Abstraction and Metaphysics in St.

Thomas' Summa
Author(s): Philip Merlan
Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Apr., 1953), pp. 284-291
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2707477
Accessed: 01-11-2017 21:52 UTC

REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2707477?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms

University of Pennsylvania Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and

extend access to Journal of the History of Ideas

This content downloaded from 200.130.19.157 on Wed, 01 Nov 2017 21:52:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 ABSTRACTION AND METAPHYSICS IN ST. THOMAS' SUMMA

BY PHILIP MERLAN

On reading modern interpretations of St. Thomas' philosophy one fre

quently receives the impression that St. Thomas professed the following
doctrine: 1. The active intellect extracts the species intelligibiles from th
phantasmata by an act of abstraction. 2. There are three degrees of a
straction. The first is from the materia signata (individualis) sensibilis, t
second is from the materia communis (sensibilis), the third from all matt
(including the materia intelligibilis) altogether. 3a. The first degree of ab
straction is applied in physics; 3b. the second in mathematics; 3c. the thi
in metaphysics.1
Now, it is the purpose of this paper to remind the reader that 3c is not
the doctrine to be found in the Summa and to explain the importance of th
absence. What the Summa says is: by the third degree of abstraction
grasp such objects as ens, unum, potentia, actus, etc. All these can ex
also without any matter (while physicals and mathematicals cannot);
which is meant that they apply also (are present in, are predicable of) im
material substances. They are immaterial only in this sense of the word,
or to use a later term, they are immaterial praecisive. But this kind of im
materiality is of course quite different from the immateriality of God, th
angels, etc., which, to use a later term, are immaterial positive. Accord-
ingly, the Summa stresses that we cannot reach disembodied forms (im-
material substances) superior to the soul such as God and the angels, by th
method of abstraction. The assertion to the contrary the Summa conside
to be an erroneous doctrine of Avempace (Ibn Bagga). The doctrine is
erroneous according to St. Thomas because these immaterial substances ar
neither forms nor universals. Thus they can be reached neither by a
stractio formae nor by abstractio universalis (I q. 88, art. 2, resp. dic.).

1 Cf. J. Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge (1937): the third degree of abstrac
tion enables the mind to consider immaterial objects like God, pure spirits, etc., a
also substance, quality, act, potency, etc.-all of which belong to the realm of met
physics (46). See the penetrating criticisms of Maritain in L. M. Regis, " La phi-
losophie de la nature," Jtudes et Recherches publiees par le College Dominica
d' Ottawa, Philosophie, Cahier I (1936), 127-158. Maritain's answer in Quat
Essais sur l'esprit dans sa condition charnelle (1939), 240, n. 1, is hardly satisfyin
either from the historical or from the systematic point of view. In Ri. Gilson, Th
Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (1929), we read that immaterial substances lik
angels or God are known only by abstracting the intelligible from the material an
sensible (236); we are thus left with the impression that "abstraction " should b
taken in its technical sense. True, Gilson later expresses himself without any am
biguity by saying that the incorporeal is known to us only by comparison with t
corporeal (256), and by emphasizing that there are no phantasms of intelligible
realities, so that no abstraction can take place.
284

This content downloaded from 200.130.19.157 on Wed, 01 Nov 2017 21:52:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 ABSTRACTION AND METAPHYSICS IN ST. THOMAS' SUMMA 285

It is true, the Summa emphasizes that the only way leading to even
adequate knowledge of these immaterial substances starts from objects
sensation. This starting point is common to several ways: one leading
physicals and mathematicals, another to such objects as ens, unum, e
a third to immaterial substances. But this third way is from the very
ginning different from the other ways. It is described by St. Thomas in
tinction from the way of abstraction in such terms as: per comparation
ad corpora sensibilia or per remotionem (I q. 84, art. 7; q. 88, art. 2
sec.); by some kind of similitudines and habitudines ad res materiale
q. 88, art. 2, ad primum).
In other words, the method of abstraction is applicable to metaphys
only to the extent to which metaphysics treats forms common to mate
and immaterial substances (transcendentals). As far as metaphysics d
with immaterial substances, it requires a method different from the met
of abstraction.
Since the sentence impossibile est intellectum . . . aliquid intelligere
. .nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata (I q. 84, art. 7, resp. dic.) is some-
times quoted to prove that abstraction is the only method by which we can
know anything above the sensibilia, it should be stressed that this sentence
occurs in the topic indicated in the title of q. 84; quomodo anima . . . in-
telligat corporalia. The knowledge of immaterial substances is treated ex
professo only in q. 88 (title: Quomodo anima humana cognoscat ea quae
supra se sunt), and throughout this quaestio the applicability of abstraction
to immaterial substances is denied.
If we consider it legitimate to designate metaphysics dealing with im-
material substances such as God, angels, etc., as metaphysica specialis, and
to designate metaphysics dealing with such things as ens, unum, potentia,
actus, as metaphysica generalis, we should say in brief: in his Summa St.
Thomas teaches that the method of abstraction is inapplicable to meta-
physica specialis. Geoffrey of Fontaines will say later: Secundum statum
vitae praesentis non est nisi unus modus intelligendi omnia, sive materialia
. . . sive immaterialia . . . scilicet per abstractionem speciei intelligibilis
virtute intellectus agentis, mediante phantasmata.3 But this is not what St.
Thomas said, and it should not be presented as his doctrine.

2 This is made completely clear in some other presentations of St. Thomas. An

older example is K. Werner, Der heilige Thomas von Aquino (1859): abstraction in
metaphysics is insufficient, as metaphysics deals not only with the most universal
but also with the most real, which must be reached by a method other than that of
logical universalization. This other method Werner correctly calls separatio (II,
157, n. 1)-the explanation of this term is given in the body of the present paper.
A more recent example: M. L. Habermehl, Die Abstraktionslehre des hi. Thomas
von Aquin (1933), 58-60.
3 Quodl. 6, q. 15, in M. Wulf, " L'intellectualisme de Godefroid de Fontaines
d'apres le Quodlibet 6, q. 15," Festgabe . . . Clemens Baeumker (1913), 287-296,
esp. 294.

This content downloaded from 200.130.19.157 on Wed, 01 Nov 2017 21:52:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 286 PHILIP MERLAN

We find the above results fully

Expositio super Boetium De Trin
tition of speculative knowledge in
(metaphysics),4 St. Thomas decla
make use of abstraction, the form
latter of abstractio formae. The m
should be called separatio rather th
intellectual method underlying all
quoted as having committed the m
immaterial substances are adequat
things-so that we can abstract t
physics only is credited with deali
all of which can obviously be reac
priate to special metaphysics St. T
motio, via causalitatis (causa exc
nysius.8
All this should have been obvious even before the study of the Expogitio
received a new basis in the form of Wyser's edition of parts of the Expositio,
based directly on St. Thomas autograph.9 Such a study establishes two

4 Boetius, De Trinitate, ch. 2 (p. 8 in the Loeb Stewart-Rand ed.). I intend

to deal with the doctrines of Boethius elsewhere.
5 Expositio super Boet. De Trin., q. 5, art. 3, resp. Even if we prefer to speak
of modes rather than degrees of abstraction (see R. Allers, " On Intellectual Opera-
tions," The New Scholasticism 26 [1952], 1-36, esp. 26), it still is impossible to
interpret separatio as one of three modes of abstraction. But it is equally impossi-
ble to recognize fully the complete difference between abstraction and separation,
and at the same time to assert that separation is the only method appropriate to
metaphysics, as is done by J.-D. Robert, O.P., "La metaphysique, science distincte
de toute autre discipline philosophique, selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin," Divus Thomas
(Piacenza) 50 (=ser. 3, vol. 24), 1947, 206-222. Precisely to the extent to which
transcendentals are the subject matter of metaphysics, the method of abstraction
must be applied in metaphysics.
6 Ibid., q. 6, art. 4. On Avempace see the introduction of M. Asin Palacios in
his edition of Avempace, El regimen del solitario (1946); E. A. Moody, "Galileo
and Avempace," this Journal 12 (1951), 163-193; 375-422. For historical perspec-
tive see, e.g., B. Nardi, "Note per una storia del' Averroismo Latino. II. La
posizione di Alberto Magno di fronte all' Averroismo," Rivista critica di storia di
filosofia, 2, fasc. 3-4 (1947), 197-220, esp. 200 and 216.
7 Expositio super Boet. De Trin., q. 5, art. 4, resp.
8 Ibid., q. 6, art. 2, resp.; cf. St. Thomas, Expositio super Dionysium de div.
nom., c. 7, lectio 4: we know God ex ordine totius universi by applying the methods
per ablationem, per excessum, secundum causalitatem omnium.
9 P. Wyser, O.P., Die wissenschaftstheoretischen Quaest. V u. VI. in Boethium
De Trinitate des hi. Thomas von Aquin (1948); cf. the important review by B.
Decker in Scholastik 20-24 (1944-1949), 415-418. Indeed, the body of this paper
was written without any knowledge of Wyser's edition. I am extremely obliged to
Dr. Decker (himself preparing an edition of St. Thomas' Boethius commentary) for

This content downloaded from 200.130.19.157 on Wed, 01 Nov 2017 21:52:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 ABSTRACTION AND METAPHYSICS IN ST. TfHOMAS' SUMMA 287

facts beyond any doubt. The first is that in the original draft of the ke
sentence St. Thomas had written patet ergo quod triplex est abstracti
making it clear at the same time that one of these three kinds of abstracti
is the forming of negative propositions (precisely what he later calle
separatio in the strict sense of the word) and only the other two are abstra
tion (of the form or the universal) in the proper sense of the word; but
even so in the final draft he replaced the words triplex abstractio by triple
distinctio, dividing it in separatio (discursive thinking) and abstractio fo
mae or abstractio universalis. (q. 5, a. 3, resp.). Thus St. Thomas con
sciously preferred the term triplex distinctio to triplex abstractio precisel
to avoid the misunderstanding that he was teaching the doctrine of thre
degrees of abstraction. The second fact is that in this sentence (. . . a
tractio a materia sensibili; et haec competit metaphysicae) the word meta
physicae as found e.g. in the Parma edition (v. 17, p. 386) or in Mandonne
(v. 3, p. 113) is a simple misprint, to be replaced by mathematicae. These
two facts should destroy any hope of finding the doctrine of the three de
grees of abstraction in the Expositio.
This has been clearly perceived by Geiger.10 The results of his analysi
of the Expositio coincide with the results of the present paper with regard
the Summa, and again it is noteworthy that the main body of the presen
paper was written without any knowledge of Geiger's (cf. n. 9). Now, the
correctness of Geiger's interpretation has been contested by Leroy.11 To
prove the weakness of Leroy's argument it is sufficient to concentrate on t
points. Leroy asks: if there is no doctrine of the three degrees of abstrac
tion in the Expositio, how are we to explain that in all his writings posteri
to the Expositio, St. Thomas does teach this very doctrine? The fac
established in the present paper that St. Thomas does not teach it in the
Summa should provide a sufficient answer to Leroy. This answer wou
hold quite regardless of the temporal relation between the Expositio and th
Summa (or between any other writings of St. Thomas), for the simple reaso
that the Summa explicitly rejects the doctrine of the three degrees, and su
an explicit rejection would outweigh any evidence provided by incidental
and non-explicit references which could be interpreted as implying that do
trine. Secondly, Leroy asserts that the term separatio does not mean any
thing else in St. Thomas but the highest degree of abstractio. Howeve
Leroy quotes no evidence to support this assertion, and it must be empha
sized that according to St. Thomas abstractio is the method by which we
"separate " the universal from the particular or the form from the who

a letter informing me of the wording of the original draft of the decisive passag
in St. Thomas' autograph.
10 L. B. Geiger, O.P., "Abstraction et separation d'apres Saint Thomas in d
Trinitate q. 5, a. 3," Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques 31 (1947),
3-40.
11 M.-V. Leroy, " Le savoir speculatif," Revue Thomiste 48 (1948), 236-339, esp.
328-339.

This content downloaded from 200.130.19.157 on Wed, 01 Nov 2017 21:52:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 288 PHILIP MERLAN

which is composed of form and m

which we " separate " e.g., a qualit
when we say " this man is not wh
tion of discursive thinking or, as
lectus componens et dividends, i.e
mentary to De Interpretatione I,
propositions. The former " separa
all according to St. Thomas; only t
of the word. The process of abstra
the process of separation does. T
could equally well say, the two
described in the Opusculum XLV
lectu respectu universalium): . .
modo, quod intellectus intelligat
falsa. Si autem sic separetur alb
homo non apprehensa albedine,
[i.e., by the second kind of separ
genus a speciebus . . . (Parma ed
1. 12, ib., vol. 20, p. 68). To say,
a maximization of abstraction is to contradict clear evidence.
Of course, it may be said that the operations of separatio and abstractio
have something in common in that both " divide." Accordingly, St. Thomas
sometimes uses the term separatio or abstractio to cover both: separatio in
the proper sense of the word, and abstractio. In such cases he may add a
word of explanation, e.g., speak of a duplex abstractio (Summa q. 85, art. 1,
ad primum; cf. Expositio, loc. cit.) or separatio proprie. Or he may rely on
the context (as in the passage from Opusc. XLV quoted above) to make it
clear whether he uses the words in their broader or in their strict sense. But
it is always clear that there is a radical difference between abstractio and
separatio taken in their strict sense.12
There is no way to deny, of course, that in St. Thomas all knowledge is
ultimately based on sensory perception. But it is oversimplifying St.
Thomas' position to say that abstraction is the only way in which to ascend
to immaterial substances. We should simply admit that St. Thomas left
unexplained how precisely the non-abstractive ascent takes place, and lim-
ited himself to hints like remotio, ablatio, comparatio, similitudo, habitudo
(relatio) ad corporalia, excessus, via causalitatis.13 He made it perfectly

12 On some important implications of the question whether truth resides essen-

tially in apprehensions of quiddities or in propositions, see, e.g., R. McKeon,
"Thomas Aquinas' Doctrine of Knowledge and Its Historical Setting," Speculum 3
(1928), 425-444, esp. 434ff.
13 The ultimate roots of some of these concepts, esp. ablatio and remotio; simili-
tudo, habitudo, relatio; excessus, seem to be found in Albinus' Epitome (Didascali-
cus), ch. 10 (p. 61 ed. Louis). Albinus describes the different ways towards the
knowledge of God by "kat' aphairesin" (ablatio, remotio), "kat' analogian"
(similitudo, habitudo, relatio), and "metabasis" based on "en toi timi6i hypero-

This content downloaded from 200.130.19.157 on Wed, 01 Nov 2017 21:52:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 ABSTRACTION AND METAPHYSICS IN ST. THOMAS' SUMMA 289

clear, however, that it is such a non-abstractive ascent which is the ba

our (always inadequate) knowledge of immaterial substances. We
even risk saying: abstraction makes it possible to intuit the objec
physics and mathematics, so that they later can be made the terms o
discursive thinking. But there is no intuition of the objects of metaph
specialis to start with; they become accessible to discursive thinking al
The whole problem is of interest simply as one of correct interpret
of St. Thomas' doctrines. But it has still another aspect. If abstraction
cannot be applied to the subject matter of special metaphysics, while it can
be applied to the subject matter of general metaphysics, the unicity of meta-
physics is threatened. It is very interesting to notice that a Thomist like
Sertillanges denies the existence of a metaphysica specialis altogether, as-
serting that God, angels, etc., when treated in metaphysics are not treated
as such; they are rather treated as being in general. In this way Sertillanges
can easily save the method of abstraction for both branches of metaphysics
and also establish the unicity of metaphysics.15 But it seems obvious that
St. Thomas did not bring about the unicity of metaphysics in the manner of
Sertillanges. In his commentary to the An. Post. I, lectio 41, St. Thomas
says: The essences (quiddities) of immaterial substances are not the sub-
ject matter of speculative sciences (metaphysics being one of them). But
Sertillanges writes as if St. Thomas had said: separate (immaterial) sub-
stances are not the subject matter of speculative sciences (metaphysics be-
ing one of them). But all that St. Thomas ever said was that knowledge of
separate substances in metaphysics is not the knowledge of their quiddities.

chen" (excessus). In the same chapter Albinus explains the principle of the so
called negative theology (p. 59 ed. Louis); cf. Proclus, Theologia Platonica III 7,
p. 131f. ed. Portus. See R. E. Witt, Albinus (1937) 124 and 132f.; H. A. Wolfson,
Philo, 2 vols. (1947), II, 73-164. In Albinus the meaning of "aphairesis" is some-
what ambiguous. See also H. A. Wolfson, "Albinus and Plotinus on Divine Attri-
butes," Harvard Theological Review 45 (1952), 115-130, esp. 117-121; 129f.
14 There is a certain similarity between St. Thomas' criticism of Avempace and
a passage in Ibn Khaldoun, Les Prolegomenes, 3 vols. (1863-1868), III, 233, indi-
cating a common source. On the relation between abstraction and intuition in St.
Thomas see A. Hufnagel, Die intuitive Erkenntnis nach dem hi. Thomas v. Aquin
(1932), 49, n. 4.
15 A. D. Sertillanges, " La science et les sciences sp6culatives d'apres St. Thomas
d'Aquin," Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques 10 (1921), 1-20, esp. 15f.
P. J. W6bert, Essai de Metaphysique thomiste (n.d.; 1927?), after having explained
the difference between the abstraction of the universal and abstraction of the form,
asserts of the latter that it can be either mathematical or metaphysical (51). This
assertion is clearly based on the misprint indicated above in the present paper. It
would be interesting to check how many misinterpretations of St. Thomas have been
caused by the failure to notice this misprint. Generally, one has the impression that
in Webert and Sertillanges general metaphysics has simply absorbed special meta-
physics. For an older example of a similar interpretation in most succinct form
cf. C. Baeumker, Witelo (1908), 276-280.

This content downloaded from 200.130.19.157 on Wed, 01 Nov 2017 21:52:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
290 PHILIP MERLAN

And this assertion is simply anoth

i.e., the method leading to the kn
special metaphysics.16 By this, ho
clude special metaphysics from th
Also a passage of St. Thomas' I
clearly that when St. Thomas by
he explicitly excluded the necessi
objects, because the objects sunt s
1).
All of which, in turn, leads to on
history of metaphysics. Is metaph
ence of being as such and its categ
reality? Avicenna and Averroes
representatives of these two poi
which Duns Scotus presented them
being as such and knowledge of
affirmatively by St. Thomas, as i
assertion that special and general
one metaphysical science. But t
Today it is discussed implicitly by
defined metaphysics as knowledg
being, and, by the same token, as
as such (Met. E 1, 1026a23-32). A
dictory definition, because knowl
all things, material and immateri
cannot at the same time be know
special metaphysics) which is on
Jaeger right? If he is, how can th

16 Cf. footnote " e " of the Leonine

Today the note reads almost like an ad
17 Duns Scotus, Quaqstiones subtilis
11-40, ed. Vives).
18 On Suarez' treatment of metap
Geistesleben, 2 vols. (1926), I, 525-560
physik bei F.S. (1928), esp. 18-22.
19 Cf. E. Lewalter, Spanisch-jesuit
(1935), esp. 44ff., and M. Wundt, D
hunderts (1939), 161-227, esp. 170.
20 Natorp had tried it by treating
text describes metaphysics as the
"Thema und Disposition der Aristotel
hefte 24 [1888], 37-65; 540-574, esp. 5
ing his developmental method. Accord
metaphysics in Platonistic manner as
moving away from this position to a

This content downloaded from 200.130.19.157 on Wed, 01 Nov 2017 21:52:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 ABSTRACTION AND METAPHYSICS IN ST. THOMAS' SUMMA 291

see that these two questions are closely linked to the question concerning the
difference between abstractio and separatio in St. Thomas, because this dif-
ference results from the different qualities of the objects of general and spe-
cial metaphysics. Thus what started as a very specific problem in St.
Thomas leads to such comprehensive questions as: What is metaphysics, its
subject matter, and its method? What was Aristotle's answer and how are
we to interpret it? 21
Scripps College and Claremont Graduate School.

metaphysics to a positive science, dealing with the only kind of reality still acknowl-
edged by him, i.e., sensible reality-so that what we now read as Aristotle's defini-
tion of metaphysics would show him oscillating between the two points of view
which he tried in vain to reconcile (W. Jaeger, Aristotle, 2nd ed. [1948], 216-219).
Ivanka may be right in asserting that this dual aspect of metaphysics appears
throughout the whole Metaphysics, thus making it very difficult to apply Jaeger's
developmental method to the solution of the problem (E. v. Ivanka, "Die Be-
handlung der Metaphysik in Jaegers Aristoteles," Scholastik 7 [1932], 1-29). But
even if Ivanka is right, the problem still remains. H. Cherniss tried to solve it in
his review of Jaeger's book (AJP 56 [1935], 261-271, esp. 265), and tries it again
in his Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy I (1944), by assuming that the
contradiction in Aristotle's definition of metaphysics is only an inevitable conse-
quence of the more basic contradiction vitiating the whole system of Aristotle, which
is to deny and to assert at the same time that the universal is the real: primary
reality is supposed to be the principles of particulars, and yet these principles can
be real only by satisfying conditions peculiar to particulars (Cherniss, loc. cit., 352;
cf. 220, 369-372).
21 On this problem see P. Merlan, Being and Divisions of Being from the Acad-
emy to Neoplatonism (in course of publication), ch. VII.

This content downloaded from 200.130.19.157 on Wed, 01 Nov 2017 21:52:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms