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    ADAMS, Marilyn Mccord - Common Nature and Instants of Nature. Ockham's Critique of Scotus Reconsidered

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    Common Nature and Instants of Nature / 55 Common Nature and Instants of Nature — Ockham’s Critique of Scotus Reconsidered! — Marilyn McCord Adams I Introduction In his Ondinato I, 2, Ockham tackles the problem of universal by critiquing ne fewer than six versions of the common opinion that “the nature, which is somehow ‘universal —at least potentially and incompletely —really exists inthe individual "2 In my own book William Ockham, chapter 2,9 I review Ockham’s attacks en “mod- erate realism” and conclude that in most cases his arguments do not so much refute 1s expose conflicting intuitions about metaphysical fundamentals, Ockhatn believed he could show competing ontologies false because contradictory. By contrast, T suggested, skillful philosophers are usually able to formulate positions that are internal'y coher- ent. Apparently siccessful counterarguments can usually be traced back to axiomatic disagreements. In the area of metaphysics, decisive refutations are rarely if ever to be found. Oddly, I permitted one exception to this moral of my story. I contended that Ockham was sucessful in convicting John Duns Scotus, perhaps his most distinguish predecessor, of endorsing a theory of universals comprised of implicitly contradictory claims.* Several years ago, I had occasion to reconsider this judgment. I now reject ry earlier verdiet—that Ockham had an unanswerable argument against Scotus's position. My purpose in this paper is to explain why. II Scotus's Theory of Universals, Reviewed "A moch briefer version ofthese remarks was presented at » conference at Wasela University in November, 1904 Tam alo grateful to Profesor Katsu Shibuya fr eater diensions of he debate Detweon Scotus sad Odkhass daring bis visit to UCLA 1901-92, *Oniinato 1,42, 47 (OTh H, 226). Note: References to Willan Ockhan's works ae to the citation, Oper Philosophicn et Theologica, ete and poblished by The Francisca Institute ‘St. Bonaventre, New York, Heteftr, I shal abbreviate “Opera Philosophie by ‘OPK, “Opera Theolyica®by ‘OTH, flowed by the volume number In roman numerals and the page nambers fa rable manera "Wiliam Ockham Note Dame, diana: University of Notre Dame Pres, 1987), p. 18-69 ‘Wain Ockham, £2, pp 82-20, 68 In my book, I summarized Scotus's theory of universls in the following five theses (TA) The nature of itself i common and is also common in reality; (12) The individuating principles or contracting diflerence is numerically fone and particular of itself and cannot be common to numerically dstinet particulars; (3) Neither the nature nor the contracting difference can exist in reality except as a constituent of a particular; (74) The nature and the contracting difference are not really distinet, but formally distinct; (15) As a result of its combination with a contracting difference, the na- ture is numerically one and is numerically multiplied as the particulars are multiplied? Several latfieations ae in order. [i] For Scotus, to say that, eg, human nature is common or incompletely universal, is to ascribe to ita real unity less than numerical unity More precisely it is to say ‘that itis not incompatible with it to exist in Socrates, and not incompa:ible with it ‘to exist in Plato, and not incompatible with it to exist in Aristotle, and so on for each particular human being. When be says (T1) that commonness pertains to the nature of itsef and (2) particularity to the contracting difference of itself, he means that commonness is pred Jcated of the rature and particularity of the contracting diference per se the second ‘way. Consequently, commonness will follow the nature wherever it goes, sothat the ua ‘re is not only common of itself but also common ia reality. Likewise, the contracting difference is particular of itself and particular in reality, Scotus recognizes that these claims could seem problematic, For (T3) neither ‘the nature nor the contracting difference can exist in reality except as a censtituent of 1 particular. And particulars require one constituent of each sort, so that the nature and the contracting diffrence exist in as constituents of one and the same real thing (res) It seems to follow that contradictories will be trae about one and the same thing: for human natare in Socrates will be common and so such that it is not incompatible with it to exist in Plato, while the contracting difference Soerateity will be particular in such a way that it is incompatible with it to exist in Plato. To dissolve the difficulty, = Wiliam Oct, 2, ppA8-46, This poston is developed by Scotus is bis Oninedo 5, 2, sd presented by Ockham in his Onna I, 2, 46 (OTH, 161-173), *Seotus, Ontnatio Tl, 43, ply 1 nn 31-3 (Vaticana VI, 402-40), ‘Common Nature and Instants of Nature / 57 Scotus appeals to his own notion of formal nom-identty or distnetion within whet is ‘one and the same real thing (res)."Briely, Seotus maintains that = and y ace ‘rmally the same, where one falls under the definition of the othe ox would so fall if they were definable in the tet Aristotelian sense in terms of genus and differentia For example, since man is rational animal, animal is formally the same as man. Correspondingly, (D1) = and y are formally nomidential or distinct, if and only if (a) «and 1 are or ae in what is really one thing (res); and (b) if and y re capable of definition, the denition of x doesnot include y and the definition of y does not incude z; and (c) if x and y are not capable of definition, then they were capable of definition, the definition of 2 would not inelnde y and the defition of y would not include 2: Now there are two ways to remove the appearance that contradictories are being af firmed ofthe same subject simultaneously: one is to argue that while the predicates are ‘genuinely contradictory, they are not really being predicated of the same subject the other isto dia that the predicates are being aserted ofthe same subjet but to deny ‘that they are contradictory. Scotus’ Lectura and Ordinatio accounts straightfrwardly seize the frst strategy, recognizing within one and the same thing (res) “realities! (rea- litates), “formalities” (formalittes), “aspects” (rationes), “formal aspects” (rationes formales), “ntensons” (intentiones) or “real aspects” (rationes reales). Thus, (T4) within Socrates, the contradictories ‘common’ and ‘not common’, or ‘compatible with ‘existence in Plato‘ and “incompatible with existence in Plato’, are predicated of distinct property-bearers, human nature and Socrateity, respectively. His contrasting Reportata Parisiensia- and Logica- account, withdraws the claim of absolute distintion bat holds that the formally non-identical are only distinct secundum quid, and maintains that such diminished distinction is enough to block application of the Indiscersibility of Wenticals to, ¢, human nature and Soeratety within Socrates? III Decisive Objection from Ockham? Ockham mouu's a double-pronged attack on Scotus’ theory of universls, arguing first that the lates notion of formal distinction is unintelligible; and contending next Lostra 1,42, p3, aad 4 275 (Vatican XVI, 26) Lectura 14.2, p2,qg4-4, 1.25 (Vtienna XVI, 216); Ondintio 8,42, p.2, q1-4,n-408 Vaticana 1, 356-57, Reporte Parisian TA, 4.3, 42, fl88a; Quacs. miscellnene, 3, nn.1-11 (Waddin 441-40), cL my Wilkam Ockham, €2, pp2-20. 58 {Uhat—even granting the formal distinction—Scotus's theses (T1)-(T) are mutually inconsistent four ways.!° In my book, I found Ockham’ case against Seatus to be ‘mostly philosophically parochial, failing to enter into his opponent's positon to appre- ciate its internal coherence. In particular, I dismissed Ockham’s case agzinst Seotus's formal distincton'* as well as his arguments that (T) is inconsistent with each of (T3) ‘and (T5) and that (14) is inconsistent with (TS). Nevertheless, I maintained that Ockham’s fourth argument was “fatal to Scotus's theory." It is time to review why. ‘The allegeily “telling” argument cut to the heart of Scotus'sposition—taking aim ‘at his contention that, eg. human nature is incompletely universal ia reality. Agninst this, Ockham eontonds that (T1}—the claim that the sature of ieslf is common aad is also common in reality—is inconsistent with the conjunction of the other theses (2)-(14), ‘Scotus hac appealed to the principle (P1) If one of a pair of opposites pertains to something of itself, the other of the psir of opposites is incompatible with that thing of itself! in arguing that the nature cannot be this of ise. For if human nature were Socrates's of itself, then being Plato's would be incompatible with human nature of itself and so it could not be common. Again, if buman nantre were numerically ove and particular of itself, numerical multiplicity would be incompatible with it of itself, and so it would ‘uot of itself be common or ove by a unity less than numerical unity So far from rejecting (P1), Ockham insists that what holds for de se predications obtains for denominative predications a8 well, sa that Scotus ought also t» concede (P2) ~ Whenever one of a pair of opposites really pertains to something in suc a way that that thing is truly and really denominated from it, whether ‘they pertain to it of itself or through something else—this fact remaining. ‘unchanged —the other of the opposites does not renlly pertain to it, but will be abcolutely denied of it => 1 Pressing his ease, Ockham observes that by (13), the nature does not excst otherwise than together with some contracting difference of other; and by (TS), the nature is " Ordinato1, 42, 1 (OTH, 17}, 4.2, @6 (OTR IL, 170 "Wiliam cham, 62, pp.46-82. "Wit Octtam, £2, pp.s2-5 "Witham Oetdain, £2, p58. MOndinatio 4.3.1, ., nA (Vatiann VI, 28). ° Ondinatio 1,42, @6 (OTH M17) ‘Common Nature and Instants of Nature / 59 ‘numerically one and particular, asa result of its combination with a contracting differ- cence. Thus, by (P2), no nature can simultaneously be common the way (T) asserts it tobe Scotus cannot consistently deny that ‘common’ and ‘numerically one and pacticulas* are opposites and hence inappropriate substitution instances in (P2}, because he himself dhas regarded them as appropriate substitutions in (P1).* Alternatively, a defender of Scotus might bring counterexamples against (P2), For instance, a human being is white denominatively and a white is white per se. But “ blackness is compatible with a human being and is not compatible with a white. Nevertheless, a human being Js white, and A is 2 buman being and white.""” Likewise, being Plato’ is compatible with human nature but incompatible with being Socrates's. And numerical multiplicity ray be compatible with human nature of itself, even though itis not compatible with Socrates." In defense of (P2), Ockham slices the counterexample with a distinction between ‘actual and potentil compatibility. If Socrates is white, blackness is not actually com= patible with Socrates, because itis contradictory for Socrates to be white ao black simultaneously. Stil, blackness is potentially compatible with Socrates because even if Socrates isin fact white, it is metaphysically—even cansally —possible that whiteness ‘not inhere in Soerstes and blackness inhere in him instead, Likewise, if hnmanity in Socrates is Socrates's denominatively, itis not actually but at most potentially com- patible with Plato's contracting diffrence. And if humanity in Socrates is numerically fone and particular, itis not actually but at most potentially compatible with numerical multiplicity: If (P2) denies ectual compatibility, Scotus might reply that potential compatibil- ity was all that thet he meant to defend: the nature is only common, not completely ‘universal, in reality, Just as it is possible that Socrates should exist without whiteness Inbering in him and have blackness inhering in him instead, soit is possible that bu :anity in Socrates should not be combined with Socrates's eoutracting difference but ‘be combined with Plato’s contracting difference instead. Likewise, human nature in re ality is only potentially, not actually, compatible with each of a plurality of contracting differences and so ealy potentially compatible with numerical multiplicity. Tt was at this point, I thought, that Ockham struck his decisive blow. For given (T), ‘human nature in Socrates is only formally but not really distinct from Socratety. But 42, 46 (OTh I, 178. * Onkinatio 1, 42, 48 (OTH, 178), " Wrukam Ockham, £2, p8. Wiliam Ockhan, =2, pS6. oo ‘those that are formally dstinet exist in what is really one and the sane thing (res) and so are logically ad metaphysicaly inseparable from one another. By contras, a substance ‘and its color are really distinct, so that the analogy with Socrates and bis whiteness breaks down. Given that itis not logically/metaphysially possible for Socrateity to exist in Plato, and given that hnman nature in Socrates is not logically /metaphysically separable from Socrateity, humanity in Socrates cannot go anywhere that Socrateity cannot go. Consequently, tis logically metaphysical impossible for hunnan nature in Socrates to exist in Plato. Likewise, i is as impossible for human nature in reality to exist in numerically many as itis for any contracting diference to do so. ‘Therefore, (71) is inconsistent with the conjunction of (T2)-(T) IV Common Nature and Natural Ps (4.1) Natural Priority —the Missing Thesis I should have been suspicious of my verdict. Even in a contest with Ockham, the ‘More than Subtle Doctor, couldn't the Subtle Doctor be trusted to have more resources ‘up his sleeve? In fact, Ockham's own summary lists the additional thesis: (76) the nature is naturally prior to the contracting difference. Scotus himself explains as follows: "The right way of understanding this can be somehow grasped frou what Avicenra says in Metaphysics V, where he asserts that ‘equinty is only ‘equinity —of itself it is neither one nor many, universal nor particular.’ 1 take this to monn that itis not of itself one by numerical unity nor many by the plurality opposite to that unity; neither is it fof tse} universal in act (the way, evidently, that something is universal qua object of the intellect) nor is it particular of itself For although it never really exists without any of these, nevertheless of itself it is not any of these, but rather is naturally prior to them all. And cording to its natural priority it is that which is per se an objec: of the intellect, and per seas such is considered by metaphysis and expressed by the definition. Propositions true (per se] the first way are true by reason of the quiddity so taken, For nothing is predicated per se the fist way of ‘Common Nature and Instants of Natare / 61 fa quiddity unless i¢ is essentially included init, insofar as it is abstracied from all thove that are naturally posterior to it?! ‘And again, he elaborates: And just as according to that being [in the intellect] the wature is not ofits universal, but rather universality is accidental to that nature according to that first aspect of it according to which itis an object [of the intllet}; so also in extre-mental reality, where the nature exists together with partisu- lavity, the neture is not of itself determinate to particularity, but is naturslly ptior to tha: aspect contracting it to that particularity, and insofar as iis naturally prior to the contracting [diference it is not incompatible with it to exist without that contracting [difference) “= ‘The natute of itself has predicated of it whatever pertains to it per se the fist way’ eg. buman nature of itself is rational animal; and presumably whatever pertains to it per se the second way—eg, human nature of itself is common, But the aature of itsolf is indoterminate and determinable with respect to existence in the intellect and existence in reality, and indeterminate and determinable with respect to universality and particulacty, with respect to being numerically one or numerically many. And the nature of itself, insofar as it is indeterminate and determinable with respect to those farther (accidental) determinations, is naturally prior to them, What the natnee is— its quiddity—is prior in the order of explanation to its being thought of ors being. real, to its being numerically one or numerically multiplied in reality Scotus; Ordinatv 43, pa, ql; anSI-82 (Vaticane VI, 402-408): Qultrautam hoe debe lal, potest lluater vide! per detum Avlceniae V Metaphysiene, bi ult quod ‘cpinits st tants equiitas,—ae et de se nt nee ples, ner wniverslis nee pacticlaie’, Intell: non et ‘ex s una’ unitate rumor, noe ‘lures plualtate oppost unital; noe “univers ct et (co ‘ode sot quo alipeldest univer text oblectam ntact), ue ea particu’ des. ict caiat numnqu st raliter sae aque istorum, de se tamen non est liquod itram, ond st priusnauraliter omnibus ist, —et secondum proritatem naturalam est quod quld wt! per se oblctum Intellets, pers, ute consderatur a metaphyic et expr ropastions ‘verae primo modo’ sunt vere ratione quitats sc accept, quia nihil deitr ‘por 5 primo modo’ de quditate nisi quod includtu in ca eset, ln quantum ipsa sbstiaibut ab ‘omnibus itis, quae san posteriors naturales ps, Scotus, Onna TL, 4, pl, ql, m4 (Vaticane VI, 404). Bt sleut secundum lu ese nou st aaturn de oe univer, sd universal act i natura secundum primam ration eas, ae per defiant; et Secunda quam et sbiotam, —ita etiu in extra, ub mara ext com singultate, non ot ls natura do ge determinate ad sngulaitatam, sed est prior natalie ipsa sation contrat ipsum ad slagulaieatem il, ot in quantum est por naturale lo conteabente, won rpugnal sib ese sine io contsaente a Given the rest of Sootus’s theory of universals, (T6) is an unsurprising elim. To discover how i paves the way for a reply to Ockham's charge of contradivtion, it will be helpful to bok to Scotus’s discussion in another context, where he draws out the Implications of will: power's natural priority in relation to its acts (4.2) Natural Priority and the Will's Non-Evident Power for Opposites, ‘Scotus is famous for his “high” doctrine of free will, according to which the will is a self-deterinining power for opposites. In his Ordinatio discussion, he is careful to distinguish wh.h sorts of opposites created and Divine wills are selfdeterm\ning powers for. (| No willis the power simultaneously vo will and not will the same thing, because ‘this involves a contradiction. [i] Created wills, as mutable, include the “evident” power {or opposite acts in succession— eg, Adam's first wiling against (note) eating the forbidden fruit, then willing to (velle) eat the forbidden fruit. Because God is simple and immutable, Divine will-power does not include any capacity for opposite acts. But ‘whereas created acts of will are sorted into diffrent species by distinctions among their objects, so that numerically the same created act could not have different abjects from those it actualy has, the Divine act of will does not share this limitation, Rather ‘numerically th same Divine act of wil (which is really the same as the Disine essence) could have—ahere creatures are concerned— Espo in ibram Pracdicamentram Aristotle, ¢.18 (OPI, $28); Ordnatio I, 19, 3 (OTH 1,308 *Ondinati I, 49, 8 (OTh I, 312). Common Nature and Instants of Nature / 67 between the nature and the contracting differences could provide the foundation in reality for such distinctions V_ Conclusion Scotus's theory of universal requires us to predicate contradictories simul:ancously of what ate/is relly. one and the same thing. Human nature in Socrates is really the same as Socratety, the contracting difference, But even in Socrates human nature of itsolfis common, and Socratety is not common but particular. Likewise, hnsman natre in Socrates is not only common of itself, but particular denominatively ‘My present cantention is that Seotus's attempts to resolve these apparent coutra-

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