Being. The
gist of the theory is that the essence (miihiyyah or dhiit) of the
Necessary Being (al-wiijib al-wujiid) cannot be other than its
existence (anniyyah or wujiid). If its essence is other than its
existence, then it must have a cause for its existence other than
itself. But since the Necessary Being, by virtue of its own necessity
(wujiib), can have no cause for its existence other than itself, its
essence must be identical with its existence. Moreover, it is
obvious also that the Necessary Being is not an accident (( ara</,)
because an accident subsists in something other than itself, such
as a substance (jawhar). The Necessary Being is not a substance
either because a substance needs an essence to determine whether
or not it exists, whereas the Necessary Being exists necessarily. 236
Ibn Sina's philosophical formulation of the theory of the Nece��ary
Being refers to the theological aspect of his ontology. His over-all
ontology, however, is more concerned with the concretely
existing things of the external world rather than with existence
itselfin the metaphysical sense-that is, with mawjiid rather than
with wujiid-and the latter is discussed only incidentally as a
component factor of the former. Thus, and in spite of the new
direction he imparts to philosophy, he yet remains within the
Aristotelian tradition of ontology which preoccupies itself with
'primary substances', 'essences' or 'quiddities'-with 'things'.
With regard to the existential structure of the concretely existing
236Cf. Metaphysica, chapters 24 and 25. Consult also the commentary

pp. 206 foll. It is to be noted that ibn Sina sometimes uses mahiyyah in the
same sense as dhat and l;aqfqah, and anniyyah in the same sense as wujud.
See the glossary to the key terms pp. 300 (l;aqfqah); 313 (mahiyyah); 325;
325 (wujiid); see also p. 301.
236 A COMMENTARY ON THE I;IUJJAT AL-�IDDlQ,
things of the external world, ibn Siria does not affirm the identity
of essence and existence, but affirms a conceptual distinction
between them and considers existence, after the manner of al
Farabi and within the sphere of conceptual analysis, as
something superadded to essence or quiddity, and as a special
kind of accident (' araef) that occurs to the essence from the outside.
Since this notion of the accidentality of existence (wujud) is set
within the conceptual framework, he does not mean that the
'occurring' of the accident to the essence from the 'outside' should
be taken in the sense of something existing in something else that
actually happens in the extra-mental world of objective reality,
like the colour ( accident) 'red' to the flower (substance, essence,
quiddity) 'rose'. In elucidation of this thesis, we may derive
example from everyday speech, where we invariably employ
propositions whose subject is a noun and whose predicate is an
adjective, such as "the rose is red". Now if we transform this
proposition into an existential one: "the rose is existent", we
perceive clearly that we treat 'existence' grammatically and
logically as if it stands on the same level of meaning and function
as 'redness'. Both 'red' and 'existent' are treated as adjectives
qualifying the noun 'rose'; they act as predicates in relation to the
subject; they are accidents of substance, essence or quiddity. But
in reality there is a fundamental difference betv.cen 'red' and
'existent' even though we classify them under the same
grammatical and logical category; for when ,Ate say "thl::' rose i�
red" the prior existence of the rose is presupposed before 'red' can
be actualized in it and, moreover, 'red' is not fundamental to the
essential nature of the rose, so that it need not beccme actualized
at all in the rose. Whereas when we say "the rose is existent" the
prior existence of the rose is not presupposed before 'being
existent' can be actualized in it, for the 'being-existent' is what
actualizes the rose. So here it is the accident that actualizes the
substance, essence or quiddity, and as a unique case 'existence' is
a special kind of accident because it behaves in a different way
than all other accidents. Ibn Sina distinguishes between two
kinds of accidents: in the case like 'redness' in the rose, it is an
extrinsic accident requiring a substratum for its existence; in the
COMMENTARY 2 37
unique case like 'existence' in the rose it is an intrinsic accident not

requiring any substratum, but constituting instead the very
existence of that substratum. The expression 'occurring from the
outside' which he uses with reference to existence as an accident
of essence does not pertain to a real extra-mental situation, for if
that were the case-like that of 'redness' to the 'rose'-then the
essence somehow has a form of existence before the accident
'existence' occurs to it, which is ontologically absurd. What he
means by this expression is that the 'occurrence' from the
'outside' happens only in the mind when the intellect, for purpose
of analysis, performs an abstraction of 'essence' from 'existence'.
Only in such a conceptual possibility can 'existence' be said to
'occur' to the 'essence' from the 'outside'. Otherwise, as it is in the
extramental world ofobjective reality, there can be no separation
between essence and existence. 237 In spite of this, however, ibn
Sina maintained the thesis of the accidentality of existence. Not
that he took the position that existence is a real accident but only
that it is a conceptual accident. Whether existence is a real accident
or not was not treated by him. But the new dimensions that
opened as a result of the philosophical repercussions of this thesis
gave impetus to the emergence of a truly Islamic ontology and
metaphysics. The islamization of ontology and metaphysics
which marked the real break from the Aristotelian tradition, that
is, the real transition from the metaphysics of the existent
(mawjud) to the metaphysics of being and existence (wujud), was
accomplished by the �iifis, particularly as reflected in the
rational and theoretical formulation of the 'system' by ibn
'Arabi, their greatest representative, as based on intuitive
knowledge gained from spiritual experience. Their school of
thought, as signified by the various appellations applied to its
237An excellent discussion of the problem of the accidentality of

existence as understood by ibn Sina and as misunderstood by ibn
Rushd, Thomas Aquinas and others right down to our present time is
elucidated by Professor lzutsu in his The concept and reality efexistence; see
pp. 2-5, 3 7-38, 79-81, 86-99, 118-129. See also ibn Sina's al- Ta' lzqiit
quoted by Mulla �adra in his Kitiib al-Mashii'ir, ed. H. Corbin, Tehran,
1342/1964, p. 34 (83).
exponents such as the 'People of Unity' (ahl al-wa&dah), the

Affirmers of Unity { al-muwa&&idun), the Existentialists or
Affirmers of Existence as the Sole Reality ( al-wujudiyyah)-is
characterized by its affirmation of the transcendent Unity or
Oneness (wa&dah) of Being or Existence (wujud); and hence it
became known as the school of wa&dat al-wujud.
The expression of the Sufi vision of the structure of reality
along philosophical or metaphysical lines was already
formulated by ibn 'Arabi's erudite and scholarly Sufi interpreters
and commentators such as al-Qunyawi, al-Qashani, and al-Jami
before Mulla $adra, but the latter developed it into its full
philosophical expression.
The basic structure of the metaphysical concept of wa&dat al
wujiid is concisely and lucidly explained by Jami, one of al
Raniri's frequently quoted sources, a great representative of this
school of$ufis, and one ofibn 'Arabi's most eloquent and erudite
commentators, who expressed it in the following way:
By the word 'existence' (wujud) is sometimes meant simply

the state ofbeing or existing, which is a generic concept or an
abstract idea. Taken in this sense, 'existence' is an 'idea of the
second intention' (ma'quliit thanryah), 238 which has no
238 By the 'idea of the second intention', 'Nhinfield's translation ofma'qi'il

thiinz as 'second intention' is Lased on the Latin tcanslation of the Arabic
term, whose meaning in Christian scholastic metaphysics is very much
influenced by the thought of Thomas Aquinas. This term (ma'qiilat
thaniyah) means 'secondary intelligibles' as distinguished from 'primary
intelligibles' (ma' qiiliit iilii). The term pertains to the nature of concepts
in the position of predicates. The predicate (quality) is said to 'occur' to
the subject(thing), while the subject(thing) is described as 'being
qualified' by the predicate (quality). In the case of a primary
intelligible, both the occurrence and the qualification actually happen
in the extra-mental world. In the proposition 'the rose is red', for
example, the quality of 'redness' indicated by the predicate 'is red' has
an independent subsistence in relation to the subject(thing) 'rose'
qualified by it, and to which it occurs. 'Redness' is a quality that exists
extra-mentally, and the subject(thing) 'rose' also exists extra-mentally
and is qualified by 'redness'. The concept of the quality like 'redness' is
COMMENTARY 2 39
external object corresponding with it. It is one of the

accidents of quiddity (miihiyyah), which exists only in
thought, as has been proved by the reasoning of scholastic
theologians (mutakallimzn) and philosophers (�ukamii). But
{ •+
sometimes existence signifies the Real Being, who is self
subsistent, and on whom the existence of all other beings
depends; and in truth there is no real objective existence
beside Him-all other beings are merely accidents accessory
to Him, as is attested by the intuitive apprehension of the
most famous Gnostics (' iirifzn) and Men of Certitude ( ahl-i
yaqzn). The word 'existence' is applicable to the Truth most
glorious in the latter sense only. 2311
called a primary intelligible, and the source from which the concept is
derived is a concretely existent red thing. In the case of a secondary
intelligible, either both the occurrence and the qualification happen
only in the mind, not extra-mentally, or the qualification alone happens
extra-mentally and the occurrence only mentally. When we deal with
two concepts as for instance in the proposition 'man is a universal', we
know that there is no extra-mental existence that corresponds to a
quality 'universality'; moreover, nothing exists extra-mentally that is ·.
qualifed by being a universal, for everything existent in the extra-mental
world is particular and individual. The concept 'universal' is a
secondary intelligible, and the source of the concept is another concept,
'man'. But in the proposition, 'the rose is existent', existence-as we
have shown above-is not a real quality like 'redness'. Its occurrence
takes place only in the mind. Since, however, the concept is extracted
from a real, extra-mental thing, the qualification by existence is an
actual external event. But to the �ufis who affirm the transcendent unity
of existence, as Jami: intends in the above passage, there is no real entity
in the extra-mental world that is qualified by the accident existence;
what is there being qualified is not an existent 'essence' or 'quiddity',
but it is rather existence itself as it limits itself into a particular mode
taking the guise of a particular thing which the mind ontologizes into
'quiddity'. Thus, for them, a secondary intelligible is always something
mentally posited, involving both the occurrence and qualification, so
that there is in reality no external object corresponding to it. See further
al-Durrah al-Fiikhirah, 40/19.
239 Lawii'i�, pp 13-14/17-18. The words in parenthesis are my own
insertions derived from the Persian text.

The Sufis who belong to the school of wa�dat al-wuJiid do not

deny or dispute that in grammar and logic existence is treated as
an adjective or a predicate, that is, as a logical accident; but the
problem to which they address themselves is whether existence as
it occurs in fact in the extra-mental world, the world of objective
reality, is likewise an accident; that is, whether existence is also an
ontological accident. They observe, in elaboration of ibn Sina's
thesis of the accidentality of existence, that while in grammar and
logic our description of facts in the case of all other accidents
imitates what actually occurs in the extra-mental world, the case
of existence presents no such imitation of the real situation. 240 To
the problem as to whether existence is an ontological accident,
they maintain that existence as it really is, as something really
happening in the extra-mental world, is not an accident at all.
On the contrary, what occurs in the extra-mental world is in this
case the reverse of what occurs in the mental world; in the extra
mental world the so-called 'essences' or 'quiddities' that in the
mental world are conceived and perceived as cores of self
subsistent substances are in reality accidents, while their real
substances are in fact existence-that is to say, existence as
modified and determined, as limited into various and multiple
particularizations and individuations that take the guise of
phenomenal forms which we regard as separate and dissimilar
things. The separate and dissimilar things of the world of sense
and ::;ensible experience are in reality extra-mental
particularizations and individuations of the Absolute Existence.
So, in the real, objective world existence is the subject, while the
'substances', 'essences', or 'quiddities' are the predicates; they are
adjectival in nature-they qualify existence into separate and
myriad entities as if they possess each an independent subsistence
and reality. In this world view, the 'substances', 'essences', or
'quiddities' are the accidents, while the Real Substance of all that
exists is Existence itself. 241
240
Seejami in his Naqd al-Nu,ru,r, Tehran, 1977, p.21, note 5. See further
241
above, pp. 306-307, note 413.

COMMENTARY
Existence, as it descends from its absoluteness to the realms of

contingency, determines, modifies and particularizes itself into
separate entities presenting the spectacle of myriad and
variegated forms that comprise the world together with all its
parts and is, as such, a veil (�fjiib) unto itself. It is a veil unto itself
precisely because it presents itself to our cognition and volition in
the guise of limitations of itself which we naturally perceive and
conceive as separate, self-subsistent objects, and which we
ontologize as quiddities. The quiddities are in reality intrinsic
limitations and modes of the very act of existence; and because
our cognition and volition hy nature operate only on the
limitations and modes of the act of existence, existence itself qua
existence, being completely veiled by them, forever eludes our
rational and intellectual grasp. Since the quiddities are in reality
accidents qualifying existence, they do not, as accidents, endure
two moments of time, so that the things of the empirical world
which they constitute are in a perpetual state of ontological
annihilation (Jani?). At the moment when the world together
with all its parts is annihilated, another similar to it takes its
place, and that other suffers the same fate, and so on repeated in
this way everlastingly. The �ufis conceive this as the perpetual
creation. From moment to moment a new world, a new creation
(khalq jadzd) takes its rise; and because of the continuous process
involved and our inability to penetrate the fineness of the veil
before us we are led to believe in the one and the same world of
separate, individual and particular things in variegated forms of
multiplicity that endures in existence. Whereas in reality the
world together with all its parts is nothing but a series of
accidents, and the real Substance of which they are accidents (i.e.
their substratum al-ma'ruef) is the Truth Most Exalted. The things
that constitute the world of sense and sensible experience have, in
themselves, no reality; they only give a semblance of individual
and particular reality as quiddities because of the way our mind
operates at the ordinary level of cognition. This does not mean,
however, that the existent things and their quiddities have
absolutely no reality whatsoever, and are entirely illusory; the
reality of each thing and its quiddity does indeed exist, but not
here. The realities of things (baqii'iq al-ashyii') exist (wujild) as

intelligibles in the Divine knowledge. They are not existent
(mawjild), and what is made existent and appears to us as the
world of individual and particular things is the actualization of
the potentialities (sing. isti' diid) inherent in the realities of things,
also called the permanent archetypes (al-a'yiin al-thiibitah), in the
form of their repercussions and necessary effects or concomitants
( i.e. their lawii,zim, tawiibi' and iithiir). The realities or archetypes
never become externalized, but remain always in their interior
condition in the Divine consciousness. So to the $iifis of this
school, the archetypes are the real and true quiddities. 242 A
reality is a form of a Divine Name, which form is manifested in
the Divine consciousness. The form of each reality is called a
quiddity ( mahiyyah) or a permanent archetype (' ayn thabit); and
this quiddity is to be distinguished from the quiddity existent in
the extra-mental world of empirical things, or rather, the
'quiddity' posited as such by the mind. We have said that al
Raniri's use of the term keadaan is to be understood as conveying
two senses corresponding to miihiyyah which it translates. 243 In
miihiyyah, the two senses in which the term is meant is ( 1) in the
particular sense as an individual existent (mawjild) which refers to
'q uiddity', and which is derived from the answer to the question:
'what is it?'; and (2) in the general sense as that by which a thing
is what it is (mii bihi al-shay'u huwa huwa), which refers to the 'real
essence' ('ayn) or the 'reality' (baqzqah) of a thing. 244 In this
second sense miihiyyah is identified as 'existence' (wujild).
'Existence' here is also understood as presenting itselfin a twofold
aspect: ( 1) as the very act itselfof existence (Latin: esse) by which
the quiddity is actualized; (2) as the quiddity in the state of
actualization (Latin: ens) 245 The first aspect refers to the dynamic
242 Here by 'quiddity' is not meant that which is opposed to existence,

because the quiddity here is essentially existence. See further below, pp.
310-312.
243 See above, pp. 227; 229-235.
244 See Kashshiij; vol. V, p. 1313 article al-mahiyyah; and Ta'rifiit, under
the same heading (p. 205).

245 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De Enteet Essent ia, trans. A. Maurer, (On Being
COMMENTARY 2 43
principle whose intrinsic articulations bring to actualization the

separate things that comprise the world; the second aspect refers
to the separate things as they exist ( mawjud). The diagram below
illustrates the general (mahiyyah I) and the particular (mahiyyah
II) senses in which the concept of mahfyyah is understood:
The essences of the possibles, or

The permanent archetypes.
These are realities subsisting as
Intelligibles in God's Mind: Forms of the
Divine Names
MAHIYYAH (I)
Quiddity as real essence ('ayn)
or as reality ( �aqzqah). This
is identified as the reality of existence
(wujud)
Reality
Act Mode
wujiid as esse mawjiid as ens
MAHIYYAH (II)
Quiddity as mentally posited,
or when existent things Concept
(mawjiidiit) become objects
of the mind.
Thus when we refer to the quiddities as being in reality the

intrinsic limitations of the act of existence, we mean by intrinsic
precisely what alludes to the actualization of the potentialities in
the form of their repercussions and necessary effects (i.e. to the act
and the mode), and not to the archetypes themselves. But those
blinded by the veil of phenomenal things think that the things of
and Essence), second revised edition, the Pontifical Institute of

Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, 1968, pp. 13-19.
24 4 A COMMENTARY ON THE J;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
the empirical world are the archetypes themselves becoming

externalized; and yet still others, the pantheists who are even
more astray in their blindness, go to the extent of believing that it
is God Himself Who is these things, and the things God, so that
they have completely identified God with the world. In this
respect Jami, quoted by al-Raniri, says:
The completest mask and the densest veils of the Beauty of

the One Real Being are produced by the manifold limitations
which are found in the outward aspect of Being and which
results from His being clothed with the properties and effects
of the archetypes indwelling in the Divine Knowledge, which
is the inner side of Being. To those blinded by these veils it
seems that the archetypes exist in these outward sensible
objects, whereas in point of fact these outward objects never
attain a particle of those real archetypes, but are and will
always continue in their original not-being. What exists and
is manifested is the 'Truth', but this is only in regard to His
being clothed with the properties and effects of the
archetypes, and not in regard to His condition when bare of
all these properties; for in this latter case inwardness and
concealment are amongst His inherent qualities.
Consequently, in reality the Very Being never ceases to abide
in His Essential Unity, wherein He was from all eternity and
wherein He will endure to all eternity. But to the vulgar, who
are blinded by these veils, the Very Being seems to be relative
and phenomenal, and wearing the forms of the multiplicity
of these properties and effects, and He seems manifold to such
persons. 246
It is not possible to arrive at a true vision of the reality of existence

by rational and intellectual processes alone as exemplified by the
philosophical method. The arrival at such a vision can only be
attained by no less than an intuition of existence itself, which
involves direct experience in the verification of its reality and
COMMENTARY 2 45
truth. The metaphysics of wa&dat al-wujud, as we mentioned

earlier, is based on such an intuition of existence arrived at by
means of the spiritual witnessing (shuhiid) and savouring or
tasting (dhawq) which occurs when the veil of separate objects
and phenomenal forms is removed ( kashj) from the vision of one
who is involved in thefana'-baqa' experience. Such a one not only
'sees' by direct vision, but 'verifies' by direct experience the
reality of existence expanding over all and every existing thing,
articulating its multiple and diverse individuations while yet
retaining its unity; and he then realizes that the separate,
seemingly self-subsistent things of the world of sense and sensible
experience are in themselves really nothing but the specific
limitations and particularizations or individuations of existence.
The intuition of existence is none other than his 'coincidence' 247
in the very act of existence itself, and hence it it also called wujiid.
The state of existential intuition is preceded by a state of ecstasis
or wajd. What follows is the passing away of the individual self, or
the subjective consciousness orfanii', and if he proceeds further he
gains subsistence in God. It is only in this latter state of
subsistence, or baqii', that he 'finds': wajada, God. This 'finding' is
wijdiin. In this sense wujiid is the finding of the Truth in existence,
and this is possible only after the extinction of the human
condition-that is, the loss of consciousness of the subjective self
or ego. 248
We said that there can be no unveiling of the real nature of the
phenomenal forms in their variety and multiplicity and separate
existences unless man transcends himself, that is, his human
condition, by which he is bound at the stage of the 'first
separation'; and this necessarily involves a transformation in
247 Coincidence here is tawfiq al-raqzq. Q;v. al-Kharraz, below, p. 298;

Jawiihir, g 1. The act of existence and names opposed to each other
produces 'coincidence' of opposites. Between them is Jana'-baqii'.
248 See Jawahir, p. 30, where al-Ranfr1 quotes Abu Y a}:lyii Zakariyya al
An�ari: al-wujiid wijdan al-baqq.fi al-wujiid wa layakiin ilia ba' da khumiid al
bashariyyah. Compare with the Risiilah of al-Qushayr1, p. 34, which is
probably the original source of this quotation.
him, without which he would be forever bound to the

ordinary level of cognition and volition. His transformation is
brought about as he attains to successively higher spiritual
stations, raising him to that stage whereby he is able to transcend
his self and gain his higher selfhood. The transformation entails
as al-Ghazali says alluding to a passage in the Holy Qur'an
that "this earth to him be changed into that which is not earth,
and likewise the heavens." 249 At this stage we are speaking about
the man who has witnessed, as though with the ocular vision, the
losing ofthe individual and particular forms that take the guise
of phenomenal objects-who has been immersed in the 'union of
separation' and the 'separation of union', and to whom the One
Truth is seen as the underlying reality of all existents..that creates
out of its own self-determinations and self-limitations the specific
forms of multiple things which the mind ontologizes as quiddities
qualifying each existent as an entity seemingly possessed of
independent reality. We are here speaking about the man who is
at the stage of the 'second separation'. 250 It should now be clear
that when al-Raniri says that the essence ( dhat), which is the
constituent determinant of a thing (keadaan), or the self (nafs:
diri), or reality (baqzqah) of a thing, and which he identifies as
being or existence (wujud), "is at times perceptible to the eyes,
such as the world," he is referring to the vision o,· perception of
the man who is at the stage of the 'second separation'. 251 This is
249
Mishkiit, p. 50; al-Qur'iin, Ibrahim ( 14): 48. See also ibn 'Arabi's
interpretation of this passage in his Tafsir, vol. I, pp. 660. See above, p.
143, the quotation from al-Ghaziili.
250
See above, pp. 131 -148.
251 T
he perception that al-Riiniri speaks of literally means perception
with the ocular vision: kelihatan dengan mata kepala, and this can only
refer to the man at the stage of the 'second separation', who 'sees' the
Truth as though with the ocular vision. Al-Ghaziili too in the Mishkat
uses a similar expression: al-mushiihadah al-'iyanryyah, when describing
the vision of the Gnostics, or those involved in illuminative knowledge
(al-'iirifun). See above, the quotation on pp. 143-144. On an analysis of
the uses of the word 'see', refer to L. Wittgenstein's Philosophical
Investigations, II, XI (trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford, 1963),
which is of some relevance to the present topic.
COMMENTARY
also clear from his gloss pertaining to the above passage, in which
he speaks of the presence ( �urj,iir) of the heart ( qalb) of the man to
God Whom he ever contemplates in deep meditation (senetiasa
ingat), such that the man becomes absent to himself and
experiences the intuition of existence (rasa: dhawq). 252 To the
vision of the man who is still at the stage of the 'first separation',
the essence al-Ranir1 speaks of is not perceptible; and it is to such
a man-indeed to the generality of mankind-that he refers
when he says that the essence is "at times not perceptible to the
eyes." Everi so, to the generality of mankind at the stage of the
'first separation', the existence of that essPnce is estci_blished by
reason ('aql) and religion or the sacred Law (shara'), or to the
select few among them; by a direct intuition of that existence
( kashf and dhawq), which brings them to the stage of the 'second
separation'.
What he means by 'reason' and 'sacred Law' in the sense of
'religion' is that the former refers initially to the intellectual
faculty from which is derived the rational and philosophical
sciences ( al-'uliim al-'aqliyyah); while the latter refers to revelation
and the traditional sciences (al-'uliim al-naqliyyah) deriving from
it. Shara' technically refers to something legal, something of the
nature of law. Man is a legally responsible being to whom God's
judgements apply. 253 God's judgements are embodied in the
sacred or revealed Law of Islam ( al-sharr ah), whose source is
revelation, that is, the Holy Qur'an. In the sense in which we
mean shara' to refer to religion as a whole, we allude to the legal
principles governing man's thoughts and actions in an absolute
manner as promulgated in the shari' ah and as patterned
252 See Hujjah, p. 3, (p. 84 above, note 5). See further Kash] al-Ma�jiib,
pp. 248-51. There is a correspondence between the man's presence to
God and God's presence to him; see the Fu[iif on ibn 'Arahi's explanation
of the Five Planes of Being, which is explained by al-Qashani in his
commentary (q.v. p. I 10). Each of the Planes is designated as a �arj,rah
(presence), and each �arj,rah is a particular form in which the Absolute
Being manifests Itself See also Corbin, Creative imagination, pp.
225-227; 360/I 9-36 I; and Dawiid Qay�ari's commentary on the Fu�ii�.
253 See al-Ta'rifiit, p. 82.
according to the customary way of thought and action of the

Holy Prophet, that is his sunnah, upon whom be peace. The
judgements concerning the share ah ( al-a&kiim al-shar'iyyah) divide
into two main branches: that connected with practice, which is
what is derived (i.e. far'ryyah) from the basic fundamentals of
Islam and which is what forms the practical duties (i.e.
'amaliyyah) in Islam; and that connected with belief and faith,
which is what constitutes the basic fundamentals in Islam
( a1·liyyah) and which is what forms the articles of beliefand faith in
Islam ( i'tiqiidiyyah). Out of the first is evolved the science of
practical judgements ( al-fiqh) derived from detailed proofs gained
by speculation on the meanings elicited from the texts and
deductions therefrom. It results in the establishment of rules and
fundamentals; the arrangements into divisions and sections of the
materials relating to them; the formulation of proofs to problems
connected with them; the stating of ambiguities and their
explanations; the determining of conventional usages and
technical terms; the pointing out of various ways of proceeding
and their differences. Out of the second is evolved the science of
belief and faith ( al-kalam) 254 derived directly from their proofs,
which are decisive, and most of which are supported by proofs to
be believed on authority such as the Holy Qur'an and the
sunnah. 255 Al-kc!iim is based on the rational foundation that the
existence of God, His Unity, Attributes and Acts can be deduced
from. thl:" Pxistence of the ,,vorld which He creates; and the
existence of the created things also furnish proof for the existence
of the rest of the things to be believed on authority. 256 Thus the
science of the articles of belief and faith is also founded upon
rational judgements (al-a&kam al-'aqliyyah) that clarify the
distinctions between three logical categories such as: the
necessary ( wiijib); the impossible ( musta&zl); and the possible
(iii'iz). By the necessary is meant that the non-existence of which
254 See above, pp. 208-213. Al-kaliim is theology.

255 See al-Taftazani, Shar� al-' Aqii'id, pp. 7- 14 from which the above
explanation of shara' is derived.
256 Al-Taftazani, Shar� al-'Aqii'id, p. 15.
COMMENTARY 249
cannot be apprehended by reason ('aql); and the impossible is

that the existence of which cannot be affirmed by reason; while
the possible is that the existence of wh1ch at one time and its non
existence at another can be affirmed by reason. 257 An example of
the first is boundary (bayyiz) to a body (jism)-that is, all bodies
must have boundaries taking up room in space or place (maball).
The existence of such boundaries is necessary to bodies and
reason cannot affirm their non-existence. In the second case, an
example is the non-occurrence of motion and rest at the same
time in a body-that is, the existence of being devoid of motion
and rest simultaneously in a body is an impossibility and reason
cannot affirm such a thing. In the case of the third, an example is
Zayd's child, whose existenrf' or non-existence at one time or
another can either of them be·affirmed by reason. On these three
logical categories then are founded the science of the articles of
belief and faith, and al-J uwayn'i asserts that an understanding of
them. constitutes reason itself. 258
Now existence is necessary in God, but as to whether existence
is a quality (rifah) of His essence, or it is the very self ('ayn) of His
essence is a problem concerning which the theologians .
(mutak·allimun) were at variance among themselves. Al-Ash'.ar'i
and his followers held that existence is the very self ('ayn) of
essence; others held that existence is a state (biil), having no cause
('illah), that is necessary to essence. In the case of God, the latter
group maintained the position that existence is a necessary state
without a cause established in His essence; it is a personal quality
(�ifah nafsiyyah) by which His essence is apprehended. According
to this view God's essence and His existence, although
inseparable, are yet distinct from one another: His essence is not
257 See Mu}:iammad al-Fac;lafi's introduction to his Kifiiyah al-'Awiimmjf

'llm al-Kaliim, with Ibrahim al-Bayjur"i's commentary, Cairo, 1328
A.H.
258 See the Kitiib al-irshiid of al-Juwayn'i, ed. Mu}:iammad Yusuf Musa
and 'Afi 'Abd al-Mun'im 'Abd al-1:Iam'id, Cairo, 1269/1950, pp.

12-16. See also his Al-'Aqzdah al-Ni.�_iimiyyahjf ril-Arkiin al-lsliimiyyah, ed.
A}:imad 1:Iija.z'i al-Saqqa, Cairo, 1399/ 1979, al-Maktabah al-Kulliyyah
al-Azhariyyah, pp. 13-15.
His existence. Likewise in the case of created things, their

essences are not their existences. This position reflected the
position of the essentialists. Al-Ash'ari and his followers, to whose
theological school al-Raniri claimed to belong, 259 maintained
that the existence of God is the very self (' qyn) of His essence.
Likewise the existences of created things are their essences. 260
God's essence is then an entity possessed of external reality, so
that if the veil were removed we would perceive it.
For the theologians the proof of the existence of God is the
origin of the world in time, in that it comes into existence after
non-existence. The gist of their demonstration that the world is a
thing originated (mu&dath), is that since the accidents are subject
to existence at one time and non-existence at another-like
motion and rest, for example-it follows that accidents have an
origination in time; and since the accidents inhere in the
substances and are inseparable from them, substances too have
an origination in time by virtue of the fact that when something
inhering in another and inseparable from it has a temporal
origin, that other thing in which it inheres and from which it is
inseparable also has a temporal origin. Thus both substances
(bodies) and accidents have temporal origin. Now since the
world consists of nothing but substances and accidents, it is
obvious that the world has a temporal origin. Whatever has an
origin must have an originator; therefore the world must have
had an originator (God). 261 The thesis of the theologians as
regards God and the world will become clearer in what follows,
in which al-Raniri gives a summary statement of the salient
features of their ontology. He says:
VI The Mutakallimin say: There- are two categories of being:

firstly, the Being of God, and secondly, the being of the
259 See my introduction to this book.

260
Jami mentions this in his al-Durrah al-Fiikhirah, 34/4. Also al-Raniri
in the Jawahir, p. 34.
261 See al-Taftazani, Shar� al-'Aqa'id, pp. 42-52; 53-55;
COMMENTARY 251
world. God's Being is Necessary Being (wiijib al-wujiid) and

is self-subsistent (qiPim sendirinya), and the being of the world
is contingent being (mumkin al-wujud)-that is, it is created
(dijadikan) by the Truth Most Exalted from non-existence
(' adam) and brought forth into external existence (wujiid
khiirijz). Moreover, it is dependent (qa'im) for its existence
upon the Truth Most Exalted. Thus the reality (baqzqah)
underlying the two is different one from the other-that is
to say, the ontological condition (keadaan) is in both cases
different one from the other by virtue of the fact that the
Truth Most Exalted is eternal (qadzm) and originates
creation (menjadikan), whereas the world is non-eternal
(mubdath) and is originated in creation (dijadikan).
Corresponding to the three logical categories of necessity

(wujiib), impossibility (istibiilah), and possibility (jawaz), which
we have just mentioned and which pertains to our rational
judgements clarifying the distinctions concerning being or
existence, the same kind of judgements apply in the case of our
conceptualization of the modes of being or existence. We refer to
the three ontological categories which we have described.much
earlier: necessity (wujiib), impossibility (imtinii'), and possibility
(imkan). 262 Al-Raniri is here referring to the theologians' thesis
that there are two categories of being or real existence whose
modes are necessity and possibility or contingency. In the former
case, that entity which has being is necessary in itself due to its
own nature. That which is not necessary in itself is either an
impossibility or a possibility. Whatever is an impossibility in itself
cannot be realized or become existent. Consequently, that which
is not necessary in itself must be contingent due to itself, and it
becomes necessary only due to another which brings it into
existence. This thesis is the same as that of the philosophers, and
may indeed have been derived from ibn Sina, who maintained
that that which exists must either be a necessity or a contingency,
262
25'2 A COMMENTARY ON THE I:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
and that only the former kind persists in existence. 263 When we
say that contingent being is contingent due to itself and necessary
due to another, we mean that if that being were not realized in
actuality it would remain a possible being; 264 and when it is
realized in actuality it has become necessary due to its being
brought into existence by the Necessary Being, for its necessity is
its being brought into existence, otherwise it would remain in
non-existence. 265 The Necessary Being cannot but be due to its
own essence; and this is what he means when he says that the
Necessary Being is self-subsistent (qii'im bi nafsihi-Malay: qii'im
sendirinya). The meaning of self-subsistence with the theologians is
that He is independent of any locus (ma�all) or subject (mawr/,ir)
in which to subsist, and He is also independent of any specifier
( mukha}}iI) or determining principle. His locus is His essence, and
His specifier is the bringer into existence ( al-miijid), without His
essence being other than He, and the bringer into existence being
other than Himself The Necessary Being exists of His own
essence. He has no need of other, for if He has then His existence
would only be possible, that is, having a cause, and He would be a
part of contingent being. Consequently, since contingent being
needs an originator to bring it out of possibility into actuality, if
the Necessary Being were not that originator there would be an
endless chain of causes and nothing would ever come into
existence. In order for the endless chain of causes to be broken,
there must be an originator outside the causes who would
originate creation. The existence of the Necessary Being is proven
by the fact that if that Being does not exist, then that which exists
would be restricted to contingent being, and consequently
nothing would exist at all. The reason for this is that contingent
263 Metaphysica, Topic 18. See further, the theologians' thesis in al
Taftazani, Shar& al-'Aqii'id, pp. 52-53.
264 This is not the same as the philosophers' meaning of 'possible', which
is an attribute related to matter, or objective possibility. Furthermore,

'possible' means, for the theologians, what may or may not be, not what
must be, as affirmed by the philosophers.
265 By 'non-existence', the theologians mean the privation of existence,
not a state of existence in the interior condition of being.

COMMENTARY 2 53
being is not self-sufficient with respect to its existence and with

respect to bringing another into existence, for the bringing
another into existence requires a self-sufficient existence prior to
it. So if there were no such self-sufficient existence which is the
Necessary Being, there would be neither existence nor bringing
into existence, and nothing would exist at alJ > which is contrary to
what we see and know. 266 The being of the world is actualized by
the Necessary Being. 'Actualized' here refers to the act of creating
which al-Raniri expressed by the term menjadikan (affixed form of
Malay jadi). We mentioned previously thatjadi in the writings of
al-Raniri and his predecessors is the equivalent of the Arabic
kawn, which corresponds to the Aristotelian genesis: 'coming-into
being'. 267 Menjadikan means takwzn, the infinitive of the second
verbal form of kiina, which has a causative meaning expressing,
according to al-Taftazani, the ideas couched in such words as al-
fi.'l: the doing something; al-khalq: the creating something; al
takhlzq: the producing something; al-zjiid: the bringing something
into existence; al-i�diith: the originating something; al-ikhtirii': the
inventing something. 268 In the writings of the theologians it
conveys the meaning of the bringing of the non-existent (al
ma'diim) from non-existence ('adam) into existence ( wujiid: the
reference here is to external existence (wujiid khiirifi'), or to what is
existent (mawjiid), as conveyed in Malay, treating of the same
topic, by the expression: menjadikan daripada tiada kepada ada). 269
Now when he says, speaking on behalf of the theologians, that the
world is created ( diJadikan) by God from non-existence into
266 See al-Jurjani's Shar& al-Mawaqif, 8v. Cairo, 1325/1907, vol. VIII, p.
12; and vol. II, pp. 140-141.
267 See above, pp. 228-229.
268 Al-Taftazani, Shar& al-'Aqii'id, p. 86; al-Tahanawi, Kashshiif, V, p.
1276.
269
See further, on ada, pp. 228-229. Compare in lfamzah Fan�iirz, p.
171. When the Malay definitive arti'cleyang ( equivalent of Arabic al-) is
used before menJadikan, it becomes the equivalent of al-mukawwin;
similarly in the case of dijadikan it becomes the equivalent of al
mukawwan. Menjadikan without the article is takwzn, while menjadi
without the suffix -kan is the equivalent of takawwun. The imperativejadi
is the equivalent of kun.
existence, it is not meant by 'created' that God is the Cause ('illah

or sabab) by which the world proceeds from non-existence into
existence as the philosophers maintain. 27 ° For the theory of
causality as propounded by the philosophers, in spite of their use
of such terms indicative of creative activity such as 'active agent'
ifilil) and 'maker' (riini') with respect to God the Necessary
Being, and His creation of the world of contingent being as His
'product' (ranil) and by His 'act' (fi' l), in reality denies creative
activity to God; and such terms as they use, if taken in their real
and true senses so intended by them, and not in their
metaphorical senses, would only violate their whole system. In
this respect al-Ghazali accuses the philosophers of dishonest
distortion of their own principles, which if strictly observed,
cannot conceive God as the Agent and Maker of the world, and
cannot conceive of the world as His action and His product.
According to al-Ghazali, the reasons that underlie the
philosophers' use of such terms only in their metaphorical and
not in their real significance, is to be found in (I), the nature of
the agent, ( 2) the nature of the action, and (3) the relationship
between the action and the agent. In the first case, the nature of
the agent, understood in its real sense, is that the agent must
necessarily have the will for the action,Jree choice in the doing ofit,
and the knowledge of what he wills. But for the philosophers, who
hold that God has no attribute at all, He has no will; the world
proceeds from Him of necessity and not by will. In thf' second
case, action must have a temporal beginning. But the
philosophers consider the world to be eternal. In the third case,
the philosophers say that God is one in all respects, and only one
proceeds from one. But the world is composed of many different
things-how can it proceed from Him? 271 The philosophers
270 Maimonides has tried to show that the philosophers' 'illah (cause)
and the theologians'Ja'i/ (agens) are equivalent terms. In our view this is
not entirely correct. Moreover, he has oversimplified the theologians'
theses in his account of them in eh. LXXII (pp. 113-119) of his Guide.
See his Guide ef the Perplexed, trans. from the Arabic by M. Friedlander,
Pardes Publishing House Inc., New York, 1904.
271 Tahiifut, Problem Ill, p. 24.
COMMENTARY 2 55
have in fact incorporated the Neoplatonic emanation and the

Aristotelian cosmos into their system, and to further incorporate
into that system the Quranic ideas of God as the Creator and
Maker of the world would be a violation of that system, as those
ideas cannot be integrated into it. So when speaking about the
origin of the world, the theologians, basing their proofs largely
upon Quranic testimony, maintain that the world is non-eternal
(mubdath) and has a temporal origin. By this they do not mean a
simple theory of creu:tio ex nihilo, 272, as a gist of their theory will
show.
The world is composed of substances and accidents. That
which subsists by itself is a substance, and that which does not
subsist by itself is an accident. In the case of substance, what they
mean when they say that it subsists by itself is that it is bounded
by itself. In the case of an accident, its being bounded is a
necessary consequence arising from the fact that the atom is
bounded, for the atom is the locus which gives subsistence to the
accident. Thus the existence of the accident is its very existence in
the subject ( al-maw{j,u'). Now whatever subsists by itself is either
composite (murakkab), such as when the atoms combine as a
body, or not composite, such as the pure atom ( al-jawhar al7fard),
or the indivisible part ( al-juz' alladhz lam yatajazza'), or the pure
soul and the pure intelligence-that is, the soul and the
intelligence from which material and bodily relations have been
subtracted (mujarrad). The theologians set forth two premises: ( 1)
that substances are not free from originated things; and (2) that
whatever is not free from originated things is itself originated. On
these two premises rest their proof that substances are among the
originated things. With respect to the first premise, they say that
substances are not free from originated things such as motion and
rest, and that their not being free of motion and rest is due to their
residing in their own boundaries (sing. bayyiz). Motion and rest
are according to them originated because they belong to the
a historical discussion on the theory of creation ex nihilo, see H.A.

272 For
Wolfson, The Philosophy ef the Kalam, Harvard University Press, 1976,

pp. 355-372.
category of accidents, which are discontinuous by nature and

which therefore have temporal origin. In the second premise,
they say that if that which is not free from originated things is not
originated-that is, if it were eternal-then it would be
inseparably connected with originated things from eternity;
which is impossible. Since here they are speaking of substances
which have boundaries and accidents, objection arises in the case
of pure souls and intelligences, which have no bodies or bodily
relations. But the theologians define 'boundary' not as the inner
surface of a container which touches the outer surface of the thing
contained; rather they define it as the imaginary space ( al-Jariigh)
a substance or body occupies, in which it extends to its
dimensions. In this way it is possible to include the pure souls and
intelligences in their definition of substance, and also to predicate
of them the accidents of motion and rest, so that they come under
the category of originated things. 273• When al-Ranir1 says,
speaking on behalf of the theologians, that contingent being
that is, the world composed of substances and accidents-is
dependent (qa'im) for its existence upon the Truth Most Exalted,
the meaning of 'being dependent for its existence' does not refer
only to its initial origination from non-existence into existence.
The world, after its initial existence, does not endure or continue
to exist (baqa'), bui. passes out of existence (Jana'); it ceases to exist
at evey moment of time, an.I what we observe of its continuance
in existence is in reality the continuous renewal of its similars.
Thus at every moment of time the world is in need of existence,
and what we observe of the world as such is that it is ever
dependent for its existence upon the Truth Most Exalted, Whose
act of creation is perpetually bringing forth similar worlds from
non-existence into existence. In this way we imagine the
continuance of the same world in existence, whereas in reality
such is not the case. Thus God's creating is from eternity. The
theologians maintain this thesis for the following main reasons:
( 1) originated things cannot subsist in God; ( 2) God describes
Himself by His eternal speech (the Holy Qur'an) as the Creator
273 See al-Taftazani, Shar� al-'Aqii'id, pp. 45-46; 48-52.

COMMENTARY 2 57
( al-khiiliq), and this means that He is the Creator all the time
indeed from eternity-and not simply in the past or in the future,
or as a possibility; (3) if, contrary to (I) above, originated things
subsist in God, then God Himself would be originated; and
consequently an infinite regress or endless chain of origination
( al-tasalsul) would follow, with the result that neither He nor the
world would ever exist. The main reasons listed above lead to
many absurdities which demonstrate judgements of
impossibility. So God's creative activity continues from and to all
eternity without implying thereby the eternity of His creation. As
regards the problem arising out of the propositions of the
philosophers with respect to the necessary connective
n·lationship (i.q. ta' alluq) between God's essence or orre of His
attributes and the existence of the world, the theologians say that
the problem arises due to the peculiar way in which the
philosophers understand the two key terms 'eternal' and
'originated'. For the philosophers 'eternal' means that the
existence of which is not connected with anything else; and
'originated' means that the existence of which is ·connected with
something else. Whereas for the theologians 'eternal' means that
the existence of which is not preceded by non-existence, meaning
it had no beginning; and 'originated' means that the existence of
which is preceded by non-existence, or had a beginning. 274 So
what is for the philosophers 'originated' can be for the
theologians 'eternal'. That a relationship of connection exists
between God and the world is acknowledged, but the nature of
that connection is disputed. Since the idea of connection is basic to
the philosophers' distinction between what is eternal and what is
originated, and since the philosophers deny the Divine attributes,
it becomes their problem to posit the connection between God's.
essence and the existence of the world, which necessitates the
eternity of the world. The theologians, while rejecting such a
connection on the ground that it necessitates the eternity of the
world, cannot altogether deny the existence of any connection
whatever between God and the existence of the world which He
274
See al-Taftazani, Shari; al-'Aqii.'id, p. 88.
creates, for to do that would be tantamount to negating the

creative function of the Maker of the world after it has been
created, 27 5 which would in turn render futile the verification of
proofs which demonstrate that originated things must have an
Originator Who brings them into existence from non-existence.
v U
Since, however, the theologians affirm the Divine attributes as

real attributes superadded to the essence of God, both in the mind
and in real existence, they maintain that the connection that
exists between God and the existence of the world is by means of
one of His attributes pertaining to creating, namely power in
accordance with the agreement of will. Power is that attribute by
which the act is made possible for the Agent, and through which
the act occurs. The act which occurs through power is directed
towards all possible things, that is, things capable of receiving
existence or non-existence. The act itself proceeds from God
through power, and not through the essence, as that would
necessitate the eternity of the act. Since the attribute is a concept
superadded to the essence, acts proceeding through it are not
eternal in that they have a beginning, for an act is something that
occurs after it was not. Will is that attribute through which God
specifies what His act produces through power. So power and
will combine in God's act of creating; and both power and will
connect God's act of producing and specifying with the possibles
which are their objects, determining for the possibles their
existe-nce and non-existence and their qualitative, quantitative,
temporal and spatial modes. The connection according to this
perspective has two aspects: potential and actual. Potential
connection has from eternity the potentiality of bringing into
existence the possible things in non-existence; but when a thing
capable of receiving existence is brought into existence, it is the
actual connection that brings it into existence and accomplishes
its existing as long as it should exist. Potential connection refers to
275 Compare, for example, with ibn Sina's thesis on this problem in
Metaphysica, Topic 20. See further al-Ghazali in his al-lqti�iid ff al
l tiqiid, edited by I.A. Qubuk <;: u and Hiiseyn Atay, Nur Matbaasi,
Ankara, 1962, part II; Tahiifut, Prob. III, p. 26.
COMMENTARY 2 59
the acts of power in relation to the possible things 276 which are its
objects and which are infinte. There is no end to the objects of
power, and hence possibility endures forever, just as the
potentiality in the connection of that one power with its objects
endures forever. When we say 'one power' we refer to the relation
of power to its objects in general: there is one power
encompassing infinite possibilities. There cannot be particular
powers corresponding fo their particular objects. It is one power
that becomes related in connection with all its objects,such as the
substances and accidents in their multiplicity, because of the
possibility (imkiin) that is their common element. Likewise,just as
the eternal power is potentially related to all its objects, so is the
eternal will potentially related to all its objects. They become
connected with their objects at a specific time. The connection is
momentary, but it is repeated with their similar objects at specific
times, one succeeding the other continuously. Hence there is a
beginning and an end to the connection repeated perpetually, so
that the contingent things each connection produces and
specifies also have beginnings and endings. They are therefore
'ever-new' (mu&dath) and thus non-eternal. So even though God's
creating is from eternity, the created things are originated
because the connection holds sway only as long as the time it lasts
for the created things to exist. This discontinuous connection
applies to every part of the world of created things; and it is such a
connection that permits the renewal of similars in the created
things,giving them a sense of continuance in existence as we have
already explained. In this sense also the connection, which
although discontinuous is yet persevering in an everlasting way,
describes the 'need' or 'dependence' of the world for its existence
upon the Truth Most Exalted. 277
276
See above note 264.
277 See further al-Taftazani, Shar� al-'Aqa'id, pp. 89-90. Al-Fa9-iifi has
given a detailed explanation of the connection discussed above. In that
explanation, he elaborates the seven types of connection based on the
two real ones (�aqzqi)-the potential and the actual-mentioned
above. For a philosophical approach, see al-Ghazafi's al-lqti0 ad ft al
l' tiqad, part II, on the divine attributes and their properties.
The whole metaphysical system bf the theologians is indeed

faithfully reflected in their definition of the two key concepts:
'eternal' and 'originated'. By it is also established the notion of
real difference between God and His existence on the one hand,
and the world a�cl, its existence on the other. Thus al-Raniri says,
<;peaking on behalf of the Mutakallimin, that the reality
(baqzqah), meaning the ontological condition (keadaan),
underlying the two: the Being of God and the being of the world,
is different; and their being different is due to the fact that the
former is eternal (qadzm) and originates creation (menjadikan),
· and the latter is non-eternal (mubdath) and is originated in
creation ( dijadikan). The difference in the reality, or ontological
condition of God as the Necessary Being, or the Necessary
Existence, or the Necessary Existent, and the world together with
all its parts as contingent being is established upon the premises
that in the Necessary Being alone is essence identical with
existence, 2 7 8 and that the Necessary Being is not a substance nor
an accident. Any being whose essence is other than its existence is
contingent, and what is contingent is composed of substance and
accident. According to this perspective, therefore, the
theologians asserted that God possesses a quality called
'difference from originated things' ( mukhiilafah Li al-bawiidith).
Thus, commenting on what the theologians say concerning the
relationship between God's Being and the world, al-Raniri
affirms that:
VII It is clear from their definition that there are two

categories of being: the one Real Being (wujiid baqzqf), and
the other metaphorical being (wu:fiid majazf).
Metaphorical being is a property (milk) of Real Being. If
both are not different one from the other, then they are
necessarily identical. Whosoever holds and believes that
the Truth Most Exalted and the world are identical
becomes an unbeliever (kafir), for it is evident from his
278 This is the position taken by the theologians of the Ash'ariyyah
school.
COMMENTARY
words expressed to that effect that God's Being and the

world are made out of to be one reality and one being.
Now bawadith (pl. of badith) denotes 'originated things'; things

that were new, not having been before. The root of the term (i.e.
badatha) expresses the contrary of something prior that has always
been (i.e. qaduma), so that the term in its metaphysical sense
expresses the contrary of what is eternal (qadzm). Literally
bawadith means 'renewed things', things that are ever-new in
their occurrence such that their existence taken individually is
discontinuous. The existence that we predicate of them as being
ever-new refers both to their temporal (zamanz) as well as their
essential ( dhatz) existence, that is, they have a beginning in time
and their essences are not self-subsistent. So because they are
ever-new temporally and essentially, their individual existences
taken collectively as a series is a 'happening' that takes place and
then ceases to take place. Then their renewal by similars occurs
and is repeated perpetually so that we see their existence as a
whole as continuous. Indeed, existence must by nature be
continuous in its existing; but in the case of the originated things
their existence is discontinuous even though we perceive the
contrary due to the perpetual process of the renewal of similars.
So what we see is in reality 'fictitious' or 'metaphorical' existence
(wujiid majazz). A semantic analysis of the concept of majaz will
clarify further what is meant by 'metaphor' when it is applied to
existence as it is here. The rootjaza refers to something allowable,
and hence, in the metaphysical or theological context, to a thing
in potentia or to a possible thing; and its infinitive noun,jawaz, to
possibility. What is meant by allowable or possible here is
depicted in the mind when a thing passed across from one place
(e.g� a path, a road) to another (e.g. the other side of the path or
road) because it has become allowable or possible for the thing to
actualize the passing at the specific time. The active participial
noun ofjaza: ja'iz, is the actual passing taking place. When we
transfer this meaning to the metaphysical context we
immediately perceive the idea that a thing that was possible has,
due to the actual connection with God effected by Him through
262 A COMMENTARY ON THE. J:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ.
His attribtes of power and will combined, passed over from the
stage of potentiality to the stage of actuality: from non-existence
into existence. Majaz then refers to the place where the
contingent occurs, that is, the world of contingent being. The
actualization of what was once potential, even though it is an
actualization, does not subsist in its actualization; it simply
passed from non-existence into existence and back to non
existence. The actual passing taking place-that is, the
actualization-. is what is termed asja'iz, so that when al-Raniri
refers to jaiz al-wujiid he means precisely this sort of transient
existence. 279 Now the meaning ofmajaz as metaphor is brought to
mind when someting passes beyond the meaning to which it is
originally applied, such as for example, to transfer the meaning of
'lion', originally applied to a beast, beyond the beast to a man,
calling the brave or courageous man a 'lion', because of the
analogy or connection between the two senses of the meaning of
'lion'. The man in reality is not a lion, but only like a lion in
bravery or courage. 280 When we transfer this meaning ofmajaz as
metaphor to the metaphysical context, what is meant by it is that
we have transferred the meaning of'being', originally applied to
something eternal and self-subsistent (i.e. to 'real being': wujiid
baqzqf), beyond that to something non-eternal and dependent
( i.e. to the world of created things), predicating of the existent
world 'being' because of the analogy or connection between the
two senses of the meaning of 'being' or 'existence'. The world in
reality does not possess being or real existence (i.e. eternal and
self-subsistent existence), but it only looks as if it has being
because of its apparent continuance in existence. We say 'looks as
if and 'apparent' because, as already explained, the actual
connection of God with the world thrbugh His attributes of
power and will combined is discontinuous, and yet it is a process
repeated continuously in an everlasting sort ofway which permits
the renewal of similars in the created things, giving them a sense
of continuance in existence. Thus the being or existence of the
279 The theologians make ja'iz synonymous with mumkin (possible).

2s0 see Jawahir, P· I I I.
COMMENTARY
world qua world is fictitious, figurative or metaphorical (wujiid

majiizf), creating in our minds a semblance of real being or
existence (wujiid baqzqf)' when in actuality it is the contrary of
reality (baqzqah).
According to al-Raniri, metaphorical being is a property,
possession, or condition (milk) of real being. We have already
explained that the term milk in Muslim philosophy is the
equivalent of one of the ten Aristotelian categories (al-maqiiliit al
' ashr), specifically that of condition (echein). 281 Condition here
refers to a state of being, a state of being in possession of a certain
mode of existing. The way in which the theologians apply the
term milk) however, which is the sense in which al-Raniri means
it, is that it is a relationship of possessioTI a body has to the
covering it has over the whole part of its extension, or over a part
of it, like the clothing one has on and which one carries about
wherever one goes, in contrast with the house one has which one
does not so carry about, and which does not cover one all the time
the way clothing does. 282 In that sense, when metaphorical being
is said to be a milk of real being, the meaning is that the coming
into-being (kawn) of contingent things is a property of real being;
and property refers to a passing mode of existence which al
Ranfri calls keadaan. Keadaan in al-Ranfri's works means among
others: (I) condition or state of affairs ( biilah); ( 2) coming-into
being (kawn); (3) a series of coming-into-being (akwiin); (4) 'is'
ness (kiiJ in); (5) the being-existent (mawjiid). 283 Al-Ranfri also
means by keadaan-though more with reference to the Siifis'
perspective in this matter rather than with that of the
theologians-the actualized determinations, limitations,
particularizations or individuations of real being at the level of
sense and sensible experience. We have said that the process of
281 See above, pp. 230-231. The categories are applied both logically as
well as metaphysically.
282 See above, pp. 230-231. See also al-Jurjani's definition in al
Ta'rffiit, pp. 204-205. For ibn Sina's thesis on the categories, see
Metaphysica, Topics 9-11; the commentary on pp. 186-190.
283 See above, p. 234; also p. 230.
actualization of the possible things is continuous as formulated in

series of renewals, while the actualization itself of the thing is
discontinuous. So the actualized things-the determinations,
limitations, particularizations and individuations of real being
are all the time passing away and being replaced continuously by
their similars giving them in their every part and as a whole a
semblance of real existence. When we regard the things-in
themselves in their moments o( actualization at their specific
times, then we are regarding their ke' ada' an, their 'being-existent'
which are modes of existence; when we regard them in their
continuance in existence in the aspect of the continuous renewal
of their similars, then we are regarding the keadaan of real being,
the condition or state of real being which is formulated in terms of
a necessary relationship with metaphorical being. This necessary
relationship is one of connection and possession. While the
necessary connection of the two is mutual, the possession is on the
side of real being only. Similarly, despite the mutual, necessary
connection, the need or dependence for existence is on the side of
metaphorical being only. With respect to the concept of milk as
formulated by the theologians, metaphorical being is like the
clothing of real being. The Siifis in fact use the term 'clothing' in
this respect (libiis) in the sense of being the equivalent of milk. 284
Now the two senses in which keadaan is meant reveals that
although the same word signifies two referents, its meaning in
each case is not the same because the two referents are not the
same: the one refers to an eternal, self-subsistent essence, the
other to a temporal, non-self-subsistent essence. In this lies the
basic difference between real being and metaphorical being.
Indeed, for the theologians this constitutes a real difference
between-the two, and this difference is further emphasized by the
possession exercised on the side of the former and which gives the
latter existence, and by the dependence on the side of the latter
for that existence. Thus because existence, which is equivocally
· 284 See
for example Jami in the Lawii'i�, pp. 35/44;Jawiihir, p. 85. in
Jawiihir, p. 10 I, ilbiis refers to the effects ( iithiir) of the acts ( a' miil) of
existence.
COMMENTARY
applied to God as well as to the world, is conceived as their

common element, a temporal as well as essential difference must
obtain between real being and metaphorical being, that is,
between Necessary Being and contingent being or between the
Being of God and the being of the world, otherwise they would
necessarily be identical or there would be another existence
duplicating God's existence. The deviating Wujudiyyah,
however, do not see the real distinction between the two, and
have consequently made out the Being of God and the world to be
one reality and one being. The Sufis of the school of wabdat al
wujiid also speak of one reality and one being, but as we have seen
and shall further see, they did make the necessary distinction.
VIII The Sufis say: We concur with the theologians in what

they say and believe (in this matter). According to our
definition, however, being is but one, and that is the
Essence of God Most Exalted. The world has no being
(wujiid) and is not qualified to be named with the name
'being' as it is pure non-being(' adam al-mabr/-). Thus when
the world is pure non being and the Being of the Truth
Most Exalted is pure being (wujiid al-mabrf,), how then can
pure non-being become one being with pure being? In
truth, the world is but a theatre of manifestation (ma;,har)
and a shadow (?-ill), a property (milk) of the Truth Most
Exalted ; that is to say, it is the theatre of manifestation of
the Truth Most Exalted; the reflected image like unto the
form (rupa) that is seen in the analogical mirror: the Truth
Most Exalted is like the gazer into the glass, and the world
is like the form that is seen therein. So then, the Being of
the Truth Most Exalted and that of the world are neither
different one from the other nor are they identical, for
their being different or identical necessitates the existence
of two independent (mustaqill sendirinya) beings. Thus
when it is the Being of God that is the one and only (being)
and the world has no being whatever, there cannot then
be differentiation between them. That is the reason why
266 A COMMENTARY ON THE J;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
we say that the Being of God and the world is one (esa).
Even though the world is seen as existing concretely
(mawjud), its existence (wujud) is not reckoned as such, for
actually it has no real being ... etc. (till the end).
According to al-Raniri here the $iifis agree with the

theologians, and this agreement in fact refers only to certain
departments of the universe or world, and not to all of them. To
be sure, the agreement refers only to that department dealing
with the nature of the accident and the doctrine of the perpetual
creation, as we shall later show.
By the words 'being is but one' the $iifis mean there is only one
being or existence, and that is the essence ( dhiit) of God. This
emphasis on there being only one being or existence implies that
there are two senses in which the term wujud (being or existence)
may be understood. Either it is understood as a general, abstract
notion in the mind to which nothing in the extra-mental world
corresponds, that is, as a secondary intelligible; or it is not
understood as such, but as the very reality itself, and nothing else
is real except it. 285 Existence as the only reality there is is not
grasped by the mind. Whenever the mind contemplates the
variegated forms and modes of the multiplicity of existent things
in the extra-mental world, there arises in it an abstract notion of
existence. At the same time and with reference to the variegated
forms and modes of the multiplicity of existent things, the mind
abstracts them from the notion of existence and regards them as
separate, individual entities, as essences or quiddities (miihiyyiit),
each having an independent reality of its own to which existence
is superadded. Most philosophers and theologians subscribe to
the view that essences are real while existence, which is common
to all essences and which is a more general concept, has only a
limited reality as a secondary intelligible to which nothing
corresponds in the external world. The $iifis of the school of
wa�dat al-wujiid, however, and as we have mentioned earlier,
28 "Q.v. Jami above, p. 238-239.

COMMENTARY
disagree with the view that existence is a secondary intelligible;

on the contrary, they maintain that nothing is real except
existence. It is the essences or q uiddities that are, according to
them, merely intelligible in their nature; they are what exist
merely in the mind, and what the mind conjures up, as it were, in
consequence of its contemplation of particular concrete things.
In reality essences or quiddities are but.mental phenomena. Thus
the mind's interpretation of the nature of existence is of necessity
a false one since it cannot help but contemplate and present it to
our cognition as if it were an essence of the class of a genus, which
it is not. Existence is that primordial reality whereby things exist;
it in itself cannot be said to 'exist' in the common sense of term as
applicable to things. The $iifis refer to existence as such as the
Truth ( al-baqq).
Whereas most philosophers and theologians adhere to the
position that the extra-mental world of concrete things is
comprised of composites of essence and existence, out of which is
formulated their corresponding metaphysics of substance and
accident, the $iifis, on the other hand, maintq,in the reverse of this
position: they hold that existence is the only reality, and the
world of concrete things is not a composite of essence .and
existence at all because essence is in reality existence as it occurs in a
particularized and individualized form. The reality of a thing is
its very existence, not its 'essence': there is not 'something' to
which existence is then attributed; existence is the thing itself.
Essence is a mode of existence. 286 The extra-mental and
dissimilar realities underlying the mutliplicity of things are in fact
the limitations and individuations of existence which create in
the mind the notion of 'essences' and 'quiddities' having
ontological reality. In themselves, however, the 'essences' or
'quiddities' are nothing-they are only something in the mind.
Thus the real substance of every individual thing is e'ither an
286 That is, in al-Raniri's terminology it is-the keadaan of a thing, or the

diri of a thing, which is its reality ( �aqzqah) as we have explained in our
commentary on section V above. Thus the reality of a thing is its very
existence. Cf. Jawahir, pp. 40-41.
individuation of real being or existence according to that

particular aspect of which the thing is its external image, or it is
the actual individuation itself of real being or existence at that
specific time according to the same aspect. Consequently each
individual thing is either an individuation of real being or
existence, or it is real being or existence itself as individuated in
that particular form; it is either being or existence made manifest,
or an 'accident' of being or existence thus manifested. The
manifested 'accident' is a quality or existential mode (milk) 287 of
the manifested being or existence, and although mentally the
quality or existential mode is posited as being distinct from the
thing qualified, it is extra-mentally identical with it. This does
not necessarily mean that real being or existence contains
multiplicity, or that it is compounded of many things. For
existence is not static; it is in perpetual movement; a dynamic,
systematic process of unfolding itself from the more
indeterminate to the more determinate; from the more general to
the more particular until it diversifies itself into the more and
more concrete. This unfolding itself of existence is what the $iifis
call inbisaf al-wujiid-the expansion and pervasion of existence in
diversified modes-as conceptualized in terms of their
metaphysics of the degrees of ontological 'descent' ( tana;::,;::,ul),
determination and individuation (ta'ayyun), and self
manifestation (tajallz) of absolute being or existence. 288 When the
absolute being or existence 'descends\ 289 creating out of itself its
myriad particularizations and individuations, there is all the
time only one existence, the particularizations and individuations
being only its variegated modes. These modalities of existence
cannot be regarded as having separate ontological reality
.287 Al-Raniri saysthat the real essence ( ayn) of a created thing (makhliiq)
is a milk or mode ofreal being or existence: Jawahii, p. 41: ma'na' ayn pada
makhluq itu milk ...
288 See above, pp. 153-175; 176-182.
289 The 'descents' of Absolute Being are only mentally posited (i'tibarf).
In reality the eternal process is not measured in terms of time sequence.

See Jawahir, p. 125.
COMMENTARY
because their real essence is existence. Only the mind posits the
modes of existence as having separate ontological reality which it
regards as 'essences' or 'quiddities'. But in reality there is only one
existence.
The world qua world-that is, the 'essences' or 'quiddities'
that comprise the world when considered in themselves as
mentally abstracted from existence-is in reality nothing; it is
something only in the mind. It is nothing not only because it is a
mere mental construct, but because the 'essences' or 'quiddities'
that comprise the world together with all its parts are, when
considered in themselves in their extra-mental state, that is, as
modes of existence, 'accidental' in their nature and, therefore, do
not endure two moments of time, in such wise that they are
perpetually 'lost' to existence. What the mind perceives as the
world possessed of being and continuance in existence is actually
only a mental phenomenon which arises in the mind as a result of
the r,apid succession of similar modes of existence, yet each
distinct from the other, involved in the dynamic process of the
unfolding of existence, which modes are abstracted in the mind as
separate, individual 'essences' having continuance in existence.
In their real nature, however, the mental 'essences' or 'quiddities'
are the extra-mental modes of being or existence. It is only when
we consider the 'essences' or 'quiddities' in themselves as
comprising the world together with all its parts that the world is
nothing. Now by 'nothing' is here meant a complete negation or
utter privation of existence, and this is denoted by the term' adam
mabrj,, or 'pure non-existence'. In this sense, the world qua world
as perceived by the mind in terms of being composed of multiple
and dissimilar quiddities is absolutely nothing; it is pure non
existence. But sometimes the term may mean something else, and
this only when applied to refer not to the world but to the
permanent archetypes or fixed essences ( al-ayan al-thabitah)
considered as things known (ma' liimat) in the Divine knowledge
or consciousness wherein they subsist as ontological possibilities
( mukminat). In that sense 'adam mabrj, does not refer to the sort of
nothingness characterized by absolute negation or privation of
existence, but rather to a mode of existence in the interior
condition ( bu/iin) ofbeing, which is denoted by the term' adam, or

'non-existence', in the sense of something not being concretely
existent but whose subsistence in the interior condition ofbeing is
nonetheless established. The qualification mabrj, or 'pure', when
'adam denotes this aspect of non-existence, means that the
something real subsisting in the interior condition ofbeing remains
purely in the interior condition and cannot essentially become existent
or concretely actualized. What of that reality that can become
existent or actualized concretely are its forces conforming with its
nature (abkam), its concomitants (lawazim) and effects (iithiir),
which become externalized and evolve into exterior existence in
accordance with the inherent potentiality or preparedness
(isti'diid a{ll) of the particular reality. Thus what is in the
condition ofpure non-existence, as referring to this aspect ofnon
existence, pertains to a mode of possibility (imkiin), and it is the
same as possible existence (wujiid mumkin). 290 The possible things
( al-mumkinat) are in this sense the realities (baqii'iq) subsisting in
God's mind, wherein they appear as the forms of the Divine
Names that come under the circumspective sway of the principal
Name al-?.,ahir, the Outwardly Manifest, and by virtue of which
can receive the effulgences (sing.fayr/,) that evolve them, in terms
of their forces, effects and concomitants, to outward
manifestation and external existence. 291 Thus when we consider
the mentally posited 'essences' or 'quiddities' in their real
290 As we have pointed out earlier, the �ufis, unlike the theologians,
mean by 'possible' existence an objective possibility; something
subsisting in the interior condition of being before being qualified by
external existence.
291 See above, pp. 167-169. The effulgences or emanations refer to the
most holy emanation (al-fayrj, al-aqdas) and the holy emanation (al-fayrj,
al-muqaddas) respectively. The essences or quiddities subsisting in God's
mind ( i.e. the possibles, fixed essences or permanent archetypes) are in
reality God's Attributes (e.g. Knowledge, Will, Power, etc.) and Names
( e.g. Knowing, Willing, Powerful, etc.). Although the Attributes are not
existent in the concrete sense, they nonetheless subsist in the Divine
consciousness and are subjective to Him, while the Names become the
modes of existence. See further above, pp. 1 fo- I 67.
COMMENTARY 271
nature-that is, not as they exist in the mind, but as they exist
extra-mentally-as the perpetually unfolding existence
presenting itself in diversified modes and in similar series, then
the world that they comprise is not nothing. Indeed, that it
creates in the mind the notion of innumerable, separate and
dissimilar 'quiddities' demonstrates that there is something about
the world qua itself, and independent of the mind, that is not
nothing. A thing as regarded by the mind when it contemplates
the thing's 'what-is-it'ness (mii hiya) creates in the mind the
notion of'quiddity' (miihiyyah). 292 This 'quiddity' is, as we have
recurrently said, nothing in itselfbut a mental phenomenon. But
when the thing is considered in terms of 'that-by-which-it-is-it'
( mii bihi al-shaf u huwa huwa), 2 9 3 then it is no longer considered
merely as a mental phenomenon, but also as an existent reality
independent of the mind. 294 This latter concept of miihiyyah
denotes the constituent determinant (keadaan) ofa thing, but here
it does not mean 'quiddity' in the sense of something to which
existence is then superadded as an attribute; here it means the
'real essence' (ayn), the 'very self (nafs) or reality (&aqzqah) that
makes the thing what it is. In this latter case the thing is in reality
a mode of existence (keadaan)-there is not, as we have said,
something to which existence is attributed; existence ( i.e. as a
particulr mode) is the very thing itself. Seen in this way, the world
is the 'theatre' of manifestation (ma;;,har) of real being or
existence, or it is the latter's shadow (;;,ill); it is the manifested
'accident', quality or existential mode (milk) of the manifested
reality ofexistence. We must always bear in mind that the Siifis of
the school ofwa&dat al-wujiid, as they are here, regard existence as
primary over essence or quiddity, and are speaking about
existence not merely as a concept, but as a reality; whereas the
theologians are all the time speaking in terms of essence or
quiddity as primary over existence, so that they are speaking
about existence as a concept. What each group means by
292
See above, p. 242 ( r); and the diagram on p. 243, Mahryyah II.
293
See above, p. 242 (2). See also Jawahir, p. 4r.
294
See further, above, pp. 229 fol., p. 243 Mahryyah I.
'existence' and 'essence' or 'quiddity', then, is not the same thing

in spite of al-Raniri's assertion to the contrary.
Existence as a reality, and not as a concept, is as we have said
not static, but is involved in a dynamic and perpetual process of
self-unfolding. When we regard the unfolding of existence in its
variegated modes of self-diversification, existence presents itself
in analogical grades by virtue of its 'descents' (tanazzulat) from
the degree of non-manifestation and non-determination to the
various degrees of manifestation and determination until It
reaches the degree of sense and sensible experience, that is, the
world of empirical things. Since everything in the various degrees
of manifestation and determination of real being or existence is
'accidental' to it, everything is forever 'lost' to existence.
Rather, that which is lost to existence loses itself in the succeeding
'breath' 295 of existence which reconstitutes itself into another,
similar but not identical thing which is but another, similar mode
of existence. The exception to this perpetual process of
rehabilitation of similars is the fixed essences or permanent
archetypes, whose original identities are perpetually
reconstituted, so that while they are non-eternal in the sense that
their existence is discontinuous, but because their original
identities are renewed they yet are perpetually gaining
subsistence, for as Ideas in the Divine mind they cannot be
subject to evanescence. 296 Because of the various degrees of
manifestation and determination through which existence
passes, and the manifold intermediary grades of ontological
expression that it undergoes, its manifestation in one degree and
in each mode in that degree is stronger in the preceding degree
and weaker in the succeeding one; is more perfect in the
preceding degree and less perfect in the succeeding one; is prior in
295 The unfolding of existence, or rather, the unfolded existence (wujiid

munbasi!) is also referred to by the $ufis as the 'breath of the Merciful'
(nafas al-ra&man); it is also 'relative' existence' (wujiid irj,iifi;, Jawahir, p.
88.
296 See above, pp. r77-r82. The fixed essences are non-eternal on the
one hand and eternal on the other.

COMMENTARY 273
the preceding degree and posterior in the succeeding one, and so

on in a descending order. 247 The multiplicity of existents that
results is not in the one reality of existence, but in the manifold
aspects of the recipients ( qawabil) 298 in the various degrees, each
according to its strength or weakness, perfection or imperfection,
and priority or posteriority. One of al-Raniri's chief sources on
Sufi metaphysics is Jami's important work entitled al-Durrah al
Fakhirah. 299 In that work, and in connection with the problem of
the one reality of existence and its multiple manifestations, Jami
explains, quoting the al-Risa/ah al-Hadiyah of �adr al-Din al
n,u�"aw-
�
J11 1 , 300 ,-h,...t·
l.-.J..J.U, •
, .. If ::i. reality differs by being more powerful, prior, stronger,

or superior in something, all of that is due, in the opinion of
the verifier, to its manifestation rather than to any
multiplicity occurring in the reality itself which is becoming
manifest. This is so regardless of whether that reality is one of
knowledge, of real existence, or of something else. There is,
thus, a recipient predisposed for the manifestation of the
reality such that the reality is more complete in its
297 That is, 'prior' and 'posterior' in a non-temporal sense, e.g. the hand
and the ring on the finger.
298 Jawiihir, p. 104.
299 Matba'at Kurdistan al-'Ilmiyyah, Cairo, 1328 A.H. See Jawiihir,
pp. 33, 36, 56, 63.

300 The following quotation is from Professor Nicholas Heer's
translation of Jami's work cited above (State University of New York
Press, Albany, 1979), which also contains a translation ofjami's Glosses
(lfawiishf) to the work and al-Lari's Commentary (SharM on the work.
Professor Heer's translations are based on his edition of the Arabic texts
(which appears in the Wisdom of Persia Series, Institute of Islamic
Studies, McGill University, Tehran Branch) prepared from a total of
twenty-four manuscripts in addition to the Cairo text printed in 1328
(note 299 above). Reference to this work will be cited as al-Durrah al
Fiikhirah; Jfawiishz; and Shar� al-Durrah, whichever applies. A set of two
numerals will be given in citing this work: the first numerals refer to the
pagination in Professor Heer's book (translation); and the second
numerals refer to the paragraph number in the text of the translation.
2 74 A COMMENTARY ON THE l;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ
·manifestation in one recipient than it is in its manifestation in

another, even though the reality itself is one in all recipients.
The inequality and dissimilarity -occurs between its
manifestations in accordance with the command causing its
manifestation and requiring an individuation of tha:t reality
which is different from its individuation in some other
matter. There is, thus, no multiplicity in the reality as such,
nor is there any division and partition ... 301
Thus the multiplicity of existents does not impair the oneness or

unity of existence, for each existent is a mode of existence, and
does not have a separate, ontological status. In presenting itself in
analogical grades in the manner we have attempted to convey,
existence is also systematically ambiguous. This analogical
gradation and systematic ambiguity is called by the Siifis ·
tashkzk. 302 For existence, in its manifold aspect as variegated
modes of itself, is that by which all things differ from one another;
at the same time existence, in its absoluteness, is also that by
which all things are unified. It is the principle at once both of
unity and diversity, of identity and difference. As we said at the
end of the last paragraph, there is a significant distinction
between the concept and the reality of existence, which may be
schematized in the following diagram:
Existence
Concept Reality
I I
I I I
General Portion Absolute Particular
I I
I I I
Quiddity Mode
301Al-Durrah al-Fiikhirah, p. 36/10. See also ibid, p. 36/9 and lfawiishf, p.

93/8 & g. On the Risii.lah al-Hii.diyah of al-Qunyawi', see Professor Beer's
note on p. 76 (note I, par. 10).
302 For a definition oftashk'fk, see al-Jurjani', Ta'rifii.t, p. 51; see also al-
COMMENTARY 2 75
The significant distinction referred to, and within the context of

tashkik) is that in existence as reality there is a clear difference
between the absolute existence and the particular and
determinate existence in terms of strength and weakness, and
priority and posteriority, which cannot be established in the case
of existence as concept; moreover, in the case of general existence
understood as a concept it can only be conceived of as the
principle of unity, and not of diversity. 303 In terms of its
determinations (ta'ayyuniit) encompassing the five ontological
grades in a descending order, the reality of existence-as referred
to by al-Raniri speaking on behalf of the Siifis 304 -is
summarized into three stages in hierarchical order:
I. General existence (wujud 'iimm), which in this case is none

other than absolute existence (wujud mu/laq). This refers to
the degree of absolute being or existence at the level of the
first determination (ta'ayyun awwal) in the condition of
essential unity (wa�dah). With reference to the infinite self
revelations of absolute being (tajalliyat), existence at this
stage pertains to the manifestation of the Essence to Itself
Durrah al-Fakhirah, 36/9; and lfawashi, 93/8, Shar& al-Durrah, 120/9. The
expressions 'analogical gradation' and 'systematic ambiguity' used
above are translations of the concept of tashkzk by Professors Izutsu and
Fazlur Rahman respectively. The expression of Sufi metaphysics along
philosophical lines was formulated by Sadr al-Dfo Shi"razi, called Mulla
Sadra (d. 1641) and carried on by his school. One of his greatest
commentators was Mulla Hadi Sabzawari (d. 1878). For Mulla Sadra's
Kitab al-Asfiir) see the philosophically orientated interpretation by F.
Rahman referred to above, The Philosophy of Mulla $adrii) State
University of New York Press, Albany, 1975 (on ta,shkik see e.g. pp.
34-37; 39, 85, 102). For Sabzawari's Ghurar al-Farii) id ) also called Shar�
i-Man,:Jimah (ed. T. Izutsu and M. Mu}:laqqiq, Tehran, 1969) see the
English Introduction to the Arabic text by T. Izutsu. See also Izutsu's
The Concept and Reality of Existence, Keio Institute of Cultural and
Linguistic Studies, Tokyo, 197 I, IV (on tashkzk), see e.g. pp. 107-109;
138-140).
303 See Izutsu, ibid. pp. 140-141.
304 Jawiihir ) pp. 52-53. See also ibid.) p. 89.

(tajallz dhiitz) by which the essential attributes Uifat) and

predispositions (shu'iin) become known to It. This is the
manifestation of the absolute being to Himself in His self
concealing aspect.
2. Relative existence (wujiid irj,iifi), which is existence in its
absolute oneness but already pregnant with infinite
possibilities toward self-diversification. This is the level of
the unity of the many (wiibidiyyah) wherein the Essence is
qualified by attributes and names ( asmii'), whose forms are
the interior archetypes or the fixed essences ( al-a'yiin al
thabitah). Here the absolute being, Who is described by the
metaphor of Light ( niir) in the-first stage of the hierarchy, is
reflected as images in innumerable and different mirrors
(i.e. the permanent archetypes). This level corresponds to
the second determination ( ta' ayyun thiinf).
3. Existence as diversified into particular and individual
entities, or into its manifold and variegated modes (wujiid
jiimi'). This corresponds to the level of the third, fourth and
fifth determinations. Here again, the effulgence of Light
from the first stage that is reflected in the second ( i.e. the
fixed essences) is in turn reflected through the second stage
to the exterior essences ( al-al'yiin al-khiirijiyyah). 305
From the above exposition of the position of the Sufis of the

school of wabdat al-wujiid in regard to the reality of existence, as
opposed to the theologians' position in regard to the concept of
existence, it becomes clear that existence (wujiid), for the Sufis, is
all there is, and that such being the case, it would be erroneous to
name a conceptual phenomenon (i.e. the world together with all
its parts as composed of mentally posited quiddities, or essences,
to which existence is superadded as an attribute) with the name
305 This corresponds to what has already been described above, pp.
159-160; 167, and to the most holy and the holy emanation or
effulgence (jaytj,) in the schema of ontological descent of Absolute Being
on p. 172. The exterior archetypes are also innumerable differing
mirrors corresponding to the interior archetypes.
COMMENTARY 2 77
of'existence'. That would suggest that existence subsists or enters
into 'the world' (i.e. the world as understood by those who held
the primacy of 'essence' or 'quiddity' over existence (the
'essentialists'), which t' o the Sufis (existentialists) 'exists' only in
the realm of concepts). Although the Sufis say that it is one of the
individuations or effects of the reality of existence, the realm of
concepts is in reality pure non-existence (' adam al-ma�r/,), whereas
pure existence (wujiid al-ma�rj,) exists in reality, which means that
it is also existent (mawjiid) in the real sense. Existence cannot
subsist in non-existence, nor can it enter into or accept what is
essentially non-existent. 306
Al-Raniri says that the meaning of ma::,har (pl. ma::,iihir)
according to its linguistic significance, 307 is 'locus in which a
thing is manifested, not in which is the thing itself ( al-makiin al
ladhzyu::,hir .fihi al-shaf lii nafs al-shay' Jthi). 308 Like a mirror: it is
the locus of the image of the beholder, and not the locus of the
beholder himself. Thus the manifested thing is not contained in
the locus of manifestation. 309 Quoting Ja.mi's Ashi" at al
Lama' iit) 310 he says that according to the Suffs ma::,har refers to the
306 0n the problem of the application of the name wujiid and its
derivative mawjiid, see e.g. al-Dawwani's essentialist position and
Sadra's criticism of it in F. Rahman, op. cit. ) pp. 136-138. An
illuminating analysis and exposition of the meaning of'name', 'named',
and 'naming' is found in al-Ghazali's Al-Maq{ad al-Asna) ed. Fa<;llou
Shehadi, Dar al-Mashriq, Beyriit, the Arabic text, pp. 17-35 (eh.I).
Another in the Lawami' al-bayyinat shar� asma' Allah wa al--fifat of Fakhr
al-Din al-Razi, Maktabah al-Kulliyat al-Azhariyyah, Cairo,
1396/1976 (under the title Shar� Asma' Allah al-lfusna Li al-Razi), see pp.
18-26. See further al-Qashani's Shar� 'ala Fu.fii.f al-lfikam, p. 4. See
further, p. 288 below.
307 Al-Raniri's reference is usually al-Firiizabadi's great Q_amiis.
308 Jawahir, p. 50.
309 See further Jawahir, pp. 112-114. Raniri quotes the Durr aL
Man;;,iim.
310 ]awahir, pp. 51-52. The Ashi"at al-Lama'at is a commentary upon
the Lama'at of 'Iraqi. According to Chittick, op. cit. (Naqd al-Nu.fii{) p.

xxxiii, this 150-page commentary includes a 20-page introduction to
ibn 'Arabi's teachings as reflected in the Lama' at.
form uurah) of a thing, whether it be in the intelligible world, or

in the sensible realm. By 'intelligible' and 'sensible' he means to
refer to the world of the permanent archetypes in the case of the
former, and to that of the exterior archetypes in the case of the
latter. In this sense, and with reference to the forms in the
intelligible world, the permanent archetypes are the maiahir in
which are reflected the essential perfections ( kamiiliit dhiitiyyah)
emanated by the most holy effulgence of Absolute Being ( al-Jaytj,
al-aqdas) in the first revelation of the Essence to Itself (tajallz
dhiitf). These essential perfections are encompassed in the Divine
Names, whose reflections appear as 'images' in the forms of the
permanent archetypes. Similarly, the exterior archetypes are the
ma;;,iihir of the permanent archetypes, through which latter are
reflected, by means of the second, holy effulgence ( al-Jayef, al
muqaddas) in the second, self-revelation of Absolute Being (tajallz
shuhudf), the concomitants arising out of the forms of the Divine
Names. Their necessary effects become the visible world. 311 Just
as the two types of ma;;,har or manifestation-form correspond to
the two forms of self-manifestation, so they also correspond, in
their existential evolvement, to the causal effects of the principal
Names, the Interior ( al-ba/in) and the Exterior ( al-?iihir), the First
( al-awwal) and the Last ( al-iikhir). 312 On the analogy of the
mirror, we see that what becomes manifest in the locus of
manifestation (ma;;,har) is the form, not the essence or the thing
itself. However, according to Jami in the Lawa'ib, 313 quoted next
by al-Raniri, 314 the case of the Absolute Being is different in that
all whose manifestations are identical with the loci wherein they
are manifested, and in all such loci, 315 He is manifested in His
own essence. Here Jami does not mean by maihar a real separate
locus in union ( ittibiid), as it were, with the Absolute manifested by
it; nor is the Absolute immanent (bulul) in it, for the maihar does
311Jawahir, pp. 51-53.

312 Seeabove, 166-167
313Page 36.
314 Jawahir, p. 51.
315 Here by 'loci' is meant the
permanent archetypes, see Jawahir, p. 5 I·
COMMENTARY 2 79
not in itselfexist separately for Him to be in union with it, or to be

immanent in it. The ma:;,har in itself is something in the interior
condition of be.ing (i.e. bafin); it is essentially non-existent (ma' diim
bi al-dhiit). In order to understand this, we must again pursue our
analogy of the mirror: when one looks in a mirror, only one's
image is seen therein, but the mirror itself is not S\:en. 316 So the
maihar is in reality the quality of the being-manifest (-fifat :;,iihir), it
is not a real and separate 'theatre' or 'place' of manifestation. 317
Now the becoming manifest (:;,uhiir) of a thing is its becoming
distinct (Malay: beza, Arabic: mayzah) from another, or its
becoming a differentia. 318 As we said earlier with reference to
realities, 319 it is due to the essential property of distinctness
inherent in each Divine Attribute that a reality from among the
infinite realities of the Divine Names becomes manifest. The
ma:;,har, then, is constituted by the Divine Attributes. 320 In the
same way that, for the �ufis, the Attributes are identical with the
Essence in reality, but superadded to It in thought, 321 so that
the ma:;,har constituted by the Attributes is in reality also
constituted by the Essence, usually referred to here as the Truth,
in that way too is the Truth, as Absolute Existence, what
constitutes His modes of existence, for the modes do not. have ·
separate, independent existences seeing that He is their real
existences and their real essences. The Truth, in virtue of His
infinite Names and Attributes, sees Himself as though in infinite
and different mirrors, each reflecting a different aspect of His
Being, th.us producing a variegated multiplicity of images
without impairing the absolute oneness of His Being. In this
316 See Hamzah Fan�uri in the Muntahz, op. cit., p. 454 (10).
.I, z ., p. 49.
3I81b'd
319
32 °For a philosophica1 discussion on the differentia as reality or mode of
existence, Mulla Sadra's later development of this Sufi doctrine is most

illuminating. See Professor F. Rahman's treatment of it in his work ( op.
cit.), pp. 49-55, et passim.
321
See Lawii'i� XV, pp. 14/18; also above, pp 163-164.
respect,Jami's analogy in al-Durrah al-Fakhirah which is also used

by al-Raniri 322 is most pertinent:
If a single particular form is impressed in many mirrors

which differ with respect to being iarge or small, long or
short, flat, convex or concave, and so forth, then there can be
no doubt that this form multiplies in accordance with the
multiplicity of the mirrors, and that its impressions differ in
accordance with the differences in the mirrors. Furthermore
this multiplicity of impressions does not impair the unity of
the original form, nor does the appearance of the form in any
one of these mirrors preclude it from appearing in the others.
The True One, "and God's is the loftiest likeness" is thus
analogous to the one form, whereas quiddities are analogous
to the many mirrors with their differing predispositions. God
appears in each and every individual essence in accordance
with that essence, without any multiplicity or change
occurring in His holy essence. Moreover His appearing in
accordance with the characteristics of any one of these
individual essences does not prevent Him from appearing
also in accordance with the characteristics of the others, as
you have learned from the foregoing analogy. 323
Commenting on this passage, Jami's disciple and commentator,

'Abd al-Ghafiir al-Lari (d. 912 A.H.) says:
This is a perfect analogy, even though there is a difference

between the appearance of the form in the mirror and His
appearance in His cognitive and concrete places of
manifestation, since He is what constitutes His places of
manifestation. Furthermore, He exists in reality, whereas His
places of manifestation do not really exist but rather have
reflected upon them the light of existence, just as a wall has
reflected upon it the reflection of red paper, although the
322Jawiihir, p. 36.
323Al-Durrah al-Fiikhirah, p. 42/24.
COMMENTARY 281
wall itself is not in reality red. As for the aspect of similarity

between them,it is that both appear in different forms while
their unity remains as it was without any change at all, and
that their appearance in certain forms does not prevent their
appearing in others. 324
Jami's reference to the 'quiddities' as being analogous to the
many mirrors with their differing potentialities (sing. isti' dad) is
an allusion to the real and individual essences (sing. 'ayn) in the
interior, intelligible world of the archetypes, whence they are
projected and evolved in the exterior, sensible archetypes to
become the world of concrete things. Now, in the case of the
mirror, it is the form, not the essence of the beholder, that is
reflected; but in the case of the maihar of the Truth, He is Himself
the manifestation-form by which He is manifested in His own
essence-He is Himself, as it were, at once the mirror and the
face. The Truth appears in each and every individual essence in
accordance with the nature of that essence, so that while it is true
that He is manifested by that essence, yet that essence, by virtue
ot its inherent potentiality, limits the Truth according to its own
nature. 325 S6 each and every manifestation-form is the Truth as
manifested according to that form, not the Truth as He is in His
absoluteness. Thus, while the Truth is identical with His
manifestation form, the latter is not necessarily identical with the
former, for it cannot be said that there is absolutely no distinction
whatever in the ontological condition of the Truth and His
multiple and variegated individuations. There is, first, the
distinction of essential priority and posteriority between the
Truth and His manifestations and individuations. 326 His being
the Truth in His absoluteness is prior to His being His
manifestation and individuation, and thus existence in reality
pertains to what is prior. Secondly, there is the distinction of
absoluteness and limitedness between them respectively. 327
32 4Shar� al-Durrah, p. 126/24.

a 2 ssee al-Durrah al-Fakhirah, p. 59/58.
326 See Jawahir, p. 51.
327 See Shar� Fu1ii1, p. 1 1.
4
Similarly, the distinction between the interior, intelligible ma?,har

and the exterior, sensible ma?,har is in terms of the former being
absolute (mu!faq) and the latter limited (muqayyad), and indeed
also in terms of the priority-posteriority relationship such as we
have described in the case of tashkzk. 328• So the Truth is revealed
in the manifested existence, and His manifestation-forms that
reveal Him are His qualities. Said in another way, He is the one
'substance', his manifestation-forms are the 'accidents' accessory
to Him. Taken in themselves the 'accidents' have no real
existence, but taken in relation to their Source they have, to use
al-Lari's expression above, "reflected upon them the light of
existence." The metaphor of light brings to mind the attendant
shadow (?-ill).
According to ibn 'Arabi that which is other-than-the Truth
(siwa al-&aqq: or that which is other than God in His aspect as the
Absolute) by which is meant the world, is in relation to the Truth
what shadow is in relation to a person, so that in this sense the
world is the shadow of God ( ?,ill Allah). 329 Al-Qashani
commenting on this 340 says that for there to be a shadow there
must be three things: a person who casts the shadow; a place or
locus where the shadow is cast; and light whereby the shadow is
cast. The person here symbolizes the Truth; the place or locus
symbolizes the possible essences ( al-a'yiin al-mumkiniit) or the
permanent archetypes ( al-a'yiin al-thiibitah); and the light
symbolizes the Divine Name 'the Manifest' ( al-?,iihir). Light, as al
Ghazali says, 341 ·1s by itself visible and makes other things visible.
Indeed, God is the Real Light, the Source of all the grades of
lights which are, in relation to His Light, metaphorical in
nature. 342 The Divine Name 'the Light' (al-nur) points in fact to
the Divine Name 'the Manifest', for like light God is by Himself
manifest and brings others into manifestation ( al-?,iihir fz nafsihi
328 See above, pp. 272-274; Jawahir, pp. 51; 95.

329 ru,ru,r,
V - p. 101. s ee aI so 1· awa-h.zr, p. 104.
340 Shar� Fu,rii,r, p. 138.
341 Mishkiit, p. 4- .
5
342 /bid., pp. 16-18; on the various grades oflights see pp. 4-16.
COMMENTARY
al-mu::,,hir li-ghayrihi). 343 Now the 'others' that are brought into
manifestation are the possible essences ( al-mumkinat) which are in
themselves mere potentialities having no actual existence and
which are essentially in the darkness of non-existence ( :;,ulmah
'adamiyyah), but which are nonetheless established as intelligibles
in the Divine knowledge. 344 The term 'darkness' (:;,ulmah) alludes
to the nature of the shadow, for all shadows are dark and nothing
could be darker than the darkness of non-being.Just as in the case
of a phenomenal shadow, if there were no light to project it and
no place where it can be cast, the shadow would remain in non
existence; it would remain a potentiality inherent in the
phenomenal being or thing and would never emerge into
actuality�so in like manner, the possible essences in their
darkness of non-existence, which in this case also means their
being enveloped in mystery, are potentialities established in the
Divine consciousness. They are the essential perfections ( kamalat
dhiitiyyah) that constitute the Divine Names and Attributes. Only
when the Light of His Essence is projected upon them that the
shadows they cast constitute the permanent archetypes, so that
the archetypes represent the 'place' or manifestation-form
( ma:;,har) of the shadow of the Essence ( :;,ill al-dhat). Then through
the permanent archetypes the essential Light is further projected
on the forces inherent in their nature ( a�kam), their necessary
repercussions (lawazim) and concomitants (tawabi') casting as
their effects ( athar) the second shadow that we call the world. 345
Citing al-Qashani, al-Raniri says that the shadow of the Essence
is called the 'relative light' ( niir irjiifi). 346 Now the possible
essences are in themselves not luminous because they possess no
343JWaq{ad, p. 157, his commentary on the Divine Name al-niir (pp.

157-158); also his commentary on the Divine Names al-,r,ahir al-bii(in,
pp. 147-50. Shar� Fu{ii{, p. 133. Qv. al-Razi on names in the reference
in note 306 above.
344Fu{ii{, pp. 101-102; Jawiihir, pp. 89; 91.
345]awiihir, pp. 52-53, the second shadow is called ?,ill khiirijz, 'exterior
shadow', i.e. the shadow of the exterior archetypes ( al-a'yiin al
khiirijiyyah). See further ibid., pp. 85; 89.
346 /bid., p.
89; see al-Qashani's Shar� Fu.fii.f, p. 144; Fu.fii.f, p. 104.
284 A COMMENTARY ON THE I;,IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
being. Without the essential Light, the possible essences do not

become essences. When the Essence manifests itself in the possible
essences its shadow becomes manifest. The possible essences are
like transparent glass, so that the shadow of the Essence projected
through them retains its light-nature. Only when this shadow of
light is further projected to the exterior archetypes ( al-a'yiin al
khiirijiyyah) to appear as the world does it acquire its dark
coloration due to the 'distance' from the Source of Light. The
Light itself is pure and colourless, but becomes coloured by the
colour of the glasses through which it shines forth. 347 This is why
the first shadow is called 'relative light', which is but another
name for 'relative being or existence' ( wujud ir/,iifi) for in the
terminology of the �tiffs light is identical with being or
existence. 348
Thus the world is called 'shadow' for two main reasons which
demonstrate the analogous nature of their reality, namely: (I)
the shadow has no independent reality; its movement is due to its
possessor and it has no efficacy to bring into existence or to cause
nonexistence; it is essentially non-being, for its real essence is not
itself but its possessor; (ii) the reality of the shadow is existential
privation ( ketiadaan) oflight; it does not possess prior existence to
which one can refer as its reality other than sheer possibility, and
it comes into existence due to the light that casts it. Its reality,
then, is other than itself. 349
It is clear from what we have explained that there are two
aspects to the shadow of the Absolute: the first is the essential
shadow of the Absolute (:;.,ill dhiitf) which becomes manifest to
Him as He reveals Himself to Himself and in Himself, and this
corresponds to the self-manifestation of the Absolute to His own
Essence ( tajallz dhiitz). 350 The shadow is projected on the interior
347 Fuiui, pp. I02- rn3.

348 See Mishkiit, p. 17; Maqiad, p. 157; Fuiui, p. rn2; Jawiihir, p. 89. Al
Raniri also says that the relative existence (wujiid ir/iifzl is identical with
the 'breath of the Merciful' (nafas al-ra�man). Jawiihir, p. 88. See also
Kashshiif, IV, p. 938 under al-;;,ill.
349 Jawiihir, p. rn5; al-Raniri here cites the author of the La/ii'if al-I' lam.
COMMENTARY
archetypes ( al-a'yiin al-thiibitah) which are the forms of the Divine

Names and Attributes. This projection corresponds to the first
effulgence ofHis Light, which is the most holy emanation ( al-fay(j
al-aqdas). 351 The self-revelations (tajalliyiit) and self
determinations (ta'ayyuniit) of the Absolute are here of an interior
nature subjective to Him, and they refer to the ontological planes
ofthe first and second determinations ( ta'ayyun awwal and ta' ayyun
thiinz) respectively. 352 Al-Raniri says that this aspect of the
shadow of the Absolute is variously called relative being (wujud
ir/iifi), general existence ( wujiid 'iimm), and the beloved ( al
ma'shiiq) in the degree of essential oneness (al-wa�dah) in the
ontological plane of the first determination; and it is called the
first shadow (?,ill awwal), and the permanent archetypes ( nl-a'yiin
al-thiibitah) in the degree of unity ( al-wii�idiyyah) in the
ontological plane of the second determination. The second aspect
ofthe shadow ofthe Absolute is what is called the exterior shadow
(iill khiirifi), which is the maihar or manifestation-form of the
second determination. This shadow is a reflection of the first
shadow as it is projected in the forms of the interior archetypes,
and it corresponds to the second effulgence of His Light, which is
the .holy emanation ( al-Jayrj, al-muqaddas), and to the self
revelations of the Absolute as He goes on determinating Himself
into ever more concrete forms in variety and multiplicity through
the exterior archetypes ( al-a'yiin al-khiirijiyyah) until finally it
assumes the forms of the visible world (tajallz shuhudi or tajallz
wujiidz). 353 This second shadow (?-ill thiinz), being a reflected
shadow ofthe first, is variously called the First Intellect ( al-'aql al
awwal), the World of Spirits (' iilam al-arwii�), the Perfect Man ( al
insiin al-kiimil) and that which is other than God (mii siwa
Allah). 354
Referring to one ofhis works entitled /fall al-?,ill ( The Casting of
the Shadow), 355 al-Raniri says that when God desired to behold
351
352 See above, the schem� of ontological descent of the Absolute, p. 172.
354 Jawiihir, pp. 52-53; 104.
355 Ms. eh. V; on an exposition of the Acts (afiil) and their Effects
286 A COMMENTARY ON THE 1:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
His resplendent Beauty (jamiil), He revealed Himself to Himself

( tajallf) in His Essence and beheld therein as in a miraculous
mirror His essential perfections (kamiiliit dhiitiyyah) in their eternal
and everlasting beauty. This First Mirror (al-mir'iit al-iilii) by
which He gazed at Himself in contemplation is the Reality of
Mu}:iammad, or the Mu}:iammadic Reality (al-&aqzqah al
mu&ammadiyyah) which reflects His Beautiful Names (al-asmii: al
&usnii) and Sublime Attributes (al-�ifiit al-'ulyii). This first self
revelation and self-contemplation of God refers to the ontological
level of the Absolute in the degree of the first determination
( ta' ayyun awwal). Then desiring to see the essences (al-a'yiin) of His
infinite Names and Attributes. He revealed Himself to Himself
yet again in their forms (sing. riirah) and beheld as in another
miraculous mirror the realities ( �aqii'iq) inherent in them. This is
the Mirror of Realities (mir' iit al-&aqii'iq) in which the forms of the
Names and Attributes are established as the fixed essences or
permanent archetypes (al-<yan al-thiibitah). Now the Absolute
Being in the highest degree of absoluteness does not require
anything, being sufficient unto Himself and needing no 'other'
whatever. But His Names and Attributes which become
apparent to Him at the lower degrees of the ontological levels
require their realities to be realized in their respective
manifestation-forms (ma:::,iihir), whether such manifestation
forms pertain to the invisible world (' alam al-ghayb) or to the
visible world (' iilam al-shahadah), for without their manifestation
forms the realities will never be able to actualize their positive
nature. The realities of the Names and Attributes can only
become positive by being actualized in their manifestation
forms. This actualization of the realities of the Names and
Attributes is effected by the self-revelations (sing. tajallz'),
determinations and individuations (sing. ta' ayyun) of the
Absolute Being in them (i.e. in their forms). Because every single
( athar), as cited in Jawiihir, p. I o I. See Nieuwenhuijze's work on Shams

al-Din, op. cit., pp. 203-206, and above, p. 27 no. IO. By the 'Casting of
the Shadow', al-Raniri says that it means the casting of light on the
meaning of the word 'shadow'; ertirrya menguraikan perkataan ?:,ill.
COMMENTARY
one of the realities is distinct from the other, His self-revelations in

them are never repeated in the same forms. Thus it comes about
that He manifests Himself in the multiplicity and variety of the
other-than-He. 356
The ontological status of that which is other than God is that it
has relative existence by virtue of being connected with the
effusion of Existence ( inbisiit al-wujiid). Each such thing is in
reality a perishing thing being perpetually renewed by the
dynamic operation of the Divine Names and Attributes opposed
to each other, or rather, by the actualization of their realities
as entified by the self-revelations, determinations and
individuations of Absolute Existence in their forms. The
existence of each such thing is then discor:..tinuous and
momentary-indeed, its existence is simultaneous with its non
existence, and our recognizing it as having an 'essence' and as a
specific, individual 'thing' having apparent continuance in
existence is in reality attributed to its quiddity which is mentally
posited ( i' tibiirf). 357 The thing as it really is is 'ever-new' in the
sense that it is forever a perishing thing being renewed by its
similar and, therefore, non-eternal (mubdath). Its being thus
renewed in existence is its being 'connected' or 'related' to
existence. Its real existence is therefore that moment of 'being
existent', that moment of being 'related-to' existence and this is
called relative existence ( al-wujiid al-itj,iifi). 358 Hence the world
which is constituted by such things is nothing but mere relations
(sing. nisbah). 359 In its aspect as 'sheer connections' or 'mere
356 ]awahir, p. IOI.

35 7 Mentally posited (i' tibiiri) means that the object thus posited exists
only in the mind when the mind considers it.
358 See al-Durrah al-Fiikhirah, p. 42/25, last sentence; and al-Fanar1,
Misbah al-Uns, p. 53 (see also Heer's note on para. 25, p. 80).

359 Jawahir, p. 104. The existential connection or relation is sometimes
referred to as a sustaining linking-up of the creative chain (isniid

menjadikan) (ibid., p. 107). Mulla Sadra refers to this aspect of the world
as 'sheer connections' (rawiibi{ ma�rj,ah): see Concept and Reality of
Existence, p. 43; Philosophy of Mullii $adrii, p. 15 and the references to the
Asfar on p. 23, note 38.
relations' the world has relative existence. In itself, however, the

world has no existence as it is pure non-being ( al-' adam al-mabef).
As al-Raniri says speaking on behalf of the Siifis, pure non-being
cannot become one being with pure being ( al-wujiid al-mab{j,).
The reason for this, as formulated by al-Qashani, is that pure
non-being is absolutely 'nothing' and being does not accept non
being, otherwise it would, after accepting· non-being, be
existence which is non-existent. Similarly non-being does not
accept being. If either being or non-being accepts its opposite, it
would turn into its own contradictory while being still itself,
which is absurd. Moreover, for something to accept another there
must necessarily be multiplicity in it, and pure being does not
include any multiplicity at all. That which accepts both being
and non-being is not pure being, but the archetypes ( a'yiin) and
their permanent states in the intelligible world, becoming visible
with being and disappearing with non-being. Everything in the
world of concrete existents is existent through being. In itself such
an existent is non-being. If this were not so, then it must be
admitted that the thing's existence had a prior existence before its
own existence. In the case of pure being, it is from the beginning
existent and its existence is its own essence, otherwise it would not
be pure being, and its existence would have an existence prior to
itself, which is absurd. 360 Al-Qashani in the foregoing argument
pointed out that the archetypes and their permanent states in the
intelligible world can accept both being and non-being,
becoming visible with being and disappearing with non-being.
The world, whose true realities are the archetypes, may also be
apprehended as having a double aspect in that its becoming
visible is due to being and its disappearance is due to non-being.
The inherent nature of the world qua world, however, is non
being. 361 In its aspect as being it is not the world as we know it,
but the archetypes, or rather, the concomitants and effects which
refer back to the archetypes in whose forms the Absolute Being
goes on manifesting Himself in multiple individuations and
360 Shar� Fu�u�, p. 4

COMMENTARY
variegated modes of existence. We have recurrently said that

those realities, in their turn, are the forms of the Divine Names
and Attributes. The world, in this latter sense, is constituted by
the forms of the Names and Attributes.
Al-Raniri says that the world is "the reflected image like unto
the form (Malay: rupa; Arabic riirah) that is seen in an analogical
mirror ( cermin bidal tamthil); the Truth Most Exalted is like the
gazer into the glass and the world is the form seen reflected
therein." The Malay word bidal is generally known to mean
'proverb', or 'parable' or 'maxim'; and from its context and usage
in �1alay literature there is no doubt that the proverbs, parables
and maxims and stories expressing moral lessons reflect, or
portray as substitutes ( sing. Arabic: badal or bidl) for what is
happening in real life. Now as to the word bidal in Malay usage, it
obviously is derived from the Arabic bidl, which has the same
measure as mitht and just as in Malay the words of Arabic origin
of this measure is pronounced with the vowel a before the last
letter, such as mithl being generally pronounced mithal, so is bidl
pronounced bidal. In Malay the word bidal is often used by itself
with the suffix an: bidalanJ and it is synonymous withperumpamaan J
meaning, again, a kind of substitute, an example, a like; and
perumpamaan and umpama are synonymously used with other
Malay words of Arabic derivation such as tamthil ( tamth'fl) and
mithal ( mithl), ibarat (' ibiirat), kias and kiasan ( qiyiis). Moreover,
they are often paired together in literary expression, such as kias
ibarat and kias-kias. In the case at hand we have the expression
bidal-tamthil. We are here referring to an allegorical or analogical
mirror. The mirror in literature is universally used as an object
for striking analogy, parable, or allegory of human life and
reality. Expressions such as cermin hidup, mir' iit al-Iafii, mir'iit al
haqa'iq, mir'at al-mu'min, mir'at al-tullab and many more are found
in Malay literature. Among the Siifis the symbolism of the mirror
refers to the permanent archetypes or fixed essences ( al-a'yiin al
thiibitah) in the Divine knowledge. The mirror in this symbolism
'reflects' the Ideas or Intelligible Forms (al-Iuwar al-'ilmiyyah)
and their realities the Lofty Letters (al-�urilfal-'iiliyiit) indwelling
in the Divine consciousness-that is to say, the Beautiful Names
(al-asmiP al-�usnii) and the Lofty Attributes (al-�ifiit al-'ulyii). The

expression conveying the idea that God is the gazer into the glass
cannot be taken as analogous to any corresponding human
situation since in the human situation it is the form or image,
and not the reality or essence that is reflected in a mirror; but the
glass is in this case an analogical one, and the form that is
reflected is the very reality or essence of the world. 362 The form
that is meant here is theform of the world. According to ibn 'Arabi,
by 'the form of the world' is meant the Beautiful Names and Lofty
Attributes; and the form of the world in this sense does not refer to
its sensible, individual form, but to its intelligible, specific form,
that is, to the Beautiful Names whose realities are the Sublime
Attributes. The sensible forms of the world are the manifestation
forms (ma,?:,iihir) of the Names and Attributes which are their
inner realities, the sensible things being their individual, exterior
forms. These latter are ever changing shapes and figures, whereas
the former are permanent and established. 363
Thus his words to the effect that God is like the gazer into the
glass and the world is the form seen refleted therein refers to God's
contemplation of Himself, His essential perfections, as He
appears in the forms of His Beautiful Names and Sublime
Attributes in the Mirror of Realities (mir'iit al-&aqii'iq) at the
ontological level of the archetypes. The world that is seen
reflected there is not the sensible world, but the intelligible world.
In this sense, and as Jami has pointed out, 364 what He sees
refleCLed in that mirror is none other than Himself in His Very
Essence. Moreover, to Lhe Siifis of the school of wa&dat al-wujiid,
the Divine Attributes are none other than the Essence with
respect to existence, being other than It only with respect to
intellection. 365 So in the same manner that we say that the
362 See Jawiihir, p. 104: the world is the form ({iirah) of the Truth, and
the Truth is its individual existence (huwiyyah) and its soul or spirit (riiM.
See also the definition of ma;;.har above, p. 277.
363Fu{ii{, p. 199; Shar4 Fu{ii{, p. 307.
·h p. 36 ; Jawa-h.zr, p. 51.
364L awa-, z_,
365 Lawii'i�, p. 14, XV/r 8; al-Durrah al-Fiikhirah, p. 44/28; lfawiishz, p.
98/20; Jawiihir, p. 56.

COMMENTARY
possessor of the image reflected in a mirror and the image

reflected are really one and the same-the image in itself having
no real, independent existence-in the same way is the Absolute
and His Names and Attributes seen by Him in the Mirror of
Realities one and not many or other than Himself.
The Sufis of the school of wa&dat al-wujud, then, affirm the
existence of the world; not, to be sure, the existence of the world
qua itself, which is in reality nothing as it is pure non-being; but
they affirm the existence of the world as constituted by the
multiple and variegated modes of the reality of existence, by the
multiple and diverse particularizations and individuations of the
absolute existence, by the multiple and mutually distinct forms of
the Divine Names and Attributes in which the Truth manifests
Himself continuously, never repeating His appearance in the
same guise, in perpetual existential movement in such wise as to
create a world which in one aspect is He and in another other
than-He
Commenting on the respective views of the Mutakallimin and
the $iifis in connection with their affirmation of existence to the
world, al-Raniri concludes that:
IX The meaning intended (maq�iid) by the words of the

Mutakallimin and the $ufis is in fact identical (suatu); there
is no (real) difference in ( the views of) the two groups.
Indeed, the view of the Mutakallimin is based upon the
proofs of reason ( al-' aql) and Tradition (al-naql). They
contemplated the world and perceived through the ocular
vision (mata kepala) that it is existent (ada: mawfiid), non
eternal (mu&dath) and changing; and they contemplated the
Being of the Truth Most Exalted and perceived through the
intellectual vision (mata hati) 366 that it too is existent,
enduring eternally (qadzm). So they affirmed two existences:
the one possible existence (al-ja'iz al-wujiid) and the
The term hati (heart) here is synonymous with the intellect (al-'aql)
366
which is an aspect of the heart (al-qalb).

other necessary existence ( al-wajib al-wujiid). Possible

existence is created (makhliiq), and necessary existence is
Creator (khiiliq). The relationship (nisbah) between the two
is the relationship of Creator and created. For this reason it
is said by them that the two are different one from the other
... (etc. till the end).
From the above words it is clear that the Mutakallimiin based

their knowledge upon three things: reason, Tradition, and sense
perception (represented here by the sense of sight). This agrees
with what the Mutakallimiin themselves maintained, in that for
them the causes of knowledge are enumerated as three: the sound
senses (al-�awiiss al-salzmah), true narrative (al-khabar al-�iidiq),
and reason (al-<aql). 367 True narrative is o'f two kinds: that which
is in sequence and continuity (mutawiitir), established by the
tongues of people of whom it is inconceivable that they would
agree together on a falsehood; and that which is brought by the
Messenger of God ( al-rasiil). 368 Tradition ( al-naql) can be
classified as part of true narrativ·e. Now naql really means
'transmission' or 'transference' of words, since that is its
dominant underlying concept. It is oral transmission, later
recorded, from generation to generation, and this is synonymous
with tradition, so that naql means 'tradition'. But to say that naql
is tradition without further qualification is too vague because in
that sense its scope is too broad, for it would include all sorts of
traditions which are not necessarily connected with the Holy
Prophet, upon whom be peace, such as pre-islamic tradition and
the traditional usage of the Community not connected with
Islam. Pre-islamic tradition is not part of naql here meantdust as
Islamic or Muslim tradition which does not go back to the Holy
Prophet is also not part of it. Indeed, al-Shafi'i, to whose legal
school al-Raniri belongs, upheld what is stated above, so that
naql as tradition, and understood as such by Muslims, must refer
367Shar� al-'Aqa'id, pp. 24-25.

36Blb z"d., PP· 29; 31.
COMMENTARY 2 93
specifically to the Holy Prophet; it must be connected with him

because the tradition began with him. Since by naql is meant
tradition connected with the Holy Prophet, and what is
connected with the Holy Prophet is his sunnah and his &adzth and
those of his Companions, the rendering of it here by Tradition
(with capital T) is to distinguish it from what is not connected
with the Holy Prophet and to refer it to what is connected with
him. The authenticity and correct interpretation of the Holy
Qur'an; the faithful transmission of the sunnah; the consensus (al
ijmii') of the 'Ulama', which guarantees both these, are all
connected with the Holy Prophet. In the classification of
knowledge and the division of the sciences, the religious sciences
are based on al-naql (i.e. they are referred to as aP uliim al
naqliyyah), while the philosophical or rational and intellectual
sciences are based on al-'aql (al-'uliim al-'aqliyyah). The religious
sciences are the Holy Qur'an: its recitation and interpretation; the
sunnah: the life of the Holy Prophet, the history and message of the
Prophets before him, the tradition (&adzth) and its authoritative
transmission; the roots of religion; theology (al-kaliim): God, His
Essence, Attributes, Names and Acts, His Unity and Unicity (al
taw�zd); philosophical theology and metaphysics (al-ta�awwuf):
this treats of the same subjects as theology, and in addition to this,
psychology, cosmology and ontology, legitimate elements of
Islamic theology and philosophy including valid cosmological
doctrines pertaining to the hierarchy of being; linguistic sciences:
,Arabic, its grammar, lexicography and literature. The rational,
intellectual and philosophical sciences are the human sciences,
the natural sciences, applied sciences and technology. A
classification based on the Aristotelian model was set forth by al
Kindi. Al-Fara.bi accomplished a more elaborate classification,
adding into it the Islamic disciplines. lbn Sina, al-Ghazali, and
ibn Rushd were all influenced by al-Fara.bi in their respective
classifications, and they made some modification and
elaboration, as did the lkhwan al-Safa who came after al-Fara.bi.
Ibn Khaldiin's classification and analysis reflected what was
established of the division and description of the sciences in the
Muslim world up to his period in the ninth century. An idea of
29 4 A COMMENTARY ON THE l;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
the division of the sciences as known in the twelfth century of the

Islamic era can be seen in the Kashshiif of al-Tahanawi. 369
Al-naql, then, refers to knowledge that is not the product solely
of the 'aql; not originating in the human intellect, nor having its
source in human reason. The origin and source of it is the Holy
Qur'an, the revelation, and the very tradition began with it.
Thus according to knowledge based on what agrees with actual
fact as established by sense perception, reason, and Tradition, the
Mutakallimun maintained that the world exists in reality. This
position is in contradiction to that of the Sophists ( al
Siifasfi' iyyah) who denied the possibility of knowledge, claiming
that all knowledge is subjective to the knower; and who denied
the realities of things, maintaining that the so-called things are
mere fancies and figments of the imagination, and believed the
world to be sheer illusion. 370 The Mutakallimun also maintained
that there are two categories of being or existence ( al-wujud): the
necessary (al-wajib) and the contingent (al-mumkin); 371 and that
the world, which comes under the contingent, is composed of
substance ( al-jawhar) and accident ( al-' ararf,). The world, so
composed, is non-eternal (mu&dath) in the sense of there occurring
to it a perpetual recurrence of its being, that is, its origination
from non-existence ('adam) into existence. It does not subsist by
itself; it is created and is depenrlf'nt for its existence upon the
Creator. 372 Bearing in mind his assertion that the views of the
Mutakallimun and the $iifis, specifically with respect to their
affirmation of existence to the world, are identical, he means by
'Mutakallimin' here primarily the Imam Abu al-I:fasan al
Ash'ari and his followers, to whose theological school he
369 See further my The Concept of Education in Islam, Kuala Lumpur,

1980, pp. 39 fol. See also ibn Sina's Metaphysica, the first chapter on the
number of the philosophical sciences; the Rasii'il of the Ikhwan, vol. 1,
pp. 266-275; ibn Khaldun's Muqaddimah, vols, II and 111, eh. VI, pp.
436 fol.
370 See above, pp. 205-208. See
also Shar� aL-'Aqii'id, pp. 19-21.
371 See above, p. 262, note 179.
372 See above, para. VI.

COMMENTARY 2 95
belongs. 373 This is quite in keeping with al-Raniri's attitude,

seeing that the nature of Ash'ari atomism involving their theory
of the perpetual recurrence of creation closely approximates the
metaphysics of the Siifis of the school of wabdat al-wujud) to whose
position al-Raniri in fact adheres. Indeed, Ash'ari atomism, seen
from a certain perspective, already implied the transcendent
unity or oneness of existence (wabdat al-wujud). 374 Nevertheless,
we should not forget that there are differences of a fundamental
nature between the views of the Ash'aris and the Sufis on the
nature of the world as reality and on the nature of existence itself.
We have already explained the Mutakalhmun's position in onr
commentary on paragraph VI above. 375 Our attention here ·v,:ill
be directed solely to the problem of the nature of the world as
reality and the nature of existence, in order to clarify the issues
involved and to determine whether or not we can accept without
further qualification al-Raniri's assertion that the intended
meaning of the words of the Mutakallimun and the $iifis is the
same in this matter. Before doing so, however, we must first
complete al-Raniri's comparison, judgement and decision upon
the views of the Mutakallimiin and the $iifis in their
understanding of the nature of the world and of existence,
Comparing the $iifis' view with that of the Mutakallimiin on this
matter, he says by way of recapitulation:
X The $ufis too based their view upon the proofs of reason and
Tradition, and further add to these spiritual unveiling
(kaslif) and direct spiritual tasting ( dhawq). They
contemplated and perceived with their intellectual vision,
and they experienced directly (rasa) with their spiritual
tasting that being ( or existence) is but one, and that is the
Being of God, Who cannot be seen with the physical eyes
373
See above, p. 250, note 259.
374 See, for example, 'Affifi's Ta'lzqiit to the Furiis, p. 151 (13)-153; 213
(12)-215; also his Mystical philosophy, pp. 29, 33-36. Al-Qashani's Shar�
Fu,rii,f, pp. 186 foll. Corbin's Creative imagination, pp. 200-207.
375
296 A COMMENTARY ON THE I;IUJJAT AL-§IDDIQ.
( mata kepala) in this abode of the world. That which the

physical eyes see is the world which has' no being like the
Being of God. So the Being of God is Real Being (IJ,aqzqi') and
Absolute (muflaq), and the being ofthe world is metaphorical
being (majiizi') and limited (muqayyad), a shadow (?,ill) and a
possession (milk) of God's Being. Of this shadow existence,
cannot be predicated, nor can absolute non-existence (' adam
muflaq) be predicated ofit for the reason that ifwe predicate
ofit existence then it is necessarily a partner (sekutu) to God's
existence; and if we predicate of it absolute non-existence,
then this non-existence is nothing at all, and yet the world is
seen as existing (ada). It is clear then that the world is the
theatre of manifestation (ma?,har) of the Being of the Truth
Most Exalted. The relationship between the Being of God
and the world is neither one ofidentity nor one ofdifference,
for the world is the form of manifestation aIJ.d the possession
of the Truth Most Exalted.
It is to be noted here that the �iifis, while affirming reason and

Tradition as causes of knowledge, did not equally assign sense
perception to the same level of importance when it came to
determining the existence of the world. This is because the
F:xistence ofthe world they alluded to is not the world ofsense and
sensible experience, but the world as it really is, which cannot be
perceived by the senses. This, however, does not mean that they
considered sense perception unimportant as a cause of
knowledge, for the knowledge of the world of sense and sensible
experience as immediately perceived by the senses is necessar-y in
determining the fact that the world as such is not absolutely
nothing. The role of sense perception, insofar as it concerns the
world as it really is, is transferred to spiritual unveiling (kash.f)
and direct spiritual tasting (dhawq).
Al-kashf is akin to the ocular vision. 376 It is the laying bare of
something covered. 'Covered' here pertains to what is covered to
one's state ofbeing or feeling (�iil), or to one's cognition ('ilm), or
376 Kitiib al-Luma', p. 346.

COMMENTARY 2 97
to one's sight or vision ( 'ayn). It is the removal by God's grace of

the covering from one's state of being, or cognition, or vision that
enables one to feel, or to know, or to see the reality-truth.377 It is
of the rank of proximity to God (qurb).378 It involves the
expansion (bas/) of the heart (al-qalb), 379 and it calms the heart
by way of contemplation (mushiihadah) when the heart is agitated
( wajd) by the vision of God.380 It is certain knowledge based on
true verification, direct apprehension, and clear vision,
uninterrupted by any distraction. The final -stage of kashf is
mushiihadah, or 'contemplation, 381 by which the �iifis meant
the vision of God in public or in private. 382 As a technical term of
the �ufis, the covering that is meant and that is caused, by God's
grace, to be lifted in the experience of kashf, is the covering of the
heart ( al-qalb), which is as the eye to the pure intellect, and which
is the spiritual organ of cognition at the higher levels of
knowledge.383 The lifting of the covering of the eye of the pure
f
377 We have formulated this description of kash based on Quranic
usage. See, for example, with reference to the removal of what is
covered to one's state of being or feeling, al-An'iim (6) :41; 17 which
refers to the removal of distress and affiiction; likewise al-.Na�l (16) :54;
al-Anbi,yii' (21):84; al-Zumar (39):38, Banz lsrii'zl (17):56, runus ("10):12;
107; al-.Naml (27): 62; the removal of penalty, al-A'riif (7):134-135;
Yiinus (10):98; al-Dukhiin (44):12; 15; al-Zukhruf (43):50, with reference
to knowledge, the laying bare of some deep secret or mystery, al-.Najin
(53) :58; .Nun al-Qalam (68):42; with reference to vision, al-.Naml (g7):44,
Qjif (50):22.
378 Kashf al-Mah�jiib, p. 226. Qjif (50):16.
379 Ibid., p. 374; al-Baqarah (2):245.

380lb l"d•) p. 414.
381 'Abd Allah al-An�ari"listed it as the first often spiritual realities. See
his Maniizil al-Sii'irfn, p. 40. The other nine are al-mushiihadah; al
mu' iiyanah; al-�ayiit; al-qabrj,; al-bas/; al-sukr; al-sa�w; al-itti�iil; al-in.fi�iil
(pp. 40-43) ·
382 Kashf al-MaMiib, pp. 329-333.
383 It is to the vision ofthe heart that the Holy Prophet alluded when he,
upon whom be peace, said: "Worship God as if you saw Him ..." (see
above, pp. 147, 153). On another occasion he also spoke of seeing God
with our hearts (see Kashf al-Ma�jiib, p. 329). That the heart is the
spiritual organ of sight is derived from the Holy Qur'an. There God
speaks ofHis covering and sealing ofhearts, and says that those who are
intellect, such that the one to whom that covering is lifted sees as
in the ocular vision the Truth or the Reality, refers to those who
we have earlier described as the people of the 'second
separation.' 384 What they see in this vision of God is the Essence
(al-dhat) that al-Raniri says is "at times perceptible to the eyes";
the essence identified as the reality of Existence ( al-wujud). 385 It
is the Absolute Existence as it involves itselfin perpetual, dynamic
movement of expansion and contraction from the more
indeterminate to the more determinate, diversifying itself
\.\'."ithout impairing its oneness into the more and more concrete
until it assumes its myriad particularizations and individuations
taking on the guise of its multiple modes which we call 'essences'
or 'quiddities'. Thus what they see it at once both the unity of
Absolute Existence and the diversity of its modes; the identity
of the realities with their ontological Source as well as their
difference from the same Source Who is the Truth Most Exalted.
Their situation in this state, as described by Abu Sa'id al
Kharraz in answer to a question about knowledge (ma'rifah) of
the Truth, is one of"coincidence between the two opposites" (al-
jam' bayn al-rj,iddayn). 386 Al-Raniri says that this coincidentia
oppositorum 38 7 pertains to the interior or the hidden ( al-biifin) and
blind (a'ma) in this world would be blind in the Hereafter, and further
astray from the path (Banz lsra) zl ( T 7):72). Not that their eyes would be
blind, since their sight (ha.far) \would then be sharp (QJif (50):22), but
that in spite ofthat their hearts would be blind. See further al-Qashani,
Shar� Fu-1ii-1) p. 155.
384 See above, pp. 131-147; 246-247, note 251.
385 The viewing with the eyes (al-mu'iiyanah) evidently meant here
involves confronting what is viewed and not doubting what the eyes see.
Thus it points to the presence (�urj,iir) to God ofthe heart ofthe mystic in
the state of uninterrupted contemplation, as al-Raniri's gloss explains.
See lfujjah p.3.
386 J(!wahir p. 9 I.
)
387 This recent Latin expression meant to convey what al-Kharraz said
was used by Corbin (Creative imagination) p. 188). He interprets it as "a

simultaniety not ofcontradictories but ofcomplementary opposites" (p.
:.wg). lzutsu also uses the expression ( The concept and reality ofexistence, pp.
13,17-18,24,137,143-144).Another version oftheArabicexpression
COMMENTARY 299
the exterior or the manifest ( al-::,ahir) aspects of Absolute

Being. 388
As regards al-dhawq, the basic meaning is 'taste' in the sense
applicable to both pleasure and pain alike. 389 As a technical term
of the $iifis it refers to a kind of intuitive knowledge, a "mystical
perception". 390 This transcendent vision refers to that of the pure
intellect, which ibn 'Arabi calls the 'aql mujarrad, 391 that is, the
intellect freed from bodily relations; and the spiritual degree of
one in that condition of intellect is that of the permanent
archetypes (al-a'yiin al-thabitah), 392 in which degree the 'iirifs
verification and cognition of the transcendental Truth is called
genuine dhawq. vVe see here the close relationship between dhawq
and kashf, and indeed also between these and wajd. Dhawq comes
before wajd. According to Abu Sa'id ibn al-A'rabi, a disciple of
J unayd, who wrote a book on wajd (Kitiib al-wajd), 393 wajd is the
first of the spiritual degrees of the elect. It is inheritance of the.
is al-Jam' bayn al-naqztj,ayn (see Corbin, ibid., p. 188). Though not quite in
the same context, the underlying truth conveyed by this expression is
also understood by Martin Euber (/ and Thou, 2nd. ed. translated by
R.G. Smith, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1958, p. 81).
389See Kashf al-Mal;jiib, p. 392.
390Nicholson uses this expression with reference to al-Suhrawardi in the
Encyclopaedia of religion and ethics, (ed. J. Hastings, New York, 1955), vol.
12, p. 21.
391See Fu,rii,r, p. 187; Shar� Fu�-ii�·, p. 287.
392We said earlier that the archetypes accept both being and non-being
(above, pp. 287-289), becoming visible with being and disappearing
with non-being. In this sense and due to their double aspect the
archetypes are the realities involved in the existential coincidence of the
opposites. Hence kashf and dhawq which involve the experience of the
coincidence of the opposites, pertain to the spiritual degree of the
archetypes. The mystic at this level, as ibn 'Arabi says, sees things (umiir)
that are the very sources (u,riil) of what appears externally in the natural
forms (,ruwar al-!abi'ah) and he then knows by intuitive knowledge
("ilman dhawqryyah) whence this state of things appears to be what they
are in the natural forms (Fu,ri4, p. 178).
393 See the Kitiib al-Luma', pp. 310-314, which gives a gist of what is in
this book. See also ibid., pp. 300 fol. On al-A'rabi, see 'Ali 'Abd al
Qadir's The Life, Personality and Writings of·al-:Junayd, op.cit., pp. x-xii.
assurance of the thing desired, and for him who has dhawq of it
there reigns in his heart certainty absolute. The elect comes to the
degree of wajd by means of pure devotion to God and intimate
converse with Him until He addresses the heart of him who is so
engrossed to the exclusion of all else so that it then 'sees' from
what is was freed and there occurs the agitation called wajd, for it
has found what was lost. This finding is called wujud, which we
have earlier described as the intuition of existence. 394 When he
recovers from the vision he loses what he has found, but the
knowledge of it remains with him.
We observe that there is already a significant difference
between the Mutakallimiin and the Siifis in the manner of
approach leading to the affirmation ofreality to the world and to
the understanding of the nature of existence. What may be said
about the Siifis on this matter is that for them their method of
approach is by direct evidence as a result of personal verification,
whereas the theologians employed the indirect method of
rational proof and demonstration. 395 Their ultimate conclusions
do not really mean the same thing, as we shall see in due course.
As regards the �iifis' position on the nature ofreai being (wujud
�aqzqz) and absolute being (wujud mutfaq) as well as other related
aspects of being and existence such as metaphorical being (wujud
majiizz), existence as being determined or limited ( muqayyad), as a
shadow (iill) and a condition possessed (milk) by God's Being, we
have already explained this earlier 396 and will have recourse to
its details again when necessary. What needs further clarification
now is the Siifis' statement that real existence cannot be
predicated of the world seen as the shadow of God because that
would amount to affirming a partner to God's existence, and that
nor can absolute non-existence be predicated of it as such
precisely because it is seen as existing.
The Malay word of Tamil derivation sekutu, is generally used
394
See above, pp. 244-245, and note 248 on p. 245 (i.e. wijdiin).
395Jami confirms this; see al-Durrah al-Fiikhirah, p. 37/11; lfawiishf, p.
93/IO.
396 See above, pp. 266-291.
COMMENTARY 301
by al-Raniri and other Malay scholars as having the same

meaning as the Arabic sharzk: a 'partner'. But this is not
necessarily always the case, since the word sekutu ( kutu) also
means 'equal to', or 'the same as', or 'identical with'. Now a
sharzk, properly speaking and with reference to God, pertains to
an 'other' to which, or to whom, worship is performed. The 'other'
refers invariably to a living being having an individuality, a
personality, and such attributes as are predicated of human beings,
jinns, angels and also the Devil; and even in the case of idols,
which are non-living, they are yet supposed to represent
individuals and personaiities. A sharzk, then, pertains to a being
having a personality of its own and worshipped as a god besides
God. 397 In the context of theistic dualism, or polytheism, another
form of the same word, shirk, is used. In the context in question,
however, the world or its existence is not really an object of
worship as the sharzk is, and it is neither an individual nor a
personality, being an abstraction, as it were, a concept, not
representable as sharzk. Since sekutu also means 'identical with', it
is possible that what is implied in the passage refers to both
identity and partnership. Although rubiibiyyah specifically refers
to the lordship that is connected with deity and worship, it
includes also the fact of possession, which is the basic meaning of
the word rabb and from which it is derived. A rabbis a possessor of
something, and to say that the world is a possessor of existence is
to identify it as a rabb besides God. The assertion of identity and
partnership here is not with God, but with God's existence,· but
since for the Siifis-and indeed in some respects for the
theologians and the philosophers as well-existence and essence
are identical in God, such an assertion amounts in fact to
identifying the world with God. This would lead either to
pantheism, or to dualism, both of which are rejected by the Siifis.
397
See LA, X: 449, col. 2; 450, col. I. It must be noted, as stated in the
Lisan al-' Arab, that one of the key concepts ofsharzk or shirk is that the co
partnership or association pertains to co-partnership of God's Lordship
(rubiibiyyah). Hence the idea of personality and of worship is inherent in
the concept of sharzk.
Similarly, to say that the world possesses no existence whatever,

that is, to say that the world is absolute non-existence, or
'nothing' cognitively and concretely, contrary to the testimony of
sense perception, would lead to monism which is equally rejected
by the Siifis. Thus the denial of a partner to God's existence
means also the denial of the possibility of anything being
identical with Him, or being a partner to Him. The Siifis' denial
of any partnership with God's existence is in fact an affirmation of
His Unicity (wal;diiniyyah). By saying that existence and essence
are identical in God, the Siifis do not mean that God is a
composite of essence and existence; they are not saying this in the
theological or philosophic£Ll context of trying to determine
whether God's existence is, on the one hand, superadded to His
essence or is, on the other hand, identical with it. Neither is God a
particular existence ( wujiid khii��), as the theologians and the
philosophers maintain. They say that God is the absolute
existence (al-wujiid al-mu/laq), and in this way they found it not
necessary to determine the relation of His existence to His essence
in the above-mentioned sense, that is, whether His existence is
identical with His essence, or whether this is not so; nor to prove
His unicity, as it is necessary for the theologians and the
philosophers to do so. This is because it is impossible for there to
be multiplicity in the absolute existence, whether it be as a
concept or as a reality. In reality, the multiplicity that is observed
and conceived is nothing but so many modes of one and the same
absolute existence in its various degrees of determination,
particularization and individuation. Jami explains this in the
following way:
Inasmuch as the Necessary Existent, in the opinion of the

majority of theologians, is a reality existing through a proper
existence, and, in the opinion of their two leaders and the
philosophers, is itself a proper existence, they all found it
necessary, in order to prove His unicity and deny a partner to
Him, to make use of proofs and demonstrations, which they
have provided in their works. The Siifis who profess the unity
of existence, however, since it was evident to them that the
COMMENTARY
reality of the Necessary Existent is absolute existence, did not

find it necessary to put forward a prooffor the assertion ofHis
unity and the denial of a partner to Him. In fact it is
impossible to imagine in Him any duality and multiplicity
without considering individuation and determination to be
in Him also. For everything multiple, whether seen,
imagined or apprehended, is either an existent or attributive
existence not absolute existence, since its opposite is non
existence, which is nothing. 398
Furthermore, the True Existence possesses a unity which is
not superadded to His essence, but is rather His being
considered as He is in Himself, for when considered in this
way His unity is not an attribute of the One, but is rather
identical with Him. This is what the verifiers mean by
essential oneness, from which are derived the unity and the
multiplicity which are familiar to all, namely mumerical
unity and multiplicity. Moreover, if it is being considered as
being devoid of all aspects, it is called oneness, but if
considered as being qualified by them, it is .called
singleness. 399
The position of the theologians in general and the philosophers

regarding the nature ofexistence and its relation to things, that is,
to external realities, is that existence is a general, abstract
concept common to all existences, that is, to everything and
anything without exception. The mind, when regarding external
realities we call 'things', can first abstract them from existence,
and then predicate existence of them; it therefore attributes to
things what it considers to be their property of existence, so that
existence is then regarded as something superadded to,
accidental to, or subsisting in things. In this mental process the
single, general, abstract concept of existence becomes multiple
and is divided into 'portions' (�i�a�: sing. �iHah) corresponding to
398Al-Durrah al-Fiikhirah, pp. 42-43/25.

399Ibid. p. 43/26. For a commentary of the passages quoted above, see
Shar& al-Durrah, pp. 126-q7/25; 127/26.
304 A COMMENTARY ON THE }:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ
things. The existences of things are these portions. These

portions, along with the general, abstract concept of existence
which is essential to and inherent in them, are external to the
essences of things and only mentally superadded to them. 400
According to this perspective existence is merely something
mentally posited ( i'tibiiri), or something conceptual, whereas
quiddities are realities realized extra-mentally, Existence in this
perspective is one of the secondary intelligibles ( al-ma'qiiliit al
thiiniyah) to which nothing in the extra-mental world
corresponds. 401 The early theologians, however, the Imam Abu
al-1:Iasan al-Ash'ari, the leader of the Ash'aris, and Abu al
I:Iusayn al-Ba�ri, the leader of the Mu'tazilis, maintained that the
existence of everything, including that of God, the Necessary
Existent ( al-wiijib), is identical with its essence ( dhiit) both
mentally (dhihnan) and extra-mentally (khiirijan). They did not
mean by 'identical' ('ayn) a combination of two things becoming
one and the same, as they did not recognize any distinction
between existence and quiddity or essence. They meant by
'identity' 'indistinguishability', whether in the mind or
externally; that is, that existence and quiddity or essence is in fact
one and the same thing viewed sometimes as existence and
sometimes as quiddity. Therefore, according to their perspective,
there is not in the external world something which is the quiddity
( al-miihiyyah) and something else subsisting in it externally which
is existence; rather, in the external world, and in the mind, then:' is
only the same 'something' viewed differently at different times,
sometimes named by the word 'existence', sometimes by the
word 'essence' or 'quiddity'. 402 The position of the philosophers,
insofar as it concerns existence being a single, general and
abstract concept common to all existences, is the same as that of
the theologians; but they differed with the theologians
concerning existence at the level of external reality. They
maintained that there is a real multiplicity of existence and not
4oo Al-Durrah al-Fiikhirah, p. 34/5.

401 See above, p. 238 and note 238.
4 2 Al-Durrah al-Fiikhirah, p. 34/4.
0
COMMENTARY
only of existents, not merely through the accident of attribution

to quiddities as the theologians maintained, nor through specific
differences, but through being in themselves multiple. Thus
existences differ from one another essentially, each being an
independent entity. They are dissimilar realities (�aqi/iq)
existing in the extra-mental world, which are mentally posited as
'portions' of the general, abstract concept of existence, being
multiplied and divided as such due solely to their attribution to
the quiddities which are their substrata. In reality; then, the
portions of existence are superadded in the mind to the existences
with dissimilar realities and are therefore external to them. 403
The existence of God, the Necessary Existent, which is identical
with His essence, is one of these dissimilar realities. 404 The
positions of the theologians and the philosophers as outlined so far
may be represented thus:
1. Theologians 2. Philosophers
(a) Single concept of existence (a) Single concept of existence
common to all existences. common to all existences.
(b) Portions of (a) m (b) Portions of (a) m
dividuated through attri dividuated through attri
bution to ( c). bution to quiddities (c).
(c) Quiddities (d) Particular existences with
dissimilar realities.
From the foregoing gist of the positions of the theologians and the
philosophers regarding the nature of existence we derive three
things: ( 1) the general, abstract concept of existence common to
all existences; ( 2) its portions individuated through its
attributions to quiddities; (3) particular existences which are
dissimilar realities. Existence as in ( 1) above is essential and
intrinsic to ( 2), but both (I) and ( 2) are external to (3).
Particular existence is identical with the essence in the case of
403/bid., pp. 34-35/6.

404 See ffawiishz, p. 92/5(1).
God, the Necessary Existent, but superadded and external in the

case of everything else. 405 As regards the position of the Ash'ari
theologians, they maintained a complete identity of existence
and essence or quiddity at all levels, that is, at the conceptual
level as well as at the level of external reality. The theologians
consider (a) and (b) above to be conceptual, and (c) to be real.
Similarly, the philosophers consider (a) and (b) to be conceptual,
and (c) considered as (d) to be real. With regard to the position of
the Siifis of the school of wabdat al-wujiid, they maintained that
just as it is possible for this general, abstract, concept of existence
(i.e. (a) above) to be superadded in the mind to the Necessary
Existence (God) and to all particular existences with dissimilar
realities (d), it is also possible for it to be superadded in the mind
to a single absolute and existent reality which is the reality of
Necessary Existence. Whereas this superadded concept would
only be something existing in the intellect, its substratum would
be an extra-mental, real existent which is the reality of
existence. 406 The position of the Siifis may be represented thus:
(a) Single concept of existence common to all existences.
(b) Portions of (a) individuated through attribution to (c)
considered as (d).
(e) Absolute existence (wujud muf,laq). 407
(f) Particular existence (wujiid kha��) considered as modes of
(e).
For the Siifis, existence at the levels of (a), (b), (c) and (d) is
nothing but a mental entity that has no corresponding existence
at the level of ex tern al reality. Only (e) and (f) are considered
real. In this respect, a gloss (biishiyah) in Jami's Naqd al-Nu�ii�
makes their position clear:
Existence ( al-wujiid), according to the philosopher (al

bakzm) and the theologian ( al-mutakallim), is accidental
405 Al-Durrah al-Fiikhirah, p. 35/7.

406 Ibid., p. 36/8.
407 Sometimes also called general existence (wujiid 'iimm), see above, p.
2 75•
COMMENTARY
(' iiri{j,), 408 to quiddities (al-miihiyyiit) and realities (al-l;aqii'iq),

and quiddities and realities are substrata (ma'rii{j,iit) for
existence. But according to the verifier (al-mubaqqiq) 409 and
the unitarian (al-muwabbid), existence is the substratum
(ma'rii{j,), while the determined and limited existents (al
mawjiidiit al-muqayyadah) are accidental to it by virtue of
attribution (al-i{j,ijah) and relation (al-nisbah). 410 Between
them 411 is a great difference (bawn ba'zd). In view of this, the
theologians and the philosophers are led to the position that
the absolute existence (al-wujitd al-mu!faq) does not have
external existence (wujiid fi al-khiirij), but only has mental
existence (wujiid dhihnf); it is a universal entity (amr kullf), a
general (concept:' iimm) which becomes existent by way of its
singulars ( afriid). The verifying knower (al-'iirifal-mubaqqiq),
however, cleaves to the position that the absolute existence is
existent (mawjiid), 412 and there is in reality no other basic ( i.e.
root) existence (wujiid a�lan) besides it, although it is possible
to posit such a thing (i.e. another source of existence) in the
mind (fial-i'tibiir). The strange thing is that the philosopher
and the theologian describe the absolute existence saying
that it is the opposite of the absolute non-existence ( al-'adam
al-mutfaq), and that it is the apportioner (al-muqassim) for all
existents, and that it is pure good (khayr mabef), and that it is
single (wiibid) without contrary ({j,idd) and like (mathal), and
yet they still say that it is non-existent (ma' diim) in the
external world (al-khiirij). 413
408 That is, inhering in quiddities and realities, or occurring to them

from the outside.
409 The verifier here is one who verifies by way of the intuition of
existence through revelation (kashf) and intuitive experience (dhawq).

410 The limited or conditioned existents are the 'quiddities' and
'realities' existing extra-mentally. Their being-existent is due to their

attribution and relation to the absolute existence which is their
substratum.
411 The theologians and the philosoph�rs on the one hand, and the $ufis
of the school of wa�dat al-wujiid on the other.

412 That is, exists externally.
413 Naqd al-Nu,rii,r, p. 2 I, gloss 5. My translation.
The �iifis, then, maintained that in addition to existence at the

levels of (a), (b) and (c) considered as (d), which are all mentally
posited, there is some other entity because of whose association
with quiddities ( (c) considered as (d)) and their being clothed
with it, existence at the levels of (a) and (b) comes to inhere in
them. This other entity is existence in reality.414 It is the absolute
existence ( (e) in the above schema)); and the particular
existences (f), which are modes and aspects of the absolute
existence are, in their actualized states, realities that correspond
to (c) and (d) or (c) considered as (d); whereas existence as a
secondary intelligible to which nothing in the external world
corresponds is one of its effects. Existence in reality is, as Jami
says:
... self-realized and a realizer of what is other than Itself. It is

self-subsistent and constitutive to what is other than Itself. It
is not inherent in quiddities, but quiddities, on the contrary,
are inherent and subsistent in It in such a manner that
impairs neither the perfection ofl ts sanctity nor the quality of
Its majesty.415
As we pointed out earlier, 416 the $ufis also maintained that there
is a higher level of existence than even the absolute existence. The
absolute existence, in the schema of ontological 'descent' of
Absolute Being, is already at the level of the first determination
( al-ta'ayyun al-awwal), 417 whereas the higher level of existence we
refer to pertains to the very essence and reality itself of existence
at the level of the Essence ( al-dhat). This is the level of existence
that is neither conditioned by anything nor by nothing; it is
transcendent from being conditioned even by transcendence, so
that it is pure indetermination (la ta'ayyun), 418 and is
consequently unknown and unknowable. The $iifis' position,
414 Jfawiishz, p. 92/5(2).

415 Loc.cit.
416
See e.g. above, pp. 153-160.
418 See above, pp. r 72 , 275-27 6.

COMMENTARY
then, insofar as the levels of existence under discussion is

concerned, involves ·three things: ( 1) absolute existence, which is
existence in reality; ( 2) its determinations and individuations
into particular existences, which are its modes and aspects arising
from the dynamic act of absolute existence, or the unfolding of
existence ( inbisii!, al-wujiid), which is the relation of absolute
existence to particular existence, and which is called the self
unfolding existence ( al-wujud al-munbasi!-); 419 and (3), as a general
concept. This last is inapplicable to the previous two.
It is clear, if the above explanation has been understood, that
there is a real distinction between the position of the Siifis and the
positions of the theologians and the philosophers on the nature of
existence. Indeed, insofar as the position of the Siifis and that of
the theologians on this problem is concerned, there is not only a
real distinction between them, but, as Jami says in the quotation
from his Naqd al-Nu�u�, a great distance separates the two. So it
would have been better for al-Raniri not to have stated that the
intended meanings of the words of the Mutakallimiin and the
$iifis are identical with respect to their positions on the nature of
existence, unless al-Raniri's statement is to be taken strictly as
applying only to their affirmation of existence to the world in
contradiction to the Sophists.
Closely connected with the problem of the nature of
existence-and since both the Siifis and the Mutakallimiin
affirm the existence of the world-is the problem of the nature of
the world as reality. Both groups also affirm the reality of the
world, that is, of the things that together constitute the world.
However, as to whether by 'reality' or 'realities' they meant the
same thing is subject for further consideration. Al-Raniri
apparently concludes that on this matter too the $ufis meant the
same thing as the Mutakallimun:
XI It is clear that from the definition of the $ufis being or

existence (wujud) and reality (�aqzqah) is one and the same
419
See above, pp. 266-269, 272-275.
in point of meaning ( ma' nii), and that is the Essence (dhii.t), of

the Truth Most Exalted. The meaning of 'reality',
according to the definition of the $iifis, is 'that by which a
thing is what it is' (ma bihi al-shafu huwa huwa), meaning
that from which a thing comes into being (jadi), and this that
is reality-like the reality of the pot is the wheel, and the
reality of the boat is the maker. The meaning of 'reality',
according to the Manµqiyyin (logicians), is 'that by which
a thing comes to be what it is as 'rational animal' is with
reference to man' (miiyakiin al-shay'u bihi ka al-�ayawii.n al
niifiq bi al-nisbah ilii. al-insii.n), that is, the reality of man is
'animal life that speaks' ( hidup yang berkata-kata). It is clear
that according to the definition of the Man#qiyyin the
reality of a thing is its very self ( diri). Thus the differences
between the Mutakallimin and the �iifis in their endeavour
to affirm God's existence as well as that of the world are
differences in expression ( laf;:,i) and not in meaning
(ma'nawi) just as people say 'fifteen' and 'twenty minus
five', the meaning is the same although the expression is
different.
Al-Raniri is saying here, speaking on behalf of the $iifis, that

existence (wujiid) and reality (�aqzqah) is one and the same. This
is true. The Malay word translated as 'one and the same' is esa,
which also means 'one' in the absolute sense equivalent to the
Arabic a�ad. The $iifis equate existence with reaiity, and that is
the essence ( dhii.t) of God, so that existence in reality is identical
with the essence of God, both in the mind and externally. We are
here referring to existence as reality, which is none other than the
absolute existence.
The absolute existence, as we have earlier described, is
perpetually involved in a dynamic, existential movement; a
pervasive, all encompassing expression of ontological evolvement
from the less determinate to the more determinate, limiting itself
without impairing its essential oneness, in the forms of its own
inner articulations which appear as multiple and varied
particularizations and individuations at the level of particular
COMMENTARY 311
existence. Their appearance with being is simultaneous with

their disappearance with non-being, and their disappearance is
simultaneous with the appearance of new others like them. Their
appearance and disappearance and their simultaneous
replacement by new others like them describes a continuous,
perpetual creative existential process of the evolvement of
absolute existence ( inbisii,! al-wujiid), which from another
perspective is none other than the perpetual process of the new
creation ( al-khalq al-jadzd) .
At the level of particular existence, then, reality is 'that by
which a thing is what it is' (mii bihi al-shay'u huwa huwa). Now a
'thing' at this level, and according to the perspective of the new
creation, only appears to be one and the same thing all the time it
exists, but in reality the 'thing' is every moment of itself not one
and the same thing with the 'thing' that appears to take its place
at the next moment of existence. From moment to moment there
is not one and the same thing appearing and disappearing and
appearing again; from moment to moment there are two
different things, but because of their similarity and our
unawareness of the real situation they are thought to be one and
the same thing. 420 Yet, in spite of the thing in reality being many
different things, the thing continues to maintain and to preserve
from loss its original unity and identity. The truth is that the
thing's continuance in its original unity and identity is due not to
itself, seeing that it is infinitely ephemeral-nay, it is a perishing
thing-but is due to its fixed essence or permanent archetype.
Now even though that too undergoes the process of simultaneous
appearance and disappearance in the intelligible world of the
archetypes, that, however, appears again always in its original
form and identity, 421 so that whatever inherent potentialities
( isti' diidiit) it may possess that are actualized or realized in the
world of sense and sensible experience in the guise of many
different things always maintain their unity and preserve their
420 It is what is thought to be one and the same thing that is illusory, and it
has only mental existence.
421 See above, pp. 180-181.
identity as one and the same thing. 'That by which a thing is what
it is' can only refer to something original in its identity, something
permanent in the midst of change and, according to the $iifis, this
that, which is the reality of a thing, or its real and true quiddity
(miihryyah), is its permanent archetype. 422
Al-Raniri's interesting analogies, obviously meant to appeal to
the indigenous understanding, comparing the reality (baqzqah) of
a thing to the revolving wheel that produces the pot in the first
instance, and to the maker that produces the boat in the second
instance, can indeed be interpreted to express what we have just
explained about the nature of the archetypes. But these analogies
are in themselves not self-evident in conveying the meaning of
reality as intended in the definition of the $iifis. What is
immediately perceived from the two analogies is the notion of
difference; the difference between the thing and its reality,
between the pot and the wheel and the boat and the maker. Now
it is true that difference has to do with reality and is what
differentiates one reality from another, and each reality from the
thing of which it is the reality, but that is unlike the sort of
difference or mukhalafah asserted by the Mutakallimiin;
moreover, the $iifis were not viewing the matter from the
viewpoint of the metaphysics of substance and accident, nor from
that of logic and the logical divisions of genus and differentia.
Since for the $iifis of the sch?ol ofwabdat al-wujiid existence is the
sole reality, it means that while they acknowledged that there is
an aspect of difference between a thing and its reality, and
between the realities of things among themselves, they also
acknowledged that between them and among them all there is an
aspect of identity as well, for the reality of existence is that by
which things differ from one another, and at the same time it is
that by which they are united in identity. 423 Existence as it
422 See above, pp. I 76- 182; 229-230, 242-243. The quiddity
(miihiyyah) meant above is quiddity in the general sense (i.e. miihiyyah I in
the schema on p. 243).
423 In accordance with the principle of analogical gradation (tashkzk) of
the reality of existence. See above, pp. 273-274. The double aspect of
COMMENTARY
unfolds and expands and limits itself into multiple and diverse
determinations without affecting its original oneness in
accordance with the requirements of the inner potentialities
inherent in it, is that whereby all things (i.e. the actualization of
the concomitants ( lawiizim) in the potentialities) are united in
identity; at the same time existence as individuated into
particular modes in the guise of essences or real quiddities of
things as actualized ( i.e. the concomitants and their effects ( iithar)
in the state of actualization) is that whereby things differ from
one another. So according to the $iifi perspective, the reality of a
thing is the individuated determination of absolute existence into
a particular mode as required by its archetype by which the thing
is what it is. The word is, in the expression 'what it is', refers to the
thing in the state of actualization; the act by which the thing is
actualized is the act of existence. These two aspects of existence
together constitute what we have called real quiddity
(mahiyyah), 424 which is the reality of a thing and which points to
none other than its archetype whose nature is established in the
interior condition (bu/iin) of Being. We say it points to the
archetype, as if the thing's being in the state of actualization and
the act of existence by which it is actualized is something dse
other than the archetype itself. Indeed, the thing's actualization
and the act by which it is actualized is not the same as the
archetype itself, seeing that the archetype never leaves its interior
condition, "never smells the odour of external existence." 425
What is actualized or externalized are the forces conforming to
the nature of the archetype (a�kam), its concomitants and effects
(lawazim and athar) inherent in the potentialities ( isti' diidiit) in the
archetype. The Truth Most Exalted, or the absolute existence,
manifests Himself in accordance with the requirements of the
nature of the archetype, 426 and since the potentialities inherent
realities owes its origin to the double nature of the Divine Names. See
above, p. 163.
424 See above, p. 312, and the references in note 422.
425 Ibn 'Arabi's expression: mii shammat rii'i�atan min al-wujud, Fu�u�, p.
76; see also Jawiihir, p. 86.

426 See al-Durrah al-Fakhirah, p. 42/24; also above, pp. 280-282.
in the archetype are multiple and diverse, His manifestation in

their forms are never repeated in the same guise, but always
appear in harmony with the multiplicity and diversity of the
forms. Nevertheless, the multiple and diverse forms in which He
is manifested is determined by the permanently abiding
archetype, so that in spite of their multiplicity and diversity they
always retain their original unity and identity. In this sense, and
speaking in terms of substance and accident, the archetype is the
substantial, antecedent reality (matbu'), while its repercussions
that appear as a thing in the external world is its accidental,
consequent reality ( tiibi'). The reality of the thing, then, is its
archetype. 427
In the first analogy, the revolving wheel (kisaran) 428 is the
principle of the dynamic movement of the-clay; as it turns, the
clay evolves, at every turn, into a pot different from the one
preceding it while yet maintaining its unity and identity; the
revolving wheel, as it turns the clay, is not the same as the pot
actualized by it, for the actualized pot-indeed many actualized
pots-is only a determination and limitation of the clay into a
particular form. In this analogy, the ever;.. turning clay is the
unfolding of existence; the revolving wheel as it turns the clay
into particular forms is the reality or real quiddity. Although he
does not mention it, we must not forget that the hand of the
Potter, always in creative contact with the clay, is at work behind
the wheel. This analogy is apparently meant to convey the
impression of dynamic, creative movement; of unity and identity
in the midst of multiplicity and diversity; of determination and
limitation. It is meant to express the coming-into-being (kawn)
aspect of things, as is indicated by al-Raniri's own interpretation
of the �iifi definition as "that from which ( daripada) a thing comes-
427 On the nature of reality, see above, pp. 161-164.

428 Kisaranin its semantic structure does not only refer to the wheel, but
more to the turning or revolving of the wheel. Indeed this latter
connotation is basic to its meaning, and the meaning of 'wheel' is
derived from it. The meaning of kisaran is both the wheel and the
revolving itself of the wheel.
COMMENTARY
into-being" (jadi). 429 Elsewhere he also says that by 'reality' is

meant that which causes the coming-into-being of a thing
(menjadikan), and which causes it to become manifest (i.e. as
external existence: men;;_iihirkan). 430 Ultimately, the realities of
things are none other than the forms of the Divine Attributes ( al
}ifiit). 431
As regards the knowledge that governs the creative movement
which causes the coming-into-being of things, and the will and
power necessary to the creative act of bringing into existence
all of which are attributes of the Creator, corresponding in this
case to the potter implied in the first analogy-these are
expressed in the next analogy, where the maker (Malay:tukang,
the equivalent here of the Arabic }iini') ,is introduced. 432 When he
says that the reality of the boat is the maker, it is obvious that by
'reality' here is not meant real quiddity (mahiyyah), 433 for the
maker also possesses a quiddity or essence different from his
product by which he is what he is. Even if the maker were God
as intended in this analogy-He too possesses a quiddity in the
sense of reality different from the quiddities of other realities, for
He is Reality Itself. What he intends to convey by this analogy is
the causality in the process of creation; and more precisely the
'creating' (takwzn) aspect of it.
Al-Raniri apparently takes the letter bii' of bihi in the
definition mii bihi al-shay'u huwa huwa ( i.e. the word by in the
definition: 'that by which a thing is what it is') to signify the
causality (sababiyyah) which, for the thing, underlies its innermost
being. This meaning points to something as the cause (sabab or
'illah) by which a thing is the thing, such as the efficient cause (al-
429 See above, pp. :228-229; 253 and note 269. See also p. 309 fol. (XI).
430Jawiihir, p. 41.
431 Ibid., p. 42; see above, pp. 288-289; 290-29 I; Kashshiif, II, p.333.
432 Tukang, meaning handicraftsman, manufacturer, artisan, skilled
worker with the hands, conveys also the meaning of doer with the
hands, equivalent to Arabicfii'il: active agent.
433 I.e., that by which a thing is what it is, in contrast to that by which a
thing is what it is.

'illah al-fii'iliyyah) and the agent ( al-fii'il). But, in objection to this

view, it may be said that the agent is in reality that by which the
thing is existent, not that by which the thing is that thing; for that
by which the thing is that particular thing is what makes the
thing to be different from others, not what makes it to be existent,
which is common to all things. 434 So this way of interpreting the
Sufi definition of reality-if this is what is meant-is not quite
correct, unless the agent or efficient cause refers to the archetype,
in which case reality means not causality, but real quiddity. If
this latter interpretation is intended, then the analogy becomes
ambiguous. However, this ambiguity is understandable, seeing
that reality itself is by nature ambiguous in that it refers to both
causality and real quiddity.
Creation according to the $iifis pertains to the Divine activity
which becomes manifest at the ontological level below that of the
Absolute Being or Existence in His self-concealing aspect,
corresponding to the level of the 'first determination' (ta' ayyun
awwal). At the level of the 'first determination', wherein the
Absolute in His seif-revealing aspect reveals Himself, of Himself,
to Himself, are realized the attributes of Knowledge ('ilm), Light
( niir), Existence ( wujiid) and Vision ( shuhiid). Knowledge involves
the knower and the known; Light implies manifesting and being
manifest; Existence entails causing to exist and being existent;
Vision involves beholding and being beheld. 435 As a result of this
self-revelation, there arises in the Absolute a triplicity
( thalathiy_vah) 436 involving Knowledge, Light, Existence and
Vision as we have just mentioned, and a consciousness of the
implication of 'otherness' such triplicity entails. At this stage the
Absolute is no longer regarded as One in His absoluteness, but as
Single (lard) by virtue of having already contained within
Himself the potentiality of the 'other', Himself being other than
434 See Kashshiif, II, pp. 331-332 ( article: al-�aqfqah)
435 See above, p. 157, the quotation from I:Iamzah Fan�uri, whose
source is Jami in Lawa'ih, XVI. The original source is the Fu�us, pp.
115-117.
436 This triplicity is alluded to by I:Iamzah using the expressionjadi tiga:
'becomes three', in his Asrar al-'Arifin ( Mysticism, op. cit., p. 364(11)).

COMMENTARY
the otherness of the 'other'. 437 From this basic ontological

situation the world comes into existence. This coming into
existence also patterns itself according to a triple structure
involving both the Absolute as God on the one hand and,
correspondingly, the 'other' that is to evolve into existence as the
world on the other hand. In the Holy Qur'an God says: "For
whenever We will ( the existence of) something, We but say to it:
"Be!"-and it comes into existence" (innamii qawlunii li shafin
idhii aradniihu an naqiila lahu kun fa yakiinu). 438 This reveals,
according to ibn 'Arabi, that what is necessarily operative in the
Divine act of creation is the Essence (dhat), the Will (iradah) and
the Word of Command ( qawl). Now the thing lo be created refers
to what is in the plane of thf' permanent archetypes ( al-a'yiin al
thiibitah), that is, its inherent existential potentiality ( isti' diid); and
it necessarily contains within itself three factors corresponding to
dhiit, iriidah and qawl with respect to the Creator, and these are its
thingness (shay'iyyah), its hearing (samii') and its obeying or
becoming like as what it is commanded to become ( imtithiil).
Without the Essence, the Will and the Word nothing would come
into existence. When God breathes out the creative Word of
Command "Be!" (kun), it is the power (quwwah) inherent in the
thing's existential potentiality ( isti' diid) that makes it capable of
reacting to the creative Command, and of being actualized and
qualified by existence or rather, of being existence qualified by it.
The coming into being (takawwun) of the thing willed into
existence pertains to the inherent power in the thing itself to come
into being, otherwise it would not be able to do so. This is why,
according to ibn 'Arabi, God refers, in the above quoted passage,
to it as coming into existence (i.e. fa yakiinu: and it comes into
existence). 439 Nothing would ever come into existence without
437 We are here at the level of the Divine Names and Attributes. The
potentiality of 'other' refers to that aspect of the double nature of the
Divine Names that points to its own intrinsic meaning, which is not
identical as such with the Essence and with all the other Names. In this
sense it refers to the Attributes. See further above, pp. 162- 163.
438 Al-Na�l ( 16) :40.
439 See Fu,ru , pp.
,r l l 5- l l 6; Shar� Fu,ru,r, pp. l 69- l 70; Naqd al-Nu,r u,r, pp.
the Essence, the Will and the Word; and yet at the same time
nothing would ever be able to come into existence without the
inherent power in the thing itself to come into existence. In this
sense the thing itself, then, is the active agent (fli'il) _ of its own
coming into existence (takwzn). It is true that in relation to the
Creative Word and the Will of the Essence the thing is the passive
recipient ( qabil), which in virtue of its hearing and obeying that
corresponds to the Will and the Word of the Essence hears and
obeys the Command to exist as it should exist in accordance with
its intrinsic potentialities; but in relation to the bringing into
existence it is the thing itself that is the active agent by which its
own coming into existence is realized. Now this, however, does
not mean that God does not involve Himself in the creative
realization of the thing into existence other than exercising His
Will and His Word without accomplishing thereby the
accompanying act by which the thing becomes actualized or
realized; for the very thing that is to be actualized is after all none
other than a mode of the Absolute itself, a determination and
· particularization of the Absolute Existence in the form of a
Divine Name or Attribute. So the thing itself, at the level of the
archetypes, is none other than a particular facet of His Being as
He manifests Himself in and according to its.form. Since the self
manifestation of the Absolute is a successive, perpetual process,
the world as constituted by such things, and which is that self
manifestation, is in a continuous state of annihilation and re
creation which is repeated for as long as God wills. Thus what is
seen and experienced is the ever new creation ( al-khalq al
jadzd). 44 ° From this brief summary of the salient features in the
195-196. For a more extensive treatment of the matter, see Izutsu, Kry
philosophical concepts, eh. XIII.
440 The thing referred to above is the permanent archetype. On the
double nature of the archetypes, as active agent (filil) on the one hand,
and passive recipient (qabil) on the other, see above p. 165. Creation is
none other than the continuous process of the self-manifestation of the
Absolute. On the ever new creation (al-khalq al-jadui), see above, pp.
I 76-182; 241-242.
COMMENTARY
Siifis' understanding of the concept of creating (takwzn), it

becomes increasingly clear that their position with regard to the
nature of reality, which involves creation and the creative
process, is not quite the same as that of the theologians, 441 as we
shall further see.
Here in this analogy too, according to the Sufis' understanding
of the concept of creation (takwzn) as we have just described, the
nature of reality-if we mean by reality not the real quiddity
(miihiyyah) primarily, but the active agency (ref.Jii'il) by which a
thing comes to be what it is-points to the permanent archetype,
as in the case ir.. the first analogy; and this ultimately refers to God
as being the Agent and Maker (ja'il, �iini') involving knowledge,
will, power and actic!:1. In this case the analogy of the boat and
the maker describes the causal relationship between the thing in
the state of actualization and its archetype by which agency, and
the flow of existence infused in it, it is actualized. Moreover, since
both these analogies, as interpreted according to the Sufi
perspective, point to the archetype, there is no disharmony
between them and the Sufi definition of reality (�aqzqah) as real
quiddity (miihiyyah). 442 An analogy by definition is an
indication of similarity arrived at by a process of reasoningfrom
parallel cases. The indication has to be so clear as not to require
further interpretation. Yet in the case of these two analogies they
are not, as we said, self-evident in conveying the similarity
between what they portray and what is intended in the meaning
441For the theologians' position, see above, pp. 251-260; 261-265.

442Whereas if the analogies are taken at their face value to mean what
they depict, there would be disharmony between them and the
definition of reality as real quiddity. For example, the real quiddity of
the boat cannot be the man who makes it, for the man possesses a real
quiddity different from that of the boat. In the same sense the real
quiddity of the pot cannot be the wheel. So it is clear that these
analogies are meant to refer only to (1) the principle of creative
movement referring to the expansion of existence; (2) the principle of
creation or creating involving real quiddities and their repercussions.
They express what is indicated in the concepts of jadi, menjadikan and
men;ahirkan (p. 3 15 above.)
of the definition of the Sufis pertaining to the specific nature of

reality. Rather what they project in the mind and the immediate
impression they create therein is the notion of difference; of
temporal origination from non-existence into existence; of
creator-creature relationship and efficacy and passive
dependence. In other words, al-Ranfri, as betrayed by these
analogies if taken at their face value, appears to speak more as a
Mutakallim rather than as a Sufi, and as such the analogies really
defeat their purpose. It would have been better if he had not
resorted to them. But there is perhaps a good reason as to why he
made use of them in this way. Earlier, the Sufi poet J:Iamzah al
Fan�uri (ft. c. 1500-1600), commenting on a line in one of his own
poems pertaining to the Absolute Existence and its descent
(tanazzul) to the planes of created beings and manifestation
( tajallz) in the realms of contingency, says that:
The analogy is, as it were, clay fashioned into drinking

vessels, or cooking pots, or water jars, or earthen containers;
the clay is the original being ( a�al wujiid) of all the earthern
vessels. Were it not for the clay, how can the drinking vessel
and the cooking pot acquire existence ( wujiid)? From the
point of view of external law (shar'i'ah), the being (wujiid) of
the drinking vessel is other than the being of the clay. From
the point of view ofinn�r reality (baqzqah), being is the clay;
earthenware vessels are without being, the clay alone has
being, for all the forms (rupa) are imaginary (wahmz) and not
real ( baqzqz) . 4 4 3
Then in a fragment of another poem entitled the Poem of the

Boat (Sha'ir Perahu), 444 in which he speaks of man's spiritual
443Asrar al-'Arijin, p. 52. For the Malay text and translation, see my The
mysticism ofJfamzah Fan{iirz, pp. 268 (32); 388 (32); for its interpretation,
see pp. 154 fol. and relevant notes. See also, in the same work, pp. 259
(22); 379 (22).
444 Cud. Or. 3374, Bibliotheca Academiae Lugduno-Batava,
Rijksuniversiteit, Leiden, p. 26.
COMMENTARY 321
journey of return to God, he begins by comparing the body of

man to a boat:
Wahai muda, kenali dirimu!

Ialah perahu tamthil tubuhmu-
0 youth, know thyself1

'Tis a boat, the like of thy body-
The poem as a whole-we quote only the rhyming half-verse

here-refers to the quest for knowledge of the self leading to
knowledge of the Lord in interpretation of what is expressed in
the well-known �adzth: "Who knows his self knows his Lord (man
'arafa nafsahu fa qad • arafa rabbahu). The river on which the boat
will sail and which opens out into the sea ( of Absolute Being)
symbolizes knowledge; and just as the body correlated with the
soul or self represents the aspect of humanity (nasiit) that is
correlated with divinity (lahiit), so is the boat, like the chest
(tabiit) in which the Prophet Musa (Moses) was floated down the
Nile, 44 5 correlated with the maker ( tukang). He says in another
poem: 446
Kenali dirimu! hai anak tukang,

Jadikan markab tempat berulang-
Know thyselfl O maker,

Make (thyself into) a boat, a place of return-
In these poems, divinity and humanity are not represented as the

one being the antithesis of the other, rather they are depicted as
the inward and outward aspects of one and the same Being, in such
wise that the generality of people might easily misunderstand
445 The symbolism of the chest (tabiit) is ibn 'Arabi's. See the Holy
Qur'an, Ta-Ha (20):39; Fu{ii{, pp. 198-199.
446 Cod. Or. 2016. Bibliotheca Academiae Lugduno-Batava,
Rijksuniversiteit, Leiden, p. 74.
such poetic portrayal to point to the obliteration of the distinction

between the divine and the human, thereby making way for a
thorough-going monism. Al-Fan�iiri, as we have attempted to
show elsewhere, 447 was no heretic, but some of his followers, or
those who claimed to adhere to his teachings and in whose hearts
there was deviation were. 448 So just as the Mutakallimiin,
according to al-Raniri, made .a clear distinction between the
divine and the human, and stressed the difference between them
"so as not to let some of the common people fall into the error of
believing that God's Being and the being of the world constitute
one and the same being, as is the belief of those who cleave to the
doctrines of the deviators and the Zindiq" 449 -in the same way,
perhaps, is his choice of analogies to be understood. We shall
return to these analogies for another possible explanation in due
course. 450
As regards the definition of reality according to the logicians
( Man/iqfy_yiin), which he treats next in comparison with that of the
Siifis, he says that the former defines the reality of man as
'animal life that speaks', that is, as a composite of'animality' and
'rationality', 451 and he further concludes that this, for the
447 See The mysticism of Jfamzah FanJiirz, eh. II, III and IV.
448 See ibid., the quotation on p. 181.
449 See above, IX.
450 See below, p. 334.
451 The Malay words /;erkata-kata literally mean: 'having uttered words',
and this also refers to the power to formulate meaning. As we pointed

out in the translation of the text, this is a literal translation of the Arabic
nii/iq alluding to nu!q, derived from the same root, which corresponds to
the Greek logos and the Latin ratio. Nafiq signifies 'rational', pointing
thereby to an inner faculty that formulates meaning involving
judgement, discrimination and clarification. It is derived from a root
that conveys the basic meaning of 'speech', signifying a certain power
and capacity to articulate words in meaningful pattern. The inner
faculty or power referred to is the' aql, or intellect, which is defined as a
spiritual substance, and which is indicated by everyone when he says
"I" (see Ta'rifiit, p. 157). The articulation of linguistic symbols into
meaningful patterns is no other than the outward, visible and audible
expression of the inner unseen reality that we call 'aql. Niftiq, from which
COMMENTARY
logicians, means that the reality of a thing is its very self. This
needs to be considered.
Our notion of a thing as it is immediately perceived-in this
case, man, for example-is simply that of a real, concrete
existent (mawjiid) having a particular individuality to which a
word-e.g. 'man'-is applied to denote it, and which when
mentioned will bring to mind the object which it denotes. This, in
brief, describes our primary notion of a thing, a physical object of
the senses. The mind, when contemplating the thing which
demands its definition, and in answer to its own inner question
about the thing: 'what is it?', proceeds to analyse it; to judge,
discriminate, clarify and classify it until it arrives at a definition of
the thing, that is, 'rational animal' in the case of 'man'. In this
concept-forming process the mind is able to abstract from the
thing its 'what-is-itness' or quiddity from its existence, existence
here being considered as something which is attributed to the
thing itself. In this way a mental division and distinction is made
between existence and quiddity, with the latter being considered
as the reality of a thing. From this we distinguish two stages of
understanding. The primary stage of understanding refers to the
objects of physics, to concrete things, such as indicated by the
word 'animal' with respect to man to which apply the ten
categories. Things as such are the Aristotelian primary
substances, or the stuff from which are derived the primary
intelligibles ( al-ma' qiiliit al-iilii), that is, they are the concretely
existent objects in the external world that correspond to the
concepts derived from them. The secondary stage of
understanding, however, refers not to the objects of physics, but
rather to those of logic. It pertains to a highly abstract mental
process, a rational elaboration of concepts as arrived at and
established according to the rules oflogic and the logical divisions
the Arabic word for logic is derived (i.e. man/iq), includes within its
semantic structure what is conveyed by ma' qiil, derived from' aql, which
is the intelligible character of a thing as grasped by the mind. In this
sense also can ratio be understood as synonymous with ma' qiil, which in
Latin is intentio.
of genus, species, and difference. Thus here the mind reflects

upon itself, as it were, and the way it understands the ideas it
formulates. These ideas or concepts are the secondary
intelligibles ( al-ma' qiiliit al-thaniyah), to which nothing in the
external world correspond, as they are not concepts of real
objects, but concepts of concepts, aq example being the concept
of 'rational animal' as derived from another concept 'man'. 452
It is clear from the above explanation that with reference to the
logicians reality refers to quiddity, and, to be precise, they meant
the quiddity as opposed to existence, in the sense that the
quiddity is regarded conceptually as the reality which is qualified
by existence, or that the quiddity is the subject and existence its
predicate. This perspective involves the understanding of
existence as a secondary intelligible, to which nothing in the
external world corresponds. Quiddity, according to the logicians,
is what is defined in the reply to the question: 'what is it?', in
contrast to quiddity as understood by the philosophers and the
theologians, which is 'that by which a thing is what it is'. The
distinction between these two meanings of quiddity is that in the
former case it refers only to genus (iins) in relation to species
(naw'), whereas in the latter case it refers always to a particular
existent, ( al-juz'iyyah), like the individual thing ( al-shakh�) to
which applies the ten categories. The combination of the two
senses of the meaning of quiddity in a specific quiddity ( al
miihiyyah al-naw'iyyah) is nothing but the very thing itself (nafs al-
452
See above, p. 238, note 238 for an explanation of the distinction
between primary and secondary intelligibles. A clear explanation of this
problem is found in lzutsu's The concept and reality of existence, IV, eh. 3,
pp. 76-80 fol. On al-Fara.bi's clarification of it see ibid., p. 79 where the
author cites the Risiilah li al-mu'allim al-thiinzfijawiib masii'il su'ila 'anhii
(note 40). In scholasticism, see the De Ente et Essentia of Thomas
Aquinas, translated with introduction and notes: On Being and Essence,
by Armand Maurer, C.S.B. (2nd. rev. ed.), the Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, Canada, 1968, eh. I. See also the article
on 'substance', by Lewis M. M. Hammond, Albert G.A. Baiz and
Rudolf Allers, in The Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. D.D. Runes, London,
1951, pp. 304, col. 1; col. 2 (c) and (d); 305, col. 2.
COMMENTARY
shay'). 453 It is this combined meaning of the two senses of mahiyyah

or quiddity as the reality of a thing that the Mutakallimiin meant
when they said that the reality of a thing is the thing itself. They
in fact say that:
The reality of a thing (baqzqat al-shay') and its quiddity

(mahiyyah) are that by which a thing is what it is (ma bihi al
shay'u huwa huwa), like 'rational animal' with reference to
'man' in contrast to 'laughing animal' and 'writing animal',
since it is possible to conceive of 'man' without reference to
them ( i.e. laughing and writing) inasmuch as they are
among the ( category of) accidents ( al-'awarirj,). And it may be
said further that, that by which a thing is what it is, when
considered ( bi i'tibar) as being realized externally
(tabaqqaqa), is a reality (baqzqah); as being individualized
( tashakhkhu�), is an ipseity (huwiyyah); and when considered
independently without considering them ( i.e. its being
realized and its being individualized), it is a quiddity. A
'thing' ( al-shay'), according to us, is the existent ( al-mawjud);
and subsistence ( al-thubut); realization ( al-tabaqquq);
existence ( al-wujud); and coming-into-being ( al-kawn) are
synonymous terms, and the meaning of them is self
evident. 454
In the above passage appeanng at the beginning of the
453 0n miihiyyah, see above, pp. 227; 229-234; 242-243. The miihiyyah of
the logicians refers to miihiyyah in the particular sense, and is the same as
the mentally posited quiddity ( al-miihiyyah al-i' tibiiriyyah); also miihiyyah
II in the schema on p. 243 above. The specific quiddity has equal
singulars, in that what is necessary for one singular is the same as what is
necessary for the other; like 'man', for example, necessitates in Zayd
what is necessitated in 'Amr, in contrast to the generic quiddity (al
miihiyyah al-jinsiyyah) whose singulars are not equal, for 'animal' as
necessitated in man is associated with 'rational', and is not necessitated
in this way in other animals. See al-Ta'rffiit, pp. 205-206; Kashshiif, V.,
p. 1313.
454 Shar� al-'Aqii'id, pp. 16-17. My translation.
commentary on al-Nasafi's 'Aqii'id, al-Taftazan1 combined

reality (�aqiqah) and quiddity (miihiyyah) as together constituting
that by which a thing is what it is. For quiddity in the particular
sense as understood by the logicians is merely a mental entity
belonging to a class of secondary intelligibles to which nothing in
the external world corresponds; whereas the theologians were
concerned primarily not with mental entities, but with extra
mental realities such as are immediately perceived as at the stage
of the primary notion of things. Thus they defined reality
( &aqzqah) as something realized externally ( ta&aqqaqa), and the
combination of reality and quiddity in the particular sense
becomes the equivalent of quiddity in the general sense, which
refers to real essence having as its referent or correspondent a
concrete, external object, an existent, a thing ( mawjiid). They
meant by this combination, therefore, to indicate a concept that
directly signifies an extramental reality, and which belongs to the
class of primary intelligibles. The concept of 'man', for example,
is a primary intelligible, as is also that of 'animal'. Now for
everything there is a reality by which the thing is what it is, and
this reality establishes for the thing its essential difference which
distinguishes it from what is not it. Reality in this sense is identical
with quiddity or essence.
The nature of quiddity as understood by reason was first
systematically analysed and formulated by ibn Sina. 455 The
theologians, after the manner of the philosophers� held that the
being of a thing can be conceived as either in the thing itself as it
exists in the external world ( al-wujiid al-khiirijl), or as it exists in
the mind ( al-wujiid al-dhihnl). In view of this, and as a further
elaboration of the relation between the quiddity and its
constituent elements as set forth by ibn Sfoa, the quiddity can be
conceived as having three aspects: ( 1) as pure abstraction
unrelated to any thing or to any mind (mujarradah); (2) as
absolute indeterminate ( mutfaqah), unrestricted by unrelatedness
to any thing or to any mind, and free to engage itselfin individual
455 Seeal-Shija', al-Manfiq, al-Madkhal, eds. G. Qanawafi, Ma}:imud al

Khu<;layri, and Fu' ad al-Ahwani, Cairo, pp. 15, 34; see also pp. 65-72.
COMMENTARY
things; and (3) as the same quiddity in ( 2) above and present in

the mind wherein it receives various accidents such as pre
dication, universality, particularity, and the like, whereby its
aspect is mixed (makhliitah). The same quiddity as considered by
the intellect under the guise of these three aspects is called, in the
first case, 'negatively-conditioned' ( Iii bi shart shay'); in the second
case, 'non-conditioned' ( bi shart Iii shay'); and in the third case,
'conditioned-by-something' ( bi sharf, shay'). 456 The first refers to
quiddity in relation to matter (miiddah); the second to genus (fins);
and the third to species (naw'). 457 In the first case, the concept of
'animal' as 'animal' is nothing Lut pure 'animal', and it cannot
be predicated of the concept 'man' because 'rn;:in' signifies
something more than pure 'animal'. It is thus an independent
concept and no other concept can be combined with it to form a
coherent unity. If the concept 'rational' were added to 'animal'
in this case, it wou·ld not produce a coherent combination, since
animal qua animal cannot be qualified by rationality. In the
second case, the concept of'animal' is no longer restricted to itself
as 'animal', so that 'animal' here is indeterminate and has the
potentiality of being predicated of other concepts in a coherent
combination. When the concept 'rational' is predicated of
'animal' in this case, it produces the composite in the form of the
concept 'man'; 'animal' in this sense can be predicated of'man',
456 See ibn Sina's Al-lshiiriit wa al-Tanbzhiit with the commentary by

Na�ir al-Din al-Tusi ( ed. by Sulayman Dunya, 2nd ed., Dar al-Ma'arif
bi Mi�r, Cairo, 1971, 4v.), vol. 1, pp. 184-85. See also Izutsu's The
Concept and Reality of Existence, pp. 146; and the Al-Mawiiqiffi'llm al
Kaliim of 'A<;lud al-Din 'Abd al-Ra}:iman ibn A}:imad al-rji (published
by 'Alam al-Kutub, Beyrut [n.d.]; distributed by Maktabah al
Mutanabbi, Cairo, and Maktabah Sa'd al-Din Damascus) al-marJad al
thiinz containing twelve maqiiJid, pp. 59-681. On the quiddity as raving
three aspects as outlined above, see al-maqJad al-thiinz, p. 60. The same
information on the subject as found in the Mawiiqif is also found in
Kashshaj, vol. V, p. I 3 14.
457 Al-lshiiriit wa al- Tanbzhiit, vol. 1, p. 184. The term miiddah signifies
prime matter as also signified by a.nother term: h ay iila from Greek hyle.
But miiddah tends more to refer to elemental matter that receives
generation and corruption.
since animality and rationality are constituent parts of man. In

the third case, the concept of 'animal' refers to what is already
actualized as something specified as 'rational', and 'animal' thus
specified refers to a particular man. It is to this third aspect of
quiddity that al-Taftazani referred in his commentary on al
Nasafi's statement that the realities ofthings are established, that
is, subsistent (&aqa'iq al-asfrya' thabitah). What he meant when he
said that the reality ofa thing and its quiddity are 'that by which
a thing is what it is' refers, in the context oflogic, to that by which
a thing is located in its genus or species. 'Animal' alone is not
'man'; it is, rather, the nature ofa being without determination of
its special form. 458 Similarly, 'rational' alone is not 'man'; it is,
when predicated of'animal', its special form which is a principle
of difference by which the speices 'man' is defined. The
combination of 'rational' plus 'animal' defines 'man', but 'man'
in his quiddity is not that combination. Man is man. 459
Humanity or being-man (insant�yah) when considered in itself is
not some kind of entity that is common to, and can be received
by, recipients of existence such as man. Being-man in itself is
something negative ( or something negatively-conditioned.: la bi
sharf shay'); only when it is referred to as something ofZayd, in the
same manner that it can be referred to as something of'Amr, that
it refers to a single, concretely existent individual In itself, being
man or humanity is neither what is in Zayd, nor what is not in
him, for the humanity in Zayd and that which is not in Zayd are
mentally posited, determined entities attached to Zayd on the
one hand, and not attached to him on the other, only after being
related to either one. 460 In the context ofreality, that is, from the
point of view of what is already actualized, where things are
without exception particular and individual, the quiddity of a
man is that by which the man is that particular man, thereby
458 /.e. as in the case of the second aspect in which a quiddity can be
conceived: unconditioned by any thing ( bi shar! la shay').
459 See al-Isfara'int's supercommentary on al-Taftazani's commentary
on the 'Aqa'id, pp. r 6- r 7.

460 See the Mawiiqif, 2nd. mar{ad, rst. maq{ad, pp. 59-60.
COMMENTARY
indicating the reality of an entity which, when considered

together with the man, is that by which the man comes to be that
man. Now, nothing establishes the identity of a man-neither
the part ( al-juz )), like 'rational', for example, nor what is
accidental (' arirj,) to him, like 'laughing', for example-except
his very self (nafs). This entity, when considered together with the
man of which it is the man's identity or very self, is other than the
man. When we say, for example, that man is composed of soul
(nafs) and body (badan) we are saying that man is neither soul nor
body, but that out of these two there is constituted a third entity.
To this refers the interpretation of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi when he
said that primary knowledge (al-'ilm al-r/,ariirz) is arrived at
because of the existence of something which is indicated by every
human being when he says 'I'. This something is either a body
(jism), or an accident (' ararj,); or a combination of both, or
something different from both; or it is a composite (murakkab)
formed of them as of two things from which is constituted a third
entity. 46 1 From this it is clear that the quiddity of a composite is
not.the composite itself, though the quiddity itself is a composite,
as illustrated by the following diagram: 462
461 See his commentary on siirah Banz lsrii) zl (17), ayah, 85, in his great
commentary on the Holy Qur'an, the Al-Tajsfr al-Kabfr. An
explanation of the terms Jism ) 'ararj, and murakkab in the context of the
interpretation referred to above is found in Kashshiij; vol. I, pp. 75-78,
under the heading al-insiin. See also note 451 above. On this third entity
as the quiddity of a thing see further al-Mawiiqif, p. 13.
462 1n this simplified illustration, the circles I and 2 represent parts of the
composite; 3, which is itself a composite formed of 1 and 2, is not the

The above illustration is only meant to simplify visually what we

mean. If circle I represents the genus (jins) 'animal' and circle 2
represents the difference (fa#) 'rational', then 3 would represent
the species (naw') 'man'. Similarly, if circle I represents the
substratum matter (maddah) and circle 2 represents the
substantial form (.rurah), then 3 would represent the substance
'body' (jism). Then again, and as related to man-both logically
as in the former case, and ontologically as in the latter case-if
circle I represents a composite body (jism) individuated in
human form (badan), 463 and circle 2 represents a sensitive and
rational soul (nafs), then 3 would represent a human being. The
reality of a human being is his very self, neither body nor soul; nor
matter nor form; nor animal nor rational.
We mentioned earlier that in the definition of reality (baqzqah)
as 'that by which a thing is what it is', which can also be
formulated as 'that by which it is it' (ma bihi huwa huwa), the ha' of
bihi (the kY of kY which) signifies causality (sababiyyah). 464 What is
apparent from the two personal pronouns (r/,amfran): huwa huwa
(it is it), is that each indicates the cause of existence ('illah al
wujud) and the cause of quiddity ('illah al-mahiyyah), both of
which constitute the cause of a thing ('illah al-s/i,ay'). Both
existence and quiddity refer to one and the same existent thing; to
its actual subsistence and to its essential nature. The cause of a
thing is that on which the thing is dependent for its being-a-thing.
This is of two logical divisions: ( 1) that by which the quiddity, as
composite I and 2 but a separate entity. Even if the two circles were to
be drawn as overlapping one another, it would not affect the
constitution of the third entity which is not the composite of the two
circles, but is a separate composite in itself. This is ibn S"ina's conclusion.
463 The distinction between jism and badan is that in the case of the
former, it is a material substance having a three-dimensional nature

which is capable of division without losing its identity as body; and in
the latter case, which is also referred to as jasad, it is a body having
complete members not capable of division without losing its identity as
a whole. The former is a body referring .to the genus of quantity,
whereas the latter refers to a body in the genus of animal.
464 See above, pp. 315-316.
COMMENTARY 33 1
from a combination of its parts, is constituted, and this is the cause

of quiddity; (2) that on which the quiddity, which is constituted
by its parts, is dependent for its qualification by external
existence, and this is the cause of existence. 465 Insofar as its
mental existence is concerned, the causes of quiddity are genus
(fins) and specific difference (ja�l), and insofar as its external
existence is concerned, they are matter (maddah) and form
(riirah), from which are derived the material cause (al-'illah al
miiddiyyah) and the formal cause (al-'illah al-�iiriyyah). As for the
causes of existence, they are the active agent ( al:fo' il), the final
purpose ( al-ghayah), and the substratum ( al-mawrj,ii'); the first two
pointing to the efficient cause (al-'illah al-fii'iliyyah) and the final
cause (al-'illah al-ghii'iyyah) respectively. 466 The cause of a thing
as outlined above may be illustrated as follows:
Active
Agent
Final
Purpose
/
Substratum
"'/
Matter
Quiddity
Form
7\
Existence
Difference
�
Mental
Thing
A M
A = Active Agent M = Matter

P = Final Purpose F = Form
Q = Quiddity
465 See al-Ta'rfftit, p. 160, under the heading 'illah al-shay'.

466
See al-lshiiriit wa al- Tanbzhiit, vol. I, pp. I 54- I 55; also Metaphysica,
332 A COMMENTARY ON THE l;IUJJAT AL-$IDDIQ,
The above outline represents the conceptual structure of an.

actual thing at the level of intellection ( al-ta' aqqul). At this level,
the cause of a thing, as indicated by the bii' of causality,
necessitates a duality (ithnayniyyah) of quiddity and existence. At
· the level ofactual existence, however, there is only one single and
identical concrete thing, which becomes a composite of
quiddity and existence when the duality at the conceptual level is
projected onto it. In the definition: mii bihi al-shay' huwa huwa:
'that by which a thing is what it is', or 'that by which it is it', the
two personal pronouns refer, in the first case, to an entity because
of which the thing is that thing ( al-amr al-ladhz bi sababihi al-shay'
dhiilika al-shay'), and in the second case, to an entity because of
which the thing is that entity ( al-amr al-ladhz bi-sababihi al-shay )
huwa dhiilika al-amr) ; 467 to its being itselfin the first case, and to its
eh. 15, pp. 41-44; also eh. 20, pp. 50-53. Matter (maddah) is the
substratum or receptacle whose existence is actualized by receiving a
substance such as form (riirah). The iatter is the substantial aspect of an
entity and its essence.The material cause is the constituent element (e.g.
wood) of an entity (e.g. chair) which has the potentiality to receive the
form (e.g. shape) of that entity. The formal cause is what realizes the
substance and makes it complete, as illustrated by the shape of a chair
which is attributed to wood (Metaphysica, p. 41). The efficient cause is
the initiator of actions leading to the realization of an entity, as
illustrated by the builder who builds a house, or an entity, or the maker
who constructs a boat.If the final form or purpose of the house were not
envisioned by the huilder, he would not become a builder of the house,
the form of the house would not be actualized, and the house would not
be made of its various elements ( Metaphysica, p. 42). See further the
Mawaqif (2nd. mawqif; 5th mar,rad and 1st maq,rad), p. 85; for the whole
section on the cause and the caused, see pp. 85-95; Kashshiif, vol IV, pp
I 039-1040. The cause of a thing as outlined above refers to the direct or
proximate (qarzbah) cause, not the indirect or ultimate (ba'zdah) cause.
For a discussion and explanation of the problem of the two personal
pronouns, see the supercommentaries on al-Taftazani's Shar� al-'Aqii'id
by Ibrah1m al-Isfara' in1 and Al)mad al-Khayaff, ibid., pp. 16-17. The
data furnished by al-Isfara' ini and al-Khayaff on this issue is also used
by al-Tahanawi in his Kashshiif, vol.II, pp.331-333 under the heading:
al-�aqzqah.
461 Kashshiif, II, p. 331.
COMMENTARY 333
being actualized in the second case. Its being actualized refers to
its existence, which is common to all other existents; its being
itself refers to its quiddity, which distinguishes it from all other
existents. According to al-Khayali, one of the pronouns refers
back to the relative pronoun ( al-maw�iil) 468 and at-Tahanawi
identified the pronoun as the one in the second case above, 469
which refers to existence and which, since it indicates the same
thing (al-shay'), is considered additional (zii'id) 470 to what is
defined, so that it would be sufficient to construe the definition
without it, such as mii bihi al-shay' huwa, 171 meaning mii bihi aL
shay' huwa al-shay' 472: 'that by which the thing is that thing'. Seen
according to this perspective the duality of quiddity and
existence is resolved, in that it is not really true; it is only
apparently so at the suggestion of the mind.
Existence and quiddity are two different entities, whether
considered logically or ontologically, 473 and yet they refer at the
same time to a single, actually existent thing. The fact that these
two, as predicates, can be attributed to one and the same thing is
clear enough evidence that the thing itself has two aspects
corresponding to them, to one of which only does the meaning of
'reali,ty' applies. For it is not possible that they both be real at the
same time, since if they were then the thing would lose its unity
and identity as one single thing and would be two different
things; nor is it possible that they both be not real at the same
time, since if that were the case the thing would lose its reality
altogether. Either one of them, existence or quiddity, is the thing
itself; and this being so, either one of them must be additional
(zii'id) to the other, that is, either one of them must be something
additional as construed by the mind, having no corresponding
468 That is, the hi of bihi (the which of by which), Shar� al-'Aqii'id, p. 16.
469 Kashshiif, II. p. 332.
470 See both al-lsfara' ini and al-Khayali in Shar� al-'Aqii'id, p. 16.
471 Kashshiif II, p. 333; and V, p. 1313.
472 /bid., V, p. 1313; Shar� al-'Aqii'id, p. 16.

473 This agrees with the positions taken by the theologians, the �ufis and
the philosophers, with the exception of the Ash'aris, who will be

discussed later, pp. 339-341, below.
reality in the external world; a secondary intelligible. Whereas

the one to which the meaning of'reality' applies would be the one
that has a corresponding reality, or actual object, in the external
world, such as what is termed a primary intelligible.
Up to this point in our explanation of what is meant by the
reality (baqiqah) ofa thing as expressed in the definition: ma bihi
al-shay' huwa huwa ('that by which a thing is what it is'), we
concur with al-Ranfri that the $iifis and the Mutakallimiin were
in accord as to what is meant by reality as expressed in the
definition. Indeed, it is a fact that the $iifis, the Mutakallimiin
and the philosophers all applied the same definition ofreality in
the sense ofquiddity or real essence (mahiyyah). 474 It is also now
clear that the two analogies given by al-Ranfri in interpretation
ofthe Sufi meaning ofreality in fact refer to the cause ofa thing
('illah al-shay') as constituted by the cause of quiddity ('illah al
miihiyyah) and the cause ofexistence (' illah al-wujiid). The analogy
indicating the reality ofthe pot to be the revolving wheel refers to
the cause ofquiddity; and that indicating the reality of the boat
to be the maker refers to the cause of existence; these including
their direct, proximate causes consisting of the material cause
(e.g. the clay), and the formal cause (e.g. the revolving wheel) as
the causes of quiddity; the substratum (e.g. the boat), the fnal
i
cause (e.g. the shape ofthe boat), and the efficient cause (e.g. the
maker) as the causes ofexistence. Both the pot and the boat are
examples of actual objects, of things that have corresponding
realities in the external world.
What we have just explained, in concurrence with al-Ranfri's
statement on the affirmation of realities, confirm conclusively
that the $iifis, in agreement with the Mutakallimiin, attested to
the actuality ofrealities as they exist in the things ofthe external
world. We do not concur, however, with al-Ranfri's conclusion
that the $iifis and the theologians meant the same thing in their
understanding of 'existence' and 'reality', or that their apparent
difference in this matter lay only in their manner of expression
474
See Kashshiif, II, p. 333.
COMMENTARY 335
( lafzz), such that there was no real difference between them on

the issue of meaning (ma'nawz).
It is indeed true that the $ufis took the same position as the
theologians in affirming the reality of things that constitute the
world, and hence the reality of the world, as established, in
contradiction to the Sophists. Likewise they concurred on the
problems connected with the nature of existence in relation to
reality as known by means of rational analysis and
demonstration. To this we have already drav1n attention in the
preceding pages. 475 They admitted that, according to t. he level of
knowledge based upon reason and sense perception-v:hich they
also affirmed as valid criteria for the veri.Gcation of truths, and
which they themselves applied in their own investigations
existence is a single, general and abstract concept common to all
existences that becomes multiple due to a rational division into
portions corresponding to things in the course of its being
attributed to quiddities; and that the meaning of 'reality' in the
sense of there being in the external world something actual to
which it corresponds pertains only to either the existence or the
quiddity of a thing, one of them being a secondary intelligible to
which nothing in the external world corresponds. Existence in
the aforementioned sense, they agreed, is the mental entity having
no corresponding reality in the external world, as we have
previously explained. 476
But the $ufis attested further, in contrast to theologians and the
philosophers, that in addition to existence in the aforementioned
serise, and as based upon clear mystical revelation and true
intuition founded upon Tradition as well as upon reason and
sense perception, there is another entity corresponding to it
which is not mental but real, and this other entity is the reality of
existence, by which existence in the aforementioned sense ( i.e. as
a concept of a concept) comes to inhere in th_e mind as one of its
effects. Existence as reality, according to them, and as we have
475 See above, pp. 303-309.

4 76 See above, pp. 323-333.
336 A COMMENTARY ON THE l;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ
recurrently pointed out, 477 is not something static, but

perpetually involves itself in a dynamic movement of ontological
self-expression, articulating its inner possibilities in concrete
forms such that the particular existences, which we regard as
multiple and diverse things having separate, individual realities,
are nothing but its modes and individuations. Seen from this
perspective, the quiddity of a thing, which is considered as a real
entity when taken within the conceptual framework of existence
in the aforementioned sense as being a secondary intelligible,
turns out to be nothing more than a mental entity, non-existent in
itself, while the existence of a thing, which is there a mental entity is
here a real entity. The real and true essence or quiddity of a
thing, according to the $iifis, is existence-that is to say,
existence as individuated in a particular mode. The $iifis
identified existence as reality as the absolute existence, or as the
Truth. 478
The theologians disagreed with the Siifis ·on their claim that
God or the Truth is absolute existence. They maintained that
absolute existence is a mental concept existing only in the mind,
and that quiddity is real and is the substratum for existence,
which qualifies it and inheres in it; that absolute existence is a
secondary intelligible to which nothing in the external world
corresponds; that it is divisible, for example, into necessary and
contingent, and further into substantial and accidental, and the
like; that it becomes multiple with the multiplicity of its
individual subjects; and that it is predicated of particular
existences by analogy, indicating that it is an accident with
respect to its singulars. 479 The logial conclusion to be derived
477 See e.g. above, pp. 266-271.

478 See above, pp. 240-241; 267 fol.
479 See above, pp. 303-306. On the arguments of the theologians with
respect to the doctrines of the �iifis of the school ofwa!Jdat al-wujiid, see al
Taftazani"'s commentary on his Al-Maqa{id Ji 'ilm al-Kalam, entitled
Shar� al-Maqa{id, Istanbul, 1277 A.H. 2v., vol. 1, pp. 55-56. These
arguments are cited in Nicholas Heer's "Al-Ja.mi's Treatise on Existence,"
an important essay containing a translation of]a.mi's.Risiilahfi al-wujiid,
COMMENTARY 337
from the above arguments is that it is impossible for God to be
absolute existence, since were He such He would be reduced to
being only a mental entity, divisible into parts, multiple, and an
accidental concept.
The answer of the $iifis as given by Jami 480 and others 481 point
by point invalidated the arguments of the theologians, who
apparently misunderstood what the $iifis meant by the reality of
existence. The $i"ifis were not referring to existence as a mental
concept when they said that it is possible for existence in that
sense to be superadded to a single, absolute and existent reality
which is the reality of existence. 48 2 That existence exists in reality
is proveu Ly the fact that if it did not exist, then nothing would
exist at all, and since the consequent is false, the antecedent is also
false. 483 The implication in the above syllogism is that quiddity,
before existence is associated with it, is non-existent externally,
for it is unthinkable that it should be existent before its own
existence. Then if existence were also non-existent externally, it
would be impossible for both existence and quiddity to exist, the
one being a substratum for the other to inhere in. If existence
were something added to quiddity externally, then quiddity, as
in Islamic philosophical theology, ed. Parviz Morewedge, State University

of New York Press, Albany, 1979, pp. 223-256. The Arabic text is on
pp. 247-256; the English translation is on p. 237-243. See, for the
theologians' arguments, p. 224. Jaml's Risa/ah was written in answer to
the arguments of the theologians and a refutation of them.
48 °For example in his al-Durrah al-Fiikhirah, and the Risiilah mentioned
in the preceding note.

481 For example, those mentioned by Heer in ibid., p. 225 such as al
Fanari, al-Qunyawi and al-Maha'imi whose works, at least the last two
mentioned, were known to al-Raniri. As Heer pointed out, the �iifi
arguments are based on reason, to demonstrate that if their position
could be defended on purely rational grounds, the argument of the
theologians that it contradicted reason would have no validity.
482 See al-Durrah al-Fakhirah, p. 36/8; lfawashz, p. 92/2; Risa/ah, Arabic
text pp. 249-250 ( I o). See also above, p. 306.

483 Risiilah, p. 248 (1) Arabic text; p. 237 (r) English translation. The
proof for the existence of the Necessary Existent is given in al-Durrah al
Fiikhirah, pp. 33-34/3.
the substratum for existence to inhere in, must exist externally

prior to existence. But this, as we said, is impossible. Thus only
existence, rather than quiddity, exists externally. Existence exists
through itself, otherwise-if it exists through another
existence-an endless chain of existences would result.
Moreover, existence must be one, becoming multiple only
through a rational division due to its being related or attributed
to quiddities. Since existence is existent externally through itself
and it is one, it is identical with the Necessary Existent (God). 484
The proof for the existence of the Necessary Existent is the fact
that if the Necessary Existent did not exist, then every thing that
exists would be restricted to contingent being (al-mumkin al
wujiid). This is impossible, because the contingent can neither
exist through itself nor bring others into existence, with the result
that if all that exists were restricted to the contingent, then
nothing would exist at all, contrary to what we see. 485
The theologians, in another line of argument, took the position
that absolute existence, which is the reality of existence affirmed
by the Siifis, in view of its absoluteness (iflaq) is a natural
universal (al-kullz al-pabi'i), 486 and as such it can have no external
existence, but exists only in the mind. The Siifis did not admit
that, in view of its absoluteness, absolute existence is a natural
universal, because it is possible for it to be an existent which is
individuated in itself, and which does not have an individuation
484 Risiilah, p. 248 (2); tr. p. 237 (2). See further pp. 248-250 (3-12);
237-239 (3-12).
485 See al-Durrah al-Fiikhirah, pp. 33-34/3; above, pp. 252-253.
486 A natural universal is defined as an intelligible in its pure
abstraction, unconditioned by anything at all, whether by being

existent or non-existent; universal or particular. It is quiddity as it is in
itself (min hayth h-iya hiya), that is, qua nature (!abrah), and negatively
conditioned (la bi sharf shay'). See above, pp. 326-327, and the reference
in note 455 on p. 326. See also al-Ta'rffot, p. 205 under the heading
miihiyyah al-shay; lfawiishz, p. 96/14. The notion of the natural universal
was first originated by ibn Sina as referring to one of the three aspects of
quiddity. The �iifis, such as al-Qunyawi, al-Qashani, Jam1 and others
applied it to existence rather than to quiddity.
COMMENTARY 339
that is incompatible with the multiple and diverse individuations
adhering to. it in the various ontological planes. Absolute
existence, in its dynamic act of self-unfolding, encompasses all
existents, whether intellectual or concrete, mental or external;
appearing in their forms and manifesting itself in conformity with
them in their various relations and aspects, both in the visible as
well as the invisible planes of existence. While being thus
perpetually involved in this act of self-unfolding in the multiple
and determined levels of existence, it nevertheless always remains
single and absolute in its own level of existence. In itself it is not
individuated, either in the mind as a universal or externally as a
particular, but becomes individuated after its realization or
actualization in its singulars through their individuation as
particular existences. In reality, however, it has no real, existent
singulars distinct from one another, its singulars being only what
the mind takes them to be in consideration of its attribution to
quiddities. The multiple and distinct singulars are conceived in
the mind, but being conceived in the mind is an attribute of the
multiplicity, whereas that which is multiple consists of real,
externally existent entities. Thus in this sense absolute existence is
neither a universal nor a particular, and it exists externally:: As, to
whether natural universals only exist in the mind as the
theologians claimed, the $ufis rejected this saying that no
sufficient proof has been adduced to substantiate such a claim. 487
The fundamental difference between the position of the $ufis
and that of the Mutakallimun, as can be seen from the above gist
of their respective arguments, is centered on the problem of the
nature of existence. Other points of difference not mentioned
above, of which we wish only to state briefly their bare identities
without going into details, all have their ultimate locus of origin
in the way in which the nature of existence is understood. On the
doctrine of Divine attributes, the $ufis took the position that
487 Seethe Risiilahj Arabic text p. 250/14, 15; English tr. p. 239/14, 15.
See further, al-Durrah al-Fiikhirahj p. 38/13, 14; p. 39/15, 16 and 17; p.
40/20; Jfawiishz, p. 92/6; p. 96/14, 15; p. 98/17; Shar� al-Durrahj p.
123/12; p. 124/18, 19; p. 125/20.
God's attributes are identical with His essence with respect to

existence, but other than it with respect to intellection; whereas
the theologians affirmed that God's attributes are superadded to
His essence both with respect to existence and intellection. 488 On
the doctrine of creation; the Siifis maintained that God created
the creation from the possible essences established in His
consciousness, and not from nothing ( ex nihilo) in the sense of
sheer privation as the theologians held. 489 Moreover, unlike the
theologians, the Siifis affirmed the permanent archetypes in their
metaphysics, in which they assume the fundamental role of the
third metaphysical category between being and non-being. As to
the difference between the $iifis and the Ash'ari theologians on
the issue of existence and quiddity, whether they are distinct from
one another, or whether they are indistinguishable, the $iifis took
the position that existence is distinct from quiddity at all levels of
existence, the intellectual and the concrete, the mental and the
external. The Ash'ari theologians, on the other hand, took the
reverse of this position, maintaining that at all these levels
existence and quiddity are indistinguishable. It is evident that on
this issue the true position is that of the $iifis. That existence and
quiddity are distinct from one another in the mind is clear
enough, but in the level of external reality it would at first appear
as though the $iifis identified existence with quiddity, since for
them quiddity is in itself really nothing, being only a limitation of
existence as it determines itself ir1to a particular mode, which
limitation is interpreted by the mind as quiddity. But this
apparent identification of existence with quiddity is not really the
case, for even though what the mind ontologizes as quiddity is in
reality a determined or limited existence, it does not follow that
this determined or limited existence is identical with existence as
it is in its undetermined or unlimited aspect. Thus what the mind
conceives as quiddity is in reality a determining limit of existence
488 See al-Durrah al-Fakhirah, pp. 43/27; 44/28; lfawashz, p. 98/19 and 20;
Shar� al-Durrah, pp. r 27 /28;
489 For details see The philosophy of the Kalam, by H.A. Wolfson, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 1976. eh. V.

COMMENTARY 341
as it unfolds itself in existential movement, creating out of such

determining limits the multiple and diverse realities of the
external world. 490 According to this perspective, in the level of
external reality existence and quiddity are not identical.
More important perhaps is the difference between the Sufis
and the Ash'aris in their understanding of the nature of reality as
it pertains to the doctrine of the perpetual creation which both
groups affirmed. We said earlier 491 that there is a striking
similarity between the Sufi doctrine of the renewal of creation at
every breath of existence (tajdzd al-khalq bi al-anfas; the word
anfiis, or 'breaths', refers to the Breath of the Merciful: nafas al
Rabmiin, which is identified as the expansion of e)fistence: inbisii!
al-wujiid), and the theory of the perpetual creation involving the
renewal of accidents (tajdzd al-a'riirj,) in Ash'ari atomism. 4 9 2 This
similarity, which was alluded to by al-Raniri in paragraph VIII
above, was acknowledged by ibn 'Arabi himself. 4 93 But in the
theory of the Ash'aris the accidents, which do not endure two
units of time and which are therefore continually being
annihilated and replaced by their similars, inhere in self
subsistent substances (sing. 'ayn or jawhar) which are their
substrata (sing. maball). When as an aggregate the accidents
inhere in a substance, the substance constitutes a thing that
subsists by itself and endures for an indefinite period. 494 The Sufis
found this theory of substances which are never free of accidents
self-contradictory. Moreover, it presupposes still another
substance, or numerous substances, other than the One Real
Substance as the substratum (al-ma'riirj,) underlying all realities.
They further contended that when the Ash 'aris defined things
their definition inevitably turned the thing into an aggregation of
accidents. Thus according to the Sufi perspective the substances
490 See The concept and reality of existence, p. 134. See further, for the
Ash'ari position, above, pp. �48-250; 303-305; note 473 on p. 333.
491 See above, pp. 266; 294-295.
492 See above,
pp. 255-256. For further details of Ash'ari atomism, see
The philosophy of the Kalam, eh. VI.
493
Fu,rii,r, p. r56.
494 See above, pp. 209-2 r r.
of Ash'ari atomism are nothing but accidents like all other

accidents, and that of which they are accidents, or their
substratum, is the one real Substance identified as the Truth,
Who when considered as He is in His own level of existence is the
Absolute, and is the One substratum in which all existents other
than He inhere; and when considered as He is in His
determinated levels of existence is the Determined, and is the
Many individuations extrinsic to Him, such that neither
composition nor multiplicity affects His absolute oneness. He is
thus the One substance and the Many accidents or attributes
inhering in Him. The Many are different from Him with respect
to determination and individuation, but are identical with Him
with respect to existence and reality. In reality, however, He is, in
the guise of His multiple determinations and individuations, not
inherent in any substratum in the sense that accidents are
inherent in a substance which is their rnbstratum; neither is He,
in His absolute oneness, really a substratum, but is rather a single
entity appearing sometimes with the quality of being a
substratum, and at other times with the quality of being
inherent. 49 5
Corresponding to the three metaphysical categories
mentioned earlier 496 and described as the three levels of the
reality of existence, the $iifis acknmvledged three leveis of reality.
According to Jami in his commentary on the Fu�u� 497 the realities
(&aqiFiq) in three m�taphysicai ievels are:
( 1) Absolute reality (&aqzqah mul!faqah). This is characterized

by being efficacious (fa" alah), one or single ( wa&idah),
495 See Fu,rii�, pp. 125-126; Shar& Fuii�, pp. 186-188; Lawii'i&, XXVI,
pp. 29�37; al-Durrah al-Fiikhirah, pp. 39-40/18; Jfawiishz, pp. 96-97/15
(2); Shar& al-Durrah, p. 135; above, pp. 57-58; 113-114. See also Key
philosoj>hical concepts, eh. XIII (III).
496 See above, pp. 275-276.
497 Shar& Fu�ii� al-Hikam (printed in the margin of 'Abd al-Ghani al
Nabulusi's Shar& Jawiihir al-Nu�ii� Ji &all Kalimah al-Fu�ii�, 2v., Cairo,

1304-1323, al-Fa�� al-Awwal. This is also cited by al-Tahanawi in his
Kashshiif II, p. 333.
COMMENTARY 343
exalted in degree (' iiliyah), necessary ( wi,[jibah) and

existing by its own essence. This is the reality of God.
( 2) Determined reality ( baqzqah muqayyadah). Characterized
by being passive (munfa'ilah), lowly in degree (siifilah),
being recipient of existence which it receives from the
necessary reality by means of effusion or emanation (al-
fayef) and manifestation ( al-tajallz'). This is the reality of the
world.
(3) Unitive reality (baqzqah abadiyyah). This reality is . .a
combination of the absolute and determined realities; of
activity ( al-fi'l) and passivity ( al-infi'iii), of being effective
(al-ta'thzr) and being effected ( al-ta'aththur); it is absolute
in one aspect, passive in another; it is a composite of the
two realities and contains within itself the corresponding
opposites inherent in its two aspects, by whose mutual
operation it becomes mulitple ( muta'add id) and
particularized ( mufaHal). In relation to what of this reality
is externalized, it is the universal active nature (al-!ab{ ah
al-kulliyyah al-fa" iilah) in one aspect, and the un� versal
passive nature ( al-!ab{ ah al-kulliyyah al-munfa'ilah) in
another. It receives its effects from the Divine Names ( al,.
asmii) al-iliihiyyah) in conformity with the mutual operation
of corresponding opposites inherent in them. To this
reality refers the plane of firstness and lastness. The active
and unifying principle of all the realities as combined in
this reality is the Reality of realities (baqzqah al-baqii) iq). 498
Regarding the nature of things that constitute the world

together with all its parts, whether it is real or illusory, the Siifis
have been generally misunderstood as affirming it to be nothing
but an illusion having no reality other than its mental existence.
In ibn Khaldiin's explanation of the doctrines of the different
498This outline corresponds to the three levels of existence stated on pp.

275-276 above; the third level ofreality corresponds to the second level of
existence; the first and second levels above correspond to the first and
third levels of existence. See also the same outline in Na qd al-Nul4) pp.
29-30.
kinds of Siifis, for example, wherein he dealt with both the

ancient and the recent $iifis, he acknowledged that the recent
Siifis, by whom he almost certainly meant particularly ibn 'Arabi
and his school ofwa�dat al-wuJiid, 499 affirmed the real character of
the higher and lower existentia and the real character of the
divine kingdom and the realm of the spirit. 500 But in spite of that
his explanation of the philosophical theology and metaphysical
doctrines of the Siifis is apparently confused and hence
misleading, and apart from his own the confusion was possibly
due to that inherent in the source or sources from which he
obtained his information regarding these matters. He stated that
the Siifis held that God is one with His creatures, in the sense that
He is incarnate (�uliil) in them, or in the sense that He is identical
with them and there exists nothing but Himself. He also stated
that the Sufi doctrine of oneness is identical with the Christian
doctrine of incarnation and the stated opinion of the extremist
Shi'ah regarding their imams. 501 In our estimation, however, this
sort of belief applies only to the pseudo-Siifis of various kinds who
affirmed either a dualism, or a monism, or a pantheism in their
various positions on the relationship between God and the world,
to which we have referred much earlier. 502 He further stated that
the Siifis asserted that the world exists only in the mind; that its
external existence is illusory; that the multiple and diverse
particulars in existence are merely mental in character, and that
if there were no minds to perceive them there would be no
particularization whatsoever in existence; and that knowledge
which is based on the mind's perception is purely subjective. 503
499 This can be gathered from the names of several Su.fis he mentioned,
and from the gist of his exposition of the �u.fi doctrine of oneness. See
Muqaddimah III, pp. 83-92.
5 oo Ibid., p. 83.
501Ibid., pp. 85-86.

502 See above, pp. 137; 1.51; 186 fol.; 214-217; 222, 225-226; 265.
503 Muqaddimah III, pp. 86, 90-92. On ibn Khaldu.n's explanation ofthe
�ufi meaning of'imaginary' (ref. khayal) as what does not exist in reality
but only in the mind (ibid., pp. 86, gr) compare above, pp. 223-225.
COMMENTARY 345
In our view, this explanation, based as ibn Khaldiin said on the
discussion by ibn Dihaq, is not correct if it was intended to
explain the position of the $iifis of the school ofwabdat al-wujud. It
applies, rather, again to the pseudo-Siifis who emulated the
method and way of thinking of the Sophists ( al-Siifasfi?iyyah). 504
To the $iifis of the school of wabdat al-wujud the world that is
considered as illusory is the intellectual ontologization of it in the
mind, and not what is externally existent and independent of the
mind. That which the mind conceives as the multiple and diverse
particulars in existence is an attribute of the multiplicity; but that
which is multiple and diverse consists of real and distinct
externally existing entities. Thus if there were no minds to
perceive them particularizations in existence would continue,
seeing that existence is perpetually involved in a dynamic,
creative movement of self-unfolding cons1stmg of the
articulations of its intrinsic and infinite possibilities in ever more
concrete forms. It would be absurd to think that the
determinations and individuations of the Absolute, which are the
particularizations in existence, would cease with the extinction of
minds, for His determinations and individuations do not depend
on the existence of minds.
It is true that some of the $iifis who experienced the 'gathering'
( al-jam') of multiplicity in the unity of the Truth whom we have
earlier described as 'the elect' ( ahl al-khawii{I), were prone to
emphasize oneness alone, a feature which followed from their
experience of absorption in the absolute unity of the One. But the
$iifis knew that such a vision of reality is not a complete one,
based as it was on the experience of the passing away of subjective
consciousness involving the passing away of all particularizations
in existence (fanii) al-Jana) preceded by Jana)). Those, however,
whose experience was not arrested at this stage, but progressed to
the stage of 'separation after union' ( al-farq ba'da al-jam'), whom
504 See above, pp. 204, 206-208, 294. These pseudo-�ufis, both the
siifas/a'iyyah mentioned above and the ones previously mentioned
belonged to the group that al-Raniri designated as the deviating
wujiidiyyah ( wujiidiyyah mul�idah).
we have earlier described as 'the super elect' (khawiiH al-khawiiH)

and as the people of the 'second separation' ( al-farq al-thiinz'), who
experienced not only the gathering ofmultiplicity into unity but
the articulation of that unity again into multiplicity without the
oneness ofthe unity being in any way effected-these $ufis ofthe
higher level did not deny the particulars in existence. On the
contrary, they affirmed both the unity and the multiplicity, and
made a distinction between them. It is this Sufi vision of reality
that is the complete one, and it is based on thefanii'-baqii' level of
spiritual experience. That is why the Sufi of this level is also
described as 'the possessor of two eyes' (dhu al-'aynayn), who sees
both unity and multiplicity as the reality of existence. 505
Indeed, ibn Kahldun was alluding to such $ufis when he
mentioned "the recent competent Sufis", 506 but unfortunately
his treatment of Sufism and Sufi metaphysics was not grounded
upon correct understanding and appreciation ofthe true position
ofsuch $ufis as one would expect, for ifit was then he would have
conveyed the doctrines of Sufism according to the inter
pretation of the best and highest representatives of Sufism;
and his classification of those who called themselves or were
called 'Sufis' did not extend beyond the general classification of
ancient and recent $ufis. Finally, just as the recent theologians
employed rational analysis and demonstration not-as ibn
Khaldun said 507 -in order to inaugurate a search for faith
through the evidence ofreason, but in order to refute the heretics;
so the recent $ufis also employed rational analysis and
demonstration not in order to establish their theses nor to adduce
proofs for them based on the evidence of reason, but in order to
put at ease the theologians and the philosophers who demanded
the 'scientific' approach. 508
The position of the $ufis that we have been discussing lies,
505 See above, pp. 131-148. See also Jami' al-Asrar, pp. 105-118.
506 Muqaddimah III, pp. 91-92.
507/b l'd.,p. 155.
508 See, for example, al-Durrah al-Fakhirah, p. 37/I 1; lfawashz, pp.
93-94/10; also see above, p. 337, note 481.

COMMENTARY 347
insofar as the problem of the nature of existence and reality is
concerned, between those of the Ash'ari theologians and the
Sophists in certain matters, 509 and between the theologians in
general (Mutakallimun) and the philosophers in other matters. 510
It is distinct in itself; it is neither the same as the position of the
Ash'aris, nor of the Sophists, nor of the Mutakallimun, nor of the
philosophers. As for the philosophers, a gist of some of their main
theses t_hat ran counter to the positions of the theologians and the
Sufis is given by al-Raniri as follows:
XII The philosophers say: The Being of God and that of the
world are both eternal (qadzm), since it (i.e. the world)
emanates from the Being of God by its own efficacy (ta'thzr)
without any act of free choice (ikhtiyar) on God's part, like
the emanation of light from the sun coming from its
essence. Now the sun has no power to prevent its light from
emanating; as long as the sun exists ( ada), so will its light
exist. In like manner, so long as God's Essence exists so will
the world exist, neither separate nor severed apart from
the Essence of God, in eternal communion from eternity
( a;:,al) to everlastingness ( abad). Furthermore they say that
God Most Exalted has no power (kuasa: qudrah) over all
(that which emanates from Him); and that He has no
power to bring into existence (menjadikan) what is other
than, and apart from, that which has already emanated
from Him; and that He has no power to change the world
that already is ( ada). They further say that the seven layers
of heaven and earth are not brought into existence by God
Most Exalted from non-existence (tiada: 'adam), and that
they endure ( baqa') everlastingly ( abadl), They also say
509
See Fu,rii,r, pp. 156,125; Shar� Fu,rii,r, pp. 186-188; Lawa'i�, XXVI,
pp. 29-37.
510
See · al-Dw:rah al-Fakhirah, which is a mu�akamah, or adjudication
between the theologians, philosophers and $iifili. On the eleven
questions taken up in the work, see the Introduction, pp. 6-7.
that to ask for help from God is to esteem one's (lower) soul
( nafsiin), for the servant (' abd) is always engulfed in His
overflowing Mercy. The purpose and benefit of worship
( 'ibiidah) is to make (menjadikan) the self (diri) similar to
God according as one's powers permit. They further say
that God Most Exalted is the lover ('iishiq) and the beloved
(ma'shiiq) of His Self.
Al-Raniri's gist of the position of the philosophers (al-faliisifah)

concerning the relationship between God and the world involves
several related problems:
1. The eternity (qidam) of the world, in that it has no

beginning, or is ungenerated (azalf).
2. The everlasting nature of the world, m that it is
indestructible ( abadf).
3. That God, in relation to the world which is His eternal
effect, is a necessary agent (al-miijib) and not a free agent
(al-mukhtiir). This involves the problem of the nature of the
Divine attributes such as power (al-qudrah), will ( al-iriidah)
and knowledge (al-'ilm).
4. That creation is the emanation of the world from God's
absolute oneness, not its temporal origination from non
existence into existence (ex nihilo).
5. That worship is the desire for self perfection.
6. The Divine self-love, in that God is both the supreme Agent
,
and the sunreme End.
In his Tibyiin, he mentions other details not mentioned in the

lfujjah, and these details are the philosophers' affirmation of the
eternity of matter ( hayiilii) and form (�iirah) (related to nos. (1) and
( 2) above); their assertion that God only knows Himself, and has
no knowledge of particulars (related to no.(4) above); their
assertion that God is simple being (jawhar baszt) also related to
no. (4) above); their assertion that God has no power over non
existence (related to nos.(1), (2) and (3) above); their assertion
that God does not create the actions of His servants from non-
COMMENTARY 349
existence into existence; and their denial of the resurrection of
bodies (related to no.(5) above). 511
All these problems and the arguments of the philosophers in
support of them together with the arguments against them as set
forth by al-Ghazali on behalf of the theologians, have been
discussed in his Tahiifut al-Faliisifah and other works.
Concerning the first problem above, the philosophers put
forward four main arguments to support their thesis that the
world is eternal and coexists with God. 512 They say, in the first
argument, that if the world had a temporal beginning there must
have been a time when it was in a state of pure possibility, and
that this being so, there must have been something, some act of
will, determining its transition from pure possibility to actuality
at the moment it was actualized into existence. Further, they ask,
why was it originated at the moment it was originated and not
before? So the something determining its existence from non
existence must itself have had a determinant, and that
determinant yet another to effect it, and so on ad infinitum. Thus
they conclude that if we were to accept a world which had a
temporal origin, we must also accept an eternal God in whom
eternally new acts of will or determinations may arise; but there
cannot be a new act of will in an eternal God. Al-Ghazali answers
objecting from two points. The first is that God's will is eternal,
and that God's eternally willing something does not necessarily
;;11Tibyiin, pp. 18; 21-24.

512 See al-Ghazali's Tahiffut al-Faliisifah, bound together in one volume
with ibn Rushd's Tahiifut al-1'aliisifah ( Tahiifut al- Tahiifut) and
Khwajah Zadah's Tahiifut al-Faliisifah ( on the margin of the text),
MuHafa al-Babi al-I:Ialabi, Cairo, 1321, p. 7, 14, 18, respectively.
For a translation of al-Ghazali's Tahqfut, see S.A. Kamali, Al-Gha;:,ali's
Tahiifut al-Faliisifah, Pakistan Philosophical Congress Publication no. 3,
Lahore, 1963. The above mentioned arguments are on pp. 14, 35, 45, 47
of this translation. For S. van den Bergh's translation of ibn Rushd's
work cited, which incorporated al-Ghazali's Tahiifut, see Averroes'
Tahiifut al-Tahiifut, E.J.W. Gibb Memorial, New Series no. XIX,
Oxford University Press, 1954, 2v. (vol. 1 translation; vol. 2 notes). The
above arguments are on pp. 1, 37, 57, 58 of vol. 1.
imply the eternity of the object of His will. 513 The second is that if
the world is assumed to have no temporal beginning, then at any
moment an infinite series of causes and effects must have been
ended, which is impossible, because an infinite past cannot be
traversed to reach the present, for it is unimaginable that these
series of causes and effects should go on into the past ad infinitum.
They must have a limit in which their sequence ends. There
cannot be an infinite time involving an infinite series of causes
and effects, as that would also involve the negation of a First
Cause. 514
In their second argument to support their thesis that the world
has no temporal beginning, the philosophers set as its basis the
eternity of time. 515 They say that if the world is posterior to God,
and God prior to the world, then this priority and posteriority
may mean either an essential or a temporal priority and
posteriority. If the first meaning is adopted-that God is prior to
the world in essence and not in time, and that the world is
posterior to God in essence and not in time-then the priority
and the posteriority would be that of the cause to the effect, as for
example the movement of the hand and that of the ring on it.
They are both simultaneous, although the former is the cause and
the latter the effect. In this case, and since the effect always
follows the cause, the one cannot be eternal and the other
temporal, but both must necessarily be either eternal or
temporal. If on the other hand_ the second meaning is adopted
that God is prior to the world in time, and that the world is
posterior to God in time-then there was, before the existence of
the world and of time, a time in which the world was non
existen t; and God must have preceded the world during a time
which came to an end and yet had never begun. So there was an
infinite time before time, and this is self-contradictory. They
513 Tahiifut, p. 7; Kamali, ibid., p. 16; van den Bergh, ibid., vol. 1, p. 3;
q.v. above, pp. 258-259; lqt4ad, eh. on will. q.v.
514 Tahiifut, p. 14; Kamali, ibid., p. 32; van den Bergh, ibid., vol. 1, pp.
32-33.
515 I.e., eternal time having a sequence of past, present, and future.
COMMENTARY 35 1
maintain, in this line of argument, that there cannot be an

origination of time, but that time is eternal. 51 6 Al-Ghazaff's
answer to this is that time had a beginning and it was created,
and that the notion of an eternal time is something relative and
subjective, the work of the imagination. The imagination ·is
unable to grasp the beginning of a time without something
preceding it. It imagines that this 'something', or a 'before', of
which it cannot rid itself and which it regards as a really existing
thing, is time. This inability of the imagination to admit a
temporal limit resembles its inability to grasp a spatial limit with
reference to bodies. Thus God's priority to the world means His
sole existence in a timeless eternity 517 limited to His being and
the absence of the world's being; and the world's posteriority to
God means His existence and that of the world limited to the
presence of two beings without the necessity of supposing the
existence of any third entity such as time. 51 8
The third argument of the philosophers for the eternity of the
world is based upon the idea of objective possibility. They say
that: the world, before it came into existence, must have been
possible, since if it were impossible it would never have come into
existence. This possibility must have had no beginning, in the
sense that it never lacked being, since ifit had a beginning then it
must have been impossible before it began. Since this possibility is
eternal and never ceased to be, the possible, that is, the world,
conforming with it is also eternal; otherwise, if the possibility had
a beginning and the world was not possible before its possibility
began, then when it began we would have to accept a transition
in the state of the world from impossibility to possibility and,
before it began, a state of existence in God in which He had no
power over it. 51 9 Al-Ghazali's answer to this argument on ?ehalf
516 Tahiifut, p. 14; Kamali, ibid., pp. 35-36; van den Bergh, ibid., vol. 1,
p. 37.
517 I.e; al dahr, eternity which is not involved in a time sequence of past,
present, and future.

518 Tahiifut, p. 17; Kamali, ibid., pp. 36, 43; van den Bergh, ibid., vol. 1,
pp. 3.8, 51.

519 Tahiifut, p. 18; Kamali; ibid., p. 46; van den Bergh, ibid.nvol. 1, p. 57.
of the theologians (i.e. the Ash'aris) is that the existence of the

world was not possible objectively before its existence; its
possibility is its very existence, that is, its possibility occurs
together with its actualization. There is no objective possibility
prior to its actualization. That the world, prior to its
actualization, is not possible does not mean impotence in God to
act upon it, for inability to act upon what is not possible is not
called impotence, as what is not possible is not an object of power.
Moreover, there is no transition in the state of the world from
impossibility to possibility; it can be posited that the world can in
one state be impossible and in another possible without there
occurring to it a transition. Neither is there a transition in God
from impotence to power when the world which was not possible
became possible, for when it was not possible it was not related to
power. The coming into existence of the world in time never
ceased to be logically possible, but the exact time it will come into
existence is not specified. The possible is only the temporal
coming into existence of the world; it is the principle of the
world's having come into existence. The possible is not something
objective extending prior to the thing whose actualization it is
related to; neither is it something that must be actualized, as that
would make what is actualized necessary and not possible.
Possibility is not an ontological, but a logical category. 520
In their fourth argument for the eternity of the world, which is
closely related to the third argument, the philosophers affirm the
eternity of primary matter ( al-hayiilii) as the necessary substratum
for all originated things. They say that the possibility of the
existence of every originated thing must be there before it existed,
since what is originated is either possible, or impossible, or
necessary. If impossible, it will never exist; if necessary, it will
never be in a state of non-existence; so it must be possible. The
possibility of the existence of every originated thing cannot in
itself exist except by being connected with a substratum which
receives that which is possible. This substratum is primary
520 Tahijut, pp. I 7, 18; Kamali, ibid., pp. 45, 46; van den Bergh, ibid.,
vol. I, pp. 54-58.
COMMENTARY 353
matter, which is not originated and which does not itself possess
other matter because that would lead to an infinite regress.
Matter is eternal; only the forms, accidents and qualities which
inhere in it are originated. 521 Al-Ghazaff's objection to this is that
the modalities of being such as possibility, impossibility and
necessity are intellectual judgements and as such they exist only
in the mind and not in external reality; they are logical and not
ontological categories, so that possibility as an intellectual
judgement does not need an existent to which it could be related.
He also points out the telling contradiction in the assertion ofthe
philosophers that possibility, which is a universal, is objective,
while at the same time they rightly deny the objectivity of
universals, which according to them exist only in the mind. 522
The four arguments ofthe philosophers to the first problem on
the eternity (a parte ante) of the world apply also to the second
problem on the incorruptible and everlasting nature ofthe world
( i.e. its eternity a parte post). In the second problem they say that
(I) the world as an effect whose cause is without beginning or
end, also is without beginning or end, since what applies to the
cause equally applies to the effect which is simultaneous with it,
and ifthe cause does not change, the effect cannot change either;
(2) the eventual annihilation ofthe world, ifit were to occur, must
occur after its existence, and this 'after' implies and affirmation of
time; (3) the possibility ofthe world's existence does not end, and
the possible (i.e. the world), which must conform with the
possibility, likewise does not end; (4) if the world were
annihilated, the possibility of its existence continues, for the
possible cannot become impossible; this possibility is a relative
attribute of matter and everything originated in time needs
matter which precedes it, just as everything that perishes needs
matter in which to perish; so the matter and the elements do not
perish, it is only the forms and accidents inhering in them that
521 Tahiifut, p. 18; Kamali, ibid., p. 48; van den Bergh, ibid., vol. I, pp.
58-59.
522 Tahiifut, pp. 18- 19; Kamali, ibid., pp. 48-52; van den Bergh, ibid.,
vol. 1, pp. 60, 64.
perish. The same answers apply to the above arguments as the

answers to the arguments in the first problem. With regard to the
third argument above that the world should last eternally,
however, the theologians do not regard it as rationally impossible
as they do not consider it necessary for what has a beginning to
have an end, but they do consider it necessary for an act (i.e. of
creation) to have a beginning and an end. The theologians
indeed regard both the incorruptibility and the corruptibility of
the world as equally possible, but they maintain that only the
Divine Law, and not reason, can tell us which of the two
possibilities will be realized. This argument has therefore no
cogency. 523 Apart from these arguments the philosophers set
forth two new arguments to the second problem, and these deal
with decay as the condition for corruptibility, and the relation of
an act to nothingness.
In the first of these arguments they say, taking the sun as an
example, that if the sun were to suffer corruption, then decay
would appear in it during the course of a long period. But
thousands of years of observation shows no diminution in its size,
and the fact that it suffers no loss of power (consequent) shows
decay has not affected it. Therefore it does not suffer corruption
(conclusion). 524 Al-Ghazali rejects the conclusiveness of the
inference to be derived from this conjunctive hypothetical
syllogism, 525 first because in this case the proposition that the sun
suffers corruption (antecedent) is not true unless it is connected
with the condition that it has decayed over a long period; only
when this is true is the antecedent true, and only then can loss of
power, the consequent, be true also; and second because it is not
proved that corruption can only take place through decay. It is"
not impossible for something to remain perfect, or free from
decay, but nevertheless to suffer corruption all of a sudden.
Moreover, even if it were conceded that there is no corruption
523 Tahiifut, pp. 20-21; Kamali, ibid., pp. 54-55; van den Bergh, ibid.,
vol. I, pp. 69-70, 73.
524 Tahiifut, p. 2 I; Kamali, ibid., p. 55; van den Bergh, ibid., vol. I, p. 74.
''2 ·'This refers to al-qiyas al-shar{i al-mutta.ril.

COMMENTARY 355
except through decay, how can it be known tha� decay does not
affect or has not already affected the sun? Mere reliance upon
observation is in this case not sound, particularly when the
immense size and volume of the sun compared to the earth
renders decay in the sun imperceptible to the senses. 5 2 6
In their second argument about the incorruptibility of the
world, which is more cogent than the first, the philosophers say,
after repeating their first argument in the first problem on the
impossibility of a temporal production of the world from non
existence into existence, that the object of will is obviously the act
of the willer. If the willer, even without undergoing change in His
own nature, acts after having not acted, the act of will must
necessarily become existent after not having been existent; for if
He remained as He was before His act became existent, His act
would be non-existent. Now the annihilation of the world is
nothing existent, and since for an act to be an act it must be
existent, how can His act of annihilation of the world which is
nothing be an act when it is related to nothing? 527 For the
philosophers, since they affirm the objectivity of possibility which
is related to matter, annihilation can only refer to the forms,
accidents and qualities inherent in matter, and not to rI1atter
itself. Primary matter is eternal and suffers neither destruction
nor change. It only takes on the possible forms of things that are
subject to destruction and undergoes change. Annihilation then
means for them the changing of the object of the annihilating act
from actual existence into another form of existence, in which the
object in actual existence becomes non-existent, insofar as its
former form is concerned, as it takes on a new form in actual
existence, as when boiled water changes into steam or air; the
same matter that once took the form of water now takes the form
of air, water becomes non-existent and air becomes existent.
They say that possibility and matter are necessarily connected
526 Tahiifut, p. 2 I; Kamali, ibid., p. 56; van den Bergh, ibid., vol. I, pp.
74-75.
527 Tahiifut, pp. 21-22; Kamali, ibid., p. 57; van den Bergh, ibid. vol. 1,
pp. 76-77.
356 A COMMENTARY ON THE l;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ.
with any transition from non-existence to existence-as in the

case of production-and likewise from existence to non
existence-as in the case ofannihilation. In this way they affirm
a third entity, which is potentiality, between existence and non
existence. The passage of transition from the one to the other,
whether it be in the case ofproduction or in that of annihilation,
is a process that describes the act of God. Thus for the
philosophers non-existence, insofar as the world is concerned, is
secondary and accidental non-existence, and not primary and
essential non-existence, so that God's act of annihilation
according to this perspective is not related to nothing. The
theologians, on the other hand, deny the potentiality affirmed by
the philosophers. They maintain that there is no such thing as a
third entity between existence and non-existence, or between
being and non-being, lying dormant as it were in some sort of
existential limbo, becoming actualized with God's act of
production and then again returning to a state of potentiality
with God's act ofannihilation. A thing either is or is not; it comes
into existence simply by God's will to let it be, and is annihilated
in a similar fashion: when He wills He creates, and when He wills
He annihilates. With regard to the annihilation of the world in
the temporal sense as an event that will eventually happen, they
mean by 'the world' everything except God of the existent things
by which He is known; and this includes the worlds ofbodies and
accidents, the animal and plant worlds, the heavens and what is
in them, and the earth and what is on it. They acknowledge other
worlds whose existence endures everlastingly, while they affirm it
as within God's power to annihilate them, including Heaven and
Hell, although they assert on the basis ofQuranic testimony that
this would not happen. Within the context of their essentially
atomistic metaphysics, the discussion on the annihilation of the
world refers to the world composed of substance and accident
whose visible aspect is the physical universe and the totality of its
parts. By 'annihilation' they mean the reduction of what is
annthilated tp non-existence, and non-existence is for them
nothing, that is, it means primary and essential non-existence
which is absolute non-existence. But the argument of the
COMMENTARY 357
philosophers against them taking into consideration their
position that non-existence is nothing, that God's act of
annihilation of the world would mean His doing nothing does not
really apply, for as van den Bergh has pointed out, 528 the
confusion lies in their failure to distinguish between the
annihilating act and the result of that act. Annihilation can mean
either one, and the philosophers have identified the two, whereas
the theologians mean the second of the two. Hence al-Ghazali's
reply on behalf of the theologians that annihilation takes place
through God's will, means that He wills the annihilation and
then the annihilation occurs. God does not in Himself change,
only His act changes, and by His act there proceeds from Him a
new fact that was not there before, namely non-existence. To the
objection that since non-existence means nothing, how could
nothing proceed from Him, the answer is that if it is nothing the
fact that it could occur as proceeding from Him means that its
occurrence is related to His power. 529 Since unlike the
philosophers, who deny altogether God's attributes, the
theologians affirm real attributes superadded to His essence, they
do not make the result of the annihilating act, that is; the
annihilation of the world, directly dependent on God Himself,
but on His attributes of will and power combined. 530 God's act,
in this case of annihilation, is not a process, but is an immediate
fact which coincides with the intention and the result. The
annihilation of the world in the sense of its reduction to nothing
does not necessarily mean the cessation of God's creative activity,
for although the theologians deny objective possibility or
potentiality, they maintain that everything is possible for God
except the logically impossible. They transfer, in this sense, the
potentiality affirmed by the philosophers to God Himself, so that
there is for Him an open possibility to create other worlds
different from, and not as a progression or development of, this
528 /bid.,vol. II, p. 58, note 77.3. See also p. 43, note 56.1.
529 Tahiifut, pp. 23-24; Kamali, ibid., pp. 60-61; van den Bergh, ibid.,
vol. 1, p. 83.
530 See above, pp. 256-259.
one. 531 The position affirming that the future annihilation of the
world from existence to non-existence is something intelligible
can equally be applied to its past production from non-existence
into existence. In the third problem above, which deals with the
nature of action; the condition for an action; and the relationship
between the agent and the action, the philosophers in conformity
with their thesis that the world is eternal still somehow describe
God as the agent and the creator of the world. 532 They mean by
God being the agent and creator of the world that God is the
cause of the existence of everything in the sense that He holds the
world_ together, or sustains it, so that if He could be supposed not
to have been then nothing would exist at all. They describe the
causal relationship between God and the world as being like that
of the sun and luminosity: without the sun there would be no
light. God is in this sense a necessary agent ( al-jif il al-mi{jib) and
the world is His eternal effect ( al-athar al-qadzm). As such He must
conform to the natural characteristic of the world as eternally
proceeding from Him without His being able to make a choice of
the opposite. 533 Since they maintain that things exist as
potentiality before they become actualized, things could be
described as proceeding from Him for, as such, they could be
related to Him as the agent of their procession from the state of
potentiality into actuality. 534 Their being related to Him as the
agent or cause of their existence is not by means of attributes
inhering in Him, such as will and power, for they deny that God
possesses attributes superadded to His essence, asserting that the
Essence is One in all respects, and that it is impossible for there to
be any duality or plurality in the Divine essence, which would be
the case, so they say, if attributes were to inhere in Him.
Nevertheless they admit knowledge in God not, to be sure, as an
attribute inhering in Him, but as identical with His essence; and
they maintain that His knowledge is active and creative, such
531
See above, p. 211.
532
See above, p. 254.
533 Tahiifut, pp. 24-26. Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, Ethics VI. 2, p.
1 39·
534 Tahiifut, pp. 26-27.
COMMENTARY 359
that His knowing things is sufficient for bringing them into
existence without need of will and power. 535
The theologians, on the other hand, maintain that God is a free
agent ( al-fii' il al-mukhtar), and argue that the agent qua cause in
the sense meant by the philosophers cannot be understood as an
active agent, for if such an agent is supposed to act the act cannot
be called an action ( al-.fi' l). Action, they say, must proceed from
will and must have a temporal beginning, for there can be no
eternal action. Act implies will, and will implies knowledge. But
to know is not necessarily to will, and to will is not necessarily to
act, only when one has acted has one had power over its object,
and so has willed it, and thus knows it. So will follows or conforms
with knowledge, but in a way that one can know without willing,
yet cannot will without knowing. 536 Knowledge according to the
theologians is universal in its relation to things, and this being so,
it is equally related to all things in a neutral sort of way, that is, it
neither affects its object nor changes it. Since things are not the
same, its being equally related to things is not the cause of the
difference in things. Knowledge follows its objects, but it does not
cause them; it is power that causes them and brings them into
existence, but power does not determine or specify each. into
something different from the other; it is will that specifies each of
them to be different from the other. Thus knowledge produces
the order of the world, will specifies its multiple and diverse
characteristics, and power brings it into existence. 537 The
535 Tahiifut, p. 38; see also al-lqti,fiid, p. 33. Apart from the philosophers,
the speculative thinkers (ah! al-na;;:,ar) among the Mu'tazilah such as
Ibrahim ibn Vassar al-NaH:am (d. 846), Abu al-Qasim ibn
Mul_iammad al-Ka'b1 (d. 929), Abu 'Uthman 'Umar ibn Bal_ir al-Jal_ii�
(d. 869), and Al-J:Iusayn ibn Mul_iammad al-Najjar (d. ?) denied the
Divine will. See al-Shahrastant's Kitiib al-Mital wa al-Ni�al, vol. I, pp.
55, 75, 78, and 89. See also his Kitiib Nihiiyat al-lqdiimfi'llm al-Kaliim,
edited from manuscripts in the libraries of Oxford, Paris and Berlin by
A. Guillaume, Oxford University Press, London, 1934, pp. 238-267 of
the Arabic text.
536 Tahiifut, p. 24.
537 Tahiifut, pp. IO- I I; al-lqti,fiid, pp. 30-38; Nihiiyat, eh. I.
360 A COM:MENTARY ON THE l;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ.
theologians do not deny that the process of creation is eternal, but

they deny that the act of creation is eternal: creation is a
perpetual process, but the creative action which originates each
discontinuous unit of which creation is composed has a temporal
beginning. 538 In this way also they deny potentiality as affirmed
by the philosophers, as well as what the philosophers believe to be
the necessary connection between cause and effect, saying that it
is God's customary way of acting to bring about a logical
sequence in movement which creates the notion of causality. In
fact, however, they affirm only God's sole efficacy as the one and
only real agent in creation. 539
Up to this point, from the foregoing discussion of the main
features of the three problems engaged by the theologians and the
philosophers, it becomes clear that the fundamental distinction
between them lies in the fact that the philosophers affirm the
coming into being of things out of each other, or from something,
some latency in matter, and not from nothing. In this sense
everything existent is a progression, a development or evolution
of what lies in potentia in matter: it is the actualization of
potentiality. The world as seen from this perspective is an
independent universe, a self-subsistent system evolving according
to its own laws. Objective possibility, which is here seen as
potentiality, is the third ontological category between being and
non-being; through it being passes over to non-being and,
likewi!;;e, non-h�ing passes over to being. The substratum for
potentiality, in which inhere all potentialities, is eternal matter
( al-hayiilii). It may be argued-as the theologians have rightly
argued-that if the potential is what must be actualized, then
the possible must inevitably turn out to be necessary and not
possible, in which case it would need no cause for its existence.
538 Tahiifut, p. 27. This is a reference to the doctrine of the perpetual

renewal of accidents in the Ash'arimetaphysics of atoms and accidents
which we have already described (see above, pp. 210-211). In this
connection also see their discussion on the Divine attributes of will and
power (above, pp. 258-259).
539 Tahiifut, p. 27.
--- ----- ., ----------- --- -•,- ------ - -------- - ·- ---------------- -- -- --- --- --- - --- - -- -- --· -- -- ------
COMMENTARY
Moreover, the argument of al-Ghazali on behalf of the

theologians against the eternity of the world is irrefutable; and
once the world is admitted as having a temporal beginning, it
follows that the Divine attributes will also have to be admitted as
they are involved in the temporal origination of the world from
non-existence into existence.
In denying attributes the philosophers assert that God is
absolutely one, and they affirm ;J.S an inviolable principle the
proposition that from the One only one can proceed. The
problem that al-Ghazali puts to them is how can the world which
is composed ofmultiple and diverse things, and which they claim
proceeds from God, be His action and His product without
violating their principle that from the One only one can proceed?
The theologians have no difficulty in explaining this problem as
they affirm real attributes superadded to the Essence. These
attributes, according to the Ash'ariyyah, are eternal and subsist
as ideal realities (ma'ani) in the Essence. They therefore do not
have to adduce proofs for the production of multiple effects from
the One, as the philosophers must do. The philosophers admit
that the multiplicity and diversity that characterize the world
together with all its parts cannot proceed directly from God's
absolute oneness as this would involve the assumption ofplurality
in the Divine essence. So they say that things proceed from a
source other than God which itself, in turn, proceeds from Him.
From that source, the single, first effect that proceeds from the
One and which becomes the principle of plurality, things
proceed by means ofintermediaries similar to it in a way in which
the absolutely One does not directly connect with the
multiplicity and diversity of effects, such that it remains free from
any duality or plurality. But al-Ghazali points out that the
consequence of this scheme whereby plurality proceeds
ultimately from what is really one would be that everything in
existence would have to be simple and not compound, and this is
contrary to reality. The philosophers themselves maintain that
body is composed of form ([ii,rah) and primary matter (hayulii), two
different and mutually dependent things neither of which is the
cause of the existence of the other. Their existence must depend
on another cause, or must have separate causes. If that cause is

one in all respects, then how do two different entities proceed
from it?-unless the cause itself is compound. Ifit is compound,
then the quest for its cause in what is really one will ultimately
lead to a meeting between the compound and the simple. No
matter how one looks at it, in either case, the principle that from
the One only one proceeds will be rendered false. 540 It can be
seen that the above discussion already broaches the subject of the
fourth problem in our summary of the salient features of the
theses of the philosophers outlined by al-Ranfri.
The fourth problem deals with the philosopher's scheme of the
emanation Uiidir) of plurality ultimately from the One
considered as the First Principle ( al-mabda' al-awwal), and the
manner in which they believe it to be possible without affecting
the absolute oneness of the One. They say that from the First
Principle only a single effect proceeds, and this is the First
Intelligence ( al-' aql al-awwal), which knows its Principle, knows
itself, and is possible in itself. From this First Intelligence three
things emanate: because it knows its principle, there emanates
from it another intelligence; because it knows itself, there
emanates from it the soul of a sphere; because in itself it is a
possible existent, there emanates from it the body of that sphere.
The triple character of the First Intelligence repeats itself in the
Second Intelligence, from which there emanates a Third, and
from the Third a Fourth and so on in a similar mode until it
reaches the Tenth Intelligence called the Active Intelligence (al
' aql al-faa iil) and the Giver of Forms ( mawiihib al-Iuwar) which
turns the sphere of the moon. From it follows the matter which
receives generation and corruption (i.e. al-miiddah) and its
different combinations which produce the animal, vegetable,
and mineral kingdoms of nature. Now according to the
philosophers, only the essence of the First Intelligence, by which
it knows itself, is derived from the First Principle; the other two of
its three aspects such as the knowledge of its principle and its
being a possible existent, are derived not from the First Principle,

COMMENTARY
but from itself. In this way only one effect proceeds from the First
Principle, and no duality or plurality is attached to it, or inheres
in it. 541 Against this scheme of emanation al-Ghazali raises five
objections. The first is that since one of the meanings of plurality
in the first effect ( i.e. the First Intelligence) is its being possible in
itself, it may be asked whether its being a possible existence is
identical with its being or not. If identical, then no plurality will
arise from it, ( contrary to what the philosophers claim); but if
not, then there is plurality also in the First Principle ( again,
contrary to what the philosophers maintain), for the First
Principle is necessary in its existence, and since its necessity is
different from its existence, plurality inheres in it just as it inheres
in its first effect. Existence is a universal capable of division into
necessary and possible, and if the one specific difference is an
addition to the universal, the same applies to the other. In this
unassailable argument al-Ghazaff exposes the surreptitious
introduction of duality in the First Principle. The second
objection concerns the knowledge the first effect has of its
principle, whether it is identical with its own existence and with
the knowledge it has of itself. If it is identical, then no plurality
exists in its essence; but if it is different then the plurality that
exists in it will also exist in the First Principle, for He knows
Himself and He knows others. In order to avoid the implication
of plurality in the First Principle, the philosophers are driven to
admit that God, the First Principle, knows only Himself and not
others, for His knowing others would involve a duality and
plurality in Him; and this leads to the absurdity that His effect is
superior to Him in that it knows itself, its principle, and its three
effects, whereas He only knows Himself. The third objection
pertains to the self-knowledge of the first effect, whether it is
identical with its essence or not. Since knowledge cannot be the
same as that which is known, its self-knowledge cannot be
identical with itself. But if this is so then the same plurality applies
to the First Principle. Moreover, since the self-knowledge of the
effect is not the same as the essence of the effect, the effect will not

be characterized by a threefold nature as claimed by the

philosophers, but by a fivefold nature, namely: its essence, its self
knowledge, its knowledge of its principle, its being a possible
existent through itself and its being a necessary existent through
another. The fourth objection is that the triplicity in the first
effect is not a sufficient principle for the explanation of
multiplicity deriving from it. The body of the highest sphere, for
example, proceeds from one entity in the first effect, su.ch as its
being possible in itself, and yet body is a composite of form and
matter. Since form and matter are two different entities and are
interdependent causes, the one cannot come into being by means
of the other, so that another cause is required for their being and
there must be two principles for them. Another example is that
the highest sphere has a definite size, which means that it must
have a determinant for that particular size, and this again shows
that there must be another cause for the determinant of its
particular size, as well as a separate principle which determines it
as such. Another example is that the highest sphere has two
immovable points as poles, and these require their determination
at those two precise points, among all possible points, to be poles.
This can only mean that the parts of the sphere are not the same,
otherwise any two points can serve as poles. This being so, there
must be a separate principle that distinguishes the difference in
the various parts of the sphere. Furthermore, if the body of the
sphere proceeds from only one and the same simple entity as the
philosophers maintain, then what proceeds must also be a simple
entity, that is, a sphere pure and simple, and not a sphere
characterized by many distinguishing features emphasizing the
difference in its various parts. All these objections put forth by al
Ghazali are intended to show that if it is permissible for the first
effect to have plurality without a cause-because plurality does
not proceed from the First Principle-then it is equally
permissible for the First Principle to have plurality without a
cause; and if it is impossible for the First Principle to have
plurality without a cause, it is equally impossible in the first
effect. Thus either the philosophers will have to admit that the
agent can produce many acts, or they will have to say that many
COMMENTARY
accidents result from the form of the body which alone proceeds
from the agent. But both these alternatives run counter to the
principles set by the philosophers themselves. Furthermore, in
the case of the second effect, the sphere that is supposed to
proceed from the first effect, which is the sphere of the fixed stars,
it has even more numerous different features that go by the
thousands; and if such plurality can proceed from the first effect,
it can equally arise in the first effect itself; and if it arises in the first
effect it can equally come from the First Principle. Hence there
would be no need of an emanation system with intermediaries,
since everything could well proceed from the First Principle. In
the fifth objection, al-Ghazali points out that there is no
conceivable connection between the first effect being a possible
existent and there arising from it as such the body of a sphere, for
it does not follow that from it being a possible existent a body of a
sphere should proceed from it. Similarly, its knowing its principle
and its knowing itself have no connection whatsoever with there
proceeding from its two knowledges the two other things such as
another intelligence and the soul of a sphere, so that the whole
initial explanation of how plurality can proceed from the one
through intermediaries is nothing but conjecture. 542
The fifth problem deals with worship as the desire for self
perfection. Al-Raniri says of the philosophers that they maintain
that: minta tulung kepada Allah itu memushakai nafsanjua) kerana 'abd
itu senantiasa dalam limpah tulung jua. In this sentence, the words
minta tulung kepada Allah (lit. to ask for help from God) refers to
prayer (al-�alat). $alat conveys the basic meaning of 'inclination'
in general, and 'bending towards'; and its relational meaning is
prayer or worship as a special ceremony which includes standing
(al-qiyam), and bending the body from an upright position (al
rukil), and prostration (al-sujiid), and supplication (al-du' a)), and
542 Tahiifut) pp. 29-32. Moreover, seen from another perspective which
is also known to al-Ghazaff-that of the Sufis who affirm the primacy
and the transcendent unity of existence-the essentialistic position of
the philosophers inevitably renders insurmountable the problem of
emanation, or the procession of plurality from the one.
glorification ( al-tasbzM. In regard to Allah, the 'inclination' and

'bending towards' is mercy (al-ra�mah). In regard to angels,
human beings, and thejinn it is what has been explained above.
In regard to birds, reptiles, and insects it is glorification. 543 The
relationship and the attitude of a creature as slave (' abd, Malay
hamba) to Allah his Lord (al-rabb), Who formed him and
therefore owns him, is expressed by way of worship ( al-'ibiidah, pl.
'ibiidiit); and raliit is a specific ceremony of worship. The call ( al
du'ii') of supplication, or earnest asking for aid, for succour from
God (minta tulung_ kepada Allah), also means raliit, or rather raliit
means du' ii' since it includes it, and the whole is being named for
the part here by metonymy. 544 Kerana 'abd itu senantiasa dalam
limpah tulungjua refers to the inclination (raliit) in regard to God,
which is His mercy (limpah tulung: ra�mah) towards the creature
(' abd). The Malay word of Sanskrit derivation, pusaka, does also
mean 'inheritance'; but the affixed form memushakai or
mempusakai as it appears in the text, and in the context we are
discussing, does not mean 'to inherit from'; it rather means 'to
regard something as precious', just as one regards an heirloom
(Pusaka) as precious property. Here it has the same meaning as
regarding something as nafis, a word which is derived from the
same root as, and conceptually connected with, nafsiin and nafs.
The fundamental meaning in the concept of pusaka is the notion
that it is something precious to the inheritor because of its personal,
historical or sentimental value. The heirloom is also a 'thing':
such as a piece of furniture, an object, or personal property. But
here in this passage what is being regarded as a precious object of
inheritance is not a 'thing' as it pertains to the soul ( al-nefs), and
therefore memushakai is here used in the metaphorical sense. Now in
543 lbn al-A'rab1 in the Lisiin al-'Arab, vol. XIV, p. 465, col. 2.
544 Taj al-'Ariis, by Sayyid Murtac;la al-Zab1dI, Cairo, 1306, vol. 10, p.
213. The first chapter of the Holy Qur'an is called siirat al-du' ii.'
according to al-Bayc;law1. See alsoLisiin al-'Arab, vol. XIV, p. 257, cols. 1
and 2. See also the Al-QJimiis al-Mubzt ofMu}:tammad ibn Ya'qiib al
FYriizabad1, with marginal commentaries, Cairn, 1319, 4 vols., vol. 4, p.
355.
COMMENTARY
the metaphorical sense of the term, 'inheritance' is not meant,

nor 'heirloom'; neither is 'to inherit from' meant, for there is
really nothing to inherit. In the metaphorical sense what is
conveyed is the basic notion of something precious and priceless
which is regarded as ifit were an object of high estimation handed
down for generations. To regard something as such is to esteem it,
and hence we have rendered the words memushakai nafsiin as 'to
esteem oneself (i.e. one's soul)'. The word nafsiin is translated here
as 'soul', but in effect it indicates the 'lower soul' and the reason
for this will presently become clear. The word nafsan construed in
that form is the dual form of nafs, the letter niin suffixed to the
word is not augmentative, but the sign of the dual, usually with
kasrah, though it may occur, as in one Jialect, with rj,ammah. 5A. �
According to the Arabs and the Muslims in general, every man
has two souls (nafsan): the soul of the intellect, or reason (nafs al
' aql), or the soul of discrimination (nafs al-tamyzz); and the soul of
the breath (nafs al-riiM, or the soul of life (nafs al-�ayat). When
philosophically transposed, these refer to the rational and animal
souls respectively. Some philosophers designate them as the
'higher' (rational) and the 'lower' (animal) souls. Some have
held that before their connection with bodies all souls ate one
from eternity, and that after their separation from bodies their
unity will be restored. First among them was Plato, 546 whose
theory of the soul is dualistic, divided into the 'higher' soul and
the 'lower' soul as set forth in his Dialogues, particularly the
Phaedo, Phaedrus, Timaeus, Philebus, Republic, Laws, Thaeatetus and
Symposium; then with varying degrees of difference, but still
dualistic, the theory of Aristotle ( De Anima); then those of the
Stoics represented by Seneca (Epistles), Epictetus (Dissertation),
and Marcus Aurelius (Meditations); the Neo-Platonists headed by
Plotinus (Enneads); the Brethren of Purity of Ba�rah (lkhwan al
$afa') in their Treatises (Rasa'il); al-Farabi (Rasa'il) and ibn Sina
(Kitab al-Shifii' and Kitab al-Najiit). 547 The division of human
545 Lisiin al-' Arab, vol. 6, p. 235, col. 1, what al-Zaijaj said.
546
Tahiifut, pp. g- 10.
54 7 Book of the Remedy and Book of the Salvation, the last mentioned being a
nature into two is generally agreed among them. The division of

human nature into two by itself is not objectionable from the
point ofview ofreligion. What is relevant to the interpretation of
our text is ibn Sina's dualism ofsoul and body, because he alone
among the Muslim philosophers connected this theory with his
theory of the two types of prayer (.raliit). In a short treatise on
prayer, 548 he gives a briefsummaryofthe nature ofman, saying
that God, having first created Intelligence (al-' aql), created from
its substance the intelligent being (man). He divided man's
substantiality into soul and body, the former being subtle and the
latter gross. The physical and animal elements constitute the
gross substance. The body of man-which is also designated as
the soul (nafs)-is formed ofthe animal (al-nafs al-l;ayawiiniyyah)
and the physical soul, which because ofits links with the plants is
called, as in Aristotle's theory, 549 the vegetative soul (al-nafs al
nabiitiyyah). Both these souls live as long as the body lives, but at
the body's death they also perish and will not be raised up at the
resurrection. The resurrection pertains only to the spiritual,
subtle substance of man, the rational soul (al-nafs al-nii#qah). This
rational soul, which prevails over that which is below it,
comprehends its Creator, and of necessity from the First One
comprehends itself, and comprehends itself to be possible in
itself. 550 The rational soul is then. the real man. 551 The function of
resume of the former: the al-Shifa', Tehran, 1885-87; the aL-Najat

Cairo,1938. An English translation of Book II,Chapter 6 of the al-Najat
by F. Rahman,Avicenna's psychology, London,1952. See also De Boer's
The history of philosophy in Islam, pp. 81-96; 106-218, 131-48. For all
other philosophers cited above,see Windelband's A hist01y ofphilosophy,
pp. 123,145,149,154,187 fol.; 245-46,685 (123); 213,215,216,230,
301-09. There are many other works of individual references to the
psychology in the theory of the philosophers,but the above will suffice
for our purpose.
548 See A.J. Arberry's Avicenna on theology, London, 1951, pp. 50-63.
549 Windelband, op. cit., p. 154.

55 °Cf. above, p. 362.
55 1lbn Sina, Risala!t.ft Ma'rifat al-Nafs al-Nafiqah wa A�waliha, in the
A�wal al-Nafs (edited by A.F, al-Ahwani, Cairo, 19y2), chapters 1, 2

COMMENTARY
the physical soul is to eat and drink, to maintain the parts of the
body and to cleanse it of impurities; the function of the animal
soul is to preserve the body; the function of the rational soul is to
wait for the revelation of truths, to reflect upon the perception of
subtle ideas. The function peculiar to the human soul (i.e. the
rational soul) is knowledge and perception, and through
thought, reason, and intellect man knows his Lord. Worship is
knowledge of his Lord. 552 If the faculties (sing. al-quwwah) of the
animal and physical souls prevail over him, man will forget his
heavenly and angelic nature and will incline more and more
towards his bestial nature; he will sink from the higher realms
into the lower depths. The faculties of his animal and physical
souls are inclined to be blameworthy and those of his rational soul
are praiseworthy, so that it is man's real duty to divorce himself
from the promptings of his blameworthy faculties. The body
overwhelms the true substance of the soul and diverts it away
from its proper yearning and quest for perfection. The yearning
after perfection, which is a necessary inclination of the rational
soul, is realized in prayer; and ibn Sfoa divides prayer into two
kinds corresponding to the two natures or souls of man, the
rational-spiritual and the animal-physical. The two kinds of
prayer are: the outwardjorm ) which refers to the body and which
is disciplinary-physical; and the inward truth) which refers to the
soul and which is real-spiritual. 553 Ibn Sina says, speaking of
and 3, and the Epilogue. In this treatise on psychology ibn Sfoa has
given proofs that the substantiality of the soul is distinct from that of the
body (eh. 1); the eternity of the soul after the decay of the body (eh. 2);
grades of the soul according to happiness and unhappiness after its
separation from the body (eh. 3). He has added an Epilogue on the
three worlds of the Intellect, the Soul, and the Body. See also Tahiifut )
pp. 70-7 I; 78 fol.
552 Ibn Sina quotes here the Holy
Qur'an: wa ma khalaqtu al-jinna wa al
insa illa li ya' budiini ( Al-Dhiiriyat (51) :56). It is important to note here
that 'to worship Me' ( li ya' budiini) means, according to ibn Sina, 'to
know Me'. This interpretation is based on that of ibn 'Abbas, the true
meaning of which we have explained in Islam and secularism; pp. 66-70
and note 76.
553 There is a parallel between ibn Sina's two types of prayer here with
37 0 A COMMENTARY ON THE l;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ.
which kind of prayer is incumbent upon whom, that the outward

prayer is for those in whom the animal and physical elements
prevail, while the inward prayer is for those in whom the
spiritual, rational elements prevail; in other words, the former
kind of prayer is for the generality of the people, while the latter
kind is for the few elect. 554 He also says that there will be no
resurrection of the body in the Hereafter, but that resurrection
means the union of the rational soul with the spiritual substances
from which it originally emanated, that is, the Active
Intellect. 555
What we have so far said is sufficient to enable us to return to
the interpretation of memushakai nafsiin. Nafsiin in the Arabic
language refers to the notion of two souls: the one, which ib:n Sina
calls al-nafs al-nii/iqah, the rational soul, variously called by the
lexicologists nafs al-' aql and nafs al-tamyz;:,; and the other, what
they call nafs al-riib and nafs al-bayiit, which in ibn Sina's
terminology is al-nafs al-bayawiiniyyah and al-nafs al-nabiitiyyah.
These two names by which ibn Sina calls the animal and physical
souls in fact refer to one soul with two different sets of functions
and faculties; they refer to the nafs al-bayiit, 'the soul of life', for
both the animal and vegetative worlds are permeated, so to
speak, with the same vital principle. In fact the term bayiit (life)
according to the $ibiib signifies the faculty of growth as in animal
and plant; and what is termed bayy according to al-Raghib
signifies the same thing: possessing the faculty of growth as an
animal and as a plant. 556 Nafsiin-also generally referred to with
the ya' al-nisbz as nafsanz-refers to the condition of the soul as
related to the body, which condition "degrades" the soul as such ( i.e.
al-nafs al-na#qah). In his well known Al-Qa�zdat al-'Ayniyyah, 557
ibn Sina calls the body and its condition by many derogatory
Plotinus' concept of contemplation as theoria and praxis, and the

yearning of the spiritual, rational soul as eras or love.
554 Al-Najat, section on the after-life (Arberry's
translation, ibid), pp.
64-76.
555 Jbn Sina, Af;wii.l al-Nafs, eh. 3.
556 Lisan al-'Arab, vol. XIV, p. 212, col. I.
557 See A.J. Arberry, ibid ,
. pp. 77-78.
COMMENTARY 37 1
names, such as "arid waste"; "depths"; "waymarks"; "mean
mounds"; "necessary woe"; "degrading depth" and "tangled
mesh"'that impedes the soul's wings to soar freely in heaven's
high ranges. The sooner the soul is released from its "narrow
cage," its "prison" ( the body), the better. This release is
prepared through contemplation or prayer, that is, the inward,
real-spiritual prayer. To pray in the manner of outward,
disciplinary-physical prayer is to ask for help in preserving and
maintaining the body; and this means that to pray as such is to
continue to degrade the rational soul (mempusakai kekurangan
martabat diri)-this at least is what al-Raniri means to convey
about the belief of the philosophers in regard to the soul and
prayer-to continue to seek the condition whereby man is in the
stage of 'two souls' (nafsan) instead of one; and this amounts to
regarding the 'lower' animal soul as something precious
(memushakai nafsan) at the expense of the rational soul. The
passage quoted above: mempusakai kekurangan martabat diri, comes
from the Tibyan, 558 and al-Raniri intends it to convey the same
meaning as memushakai nafsan. Hence when al-Raniri says that
the philosophers believe prayer to be mempusakai kekurangan
martabat diri, he means by diri there the true soul of man ( al-nafs
al-natiqah), which is sometimes referred to by philosophers and
�ufis alike as the nafs al-mutma'innah, the soul at peace, the
tranquil soul. This latter designation of the true soul describes the
blissful condition of the true slave of God, the' abd (hamba) who
has attained to the highest spiritual degree of perfection. 559 The
validity of this interpretation is further attested to by the fact of
the occurrence of the term 'abd in the sentence after the words
memushakai nafsan (rendered as hamba in the Tibyan); and in the
next sentence where 'ibadat is referred to. 560 Mempusakai
kekurangan martabat diri means, therefore, 'to set in high
estimation, or to esteem, the degradation of the (higher)
soul'-and this means the same thing as 'to esteem the (lower)
558 Page 22.

559
Ibn S1na says this on the authority of the Holy Qur'an (Al-FaJr (89):
27-30) in his A�wiil al-Nafs (ibid.), eh. 2. Cf. also note 552 above.
560 AL-FaJr (89
): 27-30.
soul', which is what memushakai nafsiin means. The words

kekurangan martabat diri ( in the Tibyiin) is not a translation of the
word naftiin (in the Jfujjah); it is rather a description of the
meaning of, or an explanation of the connotation of, the concept
nafsiin. It is this theory of the two types of prayer corresponding to
the two aspects of human nature that Muslims· generally find
most objectionable. Moreover, this theory, and its close
connection with the concept of naftiin can lead to a denial of the
resurrection of bodies which is held by all Muslims as part of the
foundation of faith. The philosophers did in fact deny the
resurrection of bodies, and such denial comes into direct and
violent opposition to the tenets of Islam.
According to the philosophers, the belief in the resurrection of
bodies involves three alternatives: the first is that man is body
(i.e. the reality of man is body, and not soul or spirit), and hence
resurr�ction pertains to the body only; 5 61 the second is that man
is soul, and that this soul is immortal and continues to survive
after its separation from the body, resurrection pertains to the
return of the soul to its original body; the third is similar to the
second, except that the return of the soul is not to its original
body, but to one similar to it. They reject as impossible all these
three alternative positions in favour of a purely spiritual
resurrection 562 on rational premises formulated on the basis of
their theory of the eternity of the world and the allied theories of
potentiality and the necessary relation between cause and effect,
which does not allow for the departure of events from their logical
and regular course. But the theologians, also on rational
premises, reject the theories of the philosophers and maintain
that, on the basis of their theory of the origin of the world and of
the possibility of the procession of the temporal from the eternal,
and their denial of the necessary relation between cause and
effect, which allows for the departure of events from their logical
and regular course, the resurrection of bodies-at least as in the
561 According to al-Tahanawi, this is also the position of some of the
theologians. See Kashshiif, vol. I, p. 75.
562 0n the philosopher's denial of physical resurrection, see Ch. V of
Fazlur Rahman's The philosophy of Mullii $adrii ( op.cit.).

COMMENTARY 373
case of the second and third alternatives mentioned above-is
possible. They also point out that there is no rational and
conclusive argument that could refute and deny the possibility of
the resurrection of bodies. Moreover, religion affirms the position
that resurrection not only pertains to the soul but to the body as
well to which it will be returned. 563
In the sixth problem above, al-Raniri says that the
philosophers believe that God is both the lover as well as the
beloved with respect to Himself, meaning that in the system of
the philosophers God is both the supreme Agent and the supreme
End, which in that system involves a profound contradiction. 564
According to al-Raniri the religion of the philosophers, in its final
analysis, would involve a denial of the love of God, since God is
both His lover and His beloved. 565 This theory of the
philosophers is connected with their theory that God knows only
Himself. He cannot know the Other as such knowledge would
involve plurality in His knowledge which is identical with
Himself, so that plurality would involve His very essence itself.
Al-: Ghazali says that their view of plurality, as evident from their
denial of God's knowledge of the Other, 566 is exaggerated, and
has led them to the position that God can have no knowledge of
individuals and particulars. Thus it follows also that He can have
no knowledge of what goes on in the world which is, without
exception, composed of individuals and particulars. They
maintain that God does not know individuals and particulars as
such because they believe that such knowledge would not only
involve· Him in plurality, but in change as well; for what goes on
in the world of individuals and particulars is subject to a spatio
temporal order of existence, and if His knowledge is connected

564 This is one of many contradictions in Aristotle's system. See van den
Bergh ibid., vol. I,pp. 22,138,276; vol. II,pp. 20,note 22.4; 91. notes
138.5; 138.6; 151, note 276.2.
565 Tibyiin, p. 22.,
566 Which ·is inherent in their theory of God's absolute oneness, from
which also their theory that God is Simple Being follows.

with such things it would mean, so they say, that God Himself is
spatial and temporal and is subject to change, as all things
involved in space and time are. Ibn Sina and his followers
maintain, however, that God knows the Other, and He knows
the particulars, but only in a universal way, that is; He knows
individuals and particulars as a whole, in a general sort of way.
He knows, for example, about man and about time and events,
but He still cannot know about the individual man and what is
happening to him now. It can be seen that the position of the
philosophers on the knowledge of God is confused and is in
flagrant contradiction with the testimony of the Holy Qur'an,
where it declares that nothing-not even so much as the
magnitude of a particle of dust or the secret in man's heart-is
hidden from His knowledge. Moreover, this doctrine of the
philosophers would lead to the destruction of religion, for it
would mean that God cannot know whether or not someone has
practised what He has commanded and prohibited, nor whether
or not what He has commanded and prohibited has been
conveyed by His Prophet to mankind. 567
Allied to their theory of God's absolute oneness and their
denial of plurality or·duality in the Divine essence, which is based
on their arguments against the attributes and against the division
into genus and specific difference with reference to God, the
philosophers further affirm that God is Simple Being, by which
they mean that He has no quiddity to which existence would be
related. They say that if He had a quiddity His existence would
be an accident, and hence also an effect, of the quiddity. But since
His existence is necessary, meaning having no agent or efficient
cause, for it to be an effect of His quiddity is a contradiction in
terms. In this argument, the philosophers' understanding of
'necessary' as 'having no cause' has validity only when applied to
their proof for the termination of a series of causes and effects
ending in a Being whose existence is without cause. But
'necessary' can also be understood as something without which
567 Tahiifut, pp. 42-44; 50-51; 53-56. See also van den Bergh, ibid., vol.
II, pp. 150-152; notes 275.1; 276.3 and 276-4-
COMMENTARY 375
existence could not be, something indispensable to existence; and
this something is an existent reality, a positive quiddity or well
defined essence. So it is possible for necessary existence to be
related to a quiddity whose effect it is, not in the sense that the
quiddity is its agent or efficient cause, but in the sense that it has
always been so related to the quiddity as something that has
continued from eternity without agent or efficient cause. As to
the quiddity being an existent reality called the Necessary Being,
the philosophers argue that every existent quiddity has already
received plurality, since it contains existence and quiddity. In
this argument the philosophers have confused existence and
quiddity at the level of conceptual analysis and existence and
quiddity at the level of reality. At the level of reality, existence
and quiddity are one. The theologians further argue that
unqualified existence without a cause cannot be conceived; there
must be an existent, definite entity or essence, to which such
existence can be understood as being that particular essence,
otherwise such existence has no object to which it corresponds in
the extra-mental world, and it is then reduced to being a
secondary intelligible having no reality. The denial of quiddity,
the .theologians argue, is tantamount to the denial of realit�, and
this results in the reduction of existence to a mere word. The
philosophers, denying this, say that if we can speak of God as
having a quiddity, His quiddity would only be His necessary
existence. So they identify quiddity and existence in God and
claim that they do not deny the quiddity; but in this respect the
theologians are right in charging them with the denial of the
quiddity. 568
Later philosophers, chief among them being Na�ir al-Din al
Tiisi (d. 1274), the great commentator of ibn Sina, have
reinterpreted their position regarding the problem of God's
absolute oneness and the related problems of the attributes and
568Tahiifut, p. 4 7. On the position of Aristotle, al-Farabi and ibn Sina on

the problem of the distinction between existence and quiddity, see
lzutsu's The concept and reality ofexistence, ibid., pp. 86-99. See also above,
pp. 3o4-3o5.
the emanation of the Many from what is really One. 569

But insoluble problems continue to beset the position of the
philosophers, and this is due to their fundamentally essentialistic
vision of reality. In fact, the same predicament equally applies to
the position of the theologians, who also view reality from the
standpoint of the primacy of essence or quiddity over existence.
According to their respective positions in this matter, existence is
an accident of quiddity occurring to it from the outside. This
occurrence takes place in the conceptual sphere when ·rational
analysis effects a division of existence and quiddity. They believe
that in the extramental sphere of reality quiddity is real and
existence is an extrinsic attribute of the quiddity. In this sense the
primary reality is quiddity, existence being secondary. When it
comes to God, however, aD.d considering the nature of existence
being only secondary and having no corresponding reality in the
external world, the philosophers, who affirm God as the
necessary existence, have to deny Him an essence or a quiddity
because if God were to have a quiddity it would make His
existence an effect of the quiddity, and would make.His existence
contingent; moreover, it would introduce a duality ( of quiddity
and existence) in Him. Besides this, they say that if God had a
quiddity then His quiddity existed before it became qualified by
existence, which is absurd. So they conclude that in God, the
necessary being, existence is identical with quiddity; in
everything other than God, whose being is contingent, existence
is distinct from quiddity. But the philosophers, particularly the
more recent among them, cannot escape the fact that existence is
for them a secondary intelligible to which nothing corresponds in
the external world. Their saying that God's existence is idenlical
with His essence is not something spontaneous that comes from
sincere conviction of the true situation; it is, rather, forced upon
them by their own assumptions in order to make existence in God
569See, for example, al-Durrah al-.Fakhirah, pp. 45/32; 46/33-34; 47/35;

48/36; 50/40; 51/41; 52/42; 68/81, and the note to it on p. 85. See also
The concept and reality of existence (ibid.), pp. 60, rog and note 98; 77 and
note 36; 121-122.
COMMENTARY 377
seem real. Whereas in fact the ultimate conclusion to be derived
from their assumptions is that God is an essence whose existence is
merely a secondary intelligible existing only in the mind and not
in external reality. 570 So long as essence or quiddity is affirmed as
primary over existence, the problems of the existence of God and
of His unicity remain insoluble. Their solution can only be found
when the whole matter is viewed from the perspective of a
fundamentally existentialist vision of reality. In this respect the
position of the $iifis of the school ofwa&dat al-wuJiid, who assert the
primacy of existence over essence or quiddity, is basically
different from those of the philosophers and the theologians. We
shall explain their position when we come to the relevant section
of our commentary on the position of the unitarian Suns. 571
Before coming to that we propose to explain briefly al-Raniri's
gist of the position of the existentialists in general. He says:
XIII The Wujiidiyyah are of two groups: one, the Wujiidiyyah

who affirm unity ( al-muwa&&idah); and the other, the
deviating Wujiidiyyah ( al-mul&idah). In the same way
that the Murjiyah were of two groups: the blessed ( al
mar&iimah); and the accursed ( al-ma!' iinah)-the blessed
being all the Companions of the Messenger of God, upon
570
The philosophers have explicity stated that existence has singulars
corresponding to the theologians' notion of 'portions' of existence; and
that God, the necessary existence, is one of these singulars of existence
( see above, pp. 305-308). The only difference between other singulars
of existence or particular existences, and God's existence is that they
need and have a cause whereas God's existence neither needs nor has a
cause other than itself. How can this position be true when they
themselves maintain that existence is a secondary intelligible having no
corresponding reality in the external world, that is, outside the mind?
See further above, pp. 306-307 with reference to the quotation from
Jami's Naqd al-Nu{ii{; see also al-Durrah al-1'akhirah, pp. 34-35/6; 36/8;
lfawashz, pp. 89-90/2 (2) and (3), 91 -92/5 (I); Shar� al-Durrah, pp.
II9/6 (2).
571
See below, pp. 407 fol., the commentary on par. XVIII.
whom be peace, and the accursed being one of the

seventy-two sects that have gone astray-so the
Wujiidiyyah who affirm unity are the �iifis, and the
deviating Wujiidiyyah are the Zindiqs. The reason why
the Wujiidiyyah are called wujiidiyyah ( existentialists) is
because their discourses, sayings and beliefs are centered
around the Existence ( wujud) of God.
Now the two groups of the Wujiidiyyah are here compared to the
two groups of the Murjiyah, 572 and this needs explanation; for
the Murjiyah generally and without exception refers only to one
of the notorious early sects in Islam, and it is not permissible to
confuse the name of that sect such that it could be made
applicable to the Companions of the Holy Prophet.
The Murjiyah (also Murji'ah) are a sect of early Muslims who
assert that faith (al-zman) is sufficient for salvation without works
( sing. 'amal); that disobedience ( al-ma'riyah) or the commission of
grave sins does not injure if there is faith, and that obedience
without faith does not bring benefit. They defer judgement
upon the committer of grave sins in this life to the day of
resurrection and hope that God will not punish them. Al
Baghdadi says that they are divided into three classes: (I) those
who accept the vicvv· of the Qadariyyah among the Mu'tazilah on
their doctrine of free will (al-qadar); ( 2) those who accept
determinism ( a!-jabr) follmving the views of the J ahmiyyah; (3)
those who reject both free will and determinism. This last forms
five sects according to their mutual differences of opinion: the
Yiinusiyyah, the Ghassaniyah, the Thawbaniyyah, the
Tiimaniyyah, and the Marisiyyah. 573 According to al-Baghdadi,
572 The same statement is made, without further explanation, in his

Tibyiin, p. 84.
573 For their details see al-Farq,
pp. 190-195. Al-Shahrastan1 lists six
sects among the Murjiyah, the 'Ubaydiyyah in addition to the five listed
above. The Ma6siyyah does not appear in al-Shahrastanl's list where,
on the other hand, the �ali}:iiyyah is listed. In his treatment of the
Murjiyah he adds a fourth class: those who accept certain views of the
COMMENTARY 379
it is the first class among the Murjiyah, who are aligned to the
view of the Qadariyyah, that are accursed. 574 In any case, he
considers the Murjiyah as a whole, even though they claim
affiliation with Islam, to be among the people of erring fancies
and wandering desires, from whom the true Muslims who follow
the approved way declare themselves free. 575
The essential elements in the meaning to be derived from the
name Murjryah as a religious sect affiliated with Islam in its earlier
days are the ideas of deferment or postponement or suspension of
judgement or punishment in which the notion of hope is implicit.
The basic words from which the form and content of the name
are derived, such as al-i,jii' (suspension) auJ al-rajii' (hope), are
intimately interconnecte<l because their source of derivation is
identical. For this reason the lexicologists list both forms of the
name mu,ji'ah and murjryah (from raja'a and raja) under both
forms, that is, with &amzah and without, to mean the same thing
as they both refer to the same sect. 576
The explanation of the origin of the name in both its forms goes
back to i[yah 106 of Surah al-Tawbah. This surah deals with events
relating to the Holy Prophet's expedition to Tabiik, which we
touched upon much earlier in another connection, 577 which
occurred nine years after the Hijrah. In it three classes of
Khawarij relating to the problems ofleadership ofthe Community (al

imiimah). See Kitiib al-Milal, pp. 139-145. See also al-Mawiiqif, pp.
427-428; al-Fi{al, vol. II, pp. 112-115. See also M. Watt, Free will and
predestination in early Islam, London, 1948, pp. 42-45 fol.
574Al-Farq, p. 190. The curse on the Murjiyah is derived from a
tradition ofthe Holy Prophet, upon whom be peace, and is reported by
al-Baghdad1. Al-Ranfr1 also mentions this tradition in his treatment of
the Murjiyah ( Tibyiin, pp. 79-84, see p. 84), along with another which
is reported in the Mishkiit aL-Ma{iibzl;, Book I on fmiin, on the authority of
ibn 'Abbas as transmitted by al-Tirmidh1 (see ibid., vol. I, p. 29).
575Al-Farq, p. 354.
576 See., for details explaining this, Lisiin al-"Arab, I, p. 84, col. 1; IV; p.
311, cols. 1 and 2; aL-Qiimiis al-Mu�ft, IV, pp. 334-335; Kashshiif, II, pp.
525-5'26.
577 S
ee above, pp. 193-194.
hypocrites (al-munafiqiin) are mentioned: those who were

obstinate and unrepentant in their hypocrisy (iiyah 101), who
were to receive punishment in this world and in the next; those
who acknowledged their wrong-doings and mixed good deeds
with evil ones, who showed penitence and amended their ways
and were accepted and left to God's mercy ( iiyah 102- 105); those
who had not made penitence and who were held in suspense for the
command of God, whether He will punish them, or turn in mercy
to them (iiyah 106). It is from the expression 'held in suspense':
murjawna-some read it as mur:fa'iina-that the name to
designate the sect was derived: Murjiyah (without bam;:,ah) in
accordance with the former reading; and Murji'ah (withbam;:,ah)
in accordance with the latter. The Holy Qur'an, however, has
that expression in the former form. It is generally agreed that
both forms mean the same thing.
Now with regard to the hypocrites who were held in suspense,
the Holy Prophet, in compliance with the revealed iiyah, deferred
their punishment and still considered them members of the
Muslim Community. When later the Murjiyah, which appeared
at the time of the appearance of the extremist Khawarij,
maintained that a grave sinner is still a Muslim and a member of
the Community in contradiction to the extreme position of the
Khawarij, they were only following the Tradition of the Holy
Prophet and no doubt also the ·Companions who all followed the
Holy Prophet. And similarly with some of the other beliefs of the
Murjiyah whose bases are to be found in the Tradition of the Holy
Prophet and his Companions-it is not surprising that such
beliefs were also shared by many well-known traditionists
including those among the followers of the Companions, and
indeed obviously the Companions themselves, since such beliefs
were based on the Tradition of the Holy Prophet himself. 578 It is
strictly speaking not correct and proper for later generations who
view the tenets of the Murjiyah as they appear to them to say that
See, for example, Mishkiit al-lvla1iibz& Book I on zmiin, eh. II, (I) (II);
578
on well known traditionists sharing beliefs similar to those of the

Murjiyah; see also Kitab al-Milal, I, p. 146.
COMMENTARY
r ,
such traditionists and Companions were Murjiyah, unless they
mean by that name to refer to the individual views of the
traditionists and Companions which coincided with those of
the sect, but which they themselves as a group derived from
Tradition and not from the sect. Even so, to classify them as
Murjiyah is not permissible as the name, seeing the notoriety the
sect acquired during its later development of belief and practice,
is liable to confuse. Moreover, the views of the traditionists and
Companions did not altogether coincide with those of the
Murjiyah in every respect. 579
Towards the end of the period of the Companions and up to
the time of the Mu'tazilah, the development of the tenets of the
M urjiyah betrayed distinct deviations from the approved beliefs
and practices of the Community. They put forward a variety of
opinions and asserted their beliefs and practices on a number of
subjects such as the nature of faith, of unbelief, of sins, of works;
of the attributes of God, His unicity, His quiddity, the vision of
God, the nature of the Holy Qur'an, of knowledge and worship,
of punishments, and the character of the Prophets, which have
been treated in many books dealing with the subject. 580 The fact
tha,ti:some of their views seem to us nearer to those approved by >
the Community when compared with those of the other early
sects then flourishing does not make it permissible for us to label
the exponents of the approved way-for example, the chief
among them, al-Ash'ari-as Murjiyah; for the position of the
People of the Approved Way and the Community ( ahl al-sunnah
wa al-jama'ah) lies between the two extremes of rigidity and
moderation. An example of this )s the extreme rigidity of the
Mu'tazilah, who believed that a grave sinner, despite his faith
and obedience, will never emerge from punishment; and the
extreme moderation of the Murjiyah, who believed that one who
has faith does not become an unbeliever by apostasy or unbelief,
579
An example is that of Abu l:lanifah on the constancy of faith, al-Farq,
pp. I 9 I - I 92.
580 Al-Ran1r1 gives a simplified gist of their tenets on the above subjects
in his treatment of the Murjiyah in the Tibyiin, pp. 79-84.

and that a grave sin is never recorded against him. Al-Ash'ari, on

the other hand, held ( contrary to the Murjiyah) that the grave
sinner who has faith and professes God's unity is dependent on
the will ofGod as to whether He will pardon or punish him for his
crime, and ( contrary to the Mu'tazilah) that no believer is
punished forever. 581 Al-Ash'ari's position in this case and in
relation to both groups is based directly on the Holy Qur'an and
Tradition: in relation to the Mu'tazilah it is based on relevant
ayiit and traditions relating to the intercession ( al-shafii' ah); in
relation to the Murjiyah one can see that it is based directly on
the very ayah with which the origin of the Murjiyah is said to be
associated, that is, on Surah al- Tawbah 106. Despite the fact that
al-Ash'ari in this case made recourse to the practice of irjii'
(postponement), which is the peculiar identifying characteristic
of the Murjiyah, yet he is not to be labelled as a member of the
Murjiyah on that account, because he practised irjii' in the right
sense as truly reflecting the clear meaning of the iiyah. On the
other hand, the position of the Murjiyah-it is obvious in this
case-deviated from the true interpretation of that ayah.
Moreover, their understanding of i'(_jii' is the relegation of works
in favour of faith, such that with faith disobedience cannot
injure. 582 Now even the Holy Prophet, upon whom be peace,
practised itjii', for example, in the case ofKa'b ibn Malik, one of
those implicated by the ayah 106 who later repented. 583 Thus it
becomes increasingly clear from this that the irjii' practised by the
581See ibn 'Asakir's Kitab al-Tabyzn ( Tabyzn Kadhib al-Muftarz fi mii

nusiba ila al-imam Abii al-lfasan al-Ash< ar�, Damascus, 1928-1929, ed.
I:Iusam al-Din al-Qudsi, with an introduction and notes by the Shaykh
al-Kawthari, p. 151. A summary translation of the work is contained in
R.J. McCarthy's The theology ef al-Ash< arz (ibid.), appendix II. The
passage referred to above is in pp. 1 73- l 74.
5s2see al-Mawaqif, pp. 427-428.
583 See the examples of meaning and usage relating to murjiyah and irjii'
in the Lisiin al- < Arab, XIV, p. 311, col. 1, middle of the column, the
explanations of ibn al-Sikkit and ibn Sayyidih. See further, 'Ali al
Qari', Mirqiit al-Mafatz�, Cairo, 1309, 5v., vol. 3, p. 566; also Mishkat al
Ma,riibz�, Book XIV, eh. IV, (ibid., vol. II, p. 731).
COMMENTARY
Holy Prophet, the Companions and their followers is only the

postponement or suspension of judgement on sinners of this type;
the granting of respite and of hope in repentance, and their
continued membership of the community. We must infer,
therefore, that al-Raniri's remark about the Companions
belonging to the 'blessed Murjiyah' means simply that they
practised the granting of respite in accordance with Tradition,
and that they regarded the grave sinner who has faith to be a
believer who has not forfeited his membership of the Muslim
Community. The name Murjiyah as he applies it to them here is
then simply a descriptive name characterizing them, and not
relating them to the sect of the same name, which is included
among the seventy-two sects that have gone astray, and which
appeared later and is generally referred to as the Murji'ah (with
bamzah) or Murjiyyah (with tashdzd). 584
Another explanation, not directly connected with the above·',
discussion, but nonetheless significant, is that in al-Raniri's text
the form murjiyah (withou bamzah and without tashdzd) is used;
and ,although it is made to refer also to the sect believing in the
postponement of judgement and the hope of escaping,',
punishment, the basic idea here is hope, as he reveals in his gloss to
it where he uses the Malay word for hope: harap. 585 Moreover, ,
the form murjiyah is ultimately derived not necessarily from raja' a,··
from which al-irjii' is derived, but from rajii, from which al-rajii',
or hope, is derived. Fear is implicit in hope, so that the meaning
of fear can also be derived from rajii, as testified by Quranic use,
in which other meanings are also derived. Hope is defined as the
clinging of the heart to the happening of a future loved event.
Now in the Holy Qur'an, in the early, Makkan Siirah al-Sajdah,
where the psychology of the hypocrites is compared with that of
the true believers and where the spiritual character of the true
believers is distinguished from that of the hypocrites, God
584 See the explanation ofibn

Sayyidih in the reference given in note 583
and what follows. For traditions on the seventy-two sects their details
are given in al-Farq, pp. 4-7.
585 }fujjah, P· g.
384 A COMMENTARY ON -THE J:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
addresses the true believers (i.e. the Companions) thus: 'You

have indeed in the Messenger of God a beautiful pattern ( of
conduct) for whoever among you hopes for God and the Last Day
( li man kiinayarjii Allah wa al-yawm al-iikhir) and engages much in
the remembrance of God'. 586 Hope ( al-rajii)-expressed in the
plural verbal formym:,iii in the ayah quoted-that is, the hope of
meeting with God, is more than once mentioned in the Holy
Qur'an; 587 and this hope of meeting (al-liqii') with God is the first
characteristic describing the good qualities of · the
Companions. 588 It is one of the spiritual stations in one's journey
to God; 589 and according to al-An�ari it has three degrees, the
highest of which is the hope of meeting with God. 590
We can sense a good reason why al-Raniri makes the
comparison between the blessed and the accursed Murjiyah on
the one hand, and the blessed (unitarian) and the accursed
(deviating) Wujudiyyah on the other. Between the blessed and
the accursed in both cases there is a resemblance in their
characteristics as reflected in their beliefs and practices; a
resemblance so subtle that it is productive of misunderstanding
and confusion, such that despite the fact that the one is true and
the other is false the identifying characteristics of each of them is
difficult for people to ascertain.Just as the Murjiyah developed
doctrines which apparently reflected the true teachings of the
Holy Qur'an and Tradition, but which as they developed, and
upon closer scrutiny, were in fact tinged with deviations from the
truth-so the deviating Wujudiyyah held doctrines which at first
sight reflected the true teachings of the $iifis as based on the Holy
586 Al-Sajdah (33): 21.

587 Apart from the surah above, also al-Kahf (18): 110; al-'Ankabut (29):
5.
al-Luma', p. 1 20.
5 88 Kitiib
589 The Risiilah of al-Qushay6, pp. 62-65.
590 Maniizil al-Sa'irzn, p 14. He says that the man who possesses this
.
degree of hope has purity of heart, and the hope incites him to an
insatiable desire for the meeting with the Truth, and renders life
troublesome and disgusting for him such that he seeks to be estranged
from created things and keeps himself in isolation.
COMMENTARY
Qur'an and Tradition, but which were in fact heretical. Because

of this people became confused and misunderstood the one for the
other and were unable to distinguish the true from the false.
Then al-Raniri says that the Wujudiyyah are so called because
they preoccupy themselves with the problem of the existence of
God. Although he does not explicitly state the matter here, he is
in fact referring to the problem discussed by the contending
groups of philosophers, theologians, and Sufis pertaining to
quiddity and existence, which of the one is primary over the
other, as we have already explained in the preceding pages; and
he is referring here to the Wujudiyyah's affirmation of the
primacy of existence over quiddity, by which they have come to
be called 'existentialists' as opposed to the 'essentialists'. But the
term 'existentialists', as in the case of modern Western
philosophy, covers a variety of different schools of thought having
in common only the emphasis on the reality of existence as
opposed to quiddity or essence. Basing his broad division of the
Wujudiyyah on the La!ii'if al-l'liim of al-Qunyawi (or perhaps a
work of the same title by al-Qashani), he says that they form two
groups comprising the genuine Sufis of the school of wabdat al
wujiid on the one hand, and the pseudo-�ufis on the other::> 9hln
order that one may make a real distinction between their
respective positions on the problem of the reality of existence, he
mentions first the pseudo-Sufis and gives a gist of their beliefs as
follows: ·,
.-'
.··
XIV The deviating Wujudiyyah say: Being (wujiid) is one, and
that is the Being of God. This unique Being of God does
not exist (ada: mawjiid) independently (mustaqill) for it to
be distinguished (from the creatures) save by being
contained in the creatures. The creatures are God's
Being, and the Being of God is the being of the creatures,
The world is then God, and God is the world. In this way
591Tibyan, pp. 95-96. See above, pp. 216-217; 222-225. On the

La!ii'if, see above, p. 94, note 36.
they affirm God's unique Being as immanent in the being

of the creatures, and they say: "There is no existent
( mawjud) except God." Furthermore they believe the
formula: 'There is not god but God' to mean: 'There is no
being in me save that God's Being is my being.' They
further say: "We and God are alike (sebangsa) and have
one and the same being (sewujud)"; and yet further that
God Most Exalted can be known in His Essence, and that
His qualitative and quantitative categories (kayfiyyiit and
kammiyyiit) are clearly visible by virtue of His being
concretely existent ( ada: mawjud) temporally (Pada ;:,amiin)
and spatially (Pada makiin).
These beliefs, as al-Jurjani says in his commentary on the

Mawiiqifof al-Ijiwhen referring to the Wujudiyyah of this group,
are contrary to reason (al-'aql) and Tradition (al-naql), and come
into conflict with the Law and with reality ( al-shara'). The errors
in them are tantamount to unbelief (kufr), because they
necessitate the identity of contingents ( al-mumkiniit) with the
Necessary Existence (al-wiijib al-wujud). The Wujudiyyah who
affirm such beliefs betray their ignorance of gradations in the
various degrees (mariitib) of the self-manifestations (tajalliyiit) and
individuations (ta' ayyuniit) of Absolute Being, contrary to the
position of the genuine $iifis, and they have thereby asserted the
indwelling ( �ulul) of God in all things, and His union ( itti�iid) in
the sense of being mixed ( makhlufah) with every one of the things
in creation. 592
. The point to note in al-Ranfri's gist of the beliefs of the
deviating Wujudiyyah is that there is a logical progression in
their assumptions leading to contradictory conclusions. First they
say that there is only one being ( or existence), and that is the
Being of God and, as such, it is also Absolute. However this
Absolute Being does not exist by itself as such without being
inseparably related to or immanent in the creatures in the sense of
being mixed with them as one reality and one being. So the
592 Tibyiin, p. 93 fol.

COMMENTARY
creatures are affirmed as God's Being and the world as God. It

follows from this, as al-Raniri himselfrightly concludes, that they
affirm as inseparable a metaphysical duality of God's Being on
the one hand and the being of the creatures on the other, while
yet at the same time saying that nothing exists but God, so that
their belief in ittibiid and buliil is implied. This is why he connects
this doctrine with their claim that "we and God are tqual or
alike, and have one and the same being," and later identified
them with the incarnationists and the corporealists to be found
among various religious communities. In the first case, and
despite the fact that the beliefs of the philosophers are far from
those of the deviating Wujudiyyah, the doctrine of the
philosophers about the eternity and incorruptibility of matter
and the eternity of the world is implied. In the second case, the
doctrines of metempsychosis ( al-taniisukh) and incarnation are
implied. The doctrine of immanence is ofcourse also implied, but
God's being present in the being of creation does not necessarily
involve heresy, and it is therefore of secondary importance in
comparison with those stated; for God's being immanent in all
creation does not by itself necessarily entail that the Being that is
immanent is not a separate self-subsisting entity, since in tlie c.ase
of the soul, it is immanent in the body, and yet it is also a separate
self-subsisting entity. Furthermore, the doctrine ofthe eternity of
the world and the incorruptibility of matter is logically prior to
the possibility of positing any pantheistic doctrine. In the last
section of al-Raniri's gist of their position, he means that they
assert that God can be likened to created things; that He is a
substance (jawhar) and a body (jism) and an accident ('araef); that
He is in a place and in time; that He is a recipient for accidents
and a locus for originated things-may He be high exalted above
what does not befit Him!
Similar to the position of the genuine $iifis, they affirm the
unity of both existence (wujud) and existent (mawjud). But the
pseudo-$iifis mean by this that there is one unique reality in the
external world which corresponds to the concept of existence.
This single reality is the Being of God or the absolute existence.
Now this absolute existence directly takes on the multiple and
diverse forms that appear to us as the world without any

gradation, such that in every particular and individual thing in
the external world it is that thing. They also claim that these
appearances of absolute existence in the forms of the external
world are purely mental in their nature, so that we may suppose
that if there were no minds to perceive them there would be no
particular and individual existences, and there would remain
only the absolute existence in its pure and simple unity. In this
way the multiple and diverse forms which are merely
phenomenal in their nature do not affect the original unity of the
absolute existence. 593 This is what they misunderstand to be
wa�dat al-wujiid.
There seems to be no doubt that the position of the pseudo
$iifis on the unity of both existence and existent as one single
reality as we have just summarized is derived from the type of
intuitive experience of existence which characterizes 'the elect'
among the $iifis ( ahl al-khawaH,). 594 We do not in the least mean
by this that the pseudo-$iifis are among 'the elect', for these latter
have verified their (partial) vision ofreality by their own intuitive
experience of 'passing away' (Jana') and 'passing away from
passing away' (Jana' al-Jana'), whereas the pseudo-$ufis have
merely borrowed the idea from the experience of 'the elect' and
interpreted it from their own subjective point of view without
personal verification in the intuition of existence. In their
intuitive experience of existence the rightly guided among the ah!
al-khawii,H are aware of the incompleteness of their vision of
reality, and they acknowledge a higher level of such intuition as
593 This is referred to by ibn Khaldun, who confuses it with the position
of the genuine $ufis. See above, pp. 343-344. A more recent Iranian
scholar has also made a general division of the Sufis into two broad
groups. The one corresponding to the deviating Wujudiyyah here he
calls the 'ignorant among the Sufis ( al-juhhiil), and he sums up their
position as above. See Mul:iammad Taq1 'Amuli, Durar al-Farii'id, I,
Markaz-i Kitab, Teheran, 1377A.H., pp. 87-88, as cited by Izutsu in
his The concept and reality of existence (ibid.), p. 135.
594 0n the type of experience of the intuition of existence which
characterizes the ahl al-khawi4r, see above, pp. I 37- I 39.

COMMENTARY 389
experienced by 'the super elect' (khawaH al-khaw��) who we have

called the people of the 'second separation'. 595 Due to this
awareness, and although they are prone to affirming only the·
unity of existence and denying the multiplicity of existents in
accord with their own initial experience offana' followed by the·
intermediate experience offana' al-Jana', the elect' are preserved
from error and do not fall into the abyss either of pantheism or of
monism. It is significantly relevant to what we have said about
the characteristic position of the ahl al-khawaH that al-Raniri ·
should refer to that section of the Futii&at of ibn 'Arabi where the·
latter deals with the beliefs of the ahl al-khawaH and positively
rejects and invalidates the teachings of the deviating
Wujiidiyyah. Ibn 'l'... rabi says:
XV · .. From here, then, a group has slipped from the path of··•
truth, and they say: "There is nothing save that which we
see." So they have made out the world to be God, and God ·
to be the world itself; and this (visible world) is not a
spectacle (mashhad) of its own coming-into-being (kawn).
They do not possess true knowledge as verified by its
experts, for if they themselves have verified it, they would
not say such a thing ... etc.
From here, that is, from the type of intuition of existence .,

experienced by the ahl al-khawaH which is then interpreted
subjectively by the ignorant who have no such experience, a group
has slipped from the path of truth, that is, the pseudo-�iifis or the
ignorant affirmers of the unity of existence (Wujiidiyyah) have
deviated from the true interpretation of the nature of the reality
of existence. They say: a There is nothing save that which we see" (ma
thamma illii mii narii), and the word thamma alludes to a passage in
the Holy Qur' an: 'Wheresoever you turn, there is the Presence (lit.
595
The intuition of existence as experienced by the khawiiH al-khawiiH is
described on pp. 136-139 above. See further, pp. 222-225.
face) of God' (fa aynamii tu"(i)alliifa thamma wajh Alliih); 596 So
according to the interpretation of the ignorant-· since the
'being-there' of things is the presence of God, and since they see
nothing but the things 'being-there', they identify the things with
God: the world is then God and God is the world. Then he says:
Andthis (visible world) is not a spectacle ofits own coming-into-being or
existence (_wa laysa hiidhii bi mashhadin li kawnihi). In this
philosophical context the term 'phenomenon' describes mashhad.
Phenomenon in this sense means 'an appearance presented to an
observer', and hence it is 'a spectacle'. The subject of hiidhii is the
world (al-'iilam), as is also the case with mashhad, so that wa laysa
hiidhii bi mashhadin means 'and this ( the visible world) is not a
phenomenon or spectacle .. ;'. However, the word kawnihi which
follows can refer to God as its subject, and not the world, so that
kawnihi means 'His Being or existence'. In fact the passage can be
interpreted in two ways such that either one is valid: it can be
-interpreted that kawnihi refers to God's Being, or to the coming
into-being of the world. /(awn in respect of the world means the
coming-into-being of the world, for the world is not 'being', it is
'becoming'-without there being construed any notion of
progression or evolution in such becoming, since the world is
discontinuous in its existing, as we have already explained 597 -;
and takwzn is the 'bringing-into-hf'ing' which is the 'prod1.1rtion'
of the world by God. The world that is actualized, considered in
itself, has no realiy of its own; it is like a dream though not a pure
illusion. It is not a sheer illusion because behind the veil of its
appearance there is hidden, as it were, the absolute Reality.. The.
meaning of this is that the world that is in the process of
actualization is conceived by the mind, which is not aware of the
process, as something that has continuance in existence and has a
596Al-Baqarah ( 2): 1 15. The pseudo-Siifis have interpreted this

erroneously. Compare, pp. 138-148.
597
See above, pp. 269-272. Not only is the world discontinuous in its
existing; it is also a new world at each. moment of its existence, so that
there is no causal nexus between the one that precedes and the
succeeding one.
·------ ----- "-- - ------- - -·-·-- ---- ---------------��. ----- --�------ ------ -·--- - --�--- --,·- ---·
- -----·-- --- - ---- ---------------
COMMENTARY 39 1
reality of its own, whereas in reality it is only what is imagined (sc.

khayiil) by the mind as such. However, that by which the world is
actualized, or that which actualizes the world, at each moment of
existence is in fact the Reality underlying the world. This Reality
is the reality of existence which is absolute existence perpetually
involving itself in an existential movement of expansion (al
inbisii!,), descending (sc. tanazzul) from its absoluteness to the
planes of created beings and encompassing all existents in these
planes. Its encompassing and its expansion over them is its
appearance in their multiple and diverse forms. Thus His
manifestations in the realms of contingency, in view of the
multiplicity and diversity o_f the forms in which He appears, and
in accordance with their natures and not as He is in Himself,
makes Him increasingly hidden. 598 In view of this, and when
kawnihi refers to God instead of the world, the meaning of the
words wa laysa hiidhii bi mashhadin li kawnihi is: 'and this (visible
world) is not a manifestation of His Being'. Here the actualizing
principle that actualizes the world such that it reveals itself as a
spectacle or mashhad is its 'manifestation', because the situation
that is described refers to tajallz or the self-manifestation of God,
and also to shuhiid, or 'seeing the Truth by means of the Truth' 599
as implied in the very concept of mashhad. Thus, what ibn 'Arabi
is saying in this connection is that those who have made out the
world to be God and God the world itself deny, on account of
what they say, that the world is no more than a manifestation of
God, the absolute existence, in various particular and individual
modes both in the mind and externally, for they are in fact saying
that it is God in Himself, not aspects of Himself, which is false.
If the subject of kawnihi in that passage is the world, then wa
laysa hiidhii bi mashhadin li kawnihi means: 'and this (visible world)
is not a phenomenon ( or spectacle) of its own coming-into-being
(or existence)'. What ibn 'Arabi is alluding to here is that since
the group that has slipped off the right path are referring to what
598 See above, pp. I 39-148; I 76- I 82; 235-236; 242 fol; 269 fol; 274 fol.
599 See al-Ta'rifat, pp. 53 (aL-tajatlD; 135 (al-shuhud); 299 (al
mushahadah).
they see with their physical eyes, they are referring to the visible
world which presents itself as the spectacle they observe. But
what they observe is in fact nothing more than the spectacle of the
world's coming-into-existence; and yet they do not realize this,
erroneously believing instead that what they see is identical with,
or is actually, God. According to the $ufis, however, the manifold
and diverse self-manifestations of God are never repeated in the
same forms, but in similar forms. These forms are then
continually appearing and disappearing in a successive series;
their appearing is their coming-into-existence, and their
disappearing is their return to non-existence. The world which is
constituted by these e,phemeral forms cannot in reality be
experienced twice at two units of time, for at each unit of time a
new world has come into existence. Thus wha.t is seen and
experienced is the ever-new creation ( al-khalq al-jadzd), and those
who have slipped off the right path do not see and experience this,
erroneously believing instead that what they see is God Himself
directly taking on the forms of the world. 600 This profound error
on their part proves that they do not possess true knowledge as
verified by its experts; otherwise, if they themselves have verified
it through a complete intuition of existence, they would not have
said such a thing.
',Vhat the deviating vVujudiyyah are denying is the reality of
things that constitute the world as they appear in their
multiplicity and diversity in the external world. In this
connection they have already been included among the class of
sophists who deny the realities of things. 601 Thin"gs are for them
mere fancies of the imagination, so that what appears to be things
are in their esrimation God Himself appearing directly in their
600 0n the �ufiinterpretation oftakwzn, see above, pp. 316-318. On the

degrees and gradations of the descents, individuations and self
manifestations of God or the Absolute; on the nature of the world as
effects and repercussions of the potentialities in the permanent
archetypes, and the nature of the world qua itself, we have explained
these many times already in the preceding pages: see below, note 606.
601 See the reference to the 'iniidryyah on pp. 205-208 above..
COMMENTARY 393
guise in the pantheistic sense; inhering in things and inseparably

mixed with them like water and wine, such that they become one
indistinguishable being having one and the same reality. 602
The true $iifis of the school ofwabdat al-wujiid do not deny the
realities of things, and in their affirmation of realities they make a
distinction between God and what is other than God. In this
connection we have to refer once again to their position on the
double nature of the Divine Names and Attributes. AIi the Divine
Names have two aspects: they are identical with God when they
refer to His Essence, but are distinct from God when they refer to
their own intrinsic meaning. This second aspect of the Divine
Names derives such a nature because each name has a special
meaning pertaining only to itself; and it follows that each is
distinct from the other and from God. When considered as
pertaining to itself in this way each Divine Name is an Attribute.
By virtue of the essential property of distinctness inherent in each
Attribute, a reality from among the realities of the Divine Names
becomes manifest in the consciousness of God. This becoming
manifest to Him in this way is its existence in His knowledge. 603
Attributes also have a dual aspect: one describes the Essence and
is identical with it; the other describes itself, or rather, it describes
the Essence as qualified by it,-no, as the Essence qualifies itself
by it. The former is eternal, the latter non-eternal. 604 It is from
this latter aspect of the Divine Attributes that the realities of
things are comprised. Realities, then, are real essences or true
quiddities, and are known as the permanent archetypes. The
realities too have a dual nature: they are on the one hand active
determinants, and on the other passive recipients of existence. 605
602 See further, above, pp. 190-191; 216-217; 222-225; 243-244.

603 See above, pp. 162-164.
604 In effect, attributes that are identical with the Essence are the Names
and Qualities of the Essence. The non-eternal nature of the latter aspect
of the Attributes is due to their being perpetually renewed in the same
forms (pp. 180-181 above). Because of their abiding nature, the realities
are described as neither eternal nor non-eternal (p. 181).
605
See above, pp. 164-165. On real essence or true quiddity, see pp.
242-243. The reference here is to 'that by which a thing what it is', in the
394 A COMMENTARY ON THE IJUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
At the level of sense and sensible experience the realities of things

are the effects of the concomitants of potentialities inherent in the
interior archetypes that have descended to the level of empirical
things. That is to say, they are the expansion of existence evolving
itself into particular and individual modes as it descends and
encompasses the archetypes and expands over their
potentialities, concomitants, and effects through the exterior
archetypes becoming the things that we see and behold. Thus in
view of the various degrees of descent through which the reality of
existence expands in its perpetual process of existential
movement, the ontological reality of the realities of things that
are infused with it is relative to the degree preceding them, such
that they become more real as they ascend and approach their
sources in the interior archetypes. In other words, the reality of
the realities is more real at the level of the interior archetypes
than at the level of the exterior archetypes; and similarly, it is
more real at the level of the exterior archetypes than at the level
of sense and sensible experience. Yet their reality at the level of
sense and sensible experience is nonetheless real, and the
multiplicity and diversity of existents in the external world are
therefore realities, even if they exist for only an atom ohime; and
despite their being replaced by similars in their perpetual
renewal, their retaining of their identities is precisely due to their
realities which are permanently establised as the archetypes. 606
Now the archetypes, as wP have said, have in themselves a dual
nature or twofold aspect, since they reflect in themselves what is
inherent in the original nature of the Divine Names and
Attributes. Thus the realities, when viewed as so many
Sufi sense-not to something to which existence is superadded from the

outside, i.e. to quiddity in the sense meant by the essentialists.
606 0n the ontological descent of absolute being, see above pp. 155-159;
162-166, 171-182. On the analogical gradation or systematic ambiguity

of existence, see above, pp. 272-275. On the world qua itself see pp.
269-272; as a manifestation form and shadow of the Absolute, see pp.
277-282; 282-287; its ontological status as what is other than God, see
pp. 287-289; 310-312; 313-315.
COMMENTARY 395
predispositions of the Essence are eternal and are identical with
it; and when viewed as the multiple and diverse determinations,
particularizations and individuations of the predispositions of the
Essence are non-eternal and are other than it; but when viewed
as they are in themselves are neither eternal or non-eternal. The
Absolute Being or Existence, theologically expressed as God, is
then not identical with what we see and behold-just a" He is not
identical with His Names and Attributes when they represent His
qualification of Himself in their forms, for qualified as such He is
not as He is in Himself. We must also not forget that for the true
Siifis there is a higher level-in fact the highest-wl1ere Gu<l as
He is in Himself is unknown and unknowable except to
Himself. 607
From the foregoing explanation it is already clear to those
possessed of understanding that the true $iifis assert that God
cannot be likened to created things in the way the deviating
Wujudiyyah have done; that He is neither substance, nor body,
nor accident; that He is neither in a place nor in time; that He is
not a recipient for accidents, nor is He a locus for originated
things-even though He sometimes appears as if He were a
unique 'substance' or 'substratum', in which accidents inhere,
and at other times as if He were the 'accidents' inhering in that
'substratum'. 608
The world then also has a double aspect: (I) as it is in itself qua
world-that is, as the mind conceives it to be; as something
having continuance in existence, subsisting independently, and
composed of quiddities to which existence is superadded as seen
from the essentialistic viewpoint of the metaphysics of substance
and accident-is essentially nothing. It is nothing not only
because it is essentially only mentally posited, but also because it
is ever-perishing, and only the perpetual renewal of its similars
creates in the mind the notion of its continuance in existence as if
it were an independent entity possessed of being. The other
607 That is, in the metaphysical terminology of the �ufis, this highest
level is designated as lii bi shar{, or non-conditioned.
608 See above, pp. 341-342.
3 96 A COMMENTARY ON THE I;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
aspect of the world is: (2) as it comes into existence at each

moment of itself independent of the mind. Each moment of itself
is discontinuous: it only is in that atomic duration, it being
replaced by another similar to it, and that other by yet another
perpetually. Everything involved in this series of the renewal of
its creation retains its unity and identity as that particular thing
precisely because of its reality (archetype), over which and in
which form existence expands from the higher to the lower levels
of being. This second aspect of the world is real and has itself two
aspects: ( 1) as existence itself, in which case it is the absolute
existence as it involves itself in dynamic movement ( i.e. the
predispositions of the Essence); (2) as modes of existence, or the
individuations of absolute existence that have descended in self
manifestations from the higher to the lower levels of being. 609
Thus when the true $iifis assert that the world is of the nature of
an illusion (sc. khayal), that it is something imagined
( mutawahham), they are merely referring to the first aspect of the
world: that which the mind represents to our cognition. Thus
what the mind 'ontologizes' to be the world-that is sheer
illusion. But the second aspect of the world which, in turn, is itself
having a dual aspect-this they assert to be the world as it really
is; and they arrive at this knowledge not by means of rational
analysis peculiar to the operation of the mind, but by a direct
intuition of existence. Those like the deviationists whose
perception of the world is not founded upon true intuitive,
existential verification, do not perceive the reality of the world in
terms of the gradations of existence, and only perceive the world
as construed and presented by the mind, which they reject as
sheer illusion. Since in their case they are existentialists and not
essentialists, they believe that what the mind construes and
presents as multiple and diverse existents are nothing but sheer
illusion, so that independent of the mind they assert that what is
really existent is one single reality of existence without
particularization and individuation. In this way their
interpretation of the doctrine of the transcendent unity of
609 See above, pp. 232-234; 270-274; 277-291.

COMMENTARY 397
existence ( wabdat al-wujud) affirmed by true $ufis is in effect an
erroneous vulgarization of it. As for the pantheists among the
pseudo-$ufis, they should more appropriately be compared with
the incarnationists and corporealists among the various sects and
upholders of religious beliefs that are outside the pale of Islam,
rather than with the existentialists who affirm the primacy of
existence over essence and the gradation of existence. The beliefs
of the deviating Wujudiyyah resemble those of the Ghaliyyah
who liken God to created things; and to those of the
Mughiriyyah, the Ba.tiniyyah, the Saba'iyyah and the
Hishamiyyah, who say that God has a form like that of man; and
also the anthropormorphists among the $ifatiyyah who teach the
same. The Ghaliyyah say that a certain person was God-like
the Christians-or that God became incarnated in him, like the
beliefs of other incarnationists of every community. The
Karramiyyah say that God is a substance and a body, and that
He is a locus for temporal events.610 Having this in mind,
therefore, al-Raniri says that
XVI ... their words and beliefs are like the words and beliefs of
the 'Ali Ilahiyyah and the Isma'iliyyah of the Rafic;liyyah
who say that the Truth Most Exalted descended and
became 'Ali ibn Abi Talib ... (and) like those of the Jews
who say that God's Prophet 'Uzayr is the son of God ...
(and) like the saying and belief of the Christians that
God's Prophet 'Isa is the son of God ... some of them
believe that God is one of three in a Trinity ... some of
them say that God's Prophet 'Isa is in fact God ... the
Christians say that God descended from the world of
divinity to the world of humanity ... He became a body
in the corporeal world, then He returned to the world of
divinity ...
610See the Kitab al-Mital, I. pp. 108-113; 173-174; 176-178; 184-186.

Nihiiyah, pp. 103-104.
-398 A COMMENTARY ON THE l;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
then he condemns as sheer rejection of true belief this

identification of God with man and man with God, and exhorts
the true believers on the authority of the Holy Qur'an to realize
that man is nothing but a creature of God. Quoting the author of
the Kitiib al-,?,ubad, he says that this is clearly stated by God in the
Holy Qur'an, where the creation of man is mentioned in twenty
eight places. The twenty-eight places refer not to particular
verses (iiyiit)-for there are more than twenty-eight verses that
mention the creation of man-but to certain chapters (sing.
siirah) which specifically mention the creation of man: 611 it is
God Who -created mankind; He created man from earth, from
clay, and moulded him into shape and fashioned him in due
proportion; then He breathed into him of His spirit; and He
created him and his mate of like nature from a single soul or
person; then from male and female He created man's progeny
from water, from sperm placed in the mother's womb, and He
made it into sticky clot, then lump of congealed blood, then bones
clothed with flesh, then He infused it with soul; then He brought
it out into the light and gave it hearing, sight and feeling; then He
developed him from infancy to maturity to old age then death;
He created for him life and death and life again; there was a
beginning to the creation of man, in stages, and He will-as He
does now-move him onward from stage to stage. 612
6 11:The Kitiib al-,?,ubad is not available to us, and what we believe to be

the twenty-eight places (mawtfi'an) referred to by its author art> those
which only mention the creation of man specifically, as summarized in
what follows above and identified in note 612. The words quoted by the
author of the Kitiib al-,?,ubad are well known to some of the most foremost
men of discernment. The same words are also quoted by the Imam 'Ali
ibn l:fasan ibn 'Abd Allah ibn l:fusayn ibn 'Umar al-'Anas in his work
entitled: al-Qjr{iis, Matba'at al-Madani', Cairo, 1386/1966, 2 vols., vol.
1, p. 159.
612 Al-Baqarah (2):21; al-Nisii' (4):1; al-An'iim (6):2; al-A'riif ( ):11-12;
7
189; al-Jfijr ( r 5):26; 28-29; 38; al-Na�l (16): 4; Banz lsrii'zl (17):61; al
Jfajj (22):5; al-Mu'miniin (23): 12-14; al-Furqiin (25):54; ai-Riim (30:20;
40; al-Sajdah (32):7-9; al-Fii#r (35):11; Ya S:in (36):77; al-$affat (37):96
fiiid (38):71; 75-76; al-,?,umar (39):6; al-Mu,min (40):67; al-lfujuriit ·
--------------------- -- - --- -- ----- --- - ---------- ----

----�- " --- ---·--- ---------- ----
COMMENTARY 399
The mention of Christians and their doctrines of the Trinity
and the Incarnation refers to the Christians as a whole, and not
merely to them as represented by a particular sect among'
them. 613 Of the numerous sects into which Christianity is·
divided, the chief ones among them are the Dyophysites, the
Monophysites and the N estorians. The differences between them
I
revolve around the problem of the Incarnation. Some sects, such
(49):13; @f (50):16; al-Ra&man (55):3; 14; al-Taghabun (64):2; Nii&

(71):14; 17; al-Dahr ( 76):2; al-Mursalat (77):20-22; 'Abasa (80):18-19;
al-Tariq (86):5-7; Iqra' (96):2. These are the twenty-eight places
referred to.
6l·1 Critics of the Holy Qur'an, who allege that the Holy Qur'an is the
work of the Holy Prophet, upon whom be peace, try to argue by

conjecture that the Trinity meant by the Holy Qur'an consists only of
the Father, the Son, and the Mother; whereas they assert that the
conciliar formulation of the Trinity consists of the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Spirit, meaning God, the Word, or the pre-existent Christ, arid
the Holy Spirit. They further deny that according to Christianity God
became incarnated in Jesus, saying that the Incarnation refers to the
incarnation of the Word withj esus, resulting in their doctrine of the two
natures ofJesus, divine and human. They confuse the matter further by
mai(ing analogous the Muslim doctrine of Divine attributes witJ:i the
conciliar doctrine of the Trinity. In fact, however, the Holy Qur'an's
references to the Christian Trinity is meant to encompass not only that
consisting of the Father, the Son, and the Mother, but its other
formulation consisting of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit,
whether they be the formulations of the Orthodox among them, or of
those the orthodox consider to be heretical, for all Christians are agreed
on the doctrine that God is the Third of Three. Moreover, the Holy
Qur'an, contrary to what they say, does not say that Jesus or the
Messiah is the Word of God, but only says thatJesus or the Messiah is a
word from God, meaning that he was created like all other things
created, by the word "Be". Similarly, the Holy Qur'an does not say that
Jesus is the (Holy) Spirit, but only a spirit of God, meaning that he was
created like Adam, into whom God breathed of His Spirit. The analogy
between the Muslim attributes and the Christian Trinity is not valid,
because the Muslim attributes do · not have the kind of deitific
theological status Christians ascribe to the hypostases, nor do they serve
the same kind of metaphysical context. For obvious reasons we cannot
go into details here. We only wish to indicate our ol:5jection to those
critics, whose contentions are best treated elsewhere. For their views, see
The philosophy of the Kalam, chs. II, III and IV.
as the Arians, the Macedonians, and the Sabellians, which derive

from the above three groups, are considered by orthodox
Christianity to be heretical. Nevertheless, Christianity as a
whole, whether orthodox or heretical, agree on the nature of God
as consisting of thre� distinct persons or hypostases ( aqanzm), and
hence they all come under the name of Trinitarians ( a�bab al
tathlzth). 614 The disagreement between the orthodox and the
heretical centers mainly on the latter's rejection of the eternity
and reality of the three hypostases, the Macedonians contending
that the Holy Spirit was created, the Arians contending that both
the Son and the Holy Spirit were created, and the Sabellians
contending that God is a single substance (jawhar wabid) having
three properties ( khawaH) incarnated in His totality in Jesus. 615
According to al-Shahrastani, the orthodox doctrine of the
Christian Trinity is represented by the three. main sects, the
Malkites, or the Byzantine Church, the Nestorians, and the
J acobites, or the Monophysites. The Malkites affirm a trinity of
God, the Word, and the Holy Spirit. By the Word they mean the
hypostasis knowledge, and by the Holy Spirit they mean the
hypostasis life. The Word became united with the body of the
Messiah and became clad with his humanity. The unity of the
Word with the body of the Messiah is described as being like
wine, or a mixture of water and milk. In other words the two
elements became one.
Two elements becoming one here means, in the Christian
sense, two natures in one hypostasis. They say that the Creator is
a single substance (jawhar wabid); one in substantiality, three in
hypostaticality. They further say that the substance is other than
the hypostases. It is to this formulation of the Trinity that,
according to al-Shahrastani, the Holy Qur'an refers when God
says: 'They have become unbelievers who say that God is one of
three in a Trinity'. 616 Al-Raniri quotes the same verse in his
reference to "some of them" (i.e. the Christians) �.vho believe that
614 See the Kitiib akFifal, vol. r, pp. 48-65; Kitiib al-Mital, vol. r, pp.
220-228; also Shar� al-' Aqii'id, pp. 62; 7 I.
6I5 Kitiib al-Milat,
p. 227.
616 Al-Mii'idah (5):76; Kitiib al-Mital, vol. 1, p. 222.
COMMENTARY 401
God is one of three in a Trinity, so that we take it to mean that he

is referring, in that connection, to the Byzantine Church, as al
Shahrastani has shown.
The doctrine of Incarnation affirming two natures in Jesus,
divine and human, in one hypostasis which is the Word, is the
general b.elief of orthodox Christianity, both in the East and in
the West. This doctrine came to be affirmed as the orthodox
doctrine as a result of many controversies culminating in the
Councils of Nicaea (325), of Constantinople (381), of Ephesus
(431), and of Chalcedon (451). The heresies we mentioned
earlier were condemned at the Councils of Nicaea and
Constantinople. Between 381 and 451 three more heresies led to
what is known as the Definition ofChalcedon which affirmed the
two natures of Jesus. These heresies were Appollinarianism,
which tended to emphasize the divinity ofj esus at the expense of
his humanity; Nestorianism, which tended to emphasize the
humanity of Jesus at the expense of his divinity; and
Eutychianism, which denied the doctrine of the two natures in
Jesus. 617 The Monophysites are derived from Eutychianism, and
they are represented in the works of both ibn l:fazm and al
Shahrastani as the Jacobites.618 They, like the others, affirmed
the Trinity, but believed that the Word appeared in the form of
Jesus in the same way that the angel appeared to Mary in the
form of man. Jesus, according to them, is not man, but God
appearing in the form of man. To these Monophysites refers the
Holy Qur'an: 'They have disbelieved who say that God is the
Messiah, son of Mary.'61 9
In the above discussion, al-Raniri intends to indicate only the
deviations pertaining to the belief in the incarnation of God in
man. Then in the following, and quoting the Ira'at al-Daqa'iq of
al-Maha'imi, he points to deviations in respect of the belief in the
617See the Documents of the Christian Church, s_elected and edited by H.

Bettenson, London, Oxford University Press, 1946, Pt. I, Sections II;
IV and V.
618 Kitab al-Fiial, vol. I, pp. 49 fol.; Kitab al-Mital, vol. I, pp. :225-227.
619 Kitab al-Mital, vol. 1, p. 225. The same verse is quoted by al-Raniri".
complete immanence and union of God with the world together

with all its parts, which is characteristic of the philosophical
pantheists:
XVII Whoever says that the Intellect ( al-'aql), or the Soul ( al
nafs), or Nature (al-tabz'ah)-the Universals (al
kulliyyiit)-and what is below ( the grade of) these, such
as the Stars ( al-kawakib), and the Elements ( al-'ana�ir),
and the animal, vegetable and mineral Kingdoms ( al
mawiilzd) are God with regard to their being His theatres
of manifestation, then he is in error in the same manner
that one is in error who says of Zayd's hand that it is
Zayd, when his hand is in fact part of the totality of his
manifestation ...
What is being referred to above is the well known gnostic schema:

nous--+psyche--+ physis--+ etc. According to the Ikhwan al-$afa', for
example, the nine grades in the Hierarchy of Being begins with
God, the Creator; then the Intellect ( al-' aql:nous); then the Soul
( al-nafs: psyche); then Matter ( al-hayiilii: hyle); then Nature ( al
{abz' ah: physis); then Body ( al-jism); then the Sphere ( al-falak),
with its seven Planets ( al-kawiikib al-sayyiirah); then the Elements
(al-'anii�ir, also al-urtuqussat: stoichos); and finally, the beings of
the World, which are the animal, vegetable, and mineral
Kingdoms.620 The above outline of the Hierarchy of Being as
understood by the Ikhwan, follows somewhat that of Jabir ibn
l:Iayyan, a disciple ofja'far al-$adiq (d. 756), except that ibn
l:Iayyan, in his Kitiib al-Khamszn, mentions Nature (al-tabz'ah)
after Soul (al-nafs)-that is, he places Nature below Soul in the
Hierarchy.621 The Universals (al-kulliyyiit) refer only to the
Universal Intellect, the Universal Soul, Universal Matter and
620See the Rasii'il, vol. 3, pp. 185; 203-208.

621See P. Kraus, Jabir ibn llayyan, l'Institut Fran�ais d' Archeologie
Orientale, Cairo, 1942-43, 2v., vol. 2, p. 150. This corresponds to the
schema outlined above.
COMMENTARY
Universal Nature-or Universal Nature first, then Universal

Matter-as these are simple; the rest of the Hierarchy below
these are compound or composite.
According to the Ikhwan, who incorporate into their
cosmology the Pythagorean philosophy of numbers, the Creator
is the First Existent and the originator of all existents which He
brings forth instantaneously from non-existence. In the order of
hierarchy of originated existents the Intellect is the first being
brought into existence, and it has two natures: innate (gharz;(()
and acquired (muktasab). After it comes the Soul, which is of three
kinds: vegetative ( nabiitiyyah), animal (fayawiintvyah), and
rational (nii/iqah). Matter, coming next, is of four kinds: artificial
uanii' ah)' natural (!abi' ah)' universal ( kulli')' and primordial
(iilii). Nature is of four kinds: that which pertains to the
constitution of the celestial spheres-a sort of fifth element
possessing qualities of heat, dryness, wetness, and cold like the
four elements-and the four elements of fire, air, water, and
earth, whose domain is the sublunary region. Next comes Body,
which has six directions (jihiit): above, below, front, back, left,
and right. Then the Sphere, st>ven in number, with its seven
planets ( al-kawiikib al-sayyiirah). The sublunary Elements are four
as we have stated, and with their four qualities they number
altogether eight dispositions and combinations ( miziijiit): earth is
cold-dry; water is cold-wet; air is warm-wet; fire is hot-dry.
Finally, last in the hierarchy of the nine grades of being are the
three Kingdoms of the sublunary region comprising the mineral,
plant, and animal realms, each further divided into three general
varieties altogether totalling nine different kinds. 622
In their astronomy, the Ikhwan conform to the general,
geocentric view of mediaeval cosmologists which include the
philosophers of the Aristotelian tradition. There are nine celestial
spheres surrounding one another in concentric fashion, the
concave part touching the convex surface of the one surrounded
by it. These spheres are involved in circular motion and are
522 Rasii'il III, pp .203-204.

transparent, the innermost one being the sphere of the Moon.

The outermost sphere is the sphere of the Highest Heaven which
encompasses all ( al-Mufit). Directly below it and surrounded by
it is the sphere of the Fixed Stars ( al-kawiikib al-thiibitah); and
below this in descending order and each surrounded by the one
above it are the spheres of Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Sun, Venus,
Mercury, and Moon respectively. The sublunary region is filled
with Matter, which has become more and more material at this
level of its existence, and forms the four Elements which receive
generation and corruption and from whose combinations are
generated the mineral, plant, and animal orders or existence. 623
Unlike the peripatetic philosophers among the Muslims who
follow the Artistotelian cosmogony, the Ikhwan deny the eternity
of the world. They maintain the origination of the world from
non-existence into existence and also its ultimate end, and they
further affirm that the Creator is distinct from the world. The
philosophers elaborate ten Intellects (al-'uqiil al-'asharah), the first
Intellect in combination with the nine Intellects each belonging
to the nine celestial spheres; and correspondingly nine Souls, one
for each celestial sphere; and ten Bodies, nine belonging to the
celestial spheres and one (i.e. Matter) belonging to the sublunary
region. 624
,Nhat al-Maha'imi wishes to convey, by citing the scheme of
the mediaevai cosmologists, is that all spiritual and material
beings in the he;:ivens and earth constituting the realms of
multiplicity and diversity and extending from the Highest
Heavens to all the spheres down to the sublunary region and to
man, is only a part of the manifestation of God, and not a
manifestation of God in His totality; for there are aspects of God
which are forever unmanifest except to Himself. To attribute to
the part an absoluteness due to the whole would be an obvious
error and a deviation from the truth. 625
623 Rasii'il, II, pp. 26-27; III, p. 187. See also above, p. 114.
624 Tahiijitt, pp. 28-29.
62 .;This is a reference to those immanentist or pantheist pseudo-$iifis
who imagine that God exists only in His multiple and variegated
COMMENTARY
Referring to the $ufis who affirm the transcendent unity of

existence (wa�dat al-wujiid), who say that what is manifest in the
world-or rather, as the world-in its entirety is the multiple
and diverse individuations of the self-revealing aspect of the
Absolute Existence ( al-�aqq: the Truth) after its descent to the
level of concrete forms and in accordance with the requirements
of its Names and Attributes, al-Maha'imi says, in objection to the
pseudo-$ufis and the ignorant, that:
... it does not in the least mean, on account of His being in

this 'Nay manifest, that His Being in all its perfection is in each
of the individual things ... (nor does it) make it permissible to
pnsit divinity in each and every one of the things (in creation)
... (The $ufis mean, by the transcendent unity or oneness of
existence) that the totality of all existences of things is one
affair (that is, it is the act of one and the same reality of
Existence as it articulates itself in accordance with its
existential modes in myriad and variegated forms, such that
the spectacle presented) is the manifestation of the Truth in
the world. It is not meant that each one of the existents is that
totality wherein the Truth is manifested in its entirety.
We have already clarified the matter dealt with above earlier in

the preceding pages dealing with the subject. 626 The two
quotations following the one above, one from another work by al
Maha'imi, the lm�iief al-Na.{z�ah; and the other from a work by al
Qunyawi or al-Qashani, the Lafii'if al-I' lam, to the effect that:
"the unity of existence is that whereby things are actualized
(ta�aqquq), and this is one"; and that: "the unity of existence is
that by which the reality of things existent (mawjiid) is actualized;
and that which is actualized is never valid to be regarded as 'be
ing' except with reference to the Truth ... " means in both cases
respectively that that by which diverse things are what they
manifestations without having any transcendental existence in Himself

They do not see that God is also the absolute existent.
626
Consult above, e.g. pp. 232-234; 241-244; 266 fol.
are, 627 or the selves and realities of things which are their very
existences, is no other than existential modes of the single reality
of Existence as it expands over their interior and exterior
archetypes, and descends to the various levels of being till it
reaches the realms of sense and sensible experience, in
accordance with the requirements of their manifold
diversifications. Thus the thing in itself-that is, considered
independently of the reality by which it is it-is not something in
a state of 'be-ing', and so it is nothing; what has come to 'be' is the
reality which actualizes one of its modes in the guise of that thing,
such that what we behold and consider to be the thing is that
mode being actualized, as we have earlier explained. 628 To this
reality, as it enacts the drama of existence, refers al-Khayyam
when he says, for example-
Whose secret Presence, through Creation's veins

Running Quicksilver-like eludes our pains;
Taking all shapes from Mah to Mahz; and
They change and perish all-but He remains;
A moment guess'd-then back behind the Fold

Immerst of Darkness round the Drama roll'd
Which, for the Pastime of Eternity,
He doth Himself contrive, enact, behold. 629
Summarizing the salient features of the doctrines of the true Siifis,

the Affirmers of Unity (al-muwa��idiin), al-Raniri says:
XVIII The Affirmers of Unity say: God's Being is one; neither

a thing numbered nor limited, nor a whole having
constituent parts, nor a thing compounded; neither
627 /.e. the quiddities in the general sense as explained earlier.See above.
pp. 230 fol., 241-243.
628 See the commentaries on paras. VIII and XI; pp. 266-291 and
310-347 respectively.
629 The fifth edition (1889) ofFitzgerald's translation of the Rubiliyyiit.
COMMENTARY
particular nor general; neither substance nor body

and such that are created by Him as are all the things
mentioned above. God's Being is unchanging and never
becomes (jadi) these things, for "He is now even as He
was", that is to say, His existence (ada) now is the same
as it was; 'before' He brough forth (menjadikan) all
things into existence He was not those things, and 'after'
He brought them forth into existence (menjadikan) He
does not become (jadi) similar to (serupa), and have one
and the same existence as, those things. God's existence
is in fact His Very Essence, and it never becomes the
existence of the created things, and the existence of the
created things never becomes the existence of God. As
Shaykh Mu}:iyi al-Din ibn 'Arabi, whose soul may God
sanctify, says in some of his works: "The Necessary
Existence (al-wajib al-wujiid) is Absolute Existence (al
wujud al-muflaq)", that is, God's Existence is not
determined or limited existence (wujud muqayyad).
God's existence qualitatively and quantitatively is
(un)known, and His Reality and Very Essence cannot
be discussed and investigated, as God Most Exalted
says: 'God makes you cautious of His Self-that is,
God has struck you with awe from attaining to
knowledge of His Very Essence ... etc.
We have already shown that the theologians, the philosophers,

and the $iifis agree that God, the Necessary Being or Existence, is
one in essence; that no division in His essence, whether iri the
imagination, in actuality, or in supposition is possible; that no
plurality or duality inheres in it. There is no multiplicity in Him;
He is not the locus of qualities, nor a thing portioned and divisible
into parts, nor is He compounded of constituent elements, 630 for
such things come under the category of bodies limited by
630That which has parts, when the parts are in composition together, is
a thing compounded; when the parts are separated from one another, is
a thing portioned or divided.
boundaries, and hence· they are originated, and that is

inconsistent with His being the Necessary Being or Existence. But
the theologians and the philosophers disagree on the nature of the
oneness; whether it is absolutely one in all aspects as the
philosophers hold, or whether it is one to which real attributes are
superadded as the theologians hold. On this problem the position
of the Siifis approximates that of the theologians, although it is
not quite the same as that of the latter, seeing the existentialist
basis on which the Siifis establish themselves as opposed to the
essentialist bases on which the theologians as well as the
philosophers erect their respective positions.
The theologians say that God possesses real and eternal
attributes superadded to His essence, both in the mind and
externally, so that God knows through knowledge, wills through
will, and exercises power through power, and so on with the rest
of the attributes. They contend, against the views of the
Mu'tazilah and the philosophers, that if knowledge, will, and
power are identical with the Essence, then it would follow that
knowledge, will, and power are also identical with one another,
and that this conclusion leads to many absurdities. Neither are
the attributes to be taken merely as synonymous terms describing
the Essence according to its modes or states (a�wiil); they are real
and eternal, distinct from one another and more <:o from the
Essence. Their reality and eternity do not necessarily imply the
existence of a plurality of eternals in the Divine essence, for the
attributes are not separate essences in God, nor do they give rise
to eternal essences outside of God; they subsist in God and are
inseparable from Him, but they are dependent upon Him while
He is not dependent upon them. The Essence must be taken
together with its attributes as one entity, and since the Essence is
eternal and without any efficient cause for its existence, so are its
attributes eternal and without any efficient cause for their
existence. The term 'God' could not be predicared of an essence
denuded of attributes, as it points to the essence and the attributes
together. The attributes are not God, nor are they other than
God, in the sense that the word 'other' denoting the attributes is
not to be taken to mean that their existence is possible to the
COMMENTARY
exclusion of the Essence in relation to them. Thus while the

theologians affirm that the Divine unity ( al-tawfzd) is far exalted
above composition, the kind of composition that can be proved
by rational methods to be incompatible with the essence of the
Necessary Being, they yet maintain that it is not an absolute
simplicity. 631
The philosophers, on the other hand, maintain that the Divine
unity is absolute simplicity. No duality or mutliplicity inheres in
Him. He is not subject to division into quantity; principle, or
in definition: this last because He has no genus nor specific
difference. He is knowing, willing, and powerful not by
knowledge, will, and power, for His attributes are the very
Essence itself. Thus His essence with respect to its connection
with things known is described as 'knowing', and with respect to
its connection with things willed is described as 'willing', and
with respect to its connection with things over which He has
power is described as 'powerful'. They insist that the Essence is
one in all respects, such that it can have no attributes inhering in
it. This, they contend, would involve the Essence in either a
duality or a multiplicity. So they deny attributes altogether,
maintaining that attributes exist only in the mind and not i:q
external reality. 632
The $iifis agree with the theologians that the Essence possesses
real attributes which are multiple and superadded to it, but differ
from them in that the attributes are multiple and superadded to"
the Essence only in intellection or in thought and not externally.
Furthermore, the $iifis maintain that these attributes are
manifestations of His essence in the external world appearing as
separate and concrete, existential entities. Their affirmation that
the attributes are multiple and superadded to the Essence in
631 For their details and arguments, see al-lqti�iid, pp. 65-75; 77-79;
80-97; Tahiifut, pp. 40-48; al-Mawiiqij, pp. 279-296; Shari; al-'Aqii'id,
pp. 69-77.
632 Al-lshiiriit, vol. III, pp. 44-45, 49-50; Metaphysica, eh. 13, 21;
Tahiifut, pp. 40 fol; Shari; al-'Aqii'id, pp. 60, 69-71; al-Mawiiqif, p. 279;
al-Milal, vol. II, p. 182.
intellection only and not also externally as the theologians

maintain would seem to imply that the $iifis in fact agree with the
philosophers in denying their reality. For the philosophers say that
the attributes are multiple and superadded to the Essence only in
the mind, and that in reality the attributes are the very Essence
itself, not in the sense that there is an Essence having attributes
and that the two of them are united as one entity, but in the sense
that the Essence has in reality no attributes at all, 633 the latter
existing only in the mind. What they mean by 'existing in the
mind' is existing only as a concept (majhiim). What the $iifis mean
by 'intellection' (ta'aqqul), however, is not the same. The
difference between essence and attribute with respect to concept
is that the two concepts, of essence and of attribute, refer to two
different things, but that what they are true of is the same, that is,
the very essence itself. For the philosophers conceive the Essence
as real whereas the attributes of the Essence are only in the mind;
so what the concept of the Essence is true of is in reality the
Essence itself, and what the concept of the attributes is true of
since attributes are only in the mind-is also in reality the same
Essence. But the $iifis mean that just as the concept of the
attribute differs from that of the essence, so do what the two
concepts are true of differ from one another: what the attribute is
true of is not the same as what the essence is true of. \A/hat God's
knowledge is true of is thus not the Essence itself, but the Essence
in a certain respect. The EssF:nce, as we have explained earlier, is
characterized by two aspects: the interior, self-concealing aspect
(al-biifin), and the exterior, self-revealing aspect (al-?:,iihir). The
first aspect is that of absolute, essential oneness ( abadiyyah
muflaqah), transcendent in itself, unknowable except to itself. The
second aspect is also that of oneness, but a oneness in which there
is already adumbrated the latent possibilites of articulation in
multiple and diverse forms. When in this second aspect God, as
the Necessary Existence, contemplates Himself and is conscious
633Meaning that what in other cases would be the result of the

operation of the essence through its attributes together is in this case the
result only of the essence alone without attributes.
-�-------· · ----- ---

-
--� -----�------
COMMENTARY 411
ofHis essential perfections (kamiiliit dhatiyyah), the first effusion of

existence takes place ( i.e. af-fayrj, al-aqdas). The contents of this
effusion of being are the forms of the Divine Names and
Attributes which are, in their emergence in His act of existence
the self-unfolding or unfolded existence ( al-wujiid al-munbasi!)
identical with Him, and yet also something different as well. 634
They are different in the sense that in this first self-contemplation,
there is already adumbrated in His Essence the latent forms of
His perfections that require realization in the realms of
contingency. Then in a second self-contemplation, He reveals
Himself to Himself in their forms such that th�ir essences ( al
a'yiin) become manifest to Him as distinct realities (l.taqa)iq). The
Attributes take their rise at this level of Divine self
contemplation. 635 This descent ( tanazzul), or effusion of His
Being, from the plane of His absoluteness (itliiq) to that of
determination ( taqayyud), that is, the first determination, occurs
in the interior condition of Being, that is, in God's mind. The
Attributes and their realities are thus inseparable from Him, that
is, they remain as intelligibles inHim, and what become separate
and contingent are their forces, concomitants or effects which are
actualized externally as the self-unfolding existence expands.over
them (i.e. al-Jayrj, al-muqaddas). The Attributes, then, are not the
Essence itself, but the Essence in a certain respect; that is, in a
certain aspect, relation, or facet of itself as it qualifies itself in their
forms. The difference, therefore, exists not only in our minds, but
in God's mind or consciousness at the level of God's cognitive
manifestation of Himself to Himself wherein the Attributes
appear as ideal realities, the permanent archetypes or fixed
essences. 636 The $iifis, then, agree with the theologians that God
634 They are identical in respect of existence and reality, but are
different in respect of determination and individuation.
635 Here the self-unfolded existence is identified as the 'breath of the
Merciful' (nafas al-ra�miin).

636 See al-Durrah al-Fiikhurah 43/27; 44/28-29; Jfawiishz, 98/I9 -'- 20;
)
Shar& al-Durrah ) 12/28; Lawii) i& ) 14/XV;/14-15. For further
explanation, see above, pp. 159-160; · 161-167; .172; 275-282;
4I2 A COMMENTARY ON THE I:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
possesses real attributes superadded to His essence; but they also

agree with the philosophers that the Essence ( and here the $iifis
mean the Essence at the level of absolute oneness where not even
a trace ofmultiplicity is discernible) is one in all respects; and that
from what is really one there can proceed only one effect. The
theologians, as we have seen, affirm of Him attributes
superadded to His essence both in the mind and externally, so
that even though He is asserted by them as being far exalted
above composition, His unity is not really one of absolute
simplicity. Since this is their positon they do not find it impossible
for multiple effects to proceed from the One, as their position does
not come under the principle that from what is really one only
one can proceed. 637 The $iifis affirm the true position in this
matter to be that of the philosophers, with whom they are in
agreement in this case. But they also differ in this from the
philosophers; whereas the philosophers affirm an absolute
oneness in an individuated Essence, 638 the Siifis assert an absolute
oneness in an absolute Essence that becomes individuated at the
level of divinity ( uliihiyyah) where, as God, He is already invested
with Names and Attributes. This level, which corresponds to the
level of the First Principle according to the theologians, does not
represent absolute oneness, but is characterized by unity in
multiplicity (wii};idiyyah). However, since the $iifis affirm the sole
reality of existence, the multiplicity and diversity are in their real
nature nothing but the modes, the particularizations and
individuations of the same reality of existence, so that there is no
real multiplicity and diversity there. Moreover, again different
from the philosophers, they maintain that the multiplicity and
diversity in the concrete existential entities that we see and
behold are in reality His Names and Attributes-or rather their
concomitants, and concomitants of the concomitants-that have
283-289; 290-291. Indeed, they are realities because of their difference

in God's mind. See also Fus_us_, p. 48 fol; 101-106.
637 An outline of the emanation scheme of the philosophers is on
pp. 362-363 above.

638 See above, p. 303 fol.
COMMENTARY
descended from the level of their absoluteness to that of

determination and limitation. As for the philosophers, since they
maintain the primacy of essence over existence, and affirm an
absolute simplicity in an individuated Essence, their position on
the attributes is confused, and their solution as to how multiple
effects can proceed from something absolutely simple is still
subject to contradictions. 639
Although the $ufis agree with the philosophers on the
principle that from the One only one effect can proceed, they
however disagree with the philosophers on what that single first
effect is. The philosophers say the single first effect from the One
which they call the Fir:;i, Principle is the First Intelligence ( al-( aql
al-azmoal), which according tn them is a concrete existent having
no other existents in its plane. The $iifis, however, since they
affirm the sole reality of existence, say that the single first effect
from the One which is the Absolute Existence is general existence
( al-wujud al-( iimm), which as the self-unfolding existence ( al-wujud
al-munbasi!), expands-as a result of God's self-contemplation in
the first degree of Being-to the level of the first determination
( al-frl ayyun al-awwal). 640 Now this first effusion of Being, as we
639 D0 not let it escape us that the Essence which according to the
philosophers is identical with existence in God, but other than existence
in contingents, in virtue of their position that it is an individuated
Essence, is identical with an individuated existence. The Sufis contend
that what the philosophers mean by existence, when they say that the
Essence is identical with Existence in God, but other than existence in
contingents, is merely existence as a concept, not as reality, in line with
the position of essentialists in general, namely that essence is the sole
reality rather than existence (see above, pp. 376-377). Among later
philosophers, al-Tus1 has attempted to demonstrate how multiple
effects can proceed from what is absolutely one, but al-Ghazaff's
argument that what proceeds in such a case must also be simple entities
seem still to hold good against its validity-as long, that is, as the matter
is viewed from an essentialist position. But the matter would be different
if viewed from the position of the existentialist $iifis (see above, pp.
361-365, 375-377). See al-Durrah al-Fiikhirah, 67/78, 79; lfawiishz,
98/20; Shar� al-Durrah, 127-128/28; Fufiif,
6
4°There is a resemblance between the general existence (al-wujiid al
' iimm) of the Sufis and the prime matter (al-hayiilii) of the philosophers;
know, is not a concrete existent, but is a relation of existence in a

general way, and its expansion over the intelligible, individual
essences established in His knowledge. These intelligible
existents become realized as essences precisely due to the
expansion of general existence over them. 641 Thus there are other
existents in this plane, including the First Intelligence. It is clear
from this that the $iifis make the First Principle of the
philosophers to be the equivalent not of the Essence in its absolute
oneness at the transcendent degree of non-determination, but the
Essence that has descended to the degree of self-manifestation at
the level of the first determination or individuation in the plane of
unity in multiplicity. 642 The philosophers believe the effect of the
Essence to be separate entities different from the Essence.
According to the $iifis, however, the effects of the Essence, or
God as the Absolute Existence, are its inherent modes or
predispositions (shu'un) and aspects (i'tibiiriit) or its intellection of
the possibles within itself which produces the essences of things in
the Divine knowledge. At the level of His essential unity these are
undifferentiated, but become differentiated through the effusion
of existence which expands over them and takes place at the level
of the first determination. The Essence at this latter level is the
First Principle according to the $iifis. The multiplicity of the
effects of the Essence adumbrated in itself at the former level
becomes realized at the latter level in the forms of attributes and
fixed essences through the mediacy of the first effusion of
existence. Thus what first proceeds from the Essence is this single
effusion. Then through the mediacy of the first effusion of
existence which effects the rise of attributes and essences, and
only that whereas prime matter is merely receptive of form in a passive

way, the general existence of the $ufis is active agent. As to the notion of
emanation inherent in the concept of expansion, it must be understood
that there is no 'emanation' as if the effects are separate from the source;
what is termed as 'emanation' is only the act of the Source.
641 General existence is also identified variously as relative existence
( wujiid irjiifl), relative light ( niir irj,ijl) and the Breath of the Merciful
(nafas al-ra�man). See above, pp. 272; 275-276.
642 With the theologians this is the level of God and His attributes.
COMMENTARY
through the mediacy also of these attributes and essences

concomitant with the flow of existence as it goes on expanding,
other modes and aspects arise until finally their effects appear as
contingent existential entities some of which are actualized at the
level of sense and sensible experience. In this way, then, the $ufis
concur with the theologians who believe it possible for multiple
effects to proceed from the one First Principle, although they
affirm with the philosophers the principle that from what is really
one there can proceed only one effect. 643
Al-Raniri's summary in this paragraph (Para XVIII)
represents the $ufis of the school ofwa&dat al-wujiid as speaking of
the oneness of God's Being with respect to the Essence at the level
of His tanscendent unity. He is also the Absolute Existence (al
wujiid al-muflaq), far exalted above duality or plurality of any sort;
immutable, He is as He was; unknowable. This is what Jami
refers to as the 'first degree' of the Essence. 644 Thus when he says
that before He brought forth things into existence He was not
those things, he means that at the degree of His essential unity He
is prior to His degree at the level of His self-revealing aspect when
realities in the forms of attributes and essences take their rise in
His consciousness. He was not those attributes and essern::es in
virtue of their difference from Him in respect of determination
and individuation, but identical with them in respect of existence
and reality. Then after He brought forth things into existence
that is, when the unfolding of existence expands over them and
they become actualized cognitively as well as concretely-He
does not become similar to those things nor have one and the
same existence as these things, for the things are in reality His
existential modes and individuations occurring at different levels
of being, some being more prior and superior to others, and at
each level they pertain only to that particular level and not to
others. 645 They are His manifestation forms (ma:;:iihir)
643 Seeabove, pp. 375, 342-343, 303-309; al-Durrah al-Fakhirah, 70/86;

87; 71/88; 89, go, gr. Lawii'i!:z, pp. 16-18 (XVIII).
644
Lawa'i!:z, p. 25 (XXIII); see also above, p. 155.
645 We refer
here to the �ufi principle of tashkzk (q.v.) above, p. 274).
416 A COMMENTARY ON THE }:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
continually being renewed by similars, appearing with existence

and disappearing with non-existence. Yet despite His diverse and
multiple existential modes and individuations, He remains as He
was in His transcendent unity. 646 Things are in themselves
devoid of existence, whatever existence they possess being His. It
follows from this that there is no (real) existence except God, as
al-Raniri says, speaking on behalf of the S ufis of the school of the
transcendent unity of existence:
XIX ... concerning the purport of the formula: "There is no

god but God' (that the meaning for them) is: 'there is no
existent (mawjiid) except God', that is: 'There is no real
existence to anything but to God', meaning there is
nothing in existence except He, and this is to negate any
partner with respect to His existence, and to affirm His
oneness with respect to His existence without attributing
existence to other than He. Verily, the existence of all
created things is nothing but a shadow (;;,ill), and it is of a
metaphorical nature (majiizz). The Primary (aJlz) and the
Real (baqzqz) (existence) is but the Existence of God.
There is absolutely no real existence in the existence of
what is metaphorical; it is annihilated (hapus: Jana') and
nothingness (lenyap), and it is non-being ('adam) when
linked to the Real, as Shaykh J unayd, God sanctify his
soul, says: "That which is non-eternal (al-mubdath) when
linked to that which is eternal (al-qadzm) is left without a
trace (athar)", meaning it is annihilated (Jana': hapus).
It has been agreed upon by the theologians, philosophers and

$ufis that there is no partner to God with respect to the attributes
of lordship and the qualities of divinity. But the $iifis affirm in
addition to that that there is no partner to Him with respect to
existence and realization, so that they understand the formula:
646 See,for example, pp. 280-281. In His transcendent unity He is

indefinable, as al-Raniri says further on in this paragraph.
COMMENTARY
"There is no god but God" to mean "There is no existent hut

God." 647 Since for the $iifis who hold the primacy of existence
God is absolute existence in reality and is necessarily existent,
there can be no multiplicity in Him, there can be no other
sharing with Him existence seeing that all existents, whether
concrete or mental, designated as 'other' are in reality 648 His
modes and aspects, His individuations that have descended in
gradations according to the inherent requirements of the
recipients (i.e. the latent forms of His Names and Attributes in
their various grades) from the highest to the lowest levels of
existence. As such they do not possess separate ontological status.
The existence of diverse and multiple things that we see and
behold is something fleeting, fictitious; but the being-in-existence
of the things-even though that too is ever-new is real. As we
said before, things in themselves independent of the one,
unchanging Reality by which they are what they are, are in fact
pure non-being; their apparent being, whether we realize it or
not, is none other than that Reality in the state of actualization in
the guise of things, limited in their forms without any change in
itself or its real oneness, so that what appears to us as the things
are modes or aspects of that Reality being realized. 649
When we said 'see and behold' most will see the multiplicity
and not the unity that has become multiplicity, let alone the
multiplicity reverting to its original unity. Only those at the stage
of the 'second separation', such as al-J unyad among them, will
see and behold what the people of the 'first separation' will not;
and they will know the true meaning of al-Junayd's words that
647 This is because of the essentialistic position of the theologians and the
philosophers in opposition to the existentialistic position of the �ufis.
648 The 'other' has two aspects: one unto itself, and the other unto what
is other than itself which accomplishes its being-existent. 'In reality'

here refers to the second if its two aspects.
649 We have already explained the �ufis' position on existence and
realization, for example, above, pp. 300-304; 305-309; 310 fol.; 325
fol.; 405-406. On fictitious or metaphorical existence, see pp. 261-264,
on its nature as shadow, pp. 282-287; as possession, pp. 263-265; as
manifestion form, pp. 277-282.
418 A COMMENTARY ON THE l:JUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
the non-eternal, when linked to the eternal, is left without a trace

because they have verified it in thefanii'-baqii' structure of their
experience of Reality when they are, as al-Kharraz says, in a
position of "coincidence between the two opposites." 650
Speaking about this spiritual condition, al-Raniri continues:
XX The Affirmers of Unity obliterate (from their subjective

consciousness) during deep meditation (mushiihadah) the
existence of created things and in their stead contemplate
the existence of God the Real and Absolute Existence
(wujud mu#aq), and they say (in this state): "There is no
real existent (mawjud &aqzq"i) except God." From this it is
clear that that which is other than God (ma siwa Allah) is
pure non-existence (al-'adam al-ma&rf), having absolutely
no real being (wujud &aqzqz), for this concurs with every
saying of the spiritual knower(' arif) and verifier (mu&aqqiq)
in point of symbolic allusion ( isharat) and analogy ('ibarat),
of spiritual tasting (dhawq) and ecstasis ( wijdan). That
which is other than God is pure non-existence essentially
(min &aythu dhatuhu) and cannot be described as 'existing
with' the Truth Most Exalted ...
Here he says that the true Siifis in their vision of God the absolute
existence, in public or in private, eliminate from their subjective
consciousness the existence of the phenomenal forms that
constitut� the world of created things. This is because they have
experienced the 'second separation' so th;:i t when they
contemplate the Truth they return (in recollection of what they
have experienced of the passing away of their faculties of rational
perception and of their individual egos which entails the passing
away also of the phenomenal forms) to the state they were in
before, when God made them absent to themselves and the world
and present with Him; and then afterwards when God granted
them their individual consciousness and made them separate
650 See above, pp. 298-299.

r.
I
COMMENTARY
from Him and present to the world again. They know by

personal verification that everything-their phenomenal selves
psychologically and all created things ontologically-is
perishing save His modes and aspects, in guises that are never
repeated for two consecutive units of time. They have seen the
unity of absolute existence that has become multiplicity, and the
multiplicity reverting to its original unity without that unity
being impaired by any change in its oneness and its perfection.
To this condition refers al-J unayd's words: "... they are dazzled
by the sight of the emanations from Him ... " 651 All existents are
in their nature His modes and aspects, whereas the phenomenal
forms in whose guises they appear momentarily are in themselves
pure non-existence. 652 As they are in themselves they are that
which is other than God (mii siwa Allah); they are, when 'linked'
to Him, or when considered in association with Him, "left
without a trace"; they cannot 'exist-with' the Absolute, as al
Raniri says further quoting ibn 'Ata' Allah al-Iskandari:
According to the People ofUnity and Gnosis (ahl al-taw&zd
wa al-ma'rifah) neither 'existence' nor 'loss-of-existence'
(faqd) may be predicated of that which is other than ,God
Most Exalted, for that which is other than God cannot ,:;dsf�
with' God because God isUnique; nor may 'loss-of-existence'
be predicated of that which is other than God because only
that which has existed is capable of qualification bylo�s of
existence ... etc.
A passage in the Kitab al-Luma' of al-Sarraj clarifies the meaning

of 'loss-of-existence' about which we are now considering:
The 'existent' (al-mawjiid) and the lost-to-existence' (al

mafqiid) are two terms signifying opposites. The 'existtnt' is
that which has issued forth from the domain of 'non
existence' (al-'adam) to the domain of 'existence' (al-wujiid);
651
See above, p. 127.
652
See further above, the quotation from al-Ghazaff, pp. 143-144; also
pp. I 76- I 78 fol.; 298-299, 300.
whereas the 'lost-to-existence' is that which has departed

from the domain of 'existence' to the domain of 'non
existence'. Dhu al-Nun-God's mercy b� upon him!-said:
"Grieve not for the 'lost-to-existence', for it is a recollection
(of 'existence') to an existent slave." The 'non-existent' (al
ma'dum) is that which 'is not', and which 'its being found' is
not possible; but if one 'finds not' a thing while yet 'its being
found' is possible, then that thing is called the 'lost-to
existence',and it is not called the 'non-existent'. 653
Now al-faqd signifies, according to al-Bay<;lawi, 'the thing's being

absent from the range of perception by sense so that its place is
not known'. Al-Bay<;lawi is here referring to a passage in the Holy
Qur'an: Qiilu wa aqbalfi: 'alayhim mii dhii tafqiduna ( 12:71 ), 654 that
is: 'They said, turning towards them: "What is it that ye miss?"
What is being missed here is 'the great beaker of the king' (.fUWii' a
al-maliki) which the Prophet Yusuf has concealed in his brother's
(Benjamin's) saddle-bag. 655 Because the drinking cup is
concealed in the saddle-bag they (the Egyptians) miss (nafqidu)
it- that is, they do not see it anywhere and they do not know its
hiding place. In this case 'absent from the range of perception by
sense' means 'lost to sight'. But it also means, however, that the
beaker is not lost to their memory-it still exists in the memory of
the Egyptians, for otherwise they would not have been able to
miss it. So in spite of its loss it is still something existent. Dhu al
Nun's words, quoted by al-Sarraj, can be interpreted in the same
way. 656 When referring to the individual self in the stage of
spiritual experience which follows wajd, the word wujud does not
mean 'existence' in the usual sense. In wajd the spiritual state is
the state of fanii' or 'self-extinction', in which the one who
experiences wajd (the wiijid) loses individual consciousness of the
self. Following this state he gains 'subsistence' ( baqii') in the
653 Op. cit.; p. 339 of the Arabic text. My translation.

654 See his Anwar al-Tan<:,zl wa Asrar al-Ta'wzl, 2 vols. Cairo, 1939.
655 Yiisuf (12): 71-72.
656 See below pp. 425-426, and note 666, on p. 426.
�---�-�------ ----- -·---·-----��-------- -------- -- - --- --- -- ---- --------

COMMENTARY 421
Absolute, and he then 'finds' (wajada) God. 657 In this

explanationfaqada may be the opposite of wajada, andfiiqid the
opposite ofwiijid, andfaqd that ofwajd. Faqd is a description of the
last stages of Janii', when the man returns to self-consciousness
without attaining to the state of baqii'.
In the quotation from al-Sarraj, al-mafqiid means the 'lost-to�
existence' and it is defined as something that has departed from
the domain of existence to that of non-existence. Faqd is defined
as loss of existence, not as existence that is lost-it is the loss that is
the dominant connotation infaqd, not the existence. Thus it is as al
Iskandari says that it can only be said of "that which has
existed." Now in al-Raniri's Malay translation, or rather,
paraphrase of that passage, he has substituted 'adam mutfaq
(absolute non-existence) for Jaqd, not that he is translating it as
such, but that he is interpreting its desired meaning according to
the intention of that passage. Since that which is other than God is
neither in the state of existence (wujiid) nor of loss of existence
(faqd), this means that it is also not in the state of being existent
(mawjiid), nor of being lost to existence (mafqiid), nor of non
existence (' adam), nor of being non-existent (ma'diim). To say-as
the logical conclusion to the statement demands with regard to
the meanings of existence ( wujiid) and loss-of-existence (faqd) in
the text-that the world is absolute non-existence(' adam mutfaq)
is equally erroneous, as the world, somehow, does 'exist'. Hence,
in order not to allow the admission of the apparently logical
conclusion to be drawn from that passage in denying 'existence?
and 'loss-of-existence' to the world, in that the world is therefore
absolute non-existence, al-Raniri has found it necessary to say
that neither existence nor absolute non-existence can be
predicated of the world together with all its parts ( i.e. the mii siwa
Alliih) If the world is neither existence nor absolute non
existence, what is it then? 'The world together with all its parts is
nothing but a series of accidents (a'riirj,), and that of which they
657
See 'Affifi's commentary on the Fu�ii{, op. cit., p. 310; and above, p.
2�5. See also al-Qushayr"i's Risiilah, p. 34 where this meaning ofwujud is
given.
are accidents (al-ma'ru(j, i.e. the subtratum) is God." "The world

is nothing but His self-manifestation ( i.e. tajalti)." If we say that
the world 'exists', we mean only that it is 'coming-into-existence'
between two units of time-and even then it is subject to
annihilation (q.v. al-'ara(j,u liiyabqiizamiinayn: the accident does
not endure two units of time)-and others like them are
continually being created to replace them. The world's
'existence' is bounded on either side by non-existence. 658 The
world cannot be described as something that has lost its existence
as that would imply that it has existed, and this is denied because
it never 'is' a real thing at each moment of itself; it cannot be
described as having lost its existence for it never in fact comes into
existence to the extent that its annihilation can be described as a
'loss'. Existence in its absolute and not in its relative sense is the
prerogative of God alone. The full passage in ibn 'Arabi's Fu.fU.f
which al-Raniri next quotes in part reads:
Thus the existence ofthe world in its totality is imagination

(khayiil) within Imagination, and the true existence is in
reality only God in particular considered as His Essence and
His very Being, not as His Names because His Names each
has two designations: the one designation points to God
Himself Who is what is name<l; the other designation points
to that by which one Name is distinguished from another. 659
What ibn 'Arabi is saying here is that real and true existence is
only God, the Unique and the Absolute, insofar as such existence
is predicated only of God Himself as unique Essence and very
Being, and not of His Names because His Names have two
designations which cannnot, as such, apply to real existence. The
'two designations' meant here are that ( 1) while each Name
designates and points to God in His absoluteness, (2) each Name
also designates itself and points to a meaning ofits ovvn not shared
658 See al-Sarraj, who says this further on in the passage we have quoted,
op. cit., p. 339 of the Arabic text.
6a9 Fu.rii,r, p. 104. My translation.
COMMENTARY
by any other Name. Thus, for example the Forgiving (al-ghafiir)

is not the Manifest ( al-?,iihir) or the Hidden ( al-bii/in), nor is it the
First ( al-awwiil) nor the Last ( al-iikhir), nor is each of these the
same as the other. In the first designation all the Divine Names
are intrinsically identical since they designate and point to God
the Absolute; in the second designation each Divine Name is
independent of the other in that each attaches its own meaning to
itself, and even though it is a Divine Name and God is named by
the particularly property inherent in its meaning, God as named
according to this second designation is God in the Imagination
( al-baqq al-mutakhayyal). 660 It is the sum of the whole of this
second designation of the Divine Names which becomes His
· Attributes that is actualized externally as the world; and since
this aspect of the Names is still of the nature of Imagination, real
existence, which is not of the nature of Imagination, cannot be
predicated of it. Neither can real existence be predicated of the
Names in their first designation, since in that aspect they are
identical in meaning and point to God alone, so that it is in fact
God Himselfin His absoluteness Who is the real reference, and of
Whom real existence can be predicated. 661
The world, as we have said before, 662 has two aspects: as
something separate and self-sufficient, outside the Reality which
is absolute existence; and as something which manifests the
dynamic individuations of absolute existence appearing in its
various grades and according to the limitations of its modes and
aspects which are continually being replaced by similars in a new
creation. It is in its first aspect that the world is a fantasy without
any real existence, something imagined ( mutawahham),
something the mind considers to have ontological independence
660In our imagination as well as in God's-that is, 'imagination' here

· as applied to God corresponds to the Sufi meaning of ta' aqqul which we
have already explained (see above pp. 410-413). We say 'in our
imagination and in God's', that is why the world is "imagination within
. Imagination".
661 Fuii,f, pp. 104 � 105. We have already explained the double nature of
the Divine Names and Attributes (see above, pp. 162 fol.).
662Above, pp. 395-396,
which it does not possess in reality. 663 It is in this aspect a 'non

thing' ( lii shay'), a nullity ( bii/il). But in its second aspect the world
is like a mirage ( sariibi), which although nothing in itself yet
reflects something real. Its reflection of something real makes the
reflection deceive the beholder who takes it to be the real object,
and so it evelopes in the darkness of mystery the real object of
which it is only a reflection. On the other hand this. nature of
darkness (ialiilah) that characterizes it pertains also to the nature
of the shadow (,?:,ill), and the shadow is always connected with
that which casts it. The world in this second aspect is like the
shadow of the Absolute, and the multiplicity of separate things of
which the world consists is like particular shadows, each different
from the other, each adumbrating a particular facet which
delimits the Absolute according to its requirements and in which
form the Absolute appears to outward manifestation. The
separate things of the world are in this aspect essentially real, for
essentially they are the realities (�aqii'iq) whose essences (a'yiin)
are established ( thiibitah) in the interior aspect of existence in the
Divine consciousness. Thus what is called 'other than God' (mii
siwa Allii.h) pertains to the world in its first aspect, and in this
respect it is neither existent nor subject to loss of existence. In its
second aspect, however, the world is something that was existent
and is !ost to existence. 664
Since such is the state (�al) of the world, its 'being-existent'
( keadaan: mawjiidiyyah) is only a relative existence ( i.e. wujiid iq.iifi)
and not a real existence duplicating God's existence which is
absolute. So in their saying that there is no existent but God the
Siiffs do not thereby intend to mean that the world and God are
two separate beings united in identity in point of existence, or
that the world is a complete illusion, for the existence of the world
is neither the same as nor different from that of God; it is a
condition of possession (milk) that characterizes the absolute
l
Being. They are aft e;r all the forms of His Attributes becoming
concretely realized.
663
Fu,ru,r, p. I 03.
664 See note 649.
COMMENTARY
We have been speaking, with reference to the fana'-baqi?

structure in the intuition of existence, about what is verified by
the men of discernment as the objective, metaphysical and
ontological aspect of the world of created things in relation to
God. In everything that we have said, the double aspect of realities
from the highest to the lowest levels of existence has been
repeatedly indicated. Now, correspondingly, in the subjective,
mystical and psychological aspect of the matter relating to man,
the same double aspect is unified in the experience of the
coincidence of opposites. The Sufi terminology defining the
duration in which Jana' occurs is waqt or 'time', by v;hich they
mean the cutting off of serial time from one's individual
consciousness such that one comes to be in a time without past or
future; a time which is something of the nature of eternity and in
which one is immersed in the coincidence of opposites ( coincidentia
oppositorum). There are two such 'times ( awqat) during whichJana'
occurs; one refers to the state ofwajd-the spiritual agitation that
precedes the 'finding' of the Truth (wijdan), which is none other
than the intuition of existence (wufiid); the other refers to the state
offaqd-the 'losing' (jiqdan) of what was found that precedes the
return to individual consciousness. What was lost is the true self
that had witnessed and verified the Truth, or God as the absolute
existence; what was lost is the state in which he was before he
existed as external existence. 665 In this sense also, what was lost is
his vision of God, for he was in a state of union and presence, and
is now in a state of separation and absence. It is possible that the
one who is immersed in 'time' in the sense described above may,
without the state (bal) of actual vision (i.e. al-mushahadah al
'iyaniyyah) which God causes to descend upon him, become
distressed by the separation, for he hasfelt but has not fully seen,
and feeling turns to genuine grief at what is lost and begets other
feelings which only emphasize the condition of individual
consciousness of phenomenal existence. To such a one also surely
refer Dhii al-Nun's words quoted earlier from al-Sarraj. But the
possessor of waqt coupled with the bal that makes actual vision
665 See Kaslif al-Mal;jub, p. 368.

possible is not assailed by feelings of grief at separation, for what

he has felt and seen in that state, of the multiplicity becoming
unity and of the unity again becoming multiplicity only to revert
to its original unity, gives him certain knowledge of his essential
reality in God, 666 and in that knowledge he gains subsistence
( baqa') in God. 667 His condition is characterized by
'steadfastness' ( tamkzn), that stage of spiritual perfection which is
the highest; there is no further stage, no change, no doubt nor
vacillation in this condition, and although he has now returned to
the stage of the 'second separation', God has erased from his
consciousness all thought of what is other than He so that he sees
everywhere God and His modes and aspects in verification of
what is said in the Holy Qur'an: 'Wheresoever ye turn there is the
Presence of God.' 668
XXI Verily, the contemplation among the knowers who are

perfect in their spiritual knowledge regarding ( the
ontological relationship between) the Truth Most
Exalted and the world is as said by the author of the
Miftii& al-Ghayb, may God sanctify his soul:
"As for the perfect who have attained steadfastness in
their spiritual knmv!edge ( ahl al-tamkzn) they do not deny
( existence to) the world as it is denied by the people of
subjective vision (ahl al-shuhiid al-&aliyy). They neither
affirm ( existence of) it as it is affirmed by the people of the
veil (ahl al-l;ijiib), but they acknowledge the existence both
666 This is the profound meaning in the inner sense of Dhii al-Nun's
words, in that there is no need to grieve for what is lost to existence, for
that being lost to existence is in fact a reminder that one is existent,
otherwise there would be no loss of existence-_ that one has essential
reality to partake of existence.
667 Knowledge of the essential reality of his true self entails also
knowledge of the essential realities that comprise the multiplicity. See

above, pp. 149- I50, regarding the identification of realities.
66BAl-Baqarah (2): 115.
COMMENTARY
of the Truth and the world and they make a distinction

between the Truth and what is other than He."
Al-Raniri has now come to the final part ofhis exposition ofthe
positions of the theologians, the philosophers, the $iifis and the
pseudo-Sufis with regard to the metaphysical and ontological
aspects of the problem of existence and reality. Since the Siifis
base their position on the experience of trans-empirical states of
awareness and vision which involves the passing away of ego
consciousness (Jani?) and the final stage of survival in God
( baqii'), it is quite natural for them to apply that experience as
criterion i.u divide mankind according to three levels of
awareness as far ;:is the vision (shuhiid) which brings about the
knowledge of the nature of existence and reality is concerned.
lfiil is the technical term for a mystical state (pl. a&wiil), which
is used in a very wide sense by the Sufis: from a spiritual state of
concentration to that of illumination, and which signifies the
partial and transitory realization of a spiritual degree. However,
construed with theyii'al-nisbz(&iiliyy), it does not in itself signify a
mystical state as such, but a state related to it. lfiiliyy also means
'present' in the sense of'now', that is, it refers to an actual state, or
a normal, conscious state, not to a mystical state, but to the
present, subjective state. As to shuhiid: 'to see with one's own eyes',
it means in the mystical sense an 'inner witnessing', an 'inner
perception', and hence also a 'vision'. The vision pertains to a
vision of Reality in actual experience, so that it closely resembles
dhawq (spiritual tasting) which we have already explained, and is
directly involved in the mystical experience ofannihilation of the
ego-consciousness ifanii'). Fanii' is a human experience; it
pertains to both subject and object, psychologically and
ontologically-it applies to the realms of the mystical as well as
the metaphysical. In the subjective, psychological and mystical
fanii', the one who experiences it undergoes two stages: the
annihilation of his own subjective consciousness, and the
annihilation of the consciousness of that annihilation ifanii') so
that he then fully realizes his true self and 'sees' or 'witnesses'
Reality by it. The Reality that is seen or witnessed by that self is
objectively, ontologically and metaphysically the 'unification'

or 'gathering together' (jam') of the phenomenal world of
multiplicity into the absolute unity of the One Real Being. If the
mystic does not transcend this stage to that of survival ( baqa'), or
remaining in and with absolute Reality, then when he
immediately returns from this experience to his normal
consciousness, and although the world in its multiple forms
reasserts itself to his sight and experience, he will deny the world
reality and will persist in discarding the multiple things as pure
illusion. This is because he does not possess perfect vision during
his mystical experience. In spite of his experience of annihilation
of his ego-consciousness and annihilation of consciousness of that
annihilation, and in spite of his witnessing th€ unification or
gathering together of multiplicity into unity, his shuhiid is
impaired by his human, subjective consciousness, for he has not
transcended this spiritual stage and has returned to the world of
multiplicity seeing only unity and nothing else. It is the subjective
element in human nature that compels him to this kind of
imperfect perception of the truth about the Reality. Indeed, al
Raniri confirms this in his gloss where he uses the expression
perangai bashariyyah (human nature or disposition) to denote this
type of vision. The Ahl al-Shuhiid al-lfaliyy in al-Qunyawi's work
cited is 2- term of reference to this class of people, as we will show
yet further.
According to the �ufis, mankind is divided into three classes of
people with respect to the problem of vision in connection with
the affirmation or negation of existence and reality to the world.
A brief allusion to this triple division is mentioned, for example,
by al-Sarraj quoting al-Makki, al-\Vasi_ti and al-Kharraz in the
Kitab al-Luma'. 669 The same triple division is also mentioned by
al-Hujwiri. 670 Ibn 'Arabi refers likewise to this division in some of
his writings, and the matter ·is further elaborated by l:faydar
Amuli, a 14th century Sufi metaphysician, in his Jami' al-Asrar.
There Amuli says that the first class division refers to the common
669 Op. cit., Bab lfiil al-Mushiihadah, p. 69.

670 Kashf al-MaMiib, p. 382.
r .
COMMENTARY
people ('awiimm), whom he calls the men of reason (dhii al-'aql);

the second refers to the elect (khawii.f.f), or men of intuitive vision
( dhu al-'ayn); and the third refers to the super-elect ( khawii,H al
khawiiH), who combine within them the best of the qualities of the
preceding classes and are hence also called the men of reason and
intuitive vision ( dhii al-'aql wa al-'ayn). Briefly stated the first class
are men who perceive only the world of multiplicity and affirm it
as real, and they do not perceive any other reality beyond it. To
this class belong the atheists and materialists, and in its higher
levels, the monotheists who in the higher stages of their
perception admit another, separate reality beyond what they see ..
and recognize it as God. They see no other connection nor
relationship between God and the world except that of Creator
and creation. The second class are those whom we have already
described, who due to their imperfect vision of Reality based on
th t; ir incomplete mystical experience, perceive only the unity of
th�pne Reality, denying the world metaphysical and ontological
reality and discarding it as pure illusion. To this class also belong
the false $iifis, the monists and those sophists of various sorts who
have not really experienced the mystical states but who arriye at
their. understanding of the matter by intellectual methods.,:.J'h�
third class are those who, having experiencedfanii' andfanii' al-
fanii' and jam', transcend that stage to the ultimate and highest
stage of baqii'. At this stage the Reality that is 'seen' or 'witnessed'
by the gnostic belonging to this class is not simply the unification
or gathering together (jam') of the world of multiplicity into the
unity of the One Real Being, but more profoundly he 'sees' and
'witnesses' the unification of that unification (jam' al-jam'), the
gathering together of the multiplicity into unity and the unity
separating into multiplicity which is again gathered together into
a new vision of unity. Compared with the unity seen by the
mystics of the second class at the stage offanii' and jam', the stage of
baqii' andjam' al-jam' experienced by the mystics of the third class
presents a fuller and new vision of the unity in that it reveals its
inner workings, as it were, wherein the multiplicity is seen as the
many self-determinations and individuations of the absolute
Unity itself. Thus multiplicity is seen as unity and unity as
4 30 A COMMENTARY ON THE l;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
multiplicity. When the mystic regains his individual

consciousness and the world appears to him as before, he does not
reject the world as pure illusion, but acknowledges its reality and
existence as modes and aspects of the Absolute. 671
It is now clear that $adr al-Din al-Qunyawi in the passage cited
by al-Raniri is in fact referring to the same division of classes of
people. The People of the Veil ( ahl al-&friib) are identical with the
class of the common people ('awamm) in I:Iaydar A.muff's,
division; the People of Subjective Vision ( ahl al-shuhiid al-&iiliyy)
are those who belong to the second class in that division; the
Perfect (kiimil) and the People of Steadfastness (ahl al-tamkzn) are
those who belong to the third class. The first class of people is
known as People of the Veil because their vision or perception of
the world and things is of the ordinary kind, and they are veiled
by the multiplicity of phenomena which prevents them from
'seeing' the inner aspect of Reality, and so they affirm the reality
of phenomena and miss the Truth. Sometimes they are also
referred to as the People of Externality ( ahl-?:,iihir). As for the
second class of people, the cryptic note to al-shuhiid furnished by
al-Raniri 672 confirms our interpretation. The note reads: !tu
tinggal dalamnya: 'That which resides in it', meaning that the
vision or perception (ltu: That) remains (tinggal: which resides)
in their subjective consciousness ( dalamnya: in it); that is, the
vision of absolute unity which they experienced at the stage of the
gathering together (jam') of multiplicity into unity remains with
them when they regain individual consciousness in such wise
that, although the world of phenomena presents itself again to
their senses and sensible experience, they discard it as an illusion
and think that what is real is only the unity and that there would
be no multiple particularizations in existence if there were no
minds to perceive them. It is their subjective consciousness that
causes this imperfect vision of Reality, and for this reason they are
called the People of Subjective Vision. People of this class-if
they ate sincere and true $iifis-are still 'on the way' as they have
671 Amuff, op. cit., pp. 107-118. See also above, pp. 131-147.
672 Jfujjat, note 59 of the translation.
COMMENTARY 43 1
not yet attained to the final stage; and although their vision of
�nity gives them spiritual benefit as al-Raniri says further in that
note ( memeri manfa'at), they are prone to ecstatic utterances
(sha/biyyiit). It is worthwhile to point out that in al-Raniri's gloss
to al-shuhud in the text, the same annotation mark is inscribed for
the term sha/biyyiit which occurs in the same page. All other
glosses which occur concurrently in the text are marked with
different annotation signs with the exception of two glosses on
page 10 of the manuscript, which have also been given identical
markings. These glosses in fact refer to closely related concepts
such as the categories of quality and quantity (i.e. kayfiyyah ancl
kammiyyah). The conclusion to be derived from this is that the
author intends to point out, in the case of al-shuhud and shat{iiyyiit,
the close relation between the ahl al-shuhud al-biiliyy and the
concept of sha/biyyiit. In fact al-Sarraj says that sha/biyyiit are not,
or.-are very seldom found among those �ufis who have attained
the perfect vision-that is among the khawiiH al-khawiiH or the
mutamakkinun: those who are sober, stable, steadfast and firmly
established irt their knowledge of the Truth-those who have
attained maturity in knowledge, the ahl al-tamkzn. 673 It is from
among the ahl al-shuhud al-biiliyy, whom ibn 'Arabi and l:fayda'.r
Amufi call the ahl al-khawiiH, that "a group as slipped from the
path of truth" (zallat aqdiimu !iiifatin 'an majrii al-tabqzq) in
erroneously identifying God with the world. 674 This is due, as ibn
'Arabi says, to their imperfect knowledge of the truth. 6T5
Between the two extremes of vision and cognition with respect to
the ontological status of the world of empirical things as
673Kitab al-Luma', op. cit., p. 380. Al-Hujw'iri" also makes this point clear,
Kashf al-Ma&jiib, pp. 119, 152, 168, 369 and 372.
674 0n itti&iid and &uliil into which
they slipped, see Jami' al-Asr;iir, pp.
216-220; (414)-(424).
675 See above, p. 389, XV;
and further, pp. 389-393. Al-Ran'ir'i's
quotation from ibn 'Arab'i's fautii&at there and the subsequent discussion
leading to the quotation from al-Qunyaw'i's Miftii& here is of great
relevance in clarifying the basic structure of ta�awwuj, which is the inner
dimension oflslam, as represented by the �iifis of the school ofwa&dat al
wujiid.
represented by the ahl al-&ijiib and the ahl al-shuhiid al-&iiliyy, the
ahl al-tamkzn are those who have transcended their own
determinations and have achieved a perfect vision of Reality, so
that they are able to recognize and affirm the reality and existence
both of God and the world, and make a distinction between
them. The terms 'reality' and 'existence' as applied here to the
world is meant insofar only as it is not an illusion, but in that it is
the tajallz-aspect of God. Hence ibn 'Arabi's earlier statement
that "the world is nothing but His self-manifestation." 676
We have already pointed out the close connection between
ecstatic utterances (sha/&iyyiit) and the People of Subjective
Vision, who are prone to be emotional. These utterances
according to al-Raniri are not beneficial to the mystic-on the
contrary, they are liable to confuse and lead astray the common
people who might chance to hear them. The gloss on the word
shaf&iyyiit in the text 677 says that "the meaning underlying the
term shatbfv_yiit is, from the point of view of language, 'to throw
away' (to cast off, to get rid of, to let off), as the boiling pot lets off
its steam (buih: froth) which does not give benefit and leaves
behind what gives benefit. In like manner, the hearts (sing. qalb)
of the People of God (ahl Allah) are like boiling pots and their
ecstatic utterances are like the froth (steam) of their spiritual
states (a&wiil): they ( the ecstatic utterances) are clearly audible
(like the bubbling), but do not give benefit insofar as spiritual
mysteries (asriir) are concerned." 67 8 Elaborating further on the
nature of ecstatic utterances, their admissability or
inadmissability as the case may be in point of the sacred Law, and
the consequences that result from them, al-Raniri in this
concluding part of his short treatise says that
XXII ecstatic utterances (sha/&iyyiit) that slip from the

tongues of some of the gnostics (sing.' iirij) when the state
676 See above, p. 63 ( I o) of the text; Fu.fU.f, p. 8 I; also above pp. 389-393
with reference to wa laysa hadhii bi mashhadin li kawnihi.
6 :i 7 Jfujjat, note 60 of the translation (p. I 02 above).
678 Cp Kitab al-Luma
. ', pp. 375-377.
COMMENTARY 433
of mystical intoxication overpowers them, such as "I am

God" and "I am the Truth", indeed imply that the
Truth, may He be exalted, and the creature are one
reality and one being; but God forbid that such is the
real case, or that they mean this, for their ecstatic
utterances occur unintentionally. Such utterances occur
on their tongues when they are unconscious of their
subjective selves, and freely let slip their unburdened
(lawas) tongues during the state of mystical intoxication,
like those who talk in their sleep when they dream of
something they desire, and like those vv·ho become
habitually hysterical with words, such as those who
suffer from a mimetic type of paroxysmal neurosis
(latah). These slips of the tongue are involuntary acts.
What is said about the ecstatic utterances of the �ufis here is that
(a), they are not meant to imply a corresponding, factual truth,
and they are unintentional (tiada maqriid dan tiada disengaja); ( b),
they occur accidentally and unconsciously (terlancar, tiada ingat
akan dirinya); (c), they are uttered in the state of spiritual rapture
or intoxication (tatakala maboknya); (d), the person who utters
them resembles one who talks in one's sleep (mengigau); (e), he is
also like one who is habitually hysterical with words (ter' iidat,
latah); and (f), they are uttered involuntarily (tiada ikhtiyarnya).
Extremely revealing about the nature of this mystical experience
is his use of the term lawas with reference to the organ of speech of
the mystic who experiences it. Lawas basically means 'open',
'wide open', 'clear', 'unobstructed', 'bare', 'unburdened'; and
relationally it also means 'reckless' and 'rash'. In its basic sense
referring to what is 'open' and 'wide of space', such as a field, or a
compound, or court of a house, it is synonymous with another
word which resembles it: luas. The notion of being 'clear' and
'unobstructed', with reference to the open space, has to do with
there being no interruption, hindrance or obstruction in the field
of vision. In the sense in which it means 'unburdened', lawas is
often applied to the comfortable feeling of being unburdened
when one's full stomach is relieved of its contents; so too when a
heavily laden coconut tree is rendered bare of fruit, or when a

tree is bare of fruit. In the sense of being 'wide open', lawas can be
applied to refer to the gaping mouth or jaws, in which case it is
synonymous with yet another word which resembles it: lawah.
The meaning of lawas goes well with lancarJ a word which occurs
in the text describing it, for lancar refers to the smooth, slipping
out or passage of a thing due to there being no obstruction,
hindrance, or friction in the passage. What is important in the
concept of lawas when applied to certain organs of the human
body-as in our present context-is the notion of relief and
unburdening which has to do with being untrammelled by lack of
space and by obstruction or oppression or restriction. When the
word lawas is applied to refer to the tongue, the mouth is also
referred to, since the mouth and tongue together are the essential
organs of speech and control articulation of words and sounds.
When the mouth loses control over the tongue, then the tongue
may utter rash words-and here we derive the meaning 'rash'
with reference to lawas. The mouth that loses control over the
tongue may be said to be gaping J so that it exercises no restrictions
on what comes out of it. Bearing in mind all that we have briefly
stated, and taking note of al-Raniri's gloss in explanation of the
term mabok (mystical intoxication, Arabic: sukr), in which he says
that it pertains to the mystic who has lost individual
consciousness of himself and of what is other than God (the
phenomenal world) due to the overpowering coming-into-vision
of God's self-manfestation upon him, we must see that terlancar
lisan yang lawas tatakala maboknya refers to loss of individual
consciousness and loss of restriction of the faculty of speech during
mystical intoxication, causing the tongue to freely unburden
itself, giving way to involuntary expressions and relieving the
tremendous pressure experienced by the mystic who witnesses the
Divine self-manifestation (tajalli'). Then, al-Raniri continues,
... when what is seen in their vision overpowers them, they

become unconscious of their subjective selves and of all that
which is other than God (mii siwa Allah), and they are heavy
with grief (mathqiil) and drowned every instant of the day and
r -
COMMENTARY 435
night in contemplation of the Truth, may He be exalted.
Then in that state God's Names take effect upon their tongues
in their habitual invocation: "He is God," "He is God"
(huwa Alliih, huwa Alliih), and "He is the Truth," "He is the
Truth" (huwa al-&aqq, huwa al-&aqq), is such wise that the
"He" (huwa) becomes transformed into "I" (anii).
This passage is clear in itself, and relates how the mystics get to
the state of ejaculating ecstatic utterances: they are mathqiil and
drowned every instant of the day and night in their
contemplation of God, all the while repeating His Name. Then,
when they experienccfanii' and dhawq, and enter into the state of
wajd, they begin to let slip ecstatic utterances. When they return to
. consciousness of their individual selves, they experience
separation (jarq) and seek to repeat their experience of union
(jam' or itti�iil). It is at this point that they are mathqiil, that is, a
'heaviness' of heart sets in upon them due to their separation from
the Beloved and their yearning and longing to be reunited. The
form mathqiil does not seem to be found in the works of
lexicologists,but it is clear that it conveys an identical meaning
with the form thiiqil. Now thiiqil means 'heavy in sickness' or
�suffering a violent disease'' and it also has the same signification
as thaqzl. The form thiiqil, for example, appears in a verse of
Labid, the mukharj,ram poet ( i.e. a poet who lived partly before and
partly after the promulgation oflslam) ,and ibn Man�iir says that
the measure thiiqil is the same as niiqil and niiqil means the same
thing as manqiil. 679 This further indicates that thiiqil means the
same thing as mathqiil, and that mathqiil is another form of thiiqil.
The imagery of being 'drowned', conveyed by the Malay word
following mathqiil in the text, that is, karam, fits in well with
something 'heavy', so that the idea conveyed by the expression
serta mathqiil dan karam is that of the mystics being 'hopelessly sunk
in sorrow or grief at their separation from the Beloved. Hence the
reason for wajd being applied also to mean 'grief, 680 because in
679Lisiin al-'Arab, II, p. 88, col. 1; Labid's verse is here quoted, see the
last word of the verse and what follows.
Gso Kashf al-Ma�jiib, p. 413.
4 36 A COMMENTARY ON THE•J:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
this sense the mystic 'loses' what he has 'found', and in losing it he
plunges into grief. This brings to recollection the concept offaqd
which we have discussed, and the purport ofDhii al-Nun's words
concerning it. We must see here that al-Raniri is describing the
wajidiin, or rather, the mutawiijidiin. 681 Al-Raniri continues:
... Such occurrence is caused by the Truth, may He be

Exalted, upon their tongues without any freedom on their
part to choose otherwise. The Sufis in their terminology call
those (genuine gnostics) who express ecstatic utterances 'they
whom the spiritual state has overpowered' (maghliib al-biil),
and they for whom the Pen is raised' ( marfil al-qalam, i.e.
whom God has caused to be exempt from the recordings of
the Pen). It is allowed to utter only such words as 'I am the
Truth' 682 and the like to those in such a state; however, the
religious Law in its literal sense (;:,ahir shara') prescribes that
they be condemned and not permitted to persist in such ways
as would seem to confirm as true the beliefs of the deviators
and the Zindiqs, and to commit acts displeasing unto the
681 /bid., pp. 413-416; for tawiijud see also the Kitab al-Luma' pp.
301 -309. According to the true believers who have attained to the state
of certainty in knowledge and faith, ecstacy 1snot susceptible of a proper
definition as it is one of the mysteries of God. It has to do with the
experience that comes ;:ibout c1.t the finding of, or meeting with the
Truth by coincidence, unexpectedly. There are three classes of $ufis in
whom genuine ecstacy is experienced (al-wiijidiin) and depending upon
their individual characteristics some are sober in their experience while
others are intoxicated by it; in some the experience leaves them calm
and quiet, in others it leaves them agitated and emotional. There are
also three classes of $iifis, apart from the three classes mentioned, in
whom their ecstacy is self-induced,or artificial ( al-mutawqjidiin). Of
these three latter classes, the first cannot really be included among $iifis;
they merely exert themselves to imitate the $iifis in order to pretend to
be classed as $iifis: they are properly classified as the pseudo-$ufis. In
our reference to al-Raniri's description above; the mutawqjidiin meant
does not refer to the pseudo-$ufis, but to genuine $iifis.
682
This is clearly meant to refer to al-I:{allaj, who cried: "Anii al-�aqq",
and to those who follow his example.
COMMENTARY 437
Truth, exalted be He. Indeed, the fact is that even if they are
unconscious of their subjective selves and overwhelmed by
spiritual intoxication, their duty and responsibility to
observe (taklif) the Divine injunctions pertaining to His
commands (sing. amr) and prohibitions (sing. nahy) does not
in the least fall away from them, for the Truth, may He be
exalted, ever prevails ( qa'im) over their intellects (command
ing them to do what is right and) preserving them from
committing sinful acts and, moreover, He bestows upon them
His succour (tawfiq) so that they might persevere in the
performance of obligatory duties (!arr!) in spite of their being
overpowered by spiritual intoxication and annihilated in
God (Jana' fi Allah) ...
Since God causes their ecstatic utterances due to His

overpowering manifestation upon them, they remain believers
(sing. mu'min) in God's sight, and will not be liable to punishment
for their utterances, which imply partnership with God in His
reality and existence, in the Day ofJ udgment. However, due to
the apparent contradiction to the Holy Qur'an, the traditions
(sing. �adzth) of the Holy Prophet, the consensus (ijmii') of the
learned doctors of law and theology that such utterances entail,
including the implication of making lawful (�alal) what God has
declared to be unlawful (�aram) inherent in them, the religious
Law condemns such utterances. 683 Provided that the person who
utters them withdraws and renounces such utterances,
disavowing any implication to a corresponding factual truth in
the claims they make, and publicly confess to error, the Law as
applicable to the community of Muslims rules that they be
condemned to death. Otherwise, and according to the legal
school of al-Shafi'i to which al-Raniri belongs, their recantation
would absolve them from that penalty. 684 This ruling applies to
683 Seethe reference to al-f:lallaj in al-Farq, p. 247 fol.

684 Al-Raniri himself, in his debates in Acheh, ruled in accordance with
the code of al-Shafi'1, that the acceptance ofrepentence was admissable.
See al-Farq, p. 250; al-Shafi'i's Kitiib al-Umm, with the Mukhta{ar of al
Muzani, vol. r, p. 227.
43 8 A COMMENTARY ON THE I_IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
genuine gnostics who experience the spiritual condition

described, whose intoxication and annihilation are clearly
authentic, and who, therefore, utter ecstatic utterances during
such states only, and not when they have returned to subjective
consciousness. For in their case, both in their spiritual condition
as well as in their normal, subjective condition, they are
preserved from error and heresy by God's grace, such that they
persevere in the performance of their obligatory duty and
responsibility towards God. They are recipients of tawfiq.
According to al-Shahrastani in his discussion on the signficance
of tawfiq, the Mu'tazilah define tawfiq as 'the becoming clear
(iihiir) ofthe signs (al-ayiit) ofGod in His creation which point to
His unicity (wabdiiniyyah).' They believe that tawfiq is universal
and precedes action. The Ash'ariyyah, on the other hand, mean
by tawfiq God's creation of a particular power ( al-qudrat al
khii.Hah) in man to obey and to choose to obey what is good. In
line with their theology and their atomstic metaphysics involving
the perpetual renewal of accidents, this power is renewed from
moment to moment such that the man continues to obey and to
choose to obey what is good as opposed to what is evil. They say
therefore that tawfiq is not universal but particular, and define it
as 'the creation ofthat power (i.e. to obey, etc.) that conforms with
the action' ( khalaq tilka al-qudrnt al-muttafiqah ma' a al-:fi' l). 685
Bearing in mind that al-Raniri himself belongs to the Ash'ari
school oftheology and that the $iifis are aligned to the same sort
of theology and metaphysics, the meaning of taw.fzq in our text
conforms with the Ash'ariview ofit as stated above. Tau.!fiq is then
God's aiding a man so that his knowledge, feeling and action
conform or coincide with the truth, with rectitude and with what
is good in contrast with khidhliin, which is God's abstaining from
685Nihayat, pp. 412-413. Al-Shahrastani's own view is that tawfiq is

both universal and particular, i.e. it is both for all mankind and for only
some of mankind. He cites as an instance of the first case the Holy
Prophet's tradition about the fitrah-that all men are born good by
nature. This view reflects the view of the theologians ( al-mutakallimiin)
generally.
COMMENTARY 439
aiding a man from evil so that he falls into it. 686

From what we have said in our commentary on paragraphs
XXI and XXII, it becomes clear that concerning the intuition of
existence which leads to a perfect vision of Reality, the masters
among the men of spiritual discernment emphasize the
excellence of knowledge over ecstasy. This is explained by al
Hujwiri in the following way:
The Shaykhs agree that the power of knowledge should be

greater than the power of wajd, since, if wajd be more
powerful, the person affected by it is in a dangerous position,
whereas one in whom knowledge preponderates is secure. It
behoves the seeker in all circumstances to be a follower of
knowledge and of the religious law, for when he is overcome
by wajd he is deprived of discrimination ( khifiib), and is not
liable to recompense for good actions or punishment for evil,
and is exempt from honour and disgrace alike: therefore he is
in the predicament of madmen, not in that of the saints and
favourites of God. A person in whom knowledge ('ilm)
preponderates over feeling ( �al) remains in the bosom of the
Divine commands and prohibitions, and is always praisvd
and rewarded in the palace of glory; but a person in whom
feeling preponderates over knowledge is outside of the
ordinances, and dwells, having lost the faculty of
discrimination, in his own imperfection. This is precisely t:he
meaning of Junayd's words. There are two ways: one of
knowledge and one of action. Action without knowledge,
although it may be good, is ignorant and imperfect, but
knowledge, even ifit be unaccompanied by action, is glorious
and noble. '6 87
The test of genuine experience and intuition is knowledge, and

knowledge, unlike ecstasy, cannot be imitated, so that it is a sure
See Ali 'lmriin (3): 160; Lisiin al-'Arab, vol. II, p. 202-, col. I.
686
Kashf al-Ma!Jjiib, pp. 414-415. For al-Hujwiri's reference to the

687
words of al-Junayd, see the Kitiib al-Luma', p. 306.

safeguard from error and heresy. Action, on the other hand-the

utterance of mere phrases accompanied by suitable behaviour
can be imitated by the ignorant, the charlatans, the pseudo-Sufis
and those in whose hearts there is deviation, such as those against
whom al-Raniri debated and condemned, both in actual fact as
well as in writing. Against such people al-Raniri warns that
... whoever expresses ecstatic utterances believing in the

outward, literal sense what is really meant to be understood
by way of analogy, and who yet all the while is not truly
overpowered by the state of spiritual intoxication as in the
case of the People of God, then he becomes a deviator and a
Zindiq and, according to the literal sense of the Law, an
unbeliever in God's sight. Such a one is condemned in this
world to be slain, and in the Hereafter to dwell everlastingly
in Hell.
Those who are not genuine gnostics and who imitate their
utterances, believing that the meanings underlying those
utterances point to a corresponding actual fact in the realm of
extramental reality are the deviators from the truth and the
Zindiqs. This is because when the meanings underlying such
utterances are taken at their face value they inevitably involve an
affirmation of incarnationism, or extreme immanence or
pantheism, or a dualism of reality involving partnership in God's
existence. They may also entail an affirmation of monism and a
reduction of the world to a mere fantasy born of figments of the
imagination. This would further involve a denial of realities, an
affirmation of a thorough-going epistemological subjectivism; a
denial of objective knowledge and of the possibility of knowledge,
all of which we have mentioned in the earlier parts of our
commentary on the beliefs of the Sophists ( al-Sufasta'ryyah) and
those extremists with strong group feeling ( al-muta' aI�ibzn) and
those who obstinately reject correction of error and heresy in
religion ( al-mu' anidzn). 688 Because of the obstinacy and
688 See above, pp. 188-191; 199-208; 216-217; 222-225; 344-345;

385 fol.; 426 fol. As an example of the type ofpseudo-�ufis who affirm
COMMENTARY 44 1
extremism, and the strong sense of group solidarity that

characterize such people, they invariably cannot come to sincere
repentance from their sophistical beliefs involving heresy and
unbelief, 689 and the jurists are agreed that they are not to be
called to repentance, but are to be exterminated from society. 690
Ecstatic utterances are ambiguous, and only the initiated
know their true meanings and can interpret them correctly. But
those in whose hearts there is deviation love ambiguity and strive
to interpret their meanings according to their own subjective
inclinations and wandering desires. They do this not only in
connection with the utterances of the $iifis, but also in connection
with passages of the Holy Qur'an and the traditions of the Holy
Prophet on which the $iifis base their verification of reality <'Ind
truth, which the deviators interpret to suit their erroneous and
heretical doctrines. The passages and traditions in question are
also ambiguous in nature, but the men deeply rooted in
knowledge are not confounded by them; they are led to
understand some, and others they could not understand they
accept by the light of faith:
It is He Who sent down upon thee the Book, wherein are

verses clear and established ( al-mubkamiit) that are the
Mother of the Book, and others ambiguous ( al-mutashiibihiit).
As for those in whose hearts there is deviation they follow the
part thereof that is ambiguous, desiring discord and desiri·ng
its ultimate meanings; but none knows its ultimate meanings
incarnationism as betrayed in their sha/�iyyiit to which they are prone

and which marked their method of expression, see al-Baghdadi's
reference to the J:Iallajiyyah in Farq, pp. 246-249. As al-Baghdadi says,
ecstatic utterances are ambiguous, they lend themselves to two different
interpretations, one true and therefore noble and praiseworthy; the
other false, vicious and blameworthy. The pseudo-�iifis usually tend to
the latter interpretation, which has caused great confusion and error
among the generality of people.
689 See above, the reference to al-Raniri's debate with the deviating
Wujudiyyah, pp. 8-g.

690 Al-Farq, p. 351.
except God. And those firmly rooted in knowledge say: "We

believe in it; all is from our Lord"; yet none remembers, but
those possessed of minds. 691
Ambiguity occurs when there is consimilarity; when two things

are alike one with the other such that the mind finds itself unable
to distinguish between them. With reference to the· above
passage, a tradition on the nature of the Holy Qur'an says that we
must believe in its verses that are ambiguous and practice its
verses that are clear and established. By 'ambiguous' here is
meant that whose meaning is not to be learned from its words,
and this is of two kinds: that whose meaning can only be
understood by reference to what is clear and established; and that
whose meaning in the ultimate sense cannot be attained. Examples
of this latter kind, to which the Holy Qur' an specifically refers in
the above passage, according to the commentators, are the Last
Hour; the Resurrection; the individual Letters found at the
beginning of some chapters of the Holy Qur'an. Among those of
the former kind are also verses which have confounded the
Christians, such as those pertaining to the nature of the Prophet
'Isa O esus), upon whom be peace; and those which have
confounded the Mu'tazilah, such as those pertaining to the
attributes of God and the Beatific Vision; and the verses
conveying anthropormorphic descriptions of God which have
confounded the Corporealers ( {ll-mujas,imah) and the Likeners
(al-mushabbihah). 692
691A_[i '/mriin (3'):7.

692 See further, the Lisiin al-'Arab, vol. XIII, pp. 504, cols. I and 2; 505,
col. 1; also the Kashshiif, vol. III pp. 792-795. In his al- Tafszr al-Kabzr
(vol. 2, pp. 394-403), Fakhr al-Din al-Razi has given an extensive
commentary on the passage quoted above, covering the linguistic
aspects including the meanings of the words in question according to the
understanding of the Arabs and from the point of view of the religious
Law; what has been said by others among the early Muslim scholars; and
his own commentary on the passage from the point of view of the
theologians against the Christians, the Mu'tazilah, and those invoived
in heresy and unbelief. Al-Ghazali's rules for interpretation ( al-tafszr)
COMMENTARY 443
The theologians, philosophers, and $ufis are agreed that

human existence has different levels: (I) real (�aqzqi) existence,
that is, existence at the level of objective reality such as the
external world; ( 2) sensible (�issi) existence, which is confined to
the faculties of sense and sensible experience including dreams,
visions, illusions; (3) imaginary (khayiili) existence, which is the
existence of the objects of sensible existence in the imagination
when they are absent from human perception; (4) intellectual
(' aqli) existence, which consists of abstract concepts in the human
mind; and (5) metaphorical (shibhi) existence, which is
constituted by things which do not exist in any of the four levels
already mentioned, but which do exist as something else
resembling the things in a certain respect, or analogous to them.
At every one of these levels, human perception of the objects of
perception is not the same. In addition to this the $ufis affirm
another level of human existence in which there is experience
existing on another level than rational truth, such as that
experienced by the people of the 'second separation', in which
they grasp things not as they were before, but in which the
mysteries of things are revealed as they really are. 693 \A/hen it
and allegorical interpretation (al-ta'l!Jzl) of the Holy Qur'an and the

traditions as found in his Kitab Fay,ral al- Tafriqah bayn al-Islam wa al
,Zandaqah (edited by Sulayman Dunya, Cairo, 'Isa al-Bibi al-1:lalabi,
1961) is approved and commented upon by ibn Rushd in his Kitab Fa,rl
al-Maqal wa Taqrzr ma bayn al-Shari' ah wa al-lfikmah min al-Itti,riil (edited
by G.F. Hourani, Leiden, Brill, 1959; also translated by the same editor
into English in E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Series, new series, vol. XXI,
London, Luzac, 1961-lnternational Commission for the Translation
of Great Works, Beirut, 1961). Ibn Khaldun's discussion on the
problem of ambiguity in the Holy Qur'an and the traditions is found in
his al-Muqaddimah, vol. III, [15]: pp. 55-75. We can hardly agree with
him, however, when he classifies the black slave girl in the tradition as
one of "those firmly rooted in knowledge." (p. 67). See ibn Rushd's
account of the same tradition in the Kitab Fa,rl al-Maqal, p. 16.
693 In the Mishkiit, op. cit, pp. 76-81, al-Ghazali's exposition on the
psychology of the human soul enumerates five faculties or spirits

corresponding to nos. (2), (3), (4) and (5) above. What corresponds to
no. (5) is there called the cogitative spirit (al-ru� al-fikri). The fifth
444 A COMMENTARY ON THE }:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
comes to theverification of what is revealed to them, they inquire

into the Tradition and the Holy Qur'an, and whatever agrees
with what they have witnessed by the light of certainty they
accept, whatever disagrees they interpret allegorically
( ta J wzl). 694
The key to the problem of ambiguity in the Holy Q!Jr'an and in
the traditions is closely connected with the existence of different
levels of human experience and cognition, and different levels in
the human capacity to understand meaning. The existence of
apparent (tiihir) and hidden (bii/in) meanings in the words in the
Holy Qur'an and in the traditions is precisely due to the fact that
they address all the different levels at once. Thus, depending
upon the levels of experience and cognition to which the words
refer, and upon the levels in the capacity to understand their
meanings, some of the meanings are apparent to all and become
established as such; some are hidden to many and become
ambiguous; and yet what are ambiguous to many are not so to
some, who know both that there is symbolization and what is
symbolized in the meanings they convey. Even so, and in view of
faculty or spirit is the holy prophetic spirit ( al-ru� al-qudsz al-nabawz'),

which corresponds to the level other than rational truth as affirmed by
the $iifis (Mishkiit, p. 77).
694 See al-Ghazali's exposition on allegorical interpretation ( al-ta'wzl)
with reference to the $iifis in his llJ:Yii' from the text in the Al-Jawahir al
Ghawiilz min rasii'il al-Imam Jfujjat al-Islam al-Ghaziilz, edited by M.S.
Kurdi, Cairo, 1934, vol. 1, p. I 80. Cited by Hourani, op. cit.,
Introduction, pp. 27-28. The $iifi position on the levels of human
experience and cognition is mentioned by al-Jami in his Al-Durrah al
Fakhirah, pp. 37/11-38/13; lfawiishi, pp. 94/ 11 - I 2-95-96/13; Shar� al
Durrah, pp. 122-,--123/1 I. On the levels of human existence, see al
Ghazali Kitab Fay1al al-Tafriqa/z, pp. 80-85; cited in Hourani, op. cit.,
pp 103-104, and note 127. For ibn R ushd 's view, see Kitab Fa1l al
M aqiil, op. cit., pp. 58 fol., and an extract from his Kitab al-Kashf 'an
Maniihij al-Adillahfi"Aqii'id al-Millah, pp. I 24- I 27, in Hourani, op. cit.,
pp. 78-81. lbn Khaldun also speaks about the levels of existence as a
key to the problem of ambiguity in the Holy Qur'an and in the
traditions, al-Muqaddimah, vol. III, pp. 69-75, although the levels he
enumerated do not quite correspond to the more philosophically precise
levels expounded by al-Ghazali.
COMMENTARY 445
the fact that the hidden mysteries of God's words are without
limit, some of the meanings of His words taken in their ultimate
senses cannot be known. Taken in this last aspect, only God
knows their ultimate meanings.
The science of interpretation, taken in both its aspects as
pertaining to the apparent and hidden meanings ( i.e. as tafszr and
ta) wzl), does not admit of learned guess, or conjecture, or
subjective opinion based on assumptions outside of Tradition,or
understandings based upon the idea of historical relativism, as if
semantic change can occur in the conceptual structures of the
words and terms that constitute the vocabulary of the sacred text.
In both cases the process of interpretation is based upon the Holy
Qur'an itself and the Tradition, supported by the knowledge of
the semantic fields that govern the conceptuai structures of the
Quranic vocabularly which projects the Islamic vision of reality
and truth, and augmented by demonstrative reasoning and
intuitive experience. It is therefore based upon established
knowledge of the fields of meaning as couched in the Arabic
language and as organized and applied in the Holy Qur' an and
reflected in the Tradition and verified demonstratively and
intuitively.
The interpretation of the hidden meanings does not invalidate
those that are apparent; nor are the apparent meanings less valid
than those that are hidden, but the hidden perfects the
understanding of the apparent, seeing that it is the arrival from
the outer skin 9f the fruit to the kernel. This is unlike the
deviating view of the esotericists, who invalidate the apparent
meanings in favour of their own subjective interpretation of those
that are hidden; and it is unlike the view of the extreme literalists
who tend to deny the ambiguous, and whose anthropomorphic
interpretation of what is apparent tends to deviate in the
direction of corporealism.
Those who are "firmly rooted in knowledge" ( al-rasikhiinfi al
'ilm) know that what coincides with the apparent meaning is
clear and established ( al-mu�kam), and what does not coincide is
ambiguous ( al-mutashabih). They know God's Essence and His
Attributes, and by cogent proofs establishing certainty they know
that God knows the things known in their particular details,

which are without limit, and that His knowledge encompasses
them all. They also know that the Holy Qur'an is God's speech,
and that He speaks not vainly. So when they see that decisive
evidence proves that the apparent meaning in His word is not
intended, they know that something else is intended by it other
than what is apparent, and they entrust the specific meaning
intended to God's knowledge and assert that that meaning
whatever it may be-is the truth. It is due to the application of
intellect in the understanding of the Holy Qur'an, the abundance
of knowledge, purity of heart, intensity in contemplation and
abstraction that characterize those firmly rooted in knowledge
that His mysteries are revealed to them. For every one of them
there is a limit to their ascent to the higher degrees of knowledge,
even though they know that there is no hope of their ever being
able to ascend to the exhaustive degree, which is impossible
because the mysteries of His words are inexhaustible. But what
they know they believe to be the truth, for there can be no true
belief without knowledge, and they affirm that aLl-the clear
and established and the ambiguous-is from their Lord; and
they know them to be the truth not simply by hearsay, but by the
firm believing, the firm grasp by which the faculties of the soul
receive what God has cast of the revealing light of knowledge into
their hearts. So when God speaks in parables and allegories using
the similitude of things from the lowest to the highest, they are
able to understand their meanings and know that it is the truth
from their Lord. 695 The expres,., ion 'firmly rooted' iu God's
description of them as being "firmly rooted in knowledge,"
brings to mind the similitude of a tall tree established in firmness,
which God has in fact likened in another place to the
characteristic quality of truth. 696 And here they who are firmly
rooted in knowledge, by being described as 'firmly rooted', are
695 See al-Baqarah (2):26, which according to al-Raz1 refers to those

firmly rooted in knowledge: al-Tafsfr al-Kabzr, vol. 2, pp. 400-401; see
also I�yii, vol. r, pp. 300-30 r.
696 Ibriihzm ( 14) :24-25.
COMMENTARY 447
likened to such a tree, whose roots are firmly fixed and its
branches reach to the skies. The faculties of the soul are like roots
buried deeply in the earth, the hidden ground of reality, well
nourished by the water of knowledge; the body and its faculties
are the trunk, branches, and leaves exposed to outward sense and
experience; the beneficial effects are the fruits; the heart is the
core of the tree. When the roots probe deeper into the earth, the
tree becomes established in firmness. Indeed, to those firmly
rooted in knowledge they know that the whole of the Holy Qur'an
is established (mu�kam) in truth; 697 and no word or speech that is
true that can be found excclls the Holy Qur'an in truth. The
meaning of mu�kam here as something firmly established is
synonymous with wathzq, meaning something strongly
constructed. 6 98 From this it becomes obvious that al-Raniri's
reference at the beginning of his treatise to the Companions who
are People of Certainty, the ahl al-wathzq, whose certitude consists
in the firmness by which the heart adheres to that which it knows
and fully grasps it-indicates also their inclusion among those
who are firmly rooted in knowledge. 69 9
And similarly, the people of the 'second separation' among the
Sufis of the school of the transcendent unity of existence are also
included among those who are firmly rooted in knowledge. Now
the Holy Qur'an speaks of the world of nature in terms of its
symbolic reality: it is like a great, open book; and the words or
signs in every page of the book of nature celebrate His praise. The
things that constitute the empirical world, the world of sense and
sensible experience, are symbols; and they too are ambiguous
because they appear to our consciousness to point to themselves,
as if they each have independent, self-subsistent and individual
reality. The symbols are, to be sure, not something unreal, not
merely appearance of the nature of illusion, but only provided
they are understood to be something in profound and dependent
connection with what they symbolize. Otherwise, considered as
697 See Yunus ( rn): 1; Hud ( 11): 1, and al-Razi's interpretation of the two
verses in al-Tafszr al-Kabzr, vol. 2, p. 394.
698 Al-Tafszr al-Kabzr, vol. 2, pp. 394-395.
699
things in themselves, they are unreal, in the sense that they exist
only in the mind having no corresponding reality in the external
world. What are existent in the external world and independent
of the mind are the appearances of realities in the process of
actualization in particular and individual forms, which are
modes and aspects of a single, dynamic and all-encompassing
Reality, as we have repeatedly said in the foregoing pages of this
commentary.
Ambiguity occurs because the truth is confused with what is
false: God is confused with the phenomenal world. This is
because the Truth, may He be exalted, has two aspects: an aspect
unto itself, absolute and dynamic, perpetually abiding after the
perishing of all created things, and this aspect does not contain
plurality or multiplicity; and an aspect unto other than itself,
which is an aspect of relatedness to plurality and multiplicity in
view of their being the mirrors or images of His manifest<ttion
forms. The mirrors are the potentialities in the archetypal
realities of things, which have reflected upon them, and in
accordance with their forms, the diverse and multiple
individuations of the Absolute. From this latter aspect of the
Truth, by which He is manifested in accordance with the
inherent requirements of the potentialities in the archetypes and
reflected in the concomitant mar:.ifestation forms, the Truth is
clothed, as it were, in the guise of what is false. To the $iifis, then,
that aspect of the Truth which is ;:i h�olute is the clear and
established ( al-mu�kam); and that aspect which is the aspect of
relatedness to the potentialities is the ambiguous ( al-mutashiibih),
for on the one hand they refer to the realities of things, and on the
other hand to the coming into existence of those realities
producing the phenomenal forms of the things which the mind
considers to be real. Because they know the Truth, by verification
in their intuition of existence, to be the abiding and absolute
Reality underlying the ever new creation, and they also know by
means of the same intuitive experience the realities of things to be
the modes and aspects of the same Reality, they affirm both the
one Reality and the many realitites. In this way, and like those
described in the Holy Qur'an as firmly rooted in knowledge, the
COMMENTARY 449
Siifis follow both the clear and established as well as the
ambiguous in their interpretation of the nature of reality and
truth. But as for those who are veiled from the Truth, and in
whose hearts there is deviation, they are unaware of His aspect
that is absolute and is ever abiding after the perishing of things,
and they think that the Truth directly takes on every shape and
form in the phenomenal world. They have confused the Truth
with the world; they follow the ambiguous because of their being
veiled by the multiplicity from seeing the unity. Whereas the
verifiers among the Sufis follow both the established unity as well
as the ambiguous multiplicity, for both the Reality and the
realities are aspects of the same Truth. The veiled ones follow
deviation and error and interpret the meaning according to their
own subjective inclination. 700
Our brief commentary on the Quranic verse relating to
established clarity and ambiguity and to those firmly rooted in
knowledge is now seen to be eminently relevant to the problem of
ambiguity in the ecstatic utterances of the Sufis and to those in
whose hearts there is deviation who follow the ambiguous and
spread discord and confusion among the ignorant. As we said
earlier, the verifiers among the Sufis generally do not look,upon
such utterances with approval, preferring sobriety and attesting
that it is more excellent than mystical intoxication. Sobriety
characterizes clarity of intellect and the cognitive faculties,
which is the true quality ofgenuine knowledge. The Holy Qur'an
itself, in the verse commented upon, extolls intellect and
knowledge when speaking of 'those possessed of minds' (iilii al
albiib). We have introduced this particular verse from the Holy
Qur'an into our interpretation of what al-Raniri says about the
ecstatic utterances of the Siifis and the deviationist
misinterpretations of them because this specific verse is clearly
indicated by implication, for al-Raniri then goes on to conclude
his treatise by quoting the prayer of those firmly rooted in
knowledge, which is a sequel to the same verse:
700 Seeibn 'Arabi's Tafsir al-Qy,r'iin al-Karzm, vol. 1, pp. 166-168; see
also above, pp. 389-393; 428-432.
"Our Lord!" (they say) "Let not our hearts deviate now
after Thou hast guided us; and grant us mercy from Thy
Presence; for Thou art the Grantor of bounties without
measure." 701
The basic meaning of the term qalb points to something that

'turns about', and to the heart that is also termed ju' iid. 702 The
heart is something that turns about, inclining to good or to evil.
When it inclines to good, it is tawfiq; to evil, it is khidhliin. 703
Referring to this the Holy Prophet, who may God bless and give
peace, said that "the heart of the believer is between two fingers
of the fingers of the Merciful." 704 The two 'fingers' represent
tawfiq and khidhliin; and they are represented as 'fingers' precisely
because fingers are the bodily instruments for causing the rapid
turning of what is held between them.705 Those who are firmly
rooted in knowledge know that we are completely at the mercy of
God as to the turning of our hearts to good or to evil, to the true or
the false; and those in whose hearts there is deviation, who have
consistently swerved away from the truth that they reject-of
them God says in another verse: "We (too) have turned their
hearts and eyes' (wa nuqallibu af idatahum wa abJiirahum ...) 706
such that they continue to be incapable of recognizing and
acknmdcdging the truth. Alluding to this verse, the Holy
Prophet said in supplication: "O turner of hearts and eyes,
establish my heart firmly upon Thy religion!" 707 The prayer of
those firmly rooted in knowledge, according to al-Razi's
commentary of the verse, is among the strongest of verses that are
established in affirming God's sole efficacy. 708 Their complete
701 .Ali 'lmriin (3):8.

102Lisan al-'Arab, vol. I, p. 687, col. 2.
703 See above,
pp. 438-439.
704 This tradition is reported by 'Abd Allah ibn 'Amr as transmitted by
Muslim in Mishkat al-Ma.rabi& ( Kitab al-Iman)' vol. I, p. 25.

705Futu&at, vol. 2, p. 104 (104); p. 105 (105).
706 Al-An' am (6): I lO.
707 See Matn al-Bukhar� with marginal glosses by al-Sindi, Dar al-Fikr,
Bayrut, 4v., (n.d.); vol. 4, p. 276. Tafszr al-Kabzr, vol. 2, p. 402.

COMMENTARY 45 1
dependence on God is clear from their saying. When they believe

in what God has revealed to them of the established and the
ambiguous, they plead with Him not to let their hearts deviate
towards what is false after having been guided to the truth. Works
of obedience must be preceded by purity of heart; and only after
their hearts have been illumined by the light of truth that there
comes to them the adornment of works of obedience. They pray
to God to grant them mercy (rabmatan) and it is the
comprehensive rabmah that is meant, so that through it the heart
might attain to the light of faith and the knowledge of His unity;
that the members of the body might achieve obedience in
worship and service; that life in the world might bring ease in
livelihood, in health, in suffering, and in peace; that at death it
might be given ease in giving up the soul, and in the examination
in the darkness of the grave; that in resurrection it might be
granted ease from punishment and forgiveness of sins, and that
the scales might preponderate over good instead of evil. They
realize their utter dependence on God for they know that the
intellect, heart, and spirit cannot hope to accomplish all this
without Him. Seeing their own existential poverty and
impotence, they seek God's mercy, for He is the giver of existence
to the realities of things.
Mercy (rabmah) in its metaphysical sense is existence (wujiid);
and the Breath of the Merciful (nafas al-rabman) is the giving of
existence to the realities of things and maintaining them in
continuance in existence. This maintaining them in continuance
in existence is their being continually renewed in their original
forms, each of which is not identical with the other. It is due to
this continuance in existence as differentia that they are realities.
Unlike the pseudo-Siifis and the Sophists, who do not know the
realities and who therefore deny them existence, those firmly
rooted in knowledge affirm the existence of realities; and this is
clear from their saying, when they contemplate the creation of
the heavens and the earth: "Our Lord!" (they say) "Thou didst
not create this in vain." 709
708 Loc. cit.
709 Ali 'lmriin (3):191.
EPILOGUE
Epilogue
The pos1t10n of the �iifis of the school of wa�dat al-wujiid,
particularly with regard to the affirmation of realities and to the
affirmation of reality to the world and the distinction between
God and His creation, has been subjected to much controversy
and confusion over the centuries. Most of the critics who engaged
in the controversy have been unaware of, or have missed careful
consideration of the following salient features of $iifi theology
anJ metaphysics, which are of paramount importance in the
correct appreciation and understanding of their position:
(I) that the basic position of the $iifis is established upon

their affirmation of the fundamental reality of existence as
opposed to that of essence or quiddity;
( 2) that the reality ofexistence is not something static, like its
effect in the mind, the concept of existence;
(3) that the dynamism of the reality of existence is
articulated in terms of expansion and contraction, and that
this existential movement evolves itself in ambiguous
gradations into the various levels of ontological expression;
(4) that the Essence in its own level of existence is unknown
and unknowable;
(5) that the Names and Attributes have a double nature, one
identical with the Essence and with each other, and the other
distinct from the Essence and from each other; and that the
archetypal realities take their rise from this latter aspect of
their nature;
(6) that the archetypal realities and their evolvement and
repercussions in the forms of empirical things each has a dual
nature characterized by complementary opposites, reflecting
their sources of origin in the Names and Attributes;
(7) that thefanii'-baqiP structure of the intuition of existence
has a dual stage level of cognitive experience characterized
by a partial experience at the first stage and a complete

experience at the second stage; and that it involves both the
psychological and the ontological realms of existence;
(8) that the true vision of the Ultimate Reality accessible to
man is based upon the second of the two stages in the
intuition of existence, which affirms both God as the Reality
as well as realities other than God, and which affirms both
God's transcendence as well as His immanence in relation to
them;
(g) that just as the Holy Qur'an contains apparent
( established) and hidden (ambiguous) meanings, so does the
book of nature contain meanings that are established and
those that are ambiguous;
(10) that religion is likewise constituted by established (i.e.
the shari' ah) and ambiguous (i.e. the baqzqah) aspects of the
same reality and truth, and that the reality of the latter is
based upon the established truth of the former.
Among the notable early critics was 'Ala' al-Dawlah al

Simnani (d. 736/1336), himself a Sufi theologian of the
Kubrawiyyah order founded by Najm al-Din Kubra of
Khwarizm (d. 618/1221), and a contemporary of al-Qashani, the
great commentator of ibn 'Arabi who we have quoted many
times in our commentary. Al-Simnani, like the many who
followed him in later times, misunderstood wabdat al-wujud to be
nothing but pure identification of the Essence with the particular
forms of its manifestations and individuations, in other words,
that it means the identification of God with the world, either in a
monistic or pantheistic sense. According to a recent, tenta6ve
interpretation of al-Simnani's position on wabdat al-wujud based
on his yet unpublished work, Al-' Urwah li Ahl al-Khalwah, 710 he
seemed to have understood existence not as a reality, but as a
concept, and considered existence as an attribute of the Essence,
and absolute existence to be something static and not dynamic,
that is, that absolute existence is not also involved in the act of
71See Collected Papers on Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, ed. by M.

0
Mohaghegh and H. Landolt, Tehran, 1971, pp. 107-109.

EPILOGUE 457
existentiation, for he proceeded to emphasise act rather than

existence as the fundamental principle of existentiation as if
existence were not itself also act. If this interpretation of al
Simnani's position is correct, then he is in error as far as his
criticism of wabdat al-wujiid is concerned; and this has become
clear in our commentary and exposition of their position.
With regard to the error and confusion in ibn Khaldun's
understanding of Sufi theology and metaphysics, we have
already touched upon this in the present commentary. In his case
the error and confusion was due to his reliance upon unreliable
and biased sources and the hasty conclusions he derived from
them, thereby contradicting principles which he as a historian
had himself established in his works. We must emphasize,
however, that ibn Khaldun had more insight into the psychology
of the Sufis than into their theology and metaphysics; and that he
was in reality not against Sufism, nor was he opposed to the Sufis
of the school of wabdat al-wujiid as interpreted by the masters
whom we have referred to in our commentary as the people of the
'second separation', and whom he referred to as "the recent
competent Sufis." He was only against the ignorant Sufis, or the
extremist Sufis, who were in fact pseudo-Sufis. Nevertheless,. his
treatment of Sufism in general and his judgement on their
perceptions based on intuitive experience as the ones that are the
least 'scientific'-which we think must also refer to the ignorant
Sufis, and not to the masters among the men of discernment
have misled many Muslim scholars and intellectuals in their
estimation on the scientific legitimacy of Sufism as a valid
method of arriving at the ultimate nature of reality.
Similar to the case of al-Simnani was that of A}:imad al
Sirhindi ( d. 1034/ 1634). Due also perhaps to his adherence to the
theology of al-Maturidi, who maintained that the Attributes are·
completely other than the Essence, he confused ibn 'Arabi's
position on the Divine Attributes, and consequently accused the
latter of pure identification of the Attributes with the Essence
leading to the complete identification of the world with God.
Like al-Simnani, he thought that the transcendent unity of
existence is not a reality, but is only the mystic's subjective
interpretation of reality, only a vision of unity which is apparently

real but is not so in reality. Using al-Simnani's terminology, he
called this subjective vision wabdat al-shuhiid: oneness of vision,
which has been translated as 'apparentism", and which he
identified as wabdat al-wujiid. This identification of wabdat al
wujiid with wabdat al-shuhiid is clearly erroneous. Wabdat al-shuhiid
in fact describes the position taken by the pseudo-Siifis and the
ignorant among the Siifis referred to by al-Qunyawi as the People
of Subjective Vision (ahl al-shuhiid al-baliyy). Wabdat al-wujiid is
based on the intuition of existence, and this is not merely a
subjective affair, but conveys also a cognitive, objective content.
We have already explained this in our commentary. In this
respect, the so-called 'reconciliation' attempted by Shah Waliyy
Allah ( d. 1 1 76/I 763) between the wabdat al-shuhiid of al-Sirhindi
and the wabdat al-wujiid of ibn 'Arabi is irrelevant, for the two
positions described by these terms refer to different situations and
cannot be reconciled. Nevertheless, in contradistinction to al
Sirhindi, Shah Waliyy Allah had a more profound insight into
the true meaning of wabdat al-wujiid, to which position he himself
adhered. It would be much nearer the truth to say that al
Sirhindi was mistaken as far as his interpretation of wabdat al
wujiid is concerned; that his wabdat al-shuhiid has nothing to do
with wabdat al-wujiid; ,;1,nd that his own position-by whatever
name he chose to call it-is but one of the aspects or facets, one
of the forms encompassed within the dimensions of wa/J,dat
al-wujiid 711•
ln contemporary times, the thought of Mu}:iammad Iqbal (d.
1938) on the nature of God, man, and the universe as outlined in
711
For misinterpretations of wa&dat al-wujud vis-a-vis wa&dat al-shuhud,
see for example, Burhan A}:imad Fariiqi's The ·Mujaddid's conception of
Tawhid, Ashraf, Lahore, 1943, eh. I and II; and G.N. Jalbani's The
teachings of Shah Walfyullah of Delhi, Ashraf, Lahore, 1967, pp. 74-76;
164-168. A correct definition of wa&dat al-wujud was already given by
al-Qunyawi or al-Qashani as: that by which the reality of things
existent is actualized; and that which is actualized is never valid to be
regarded as 'be-ing' except with reference to the Truth; and also by al
Maha'imi: the unity of existence is that whereby things are actualized,
and this is one (see above pp. 405-406).
EPILOGUE 459
his Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam is
basically an attempt at a reasoned simplification of the Sufi
method of approach and of their complex vision of the nature of
reality. Although he himself did not clearly and positively
acknowledge his profound debt to the Sufis ofthe school ofwa&dat
al-wujiid, there can be no doubt, from what is clearly reflected in
his Reconstruction, that he could never have formulated his
philosophy without sufficient knowledge of Sufi theology,
psychology, and metaphysics. Even though he did not show any
awareness of the fundamental position of the Sufis on the
principality ofexistence, the Islamic aspects in his philosophy are
largely derived from Sufism. As an example, we adduce the
following salient features representing the core of his philosophy:
that intuition refers to a faculty of knowledge, and that it is a
source of knowledge; that the Ultimate Reality cannot be
reached by reason, but by intuition and experience of states of
transcendental awareness; that there is harmony between
intuition and intellect and the faculties ofthe self; that knowledge
of reality is possible through intuition; that intuition of the self
leads to knowledge of real essence; that knowledge of God can
only.be reached through intuition of the self; that intuition of the
self can determine the nature of the material world; that the
empirical world, the world ofsense and sensible experience, is the
creation of the self; that the self is of a twofold nature, one
described as the efficient and the other as the appreciative self;
that the self, in correspondence with its twofold nature, exists in
unity and diversity; that time and space are not independent
categories, and that real time is duration; that time, for the
efficient selfis serial, and for the appreciative selfis duration; that
the self, in its real essence, is an ego, an individual reality, and
that all realities are individual (egos); that there are super egos;
that the self is immortal; that the egos possess freedom, and that
the selfevolves according to its possibilities in eternity; that things
are not substantial; that there is continuous creation, so that the
world is not a complete act, but a becoming; that reality is
dynamic, and that movement (or we would say, that which
continually moves) is the essence ofreality; that the Ultimate Ego
encompasses finite egos in His Being; that God is both

transcendent and immanent, and that the world of nature
consists ofsigns of God, revealing to man its symbolic significance
and allowing man to observe and to involve himself in knowing
this aspect of Reality in order to apprehend its ultimate nature.
In spite of that, however, there are other aspects in his philosophy
which are not derived from Sufism, but which he attempted to
fuse together with it into what in reality amounts to an impossible
combination, and these are largely derived from the evolutionist
philosophy and science of the West that emerged once again at
the end of the nineteenth century after lying dormant since
antiquity. With due respect to him, we think that his reduction of
Sufism such that it becomes confused with the science and
philosophy of organic or biological and non-organic evolution is
a grave mistake. Neither the creative evolution of Bergson, nor
the theory of evolution of Nietzsche about the inexplicable, new
mutation of the human species bringing into existence the
superman is congenial to Sufism or to Islam. Indeed, the
evolutionary concept of nature in modern science and
philosophy already implies a sort of contempt for past human
achievement-a character trait prevalent among the so-called
Muslim 'modernists'. As to Darwin's theory of biological
evolution which caused the emergence of thP concept of
evolution in modern science and philosophy, this is alien to
Sufism and to Islam. It is true that in the writings of the Ikhwan
al-Safa, of ibn Miskawayh, ofSufis such as ibn 'Arabi and Rumi,
and later again repeated in the work of ibn Khaldun, a scientific
form of a theory of evolution is found which hears a striking
resemblance to the Darwinian theory of evolution. But the
resemblance is superficial, for the Muslim thinkers and Sufis were
referring to the gradation in nature involving the spiritual
evolution of the soul of man, not to the evolutionary concept of
nature that Darwin inaugurated in modern science and
philosophy. This is not the place to go into details, but a tracing of
the ideas upon which Iqbal developed his thought, and a critique
of his Reconstruction has yet to be undertaken.
Modern philosophy has become the interpreter of science, and
EPILOGUE
organizes the results of the natural and social sciences into a

world view. The interpretation in turn determines the direction
in which science is to take in its study of nature. It is this
interpretation of the statements and general conclusions of science
and the direction of science along the lines suggested by the
interpretation that must be subjected to critical evaluation, as
they pose for us today the most profound problems that have
confronted us generally in the course of our religious and
intellectual history. Our evaluation must entail a critical
examination of the methods of modern science; its concepts,
presuppositions, and symbols; its empirical and rational aspects,
and those impinging upon values and ethics; its interpretation of
origins; its theory of knowledge; its presuppositions on the
existence of an external world, of the uniformity of nature, and of
the rationality of natural processes; its theory of the universe; its
classification of the sciences; its limitations and inter-relations
with one another of the sciences, and its social relations.
Contemporary science has evolved and developed out of a
philosophy that since its earliest periods affirmed the coming into
being of things out of each other. Everything existent is a
progression, a development or evolution of what lies in latency in
eternal matter. The world seen from this perspective is an ·
independent, eternal universe; a self-subsistent system evolving
according to its own laws. The denial of the reality and existence
of God is already implied in this philosophy. Its methods are
chiefly philosophic rationalism, which tends to rely on reason
alone without much reliance upon sense perception or
experience, and secular rationalism, which while accepting
reason tends to rely more on sense experience, and deny
authority and intuition as sources of knowledge. The vision of
reality as seen according to the perspective of both forms of
rationalism is based upon the restriction of reality to the natural
world which is considered as the only level of reality. Such
restriction follows from the reduction of the operational powers
and capacities ofthe cognitive faculties and senses to the sphere of
physical reality. In this system knowledge is valid only as it
pertains to the natural order of events and their relationships;
462 A COMMENTARY ON THE IJUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
and the purpose of inquiry is to describe and to systematize what

happens in nature, by which is meant the totality of objects and
events in space and time. The world of nature is described in
plain naturalistic and rational terms divested of spiritual
significance or of symbolic interpretation, reducing its origin and
reality solely to mere natural forces.
Rationalism, both the philosophic and the secular kinds, tends
to deny authority and intuition as legitimate sources and
methods of knowledge. Not that it denies the existence of authority
and of intuition, but that it reduces authority and intuition to
reason and experience. It is true that at the original instance in
the case of both authority and intuition, there is always someone
who experiences and who reasons; but it does not follow that
because of this authority and intuition should be reduced to
reason and experience. If it is admitted that there are levels of
reason and experience at the level of normal, human
consciousness whose limitations are recognized, there is no
reason to suppose that there are no higher levels of human
experience and consciousness beyond the limits of normal
reason and experience in which there are levels of intellectual
and spiritual cognition and transcendental experience whose
limits are known only to God.
As to intuition; most rationalist and secularist thinkers and
psychologists have reduced it to sensory observation and logical
inference that have long been brooded over by the mind, whose
meaning becomes suddenly apprehended, or to latent sensory
and emotional build-ups which are released all of a sudden in a
burst of apprehension. But this is conjecture on their part, for
there is no proof that the sudden flash of apprehension comes
from sense experience; moreover, their denial of an intuitive
faculty such as the heart, implicit in their contention regarding
intuition, is also conjectural.
Since it i� man that perceives and conceives the world of
objects and events external to him, the study of nature includes
man himself. But the study of man, of mind, and of the self is also
restricted to the methods of new sciences such as psychology,
biology, and anthropology, which regard man only as a further
EPILOGUE
development of the animal species, and which are none other

than methodological extensions of the restriction of reason and
experience to level of physical reality.
Finally, doubt is elevated as an epistemological method by
means of which the rationalist and the secularist believe that
truth is arrived at. But there is no proof that it is doubt and not
something else other than doubt that enables one to arrive at
truth. The arrival at truth is in reality the result of guidance, not
of doubt. Doubt is a wavering between two opposites without
preponderating over either one of them; it is a condition of being
stationary in the midst of the lwo opposites without the heart
inclining towards the one or the other. If the heart inclines more
towards the one and not towards the other while yet not rejecting
the other, it is conjecture; if the heart rejects the other, then it has
entered the station of certainty. The heart's rejecting the other is
a sign not of doubt as to its truth, but of positive recognition of its
error or falsity. This is guidance. Doubt, whether it be definitive
or provisional, leads either to conjecture or to another position of
uncertainty, never to the truth-"and conjecture avails naught
against truth." 712
In contrast to the position of modern science and phil0sophy
with regard to the sources and methods of knowledge, we
maintain that just as there are levels of reason and experience, so
are there levels of authority and intuition. Apart from the
authority of men of science and learning generally, the highest
level of authority in our view is the Holy Qur'an and the
Tradition including the sacred person of the Holy Prophet. They
represent authority not only in the sense that they communicate the
truth, but in the sense also that they constitute the truth. They
represent authority that is established upon the higher levels of
intellectual and spiritual cogmt10n and transcendental
experience that cannot simply be reduced to the normal level of
reason and experience.
With regard to intuition, and at the normal level of human
consciousness, the higher levels to which great men of science and
712 Yiinus ( IO): 36.

learning attain, in the moments of their decisive discoveries of

laws and principles that govern the world of nature, are levels
commensurate with the training, discipline and development of
their powers of reasoning and experiential capacities, and with
the specific problems that confront them which reason and
experience are unable to give coherent meaning. The arrival at
the meaning is through intuition, for it is intuition that synthesizes
what reason and experience each sees separately without being
able to combine into a coherent whole. Intuition comes to a man
when he is prepared for it; when his reason and experience are
trained and disciplined to receive and to interpret it. But whereas
the levels of intuition to which rational and empirical methods
might lead refer only to specific aspects of the nature ofreality, and
not to the whole of it, the levels of intuition at the higher levels of
human consciouness to which prophets and saints attain give
direct insight into the nature of reality as a whole. The prophet
and the saint also require preparation to receive and to be able to
interpret it; and their preparation does not consist only of the
training, discipline and development of their powers of reasoning
and their capacities for sense experience, but also the training,
discipline and development of their inner selves and the faculties
of self concerned with the apprehension of truth-reality.
Islamic science and philosophy ( i.e. bikmah as contrasted with
falsafah) have always found coherent expression within a basic
metaphysical structure formulated according to the tradition of
$ufism and founded upon the authority of Revelation and
Tradition, sound reason, experience and intuition. Since the
divergence between this Islamic metaphysics and modern
science and philosophy is rooted in their respective positions
concerning the sources and methods of knowledge and the
epistemological process, we cannot afford to allow ourselves to
submit to the dictates of the statements and general conclusions of
a science and the interpretations of a philosophy that both rely
upon restricted forms of empiricism and rationalism as sources
and methods of genuine knowledge, seeing that the purpose of
inquiry is to discover the truth about the ultimate Reality. The
ultimate Reality is not to be conjectured vaguely as Force,
EPILOGUE
Energy, Elan Vital, Space-Time, Movement, Change, or

Becoming, in line with the statements, conclusions and
interpretations of modern science and philosophy.
The study of nature by science ought not to be reduced to the
methods of empiricism and rationalism that operate solely on the
world of objects or events in space and time and their relations.
The statements and general conclusions derived from these
methods must be reformulated, and the methods themselves
modified, such that they can be integrated into a unified system
that discloses the ultimate Reality in positive terms. Islamic
metaphysics, which is but another name for philosophical
Sufism, is the unified system alluded to, for it already integrates
reason and experience with their higher orders in the
suprarational and transempirical levels of human consciousness.
What we need, then, is not a reconstruction, but a restatement of the
statements and general conclusions of Islamic metaphysics in
accordance with the intellectual perspective of our times and the
developments in the domains of knowledge; and this entails a
realignment, where relevant or necessary, of the direction of
developments in the various sciences such that they become
integrated with it.
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INDEX I
Names ofpersons mentioned in the text of the

Introduction) Translation) Commentary and
Epilogue
Index I
Names of persons mentioned in the text of the Introduction,
Translation, Commentary and Epilogue
'Abd Allah al-An�ari al-1:farawi, Idris a I-Shafi 'i,p. 29,8 2 ' l 99,
p. 16,43,384 292,437
'Abd Allah al-Balbani,p. 18 Abu 'Ali Al)mad ibn Mul)ammad
'Abd Allah Basta.mi,p. 22 ibn Miskawayh,p. 219,460
'Abd Allah ibn 1:fusayn ibn 'Ali Abu 'Ali Ghulam ibn Turkan, p.
al-'Ajalani,p. 22. 14
'Abd Allah ibn Shaykh al- Abu 'Ali al-1:fusayn ibn 'Abd
'Aydarus,p. 15 Allah ibn Sina,p.2I2,219,22 l'
'Abd Allah al-Yamani,p. 10 ,11 235, 236, 25 l, 293, 326, 367,
'Abd al-'A�im al-Mundhiri,p. 25 368,369,370 ,374,375
'½.bd al-'Aziz,p. 49 Abu Bakr ibn 'Abd Allah al-
'Abd al-'Aziz ibn 'Abd al-Majid 'Aydarus,p. 13,15
ib.n Temenggong Ibrahim, p. Abu Bakr al-Baqillani,p. 29,2 IO,
26 212, 213
'Abd al-Ghafiir al-Lari, p. 280 , Abu Bakr al-Shibli,p. 14,97
282 Abu Bakr al-�iddiq, Companion
'Abd al-1:fayy ibn Fakhr al-Din of the Holy Prophet,p. 96,117,
al-1:fasani, p. 12,28 196
'Abd al-Karim al-Jili,p. 19,44 Abu Bakr Thabit ibn Qurrah al-
'Abd al-Qahir al-Baghdadi, p. 1:Iarrani,p. 219,220
20 6,210 ,378 Abu Bakr al-Wasiti,p. 428
'Abd al-Ral)man ibn 'Awf,Com Abu al-Fa<;ll Al)mad ibn 'Ata'
panion of the Holy Prophet,p. Allah al-Iskandari,p. 98, 419,
196 421
'Abd al-Ral)man ibn Khaldun,p. Abu al-Fa<;ll ibn Kanil),p. 1 4
41,209,293,343,345,346,457, Abu al-Fa<;Il Jamal al-Din
460 Mu}:iammad ibn al-Mukarram
'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Sinkili,p. 25 ibn Man�ur,p. 198,205,435
'Abd al-Razzaq al-Qashani, p. Abu al-Faraj ibn al-Tayyib, p.
18,44,180 ,238,28 2,283,288, 219
385,40 5, 456 Abu al-Fath Muhammad ibn
Abu 'Abd Allah al-Bay<;iawi, p. 'Abd al-Karim al-Shahrastani,
213, 420 p. 218,219,221,400,40 1,438
Abu 'Abd Allah Mul)ammad ibn Abu }:faf� Najm al-Din 'Umar al-
47 0 A COMMENTARY ON THE J:IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
Nasafi,p. 12,25,47,206,326, Abu Sulayman al-Sijistani p.2 I 9,

328 220
Abu }:Iaf� 'Umar ibn 'Abd Allah Abu Talib ibn 'Abd al-Mugalib,
Ba Shayban,p. 13,15 p. 205
Abu }:Iamid Mu}:lammad al Abu Talib al-Makki,p. 23,428
Ghazali,p. 16, l 7,29,43,143, Abu 'Ubaydah ibn al-Jarra}:i,
168, 212, 213, 221, 222, 246, Companion of the Holy
254, 282, 349, 351, 353, 354, Prophet,p. 196
357,361,363,364,365,373 Abu Ya}:iya Zakariyya al-An�ari,
Abu al-}:Iasan al-Ash'ari, p. 29, p. 20
209, 2 l O, 2 l l, 250, 294, 304, Abu Zakariyya Y a}:iya ibn 'Adi
381,382 al-�aymur'i,p. 219,220
Abu al-}:Iasan Mu}:lammad ibn Abu Zayd A}:lmad ibn Sahl al
Yusuf al-'Amiri,p. 219. Ralkhi,p. 219
Abu Hurayrah,Companion of the Adam,the prophet,p. 125, 126,
Holy Prophet,p. 147,185 132
Abu al-}:Iusayn al-Ba�ri,p. 304 'Ac;lud al-Din A}:imad ibn 'Abd al
Abu Ja'far A}:lmad al-Tahawi,p. Ra}:iman al-Tj'i,p. 24,207,386
209 A}:lmad ibn Abi al-}:Iasan al
Abu al-Khayr ibn Shaykh ibn Rifa'i,p. 14
}:Iajar, p. 5,22 A}:lmad ibn Mu}:iammad ibn 'Abd
Abu al-Ma'ali al-Juwayni,p. 2 I I, al-Ra}:lim al-Rifa'i,p. 14
2 49 A}:imad ibn Mu}:lammad ibn
Abu Man�ur al-Maturidi,p. 209, Hajar al-Haythami,p. 21
457 A}:imad ibn Musa al-Khayali,p.
Abu Na�r 'Abd al-Wahhab Taj 333
al-Din ibn Subki,p. 18 A}:lmad Shah, Sultan of Pahang,
Abu Na�r Mu}:lammad ibn p. 7
Mu}:lammad ibn Tarkhan al A}:imad al-Sirhindi",p. 457,458
Farabi, p. 2 l 2, 219, 220, 236, A�mad ibn al-Tayyib al-
293,367 Sarakhsi, p. 219
Abu Na�r al-Sarraj, p. 43, 419, 'A'ishah, wife of the Holy
420,425,428 Prophet,p. 195
Abu al-Qasim J unayd al- 'Ala' al-Dawlah al-Simnani, p.
Baghdadi,p. 14,22,29,43,97, 456,457,458
125,127,298,416,417,419 'Ala' al-Din Ri'ayat Shah,Sultan
Abu al-Qasim al-Qushayri,p. 43 of Acheh,p. 6
Abu Sa'id ibn al-A'rabi,p. 299 'Ali ibn Abi Talib,Companion of
Abu Sa'id al-Kharraz,p.22,298, the Holy Prophet, p. 14, 92,
418,428 l 17,194,195,196,397
Abu Shakur al-Salimi,p. 20 'Ali Abu al-Fac;ll al-Qari' al-
Abu Sulayman Mu}:lammad ibn Wasit'i,p. 14
Ma'shar al-Muqaddasi,p.219, 'Ali ibn A}:imad al-Maha'imi, p.
220 r9,93, 105,231,401,404,405
INDEX I 47 1
'Ali al-'Ajami, p. 14 Fatimah, daughter of the Holy

'Ali ibn al-Bariyari, p. 14 Prophet, p. 194, 195
'Ali ibn 'Uthman al-J ullabi al
Hujwiri, p. 43, 428, 439 Gorgias, p. 206
'Ali ibn 'Uthman al-Rifa'i, p. 14
'Amir ibn Wathil al-Kinani, last J:Iahib al-'Ajami, p. 14
of the Companions of the Holy J:Iamzah al-Fan�uri, p. 6, 8, 46,
Prophet, p. 196 51,157,161, '.201,227,320,321,
Anaxagoras, p. 218 322
Anaximenes, p. 2 18 al-J:Iasan, grandson of the Holy
Aristotle, p. 218, 219, 220, 367 Prophet, p. 194, 195
al-Azhari, p. 192 J:Iasan al-Ba�ri, p. 14
J:IayJar Amuli, p. 428, 430, 43 I
Badr al-Din Abu 'Ali Hippias, p. 206
Mu}:lammad ibn Burhan al Homer, p. 2 18
Din ibnJama'ah, p. 23 J:Iunayn ibn ls}:laq, p. 219
Bergson, H., p. 460 al-J:Iusayn, grandson of the Holy
Burhan al-Din Ibrahim al-'Alawi, Prophet, p. 194, 195
p. 14 J:Iusayn ibn Man�ur al-J:Iallaj, p.
23
Chrysippus, p. 2 18.
lbn al-A'rabi, p. 198
Darwin, C., p. 460, lbn Sayyidih, p. 194
Dawud, the prophet, p. 96 Ibrahim ibn 'Abd Allah al
Shami, p. 7
Dawud ibn 'Abd Allah al-Fatani,
p. 25 Ibrahim ibn Yusuf ibn al-Mar'ah
ibn Dihaq, p. 345
Dawud ibn Ma}:imud al-Qaysari,
p. 18, 44 'Isa Uesus) the prophet, p. 92, 93,
Dawud al-Ta'i, p. 14 397, 400, 401, 442
Dhii al-Nun al-Mi�ri, p. 420,425, 'Isa ibn 'Ali ibn 'Isa al-Wazir, p.
436 219
Djajadiningrat, R.A.H., p. 26 lskandar Dhu al-Qarnayn, p. 28
lskandar Muda, Sultan of Acheh,
p. 7, 8
Empedocles, p. 218 lskandar Thani 'Ala' al-Din
Epictetus, p. 367 Mughayat Shah, Sultan of
Acheh, p. 7, 8, 12, 26
Fakhr al-Din al-J:Iirali ( or al lskandar, T., p. 26
J:Iarali), p. 1 7 lsma'i ibn Ibrahim al-Jabarfi, p.
Fakhr al-Din Ibrahim al-'lraqi, 14
p. 18
Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, p. 23, 211, Jabir ibn J:Iayyan, p. 402
212, 329, 450 Ja'far al-Sadiq, p. 402
Farid al-Din 'Attar, p. I 15 Jalal al-Din Ru.mi, p. 114, 121,
47 2 A COMMENTARY ON THE I:,IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
122, 148, 215, 460 Mu}:tammad ibn Ya'qiib al

Jalal al-Din al-Suyiiti, p. 20 Firiizabadi, p. I 9
Jamal al-Din Mu}:tammad ibn Mu}:tyi al-Din Ibrahim ibn al
A}:tmad Fa<;ll, p. 15 A'rab ibn 'Ali al-Rifa'i, p. 14
Jamal al-Din Mu}:tammad ibn Mu}:tyi al-Din Mu}:tammad ibn
Mas'iid Abi Sakil al-An�ari, p. 'Ali ibn 'Arabi,p. r6,17,18,20,
15 22, 23, 44, gr, 96, 99, 153, 156,
Jamal al-Din Mu}:tammad ibn 157, 161' 162, 167, 168, 176,
Sa'id Gin al-Tabari, p. 15 I 77, 183, 234, 237, 238, 282,
299, 317, 341, 344, 389, 391,
Ka'b ibn Malik, Companion of 407, 422, 428, 431, 432, 456,
the Holy Prophet, p. 382 457, 458
Musa ibn Maymiin
Labid, p. 435 (Maimonides), p. 210
Muslim, p. 147, 185, 195
Mani, p. rgo
Man�iir al-Rifa'i, p. 14 Najm al-Din Kubra, p. 456
Marcus Aurelius, p. 367 Na�ir al-Din al-Tiisi, p. 375
Ma'ruf al-Karkhi, p. 14 Niemann, G.K., p. 26
Mary, p. 401 Nietzsche, F., p. 460
Mazdak, p. 1go, 217 Nieuwenhuijze, C.A.O., van, p.
Mu'ayyid al-Din al-Jandi, p. 23 27
Mu}:tammad, the Prophet, p. 84, Nur al-Din 'Abd al-Ra}:iman al-
105, I 17, 197, rgg Jami p. 19, 20, 44, 123, 155,
Mu}:tammad ibn 'Abd Allah al 163, 177, 181, 232, 238, 244,
'Aydariis, p. 13, 15 273, 277, 278, 280, 281, 290,
Mu}:tammad ibn Ab1 Bakr al 302, 306, 308, 309, 337, 342,
I)uja'i, p. 14 415
Muhammad ibn Abi Bakr al- Nur al-Din Mu}:tammad ibn 'Ali
1:fanafi al-A}:tamadabadi,p. l 2 al-Raniri, p. 3, 4 , 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
Mu}:tammad 'Adil Shah, p.13 10, l l, 12,13,14,15,21,22,23,
Mu}:tammad A'la ibn 'Ali al 24,28,29,31,44,46,47,48,49,
Tahanawi, p. 206, 214, 2r6, 50, 83, 109 l 10, l l 1, l 12, l l 3,
333 l 16, l I 7, l l 9, 120, l 2 l, l 23,
Mu}:tammad Arshad ( al-Banjari), 124, l 28, l 29, 138, 140, 148,
p. 25 149, l5 l, l 61, 162, 168, 169,
Mu}:iammad ibn Fa<;ll Allah al l 73, 177, 182, 186, 19 l, 194,
Burhanpuri, p. 2 l' 46, l 04 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203,
Mu}:tammad Iqbal, p. 458, 460 204; 207, 213, 216, 222, 226,
Mu}:iammad Jaylani ibn l:fasan 227, 229, 234, 235, 238, 244,
ibn Mu}:tammad al-1:famid, 246, 247, 250, 251' 253, 256,
p. 6 260, 262, 263, 266, 272, 273,
Mu}:tammad al-Rifa'i, p. 14 275, 277, 278, 280, 283, 285,
Mu}:tammad al-Yamani, p. 5 289, 291, 292, 295, 298, 301,
INDEX I 473
309, 310, 312, 314, 315, 320, $ala}:i al-Din Ibrahim ibn 'Abd
322, 334, 341, 347, 348, 362, Allah, p. 28
365, 37 l, 373, 377, 383, 384, Sari al-Saqati, p. 14
385, 386, 387, 389, 397, 400, Sayyid l:f usayn al-Shatiri, p. 23,
401, 406, 415, 416, 418, 419, 162
421, 422, 427, 430, 431, 432, Sayyid Ma}:imud Kayswaraz ( or
434, 436, 437, 438, 440, 447, Kaysuraz), p. 22
449 Sayyid Nur al-l:fasan ibn Siddiq
l:fasan al-Qanawji, p. 1 2
Parmenides, p. 228 Sayyid al-Sharif'Ali al-J urjani 1 p.
Plato, p, 218, 221, 367 24, l19, 386
Plotinus, p. 219 221, 367 Sayyid al-Sharif Mu}:iammad ibn
Porphyry, p. 219 3-l-l:fasan al-Samarqandi, p. 14
Prodicus, p. 206 Shah Waliyy Allah, p. 458
Protagoras, p. 206 Shams al-Din ibn 'Abd Allah al
Pythagoras, p. 2 18 Sumatra'i, p. 6, 8, 46
Sharaf al-Din al-Barizi, p. 18
Qutb al-Din Abu al-l:fasan 'Ali al-Sharif Na�ir al-l:fusayni al
ibn 'Abd al-Ra}:iman al-Rifa'i, Jaylani, p. 20
p. 14 Shaykh ibn 'Abd Allah al
Qutb al-Din al-Qastallani, p. 23 'Aydarus, p. 13, 15, 21
Shihab al-Din Abu J:Iaf�, 'Umar
Rabi'ah al-'Adawiyyah, woman al-Suhrawardi, p. 24
saint of Ba�rah, p. 148 Shihab al-Din Ahmad ibn Abi
al-Raghib al-I�fahani, p. 370 Bakr al-Raddad, p. 15
Razin, p. 197 Shihab al-Din A}:imad ibn 'Abd
al-Malik, p. 22
Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas, Compan Shihab al-Din A}:imad ibn Majid,
ion of the Holy Prophet,p. 195, p. IO
196 Shu'ayb, the prophet, p. 1 77
Sa'd al-Din al-l:famawi, p. 23 ibn Sirin, p. 120.
Sa'd al-Din Ma}:imud Shabistari, Syed Muhammad Naquib al-
p. l 15 Attas, p. 28
Sa'd al-Din Mas'ud ibn 'Umar al Socrates, p. 218
Taftazani, p. 12, 25, 47, 206, Solon, p. 2 I 8
253, 326, 328
$adr al-Din al-Qunyawi, p. 17, Taj al-'Alam �afiyyat al-Din
44,273,385,405,428,430,458 Shah,Sultanah of Acheh,p. l 2,
$adr al-Din Ruzbihan Baqli 26, 27
Shirazi, p. 17 Taj al-Din Mu}:iammad al-Rifa'i,
$adr al-Din al-Shirazi (Mulla p. 14
$adra), p. 44 Tal}:iah, Companion of the Holy
Sa'id ibn Zayd,Companion ofthe Prophet, p. 196
Holy Prophet, p. 196 Tal}:iah ibn Mu}:iammad al-
Nasafi, p. 219, 220 Van der Tuuk, p. 24, 28

Teungku Kuta Karang, p. 25 Vasco da Gama, p. IO
Thales, p. 2 18 Voorhoeve, P., p. 24, 27, 28, 49
Tudjimah, Ny. p. 26
Tun Seri Lanang, p. 7 Al-Wasifi, p. 23
Wilkinson, R.J., p. 25, 26, 28
'Umar ibn al-Khattab, Compan Winstedt, R.O., p. 25, 26
ion of the Holy Prophet, p. 147,
185, 196 Ya'qub ibn lsJ:iaq al-Kind1, p.
'Umar al-Khayyam, p. 406 219, 220, 293
'Uthman ibn 'Affiin, Companion
of the Holy Prophet, p. 196 Zayn al-Dfo al-Khafi, p. 23
'Uzayr (Ezra), the prophet, p. 92 Zeno, p. 218
al-Zubayr, Companion of the
Van Ronkel, Ph.S., p. 26 Holy Prophet, p. 196
INDEX II
Names of Schools) Sects ) Groups

Index II
Names of Schools, Sects, Groups
Ahl Allah: People of God (the $iifis),p. 103,222,432

Ahl al-Bayt: the Houst>hold of the Prophet,p. 194
Ahl al-Jfijab: People of the Veil (the common people),p. 19,45,364,
368,370 426, 430, 432,327, 328, �67, 370,388
Ahl al-KhawaH,· the elecL (the $iifis), p. 91, 345,388,389, 431
Ahl al-Ma;_al: People of the Porticoes, (the Stoics) p..218
Ahl al-Na;_ar: the specuiative thinkers, p. 29;, note
Ahl al-Riwaq: People of the Tents, (the Stoics) p. 218
Ahl al-Shuhiid al-Jfaliyy: People of Subjective Vision,p. 102,426, 428,
430, 43 I, 432,458
Ahl al-Suliik: People of the ($iifi) Path,p. 157,158
Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jama' ah: People of the Approved Way and the
Community,p. 196,381; Sunnz, p. 29
Ahl al-Ta'as_s_ub: extremists having strong group feeling, p. 201,202
Ahl al- Tamkin: People of Spiritual Maturity or Steadfastness (people of
the 'second separation'),p. 102,426,430,431,432
Ahl al-Ta's_zb: (see ahl al-ta'as_s_ub), p. 201,202, 203
Ahl al-Taw�zd wa al-Ma'rlfah: People of Unity and Gnosis,p. 98, 419
Ahl al-Wa�dah: People of Unity,p. 222, 238
Ahl al-Wathzq: People of Firmness in belief, of Certainty, p. 198,
447
Ahl al-Yaqzn: men of certitude,q.v. ahl al-wathzq, p. 239
Ahl al-?,ahir: People of Externality,p. 430
'Alz llahiyyah: heretical sect,p. 1o,92,397
al-Anrar: the Helpers,p. 196
al-'Arifan: the Gnostics (the men of illuminative knowledge), p. 104,
143,144,239
As_�b al-Tathlzth: Trinitarians (Christians) p. 400
al-'Asharah al-Mubashsharah bi al-Jannah: the Ten who have been
promised Paradise,p. 193.
Ash'arz: al-Ash'ariyyah: al-Asha'irah: the theologians,p. 29,30,31,33,44,
45,46,304,340,341,342,347,352,438
al-Awliya'iyyah: pseudo-$iifis,p. 216
al-Awwaliin: the ancient ( early) theologians,p. 212,213
al-'Aydariisiyyah: $ufi sub-order,p. 29
al-Babakiyyah: esoteric deviationists, p. 188, note

al-Badriyyiin: those of the Battle of Badr, p. 196
al-Baramikah: deviationists, p. 188, note
al-Ba/iniyyah: the Esotericists, p. 188, 189, 220, 397
al-Dhammiyyah: heretical sect, q.v. 'Alz Ilahiyyah, p. 92, note

Dhii al-'Aynayn: the possessor of two eyes, p. 146, 346
al-Falasifah: the philosophers: p. 31, 33,34, 84, 89, go, 208, 212, 218,
219,221,222,239,251,254,257,267,302,303,304,305,306,307,
309,324,326,334,335,347,348,349,350,351,352,353,354,355,
356,357,358,359,360,361,362,363,364,365,367,368,371,372,
373,374,375,376,377,387,403,404,407,408,409,410,412,413,
414, 415, 416, 427, 443
al-Ghaliyyah: heretical sect, p. 397

al-Ghassaniyyah: heretical sect, p. 378
al-lfaliyyah: pseudo-$ufis, p. 2 l 6
al-Hishamiyyah: heretical sect, p. 397
al-lfubbiyyah: pseudo-;,iifis, p. 216
al-J-jukama': see al-falasifah, p. 239; sing. al-f;akzm, p. 306
al-lfukama' al-Sab' ah: the Seven Sages, p. 2 I 8
al-lfuliiliyyah: pseudo-$ufis, p. 216
al-lfiiriyyah: pseudo-$ufis, p. 216
al-lhal;iyyah: pseudo-$ufis p. 216

Ikhwan al-$afa: the Brethren of Purity,p.113,114,220,293,307,340,
402, 403, 404, 460
al-flhamiyyah: pseudo-$ufis, p. 2 I 6
al-' Inadiyyah: the Obstinate, p. 207, 14 7, 331
al-' Indiyyah: the Subjectivists, p. 207
al-lsma'zliyyah: the esotericists, p. 192, 189, 190, 191, 220, 397
al-lttif;adiyyah: the philosophical pantheists, p. 225
al-Jahiliyyah: the People of Ignorance, p. 188

al-Jahmiyyah: heretical sect, p. 378
al-Karramiyyah: heretical sect, p. 397

al-Khawarr: the elect, p. 138, 139, 215, 216, 217, 327, 328, 366, 429
al-KhawariJ: heretical extremists, p. 380
al-Khaw¾r al-Khawarr: the superelect,p. 139,215,217,346,327,366,369,
389, 429, 43 I
al-Khulafii' al-Rashidiin: the Rightly Guided Successors, p. 196
INDEX II 479
al-Khurramryyah: heretical sect, p. 188, note
Khu,ru,r: the elect, p. 215, note
Khu,ru,r al-khu.ruF the superelect, p. 215, note
al-Kubrawryyah, $iifi order, p. 456
al-La-Adrryyah: the Agnostics, p. 207, 147
rzl-Majus: Zoroastrianism, p. 189

al-Malamatryyah: pseudo-$ufis, p. 216, note
al-Manawryyah: Manichaeanism, p. 189
al-Manfiqryyzn: the Logicians, p. 88, 3 ro, 322
al-Marzsryyah: heretical sect, p. 378
al-Mazdakryyah: Mazdakism, p. 189
al-Mu' anidzn: the Obstinate,p. 83, I 99,200,20 I' 29, I 38,203,204,205,
207, 208, 140
al-Mughzrryyah: heretical sect, p. 397
al-Mu�ajirun: the Emigrants, p. 196
al-Mu�mmirah: heretical sect, p. 188, note
al-Mujassimah: the Corporealizers, p. 216, 2 I7, 442
al-Mul�idah: the deviators,p. 84, 189, 377
al-Murji'ah: the Postponers ofDivinejudgement,p. go,377,378,379,
380, 38 I, 382, 383, 384
al-Muta' akhkhiruna: the recent (theologians),p.212,213,(philosophers:
p. 218)
al-Muta'a,r,ribzn: the extremists,p. 83,199,201,202,203,208,440, 142,
1 47
al-Mutakallimun: the theologians: p.29,33,34,38,44,45,84,85,86,89,
99, 208, 2IO, 21 I, 212, 213, 239,249, 250, 252, 255, 256, 25 7, 258,
259,260,263,264,265,266,267,271,276,291,292,294,295,300,
302,303,304,305,306,307,309,310,312,322,324,325,326,334,
335,336,337,338,339,340,347,356,357,359,360,36 1,372,377,
407, 408, 409, 41 l, 412, 415, 416, 427, 443
al-Mutakiisilryyah: pseudo-Sufis, p. 216
al-Mutajahilryyah: pseudo-Sufis, p. 216
al-Mutaqaddimun: the early (ancient) philosophers, p. 218
al-Mut�awwif: the aspirant of Sufism, p. 214, 215, 216
al-Mu'tazilah: the Seceders, p. 208, 209, 210, 304, 318, 321, 376 378,
38 I, 382,408, 438, 442
al-Mushabbihah: the Likeners, p. 216, 217, 442
al-Must�if: the pseudo-Sufi, p. 214, 215
al-MuwaMidun: the Unitarian $ufis-the Affirmers of Unity of the
school of wa�dat al-wujud, p. 238, 307, 317, 345
al-.Nabryyzn: the prophets,p. l16, I I 7' I 20, l 2 l' l 22, I 25, l 26, l 28, l 29,
480 A COMMENTA,RY ON THE �UJJAT AL-�IDDIQ,
140, 182, 186, 187

al-Na{iirii: the Christians, p. 92, 93, 95, 397, 399, 400, 401
al-Qadarzyyah: heretical sect,p. 37 8, 379
al-Qp}andariyyah: pseudo-Siifis,p. 216, note
al-Q,ariimi/ah: the Carmathians, p. I 88, note
al-Riiji,rj,iyyah: the Riiji,tj,ah, p. 92, 397
al-Riishidun: the Rightly Guided, p. 197
al-Rifiliyyah: Sufi order, p. 13, 29
al-Sabii'iyyah: heretical sect,p. 397

al-Sab'iyyah: heretical sect, p. 188, note
al-Sabbiibiyyah: heretical sect, p. 92
al-$iili&zn: the Incorruptible in virtue, p. 117
al-Shamriikhiyyah: pseudo-Sufis, p. 216
al-Ski' ah: the Shi'ites, p. 344
al-Shuhadii': the Witnesses,p. 117
al-$iddzqzn: the Veracious, p. I og, I I 6, I I 7, ( al-$iddzq I I 7), I 20, I 2 l,
122, 125, 126, 128 , 129, 130, 140 (al-$adiqzn, p. 193)
Sophistai: Sophists,p. 206, 250, 273
al-Siifas/ah: Sophists: sophistai, p. 206
al-Sufaha': the wicked and ignorant, p. 84, 200, 201, 202, 203
al-$ufi: the mystics: p. 29,31,32,33,34,35,36,38,41,43,44,45,46,84,
85,86,87,88,8 9,95,99, !03, I 15, l 16, l 19,120,124,125,127,155,
156,157,162,168,174,179,213,214,2 15,222,224,226,230,235,
237,2 38,240,241,242,264,265,266,267,274, 275,276,277,28 4,
288,291,294,295,296,297,299,300,302,306,308 ,309,310,312,
313,314, 3r6,319,32o,322,334,335,336,337,338 ,339,340,341,
342,343,344,345,346,377,378,38 7,392,393,395,396,397,4o5,
407,408,409,410,411,412,413,414,415,416,418,425,427,43o,
436, 441,443, 448, 449, 455, 457, 458, 459, 460
al- Ta'lzmiyyah: heretical sect, p. 1 88, note
al-Thawbaniyyah: heretical sect,p. 378
al-Tiimaniyyah: heretical sect,p. 378
wa&dat al-wujiid: see Index III under same listing
al-Wiiqifzyyah: pseudo-Siifis,p. 216
Wujudiyyah: existentialists,p. 8,43,go,194,216,217,238 ,89,317,323,
324, 331, 377,378, 384, 385, 38 9
al-Wujiidiyyah al-mul&idah: the deviating existentialists, p. go;
al-mal 'iinah, go,95,99, IOI, 222,265,377,378,384,385,386,387,392
al-Wujiidiyyah al-MuwaMidah: the unitarian existentialists, p. go;
al-mar&iimah, go, 95, 97, 98, rno, 377, 378, 406
INDEX II
al-Yahud: the Jews, p. 93, 95

al-Yunusiyyah: heretical sect, p. 378
,?,indzq: heretic dualist: p. 12, 84, 87, go, 104, 105, r38, 186, 187, 190,
191, 199, 203, 322, 378, 436, 440, 128, 142
INDEX III
Glossary of technical terms in Arabic) Malay

( M); Latin ( L) and Greek ( G)
Index Ill
Glossary of technical terms in Arabic, Malay (M), Latin (L) and
Greek (G)
abad: eternity without end; (L): a <adl: justice, p. 152

parte post, p. 89, 347 aj' al: acts (of God), p. 285, note
abadz: everl::isting; (M): tiada berke afrad (lard): singulars, single, p.
sudahan, p. 89, 100, 226, 347, 232, 307
348 agens (L): agent,fo'il, p. 254, note
abadiyyah: sempiternity, everlast- a�ad: one, absolute and transcen
ingness, p. 186 dent; (M): esa, p. 159, 3 IO
< abd: true servant of God, p. 89, a�adiyyah, transcendent oneness:
96, I 33, I 38, 348, 366, 377 p. 1 59
abqa: more abiding, p. 38, 181 a�adiyyah jam': unity of the whole
abraza: to cause to emerge from aggregate, p. 156
non-existence into existence a�adiyyah mu/laq(ah): absolute
(initial act of creation), p. 161 oneness, p. 154, 159, 410
actus essendi (L): act of existence,p. a�kam: forces conforming with the
229 (i), see esse nature of a thing, p. 161, 169,
ada (M): existent: mawjiid, p. 87, 270, 283, 313
88,89,90,91,95,101,227,228, al-a�kiim al-'aqliyyah: rational
229, 230, 231, 234, 235, 291, judgements, p. 248
296, 347, 385, 386, 407 al-a�kiim al-shar'iyyah: the judge
adab, spiritual and cultural ments concerning the Law, p.
refinement, p. 47 248
< adam: non-being, non-existence; a�wiil: spiritual states of transcen
(M): tiada, p. 85, 89, 97, 143, dental awareness, p. 135, 408,
150, 162, 169, 233, (non 427, 432, states of the essence,
existent); 251, 253, 270, 294, p. 408
347, 416, 419, 421 ajsiim (jisim): bodies, p. 2 IO
al-< adam al-ma�(j,: pure non-being; ajsiim basz[: simple bodies, p. 171
pure non-existence, p. 85, 98, al-iikhir: the Last,p. 158,167,173,
(' adam ma�(j,) 143,169,170,265, 278, 423
269, 277, 288 akwiin ( kawn): a series of coming
< adam mu/laq: absolute non-being, into-being, p. 234, 263
absolute non-existence, p. 87, akwiin al-khalq: coming-into-being
169,170,295,421, (al-'adam al of things in creation, p. 23 I
muflaq); 307 al-'iilam: the universe or world
together with all its parts, p. the Aristotelian categories), p.

39° 210, note
'iilam al-aJsiim: the world of bodies, a parte ante (L): a,zalz: eternity,
p. 182 without beginning, p. 166,221,
'iilam al-a'yiin al-thiibitah: the 226, 353
world of the permanent ar a parte post (L): abadz: eternity,
chetypes, p. 173 without end, p. 221, 226, 353
'iilam al-dhihn: the world of the apieron (G): the unlimited, p. 228,
mind, p. 182 note
'ii/am al-�iss: the world of sense, p. aqiinzm: hypostases, p. 400
182 'aql: reason, p. 84, 212, 226, 247,
'iilam al-mithal: the world of 249, 29 I' 292' 293' 294, 386,
images, similitudes, p. 182, 223 'aqlz: intellectual, rational, p.
'iilam al-arwii�: the world of spirits, 381
p. l 74, 182, 285 'aql-muJarrad: pure intellect, p.
'iilam al-ghayb: the world of the 183, 299
Unseen, the invisible world, p. al-'aql:the intellect, p. 93, 131,
167, 286 368, 402
'alam al-liihul: the world of divi al-'aql al-awwal: the First
nity, p. 93 Intellect, p. 285, 362, 413
'iilam al-niisut: the world of hu al-'aql al-fa"iil (the active
manity, p. 93 intelligence). p. 362
iilam al-shahiidah: the world of 'aqlz: intellectual, p. 443
sense and sensible experience, al-'anii�ir al-'uqud: the modes or
the visible world, p. 167, 174, modalities of being or
286 existence,p. 168
'iiliyah: lofty in degree, exalted, p. al-'aqii'id: articles of belief, p. 29,
l 73, 343 46
al-'iilim: the knower, p. 157 'ararj,: accident (pl. a'riirj,), p. 99,
'amii: to be blind (to the truth), p. 100, 134, I7l, 210, 235, 236,
239, 298, note 294, (pl. 'awarirj,); 325,387,329,
'amal, a'miil: works, practice, p. 421
184, 378 araefiyyah: accidentality, p. 171
'amaliyyah: practical duties,p. 248 araef 'iimm: general accident, p.
'iimm: general, p. 232, 307 232
amr: command, Divine injunc- 'iirirj,: accidental, p. 307, 329
tions, p. 104, 2 I 7, 437 'iirif: gnostic, intuitive knower,
amr kullz: universal entity, p. 307 p. 92, 98, 104 (pl. 'iirifiin) 143,
al-' anii�ir: the elements, p. 94, 402 299, 307, 418, 432
anniyyah: wuJud: existence, p. 235 arkiin al-dzn: principles, essentials,
an yafal, fi'l: action (one of the pillars of religion, p. 185
Aristotelian categories), p. 2 10, al-arwiif;,: the spirits, souls, p. 111,
note I 18, I 19, 120, 124
an yanfa'il, infi'iil: passion ( one of 'iishiq: lover-the Supreme
INDEX III
Agent, p. go, 348 permanent archetypes, p. 5,

ashkhiiJ: individuals, p. 174 153, 158, 162, 242, 269, 276,
a{al wuJiid: the original being, 282, 285, 286, 289, 299, 317
basic existence, p. 320 'aynz(dhiiti): interior (essential),p.
a�lz: primary ( a�iilah al-wuJiid), p. 167
97, 4 1 6 ay na: place (one of the Aristo
a�liyyah: basic fundamentals, p. telian categories), p. 2 1 o, note
248 al-awwal: The First, p. 158, 166,
asmii': names, p. 136, 276 l 73, 423
al-asmii' al-&usnii: the Most al-awwal al-&aqq: the First Truth,
Beautiful Names, p. 286 p. 1 43
al-asmii' al-iliihiyyah: the Divine 'awiimm, the common people, p.
Names, p. 343 I 33, 429, 430
al-asmii' wa al-rlfat: names and azal: eternity,without beginning,
attributes, p. 160 (L): aparte ante, pp. 89,347,286
asriir: spiritual mysteries, p. 174, azalz: eternal,beginningless; (M):
43 2, tiada permulaan, p. 100,226,348
athar: effect; (M): bekas, p. 98,101,
416 (pl. iithiir), 161, 169, 182, badan: body, p. 329, 330
242, 270, 283, 313 baqii': (M) kekal, to endure m
al-iithiir: traditions relating to the existence, p. 38, 89, 105, 127,
Companions, p. 5 140, 146, 147, 149, 160, 177,
al�athar al-qadzm: the eternal 179, 181, 182, 211, 245, 256,
effect, p. 358 347, 420, 421, 426, 427; 428,
ayiit: words of the Holy Qur'an 4 29
p. 188, 128, (ayah), 192, 193, biiqiyah: to subsist, p. 161
195,379, (ayah), 319,321,323, barii' at: immunity from re
336, 438 (signs of God) taliation, p. 193, 194
'ayn: being, essence: p. 153, 227, ba�ar: sight, p. 298, note
230, 234, 242, 249, 250, 27 l, ba1t: expansion (of the heart), p.
28 I, 296, 304, 34 I 297
'ayn wii&id : single substance, p. biifil: nullity, false, p. 100, 129,
179, 234 150,151,204,424
a'yiin: archetypes,essences,p. 167, al-biifin: the Inwardly Hidden,p.
174, 182, 286, 41 l, 424 I 58, 106, l70, I 73, 278, 423
al-a'yiin al-khiirijiyyah: the exterior biifin: interior, hidden, p. 159,
essences or archetypes, p. 161, 229, 279, 298, 410, 444
165, 166, 276, 284, 285 biifinah: concealed in the interior
'ayn thiibit: fixed and permanent condition of Being,p. 1 70, 107
essence, p. 164, 242 bekas (M): effect: athar, p. 101
al-a'yiin al-mumkiniit: the essences berkata-kata (M): having uttered
of possible things, p. 168, 171, words: niifiq p. 262
282 beza (M): distinct, q.v. maiyzah p.
al-a'yiin al-thiibitah: fixed essences, 163, 279
bi al-i'tibiir: when considered as,p. dhikr: recollection,remembrance,

32 5 invocation, p. 184
bi shar/ lii shay ': non-conditioned, dhu: one of the Aristotelian
p. 327 categories: milk: (M) ber-:
bi shar/ shay': conditioned by having, p. 231
something, p. 327 dhu al-'aql: men of reason, p. 428
bicara (M): verbal exposition dhu al-' ayn: men of intuition, p.
(kaliim), p. 157 42 9
budi (M): intellect ('aql), p. 157 dhu al-'aql wa al-' ayn: men of
bu/un: the interior condition of reason and intuition, p. 429
being, p. 161, 270, 313 dhurriyyah: human offspring,
progeny, p. 125
coincidentia oppositorum (L): coin rj,idd: contrary, p. 307
cidence between two opposites, dijadikan (M): created: makhluq
p. 298, 425; al-jam' bayn al p. 85,92,251,253,260, (ja'ala)
rj,iddayn and al-jam' bayn al din: religion, p. 187
naquj,ayn diri (M): keadaan: self of a thing,p.
creatio ex nihilo (L): creation out of 89, go, 92, 227, 230, 246, 310,
nothing, p. 255 348
al-du' a': the call (of supplication),
al-diirat (al-dharrat): souls, spmts p. 365, 366
of saints, p. l l l, l12, l13, l16,
118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, echein (G): milk, possession,
127, 140, 148 condition, p. 231, 263
al-dahr: timeless eternity-not ens (L): quiddity in state of
involved in a time sequence of actualization (mawjiid) p. 242,
past,present and future,p. 35 r, 2 43
note esa (M): one q.v. a�ad and wa�id,
dharr: seeds capable of producing absolutely one, p. 86, 266, 3 IO
offspring (plants, animal, and r:sse: act of existence by which
human), p. 124, 125, 126 quiddity is actualized, p. 242,
al-dharrat: the atoms (souls or 2 43
spirits of the saints), p. 123, ex nihilo (L): out of nothing, from
124, 125, 126, 127, 140, 148 nothing (creation), p. 340, 348
dhiit: essence; keadaan, p. 84, 137,
153, 226, 227, 234, 235, 246, fa" al (fa" iilah); efficacious, p. 342
266, 298, 304, 308, 310, 317, filil: active determinant,agens, p.
dhatz: essential, p. 167, 261 165, 167, 171, 254, 316, 318,
dhawq: immediate tasting, in 319, 331
tuitive experience of existence, al-fii' il al-mujzb: the neccessary
p.84,87,98,135,144,182,212, agent, p. 358
226, 245, 247 l 295, 296, 299, al-fii' il al-mukhtar: the free agent,
300, 418, 427, 435 p. 359
dhihnan: mentally, p. 304 al-falak: the sphere p. 402
INDEX III
falsafah: philosophy,p. 464 al-fi' l: action, the doing some

fan: perishing,p. 139,179 thing,p. 253,254,343,359
fanii': annihilation,p. 38,97,98, Ji al-i' tibiir: in the mind,p. 367
104, 127, 135, 136, 137, 138, Ji nafs al-amr: in the thing itself,p.
I 39, I 40, 145, 146, 149, I 76, 170
I 79, 182, 214, 233, 241, 256, fiqdiin, losing,p. 425
345,388,389,416,(janii' -baqii'), al-fiqh: the religious science of
215, 425, 427, 435, 245, 346, practical judgements,p. 5, 25,
418, 420, 421, 425, 429, 437, 248
455 Ju'iid: heart ( qalb), p. 184,450
fanii' al-fanii': extinction of
genesis (G): becoming, q.v. kawn:
extinction, p. 137, 138, 139,
jadi, p. :253
140, 145, 149, I 76, 214, 345,
gha.fiah: heedlessness, p. 148
388,389,429
al-ghefur: the Forgiving,p. 423
faqd: loss of existence, lost to
gharz:(i: innate,p. 403
existence,p. 98,419,420,421,
al-ghiiyah: the final purpose,p. 3.3 1
425,436
al-ghayb: the Unseen,p. 166,170
faqr: poverty,p. 138,149
ghay b al-ghayb: the Mystery of the
al-fariigh: the imaginary space,p.
Unseen,p. 162
256
gh ayriin: different,p. 180 (L)
fard: single,p. 316
al-fart},: obligatory duties,p. 104, habere (L): milk, (M) her-, to have,
437 possess10n,p. 231
far'iyyah: legal judgements de hadatha: to be new-posterior, p.
rived from the basic fundamen 26 I
tals of Islam,p. 248 al-Hiidi: the Guide who gives
al-farq: separation,p. 131,435 guidance,p. 187
al-farq al-awwal: the first sep �iidith: temporally originated, p.
aration,p. 131 225,261
al-farq al-thiinz: the second sep �adith: saying of the Prophet, p.
aration,p. 132,143,345 I 19, 147, 184, 185, 195, 230,
al-farq b'ad al-jam': separation after 234,293,32 I, 437
union,p. 143,345 �atj,rah: presence,p. 161,247,note
fasiid: corruption,p. 2 1 1 al-�atj,rah al-'ilmiyyah: intelligible
fa�!: difference,differentia,p. 330, presence: the forms of the
33 1 known as present to God in His
faytf.: effusion, emanation, efful- consciousness or knowledge,
gence,p. 162,270,343 pp. 161
al-faytj, al-aqdas: the most holy al-�akzm: the philosopher,p. 306
emanation, p. 164, 278, 285, �l: state of being (pl. a�iil) p.
41 I 100, 249,424; spiritual state,p.
al-f aytj, al-muqaddas: the holy 296, 425,427,439
· emanation, effusion, p. 165, �iilah: state of being,p. 263
166,168,278,285,41 I �aliil: permitted,lawful,pp. 437,
375 �ram: unlawful,forbidden,p. 437

ha[ik: perishing,p. I 79 harap (M): hope (raja'), p. 383
!Jii,liyy: subjective state,p. 427 �arzr: care,p. 194
hapus (M):fana': annihilated, p. hati (M): qalb: 'aql, p. 5,32,233
97,98,416 al-�awass al-salzmah: the sound
�aqa'iq:realities,p. 153,161,168, senses,p. 292
180, 230, 270, 286, 305, 342, al-hayiit: p. 238
411,424 al-�ayawan al-na(iq: rational
�aqii' iq al-ashyii: the realities of animal,p. 88 and note
things, p. 158, 160, 161, 168, &ayawaniyyah: animal nature, p.
207,242,267 4 o3
&aqa'iq af-a'yan al-khiirijiyyah: the &ay{ah: circumspective sway, un
realities of the exterior ar der the power of,p. 171
chetypes, p. 168 hayulii (G): hyle: matter: maddah, p.
�qq al-yaqzn: p. 141' 149 348; primary matter; p. 352,
�aqzqah: reality,p. 143,153,183, 360,36 l, 402
227, 242, 243, 246, 251, 260, &ayyiz : boundary (existential),p.
263, 271, 309, 3ro, 312, 319, 249,255
320,325,326,330,334,456 hidiiyah: guidance,p. 187,124
�aqzqah ahadiyyah: unitary reality, hidup yang berkata-kata ( M): al-
p. 343 � ayawiin al-na(iq: rational
&aqzqah al-&aqii'iq: the reality of animal, p. 88,3 ro
realities, p. 343 �ijiib: veil concealing the Truth,
&aqzqah muqayyadah: determined p. 148
reality,p. 343 &ikmah: wisdom, p. 152,464
�aqzqah mutfaqah.· absolute reality, �iHah (pl. &irar): portion of
p. 34 2 existence,p. 303
&aqzqat al-insan: the reality of man, �issz: sensible,p. 443
p. l 19 &ubb: love as the principle of
�aqzqat al-shay': the reality of a ontological movement,p. 164
thing, p. 325 huda: guidance (divine), p. 187,
�aqzqah wahidah: single reality,p. 123
232,234 &ur/,ur: presence,p. 135,247
al-�qzqah al-mu�mmadiyyah: the �ukm: iogical judgement,p. I 5 1
Mu}:iammadic Reality, p. 286 &ulul: incarnation, pp. 137, 225,
�aqzqz: real (being), p. 97, 296, 278,344,386,387
320,416,443 al-�uruf al-' iiliyat, the Lofty
�aqq: truth contra falsity (ba!il), p. Letters, the po ten tiali ties
128, 129, 149, 150, 151, 152, dwelling in the Divine
153, 183, 187, 234; Absolute consciousness,p. 22, 289
Existence, 84, 136, 142, 153, �urul, arrival of meaning in the
183,232,267,405 soul,p. 134
al-&aqq al-mutakhayyal: God in the huwiyyah, pl. huwiyyat: ipseity,
imagination, p. 423 concrete individual realities
INDEX III 49 1
actualized in external exis 332,note

tence, individual substance,p. al-'illah al-fililiyyah: the efficient
166,227,230,325,232,264 cause, p. 316, 331
hyle (G): universal matter,p. 402, al-'illah al-ghii'iyyah: the final
see hayulii cause,p. 33 1
al-'illah al-miiddiyyah: the material
'ibiidah: worship (pl. 'ibiidiit: de cause,p. 331
votional duties), pp. 25, go, al-'illah al-{ iiriyyah: the formal
348, 360, 371 cause,p. 33 1
'ibii.rat (' ibii.rah): analogy; pl. 'illah al-miihiyyah: the cause of
'ibiiriit, p. 98,418,356 quiddity,p. 330,334
irj,iifah: relation (al-irj,iifah): attri 'illah al-shay ': the cause of a thing,
bution, p. 307,248 p. 330,334
iftirii.q: separation, p. 211 'illah al-wujud: the cause of
al-i&diith: the origin a ting some existence, r 330, 334
thing; temporal origination,p. imam: spiritual head,p. 197,344
2 9, 2 53 al-imii.mah: leadership of the
i&sii.n: excellence of virtue, p. Community,p. 379, note
147, 184,185 zmii.n: the becoming true to the
al-fjii.d: the bringing something trust by which God has
into existence from non confided in one, not by
existence,p. 253 profession of belief with the
ijmii': consensus of the learned,p. tongue only,without the assent
5,152,212,293,437 of the heart, p. 130, 131, 147,
ijtimii': combination of atoms as 185,193,378,318,320
body, p. 21 l imkiin: contingency, p. 156, 168,
al-ikhtirii': the inventing some- 169,170,251,259,270
thing, p. 253 imtinii.': impossibility,logical and
ikhtiyiir: free choice, p. 89, 347 ontological,p. 168,169,251
iliihiyyah: divinity, p. 156 imtithiil: obeying or becoming like
'ilm: knowledge, the attribute of as what a thing is commanded
knowledge, p. 157, 200, 296, to become,p. 317
316, 348,439 inbi{iit al-wujud: the expansion of
'ilman dhawqiyyan: intuitive know existence,p. 268,287,309,311,
ledge, experiential knowledge, 341,391
p. 299, note al-infi'iil: passivity,p. 343
al-'ilm al-rj,arurz: primary know inpotentia (L): latent (cy),p. 174,
ledge,p. 329 261' 360
il&iid: deviation from the truth,p. al-insiin: man, p. 329,note
188,191 al-insiin al-kii.mil: the perfect man,
'illah: cause, p. 249,254,315 p. 44,285
'illah ba'zdah: ultimate cause, p. insiiniyyah: humanity,p. 328
332, note intentio (L): ma'qul: intention, p.
'illah qarzbah: proximate cause,p. 323, note
intiqal: (�arakah) : movement (of 388,note

atoms),p. 211 jahl: a deficiency m intellect or
iradah: will, attribute of will, p. understanding, ignorance, p.
317,348 200
'iifan 'ilmz: illuminative know- jii'iz: possible,p. 248,261,262
ledge,p. 144 al-jii'iz al-wujiid: possible being,
al-ir:ja': suspension of judgement, pp. 87,291
p. 379, 382,383 jalzs: companion with whom one
isharat: indiciations: allusions, p. sits and discourses,p. 184,note
98,418 al-jam': gathering together, p.
isi (M): content, flesh: meat, 136, 140, 214, 345, 428, 429,
existence (i.ry:issi), p. 227,228 430,435
islam: complete submission,p. 185 jam' al-jam': the gathering of
isti'dad: potentiality, prepared gathering,p. 140,214,429
ness,p. 164,242,281, 317; pl. al-jam' bayn al-rj,iddayn: coincid
isti'dadat, p. 31 I, 313 ence between the two opposites,
isti'dad a,rlz: primordial poten q.v. coincidentia oppositorum, p.
tiality,p. I 64, I 70,270 29 8
istighraq: spiritual absorption, p.al-jam' bayn al-naqzrj,ayn: coincid
122,140,141,149 ence between the two opposites:
isti�alah: impossibility,p. 251 coincidentia opposztorum, p. 4:25
ithnayniyyah: duality,p. 332 jamiil: Beauty,p. 286
i!laq: absoluteness, p. 226, :138, jasad: body,p. 330,note
41 I jasmiinz: physical things,p. 158
i'tibarz: mentally posited, p. 226, jawiiz: possibility,p. 251,261
287,304,245 jawhar: substance, p. 171, 2 ro,
i'tibarat, aspects, intellection of 226,235,294,341, 387
possibles,p. 414 jawhar basz!: simple being,p. 348
i'tiqad: belief in the articles, jawhar fard: indivisible atom, p.
doctrines,tenets of religion,p. 210,255
84,186,187 jawhar wa�id: single substance,p.
al-i'tiqadiyyah: principles of belief 400
and faith,p. 248 jawhariyyah: substantial,p. 171
itti�ad: union, p. 144, 145, 225, jiiza: actual passing taking place,
278,386,387 p. 261
itti,ral: union,p. 435 jihad: holy war,p. 47
i?,har, becoming manifest,p. 438 jihiit: the six directions,p. 403
jinn: genie,p. 301,366
jadi (M): coming into being, jins: genus (pl. ajniis), p. 9, 173,
becoming, p. 85, 88, 92, 95, 324, 330,33 I
229, 253, 3 10, 315,4o7 jism: body,p. 249,329,387,4°2
al-jabr: determinism,p. 378 al-juz': the part,p. 329
jahil: ignorant, p. 200, 203; (pl. al-juz' alladhz lam yatajaaa': the
juhhal: the ignorant �ufis), p. indivisible atom,p. 255
INDEX III 493
ju::.,'iyyat: particulars (particular one of the sources of knowledge,
existences), p. 166; (sing. al p. 292
ju::.,'iyyah: particular existent), al-khala': void, metaphysical, p.
p. 3 2 4 2l l
al-khalq: the creating something,
ka'in: isness,p. 234,263 p. 2 53
al-ka'in al-thiibit: (M) keadaan yang khalq jadzd: new creation,p. 1 76,
thiibit, permanent isness,p. 234 241,311, 318, 392
kalam: dialectic,p. 24, 208, 209, al-khiiliq: the Creator,p. 87,257,
210,212, 213,248,293 292
kamiiliit dhiitiyyah: essential per a!-khiirij: the external world, p.
fections,p. 160,278, 283,286, 3o9
41 l kharijan: extra-mentally, p. 304
kiimil, perfect,p. 430 kha{{: particular,p. 174
kammiyyiit: quantitative cat- khawa{{: properties,p. 400
egories, p. g 1,386,431 khayiil: khay iiliit, fancies of the
kan::., makhfiyy: hidden treasure, p. imagination, p. 207, 222, 223,
1 55 394,422
karam (M): drowned (istighriiq), khayalz: imaginary,pp. 100, 223,
p. 435 443
kashf unveiling, p. 84, 87, 137, khayr ma�(j,: pure good,p. 307
138, 212, 226, 245, 247, 295, khidhlan, God's abstaining from
296,297,299 aiding,p. 438,450
al-kathrah: multiplicity,p. 136 khi/ab, discrimination,p. 439
al-kawakib: the planets (stars) p. khu/bah: preface to a book,p. 28
94,4°2,4o3,4o4 kisaran (M): turning wheel,p. 314
kawn: coming-into-being, p. 91, kidhb: falsehood ( of statement),
229, 234, 253, 263, 314, 325, p. 151,152,note
389,390 kuasa (M): qudrah: power p. 89,
kayf quality,p. 210 347
kayfiyyat: qualitative categories,p. kufr, unbelief,p. go, 386
91' 386,431 kullz: universal,p. 403
keadaan (M) mawjudiyyah): being kullz maqul: categorical universal,
existent, diri, p. 84 (constituent p. 232
determinant of a thing), 85 al-kullz al-tabi'z: the natural un
( ontological condition); iversal,p. 338
(being-existent); 100,226,227, al-kulliyyat: the universals, p. 94,
229, 230, 231, 234, 235, 242, 166,402
25 l, 260,263,264,27 I kunhi dhat: the innermost essence,
kelengkapan (M): preparedness, p. 1 57
potentiality ( isti' diid), p. 165
ketiadaan (M): existential priva laf::.,z: verbal expression, p. 89,
tion: nonexistentiality,p. 284 l 69,310,335
al-khabar al-{iidiq: true narrative, la�ada: to decline,to deviate from
right course, p. 188 ma bihi al-shay' huwa al-shay': that

lahu: dhu: (M) ber: (L) habere, one by which the thing is that thing,
of the Aristotelian categories,p. p. 333
231 ma bihi huwa huwa: that by which it
lahut: divinity,p. 32 l is it,p. 330
La ta'ayyun: pure indetermination; ma bihi al-ta!Jaqquq li al- shay': that
(M) tiada nyata, p. 157 by which a thing is actualized,
la bi sharf shay': negatively p. 1 75
conditioned,p. 327,328,note al-mabda' al-awwal: the First
la shay': non-thing,p. 100,424 Principle,p. 362
latah (M): mimetic type of ma siwa Allah: that which is other
paroxysmal neurosis, p. 103, than God,pp. 98,ro3,139,186,
433 285,418,419,42 I, 424,434
la{ifah ru!Janiyyah: spiritual sub- mabuk (M): sukr: mysti.cal
tlety,p. l 37 intoxication,p. 434
la ta' ayyun: non-individuate,non al-maddah: matter, p. 327, 330,
determinate,p. 145, 156, 157, 331,362
308 madhhab: legal school,p. 29
la tajallz: non-manifest (M) tiada ma'dum: non-being, non-existent,
nyata,p. 157 ma'dumah, p. 150; pp. 161,253,
la!ffah: spiritual substance,p. 13 7 307,420,42 l
lawah (M): gaping (of jaws), p. ma'dum bi al-dhat: essentially non
434 existent,p. 279
lawas (M): unburdened, p. 433, majhum: a concept,p. 41o
434 majqud: lost-to-existence, p. 419,
lawa::_im: concomitants,necessary 421,359
repercussions,p. 16 r, I 66,169, maghlub al-.�a!: to become
242,270,283,313 overpowered by the spiritual
lenyap (M): nothingness,p. 97,41b state,p. rn3,436
libas: clothing,p. 2b4 ma!Jall: substratum, locus, q.v.
al-liqa': the meeting (with God), maw�u', p. 211,149,252,341
p. 384 ma/;�: pure-absolutely, p. 169,
logos (G): 'aql: (L) ratio; nufq: (M) 270
berkata-kata, p. 322, note ma yakun al-shay'bihi: that by
luas (M): wide of space,p. 433 which a thing comes into being,
p. 88,3ro
ma'anz: ideal realities,p. 174,361 mahiyyah: (M) diri: keadaan,
ma bihi al-shay' huwa huwa: that by quiddity,essence,pp. 164, 71,
which a thing is what it is,p. 88, I 00, I 02 (pl. mahiyyat); I 34,
242, 271, 3ro, 311, 315, 325, 166, 182, 227, 230, 235, 239,
332,334 242, 243, 266, 271, 307, 312,
ma bihi al-shay' huwa: that by 313, 315,319,325,326,334
which the thing is that thing,p. mahzyyah al-shay": the quiddity of
333 a thing,p. 338,note
INDEX III 495
al-mahiyyah al-i' tibariyyah: men ma'rifah: gnosis, intuitive know
tally posited quiddity, p. 325, ledge; (M) pengenalan, kenal, p.
note 92, 136, 157, 183, 298
al-mahiyyah al-jinsiyyah: the gen ma'rurf. (pl. ma'rurf.at): substratum,
eric quiddity, p. 325, note p. 99, roo, 234, 241, 307 (al
al-mahiyyah al-naw' iyyah: the ma'rurf.at); 307, 341, 422
specific quiddity, p. 324 mashhad: spectacle, p. g1, 388,
majaz:,: metaphor, place where 39o, 39 1
contingent occurs, p. 143, 261, al-ma'shuq: the Beloved, the Sup-
262 reme End, p. go. 285, 348
majaz:,z: metaphorical p. 97, 295, al-ma'�iyah: disobedience (to
4.16 wards God), p. 378
makhluq: created thing (pl. mata: time, one of the Aristotelian
makhluqat), p. 87, 93, 292 categories, p. 2 ro, note
makhlu{ah: mixed,_ p. 327, 386 mata hati (M): intellectual vision,
al-m«iyyah: withness, p. 144 pp. 87. 291
al-ma' tum (pl. ma' lumat): the mata kepala (M): ocular vision pp.
known, things known, pp. 157, 87, 291, 295
169, 269 matbu': followed, p. r 71, 314
ma'na: meaning, p. 88, 1_34 310 mathal, like, p. 307
ma'nawz, relating to meaning, pp. mathqul: heavy with grief, p. 103,
89, 310, 335 434, 435
man{iq: logic, p. 88, note, 323, note mawahib al-�uwar: Giver of Forms,
man-?,ur: the seen, p. 136 i.e. the Active Intelligence (al
maqam: station (spiritual), p. 184 'aql al-fa"al), p. 362
maqs_ud: meanmg intended, al-mawalzd: the three kingdoms of
intention, p. 291 Nature, p. 94, 402
maqu[at: categories, p. 2 I 0 mawalzd al-thalathah: the three
al-maqulat al-'ashr: the ten kingdoms of Nature, p. 171
Aristotelian categories, p. 210, mawrf.u': subject, substratum, p.
note, 263 252, 255, 331
ma'qul: intentio, ratio: intelligible mawjud: existent: concretely
thing grasped by the mind existing, q.v. ada, p. 86, 87, go,
(' aql), p. 323, note 91, 92, 94, 97, 143, 222, 228,
ma'qulat thaniyyah: secondary in 229, 230, 234, 235, 237, 242,
. telligibles, p. 304, 324; ma'qul 243, 253, 263, 266, 277, 291'
thanz, sing., p. 238 3o7, 323, 325, 326, 385, 386,
ma'qulat ula: primary intelligibles, 387, 4o5, 416, 419, 421;
p. 323 mawjudah, 161
mariitib: degrees, planes or levels mawjud baqzqi: real existent, p. 98,
of being, p. 155, 225, 385 418
maifii' al-qalam, to become exempt al-mawjud al-da'im: (M): mawjud
from the recordings of the Pen, yang senetiasa, perpetual exis
p. 103, 436 tent, p. 234
al-mawjudat al-muqayyadah: lim mi�ra, half-verse in a quatrain, p.

ited existents, p. 307 123
mawjiidiyyah, being-existent (kead mzthaq: convenant, p. 145, 198,
aan), p. 424 1 99
al-maw�iil: the relative pronoun, mizijjat: dispositions and com-
p. 333 binations p. 403
mayzah: (M) beza: to be distinct, mu'amalat: practical duties, p. 25
p. 163, 279 al-mu'ayanah, viewing with the
ma;har: manifestation form, p. 85, eyes, p. 297, note, 298, note
86, 88, 142, 166, 173, I74, 265, m u ' ayy a n : determined -
271,277,279,281,282,283,pl. individuated, p. I 74
ma?,iihir: 277, 278, 285, 286, mufaHal: particularized, p. 343
290, 296, 4I5 mubakamah: adjudication, p. 347,
mengqiyamkan (M): to give sub note
sistence, p. 100 mubaqqiq: verifier, p. 98, 307, 418
menjadi (M): takawwun, becoming, mubdath: non-eternal, ever-new,
p. 253, note originated, p. 38, 85, 87, 97,
menjadikan (M): originating, p. 179, 181, 2II, 250, 251, 255,
85,89,90,92,95,251,253,260, 259, 260, 287, 291, 294, 416
'.)IS, '.147, 148, 407 al-Mubit: the outermost sphere of
menjadikan daripada tiada kepada ada the Highest Heaven, p. I I 4,
(M): bringing something forth 4o4
from non-existence into exis mubkam: strong, p. 198, 447
tence, p. 253 al-mubkamat: verses of the Holy
mempusakai (M): to regard some Quran that are clearly estab
thing as precious, p. 366, 367, lished in their meanings: p. 441,
370, 371 (see nafsan) 445; sing. al-mubkam, p. 445,
men;ahirkan (M): to cause to 448
become mauifest-i.e. as exter mujarrad: abstracted from bodily
nal existence, p. 3 I 5, 3 I 9 relations, p. I71, 255, mujar
milk: possession, condition, habere, radah, unrelated to any thing or
dhii, lahii,. one of the Aristotelian to any mind, p. 326
categories, p. 85, 86, 87, 101, al-miijib: the necessary Agent, p.
23I, 260, 263, 264, 265, 268, 348
27 I, 295, 300, 424 al-miijid: the bringer into
min �ayth dhatuhu, essentially, 98, existence, p. 252
p. 418 al-mukawwan: that which is
min �ayth hiya, hiya: as it is in itself, brought forth into existence
p. 338, note (M): dijadikan, p. 253, note
mithal: like, similar, p. 289 al-mukawwin: the bringer forth
mir'at al-�aqa'iq: the mirror of into existence (M): yang menja
realities, p. 286, 290 dikan, p. 253, note
al-mir'at al-iila: the first mirror, p. muktasab: acquired, p. 403
286 mukhalafah li al-bawadith: differ-
INDEX III 497
ence from originated things: p. 306
29, 2 I I, 260, 312 al-mutashiibihiit: verses of the Holy
mukhiila/ah: mixed, p. 225 Quran that are ambiguous in
mukha��i�: specifier, determining the meanings: p. 441, 445; sing.
principle, p. 252 al-mutashiibih, p. 446, 448
al-mukhtiir: the free agent, p. 348 mutawahham (wahm) : a thing
mul&id: deviator, heretic (pl. imagined, p. 99, 396, 423
maliihidah), p. 84, go, 187, 188, mutawassi/ah: intermediate m
189, 191 degree, p. 173
mu'min, believer, faithful, p. 437 mutawiitir: (narrative) that is in
al-mumkin: the contingent, p. 294 sequence and continuity,p. 292
mumkiniit: possibles, possible mu/laq: absolute, p. 87, 282, 295
thing,p. 161; 168 (al-mumkiniit); mu![aqah: absolute indeterminate,
171; 269, 270, 283, 386; (mum p. 326
kin); 262, note muwiifaqah: coinciding, p. 119
al-mumkin al-wujiid: contingent al-muwaMid: the unitarian, p. go,
being,p. 85,225,251,338,191, 3°7
277
mumtani': impossible, p. 169 nabiitiyyah: vegetative, p. 403
mumtani'iit: impossibles, p. 1 70 nafas al-ra&man: the Breath of the
munazzah: transcendent, p. 226 Merciful, p. 176, 341, 411, note,
munfa'ilah: being passive, p. 343 414, note, 450
al-muqa5Aim: apportioner (of al-nafs (q.v. diri), the soul; p. 93,
existence), p. 307 131, 227, 230, 231, 234, 246,
muqayyad: limited, determined, 27 l, 329, 330, 366, 367, 368,
p. 87, 282, 295, 300 (al 402
mawjudiit) nafs al-'aql, the soul of the intellect
al-muqayyadah: limited ex1s or reason, p. 367, 370
tents, p. 307) nafs al-&ayiit: the soul of life, p.
murakkab: composite, p. 171, 255, 367, 370
32 9 nafs al-ru&: the soul of the breath,
mushiihadah: contemplation, deep p. 367, 370
meditation, p. 98, 297, 418, nafs al-shay': the very thing itself,
330, 355 p. 324-5
al-mushiihadah al-'iyiiniyyah, in nafs al-tamyzz: the soul of
tuitive vision akin to ocular discrimination, p. 367, 370
vision, p. 143, 246, note, 423, al-nafs al-&ayawiiniyyah: the animal
42 5 soul, p. 368, 370
musta&zl: impossible, p. 248 al-nafs al-kulliyah: the universal
mustaqill: independent,pp. 86,go, soul, pp. 113
265, 385 al-nafs al-mu/ma'innah: the tran
muta'addid: becoming multiple, p. quil soul, p. 371
343 al-nafs al-nabiitiyyah, the vegetative
al-mutakallim: the theologian, p. soul, p. 368, 341
al-nafs al-na/iqah: the rational p. 297, note

soul, p. 119, 368, 370, 3 71 qabil: passive recipients, p. 165,
nafsan: lower soul,p. 89,two souls, 167,171,318; pl. qawiibil, p. 272
p. 348, 366, 367, 370, 371, qadar: power in man to determine
37 2 his action (free will),p. 209,378
nalry: divine prohibition, p. 104, qadim: eternal, p. 38, 85, 87, 89,
217, 437 97,166,187,225,251,260,261,
al-naql: Tradition going back to 29 I , 347, 4 i 6
the Holy Qur' an and the Holy qaduma: to be prior, p. 261
Prophet, p. 87, 212, 291, 292, qii'im: to be dependent on p. 85,
293, 294, 386 251, 256, (to prevail over), p.
nasut: humanity, p. 32 l 104, 437
na#q: rational; 'speech', p. 322, qii'im bi nafsihi: self-subsistent,
note, nafiqah, p. 403 (M): qa'im sendirin_ya, p. 2.52
naw': specie,pl. anwa', p. l 73,324, qa'im sendirinya (M): self-
327, 33° subsistent, p. 85, 100, 251, 252
na;;,ir: the seer, p. 136 al-qalb: (M) hati: heart, p. 115,
nisbah: relation, p. 87, 287, 292, II9, 13r, 184, 198, 247, 297,
307; (al-nisbah) 432, 450
nisy an: forgetfulness, p. 148 qawl: word (of command of God):
nous(G): the intellect ('aql), p. 402 kun! p. 317
nufos: souls (pure), p. 171 qidam: eternity, p. 186, 348
nur: light, p. 157, 276, 282, (al al-qiyam: standing (in prayer), p.
nur); 282 316 365
nur irj,iifi: relative light: relative qudrah: (M) kuasa: power, p. 347,
existence, p. 283, 414, note 348
nutq: reason: logos: ratio, p. 322, d-qudrat al-kha{{ah, particular
note power, p. 438
pada. makan (M): spatial: makani, qurb: proximity (to Cod), p. 297
pp. 91, 386 quwwah: power, p. 317 ( the
pada zaman (M): temporal: zamani, faculties of the animal and
pp. 91, 386 physical souls: al-quwwiit), p.
perangai bashariyyah (M): hum 369
anity, human disposition, p.
428 al-rabb: the Lord,p. 133, 138,301
perumpamaan (M): example, al-ra�mah: mercy, p. 366, 451
substitute, p. 289 al-rajii': hope, p. 318, 323, 379,
plrysis (G): nature (al-tahi: ah) p. 383, 384
402 raqii'iq: subtle manifestations, p.
psyche (G): the soul (al-najs), p. 402 174, 186
pusaka: pusaka (M): precious raqiqah: subtle manifestation, p.
acquisition, p. 366 1 74, 186
raqiqah al-nuzul: subtle manifes
al-qabtj,: contraction (of the heart), tation that descends to the
INDEX III 499
heart of the 'abd, p. 176, 186, �a&w: sobriety,p. 29,142,297, note
notes saj', rhymed prose, p. 109, 123
rasa (M): q.v. dhawq, spiritual al-�aliit: prayer, worship, p. 365,
tasting, p. 87, 24 7, 295 366, 368
al-rasul: the messenger (of God), samil: hearing, p. 317
p. 292 �anil: product, p. 254
ratio (L): reason, p. 32, ma'qul: �anilah: artificial, p. 403
intentio, p. 323, note �iini': maker, p, 254, 315, 319
rawiibi/ ma&tfah: sheer (pure) sariibz: of the nature of a mirage,
connections, p. 287, no� p. 100, 424
rubilz, quatrain, p. 123 sebangsa (M): one kind, p. 91, 386
rububiyyah: lordship, p. 185, 187, sekutu (M): common, partner, q.v.
191' 301 mustarak, p. 87, 296, 300, 301,
al-ru�: the spirit, p. l 19, 290 (ruM senetiasa ingat (M): mushiihadah,
al-ru� al-fikrz, the cogitative spirit, ever contemplating, p. 247
p. 443, note serupa (M), similarity, p. 95, 407
al-ru� al-qudus: the holy spirit, p. sewujud (M), one being, p. 91, 386
1 37 shabzhiin: similar, p. 180
al-ruh al-qudsz al-nabawz, the holy al-shafil ah: intercession, p. 382
prophetic spirit, p. 444, note shafiq, compassionate,p. 191,193,
ru� insiinz: human spirit, p. 158 1 94
ru� �ayawiinz: animal spirit, p. 158 shii'n, pl. shu'un: creative activity,
ru& ifjiifi: relative spirit, p. 158 p. 140, 162
ru& nabiitz: vegetative spirit,p. 158 shahida: to be a witness to, to
al-ruku': bending the body from testify to, p. 120
an upright position (in prayer); al-shakh�, the individual thing, p.
p. 365 32 4
rupa (M): form; q.v. surah, p. 86, shara': religious law, moral obli-
265, 289, 320 gation, p. 84, 226, 247, 386
rushd: perseverance in the right shari'ah: the sacred Law, p. 29,
way, etc, p. 198 183, 184, 187, 188, 247, 248,
ru'yii: vision of God, p. 209 320, 456
sharzk: partner (of God) p. 110,
sabab: cause, p. 254, 315 169, 170, 301
sababiyyah: causality, p. 315, 330 al-sha/&iyyiit: ecstatic utterances,
al-�iidiqun: the veracious and p. 102, 431, fl.32, 441, note
righteous, p. 193 shay' (pl. ashyii'): 'thing', p. 325,
�iidir: emanation, p. 362 333
safah: ignorance and wickedness, shay'iyyah: thingness, p. 317
p. 200 shaykh al-Islam: highest religious
safih: (pl. sufahii'): ignorant and official p. 6, 8
wicked, p. 200, 203 shibki: metaphorical p. 443
siifilah: lowly in degree, p. 173,343 shirk: polytheism, p. 301
safsa/ah, sophistry, p. 206 al-shuhud: spirituaf vision, p. 133,
135, 157, 184, (sight); 245,316, forms, the intelligible forms, p.

391, 427, 428, 43°, 431 I 58, I 60, 289
shuhiidz: exterior, sensible, p. 167 al-�uwar al-/abc ah: the natural
shu'iin: predispositions, ontologi forms, p. 299, note
cal states, p. 161, 162, 231,
276, 414 ta'alluq: necessary connective
�idq: truth (i.e. of statement), p. relation, p. 257
151, 152 al-ta'aqqul: intellection, p. 332,
�iddzq: veracious, p. 203 410
�ifah: quality, p. 249 ta'ayyun: determination, m-
�ifah nafsiyyah: personal quality,p. dividuation, p. 164, 226, 268,
2 49 286
al-�ifat: the (divine) attributes, p. ta' ayyuniit: determinations, m
136, 209, 276, :P.1 divid uations, p. 149, 155, 225,
al-�ifat al-'ulyii: the Most Sublime 231, 275, 285, 386
Attributes, p. 286, 290 ta' ayyun awwal: first determi-
�ifat ,?:,iihir (M): the quality of the nation, p. 156, 157, 160, 275,
being-manifest, p. 279 285, 286, 308, 316, 413
al-silsilah: spiritual chain of ta'ayyun thiinz: second determi
teachers, p. 14, 29 nation, p. 158, 276, 285
szwa al-�aqq: other-than-the- ta' ayyun thiilith: third determi
Truth, p. 282 nation, p. 158
stoichos ( G): the Elements, p. 402 ta' ayyun riibi': fourth determi
suatu (M): identical, one and the nation, p. I 58
same, p. 291 ta'ayyun khiimis: fifth determi
�iifi: term indicating one on the nation, p. I 58
spiritual journey to God, p.214 tiibi': follower-consequent re
al-sujiid: prostration (in prayer); ality, p. 171, 314
p. 365 al-taba' iyyah: consequentialness,
sukr: mystical intoxication, q.v. p. 1 44
mabuk (1-1), p. 29, 141, 434 al-/abz' ah: nature, p. 94, 402,
sunnah: model practice of the Holy natural: 403
Prophet, p. 5, 138, 197, 248, al-/abz' ah al-kulliyyah al-fa" iilah:
2 93 the universal active nature, p;
siirah: chapter ofthe Holy Qur' an, 343
p. 193, 194, 379, 398 al-!ab'i!ah al-kulliyyah al-munfa'ilah:
�iirah: substantial form: rupa (M), the universal passive nature, p.
pp. 136,166;278,286,289,330, 343
33 I, 348, 361 tiibiit: the chest (in which Musa
�uwar: forms, sing, �iirah, p. 160, was floated down the Nile), p.
166 321
al-�uwar al-asmii': Forms of the tafsfr: interpretation, p. 188, 209,
Divine Names, p. 167 445
al-�uwar al-'ilmiyyah, the cognitive ta�aqqaqa: being-realized exter-
INDEX III
nally,p. 325,326 3 1 9,39°

al-ta�aqquq: realization, actualiz tamkzn, spiritual steadfastness, p.
ation,p. 94,325,405 426
ta�{iq: verification, p. 182 tamthil (M): tamthzl), similitude,p.
[ii'ifah: a branch of a Sufi order,p. 289
29 al-taniisukh: metempsychosis, p.
tajallz: self-manifestation of the 387
Absolute, (pl. tajalliyiit) p. 99, tanazzul: pl. tanaauliit: the de-
136, 164, 166, 268, 275, 285, scent of absolute being,p. 155,
286, 320, 343, 386, 391, 422, 231,268,272,320,391,411
432,434 tarzqah: the way,the .Sufi path: p.
tajallz dhiiti: essential self manifes 13, l 83
tation of the Absolute, p. 276, a!-tasalsul: endless chain of
278,284 origination,p. 257
tajallz ghayb: self-manifestation of tafawwef: Sufism, p. 6, 33, 184,
the Absolute rn the 129, 156, 176, 183, 184, 215,
invisible/unseen,p. 167 216,293
tajallz shahiidah: self-manifestation ta.rdzq: to affirm belief and faith in
of the Absolute in the visible,p. the heart: one of the conditions
167 of zmiin, p. 130,131,147,151
tajallz shuhudz: self-revelation of ta'thzr: efficacy: giving impression;
the Absolute in the visible producing effect, p. 89, 167,
world, p. 278,285 343, 347
tajallz wujudz; existential self al-ta' aththur: being-effected,p.343
revelation of the Absolute,e.g. taqyzd: limitedness, p. 226
tajallz shuhudz, p. 285 al-tasbu;: glorification (in prayer),
tajalliyiin: two kinds of self p. 366
manifestations of Absolute tashakhkhu,r: being-individualized,
Being, p. 167, 182 p. 3 2 5
tajalliyiit: self-manifestations, p. tashdzd, orthographic sign doubl
149,157,225,231 ing same letter,p. 123
tajdzd al-a'riid: the renewal of tashkzk: systematic ambiguity;
accidents, p. 341 analogical gradation, p. 274,
tajdzd al-khalq bi al-anfos: the 275, 282, 253,353
renewal of creation at every tawiibi': attendant repercussions
breath, p. 176,341 that follow from the prepared
takawwun: menjadi (M), to come ness inherent in each archetype
into being,p. 317 or permanent essence, p. 166,
al-takhlzq: the producing some 242,283
thing, p. 253 tawiijud, artificial ecstasy,p. 436
takllf: responsibility to observe tawallud; generation,p. 2 1o
commands and prohibitions of tawbah: repentance, p. 193, 194
God, p. 104,437 tawfiq: succour,p. 104, 128, 129,
takwzn: creating,p. 253,315,318, 139,76,I 19,186,187,188,197,
502 A COMMENTARY ON THE J;IUJJAT AL-�IDDIQ.
437,438,450 al-u�iil: roots-the science of the

al-tawfiq al-raqzq, spiritual suc- sources,p. 5,299,note
cour,p. 121,1 77,186,245,note u�/uqussiit (G: stoichos); the
tawbzd: unificatio'n (Oneness of elements (al-'anii�ir), p. 402
God), p. 97, 109, 127, 129,
130, 135, 145 (al-tawbzd); 184, al-wabdah: unity (Divine), essen
191,293,408 tial unity,p. 136,161,238,275,
terbit (M): to emanate,to arise,p. 285
89,note wabdat al-baqzqah: oneness of
thiibitah: fixed permanently, p. reality,p. 225
160, 180 (thiibit, established), wabdat al-shuhiid: unity of vision,
170,42 4 oneness, of perception,p. 458
thaliithiyyah: triplicity, (M): jadi wabdat al-wujiid: transcendent
tiga), p. 316 unity of existence, pp. 33, 43,
thiiqil (q .v. mathqiil) 44,149,185,238,240,245,265,
thaqzf (q.V. mathqiif) 266, 271, 276, 290, 291, 2 95,
al-thubiit: subsistence,p. 325 306, 312, 344, 345, 377, 385,
tiada (M): not existing ('adam), p. 388, 393, 397, 405, 415, 431,
89: 228,347 note, 455,456,457,458,459
tiada nyata (M): not manifest (la wabdiiniyyah: unicity, p. 301, 438
tajallf), p. 157 wiibid: one,single,immanent, p.
to kenon (G): empty space-is not, 159,307,342 (wii�idah)
q.v. (M): tiada, p. 228 wii�idiyyah: unity (in multip
to me on (G): not existing,q.v. (M): licity),p. 45,154,160,164,2 76,
tiada, p. 228 285, 412
to on (G): individual substance: wahm/awhiim: fancies, imag
huwiyyah, p. 230 ination,p. 207
to pleon (G): the full,p. 228 wahmz: imaginary,p. 320
to ti en einai (G): that by which it is wajada: to find, finding, p. 245,
it, p. 230, corresponds to 421
q uiddity: miihzjyah wajd: ecstasis, p. 245, 297, 299,
tukang (M): �iini': maker: filil, p. 300,420,421,435,439
315,32 1 wajh: aspect,face,p. 143, I 79
wqjid: one who experiences wajd,
iilii: primordial,p. 403 p. 420 42 I
uliihiyyah, (the level of) divinity,p. wqjib: necessary,p. 248,294, (al
412 wiijib) the Necessary Existent;
al-'uliim al-'aqliyyah: the rational 304,343 (wqjibah)
sciences, p. 247,293 al-wajib al-wujiid: the necessary
al-'uliim al-naqliyyah: the tradi being,pp. 85,87,96,225,235,
tional sciences,p. 247, 293 251,292,386,407
umiir (sing. amr) things,p. 299,note waqt, time,p. 425 (pl. awqiit)
'uqiil: intelligences (pure),p. 171; wathzq: strong belief,certainty,p.
(ten),p. 404 198,447
INDEX III
wijdiin: ecstasis, p. 98, 418, 363; p. 226,302, 306

finding, intuition of existence, wujiid kh ayiilz: imaginary being,p.
p. 245, 425 222
wujiib: necessity,p. 168,235,251, wujiid ma�tj, ( al-wujiid al-ma�tj,):
192 pure existence, p. 265, 277;
wujiib al-wujiid: necessity of exis absolute being, p. 85, 288
tence, p. 186 wujiid majiizz: metaphorical being,
wujiid: being, existence, p. 84, p. 85,200,261,262,263,300
86, go, 134, 148 (individual wujiid mumkin: possible existence,
existence); 156, 157, 157, 226, p. l 70, 270
227' 230, 231, 234, 235, 236, al-wujud al-munba�it: the self
237, 238, 242, 243, 245, 246, unfolding existence, p. 309,
253, 265, 266, 276, 294, 298, 411,413
300, 306, 309, 3 ro, 316, 320, wujiid muqayyad: limited or
325, 378, 385, 387, 419, 420, determined existence, pp. 96,
42 l, 425, 451 4o7
wujiid • iimm: general existence, p. wujiid muta'ayyin: determinate
275, 285, 412 being, p. 158
wujiid a�lan: basic (root) existence, wujiid muflaq ( al-wujiid al-mu!faq):
p. 3°7 absolute existence, pp. 96, 98,
wujiid • aynz: concrete, individual 153, 169, 226, 275, 300, 301,
existence, p. 148, 17I; al-wujiid 306, 307, 4o7, 415, 418
al-' aynz, p. 161, rag wujiidz: existential, ontological:
wujiid dhihnz: mental existence, p. q.v. shuhiidz, p. 167
307; 326: al-wujiid al-dhihnz: the wu�iil: arrival ( of the soul) at
world a� it exists in the mind meaning, p. 134
wujiid fi al-khiirij: external
existence, p. 307 yabqii: remains-endures; con
wujiid �aqzqz: real being, p. 85, tinuance in existence, p. 179,
98,222,260,262,263,300,418 180
wujiid itj,iifi: relative existence, p. yang dijadikan (M): that which is
276, 284, 285; 287, 414, note, brought forth into existence,p.
424 158
wujiid • ilmz: intelligible existence, yang mengadakan (M): the bringer
p. l 7 l forth into existence, p. 157
wujiid jiimi': existence (multiple)
i.e. as diversified into its :r,iihir: manifest-manifestation,
particular and individual p. 159 (exterior); 161,164,229,
modes, p. 276 2 99, 4ro
wujiid khiirijz: external existence, al-:r,iihir: the Manifest, p. 158,
p. 85, 251, 253; ( al-wujiid al 167, I 70, I 73, 270, 278, 282,
khiiri:fz) the external world, p. 423,444
326 al-:r,iihir fi nafsihi al-muihir li
wujiid khii��: particular existence, ghayrihi: in Himself manifest
and brings other into manifes ;;,ill al-dhat: the shadow of the
tation, p. 282, 283 Essence, p. 283
;;,ahir shara', literal sense of ;;,ill thanz: the second shadow, p.
religious law, p. rn3, 436 285
za'id: additional: superadded to ;;,ill dhatz: essential shadow, p. 284
something, p. 333, 272 ;;,ill khariJz: exterior shadow, p.
zakat: tithe, p. 47 285
;;,alalah: darkness, pp. rno, 424 ;;,illz: of the nature of a shadow,
zamanz: temporal, p. 261 shadowy existence, p. IOO
zandaqah: the dualist; the believer zindzq: dualist (pl. zanadiqah), see
in no religion; the deviator in zandaqah, p. 186, 187, 190, 191,
religion; the impugner · of 203
religion; the believer in the ;;,uhur: the becoming manifest, p.
eternity of the world, etc., p. 191 2 79
;;,ill: shadow, pp. 85, 87, 97, 265, ;;,ulm: injustice, p. 152
27 l, 282, 300, 416, 424 ;;,ulmah: darkness, p. 283
;;,ill Allah: the shadow of God, p. ;;,ulmah 'adamiyyah: the darkness of
282 non-being, p. 283
:;,ill awwal: the first shadow, p. 226
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A Commentary On The Hujjat Al-Siddiq of Nur Al-Din Al-Raniri

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A COMMENTARY ON THE

BEING AN EXPOSITION OF THE SALIENT POINTS OF DISTINCTION

© SYED MUHAMMAD NAQ,UIB AL-ATTAS, !9i

The calligraphy appearing on the half title page reading: 'ALLAH

It is indeed a great honour for me to be accorded the

On the evening of the same day, during the banquet in honour

Malaysia and other institutions of higher learning, Ohio

When I was informed of my selection to this distinguished

encounter today-a religious confusion characterized by

While I have spoken about the neglect of the past, I am not

midst of all sorts of duties at home, but immensely more

29 J umad al-Akhir I 406 Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas

Segala pujian bagi Allah nan mahaesa

Dialah Yang memberi petunjuk kepacla hambaNya yang

Meskipun zahir bentuk basyari

Meskipun rupaku anak Adam

yang awwal dicipta clan akhir menjelma, sehingga

1 The clans of the Quraysh were: Hashim, Umayya, Nawfal, Zuhra,

' maintained close contact with Pahang in the Malay Peninsula

atmosphere generated by their debate, instead of becoming

Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk lnstituut voor Taal-Land- en

Volkenkunde (VKI), vol. XXVI, The Hague, 1958, especially pp.

Malay language, literature, and literary expression could not

When a group of the deviating and strayed Wujiitliyyah

Al-Raniri's vigorous polemics and prolific writings against the

13 Al-Niizi'iit (79) :24.

Malay-Indonesian Archipelago, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (DBP), Kuala

and taught the people the right conduc-t in the understanding

infidelity and paganism. Here, again, the preaching oflslam had

Winstedt, A history of classical Malay literature, Oxford University Press,

Before his arrival in Acheh in 1637 and during his probable

26 See below, p. 28; no. 2.

I I. His spiritual upbringing.

'Aydariis' (al-' Aydariisz). In his lengthy work on Siifimetaphysics,

26. Shihab al-Din Al;mad ibn Abi Bakr al-Raddad; 33

III. His sources on $lfz doctrines and metaphysics.

pt. II (note 66, below), p. 74.

34 ]awahir, pp. 146-147.

Jawahir al-'Ulum fi Kashf al-Ma'lum, 37 both of which I have

1. Manazil al-Sa'irzn, 39 of 'Abd Allah al-An�ari al-I:Iarawi (d.

the last chapter (chapter V) of the book, he had to ('f'::i.se writing,

Sons, Cairo, 1966, 2nd printing, pp. 3-48.

Hanbalite, Imprimerie Catholique, Beyrouth (Recherches l'Institut de

al-Mashriq, Bayrut, 1971.

Brockelmann, Geschichte der Arabischen Litteratur (GAL), 2v. and

4. #ya' 'Ulum al-Dzn, 43 also by al-Ghazali;

R iizbi}:ian Baq Ii Shirazi ( d. I 209); 4 5

Supplementbiinden (GALS), 3v., E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1943; 1949; 1937,

Cairo, 1939, 4v.

45See GAL I, 414, no. 14.

Shams al-Din al-Fanari's commentary on the same work entitled

11. Lama'iit 52 of Fakhr al-Din Ibrahim al-'lraqi (d. 1287);

52 Jawiihir, p. 117. Published Kulliyyiit-i 'lriiqz, edited by S. Nafisi,

2 o. Al-lnsan al-Kamil64 of 'Abd al-Karim al-Jili (d. 1403); 65

Studies in Islamic mysticism, Cambridge, 1921, reprinted in 1967, chapter

'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi's Shar� Jawahir al-Nu{ii{fz }fall Kalima! al­

28. Ashi"iit al-Lama 'at 77 a commentary on the Lama 'at of al­

77 Jmvtfhir,p-p: 42, 5-i:

commentary by 'Abd al-Ghafiir al-Lari and Persian commentary by

Shafi 'i doctrine oflaw, and is also a commentary on al-Sakkaki's work

87Jawa -h'zr, p.. 39.

'Arabi by al-SharifNa�ir al-I:Jusayni al-Jaylani (fi. 1533); 88

Tawbzd wa hidiiyah li kulli Mustarshid wa al-Rashid. Al-Raniri's Tibyiin has

'Abd al-Ghani al-Nabulusi's Shar� Jawahir al-Nu{ii{fz }fall Kalima! al

28. Ashi"iit al-Lama 'at 77 a commentary on the Lama 'at of al

wrote a commentary on the Al-O.J1sidah al-Mzmiyyah of 'Umaribn al

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