Welcom me to The Sco ottish Corrid

dor, the fifth in

our series of Pint‐Sized Campaigns for Chaain Thhis Pint‐Sizeed campaiggn focuses on the
of Comm mand. Heree, again, we again look at parate bodie s of veteran German
atttack by disp
the figghting arou und Caen after D‐Daay; trroops formed d into improomptu kampffgrüppen
specificaally the crucial defence of
o the “Scottiish aggainst greenn but deterrmined Britiish units
Corridorr”, a salient into Germa an lines whiich who
w had been n training forr nearly five years for
th
was created by thee 15 Scottissh Division oon heir first tastte of war. It features a double
th
the 27thh of June 19441 when the Argyll & ladder, with the
t Germanss attacking a narrow
Sutherlaand Highlan nders broke through t he coorridor from both the Eaast and the West
W in a
defences of 12 SSS Hitlerjugen nd to seize a drrive to firstt isolate andd then destroy the
bridgeheead across th he Odon Rive er. Brritish spearhead off to thhe South and d already
figghting on Hilll 112.
As will be seen, the key seriies of actioons
presenteed within, all o the 28th of
a fought on One of the keys to maaking any campaign c
June, were critical to
t ensuring that the gaiins viable is keeping things siimple and brrief. Our
already made weree retained and that t he Att the Sha arp End caampaign handbook
German grip on Caen was weake ened. prrovides the key to unloccking this ca ampaign.
Using the rule es in At the Sharp End you’ll be
The Scotttish Corrido
or campaign can be play ed abble to run this campa ign very ea asily and
as a stand‐alone cam mpaign or may
m be treat ed qu ght from thee box. The fact that
uickly, straig
as a follow‐on from m our Operration Mart let th
he support lists are speccific to this campaign
c
campaiggn which waas fought on o the grou nd also means th hat collectingg the forces required
adjacentt to the areea we are co
oncerned wiith is also very achievable.
here.
Once you are e ready to bbegin, the campaign
c
With Geeneral Sir Beernard Monttgomery’s pl an will
w provide between
b six aand eleven games
g in
to seizee the initiative and keep p the Germ an to
otal, by whicch point it will have re eached a
forces inn Normandyy wrong footted, Operatioon measurable
m conclusion. YYou’ll have a winner
Epsom was the laargest offensive launch ed annd a loser, all in the type of tim me‐frame
after D‐‐Day. In addition to the objective of which
w is ideal as a club prroject or for a couple
seizing kkey ground around
a Caen, the offensiive off friends ga aming over a month or two.
was dessigned to tiee down Germ man armour ed Peerfect, we thhink, for a fasst, fun and enjoyable
e
forces, ppinning themm to the Brittish sector a nd caampaign experience.
unable to launch a co‐ordina ated counteer‐
attack. The impactt of this policy was nevver W hope you enjoy The SScottish Corrridor and
We
better illustrated th han during Epsom, wh en th paign will proovide you with hours
hat this camp
three Panzer Divisions, 2 Panzeer, off gaming funf whilst also providing an
Leibstanndarte and Das
D Reich, were all oblig ed illuminating insight into the historical battle
to comm mit forces innto action piecemeal a nd annd the braveery of the innexperience
ed British
straight from the maarch to the frront. trroops who stood firm m against some
s of
Germany’s mo ost vaunted fformations.
What Ep psom also deemonstrated
d, and this w
will
also be seen hereinn, was how opportunity
o in Riichard Clarke
e
war is sso often transient. A weak
w offensiive La
ard Island, November
N 20015
launched at the righht moment is
i often bettter
than a strong atttack launched after t he
momentt of opportunity has passsed.

Page 2
Followinng the D‐Dayy landings and immediaate which
w had serrved them wwell time and
d again in
establish
hment of a viable lo odgement oon he East where a flexiblee, or elastic, form of
th
French soil by Allied forces, the speed of deefence saw the front line made e up of
progresss inland failed to meet t he sttrongpoints which
w wouldd break up an
ny Soviet
expectattions of Alllied plannerrs as Germ an offfensive before a counter‐attack by
resistance solidified.. arrmoured forces would reestore the frront line,
isolating any Russian forrmations wh hich had
The inittial plan opttimistically demanded
d t he su
uccessfully broken
b throuugh the front. This
British capture of Caen on D‐Day itseelf, well‐establish
w ed methodd of defen nce was
thereby allowing the RAF to establiish clearly identified by G General Sir Bernard
operatioonal airfieldss in Norman ndy to provi de Montgomery,
M the Allieed commander in
critical support to ground d operationns. Normandy and he plannedd accordinglyy.
Howeveer, a well‐tim med, if some ewhat chaottic,
German counter‐atttack by 21 Panzer
P Divisioon Monty’s
M prim
me consideraation for the British
on the aafternoon of June the 6th was sufficieent annd Canadian n forces wass to ensure that the
to halt tthe hesitant advance of the British 33rd US operations to the Weest were allowed to
Division. prrogress unhindered by ddrawing the vast
v bulk
off the German armoured forces to th he British
Over thee following weeks efforrts were ma de seector of the front. This w
would allow the port
to breakk through thhe German defensive
d linnes off Cherbourg to be capturred and a bu uild‐up of
and to b break out in
nto the good d tank counttry trroops in the Cotentin prioor to a breakout and
around Caen which h would allo ow a battle of drrive toward Paris. Thhe initial fa ailure to
manoeu uvre in which the Brittish felt theeir caapture Caen was turned tto an advanttage as it
superiorrity in mateeriel would favour the m. be ecame increeasingly cleaar that the Germans
G
Howeveer, at almostt every pointt the Germaans viewed the city as the ccorner‐stone of their
thwarted their advvances, most famously at de efences andd would com mmit ever‐inncreasing
Villers‐B
Bocage a week
w after D‐Day wh en nu umber of tro
oops to that sector to prrevent its
Michael Wittmann anda Tiger tan nks of Schweere faall. US General Omar BBradley was later to
SS Panzeer Abteilung 101 plugged d the breach in write:
w
the line in an emphaatic fashion.
“The containnment missiion that had d been
As we saaw in Operaation Martleet, the Germ an assigned Monty
M was nnot calculatted to
High Coommand was not inactive during t he burnish British ppride in the
weeks ffollowing th he invasion. Plans weere accomplishmment of theirr troops. Forr in the
made fo or a major counter‐atta ack by Panzzer minds of moost people, ssuccess in ba attle is
Group WWest, attackking to the West of Ca en measured in i the ratee and leng gth of
and deestroying th he British and
a Canadi an advance. Th hey found itt difficult to realize
lodgemeent before advancing westwards to that the more successfful Monty was w in
roll up the US forcces around Omaha
O beacch. stirring up German reesistance, th he less
This woould have issolated the remainder of likely he wa
as to advancce. By the end of
Allied fforces to the Cotentin Peninsu lar June
J Rommmel had cooncentrated seven
where, without supplies, they could be panzer divissions againsst Monty’s British
containeed and, ultimately,, destroyeed. sector. One was all the eenemy could d spare
w based on the ability of
Howeveer, this plan was for
f the US front.”
the Germans to maass their arm moured forcces
for a single co‐ord dinated bloww, a strateegy

Page 3
Monty reasoned that if the British and
Canadian troops could exert pressure around
Caen without respite, not only would the
Germans be obliged to deploy their reserves
in that sector, but they would also be unable
to hold back any forces with which to launch
the type of text‐book counter‐attack in which
they specialised. Operation Epsom was
designed with this in mind and in the event
served to prove Monty correct.
BRITISH PLANS
On the 23rd of June Montgomery attacked
with the 51st (Highland) Division from the
Page 4
Orne bridgehead to capture Ste‐Honorine la
Chardronette from 21 Panzer Division's
Kampfgruppe von Luck. With German
reserves now pulled to the East of Caen, he
made plans to resume offensive operations to
the West as rapidly as possible.
Operation Epsom was devised as a plan to
encircle Caen, initially with attacks both West
and East of the Orne but it was rapidly
recognised that there was simply no room to
the East of the river for a major troop build‐up
in that area, so the plan was revised to begin
in the West with the possibility of further
exploitation in the East if the opportunity
presented itself.
Originally planned for the 22nd of the month,
Epsom was to be undertaken by Lieutenant
General Sir Richard O’Connor’s VIII Corps
comprising the 11th Armoured Division, 15th
Scottish Infantry Division and the 43rd Wessex
Division. Armoured support was provided by
the 31st Independent Tank Brigade and the 4th
Armoured Brigade, all in all a sizeable and
well‐balanced force of 23 infantry Battalions,
10 battalion‐sized tank units, two dedicated
Reconnaissance Regiments and, most
importantly, impressive concentrations of
artillery. Accompanying this force was a full
complement of support units in the form of
anti‐tank and anti‐aircraft units, Engineer and
the likes. In itself, the ability of the British at
Epsom (and the Allies in Normandy generally)
to commit whole Corps to a co‐ordinated
attack stands in stark contrast to the Germans
who were obliged to throw whatever they
had into the line piecemeal as it arrived in the
area of operations.
Operation Epsom comprised of four main
phases: Gout, Hangover, Impetigio and
Goitre. In Phase One, the 44th and 46th
Brigades were to attach with two squadrons
of Churchill tanks from 9 Royal Tank Regiment
and 7 RTR respectively. With the initial
German defences overcome, 11th Armoured
Division would release its reconnaissance
troops who would head for the Tourmauville
bridge whilst the 227th Highland Brigade
would advance with two battalions, again
supported by one Squadron of Churchills
each, to occupy the Odon crossings. Phase
Three would see the 29th Armoured Brigade
cross Hill 112 before a general advance to the
Orne would take place in Phase four.
Following that there were options to exploit
further to the South, from the Orne
bridgehead and in the area of Carpiquet.
Preceding Operation Epsom, the 49th Infantry
Division were to launch an attach to capture
Fontenay‐le‐Pesnel prior to pushing on
southwards to take the village of Rauray and
the high ground to the immediate West of the
Page 5
Epsom operational area. This was to protect
the flank of the main operation from potential
armoured counter‐attacks from the high‐
ground whilst also denying the enemy’s
observers a grand‐stand view of the main
attack. Code‐named Operation Martlet, this
was to be launched on the 25th of June, just 24
hours before Epsom was to be launched.
GERMAN DEFENCES
On the German side, as already intimated, the
situation was becoming desperate. From the
Orne river as far West as Fontenay le Pesnel
the main unit assigned to hold the front was
12 SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend. Formed in
1943 from youths volunteering from the Hitler
Youth movement, it had benefitted from a
core of experienced leaders being provided
chiefly from 1 SS Leibstandarte Division and a
training regime which focussed on realistic
combat training rather than drill and spit and
polish. This was fortunate as the Division was
committed to the front as part of the first
wave of German units close enough to make
an early intervention after D‐Day; first going
into action on the 7th of June. Since that time
it had fought without respite or
reinforcements gaining an immediate
reputation for bravery and stubbornness in
defence as well as a less fortunate notoriety
for the summary execution of some Canadian
prisoners.
With a two battalion Panzer Regiment, the
Division fielded predominantly a mix of Mark
V Panther tanks in the 1st battalion and Mark
IV tanks in the 2nd battalion. Despite being
constantly in combat since just after the
invasion, these Panzer battalions were still
remarkably well equipped, with 58 Panzer IVs
and 44 Panzer V Panthers in service two days
before the launch of Epsom. Of the fifty‐five
tanks lost up to that point, around half of
them were under repair, a remarkable
statistic which is indicative of the fact that the
Germans had generally been able to hold their
ground and, as a result, salvage most of their
damaged tanks.
In support, the 12 SS Division had two
battalions of Field Artillery with one of self‐
propelled battalion of two Wespe and one
Hummel batteries. Additionally the usual
complement of support battalions,
Aufklärung, Pioneer, Pak anti‐tank,
Jägdpanzer and Nebelwerfer rocket launchers
were also present and largely intact. Where
the cost of nearly three weeks of constant
contact with the enemy had been high was in
the infantry arm of the Division.
The two Panzergrenadier Regiments, the 25th
and 26th, were, in theory, both three
battalions in size. However, the Division’s
newly appointed commander, Kurt ‘Panzer’
Meyer, stated that by the time of Epsom the
Panzergrenadier battalions had, "on average,
a strength of two companies" and that "Most
of the company commanders and platoon
leaders had already been killed in action or
were wounded". Indeed, losses in manpower
meant that the front could no longer be held
in depth and that support units, such as
Pioneers and reconnaissance companies,
were now fighting in the front line as
Page 6
infantrymen rather than fulfilling their
intended duties.
On the 26th of June, 12 SS Hitlerjugend was
covering a twelve mile frontage with limited
numbers. The 25th SS Panzergrenadier
Regiment was deployed to the North and
North West of Caen from Epron to
Franqueville. At Franqueville 26 SS
Panzergrenadier Regiment took over the
front, covering over seven miles with its three
depleted battalions; three to four times the
frontage which German doctrine
recommended for a Regiment's defensive
frontage, a Regimentabschnitt of just two to
three kilometres.
OPERATION EPSOM
Operation Martlet was launched on the 25th
of June with immediate mixed results. The
troops advancing to the West of Fontenay
pushed out elements of Panzer Lehr Division
who were holding that sector and were able
to follow up initial success with further
advances to the South. In Fontenay itself,
well placed German n tanks had been
b dug in to th
he German recovered
r a nd stuck stooically to
provide fire supportt for the Panzzer Grenadieers th
heir positions. In St Mauuvieu it tookk most of
and the early mornin ng mist also hampered t he th
he day to secure
s the positions, with
w the
British advance ntly,
significan whoole atttackers haviing to see off
ff a counter‐a
attack by
Compan nies becominng disorientated and faili ng ellements of 21 Panzer aand 12 SS from f the
to movee onto theirr objectives.. It was onnly diirection of Marcelet
M duri ng the afternoon.
t majority of
with thee greatest of effort that the
the towwn was in Brritish hands by the end of In
n Cheux the e defenderss were assisted by
the day,, the attackeers having beeen obliged to su
upporting armour on thee Rauray spur which
fight offf German armmoured coun nter‐attacks to haad originally been attackking the 49thh Division
secure the limited addvances theyy had made. buut was now w pulled intto this new w battle.
German artillery fire, coombined with well‐
Howeveer, whilst 12 SS had stoo od firm, Panzzer pllaced minefields, obligedd the British
h armour
Lehr hadd withdrawn to create a three mile g ap to
o move up th hrough Cheuux itself, jamming the
in the line, a gap th
hrough which the Germ an ro
oads in wh hich British infantry were
w still
comman nd were concerned would be figghting to oust the German de efenders.
exploited by Allied armoured
a fo
orces. A majjor In
ndeed these ms were to hamper
e traffic jam
armoureed counter‐aattack was planned for t he fo
orward move ement by thhe troops who
w were
morningg of the 26tht
with the bulk of 12 SS re
eady to launch the seecond phase e of the
Panzer R Regiment waas scheduled d to take paart. opperation.
As it was, the high ground
g arounnd Rauray wwas
firmly in
n German hands as Epsom m began.

At 07200 on the 26th of June British

B artilleery
began hammering th he German front
f lines wiith
a ferocitty which the Germans would never gget
used to. This was of a level th he veterans of
Leibstanndarte’s cammpaigns in the East h ad
never exxperienced and which thet grenadieers
defences sim
in their d mply had to endure
e as beest
they couuld.

At 07300 the infan ntry of the 15th Scottiish

Division supported by 7 and 9 RTR roll ed THE
H SECOND PHASE
forward with the support
s 7 th Armour ed
of 79 With
W the capture of the villages form ming the
Division’’s “funnies”.. On the left the two le ad German main n line of resi stance, the might of
battalionn of the 44 4th Brigade, the 6th Royyal 1th Armoured Division w
11 was to be unnleashed.
Scottish Fusiliers andd the 8th Royyal Scots, weere he 2nd Norrthamptonshhire Yeomanry, the
Th
to take SSt Mauvieu and
a the ham mlet of la Gauule Division’s Cromwell equippped reconn naissance
respectively. To their right, the 2nd Glasgoow un
nit, was to make
m a rapid advance sou uthwards
Highlandders and 9th Cameron nians of 466th to
o seize the bridges acrosss the Odon ata Gavrus
Brigade attacked Cheux and Hau ut du Bosq. nd Tourmauvville. The 2227th Highland
an d Brigade
was
w tasked with w pushingg on to cap pture the
Divisional command der Kurt Meyer wrote a Viillers‐Bocage
e to Caen road. The
T 10th
graphic and highly dramatic account of t he Highland Light Infantryy, supported d by C
action oon that morrning. In so
ome areas t he quadron of 7RTR,
Sq 7 were tto capture Grainville‐
defendeers were so thoroughly
t shocked by t he ur‐Odon while the 2nd Gordon Higghlanders
su
British bombardmeent that the t attacki ng an
nd C Squadron 9RTR weere to seize Tourville‐
T
battalion
ns were ab ble to move e up to theeir ur‐Odon before the 2 Argyll & Su
su nd
utherland
objectives with little problem. Clearing oout Highlanders advanced
a too relieve the
e armour
the defeenders was to prove mo ore difficult as nd secure the bridges. Following on
an o would

Page 7
be the 23rd Hussars, the 2nd Fife & Forfar
Yeomanry with 3RTR as a reserve.
It was an optimistic plan and one which
depended on speed combined with the rapid
clearance of the German held front‐line
villages and the British ownership of the
Rauray Spur. Neither of the latter had been
achieved and as a consequence the delays in
unleashing the armour gave the Germans
time to react.
Around Rauray, 12SS Panzer Regiment was
able to move the Panzer IVs of its 2nd battalion
to block the southern exits from Cheux. In
Grainville and Colleville, one Company of
Schwere SS Panzer Abteilung 101 moved to
support the 12 SS Aufklärungs‐abteilung who
were providing a screen there with the
support of a battery of 88mm Flak guns. Thus
strengthened, the Germans prepared to meet
the next phase of the attack.
Page 8
As the 7th Seaforth Highlanders, the reserve
battalion of the 46th Brigade, moved forward
to attack onto Ring Contour 100 to the South
East of Cheux, they hit German resistance.
After suffering significant casualties they
withdrew to the reverse slope.
The Northamptonshire Yeomanry had no
better luck when its advance was halted by
well‐placed Panzers. A pattern was emerging
and at all points the British planned advance
was blocked. Like the Seaforths, the HLI and
the Gordons failed to make headway. By the
end of the day it was looking as though the
Germans had nipped Epsom in the bud,
although news of the fall of the Rauray spur to
the 49th Division provided a significant relief
as it obliged the withdrawal of some panzer
elements from that flank.
As night fell, the Germans began to rearrange
their defences. The headquarters of 12 SS
Panzer Regiment was moved to Grainville.
The remnants of the German defenders in the
frontline villages withdrew under cover of
darkness and heavy rain to form what Hubert
Meyer, the Divisional Chief of Staff, described
as a “chain of dispersed strongpoints without
any depth”. Allowing for losses that day, the
Division reported its armoured strength to be
thirty Panzer IV and 17 Panthers. 12 SS
Pioneer‐abteilung was, to all intents and
purposes, destroyed and 26 Panzer Grenadier
Regiment was so dispersed as to make an
assessment of its strength impossible.
At this point Feldmarschall Rommel approved
the use of II SS Panzer Korps in a counter‐
attack from the West and 1 SS Leibstandarte
Division from the East. This is a classic
example of the problems faced by the
Germans; the principle units, 9 SS
Hohenstaufen and 10 SS Frundsberg, were still
en route to the area and none would be able
to make any contribution for at least 48
hours. The Leibstandarte would have just two
battalions in the area to the South West of
Caen by the 28th, 36 hours away, the rest of
the Division would take the best part of a
week to assemble and be ready for action.
Rather than massing their fresh forces for a
co‐ordinated counter‐attack, they were used
to deal with immediate tactical demands.
This was highlighted by Kurt Meyer who later
wrote:
“As so often in the past, command and
control was being exercised from a tactical
perspective and not strategic
considerations. Important decisions were
not made. Mobile defence had been
abandoned. We had no other choice than
to sell our lives as dearly as possible”
For now the Hitlerjugend would have to hold
the line with whatever assistance they could
get from 21 Panzer Division and 2 Panzer
Division, the latter a formation which had
spent its time since the invasion on the
Somme awaiting the expected second landing
around Calais which never came. Only a few
Page 9
elements of 2 Panzer had reached Normandy
but these were now to be thrown into action
in an attempt to stem the British tide as were
lead elements from 2 SS Panzer Division, Das
Reich which was just completing its long and
infamous march from the South of France.
DAY TWO
Dawn on the 27th of June saw the 10th
Highland Light Infantry attempt to advance
towards Grainville but again their advance
was blocked by four Panzer IVs from 8
Kompanie now supported by disparate groups
of Pioneers and Grenadiers from II/26
Panzergrenadier Regiment. Fighting was
intense and no headway was made, but this
action did have the critical effect of pinning
German forces to this sector. While this
attack was underway the 2nd Argyll &
Sutherland Highlanders advanced from the
direction of Cheux across the saddle to the
West of Ring Contour 100 and, supported by
the 23rd Hussars, to attack into Colleville.
Here 12 SS Aufklarungs‐abteilung resisted
with the 88mm guns of the Flak battery, but a
two hour fight saw the village fall and 15/25
SS Panzer Grenadiers withdraw eastwards.
Meanwhile, further North in Haut du Bosq,
the 5th Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry had
moved up to relieve the Cameronians. As
they arrived to conduct the relief it was clear
that the southern parts of the village,
occupied overnight by the HLI, had been
infiltrated by small parties of Germans who
needed clearing out. This operation came to
an abrupt end with the arrival of six Panthers
which drove into the heart of the Cornwalls’
position. These were the vanguard of 2
Panzer Division which was being thrown into
action. Remarkably they attacked without
infantry support and the DCLI despatched the
bulk of them with PIATs among the orchards.
This action was a significant boost for British
morale, but it did raise concerns about a
counter‐attack in that sector and troops were
diverted to reinforce the flanks of the corridor
in that area.
At 1000 the 7th Seaforths crossed Ring
Contour 100, this time without any resistance.
They moved to the right to relieve the 2nd
Gordons which, in turn, allowed the latter to
move into Colleville with 29 Armoured
Brigade following into the gap created by the
Argylls.
On the German side the possibility of a British
breakthrough was becoming clear and in the
early afternoon 8 Kompanie, 12 SS Panzer
which had been blocking the advance of the
HLI all morning withdrew Southwards as it
was outflanked both in the area of Colleville
and with the 49th Division pushing South from
Rauray. This allowed a fresh advance by the
Fife & Forfar Yeomanry towards Grainville,
but the German line was shored up here by
Tigers from Schwere SS Panzer Abteilung 101
and the rag‐tag collection of German units
here again repulsed the attack. However, this
action once again stopped the Germans from
re‐deploying their forces and the Argylls were
able to continue their advance against limited
opposition.
By 1500 the Argylls had taken the twin villages
of Tourville and Mondrainville. At 1700 they
captured the Tourmauville bridge over the
Odon intact, immediately forming a defensive
perimeter with their anti‐tank guns. Half an
hour later the 23rd Hussar Battlegroup, one
tank squadron with 8 Rifle Brigade in M5
halftracks, followed up; the dismounted
Motor Infantry clearing the route of any
remnants of resistance. By 1930 three tank
squadrons were across the Odon.
On Day One, Cheux had proved to be a
bottleneck, with isolated German infantry
putting up resistance until dark. The failure to
eject them had meant that British Engineers
had been unable to clear the minefields
around the village and now traffic jammed the
single clear route southwards. What was
more, whilst German armour was not keen to
advance against Mondrainville and Tourville,
lacking the infantry support to operate in
close country; they were able to snipe down
the straight road with some effect, as
numerous burning British tanks served to
Page 10
testify. Nevertheless, as night fell, the 159th
Infantry Brigade, the infantry element of 11th
Armoured Division, were able to move to
Tourmauville, ready to support an attack by
the Division towards Hill 112 when Phase
Three of Epsom was launched on the
following morning.
For the Germans nightfall brought some sense
of relief. With advanced elements of the
Leibstandarte and Das Reich arriving on the
next morning, they were able to withdraw
much of Hitlerjugend from the front line and,
withdrawing them South of the Odon, re‐
organise them to form a Security Line,
Sicherheitslinie, running from Esquay to Hill
112 and northwards to Fontaine‐Etoupefour.
Some elements of the Division still in contact
with the British, such as the remnants of 26
Panzer Grenadier Regiment, now formed as
Kampfgrüppe Olboeter, and 7 Kompanie 12 SS
Panzer Regiment remained in place; the
former blocking further southwards
movement by 49 Division, the latter blocking
any westward expansion of the breach from
Grainville.
One company of tanks was released from 21
Panzer Division to stop any push eastward
from the corridor and to hold the line while
Kampfgrüppe Frey of the Leibstandarte
moved into position around Verson.
DAY THREE
The events of the 28th of June are too broad to
be covered in full detail here. Suffice to say
that 11th Armoured Division began the day
with an attack across Hill 112 as planned for
the third phase of Epsom. Fighting was to
rage here through the day with the tanks of
29th Armoured Brigade and 159th Infantry
Brigade locked in battle for possession of the
high ground.
While events were unfolding on Hill 112,
Standartenführer Kurt Meyer was attempting
to organise an immediate counter‐attack
against what the British were now calling the
“Scottish Corridor”. Meyer recognised that at
this moment the corridor was limited in width
and held by troops who had been fighting for
two days. A major counter‐attack was already
being planned for the following day, but
Meyer recognised that any delay would allow
the British to move fresh troops forward to
strengthen their defences, at which point it
was unlikely that even the strongest force
would be unable to make headway. For
Meyer, the 28th was the critical moment, even
though he lacked the forces he would
normally desire to undertake the task.
Meyer planned to use lead element of
Kampfgrüppe Weidinger to attack from
Noyers in the West up the Villers‐Bocage to
Caen road whilst Kampfgrüppe Frey attacked
from Verson in the East. The objective was to
cut off 11th Armoured Division by securing the
railway line which ran to the North of Mouen
and Colleville. This line, with a succession of
cuttings and low embankments formed a
natural anti‐tank obstacle, with a limited
number of crossing points which the British
had to use to cross it. If this could be secured,
it would provide a strong bulwark against
further attacks and allow time for 11th
Armoured Division to be defeated in detail;
isolated and without supply, as it would be. It
was an audacious plan.
Page 11
Unfortunately getting the plan to become a
reality was problematic. Kampfgrüppe
Weidinger had, in theory, two infantry
battalions, one each from 4 SS
Panzergrenadier Regiment Der Führer and one
from 3 SS Panzergrenadier Regiment
Deutschland one tank battalion from Das
Reich as well as accompanying Pioneers from
2 SS Das Reich. This was to be accompanied
by a number of Panthers from I Kompanie, 3rd
Panzer Regiment. Certainly none of Das
Reich’s tanks were available on the 28th of
June, Weidinger was later to confirm that to
Hubert Meyer, so he was obliged to attack
with the 1st battalion of Der Führer supported
only by Pioneers, some reconnaissance
elements and a small number of Panthers
from 2 Panzer Division. Their objective was
Mondrainville and the railway crossing at
Colleville.
To the East Obersturmbannführer Albert Frey,
commander of the 1st SS Panzergrenadier
Regiment Leibstandarte was not at all happy
about being attached to 12 SS and, in
particular, with Meyer’s plan. He protested
vociferously that only two battalions of his
Regiment were available and that none of the
Division’s artillery was present to support the
attack. Indeed the armoured support he was
allocated was a mix of one short Company of
Panzer IVs from 21 Panzer Division and a few
(literally two or three) Tigers from Schwere SS
Panzer Abteilung 101. Meyer over‐ruled him
and stressed that Hitlerjugend would provide
artillery support. The attack began at 0600,
its objective Tourville and the railway crossing
at Mouen.
Unsurprisingly, no artillery support was
forthcoming for Kampfgrüppe Frey. On the
left, II/1 Leibstandarte advanced along the
main road whilst on the right I/1
Leibstandarte advanced along a track skirting
the southern edge of the railway line to clear
out Mouen.
By sheer accident, one Company of the 3rd
Monmouths, part of 159th Brigade, had
become disorientated as it advanced
southwards in the dark night of the 27th of
June. Upon arriving in an unidentified village,
the Company commander decided to rest his
men in the deserted buildings and continue
his march South in the morning. This accident
placed C Company, 3rd Monmouths, directly in
the path of the 1st battalion of the
Leibstandarte. Fighting began almost
immediately and the tanks of the 4th
Kompanie of 22 Panzer Regiment went into
action to support the attack.
Outnumbered, the Monmouths nevertheless
put up a fight. It was only in the afternoon
that Mouen was fully secured by the
Leibstandarte but the key rail crossing there
was now cut. To the West Colleville was still
in British hands and thus far there was no sign
of Weidinger’s force capturing it. As a result
Frey’s men pushed on to this next objective.
It is clear that the British command was
focussed on events around Hill 112 and the
action in Mouen had passed them by. As such
the reports from the Glasgow Highlanders
that Colleville was under attack came as a
nasty shock. Fortunately a number of troops
of Churchill tanks, passing through en‐route to
the action to the South, were dragged into the
fight and the Highlanders clung on to the
Page 12
village, halting the German attacks in the
orchards to the West of Mouen.
On the morning of the 28th Kampfgrüppe
Weidinger was delayed in launching its attack
as a battalion of 3rd SS Panzergrenadier
Regiment Deutschland was diverted to the
North to attack into Bretteville where
Kampfgrüppe Olboeter was under severe
pressure from the 49th Division still pushing
down from Rauray. With this delay, the 9th
Cameronians were able to capture Grainville
before midday after a frontal attack with
artillery support. The battalion was in the
process of securing the village when elements
of the 1st battalion of 4th SS Panzergrenadier
Regiment Der Führer attacked with Panthers
from the 2nd Panzer Division. This was part of
Weidinger’s main thrust against both
Grainville and up the main Villers‐Bocage to
Caen road. The Cameronians’ history records
that “several hours of confused street fighting
followed” as Churchills and Panther clashed at
short range. However, but the village was
held and by late in the afternoon the
Cameronians were pushing their outposts
westwards.
Meanwhile, to the South, the 7th Seaforth
Highlanders had spent the morning moving up
to their new positions in the hamlet of Le
Valtru where they, in concert with the 9th
Cameronians, were to guard the western flank
of the corridor. This move would also secure
North‐South road communications with the
Argylls in Gavrus on the southern bank of the
Odon. Before they could reach Le Valtru, they
too were hit by the same attack as the
Cameronians. Fortunately their commanding
officer, Lieutenant Colonel Grant, had insisted
on the battalion advancing in battle formation
with armoured support provided by A
Squadron 9 RTR and the two forces met as
they advanced.
Unfortunately for the Seaforths, the 9 RTR
liaison officer’s radio was faulty and the co‐
ordination between the two units was poor,
friendly fire from the tanks causing some
casualties. Nevertheless the Seaforths were
able to advance onto their objective after an
initial armoured battle. However, elements of
Der Führrer managedd to by‐pass the t cross‐raiids paatch up their lines wheerever a bre
each was
and penetrated through towarrds made.
m
Mondrainville. This was to be the t high‐watter
mark oof the Germ man advancce, with le ad Operation Epssom continuued for several more
elementts of Frey an
nd Weidinge er’s forces juust daays but th he result w was, effecttively, a
600 yard
ds apart. Briitish artilleryy and elemennts sttalemate. Hill 112 was reinforced to t such a
of the Glasgow Highlanders
H stopped t he deegree that th
he British didd not capturre it until
advancee and Weidinnger’s men withdrew.
w he 4th of August.
th A Yett despite failing to
acchieve the territorial
t gaains hoped for, the
Finally rrecognising the threat still posed by im
mpact on thee Germans w was clear to see. Four
Kampfgrrüppe Frey, the British committed
c t he daays after Epsom Operration Wind dsor was
10th Higghland Lightt Infantry to
o attack froom launched around Carpiquuet. Four days later
North oof the railwaay line into Mouen. Tw wo Operation Ch harnwood, followed tw wo days
companies attacked d with a squa
adron of tannks later by Operration Jupiteer. The me easure of
in supp port but weere halted by combin ed he success of this straategy of continuous
th
machinee gun and taank fire fromm Frey’s meen. atttacks without respite shhould not be e viewed
Unsucceessful as thiis attack waas, the actioon n miles of advance, but by the final
in
saw Gerrman tank numbers
n depleted furthher deestruction of
o German fforces in the e Falaise
and putt an end to the German n attack. TThe Poocket and the fall of PParis in Auggust, just
corridorr was still open
o and further
f Britiish elleven weeks after D‐Day..
troops were com mmitted to its defennce
overnighht.

As it waas a larger German counter attack w was

launched on the next day,, with 9 SS
Hohensttaufen and 10 SS Frun ndsberg agaain
being thhrown into combat
c befoore they couuld
assemblle for a co‐orrdinated atta
ack. Howeveer,
the mom ment of opp ad passed a nd
portunity ha
this atttack was defeated witth almost no
territorial gains.

Was Ku urt Meyer correct to o hurl theese

disparatte elements into battle when he di d?
Clearly FFrey believed
d that to com
mmit his forrce
to battle before his division had assembl ed
and wass ready act in a coheren nt manner w was
unwise. Certainly there are significaant
questionns to be askeed about what would haave
happeneed if C Com mpany of the e Monmoutths
had no ot been prresent in Mouen,M or if
Weidingger had atttacked earrlier and t he
Camerons had been n unable to take
t Grainvil le.
Howeveer, the truth was that ultimately Meyyer
had little choice. ToT delay would have se en
the British reinforcee the corridor in strenggth
and allo
ow the 11 Arrmoured Division to attaack
Hill 1122 without harassment.. Thanks to
Montgomery’s poliicy of exerrting constaant
pressuree on the Germans they simply had to

Page 13
Operatio on Epsom presents
p us with seve ral suupport choicces. What is more, the
t two‐
campaiggn options, the attack by the Argyylls prronged attack makes thhe campaign ladder
down th hrough to th he Odon, taking on 12 SS raather differrent to anny we havve seen
recce troops has greeat appeal. However, t he prreviously.
German counter‐atttack on the e 28th offerss a
really in
nteresting opption as its failure was to Th
he following campaign hhas been dessigned to
ensure that the lod dgement achieved by t he ru
un with At the Sharp End, the campaign
c
15th Sco on was secured and a t oe
ottish Divisio su
upplement foor Chain of Command. As such,
hold esttablished accross the Od don. Had t he no e campaign rules are du
ot all of the uplicated
counter‐‐attack succeeeded, wha at would haave ere. Rather all of thee rules from
he m At the
happeneed next is an nyone’s guess, but it wouuld Sh
harp End aree applied unlless otherwisse stated
certainlyy have chaanged the way w we vieew he
ere.
Epsom. Consequeently, it is this series of
actions wwhich we foccus on here. Thhe Scottish Corridor
C is a Full Map Caampaign.
Beelow is the master ca mpaign map, taken
The forremost Allieed players are the 155th from a 1944 4 1:25,000 General Sta aff map,
Scottish Division with
w the German forcces shhowing the six
s potentiall battlefieldss for this
being tw pe made up of
wo disparatee kampfgrüpp caampaign. WeW have useed this period map,
men froom many different units of the Heeer along with aerial reconnaaissance photographs
h nature of
and thee Waffen SSS. The ad hoc taaken in June
e of 1944 too construct all
a of the
these fo
ormations makes
m me interesti ng
for som taabletop mapps which wi ll follow. WeW have

Page 14
 also consulted modern 1:25,000 maps to
ensure that the survey data used is correct.
As can be seen, the campaign takes place
across a stretch of French countryside around
five kilometres, three miles, wide. From the
East, Kampfgrüppe Frey are attacking; from
the West Kampfgrüppe Weidinger. For the
Germans, the objective is simply to link the
two forces. This may happen when all six
tables have been secured. Unusually, as the
Germans are attacking from two directions,
how this is achieved will depend on where the
Germans have success. It could be that
Kampfgrüppe Frey capture four table whilst
Kampfgrüppe Weidinger only capture two. All
that is important is that the two German
attacks hold all six tables. The British player
must hold his ground and stop the Germans
achieving their objective in order to keep 11th
Armoured Division to the South in supply.
THE CAMPAIGN LADDER
The master map shows the six “rungs” of the
campaign. What is unusual is that the
Germans begin the game at both ends of the
ladder. The campaign rungs are as follows:
Rung Name Scenario
6 Probe at Bas de Mouen 2 of each campaign turn will normally depend
5 Attack into Mouen 3 on the result of the previous game.
4 Capturing Colleville 6
3 The Outskirts of Colleville 3 When the Germans win a game and, as a
2 Exploiting the Gap 4 consequence, hold the initiative, the next
1 An Encounter at Le Valtru 1 game played must be at the other end of the
SETTING UP THE CAMPAIGN
The Scottish Corridor sees numerous units
involved. Both Kampfgrüppe Weidinger and
Kampfgrüppe Frey have two platoons which
they may commit to the action as they desire.
At the start of each game the German player
decides which platoon he is using for that
game. Casualties are tracked as normal as are
men returning to the unit after being
wounded. However, neither force has any
additional replacements or reinforcements.
Page 15
If playing The Scottish Corridor as a
continuation of the Operation Martlet
Campaign, Kampfgrüppe Weidinger will have
two platoons if the British win thata
campaign. If the Germans win a narrow
victory then they will have three platoons but
with one (of the German player’s choice)
being withdrawn after two games. If the
Germans win a major victory or more, then
Weidinger will have three platoons for the
whole campaign as the British 49th Division
have been well and truly stopped and that
flank is secure.
The British will get a fresh platoon for each
game they fight. They will not track casualties
or consider reinforcements or replacements;
however, they will track the C.O. and the
men’s opinion through the whole campaign as
though they are one unit.
INITIATIVE
The campaign will begin with the German
player holding the initiative and attacking in
Scenario 6, Probe at Bas de Mouen. After
that, who holds the initiative at the beginning
ladder. So, if the Germans win Scenario 6, the
next game to be played is at the opposite end
of the ladder, Scenario 1. If they win this in
turn, the next game will be Scenario 5, Attack
into Mouen. This continues for as long as
both Kampfgrüppe are still attacking.
If either Kampfgrüppe declares that it is no
longer advancing but is attempting to secure
its gains (see below), then the campaign
continues with the British player holding the
initiative in any campaign turn when the
inactive Kampfgrüppe would have been
attacking, irrespective of who wins the game.
Once a Kampfgrüppe makes such a
declaration it cannot resume the offensive
and attack in any subsequent Campaign Turn.
It may, however, be attacked by the British
who can attempt to regain lost ground.
If the British hold the initiative, they may elect
to attack at either Kampfgrüppe. Any British
attack will fight the scenario as an Attack &
Defend scenario, using the Patrol Phase set up
from Scenario Three in the main rules.
Support available is always as indicated in the
campaign scenario.
seize the initiative for that turn and launch an
attack against the most advanced position of
either German Kampfgrüppe with the
Highland Light Infantry.
This attack will be undertaken by a fresh
platoon with twenty points of support and an
automatic preliminary bombardment at no
cost. The German player may select 12 points
of support. The scenario will be treated as
Scenario Three, Attack & Defend, irrespective
of what table it is fought on.

CONSOLIDATION & STRENGTHENING

DEFENCES
At any point in the campaign either German
Kampfgrüppe may declare that it is halting its
advance and trying to secure the gains it has
made. In this case they may strengthen the
defences on their foremost table with one
additional minefield, entrenchment or barbed
wire in each turn which it defends that table.
This occurs whether they are attacked in a
turn or not.
If the British hold the initiative at the end of
any turn they may strengthen the defences at
one point of their chosing.
THE ARMY LISTS & BRIEFINGS
The following lists are used for the Germans
and British forces in this campaign. They are
based on standard organisational structures
for the period, but allow for losses suffered to
date, localised reinforcements allocated and
with support options specific to this campaign
and based on what equipment was known to
be in the area at the time as well as
preferences within that formation.

CASUALTIES, REPLACEMENTS &

REINFORCEMENTS
For both players, casualties are treated
according to the rules in At the Sharp End,
with losses in each game being split into those
never to return, those who are lightly
wounded and return for the next game and
those who miss the next game.

WILD CARD OPTIONS

Only one Wild Card is present in this
campaign. The British may elect to play The
Skirl of the Pipes card once at any time in the
campaign after midday. This sees the British

Page 16
BRITISH CAMPAIGN BRIEFING
Two days in and the Epsom offensive appears
to be going well. You can hear the fight raging
to the South and know that our troops and
armour have crossed the Odon and are
pushing on towards the Orne River.
Your battalion has been assigned to guard the
flanks of the corridor which stretches some
five miles in length and is critical for supplies
to get through to the troops exploiting the
breakthrough.
You are keenly aware that the Germans are
masters of the counter‐attack and recognise
that, with the corridor being just a couple of
miles wide, there is a real chance that the
enemy could be preparing to launch an attack
in your sector. If they do so you must be
ready to fight to secure the gains made thus
far.
At the start of the campaign your
commander's opinion is at zero as is your
men's. You roll for your own Outlook on page
38 of At the Sharp End with an unmodified
D6. Track these through the campaign as
normal. The opinions reflect those of the
Division as a whole, so you will only need to
track this once, not for each unit deployed.
Page 17
GERMAN CAMPAIGN BRIEFING
For over three weeks German forces have
been fighting in Normandy to contain the
invasion. Your force has been rushed to the
region in order to launch a major counter‐
attack which will drive the enemy back into
the sea. However, as you arrived in
Normandy you have been surprised to
discover that your force has been
subordinated to another Division and is to be
used to make an immediate counter‐attack
against a localised British breakthrough. You
are not best pleased, but orders are orders!
Your objective is to attack in a pincer to sever
the narrow corridor which the British have
pushed southwards and across the Odon. Our
forces will be attacking from both the East
and West with the objective of meeting and
trapping the enemy lead elements in a kessel
which can then be contained and destroyed.
At the start of the campaign your C.O.'s
opinion and men's opinion both stand at 0.
Roll for your own outlook on page 38 of At
the Sharp End with an D6‐1.
 LIST ONNE
Medical
M Orderly
Addjutant
Je
eep or Car, no crew
INFANTRY PLATOON En
ntrenchmentts for one Teeam
This force is used throughout
t this
t campaiggn. LIST TW
WO
Despite lack of co ombat expe erience, theese PIIAT Team, 2 men
units haad been trraining for four years in 2”” mortar Tea
am, 2 men
preparattion for the
t invasion and theeir Rooadblock
mance is consequentlly rated as
perform
Prre‐Game Barrrage
Regular..
LIST THRREE
Command Dice: 5 Sn
niper Team
Quality: Regular Universal Carrrier Team wi th Junior Lea
ader
Prre‐Game Close Support BBarrage
PLATOON HEADQUARRTERS LIST FOOUR
Lieutenaant, Senior Leeader armedd with pistol Reegular Infanttry Section w
with Junior Leeader
Platoon Sergeant, Senior
S Leadeer, armed wiith Reegular Vickeers MMG oon tripod mount, m 5
SMG crrew
PIAT Tea
am, 2 men LIST FIVVE
2" mortaar Team, 2 men
m 6 pounder anti‐tank gunn with 5 crew and
Ju
unior Leader
SECTIONSS ONE TO THREE
H M5
M Stuart Lighht Tank withh Junior Leader
Corporal, Junior Leader armed with
w Sten LIST SIIX
BREEN TEAM RIFFLE TEAM M4
M Sherman with
w Junior LLeader
Bren LM
MG Six riflem
men LIST SEVVEN
Three crrew Sh
herman Fireffly with Junioor Leader
Ch
hurchill Mk VII
V with Junioor Leader
National Characterisstics are the same as thoose
listed in the main ru
ule book for a British forcce: Th
he support liist options lissted are the same as
Five Rouunds Rapid! and Concenttrated Fire. hose in the main Chainn of Command rule
th
bo e same speciific rules app
ook, with the plying.
SUPPORRT OPTIONSS
The follo
owing suppo orts may be selected wiith Sh
herman Fire
efly
the suppport points available
a for each scenarrio. Fo
or each She erman Fireflly selected, at least
The listt is relativeely eclectic due to t he onne standard M4 Shermaan must be selected
number of units wh hich were su ucked into t he ass support forr that game.
action w
while en routte Southward ds to cross t he
Odon. Close Support Barrage
Th
his barrage is the sam me as a Pre‐Game
Please n
note, these liists and their points valuues Baarrage, but continues uuntil the end of the
are specific to this supplemen nt and do nnot se
econd game turn.
replace those in thhe main rule es for gene ral
gaming.

Page 18
 GERMAN SUPPPORT LIST
LIST ONNE
Medical
M Orderly
Addjutant
SS PAN DIER PLATOO
NZERGRENAD ON Piioneer Demo olition Team
This uniit represents the troops of both t he Piioneer Mine Clearance TTeam
ndarte and Der Führer with suppoort
Leibstan Piioneer Wire Cutting Team m
from a vvariety of uniits.
En
ntrenchmentt for one Teaam
Addditional single Panzerfaaust 30
Command Dice: 5
Quality: Superior Reegulars LIST TW
WO
Se
enior Leader
PLATOON HEADQUARRTERS LIST THRREE
Oberschharführer, Seenior Leader with Machi ne Piioneer flame
ethrower Teaam
Pistol Sn
niper Team
Three Paanzerfaust 30 LIST FOOUR
MG42
M on tripo
od mount, 5 crew
SQUADS ONE TO THREE le
eIG.18 with 5 crew and Juunior Leader
Scharfüh
hrer, Junio
or Leader armed wiith LIST FIVVE
machinee pistol. Paanzergrenadier Squad wiith Junior Lea
ader
LM
MG TEAM LM
MG TEAM LIST SIIX
MG42 MG42 Paak 40 anti‐ta
ank gun wit h 5 crew an
nd Junior
Three crrew Three crew Leeader
One rifleeman One rifleman Paanzer IV F with Junior Leeader
LIST SEVVEN
The three panzerfaausts are ussed like hannd‐
Pa
anzer IV G/H
H with Juniorr Leader
grenadees, requiring a Comman nd initiative to
Flammpanzerr III with Juniior Leader
h one. Theyy may be allocated to o ne
fire each
or moree squads. TheyT are no
ot allocated to LIST TEEN
specific figures, but are considered to be wiith Paanther with Junior Leadeer
the squaad until theyy are required
d. Tiiger I with Ju
unior Leaderr

National Characterisstics are the same as thoose Thhe support liist options lissted are the same as
n the main rule book for
listed in f a Germ an th
hose in the main Chainn of Command rule
force: MMaschinengeewehr and Ha andgranatenn! boook, with th
he same speecific rules applying.
a
However, the above optioons are uniqu ue to this
As Supeerior Regular troops, anny roll of t he caampaign.
Comman nd Dice wh hich results in a single 6
being ro
olled sees th
his generate one Chain of
Comman nd point.

SUPPORRT OPTIONSS
The folllowing supp port list is used for thhis
campaiggn. The sup pport options listed in r ed
are onlyy available to
o Kampfgrüp ppe Weidingeer.
Those in Blue are a only available ffor
Kampfgrrüppe Frey.

Page 19
 CAMPAIGN ARSENAL
The following table is used for the campaign. For other weapons, consult the main rules.

CAMPAIGN ARSENAL TABLE

ARMOURED VEHICLES
VEHICLE ARMOUR A.P. H.E. SPEED NOTES
Flammpanzer III 6 Flame Flame Average Hull MG only
Panzer IV F 6 5 6 Average
Panzer IV G/H 6 9 5 Average
Panther A/G 11 12 5 Fast
Tiger I 11 12 7 Slow Slow turret, Heavy Armour
M5 Stuart 4 5 3 Fast
Sherman M4 6 7 6 Average Ronson
Sherman Firefly 6 12 2 Slow No H.E. shell, no Hull MG
Churchill VII 10 7 6 Slow Heavy Armour
TRANSPORT VEHICLES
Jeep 0 ‐ ‐ Wheeled Open top
Universal Carrier 2 ‐ ‐ Fast Low profile, small
ANTI‐TANK WEAPONS
ANTI‐TANK WEAPON A.P. H.E.
leIG18 4 6
Pak 40 9 5
6 Pounder 7 4

Page 20
For the following sccenarios we have provid ed o breach walls by drivingg through th
to hem, and
the playyers with a total
t of the support
s poinnts th
hen they risk "bogging doown".
which tthey may seelect from the campai gn
specific lists. Buuildings showwn with red roofs are ressidential,
hose with grey roofs
th fs are agrricultural,
Generaal Terrain No
otes noormally barnns. Most buiildings should be two
We havve provided specific terrain notes ffor sttoreys in heig
ght.
each sscenario; however,
h some gene ral
while on the terrain in thhis
remarkss are worthw Where
W fields are
a shown ass wheat theyy provide
area of N
Normandy. ligght cover when
w troop s are statio
onary in
th
hem, no cove er when movving. All oth
her fields
Firstly, tthis is not bocage
b counttry, so hedgges arre low‐lyingg crops wh ich count as open
are not impenetrablle. Howeverr, this is a veery grround.
rural areea and hedgges do blockk line of sighht.
Troops within 2" of o a hedge may be se en All of the scennarios have bbeen designe
ed with a
through it, but furth her away the
ey are invisibble minimum
m of notes. The campaign backdrop
b
and maay not be targeted. Mo oving throu gh shhould set the e scene for eeach game. Just one
such hed dges counts as a Mediumm Obstacle. shheet is required to bee printed for f each
sccenario, showing the m map and the support
Most off the roads in this campaign are ddirt lisst options for each playe r.
tracks, tthese being shown in ta an. Cobbled or
metalled d roads are shown
s in gre
ey. At this tim
me On each map p, the deployyment areass for the
of year it makes litttle practical difference as Paatrol Markers are indicaated. In som me cases
the grouund is hard. Metalled or cobbled roaads th
his is a sing
gle point, shhown by on ne Patrol
can takee up to two o tanks abreeast but othher Marker.
M In such cases all of that nation’s
AFVs are too wide to pass eacch other. TThe Paatrol Markers begin at tthat point. Where a
lesser rroads, show a just wi de
wn in tan, are taable edge is shown by an arrow extending
e
enough for a single tank or AFV V. Two jeeps or along that edgge, or wheree the arrow or boxed
light halftracks may pass each otther. arrea indicate
e a generaal area, the e Patrol
Makers
M w which sidde begins in which
show
Orchard ds make up p most of the t woodla nd lo
ocation, not the
t precise l ocation of th he actual
shown. Where plan nted in a re egular patterrn, Paatrol Markerrs which mayy be deploye ed as the
the visibbility rules for
f orchardss in the maain pllayer wishes in, or along,, the area ind
dicated.
rules appply. Where these are more
m randommly
distributted, treat them
t as wo oods. Norm an W have attempted to usse the scenarios here
We
buildinggs tend to be well built off stone and, as “sstraight from
m the box”, soo that they match
m up
such, shhould be treated as hard d cover. Waalls with
w the onees in the m ain rule book. As a
are either shown in n a dark tan colour, theese esult there are limited additional umpire's
re
being mmedium obstacles of 5' maximum in nootes requireed for this campaign, as seen
height, or a light tan, these being majjor abbove. Below each maap are the briefings
obstaclees, typically high
h walls arround 6' to 110' which
w may be
b cut out and handed d to the
in heigh ht. Only the fully tra acked vehiclles re
elevant playeers.
present in this camp paign are suffficiently heaavy

Page 21
 Scenario One
AN ENCOUNTER AT LE VALTRU
Background
This scenario sees Der Führer launch their attack at Le Valtru just as the 7th Seaforth Highlanders
attempt to move into the village. launch their attack into the eastern outskirts of Mouen. This is a Patrol
Scenario, albeit one with a lot of support to reflect this encounter action.

Patrol Phase Deployment

Both players must deploy four Patrol Markers on the table, but unlike Scenario One in the main rules
they may place these anywhere along their friendly table edge within 12” of another marker. All other
aspects of the scenario set‐up and objectives for victory are as indicated for Scenario Two in the main
rules.

British Forces
The British player fields one platoon of infantry with a total of 16 support points available for the first
time this scenario is played. On subsequent playing of this scenario, decrease the amount of support
available by 2 points each time.

German Forces
The German player has a total of 16 support points available whenever this scenario is played.

Page 22
 Scenario Two
EXPLOITING THE GAP
Background
In this scenario the German troops attempt to push on through the farming community of Mondrainville
towards Colleville. Isolated British forces will attempt to delay them for as long as possible. The
Germans must clear this position before they can progress further.

Patrol Phase Deployment

This is Scenario Four in the main rule book and all deployment is as stated there. The German and British
initial Patrol Marker deployment options are shown on the image above, with all of the German markers
beginning on the road at left with the British in the shaded area at lower right. The British also have one
fixed Patrol Marker on the village school, as indicated, which may not move in the Patrol Phase but will
lock down any German markers which move to within 12”.

British Forces
The British player fields his core platoon of infantry along a total of six support points each time this
scenario is played. A Pre‐Game Barrage is always available at no cost and this may be upgraded to a
Close Support Barrage for one support point.

German Forces
The German player has a total of 16 support points available whenever this scenario is played. If the
Germans have by‐passed Le Valtru in Scenario One, the number of support points will be reduced by 3
each time this scenario is subsequently played.

Page 23
 Scenario Three
THE OUTSKIRTS OF COLLEVILLE
Background
Pushing onwards, the Germans are intent on moving into Colleville from the West. The railway crossing
here is flat with neither embankment or any type of cutting.

Patrol Phase Deployment

This is Scenario Three in the main rule book and all deployment is precisely as stated there. The German
and British initial Patrol Marker deployment options are shown on the image above. The German player
places all of his markers on the road. The British player may deploy his Patrol Markers anywhere within
the area shown within 12" of at least one other marker.

British Forces
The British player fields his platoon of infantry with a total of 14 support points available for the first
time this scenario is played. On subsequent playing of this scenario, increase the amount of support
available by 2 points each time.

German Forces
The German player has a total of 14 support points available whenever this scenario is played. On
subsequent playing of this scenario, decrease the amount of support available by 2 points each time.

Page 24
 Scenario Four
CAPTURING COLLEVILLE
Background
The Germans are seeking to capture one of their key objectives, the village of Colleville. If this falls the
railway crossing to the North will be shut, closing a crucial British line of supply and communications.

Patrol Phase Deployment

This is Scenario Six, Attack on an Objective, in the main rule book and all deployment is precisely as
stated there. The German and British initial Patrol Marker deployment options are shown on the image
above. Both the attacker and defender may place their Patrol Markers anywhere along their deployment
area, indicated by the dashed lines, within 12" of a friendly Patrol Marker.

British Forces
The British player fields his platoon of infantry with a total of 20 support points available for the first
time this scenario is played. On subsequent playing of this scenario increase the amount of support
available by 1 point each time. A Pre‐Game Barrage is always available at no cost and this may be
upgraded to a Close Support Barrage for one support point.

German Forces
The German player has a total of 20 support points available each time this scenario is played. On
subsequent playing of this scenario, decrease the amount of support available by 2 points each time.

Page 25
 Scenario Five
ATTACK INTO MOUEN
Background
Mouen itself is a key objective if the railway crossing to the North is to be secured. The Germans
attempt to fight their way through the close terrain to push the British defenders out.

Patrol Phase Deployment

This is Scenario Three in the main rule book, Attack & Defend, and all deployment is precisely as stated
there. The German and British Patrol Marker deployment options are shown on the image above with
the German markers are all deployed on the road on their table edge. The British may deploy their
Patrol Markers anywhere within their deployment zone within 12” of another marker.

British Forces
The British player fields his platoon of infantry with a total of six support points available for the first
time this scenario is played. On subsequent playing of this scenario, decrease the amount of support
available by 1 point each time.

German Forces
The German player has a total of 15 support points available whenever this scenario is played.

Page 26
 Scenario Six
PROBE AT BAS DE MOUEN
Background
The Leibstandarte attack the isolated troops of the 3rd Monmouths in Bas de Mouen. They must break
through quickly in order to push on to their objectives.

Patrol Phase Deployment

This is Scenario Two in the main rule book, The Probe, and all deployment is precisely as stated there.
The German and British Patrol Marker deployment options are shown on the image above with the
German markers deployed on the road on the eastern table edge. The British player places all of his
Patrol Markers at one spot within his deployment area.

British Forces
The British player fields his platoon of infantry with a total of six support points available for the first
time this scenario is played. On subsequent playing of this scenario, decrease the amount of support
available by 1 point each time.

German Forces
The German player has a total of 16 support points available for the first time this scenario is played. On
subsequent playing of this scenario, decrease the amount of support available by 2 point each time.

Page 27
 ampfgrüppen in ordeer to isola
Ka ate 11th
As the ccampaign prrogresses, th
he umpire w
will Armoured Divvision to the South of the
e Odon.
need to make the British
B and German playeers
aware o
of certain eveents. he Campaign
Th n begins at 0700 and la asts until
21
100 with each
e turn llasting an hour; a
Scenariio One, the By‐Pass Op
ption po
ossible twelvve turns (thee 2000 turn ending
e at
When p playing Scenario One, the Germ an 21
100). How wever, Kamppfgrüppe Weidinger
W
may elect to attempt to simply
player m s by‐paass was
w delayed in starting and this ma ay affect
ng this action into a Pro be
the Britiish by turnin he campaign.
th
scenario
o. However, if this option is taken, t he
German platoon whichw progre
esses on muust If this campaig gn is being pplayed as a follow‐on
f
complette the campaign and can never be from Operation Martlet,, a narrow German
replacedd with anoth her platoon as
a these forcces victory or bettter in that campaign willw mean
are conssidered to bee still engageed at Le Valttru th
hat the cam mpaign beginns at 0700 without
and willl not featu ure again. Support ffor deelay. A draww will delay tthe start untiil 0800, a
subsequuent scenario os may still be selected as w delay it until 0900 and an
Brritish win will
normal. ouutright Britissh win will ddelay the sttart until
10000.
If a subssequent Brittish counter‐‐attack pushhes
the Germans back to Scenario One they aare If the campaign is beiing played without
automattically defeaated as Le Valtru
V is still in re
eference to Operation Martlet, ro oll a D6
British h
hands. whenever
w it iss the turn of Weidinger’ss force to
atttack. A roll of 1 or 2 meeans that they fail to
doo so due to pressure on their left fla ank from
The Lad
dder – Goin
ng the Other Way
49 T delay w ill hand the initiative
9 Division. This
In desiggning the sceenarios for this campai gn
in
n that turn too the British.
we havee assumed th hat scenarios one to thrree
will be ffought by Weidinger’s
W fo
orces whereeas
Too win an outtright victoryy, the Germa ans must
four to ssix (or six to four to be precise)
p will be
caapture all sixx tables by thhe end of the day. If
fought bby Frey and the Leibstan ndarte. Theere
hey capture five tables tthis is a draw, being
th
is a posssibility that this
t will not actually
a be t he
su
uccessful in seeing
s 12 SSS secure Hill 112 and
case and d that one Kampfgrüpp
K pe will be heeld th
111 Armoured d Division reetreat to leavve only a
up while the otherr pushes on to the runngs
brridgehead across the O Odon. If the British
designed d to be fou ught from th he other sidde.
hoold two tab bles they wiin a narrow w victory,
This willl mean thaat the deployment areeas
whereas
w hollding threee or more e tables
shown for the Patrol Phase are incorrect.
re
epresents a major
m victoryy for the Brittish.
If this occurs, eacch scenario fought “t he
wrong wway round” will
w be treateed as an Attaack
& Defend scenario o with the Patrol Phaase
deploymment shown in Scenarioo Three in t he
main rulles.

Winning the Camp

paign
ds entirely oon
Winningg this campaign depend
whetherr the Geermans can n link theeir

Page 28
 LEGGAL STUFF
All contents of this book are Copyright
C 20 15
to TooFaatLardies an
nd Richard Clarke and m
may
not be reproduced d in any foormat withoout
permission.

Permission is grantted to the purchaser to

print ouut this book in its entiretty for personnal
use and d the scenario notes and d briefings ffor
limited distribution n within your immediaate
circle off gaming frieends, or for use
u for displlay
purposees if runnin ng the cam mpaign or a
compon nent game att a show or convention.

Please d don’t make this producct available oon

file sharring web sitees. It is cheaap at the priice
of a pinnt, especiallyy when mea asured againnst
the fun you should d have from m playing t he
campaiggn. It isn’t “sharing”,
“ it is theft andd it
hurts the hobby. Th hanks.

www
w.toofaatlardie
es.co.u
uk

Page 29