The contribution of international alliances to the beginning and progression of

World war 1 by Connie Beck

Alliances between countries, such as those between Germany and Austria and Russia and
Serbia, heavily influenced the start of the first world war. On either July fifth or sixth, Germany
and Austria created a ‘blank check’ pledging their allegiance to each other, specifically Germany
promising that in any case they would support Austria in war. This action already promised that
even if a minor war began including Austria then this world already escalated to something more
than necessary. This allegiance was proved as Germany did immediately side with them on
what should have been a small war if anything. On July 30th, Russia put a war machine that
they had been preparing, due to their allegiance with Serbia, into motion. This action combined
with the decided partnership between Serbia and Russia caused what could have simply been a
precaution, to be interpreted as much more. Due to Russia’s previous agreement, an act of
defense could have very clearly been recognised as a threat by Germany and Russia which
later did result in war between Germany and Russia beginning. The combination of decisions on
both sides of what was supposed to be a small war, created allegiances that very clearly stood
a large part in the beginning of the war and without such decisions, the outcomes may have
been very different.

Connie,
You have a good writing style. You clearly understand the concepts, and the only thing I’d look
for to go to a 7 would be the rest of the parties in the alliances, and how they were drawn into a
conflict for no benefit to their situation. Nice work: 6

Why did the Schlieffen Plan fail? by Connie Beck

When facing conflicts in World War 1, Germany’s Schlieffen Plan failed due to their lack of
planning and how big of a gamble it was. This plan suggested that Germany take the majority of
their troops and try to draw France before Russia was ready and then after defeating the
French, moving on to the Russians. Germany tried to bring what they could, taking 5,000 cars
and 1.4 million horses but in order to move all of this in the time they wanted they needed trains.
Wanting to move quickly, the Germans took the train but found it difficult to retreat due to the
French having destroyed the tracks behind them. Even this simple move got a large number of
the German troops and their materials stuck in an inescapable position, back up materials and
informative telegrams were delayed due to the recent change in transportation option and so
any plan was now scrapped due to this predictable roadblock. The success of the Schlieffen
plan was also eradicated by Germany’s ignorance towards Russia’s power. Germany once
again overestimated their success when depending on the unification of their country in order to
succeed in this war. This idealistic united Germany in battle was quickly defeated by the
Bavarian Prince Ruprecht. He decided that he did not want to send his Bavarian troops to
defend Prussia, directly disobeying the plan, and therefore sent the entire plan spiraling.
Germany lost control over the battles that were taking place and simply had to fight to save
wherever they could. This gamble, hoping that their country would unite when they had been
doing quite the opposite, contributed to the, what seemed inevitable, failure of the Schlieffen
plan. Under different circumstances with more time to plan an idea like this could have been
genius but under these circumstances, the situation was foreseeable.

Source (video on haiku):

"The Schlieffen Plan - And Why It Failed I THE GREAT WAR Special feat.
AlternateHistoryHub." Youtube, uploaded by The Great War, 7 Sept. 2015,
www.youtube.com/watch?v=lHeMPV5VDR4&feature=emb_logo&ab_channel=TheGreatWar.
Accessed 8 Feb. 2021.

What challenges would the Russian army face against the modern German army?
What steps did they take to improve their army? by Connie Beck

An account written by Sir Alfred Knox revealing his direct understanding of the war which he
lived through specifically, referencing the challenges Russia would face due to their large
numbers and quantity of strength yet lack of modernised methods and technology. Using the
analogy “a heavyweight muscle-bound prizefighter who, because of his enormous bulk, lacked
activity and quickness” written in Danzer’s Armee Zeitung in November 1909, Knox summarizes
how Russia were immobile and left wanting ‘modern equipment’, that was not immediately
attainable, to assist in their upcoming battles. This clearly raises the suspicion that Russia were
actually not at all prepared for what was to come and clearly demonstrates how their all brawn
no brains method, so willingly used before, would prove to be a roadblock when facing a
revolutionary conflict such as this one. Knox once again enlightens us with his first-hand views
when describing that the Russian soldiers were “lazy and happy-go-lucky, doing nothing
thoroughly unless driven to it, The bulk of them went willingly...they had little idea what war
meant”. These frank words once again admit that Russia only focused on loading men onto the
battlefield and suggest that little time was actually spent educating those they were sending or
creating a modern plan to deal with this modern situation. This plain spoken primarily sourced
evidence provided by a man working with the country whose methods he spoke so lowly of can
only lead us to believe that this recount was unbiased, truthful and that Russia really did face
the major challenge of not being developed and prepared enough for this life-changing
disaccord.

Despite their unfortunate discrepancy for the changes that were to come, Russia did attempt to
regain the large number of resigned officers due to failure in Manchuria and built a strong sense
of respect and faith between their officers and men. Knox offered a new perspective of his own
teams fight when explaining “the Russian army might possess certain valuable qualities
non-existent in other armies...more fitted to stand privation...more fitted to stand nerve strain”
suggesting that Russia did plan to use the strength they had to their advantage. Having an
advantage in this department often overruled by technology in other armies, clearly seemed to
be a step the Russia decided to take. They used the “rigor of the climate” and “lower general
civilisation” to produce an army ready for the war they were to face hoping that this and their
numbers would be enough. After being informed of this countries previous failure in recent war
and therefore dependency on their “no less than 5,123 officers” our writer elaborates on their
attempt to regain those men who resigned, “The pay of all officers...raised by amount varying
from 25 percent to 35 percent...pensions were raised...flow of promotion was accelerated”. This
obvious attempt to make positions in the Russian military more appealing was a distinct attempt
at preparing the country for war and a plea for numbers to help improve their own chances. The
General’s description of Russia’s struggle for improvement with such transparency suggests the
possibility of the bias that he may have possessed for the side he himself worked for must be
eradicated. Not only this but his position as a General working in Saint Petersburg during the
war itself strongly suggests that his perspective was a trustworthy one with an true
understanding of the situation. All of this information explains that Russia attempted to regain
numbers and strength to work towards a better outcome and is confirmed by this highly
trustworthy primary source.

What was life like in the trenches on the Western Front? by Connie Beck

Life in the trenches during the war was exhausting and painful for the soldiers, they
spent days in trenches waiting for action and catching illnesses. The poem Dulce et
Decorum est by Wilfred Owen is a detailed recount of his experiences fighting outside of
the trenches describing just how sick his comrades were. Specifically within the quotes
“coughing like hags”(line 2), “but limped on, blood-shod”(line 6) and “drunk with
fatigue”(line 7), we are given a detailed visual by a man who experienced these
hardships himself. His trustworthy description of his own firsthand experience describes
in such great detail how this long perilous war destroyed the men around him. Owen
shows us how men were ill and yet still ‘limped on’ and kept fighting in their awful
conditions. It seems implausible to not believe Wilfred Owen’s recount as he recollects
such painful times in such painful details that he himself had to live through and survive
when those around him didn’t. This evidence may only be penalised for the fact that it
was written after the war and each detail may not be extremely precise but we are still
led to believe that this is a highly reliable source. Owen’s well written evidence clearly
proves that World War 1 was a traumatic, tiring and painful experience and that life in
the trenches and when fighting outside of them was truly awful.

Source:

https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/46560/dulce-et-decorum-est