Subscribe Sign in

!e United States Needs a Better

Strategy to Deter Iran
Stoking Tehran’s Fears May Be the Only Way to Avoid
War
By Dennis Ross
July 6, 2022
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Semnan, Iran, November 2006
Hossein Fatemi / Panos Pictures / Redux

Share Save

L
ast week, Iran and the United States brie!y resumed indirect negotiations
to resurrect the 2015 nuclear deal. Unlike the previous round of talks in
Vienna, which broke down in March, this round was hosted by Qatar and
did not include representatives from most other parties to the original accord:
China, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Even though the talks
ended without a breakthrough, the fact that Washington and Tehran agreed to this
new format suggests a common interest in restoring the deal. U.S. President Joe
Biden’s administration has a strong desire to put Iran’s nuclear program back in the
box and to avoid choosing from an unappealing list of options for preventing
Tehran from enriching uranium to near weapons grade and shrinking its
“breakout” time to close to zero. For Iran, the strongest motivation is sanctions
relief, which would permit it to sell oil and gain access to billions of dollars in
frozen accounts. Such relief is especially important now, since Iran’s cash-strapped
government has been forced to slash subsidies on dairy, eggs, and wheat, triggering
public backlash and protests throughout the country.

To be sure, a common interest does not guarantee a renewed deal, as the absence of
any progress in this latest round of talks indicates. Tehran has insisted that
Washington remove the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from its list of foreign
terrorist organizations, something that Biden has publicly promised not to do. Still,
I believe an agreement is likely at some point, even if the hesitancy of each side to
appear to concede anything more may mean one could take time to materialize. It
is, of course, also possible that the United States and Iran never overcome their
di"erences. Or that Tehran, thinking Washington will concede under greater
pressure, accelerates its nuclear program, accumulates multiple bombs’ worth of 60
 percent enriched uranium, begins to enrich to 90 percent (weapons grade) and
disperse its stockpiles, and denies access to international inspectors so that the
world can’t see what it is doing.

Clearly, if there is no deal, or if Iran begins to ramp up its nuclear program as part
of its negotiating strategy, the United States will need a better strategy for
deterring Tehran. But even if the two sides reach an agreement, the Biden
administration will need to improve its deterrence. !at is because once the
sanctions related to the 2015 accord have been lifted, Iran will have little need for a
follow-on agreement, such as the “longer and stronger” deal the Biden
administration previously touted. Moreover, key provisions of the 2015 deal will
“sunset” in 2030, leaving Iran without limits on the size of its nuclear
infrastructure, the number or quality of its centrifuges, or the level of its
enrichment. In other words, come 2030, Iran may feel little reason not to advance
toward a point where it is a turnkey away from a nuclear weapon capability. And
resurrecting the deal would give Iran many more resources. As the Israelis, Saudis,
and Emiratis are fond of pointing out, if the Iranians can "ood their proxy militias
in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen with weapons when they are under sanctions,
imagine what they will be able to do when they are not.

Stay informed.
In-depth analysis delivered weekly.
Sign Up

To improve U.S. deterrence in the long run, Washington should publicly declare
what Tehran will lose if it continues down its current path—and what it will gain
from changing course. !e aim must be to restore Iran’s fear of U.S. military action
without putting the country in a corner with no diplomatic way out. On the one
:
 hand, Iran’s leaders must know that by pressing ahead they will risk losing their
entire nuclear infrastructure, which has taken them several decades to develop. On
the other, they should understand that the broad sanctions regime—with its
practical limitations and chilling e#ect on doing business with Iran—will be lifted
if they give up their nuclear weapons option and stop coercing their neighbors.

NO ROOM FOR DOUBT

!e Trump administration did not succeed in developing an e#ective deterrence

strategy, and so far, neither has the Biden administration. President Donald
Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy failed to deter Iranian attacks—whether direct
or via proxies—against U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria, tankers in the Persian Gulf
and the Gulf of Oman, and oil infrastructure in Saudi Arabia. Even the targeted
killing of Qasem Soleimani, the leader of Iran’s Quds Force, did not halt proxy
attacks against the United States, although it may have made Iran more cautious
about killing Americans.

Biden’s approach has proved no more e#ective. He accepted Iran’s demand for
indirect negotiations, permitted China to buy Iranian oil with no penalty, and took
the Iran-backed Houthi militia in Yemen o# the list of o$cially designated
terrorist groups. Instead of moderating its behavior, however, Iran appears to have
been emboldened. During the presidencies of Barack Obama and Trump,
enriching uranium to 20 percent—the dividing line between low and high
enrichment—was considered provocative. Now, Iran is not only enriching to 20
percent without consequence but has gone ahead and enriched to 60 percent,
suggesting that it has little fear of a tough U.S. response. And so far, it has been
right. (Israeli security o$cials told me that there was a debate within the Iranian
:
 regime over whether to enrich to 60 percent, with some o$cials arguing that it was
too risky. !ose who pushed to enrich no doubt feel vindicated and even more
con%dent that the United States will not respond with force.)

To deter Iran from advancing its nuclear program and pursuing destructive
regional polices, Washington will need an integrated strategy that draws on
political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, cyber, and military instruments. It will
also need to spell out its posture, not just in private but in public as well.
Washington must put Iran on notice—and condition the international community
to expect—that it will respond with all appropriate means if it detects movement
toward a nuclear weapon. As part of the 2015 deal, Iran pledged not to seek,
acquire, or develop a nuclear weapon. Since the United States is publicly
committed to preventing an Iranian nuclear bomb, it should hold Iran to its pledge
whether or not the 2015 deal is restored. Instead of saying all options are on the
table—a statement so commonplace that no one takes it seriously—the Biden
administration should say that if Iran moves toward a weapon, it will jeopardize its
entire nuclear infrastructure. Before announcing this change in posture publicly,
the administration should privately explain its rationale to U.S. allies and line up
their support. When the United States is aligned with its allies on Iran, Grand
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other Iranian leaders understand that it is better able
to raise the costs to the Islamic Republic. Moreover, keeping Iran politically
isolated matters. Iranian leaders do not see their country as similar to North Korea.
In their eyes, they are heirs to a great civilization, not a hermit kingdom.

The United States must aim to restore Iran’s fear of U.S. military action
without putting the country in a corner.

Since Iranian leaders doubt that the United States will use force to prevent them
from advancing their nuclear program, the Biden administration will need to take
:
 several steps to make its declaratory policy credible. First, it should instruct the
U.S. Central Command to conduct exercises, both on its own and with allies in the
Middle East, to rehearse air-to-ground attacks on hardened targets. Second, it
should run exercises in which it refuels Israeli aircraft—something that would be
necessary in any actual Israeli attack on Iran. What it should not do is what it did
in May: deny that it refueled Israeli aircraft during a joint exercise simulating
distant air-to-ground attacks. Washington needs to stoke Iranian fears of an attack,
not give the country’s leaders reason to doubt it would ever act militarily against
them.

Finally, to lend further credence to its declaratory policy, the United States should
provide additional military assistance to Israel. As noted above, Israel needs better
refueling capabilities to credibly and e#ectively threaten Iran’s hardened nuclear
infrastructure. !e Biden administration should therefore accelerate the delivery of
the KC-46 tanker, an aerial refueling and transport aircraft that it has agreed to sell
to Israel, but not before 2024 at the earliest. Agreeing to move up the timetable,
perhaps on Biden’s visit to Israel on July 13 and 14, would signal to the Iranians
that the United States is ready to enable an Israeli military option if necessary.
Alternatively, it could send a similar signal by providing the Israelis with the
Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP)—a 30,000-pound “mountain buster”—and
leasing them a B-2 bomber to carry it. Israel currently lacks the ability to destroy
Iran’s underground Fordow enrichment site, which is built inside a mountain, but
an MOP and a B-2 would change that, underscoring that Washington is prepared
to support Israeli strikes if necessary.

!at is not to suggest that the United States should want Israel to act in its stead.
Rather, it is to signal to Iran that Washington will act alone or with others to
destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure if the country moves toward a nuclear weapon.
Iran’s leaders must see any such move as dangerous to them; they must believe that
the United States means what it says; and they must understand that it is preparing
:
 the ground for military action if Iran makes a diplomatic outcome impossible.

SOMETHING TO FEAR

But Washington cannot focus solely on Iran’s nuclear program. It must also have a
strategy for countering Tehran’s destabilizing regional behavior, preventing Iranian
weapons from reaching Iranian proxies, and bolstering the defenses of U.S. allies
and partners in the region—in particular against the drones, cruise missiles, and
ballistic missiles of Iranian proxies. To that end, the U.S. Central Command could
integrate the early warning, drone, cyber, and missile defenses of U.S. regional
partners, although these partners would have to agree to do so.

At a time when many U.S. friends in the Middle East are worried that the United
States is withdrawing from the region, defense integration is one way to reassure
them and keep Washington embedded in the area. It has the bene%t not just of
sharing the burden of defense but also making the existing assets of individual
countries in the region count for more. !e United States would not need to
provide additional defensive missiles to its partners if the missiles it has already
provided could be pooled e#ectively. !e sum of these weapons truly is greater than
the individual parts. And to the credit of the Biden administration, it is already
working to develop the security architecture for integrated air and missile defense
in the Middle East.

Finally, the United States must be prepared to respond more forcefully to attacks
by Iranian proxies on U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria. Bases where U.S. forces are
stationed have been targeted more than 40 times, but the United States has
responded in a highly calibrated way only twice. Washington’s responses must be
unexpected, and they must signal to Iranian leaders that, contrary to their
:
 assumptions, the United States is willing to use force against them. Maybe it is
time to take a page from the Israeli playbook: hit Iranian—not proxy—targets in
the middle of the night and don’t acknowledge it. !e United States shouldn’t put
Iran in a position where it must respond or lose face, but it should also make clear
that it is no longer willing to tolerate these attacks.

!e goal of the United States’ declaratory strategy must be to establish deterrence.

!e more clearly Iranian leaders understand what they could lose, the more likely
they will be to seek a diplomatic alternative. Of course, the United States will also
have to make clear what Iran stands to gain from such an alternative. !at could be
far greater sanctions relief if Tehran agrees to a longer and stronger deal. A “more
for more” agreement of this kind might be possible—but only if Iranian leaders are
genuinely afraid of what they could lose without one. Ironically, it seems, restoring
Iran’s fear of the United States may be the only way to avoid a war, limit Iranian
threats in the region, and produce an acceptable diplomatic outcome on the
character of the Iranian nuclear program.

You are reading a free article.

Subscribe to Foreign Affairs to get unlimited
access.
Paywall-free reading of new articles and a century of archives
Unlock access to iOS/Android apps to save editions for offline reading
Six issues a year in print, online, and audio editions

Subscribe Now

DENNIS ROSS is Counselor at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a former
U.S. envoy to the Middle East who served in senior national security positions in the
:
 Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and Obama administrations.

MORE BY DENNIS ROSS

More: Middle East Iran WMD & Proliferation Defense Policy Biden Administration

Recommended Articles

Iran on the Nuclear Brink

!e End of the Deal Would Leave Only Bad Options to !wart
a Dash for the Bomb
Eric Brewer
:
 What America Should Do If the Iran
Nuclear Deal Talks Fail
Outsourcing Middle East Security to Israel Is a Bad Plan B
Maria Fantappie and Vali Nasr
:
 GET THE MAGAZINE

Save up to 55%
on Foreign A!airs magazine!

Subscribe

F O R E I G N A F FA I R S

Weekly Newsletter
Get in-depth analysis delivered right to your inbox

Sign Up
:
 ABOUT

CONTACT

SUBSCRIPTION

FOLLOW

GRADUATE SCHOOL FORUM

From the
publishers of
Foreign Affairs

Cyber Week in Review: July 7, 2022

by Adam Segal

Gender and Power in an Age of Disinformation: A Conversation With Mary Anne Franks
by Catherine Powell

The Supreme Court’s EPA Ruling Will Delay U.S. Climate Action
by Alice C. Hill

Published by the Council on Foreign Relations

Privacy Policy Terms of Use

©2022 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. All Rights Reserved.

: