SSRN Id2482532

Legal Studies Research Paper Series
A Common Law Court in an Uncommon Environment:

The DIFC Judiciary and
Global Commercial Dispute Resolution
Jayanth K. Krishnan & Priya Purohit
Research Paper Number 300
AM. REV. INT’L ARB., forthcoming (2015)
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Forthcoming: The American Review of International Arbitration (2015)
Krishnan & Purohit
A Common Law Court in an Uncommon Environment:

The DIFC Judiciary and Global Commercial Dispute Resolution
Jayanth K. Krishnan*
Priya Purohit**
Abstract
This article analyzes a fascinating development – the emergence of English-speaking, American

and British-style common law courts within the Islamic monarchy of Dubai. The ‘Dubai
International Financial Centre (DIFC) Courts’ were officially opened in 2006. By 2011, these
courts saw their jurisdiction expanded to cover any commercial matter (domestic or foreign)
with consent from the parties. The monarchy’s establishment of this parallel judiciary reflected
a dual intent: to promote Dubai’s status among Western investors as the premier place to
conduct business, and to confirm that a familiar, reliable, and efficient legal system operates in a
just manner. Relying on ethnographic work, interview data, and primary sources, this article
evaluates the DIFC Courts and the diverse perspectives surrounding them. As the analysis
reveals, the story of this common law court is one of nuance – highlighting how in this era of
globalization a Western judicial system can indeed exist within an Islamic, Arab-Gulf
monarchy.
Introduction
A rather remarkable development – upon which surprisingly little research has focused
– is occurring within a religious monarchy in the Middle East. In 2004, the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) authorized one of its seven monarchal provinces, the Emirate of Dubai, to pass
Dubai Law No. 9 creating a global, cosmopolitan business campus.1 Located within heart of the
downtown area, the ‘DIFC’ – or Dubai International Financial Centre – was established in order
to attract foreign investment and to make this emirate an international hub for commercial
* Charles L. Whistler Faculty Fellow, Professor of Law, and Director of the Center on the Global Legal
Profession, Indiana University-Bloomington, Maurer School of Law. (jkrishna@indiana.edu).
** Research Fellow, Center on the Global Legal Profession, Indiana University-Bloomington, Maurer School
of Law and Ph.D. candidate, Department of English, Indiana University-Bloomington, (ppurohit@indiana.edu). The
authors are grateful to the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) for sponsoring this research. Special thanks to
Jeffrey Apperson and Timothy Hughes at the NCSC for their support, insights, and advice. Also, the authors thank
Mark Beer and the staff at the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts for their assistance, as well as the lawyers,
judges, and other court personnel interviewed for this project. (Where they so requested, the identities of these
individuals have been anonymized.) For their comments and advice on different aspects of this project, the authors
thank: James Fry, Marc Galanter, C. Raj Kumar, Christiana Ochoa, Viplav Sharma, and Carole Silver. The authors
are also grateful to the editors of The American Review of International Arbitration: George Bermann (Columbia
University Law School), Elizabeth Cooper (Columbia University Law School), and Robert Smit (Simpson Thatcher
& Bartlett LLP). Finally, the authors express their gratitude to Vitor Dias for his able research assistance.
1 See Dubai Law No. (9) of 2004, In respect of Dubai International Financial Centre,
http://www.difc.ae/sites/default/files/Dubai%20Law%20no%209%20English%20and%20Arabic_0.pdf.
Electroniccopy
available at:
Krishnan & Purohit
transactions.2 The government touted Dubai’s geographic position in the Gulf as a strategic
advantage – a bridge for those working in South and East Asia, the Middle East, Europe, and
Africa. Moreover, Dubai-officials aspired to an even larger vision: to have the DIFC
eventually serve as the world’s leading arena for major international business dealings.3
Dubai Law No. 9 outlined that there were to be three components to the DIFC: a) an
authorizing agency that would be the regulatory body overseeing employment law, corporate
law, commercial law, and real estate; b) a regulator agency that would oversee all financial
matters involving the DIFC; and, most interestingly, c) the DIFC common law courts.4 The
DIFC courts came into existence in 2006 and for the first five years they served as an
adjudicatory forum for all commercial disputes within the DIFC. In 2011, following the
passage of the Dubai Law No. 16, the DIFC courts were granted jurisdiction over any
commercial matter (domestic or international) so long as all parties gave consent.5
This article will focus, in particular, on these DIFC courts. Dubai government leaders
(and DIFC-officials specifically) have promoted the DIFC courts with great enthusiasm.
Western common law and legal principles, and the English language are used, in order to make
the DIFC courts accessible to international legal and business professionals.6 Furthermore, the
judges of the DIFC courts (on both the first instance court and appellate court) are
internationally respected. (The current Chief Justice is Michael Hwang, an Oxford educated
former law professor, and leading Singaporean lawyer who headed the litigation and arbitration
department of the firm Allen & Gledhill.)7 The goal is to have the DIFC judiciary be efficient,
just, and legitimate. It is to serve as a haven – an accessible Western-style judicial system
within a highly centralized, Arab-Gulf monarchy.8 The DIFC courts are a prime example of the
complicated, nuanced, and even ironic ramifications that can accompany globalization today.
This story, however, is one that has been largely overlooked by researchers and
academic observers of the global legal profession. While there have been some accounts9 --
2 Id.
3 Id. See DIFC About Site, http://www.difc.ae/about. See also DIFC About Site, Dubai for Business,
http://www.difc.ae/dubai-business. For a recent account, reiterating this position, see Gemma Varriale, What DIFC’s
New Chief Must Prioritize, IFLR, Aug. 9, 2012, http://www.iflr.com/Article/3073393/What-DIFCs-new-chief-must-
prioritise.html.
4 See Dubai Law No. (9) of 2004; Alejandro Carballo, The Law of the Dubai International Financial Centre:
Common Law Oasis or Mirage within the UAE, 21 ARAB LAW QUARTERLY 91, 95-96 (2007) (discussing the
basic arrangement of Law No. (9)).
5 Dubai Law No. (16) of 2011 Amending Certain Provisions of Law No. (12) of 2004 Concerning Dubai
International Financial Centre Courts, http://www.difc.ae/sites/default/files/Translation-
Law%20No%2016%20of%202011%20Amending%20DIFC%20Courts%20Law%20%28040212%29FINALsigned
%20%28external%20doc%29123_0.pdf.
6 See Michael Hwang S.C.: Introduction, http://www.mhwang.com/intro1.htm (last visited Feb. 2013).
7 Id.
8 See Damien P. Horigan, A Legal Oasis, 16 HAWAII B.J. 19 (2012); Damien P. Horigan, The New
Adventures of the Common Law, 1 PACE INT’L. L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION 1 (2009). For a discussion of the
mission and vision of the DIFC courts, see its informative website, http://difccourts.ae/about-the-courts/.
9 See, e.g., British Lawyers in Dubai: Money for Old Law, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 2013,
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21591583-new-international-courts-dubai-are-giving-british-legal-firms-
boost-money-old-laws; An Interview with Mark Beer: Registrar of the DIFC Courts, WHO’S WHO LEGAL, Oct.
2012, http://whoswholegal.com/news/counselinterviews/article/30068/an-interview-mark-beer-registrar-difc-courts;
Anupa Kurian, Top Lawyer’s Love Affair with Life in Dubai, GULFNEWS.COM, Aug. 1, 2013,
http://gulfnews.com/life-style/people/top-lawyer-s-love-affair-with-life-in-dubai-1.1215724.
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available at:
Krishnan & Purohit
mainly describing the DIFC’s existence -- the coverage of the DIFC courts has been brief. Most
who know about this fascinating institution are either practitioners in the region or a select set of
interested judicial observers.
Furthermore, the emergence of the DIFC courts adds another layer to the scholarly
discourse on how states – especially those that are non-democratic – seek to procure foreign
investment and to ensure to investors that there will be judicial fairness, reliability, efficiency,
and predictability.10 Mark Massoud, as part of a recent survey of literature on this issue, has
conducted an empirical study of one such state, Sudan. An “illiberal regime,”11 as he terms it,
Sudan has attempted to invite investment from abroad by embracing foreign legal practices,
such as international arbitration, within its state borders.12 Others have conducted parallel
research over the years.13 At its very core, the literature highlights a clear tension. How can
state leaders who wish to attract foreign capital yet lack a history of providing reliable judicial
services for foreign investors, strengthen their courts, while not relinquishing their grip on
power to increasingly emboldened judicial officials?
The story of the DIFC offers another angle from which to answer this question. The
UAE has foreign and domestic lawyers who engage heavily in international arbitration, and
there are also domestic courts that regularly hear matters involving high value commercial
transactions. Yet the UAE, and specifically Dubai, has introduced American and British-style
common law courts into the country’s mainstream judiciary. The following sections, as detailed
below, will explore the manner in which this importation of a parallel judiciary has occurred, as
well as the overarching ramifications and potential impact on a country’s legal system.
Section One will begin by discussing the methodology employed and then move to a
background-description of the DIFC common law courts. The mission, vision, and workload of
the courts will be examined, along with how these courts fit within the broader judicial
framework of Dubai. Section Two will then move to a critical evaluation of the DIFC courts,
levelled not by local Dubai-Emiratis, but rather by another group of interested stakeholders.
Several international lawyers from American and British law firms in the city have been raising
questions relating to the effectiveness of the DIFC courts. Their views are presented alongside
their suggested alternatives for commercial dispute resolution.
Section Three presents a strong rebuttal by supporters of, and administrators within, the
DIFC courts. Section Four, the conclusion, then visits the broader implications of the
incorporation a foreign-type judicial system into a sovereign state such as the UAE. Of course,
the UAE and its neighbors in the region have long been influenced by European legal
10 See Mark F. Massoud, International Arbitration and Judicial Politics in Authoritarian States, 39 LAW
AND SOCIAL INQUIRY 1, 6 (2014) (discussing the means by which an illiberal government would attempt to align
its economic interests with those of its foreign investors to mitigate any risk factors associated with investment).
11 Id. at 1.
12 Id. at 10-22.
13 See id. citing YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERICIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
(1996); Andreas Schedler, Authoritarianism’s Last Line of Defense, 21 JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY, 69-80
(2010); Trari M. Tani, Arbitration in All Related Disputes to Oil, According to the New Algerian Hydrocarbons Law,
1 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARAB ARBITRATION, 81-88 (2009) (examining the ways in which
authoritarian rules have begun utilizing domestic liberal institutions to their benefit, Schedler departs from Delazay
and Garth, as well as Tani, all three of whom highlight the increasingly prominent role of international arbitration in
Egypt and Algeria, respectively, in recent years).
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2482532

Krishnan & Purohit
principles.14 Remnants of the Napoleonic Civil Code, for example, are still visible within the
practices of the local Dubai courts.15 But this current development involving the DIFC courts is
different. In the emirate’s importation of a foreign court-system and a body of common law to
manage certain commercial disputes, there is implicit acknowledgement that investors should
have a choice in the legal systems under which they work.16 The consequences of maintaining
parallel judiciaries, especially within states determined to enhance their global market presence,
raise the question of what varied purposes courts might offer in today’s era of globalization.
I. The Background and Context of the DIFC

A. Methodology
The information upon which this analysis is based derives from several sources. To
begin, during June 2014, the first author was granted permission to spend time with court
personnel and the head registrar of the DIFC courts. Through these interviews and interactions,
he learned directly how this institution functions. Also, because a certain number of cases from
the DIFC courts are published on-line, both authors analyzed these matters, understanding the
types of issues heard, parties involved, and rulings rendered.
In addition, there are over seventy international law firms located in Dubai, as listed in
Appendix A. The first author interviewed twenty-six experienced commercial dispute
resolution lawyers from across a range of these firms in order to gauge their views on the DIFC
courts.17 Furthermore, interviews were conducted with local Dubai-Emirati lawyers who work
in this field and with in-house lawyers from different multi-national corporations. And, the first
author spent time in the two other major competing dispute resolutions settings for commercial
matters – the local Dubai district court and the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC),
the latter being a forum established under the auspices of the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and
Industry (DCCI). Interviews were conducted with officials from each of these respective
institutions.18
Finally, the authors relied on the minimal secondary sources that exist on the DIFC
courts and dispute resolution in Dubai, more generally. In particular, the authors performed
content analysis of newspaper accounts, practitioner and bar-journal reports, and the few
scholarly pieces that make mention of these issues. In sum, relying on multiple methods of
inquiry provided the authors with a fuller picture of how the DIFC courts fare – and are
14 See, e.g., JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN AND ROGELIO PEREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW
TRADITION, 3rd ED. (2007); Ahmed Aly Khedr and Bassam Alnuaimi, A Guide to United Arab Emirates Legal
System, GLOBAL LEX, HAUSER GLOBAL LAW SCHOOL PROGRAM (June 200); Andrew Tarbuck and Chris
Lester, Dubai’s Legal System: Creating a Legal and Regulatory Framework, MOTIVATE PUBLISHING (2009).
15 Author interview with high-ranking court official from the Dubai local courts, June 10, 2014.
16 As will be discussed below, interestingly (and perhaps ironically) local Dubai court officials actually
welcome the presence of the DIFC courts.
17 The authors determined the experience level of the lawyers selected for interviews by examining their
biographies and consulting with several of the sources listed in Appendix A. The authors also engaged in the social
science method of “snowballing” whereby several experienced lawyers were selected based on recommendations
made by initial lawyers contacted.
18 The DIAC was created first in 1994 as the Centre for Commercial Conciliation and Arbitration, and then
evolved into the institution it is now, in 2004. See, Dubai International Arbitration Centre,
http://www.dubaichamber.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/diac.pdf.

Krishnan & Purohit
themselves perceived – in comparison to the other competing institutions that exist within the
country.
B. Structure, Purpose, and Workload
Established in 1971,19 the UAE has a constitution that is federal in nature and allows for
a special judicial configuration. There is a unified, tiered federal judiciary that has at its apex a
Federal Supreme Court.20 However, Dubai was permitted to opt-out of this system and thus has
its own set of courts: a “Court of Cassation, Court of Appeal, and Court First Instance.”21
Furthermore, unlike the other emirates, in which Shari’a law is foundational to statutes passed
by the federal government, in Dubai “the Shari'a is relegated to a secondary role, after the laws
in force in the Emirate.”22
Given this backdrop, it is perhaps not surprising that a parallel court system could
emerge in Dubai. As stated, there are two levels to the DIFC courts. There is a Court of First
Instance that has jurisdiction over:
“a. Civil or commercial claims and actions to which the DIFC or any DIFC Body, DIFC
Establishment or Licensed DIFC Establishment is a party;
b. Civil or commercial claims and actions arising out of or relating to a contract or
promised contract, whether partly or wholly concluded, finalized or performed within DIFC or
will be performed or is supposed to be performed within DIFC pursuant to express or implied
terms stipulated in the contract;
c. Civil or commercial claims and actions arising out of or relating to any incident or
transaction which has been wholly or partly performed within DIFC and is related to DIFC
activities.
d. Appeals against decisions or procedures made by the DIFC Bodies where
DIFC Laws and DIFC Regulations permit such appeals.
e. Any claim or action over which the Courts have jurisdiction in accordance with DIFC
Laws and DIFC Regulations.” 23
There is also a Court of Appeal that hears matters “filed against judgments and
awards made by the Court of First Instance.”24 This appellate body may also provide an
“interpretation of any article of the DIFC’s laws based upon the request of any of the
19 The seventh emirate, Ra’s Al Khaimah, joined in 1972. In total the seven consist of Abu Dhabi, Dubai,
Sharjah, Ummal-Qawain, Ajman, Fujairah, and Ra’s Al Khaimah. Cite Carballo, supra note 4, at 93.
20 Id. at 93-94.
21 Id. at 94.
22 Id. at 94. Also note that: “In those matters not expressly granted to the civil courts, the Shari'a courts have
residuary jurisdiction (and apply not only the Shari'a but also the local secular laws in both substantive and
procedural matters).” (Id). And one final point is that “though Dubai still retains its judicial system, it decided to
apply the Federal Civil Procedures Law (No. 11 of 1992) 21 and the Federal Law of Evidence in Civil and
Commercial Transactions (No. 10 of 1992) in its civil courts.” (Id).
23 See Article 5A, Dubai Law No. 16 (2011), also cited. http://www.difc.ae/sites/default/files/Translation-
Law%20No%2016%20of%202011%20Amending%20DIFC%20Courts%20Law%20(040212)FINALsigned%20(ext
ernal%20doc)123_0.pdf. See also Carballo, supra note 4 at 96.
24 See Article 5B, Dubai Law No. 12 (2004); see also Carballo, supra note 4 at 96.

Krishnan & Purohit
DIFC’s bodies or the request of any of the DIFC’s establishments . . . .”25 The Court of
Appeal is the court of last resort within the DIFC; it has discretionary jurisdiction and sits
in panels of at least three judges (whereas the Court of First Instance has single-judge
benches).26
An ancillary arm of the DIFC courts is the small claims tribunal, which was
created in 2007. This forum is intended to deal with cases of relatively smaller monetary
value.27 Currently, there are five eligible DIFC court-staff members who can sit as
tribunal adjudicators, although only one official is needed per bench to hear cases.28
There is another aspect to the courts that relates to pro bono work. Started in 2009 and
promoted as the first of its type in the Middle East,29 the DIFC courts’ pro bono program
involves court-staff and external volunteer lawyers who counsel financially needy clients
on issues related to the DIFC. Initiated as a pilot project, in 2012 it evolved into a full
pro bono clinic with DIFC court-staff seeking advice from lawyers and judges from
different parts of the world on how best to provide this service.30
In terms of its workload, unfortunately it is not possible to ascertain the specifics
of each and every matter that comes before the DIFC courts. What is known, according
to Head Registrar Mark Beer, is that since their inception, the courts have heard
approximately 600 cases31 “across the various courts ranging from significant and
complex cross-border commercial disputes to property disputes and employment
disputes.”32 In addition, Beer notes that “[n]inety per cent of small claims are resolved in
three weeks or less, and in the main Court of First Instance, where the most complex of
cases are heard, on average 95 per cent are settled before trial.”33 Table 1 provides
information on cases heard by the Court of First Instance, as of July 9, 2014.
25 Id. at all cites.

26 For background on the DIFC courts’ structure, see its website at: http://difccourts.ae/about-the-
courts/courts-structure/. Currently the members of the bench are: Chief Justice Michael Hwang (from Singapore);
Deputy Chief Justice Sir John Murray Chadwick (from UK); HE Justice Omar Juma Al Muhairi (from UAE); HE
Justice Ali Shamis Al Madhani (from UAE); HE Justice Shamlan Al Sawalehi (from UAE); Justice Sir David Steel
(from UK); Justice Roger Giles (from Australia); Justice Tun Zakie Azmi (from Malaysia); and Justice Sir Anthony
David Coleman. (See http://difccourts.ae/about-the-courts/courts-structure/judges/).
27 Cases are not permitted to exceed 100,000 AED or approximately $27, 225 USD. For employment/labor
related cases the value may be up to 200,000 AED or approximately $55,000U USD. And there is the possibility that
a non-labor case of value up to 500,000 AED ($136,125 USD) can be heard where the parties consent to it being
heard in front of a small claims tribunal. See
http://difccourts.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=2725&element_id=3485.
28 For a list of the five members, see

http://difccourts.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2725&element_id=3488.
29 See DIFC Courts’ Pro Bono Programme Guidelines,
http://difccourts.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=2725&element_id=4013.
30 Id.
31 Author interview with Mark Beer, June 8, 2104.
32 Id.; see also, An Interview with Mark Beer – Registrar of the DIFC Courts, Oct 2012, WHO’S WHO
LEGAL, http://whoswholegal.com/news/counselinterviews/article/30068/an-interview-mark-beer-registrar-difc-
courts.
33 Id.; see also author interview with Mark Beer, June 8, 2014.

Krishnan & Purohit
Table 1: Court of First Instance Cases34

Subject Matter of Case Number of Such Cases
Appointment of Arbitrator 1
Breach of Contract 71
Counterclaims 15
Declarations [Evaluation 9
of Witness Testimony]
Employment 53
Goods Supplied/Repair 3
Injunctions 2
Petitions for Winding-Up 4
(Corporations)
Possession of Property 1
Dispute
Total 159
The authors sought to gain information regarding the other 440-plus cases that
are part of the DIFC courts’ workload. However, court personnel at the DIFC informed
the authors that the above data are all that are publicly released.35 The courts’ general
practice is to make cases available to the public only once they reach what is called an
“acknowledgment of service”36 stage. Cases, though, often do not reach this threshold,
and as the authors were told, “various other situations [can] arise which result[s] in the
case not being made public”37 either. Furthermore, all small claims tribunal cases are
private and so the authors were not given access to these files but were informed that a
significant percentage of the outstanding cases fell into this category.38
For DIFC court officials this stance strikes the proper balance between providing
necessary information to the public and protecting the interests of the parties that
approach them. There is great pride among the staff in how efficient, systematic,
business-friendly, and professional the process is. That the courts operate through an
English-based, common law, stare decisis system only further makes this venue that
much more attractive to parties from around the globe looking to work in Dubai.
Yet there is another set of stakeholders in the Emirate – international law firm
lawyers – who offer an alternative perspective on the DIFC courts. Interestingly, from
the data gathered, this group does not challenge the integrity of the DIFC court process or
those who work within it. Rather their views are based on other issues that are examined
next.
34 Data from the DIFC courts website https://difccourts.visionhall.eu/?Start=search#:7.

35 Author correspondence with DIFC-court staff member, July 9, 2014.
36 Id. For a definition, see DIFC courts website at http://difccourts.ae/rules-2/part-11-acknowledgment-
service/.
37 Author correspondence with DIFC-court staff member, July 9, 2014.
38 Id. Author interview with DIFC staff members, June 8, 2014.

Krishnan & Purohit
II. Evaluation of the DIFC Courts by a Contingent of the International Bar

A. Background
There are a significant number of international law firms in Dubai, which has a
population of slightly over 2 million. However, no one comprehensive, available database of
these firms exists; therefore the authors used multiple sources to triangulate, verify, and then
compile what is the most extensive listing to-date. Appendix A lists the foreign firms that
currently have a presence within the emirate.
The vast majority of these foreign firms are from Britain and the United States,
although there are those that come from other places such as Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, East and
South Asia, and Continental Europe. The lawyers from these foreign firms are permitted to
provide advice on matters related to international law and on the laws of their home
jurisdiction.39 Additionally, the UAE allows foreign lawyers to practice domestic law, with the
only stipulation being that to appear as a lawyer in court, the individual must be an Emirati
national.40 Diane Hamade, a well-known Emirati lawyer, has discussed this last point, arguing
that such lax regulations have led to the country being “over-lawyered.”41 She contends that
“foreign lawyers [can] practice UAE law without any prerequisite knowledge . . .”42 and that
this has led to “many big firms . . . [being] slapped with complaints [by disgruntled clients] over
erroneous legal advice.”43
The foreign lawyers interviewed for this study dispute Hamade’s assertions, noting that
they are exaggerated and, moreover, make little economic sense.44 Why would foreign lawyers,
they contend, who do not have local educational training or know Arabic, and are barred from
litigating in court seek to invest in the practice of domestic law?45 They are in Dubai for one
reason – to make money on high-end, transactional commercial deals. It is in such situations
that access to a reliable legal process – one with which they are acquainted – is of key import.46
The question then is whether the DIFC courts satisfy this wish. For many of these lawyers, the
answer is not yet.
39 See UAE (Dubai) International Trade in Legal Services, INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, n.d.,
http://www.ibanet.org/PPID/Constituent/Bar_Issues_Commission/ITILS_UAE_Dubai.aspx; British Lawyers in
Dubai, supra note 9.
40 Id. at both cites; see also, How to Practice in UAE, THE LAW SOCIETY OF ENGLAND & WALES, Oct.
29, 2007, http://international.lawsociety.org.uk/ip/africa/568/practise.
41 Diana Hamade, Lack of Regulation Leads to a Free-for-All in Legal Practices, THE NATIONAL, Oct. 26,
2011, http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/lack-of-regulation-leads-to-a-free-for-all-in-legal-
practices.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., author interview with foreign lawyer, June 2, 2014; author interview with foreign lawyer, June 5,
2014.
45 Id. at both cites.
46 Id.

Krishnan & Purohit
B. Enforcement within Dubai47
The above sentiment stems from the lawyers’ views that judgments from the DIFC
courts are potentially unenforceable outside the DIFC complex. This concern has three layers
to it. Consider the first scenario where one party is from within the DIFC but the other is not --
although it is still based in the Emirate of Dubai. Assume both parties consent to a case being
brought to the DIFC Court of First Instance and a judgment is rendered against the non-DIFC
side. If the losing party’s assets are located within the Emirate (but again, outside the DIFC),
then the prevailing party must pursue an enforcement action within the local Dubai courts.48
Since 2009, there has been a ‘protocol of enforcement’ between the DIFC courts and
the local Dubai courts.49 In 2011, this agreement was enacted into law by the emirate.50 The
steps for enforcement are straightforward. The prevailing party must apply for an “execution
letter”51 from the DIFC court, which then is sent to the local Dubai court. Under Section 7(2) of
the 2011 statute, the judgment is translated into Arabic.52 Then, provided that the DIFC court
judge has described specifically how the order should be enforced, it thereafter becomes a
judgment of the local Dubai court. Furthermore, this now Dubai court ruling is deemed “final
and executory.”53
According to the lawyers interviewed, while the above procedure appears clear and
simple, such is not the case. There is great skepticism and, in some cases outward hostility,
towards the local Dubai courts. One prominent international lawyer remarked that “the local
courts are filled with delays and bureaucracy,”54 where the judges have no familiarity with the
types of orders they are requested to certify.55 This lawyer (and others) noted that because the
local Dubai courts operate in a civil law tradition, they approach conflict, litigation, party-
expectations, and resolutions in a different manner.56 For example, most of the work is non-
adversarial and non-oral and instead “paper-oriented,”57 where lawyers engage primarily in the
submission of documents for evaluation. In addition, there is great reliance by local judges on
the case expert, who is a third party with specialty on the issue at bar.58 However, in these
lawyers’ experiences, it is not uncommon for the case expert to lack technical and substantive
expertise, and to find problems with how a DIFC court ruling has been procedurally transferred
47 Note, the framework for subsections B-D draw upon the DIFC Courts own White Paper on this subject, and
this White Paper is cited extensively below. See: DIFC Courts, Guide to Enforcement – Open for Consultation
(2012) [hereinafter DIFC White Paper],
http://difccourts.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2725&element_id=9033&print=1. In addition,
the law firm of Fichte & Co presented a power-point lecture on this topic in 2013 and from examining it, it appears to
extract directly from the DIFC White Paper. (Where the text below relies on material that appears in both sources, the
authors cite the earlier-dated, DIFC White Paper.)
48 See, e.g., author interview with foreign lawyer, June 2, 2014; author interview with foreign lawyer, June 5,
2014. See also DIFC White Paper, supra note 47.
50 See Dubai Law No. 16 (2011)
51 Id. at (7)(3)(a).
52 Id. at 7(2).
53 Id. at (7)(2)(a) (2011).
54 Author interview with respondent, June 2, 2014.
55 Id.
56 Id.; author interview with respondent, June 8, 2014; author interview with respondents June 10, 2014.
58 See cites at supra note 56.

Krishnan & Purohit
to the local court.59 When these instances occur, there can be significant delays in converting
the DIFC judgment into a local Dubai court order.60
Relatedly, other lawyers noted that judicial independence is nowhere near what DIFC
court judges exert, and it is “idealistic and naïve”61 to expect judges on the Dubai benches to
behave as Western, common law adjudicators do. As one lawyer stated, “the UAE is a great
place to live, especially for the material benefits, but . . . there are limits to what courts and
judges can do in this system.”62 Otherwise put, these lawyers see an inherent judicial
conservatism within the local courts, where it can frequently take anywhere from “six months to
a year”63 before a local judge even considers a DIFC court matter, especially one that may prove
to be delicate or potentially controversial.
These lawyers who express skepticism also point out one other important loophole that
can stall a DIFC court judgment from being transformed into a local Dubai court order. The
Dubai judiciary adheres to the UAE’s Federal Civil Procedure Code. Within it, Article 31 states
that the “[j]urisdiction [of a case] shall be vested in the court within whose area the defendant
has his domicile unless the law provides otherwise . . . .”64 Several lawyers expressed
nervousness about how in cases where the losing party is based in Dubai and has assets
‘onshore’ (and thus not within the DIFC), even with a DIFC court judgment that is handled in a
procedurally correct manner, a local Dubai court could simply refuse to approve it on “the view
that the underlying enforcement application is one that they [the local courts] should have heard
in the first place.”65
Thus, even with the 2011 law that prohibits the local courts from reviewing a DIFC
court ruling on the merits, there are definite worries about “turf-guarding”66 and rivalries
between the local bench and its DIFC court-counterpart. Some even speculate that local judges
59 See cites at supra note 56. Cite interview data.

60 See cites at supra note 56. Mark Beer disputes this assertion, noting that if the paperwork filed in the local
Dubai courts is done properly, then the process takes only about a week. However, the problem lies – and delay can
occur – according to Beer who has discussed this issue with local Dubai court officials, in that international lawyers
often do not file the paperwork properly. See correspondence from Mark Beer, August 18, 2014, and infra Section
III. B.
62 Id.
63 Id. See also cites at supra note 56. According to Mark Beer, he and his staff have not heard about this
issue arising and would have expected to be alerted by parties seeking enforcement. See correspondence from Mark
Beer, August 18, 2014, and infra Section III.B.
64 See Fed Law. No 11 of 1992 Civil Procedure Code, Chapter 1, Section 3, Article 31. Also discussed at
DIFC White Paper, supra note 47,
http://difccourts.complinet.com/en/display/display_viewall.html?rbid=2725&element_id=3464&print=1.
65 See Mike McClure, DIFC Court Confirms Its Jurisdiction to Recognize and Enforce Foreign and Domestic
Arbitral Awards – But Do Problems Lie Ahead?, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG, June 25, 2014,
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/06/25/difc-court-confirms-its-jurisdiction-to-recognise-and-enforce-
foreign-and-domestic-arbitral-awards-but-do-problems-lie-ahead/. See also cites at supra note 56. Also for a critical
take on the local Dubai courts, see Gordon Blanke, Recent Ruling of Dubai Court of Cassation on Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards: Back to Square One It Is …, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG, Oct. 21, 2013,
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/10/21/recent-ruling-of-dubai-court-of-cassation-on-enforcement-of-
foreign-arbitral-awards-back-to-square-one-it-is/. Gordon Blanke, Recent Ruling of Dubai Court of First Instance on
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Back to Square One? KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG, March 12, 2013,
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2013/03/12/recent-ruling-of-dubai-court-of-first-instance-on-enforcement-of-
foreign-arbitral-awards-back-to-square-one/.
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Krishnan & Purohit
will increasingly use the Article 31 maneuver as a means of asserting their relevance vis-à-vis
the DIFC courts.67 Regardless of whether these perceptions and predictions are accurate, they
exist, and together with the points made above, they explain why these lawyers hold the
concerns they do.
C. Enforcement Outside Dubai but Inside the UAE
A second concern by international lawyers relates to enforcing DIFC court judgments in

other emirates within the UAE – particularly Abu Dhabi. Before the passage of the 2011 Dubai
statute, judgments by the DIFC courts were not self-executing in the six other emirates. So, for
example, where a party sought to enforce a DIFC court judgment against a defendant who held
assets in Abu Dhabi, the Abu Dhabi local court would not automatically endorse this judicial
order. Rather there was a procedure, as provided for within Article 221 of the UAE’s federal
civil code, which needed to be followed.68
First, the DIFC court formally had to refer its judgment to the local court of the other
69
emirate. Specifically, this meant that the DIFC judge had to file a set of papers that outlined
the case and then state the rationale for decision rendered.70 Once the local court of the other
emirate received the paperwork, it then had the prerogative to review the case for procedural
defects.71 (It was not supposed to offer an opinion on the substantive merits of the DIFC court
case.) Furthermore, a decision by the local court (as it related to procedural matters) was
subject to that jurisdiction’s appellate body.72
DIFC court officials and others who wanted to expedite execution orders in the other
emirates saw this Article 221 practice as time consuming and rife with potential delay. There
were also concerns regarding the unwillingness of local courts in the other emirates to cede their
jurisdiction and ability to review, de novo, matters from an institution they perceived as an
external court.73 Additionally, there was a sense that the local courts invoked their procedural
powers of review to encroach upon the substantive merits of cases.74 Finally, given that parties
retained the right to appeal, there was a belief that legislative changes were needed to Article
221 in order to accelerate the execution process.75
The passage of the 2011 Dubai statute sought, in part, to remedy these issues. The law
mandated that a DIFC court order “shall be executed by the competent entity having jurisdiction
outside DIFC in accordance with the procedure and rules adopted by such entities in this regard
. . . .”76 In other words, the local courts within the other emirates were obliged to carry out
DIFC orders. Moreover, DIFC court officials formally signed memorandums of understanding
67 Id. See also cites at supra note 56.

68 For a discussion of these points, see DIFC White Paper, supra note 47.
69 See Civil Procedure Code Article 221; DIFC White Paper, supra note 47; author interview with DIFC court
staff, June 8, 2014.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See Dubai Law No. 16 of 2011, 7(2), http://www.difc.ae/sites/default/files/Translation-
Law%20No%2016%20of%202011%20Amending%20DIFC%20Courts%20Law%20%28040212%29FINALsigned
%20%28external%20doc%29123_0.pdf.
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Krishnan & Purohit
(MOUs) with their Emirati-court counterparts as a means of further solidifying the intent of the
legislation.77
It would seem that these steps would have quelled any concern lawyers had regarding
enforcement of a DIFC judgment outside of Dubai but within the UAE. They did not. Of all of
the lawyers interviewed, not one was aware of a case where an Emirati court outside Dubai has
enforced a DIFC judgment since the 2011 statute was passed. In fact, none of these lawyers
knew of even a single case where another Emirati court had been asked to enforce a DIFC
judgment. “We are waiting for a test case,”78 one lawyer remarked. Three other lawyers each
separately echoed this sentiment and wondered whether the absence of such a request is an
indication that the DIFC courts are not all that busy – at least in terms of higher-value, more
complicated legal matters.79 Indeed one interviewed-lawyer directed the first author to the
DIFC court’s own website, which has publicly recommended that “parties seeking to enforce
judgments and orders . . . might be better advised to opt for the "tried and tested" means
provided by Article 221.”80 (Unfortunately, there is no available data on the number of
judgments attempted to be enforced in another emirate’s court either before or after the passage
of the 2011 statute.)
The lack of faith by these lawyers in the robustness of DIFC court orders, beyond the
DIFC complex, has a significant impact on the advice they provide to clients. Perhaps this
point is best illustrated when focusing on the related concerns discussed in the next section.
D. Seeking Enforcement Beyond the UAE
Will judgments rendered by the DIFC courts be enforced in other countries? Given
their global clientele, this question is of utmost importance for the international bar working
within Dubai. For the analysis to advance, the starting point must be that the DIFC courts are
not foreign entities within Dubai, but rather parallel courts integrated within the country’s
judicial system.81 That they are ‘state courts,’ therefore, means that they ought to enjoy the
benefits from treaties the UAE has signed with other countries, as it relates to the enforcement
of commercially-based judicial orders. And there are several such relevant treaties in place.
Regionally, the UAE is a party to the 1983 Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial
Cooperation, as well as to the 1995 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Convention.82 The
Riyadh Agreement has twenty signatories,83 and of importance here is Article 25(b), which
states that “each contracting party shall recognize the judgments made by the courts of any
77 The DIFC courts website lists all of the arrangements that have been signed between the courts and other
jurisdictions. For those within the UAE, they include MOUs with the Ras Al Khaimah Courts, the Dubai local
courts, the Ministry of Justice, the Dubai Judicial Institute. See
79 Author interview with respondents on June 4, 2014, June 5, 2014, June 9, 2014
80 See DIFC White Paper, supra note 47.
81 Id.; see also agreements discussed, supra note 77. See also discussion, infra Section III.B.
82 See DIFC White Paper, supra note 47. The UAE became a party to the GCC Convention in 1996.
83 See Riyadh Agreement for Judicial Cooperation, 1983, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38d8.html.
The parties are: UAE, Jordan, Bahrain, Tunisia, Algeria, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Somalia, Iraq, Oman,
Palestine, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, and Yemen
12

Krishnan & Purohit
other contracting party in civil cases including . . . commercial”84 cases. Moreover, this
provision deems that, when needed, each of the countries shall “implement”85 judicial orders
from one signatory’s jurisdiction to another’s, and that such matters will have “the force of res
judicata.”86 The GCC Convention involves six parties,87 and its pertinent provision provides
that they “shall execute the final judgments issued by the courts of any member state in civil,
commercial, and administrative cases . . . .”88 In addition, the UAE has a series of bilateral
treaties on judicial enforcement, including those with Tunisia, 89 India,90 China,91 and France.92
For several international lawyers, these agreements have value and are important
instruments that they can employ on behalf of their clients. Yet the aforementioned impasse, of
trying to enforce judgments in other emirates within the UAE, materializes here as well.
Specifically, each of the above conventions has “procedural outs”93 within them that allow
courts in the non-originating jurisdiction to review the case at hand. It is true that these
reviewing courts are not supposed to perform a substantive merits-evaluation, but the lawyers
who work in this area noted that the lines are often blurred between what is a procedural and
substantive analysis.94 As such, and contrary to what the DIFC courts suggest, judges retain the
ability to review matters in more than just peripheral ways, especially if they decide to take an
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 See Gulf Cooperation Council Convention 1995. The parties are: UAE, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, Saudi
Arabia, and Kuwait.
88 Id. at Article 1. See also DIFC White Paper, supra note 47.
89 Agreement on Judicial Cooperation, Execution of Judgments and Extradition of Criminals between the
UAE and the Tunisian Republic (1975), Ghada Qaisi Audi, Enforcement of DIFC Courts’ Judgments and Orders
within and Outside the DIFC, FICHTE & CO., June 2013, http://acceluscdn.thomsonreuters.com/accelus-
pdf/24.%20Session%2010%20-
%20Enforcement%20of%20DIFC%20Courts%20Judgements%20and%20Orders%20within%20and%20outside%20t
he%20DIFC.pdf (see comment supra note 47).
90 Agreement on Judicial Cooperation in Civil and Commercial Matters with India (2000), Audi, supra note
89.
91 Convention on Judicial Assistance in Civil and Commercial Matters between the UAE and the Republic of
China (2004), Audi, supra note 89.
92 Convention on Judicial Assistance, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters ("the Paris Convention"). See DIFC White Paper, supra note 47. Also note these other bilateral treaties,
“the Agreement on Legal and Judicial Cooperation with Somalia (1972);
• the Agreement on Legal and Judicial Cooperation with Jordan (1999);
• the Agreement on Legal and Judicial Cooperation with Egypt (2000);
• the Agreement on Legal and Judicial Cooperation with Syria (2002);
• the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, Extradition of Offenders, Cooperation in Civil,
Commercial and Personal Matters, Service of Judicial and Extra-Judicial Documents, Obtaining Evidence,
Commissions and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral Awards with Sudan (2005);
• the Treaty on Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, Extradition of Offenders, Cooperation in Civil, Commercial
and Personal Matters with Morocco (2006).” (See Michael Black, Dubai: A Regional Arbitration Centre? An
Introduction to the Legal Systems in Dubai and the UAE, Arbitration Law and the Need for Reform, Paper Presented
at the Midwinter Meeting, Advanced Legal Concepts Learned from Complex Construction Projects, Feb 2-3, 2012, at
8, http://clients.squareeye.net/uploads/xxiv/documents/American_Bar_Association_Feb_2012_Michael_Black.pdf).
93 See, e.g., author interview with respondent on June 9, 2014. Echoing this sentiment were lawyers during
author interviews on June 2, 2014 and June 5, 2014.
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Krishnan & Purohit
aggressive approach to their jobs as adjudicators – a troublesome possibility for vested

international lawyers.95
Other international lawyers simply did not place much weight on these protocols.
Based on their experiences, these lawyers argued that few, if any, DIFC court judgments ever
are brought in courts of the countries that have signed these protocols. One particularly well-
known lawyer stated that to his knowledge, there has been only one DIFC court judgment that
has sought to be enforced in a treaty-country’s courts – Kuwait.96 The Kuwaiti court affirmed
the DIFC court judgment, but according to this expert, most parties using the DIFC courts do
not consider these treaties relevant, because if they wish to enforce an order, they normally need
to do so in a jurisdiction that is not covered by the signed agreements.97
It is this last point that leads to perhaps the strongest concern about the ability to
execute DIFC court judgments abroad. The daily work for many international lawyers in
Dubai involves counseling clients on how and where best to resolve potential disputes if they
arise during a contractual deal. If a lawyer’s client finds that the other party is not performing
or is reneging or violating provisions of the contract; and if there is an agreement to use the
DIFC courts; and if the party bringing suit prevails, but the defendant’s assets are located in,
say, London (as is often the case) – then what? Presumably, the plaintiff would then petition
the relevant body – here, England’s Commercial Court – to enforce the DIFC court judgment.98
The problem, however, is that in this example there is no agreement or treaty between
England and the UAE to recognize and enforce each other’s judicial rulings. It is true that in
2013 the Chief Justice of the DIFC courts and the “Judge in Charge” of the Commercial Court
signed an MOU that the former’s judgments would be respected by the latter, notwithstanding a
limited set of exceptions.99 Yet, international lawyers hasten to remark that the MOU’s own
language notes that the agreement itself states that it “has no binding legal effect,”100 and as one
skeptic remarked, “the DIFC is not a sovereign state”101 that can mandate such compulsory
protocols.
Otherwise put, according to the international lawyers, the prevailing party in the DIFC
court cannot automatically execute an order in a country with which the UAE government does
not have an agreement, such as in England’s Commercial Court. At best, the party can only
enforce on what is referred to as the defendant’s liability or debt.102 The distinction, albeit
subtle, is significant, because enforcing on the latter is not presumed.103 As a result, a party
seeking to enforce a DIFC court ruling on the defendant’s debt opens itself up, in this example,

96 See Global Strategies Group (Middle East) FZE v. Aqeeq Aviation Holding Company LLC, 002/2010.
Note the DIFC White Paper highlights this case as well, see also supra note 47.
99 See Memorandum of Guidance as to Enforcement between the DIFC Courts and the Commercial Court,
Queen’s Bench Division, England and Wales, Jan. 23, 2013,
http://international.lawsociety.org.uk/files/MoG%20DIFC-UK%200113.pdf; see also DIFC Courts, Legal
Frameworks, Protocols, MOGs, and MOUs,
100 See Memorandum of Guidance, supra note 99.
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Krishnan & Purohit
to that English court now re-examining the merits of the order, which could lead to another
round of litigation and further costs in terms of legal fees.104
Therefore, given all of these various hurdles that international lawyers see as hindering
enforcement of DIFC court judgments (abroad and domestically), they offer a strategic piece of
advice to their clients on matters of commercial dispute resolution: use arbitration.
E. Alternatives to the DIFC Courts: Views on International Arbitration, the DIAC,

and the Dubai Local Courts
For commercial transactions, every one of the lawyers interviewed for this project
stated that they tended to favor including arbitration clauses in contracts to settle potential
disputes.105 Some lawyers noted that occasionally they employ a “split provision,” which is a
contractual clause that allows certain disputes to be settled through arbitration with others to be
litigated in court.106 With the latter, it is not unusual for the DIFC courts to be elected, but,
again, rarely are they considered as the sole means of resolving a dispute within a contract.107
There are many reasons that arbitration is so valued and preferred. For one thing, the
proceedings are private and kept confidential, which clients routinely favor.108 Arbitration is
also thought to be efficient and not hampered by the procedural delays that typically accompany
courtroom litigation.109 Furthermore, the arbitrators hearing the cases tend to be experts who
have experience settling such disputes.110 Perhaps most importantly, though, the procedural
rules selected for arbitration, and the ability to enforce arbitral awards, are seen as reliable and
reassuring to business clients – especially those from abroad.111
Regarding procedure, international lawyers who cater to this contingent of foreign
clientele regularly pursue arbitration in one of two ways. One method is to opt for ad hoc
arbitration, where the parties agree that they will decide on their own how best to arbitrate a
case should a conflict arise.112 A contractual provision that provides for ad hoc arbitration can
be as narrow or broad on the details of the proceedings as the parties’ desire.113 At the very
least, lawyers generally will include what the governing law of the arbitration will be (often
known as the ‘seat’); thereafter issues of arbitrator-selection, specific forum-procedures, and
award-enforcement may be determined later.114
105
See, e.g., cites at supra note 56 and 93.
106 See, e.g., author interview with respondents on June 5, 2014 and June 9, 2014.
108 See, e.g., cites at supra note 56 and 93. Note this confidentiality is kept up until the award needs to be
ratified by a court, upon which then it is usually made public.
111 Id. at all cites. Note there is a counter-argument here that in the Middle East arbitral awards are not easily
enforceable and that courts in the Middle East lag behind courts in other countries in terms of such enforcement. See
correspondence from Mark Beer, August 18, 2014.
113 Id. at all cites; see also Robert D. Carrow, Arbitration, n.d., http://www.carrow.com/ad-hoc.html;
114 See, e.g., cites at supra note 56 and 93. See also Carrow, supra note 113 (noting that if these issues cannot
be resolved, then they “will be determined by the law of the place designated for the arbitration, i.e., the "seat" of the
arbitration.”)
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Krishnan & Purohit
Alternatively, parties may opt for institutional arbitration. Within the UAE, there is no
state law specifically devoted to arbitration.115 Thus, when following the institutional
arbitration route, lawyers rely upon established arbitration bodies, such as the Paris-based,
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) or the London Court of International Arbitration
(LCIA), to set the rules of the proceedings, select the panel of arbitrators, and provide
infrastructural and logistical support.116 In 2008, the DIFC (although, importantly, not the DIFC
courts) entered into an agreement with the LCIA to launch the DIFC-LCIA Centre. By
collaborating with one of the most respected arbitration institutions in the world, the DIFC has
proclaimed its interest in providing business clients within and outside its complex “efficient,
neutral, dependable and cost-effective ADR services. . . .”117 Increasingly, international lawyers
in Dubai are choosing this forum, as it provides the benefits of the LCIA, while allowing for the
location of arbitration to remain within the emirate itself.118
But arbitration’s advantages, relative to litigation, is perhaps most conspicuous when it
comes to matters of enforcement. Whether it is ad hoc or institutional arbitration, awards
reached through these mechanisms – that then need to be enforced in another jurisdiction – can
be more easily done so through an international agreement of which 148 countries are members:
the 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, also known as
the New York Convention.119
The process for foreign enforcement works in the following manner. Once an arbitral
award is issued (typically by either a one or three person panel),120 it must then proceed to a
court for a ratification-of-enforcement order. In Dubai, the DIFC courts will tend to be the
ratifying body for DIFC-LCIA arbitration awards, although in theory the DIFC courts could
also consider ratifying arbitration awards that come from ad hoc proceedings or another
institutional-based arbitration.121 The DIFC courts do not take long to ratify the award (usually
under 30 days),122 and this enforcement order allows the prevailing party to demand that the
defendant pay out the arbitral award.123 If the defendant’s assets are in Dubai, then the DIFC
court’s ratification ruling is the legal justification for collecting the assets.124
However, if, as is frequently the case, the defendant’s assets are located elsewhere, then
the New York Convention provides that the prevailing party can take the arbitral award decree
and have it judicially enforced in the jurisdiction where those assets lie (assuming of course that
115 As such, the 1992 UAE Federal Civil Procedure Code (No. 11) governs.
116 See, e.g., cites at supra note 56 and 93. See also Carrow, supra note 113.
117 See quote from LCIA Director General, Adrian Winstanley, in The Launch of the DIFC|LCIA Arbitration
Centre, Feb. 17, 2008, http://www.difc.ae/news/launch-difc-lcia-arbitration-centre (noting that in 2008, Dubai passed
the DIFC Arbitration Law, based upon the UNCITRAL Model Law on Commercial Arbitration.)
118 Author interview with two respondents, June 8, 2014.
119 See 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention.html. The agreement actually went into
force on June 7, 1959. See counter-point, supra note 111.
120 The panel size will depend upon the arbitration rules that govern.
121 Author interview with two respondents, June 8, 2014; see also author interview with DIFC court staff, June
8, 2014. This point is provided that the seat of arbitration is in Dubai. See correspondence from Mark Beer, August
18, 2014.
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Krishnan & Purohit
that jurisdiction’s government is a signatory to the treaty.)125 Enforcing an arbitral award in this
fashion has comparatively few “procedural outs.”126 According to the lawyers, courts are loath
to inquire as to the merits of arbitration proceedings and tend to show great deference to the
findings of the arbitration panel.127 It is thus much easier to enforce an arbitral award than a
court order – particularly if there are no treaties in place regarding the latter.128 International
lawyers even point to a recent development (and as they suggest, major concession) by DIFC
courts officials, whereby the latter have been recently working with the “UAE legal community
on introducing a new mechanism to allow parties opting into the jurisdiction of the DIFC Courts
to also refer their final judgments for enforcement through the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration
Centre.”129 According to the lawyers, this move demonstrates that even the DIFC courts now
recognize that arbitration awards are easier to enforce abroad than their own judgments.130
It is worthwhile to note that although these lawyers all believed in the importance of
engaging in either ad hoc or institutional arbitration, some also spoke positively about using
another arbitration institution within the UAE, the Dubai International Arbitration Centre
(DIAC). DIAC was first created in 1994 as the Centre for Commercial Conciliation and
Arbitration, and then in 2004 evolved into the institution it is now.131 The DIAC is an
“autonomous, permanent, non-profit institution . . . [l]ocated [within the] . . . quarters of the
Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry.”132 The vast majority of arbitration matters that the
DIAC hears involve construction disputes.133 The DIAC has its own set of rules governing
arbitration proceedings; cases are heard by either one or three person panels; and on average the
DIAC takes in about 400-420 cases per year.134 The arbitrators may or may not necessarily be
125 See New York Convention, supra note 119; see also author interview with two respondents, June 8, 2014.
126 Author interview with respondent, June 9, 2014. It is important to recognize that treaties (whether they are
the New York Convention or the GCC Protocol) have what might be called ‘public policy exceptions’ that allow for
courts to opt out of enforcement. There is an argument that the arbitration process restricts a court’s ability to rely on
this important public policy exception. See correspondence from Mark Beer, August 18, 2014.
127 See, e.g., cites at supra note 56 and 93. See counter-point supra note 111.
129 DIFC Courts Consult Legal Community to Increase Enforceability of Judgements, WAM, EMIRATES
NEWS AGENCY, July 17, 2014, http://www.wam.ae/en/news/general/1395267734489.html.
130 See, e.g., cites at supra note 56 and 93. See also id. (noting that "[i]f it comes into force, the innovative
Practice Direction, the first of its kind globally, would allow the DIFC-LCIA Arbitration Centre to convert a DIFC
Courts judgement [sic] into an arbitral award, providing greater enforcement internationally under the provisions of
the New York Convention of 1958 . . . ."). For commentary on this issue, see also Gordon Blanke, The DIFC and
Arbitration: Raising the Stakes, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG, July 20, 2014,
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/07/20/the-difc-and-arbitration-raising-the-stakes-2/. For a counter-point
to this assertion, see infra Section III. B (noting that this move was made simply to facilitate enforcement).
131 For background on the DIAC, see its website at http://www.diac.ae/idias/aboutus/.
132 Id.
133 Author interview with DIAC respondent, June 9, 2014. (The respondent noted that about 80% cases
involve construction.).
134 Id. Note this seems to be an increase from even just a few years ago. See Bi-Annual Statistics 2010, Dubai
International Arbitration Centre at 2 (noting that in 2007, 77 cases were filed, in 2008, 100 cases were filed, in 2009,
292 cases were filed, and in 2010, 186 cases were filed).
http://arbitrationlaw.com/files/free_pdfs/DIAC%202010%20Biannual%20Statistics.pdf. For a discussion of this
point, see Kaashif Basit, United Arab Emirates, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION REVIEW (ed., James H.
Carter 2011) at 479-480, http://www.kbh.ae/media/int_arb.pdf.
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Krishnan & Purohit
lawyers, and the DIAC has an administrative staff along with an international executive
committee and board of trustees.135
The lawyers with favorable views towards the DIAC appreciated the professionalism of
its arbitrators.136 Moreover, given its specialty in resolving construction disputes, lawyers with
such cases saw the DIAC as an efficient body.137 Yet for other lawyers, conducting DIAC-
arbitrations was a formidable challenge. Ratification of DIAC-awards typically is done through
the local Dubai courts.138 According to these lawyers, working in the latter is a difficult
process. Many of the points previously cited regarding the local courts139 are seen as serious
deficiencies by lawyers seeking to obtain enforcement of DIAC-awards. These foreign
lawyers’ inability to work within an Arabic judicial setting, the civil nature of the system, and
the routine delays intrinsic to the process make selecting the DIAC less appealing than selecting
ad hoc or standard institutional arbitration.
The above discussion provides an overview of the sentiments that a contingent of

international lawyers has towards the DIFC courts and other adjudicatory institutions within the
country. It also highlights an enormous preference for arbitration. The next section presents an
important set of counter-perspectives.
III. In Support of the DIFC Courts

A. External Advocates
1. The Local Dubai Courts & DIAC
Before moving directly to the views of those working inside the DIFC courts, it is
interesting to note that there exists a set of external supporters within the UAE who challenge
the depiction detailed above. The first, perhaps most unlikely group, are officials working
within the local Dubai courts. The first author spent time at the main courthouse in Dubai and
met with influential figures there.140 The complex itself is a marvel of infrastructural and
technological innovation. Contrary to the views presented by the international lawyers, the
courthouse is neither chaotic nor haphazardly run.141 It is true, Arabic is the language of use,
but there are also many placards with English translations and all of the court staff with whom
the author met spoke English as well.142 Upon entering, one sees a main entry foyer with
administrative desks on both the left and right sides.143 In the middle is an area for people who
are sitting and waiting their turn before being called by a staff official to proceed to the relevant
stall to discuss the reason for their presence.144
135 Id. See also author interview with another DIAC official, June 9, 2014. (Note, there is currently not a
permanent director of the DIAC at the moment.).
136 See, e.g., author interview with respondents, June 4, 2014; June 5, 2014.
137 Id.
138 See, e.g., author interview with respondent, June 2, 2014; author interview with respondent June 5, 2014.
139 See text at supra notes 54-67.
140 Author observations on the Dubai lower courts, June 10, 2014.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
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Past this main central area, there are courtrooms on the same floor and other
administrative offices.145 Additional courts are located on higher-level floors.146 Particularly
relevant for this project’s purpose is that since 2008 there has been a specialized ‘commercial
court’ tasked with the expeditious handling of business-related cases.147 Its jurisdiction covers,
specifically, “trade issues . . . [including] commercial contracts, banking, companies,
intellectual property, stocks, arbitration, bankruptcy, air and maritime [matters], and
commercial agencies [and] attachments cases . . . .”148 Single judges will hear cases in which
plaintiffs bring forth claims of 100,000 Emirati Dirham ($27,000) or less; for claims surpassing
this amount, a three-judge panel is required.149 Furthermore, this court hears matters using the
traditional civil law approach: lawyers and parties can appear in person and submit required
documents upon which the judge and an assigned court expert deliberate. But there are also
deliberations on-line, where the court can receive documents via its website and provide
notifications, interim orders, and even final judgments electronically.150
The reason that local court officials value the DIFC judiciary is because they perceive
that it helps the Dubai commercial court keep its docket from swelling with cases. Consider
Table 2, which shows that for each type of case that it hears, not one category takes more than
one month before receiving a first hearing.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 See Enhancing the Judicial Specialization at the Commercial Court, Government of Dubai, Dubai Courts,
(2014), http://www.dubaicourts.gov.ae/jimage/files/dc_jud_spec_enh_comm_court_en_2014.pdf [hereinafter
Commercial Court].
148 Id at 1. It is important to note that since 2008 the Dubai Court of First Instance has changed its
composition. It is still the first court of resort, but it is now divided into six specialized benches that each has a
“separate Chief Judge and Judicial Circuits which are as follows: Civil Court, Commercial Court, Personal Status
Court, Criminal Court, Labour Court, [and] Real Estate Court.” (See Pioneering in Courts Work, Government of
Dubai, Dubai Courts,
http://www.dubaicourts.gov.ae/portal/page?_pageid=292,447242&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL). In the
common parlance, however, these specialized courts are often referred to as the ‘Court of First Instance,’ including in
commercial matters. (See also author telephone interview with a Dubai local courts official, August 3, 2014 and then
follow-up email correspondence, August 4, 2014.). For a lawyer who has been writing on the Dubai courts, see
Gordon Blanke, DIFC Court of First Instance Confirms Its Status as Host Jurisdiction for Recognition of both
Domestic and Foreign Awards, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG, June 7, 2014,
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2014/06/07/difc-court-of-first-instance-confirms-its-status-as-host-jurisdiction-
for-recognition-of-both-domestic-and-foreign-awards/; Blanke, Recent Ruling of Dubai Court of Cassation, supra
note 65.
149 See Pioneering in Courts Work, Government of Dubai, Dubai Courts,
http://www.dubaicourts.gov.ae/portal/page?_pageid=292,451199&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL#Commercial
cases of full jurisdiction; see also Black, supra note 92 at 5.
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Table 2151
Average Waiting Time for the First Hearing

in the Commercial Court
Type of Case Average (in number of days)
Attachments 30
Bankruptcy 21
Air and Maritime 28
Commercial Power of Attorney 33
Arbitration 26
Intellectual Property 29
Companies 29
Commercial Papers 27
Banking 30
Commercial Contracts 26
Although they cannot show causality, local court officials certainly believe that having
another forum, such as the DIFC courts, that hears matters like those listed in Table 2, assists in
distributing the commercial-case workload. An Arab commercial law lawyer who works at
prestigious regional firm also held similar sentiments.152 This individual conveyed how he and
his firm-colleagues routinely advise their foreign clients to opt-in to the DIFC courts as the
forum to resolve disputes, whereas with their Arab clients they recommend using the Dubai
commercial court. He added that it is incorrect to suggest that the commercial court only hears
petty matters and is unsophisticated or unfamiliar with how to handle complicated issues. “The
court can hear cases worth many millions of dollars,” he stated.153
Data show that between 2008 and the end of 2013, the commercial court had 2278 cases
come before it.154 70% of litigation in the commercial court involves disputes over contracts
and banking (48% and 22%, respectively), and another 20% are a combination of commercial
paper and corporation cases.155 To reiterate, if the DIFC courts were not an available option,
international clients would be required to go to the Dubai commercial court to litigate and to
have arbitral awards ratified. The result would be a backlog in the commercial court and then,
invariably, delay in the rendering of final judgments. The graph below shows, however, how
151 See Commercial Court, supra note 147, at 4.

153 Id.
154 See Commercial Court, supra note 147, at 2.
155 Id. at 2. (noting that 12% are commercial paper cases and 8% are corporation cases. It is important to note
that there is a pie chart referenced in this source that the Dubai government places in its document. However, there
appears to be an error. The percentages in the pie chart tally to over 100%. The contracts and banking percentages
are discussed in the government’s text, so presumably the government’s authors confirmed these figures before
placing them there. But the remaining percentages are: commercial papers 12%, companies 8%, intellectual property
1%, arbitration 4%, commercial power of attorney 2%, air and maritime 2%, bankruptcy 0%, and attachments 3%.
This total (including contracts and banking) is 102%. An inquiry was made to explain this discrepancy, but to date
there has been no response.)
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presently there is a relatively quick commencement-to-conclusion period (in days) from when
cases have their first hearing to when there is a final decision.156
On average, a case in the commercial court concludes within 289.4 days.157 Power of attorney
disputes take the longest (671 days on average); attachment and commercial contracts are the
fastest (each 117 days on average).
Another group that feels similarly optimistic about the DIFC courts are DIAC officials.
Traditionally, when a DIAC arbitration is concluded, the arbitral award needs to go in front of a
local court to be ratified.158 A 2011 report notes that in years past it had been typical for this
process to “take more than 18 months from start to finish.”159 Today, as the above graph shows,
on average it takes about five months for an arbitration case to conclude. While this amount of
time is not as comparatively long as before, DIAC officials are aware that the DIFC courts pride
themselves on handing down a ratification of enforcement order within an even shorter period
156 Id. at 4. The authors discovered a typographical error in this graph from the government’s source. For id.
at 4, the government’s source labels the third bar (356) and the last bar (117) as both air and maritime. The second
labelling of air and maritime should actually be commercial contracts, because this bar graph from the Dubai
government source is a follow-up to a bar graph on id. at 3, upon which the authors’ Table 2 above is based. The last
category in the authors’ Table 2 is commercial contracts, which is what it is in the government’s source, id. at 3.
Thus the authors are confident in their correction of the typographical error. Again, an inquiry was made to the
government, but no response was received.
157 The average here was calculated by adding (from the previous graph): 117, 135, 356, 671, 148, 395, 339,
330, 286, 117, and then dividing by 10, the number of case categories.
158 Author interview with DIAC respondent, June 9, 2014.
159 See Christopher Mills and Richard Bell, United Arab Emirates: Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the
UAE, MONDAQ, Feb. 10, 2011,
http://www.mondaq.com/x/122512/Commercial/Enforcement+Of+Arbitral+Awards+in+the+UAE.
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of time.160 Interestingly, these officials have learned (and are supportive) of lawyers
increasingly placing provisions within contractual agreements stating that the ratification of a
DIAC award may be done not by the commercial court – but rather by the DIFC courts.161
DIAC officials are not involved in enforcement, so this change does not bother them. In fact,
given that their clients are happy when arbitral awards are enforced in as fast a fashion as
possible, the officials are delighted to support whatever means are available to achieve this
quicker result – including using the DIFC courts.
Clearly, local Dubai court officials and the DIAC administrators support the DIFC
courts for instrumental purposes. However, to suggest that this reason is their only motivation
behind their endorsement ignores another reality. Officials from both the Dubai local courts
and the DIAC are keenly interested in seeing the Emirate’s economy thrive.162 In part, for that
to happen, their view is that there has to be continued, deep, and sustained investment from
abroad.163 Given that the DIFC judiciary seeks to facilitate legal predictability, transparency,
and certainty for overseas investors, its presence in Dubai increases the likelihood that
foreigners will see the UAE as a welcoming place to do business. Two other groups hold
similar sentiments; their support is examined next.
2. In-House Counsels and Supportive Foreign Lawyers
DIFC court officials regularly state that they are most interested in serving the legal
needs of the business community. For such businesses and multinational companies, the legal
professionals on the front lines are in-house counsel. These lawyers, however, often see a
disconnect between their needs and those of the outside law firms they hire for legal
representation. One main disagreement that can occur is on how best to settle disputes.
According to the in-house counsels interviewed, the protracted nature of the tactics and
strategies used by law firm lawyers with whom they engage are the cause of much frustration.
In particular, the insistence by law firm lawyers on employing arbitration as the main vehicle
for resolving disputes was questioned.164 One in-house lawyer even went so far as to claim
“this whole arbitration thing is a scam.”165 While other in-house colleagues see that view as
extreme, for several reasons there is a belief that arbitration is not necessarily the only means of
dealing with conflict.
To begin, the possibility (and potential pitfalls) of arbitration arises when a company
enters into a deal with another party and the contract calls for provisions on how best to resolve
160 The DIFC court staff reinforced this point on June 8, 2014.
161 To date, the authors are not aware of any DIAC arbitral award that has been ratified by the DIFC courts.
Officials at the DIFC courts also were not familiar with a case of this nature. But according to a DIAC official, this
individual has heard that lawyers are only recently placing this new provision within contracts. Author interview
with DIAC respondent, June 9, 2014.
162 Id.; also author interviews with administrative staff officials from the Dubai local courts.
164 After the first author’s visit to Dubai, he had a post-fieldwork interview with a lawyer on July 4, 2014. See
also author interview with respondent, June 7, 2014.
165 Author post-fieldwork interview with a lawyer on July 4, 2014
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future disputes.166 On basic deals, in-house lawyers will routinely handle such negotiations.
While they will frequently include an arbitration clause within the contract, it is also not
uncommon for them to incorporate the above-mentioned split provision, with the court chosen
for litigation to be the DIFC judiciary.167 On more complicated transactions, however, in-house
lawyers will turn to their staple of law firms for consultation, and it is in these situations where
tensions can emerge.168
Specifically, in-house lawyers stated that they felt unsatisfied by the heavy reliance law
firm lawyers placed on arbitration. “What does it even mean to prevail in arbitration?”169 asked
the legal counsel of a multinational conglomerate. This lawyer proceeded to explain that
winning an arbitral award was only an early first step and did not necessitate automatic
enforcement of that award.170 “We find ourselves having to chase down assets all over the place
. . . and this can take years,”171 he stated.
Other in-house lawyers supported this point by rejecting the argument that arbitrations
are speedy and efficient. Delays often are present, whether they are from the other parties,
themselves, or the arbitrators.172 One in-house lawyer commented that it was not as though
when a dispute arises, the different parties and arbitrators all peaceably go into a room and settle
the matter in one sitting.173 Rather, it can take several months just to agree on where to meet;
and when the arbitration does commence the proceedings can be as contentious and difficult as
any standard litigation matter.174
For these reasons, in-house lawyers have become more sympathetic to privileging the
DIFC courts within contracts as the venue for resolving disputes. To be sure, arbitration is still
used and included in agreements, but there is some disillusion with this process. By contrast,
and based on their own experiences, experiences of others, or upon general perceptions they
have formed, in-house lawyers have a favorable impression of the DIFC courts.175 The
expediency that the courts can provide is perhaps the most attractive feature. Specifically, the
DIFC courts can and do regularly issue summary judgment orders.176 The procedure allows
cases to be resolved quickly and without the laborious, unnecessary hassle (in the eyes of in-
house lawyers) of prolonged litigation.177
In addition, rulings by the DIFC courts can have precedential value for future cases and
are thus useful for in-house lawyers to consider as they make legal decisions on behalf of their
employers.178 In-house lawyers believe that being able to insert the DIFC courts-option as the
forum for recourse within a contract provides another benefit as well.179 Because parties know
that the DIFC judiciary places a premium on resolving matters expeditiously and definitively –
166 See, e.g., author interview with respondent, June 5, 2014.

167 Id.; see also author interview with respondent, June 6, 2014.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 See, e.g., Author interview with respondent, June 6, 2014; Author interview with respondent, June 7, 2014.
173 See, e.g., Author interview with respondent, June 6, 2014.
174 Id.
175 See, e.g., Author interview with respondent, June 6, 2014; Author interview with respondent, June 7, 2014.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
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and that the loser of litigation is required to pay legal costs for both sides – they work hard to
avoid being in court.180 Hence, the parties have an incentive to execute the terms of the
contract, and where they cannot, they tend to settle rather than resorting to the DIFC courts.
Both the presence and legitimacy of the DIFC courts, therefore, serve as motivation for the
parties to adhere to the agreement they signed and as a deterrent to parties who are considering
not fulfilling their contractual obligations.181
There are another group of lawyers who hold similar sentiments to these in-house
lawyers – a corps of lawyers who work in international law firms but who do not hue to the
views of their colleagues discussed in Part Two. As one these respondents stated, “the majority
of international lawyers are skeptical of anything [i.e. the DIFC courts and the local Dubai
judiciary] except for arbitration.”182 This individual and a minority of others stated that they are
sympathetic to the views of the in-house lawyers. Moreover, although these international
lawyers used arbitration and felt that it had important benefits and advantages, they also
conceded that it was a very expensive method of dispute resolution – especially when compared
to the DIFC courts.183 Summarizing the thoughts of one respondent: arbitration lawyers make
enormous amounts of money (as they are paid both per hour and per arbitration proceeding);
arbitrators make enormous amounts of money for presiding over cases; and clients pay
enormous amounts of money for this entire process.184
A final reason cited for why these lawyers value the DIFC courts relates to their
admiration for the sitting judges.185 The DIFC bench is comprised of judges from different parts
of the world, including Australia, Britain, Malaysia, Singapore, and the U.A.E., and they are
well reputed and highly respected.186 Their experience is deep; the opinions they write are
thought of as analytical, richly reasoned, and cogent.187 Furthermore, the questions they ask
during proceedings illustrate they have studied the cases before-hand and care about the type of
justice being administered.188 Regarding the judges from abroad, there were lawyers who stated
that they had actually appeared before them in the respective judge’s home jurisdictions.189 “In
my experience, they are every bit as good here as they were there,”190 one lawyer remarked.
Other lawyers echoed this sentiment,191 and as for the Emirati judges on the DIFC courts, two of
180 Id.
181 Id.
183 See, e.g., id.; also author interview with respondent, June 9, 2014.
184 Author interview with respondent, June 10, 2014. Arbitration lawyers within similarly-situated institutions
in other jurisdictions have themselves levied parallel critiques against those practicing in the field, citing the need for
a more explicit understanding of common and civil law procedures within the practice. See, e.g., Patrick Dahm,
Andreas Respondek, and Kevin O’Shea, A Grain of Civil Law – Some (Not so) New Chords for the International
Arbitration Jazz, SINGAPORE LAW GAZETTE (forthcoming October 2014).
185 See, e.g., id.; author interview with respondent, June 9, 2014; author interview with respondent, June 3,
2014.
186 See supra note 26.
188 Id.
189 See, e.g., author interview with respondent, June 2, 2014; author interview with respondents, June 8, 2014.
190 Author interview with respondent, June 2, 2014
191 See, e.g., author interview with respondent, June 2, 2014; author interview with respondents, June 8, 2014.
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the three worked in the local Dubai courts before taking their current posts, and lawyers familiar
with them also commented positively on their legal acumen.192
Thus, the supporters of the DIFC judiciary are diverse, coming from different
institutions and different backgrounds. These backers also provide great legitimacy to DIFC-
court officials, whose views are examined next.
B. DIFC Advocates
Since 2008, Mark Beer has been the head registrar of the DIFC courts and its most
prominent advocate. Beer is an Oxford-trained lawyer and former Vice President and Legal
Counsel at MasterCard Corporation.193 (Before MasterCard, he worked as a commercial lawyer
for the law firm of Clyde & Company and prior to that with the firm of Edge & Ellison.194)
Beer’s reputation within the legal and business community – among both those supportive of
the DIFC courts and those who have questions – is stellar.195 He is thought of as brilliant,
honest, charismatic, and eloquent, and someone who is seen as having boundless, optimistic
energy.196 His work on behalf of the DIFC courts and on “strengthening relations between the
UK and UAE”197 earned him the prestigious Order of the British Empire Award in 2013 from
the British government.
In person, Beer encapsulates all of these attributes.198 His staff officials respect him
greatly and, like him, they too are strong champions of the DIFC courts.199 Beer and his
colleagues are resolute in presenting not just a rebuttal to those who raise issues about the
DIFC, but a powerful, affirmative case for why the DIFC courts are necessary and vital to the
strength of Dubai’s growth as an international business hub.
First, Beer flatly rejects the point that DIFC court judgments are difficult to enforce in
Dubai, the greater UAE, or abroad. There is simply “no problem,”200 Beer stated, and the
concerns that lawyers have are either exaggerated or unfounded. In the Emirate, for example, it
is a requirement that “DIFC Courts’ judgments must be enforced through the Dubai Courts, in
accordance with the Federal Civil Procedures Law.”201 There is thus no question that the
192 The two judges are Justice Omar Al Muhairi (see http://difccourts.ae/about-the-courts/courts-
structure/judges/omar-juma-al-muhairi/) and Justice Shamis Mohamed Shamis Al Madhani,
http://difccourts.ae/about-the-courts/courts-structure/judges/h-e-justice-ali-shamis-mohamed-shamis-al-madhani/.
See, e.g., author interview with respondents, June 4, 2014; June 9, 2010; June 10, 2014.
193 See Linked in, Mark Beer webpage, http://ae.linkedin.com/in/markgbeer.
194 Id.
195 See, e.g., author interviews with respondents on June 2, 2014; June 3, 2014; June 5, 2014; June 8, 2014;
June 9, 2014.
197 See Shane McGinley, Interview: DIFC Courts Chief, Mark Beer, ARABIAN BUSINESS, Nov. 2, 2013,
http://www.arabianbusiness.com/interview-difc-courts-chief-mark-beer-524904.html?page=0.
198 The first author met Beer, individually, and then met his staff and spent part of the day of June 8, 2014 at
the DIFC courts. (The author also spent part of June 4, 2014 at the courts.).
199 Id.
200 Author interview with Mark Beer, June 8, 2014.
201 See DIFC Courts, Frequently Asked Questions, http://difccourts.ae/about-the-courts/faqs/; see also, Dubai
Law No. 12, 2004, as amended.
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Krishnan & Purohit
government and local judiciary have envisioned working cooperatively with the DIFC courts
since their emergence in 2006. Furthermore, since 2009, there has been a Protocol of
Enforcement in place between the DIFC courts and the local Dubai courts.202 This agreement
stipulates that the local Dubai courts will enforce judgments from the DIFC judiciary, so long as
they are final and translated into Arabic.203
Subsequently, the government expressed this intent formally through official legislation
(Law No. 16, 2011), noting that DIFC court judgments would be recognized as judgments of the
UAE judiciary.204 Beer’s office keeps a running tally of how “[t]here are a number of cases
where DIFC Court orders have been enforced by the Dubai Courts . . . [even now including]
interim orders, such as freezing orders (Mareva injunctions)”205, and arbitration-ratification
decrees.206 According to Beer, DIFC courts are integrated within, and are part-and-parcel of,
the Dubai judicial system.207
Given this approach, then, the second area of concern – relating to whether DIFC
judicial orders are enforceable in another emirate, such as Abu Dhabi – should be alleviated. A
basic element of the UAE’s judicial system is that court orders from one emirate are respected
and enforced in another. If DIFC court-judgments are recognized and enforceable by (and on
par with) the local Dubai court-rulings, then it only follows that DIFC judicial orders should be
recognized within the other emirates as well.208 While some international lawyers may question
this proposition, not all do, and there are those who have issued legal opinions affirming this
contention.209
Moreover, this type of excessive worrying about enforcement misses a key point
discussed in the section above on the DIFC courts’ workload. Recall that over 95% of all of the
cases that come before the DIFC settle before there is a final judgment.210 In fact, “[t]he DIFC
courts are set up to promote settlement. Settlement not only saves parties time and money but it
allows them to work together in the future and to continue doing business.”211 The notion that
there are somehow a flood of judgments emerging from the DIFC courts that are in need of
enforcement in other emirates is not the reality. That there has not yet been a “test case”212 on a
DIFC judgment’s enforceability in a place like Abu Dhabi, is not indicative of a fear of using
the DIFC courts, but rather, and less dramatically, merely symptomatic of the absence of a
202 See http://difccourts.complinet.com/net_file_store/new_rulebooks/d/i/DIFCC_protocol_dubaicourts.pdf.

203 Id. See also DIFC White Paper, supra note 47.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Author interview with Mark Beer, June 8, 2014. Shortly before this paper entered into copy-editing
review, the authors learned of how even though there may be an order of enforcement issued by the local Dubai
courts upon receipt of a DIFC judgment, there nevertheless can be the practical problem of asset-tracing within
Dubai, thereby making the physical seizure of assets from a defendant difficult. See e.g., DIFC ARB 001/2010.
209 See Rupert Choat, Slava Kiryushin, and Sarah French, Enforcement of Judgments between the English
Commercial Court and Dubai’s DIFC Courts, LEXOLOGY, Feb 21, 2013,
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=515f3c79-439a-4276-975c-338dc9d55d20 (noting that “Where a
DIFC Courts’ judgment is to be enforced outside of Dubai in another emirate, enforcement will proceed in
accordance with the relevant civil procedure rules and procedures that apply with respect to the enforcement of Dubai
Court judgments in other emirates (e.g. Abu Dhabi, Ras Al-Khaimah, etc.”).
210 See supra note 33.
211 See An Interview with Mark Beer, supra note 9.
212 See supra note 78, (referring to a skeptical lawyer of the DIFC).
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situation in which this issue has arisen.213 This is because, as Beer reiterated, parties virtually
always settle214 -- a key for why they deeply value the process and why “[a]n independent
survey found that 100 per cent of all people using the courts would recommend . . . [them,] and
[that] 92 per cent were extremely satisfied.”215
This rebuttal by Beer also relates to another issue that he believes is an improper metric
by which to evaluate the DIFC courts. Some observers discussed above wonder how busy the
courts really are, and whether, given how few cases go to trial, the DIFC judiciary makes a
substantive difference in the lives of businesspeople working in the region. For Beer, this is a
spurious point, because as he remarked, judging a court by how many cases are on a docket is
similar to evaluating a hospital based on the number of patients that are in sickbeds or are
dying.216 If a court is doing its job, and its judgments are perceived as legitimate, efficient,
final, and enforceable, then rationale parties (many of whom will have placed the DIFC courts
as the forum to settle disputes) will do what they can to avoid litigation.217 If, however, they opt
for going to trial, the DIFC courts are there to serve them; the process will be cheaper than
arbitration;218 and given that the judgments are issued with the UAE Ruler’s imprimatur, they
will be enforced throughout the country.219
Regarding enforcement beyond the country’s borders, Beer is as strong a proponent of
the DIFC judiciary. Regionally, since the DIFC courts are on equal footing with the Dubai local
courts, there is no issue with enforcing DIFC judgments in countries that are parties to the GCC
Protocol or the Riyadh Convention, or within states with which the UAE has a bilateral
treaty.220 For other countries, the memoranda that Beer has facilitated between the DIFC
judiciary and the courts in Britain and Australia, for example, do matter and clearly signal these
judges’ respect for DIFC court judgments and vice versa.221 Beer, of course, knows that he is
not a political leader of a state and that these memoranda are not binding treaties. But judges,
judicial organizations, and even bar associations from different geographic locations routinely
enter into cooperative arrangements and memorialize them by signing MOUs. Moreover it is
not so remarkable that judges from different jurisdictions: a) see the positive work from the
DIFC courts; b) recognize that these courts have the endorsement of the UAE government; and
213 See author interview with Mark Beer, June 8, 2014. Also, remember that Dubai is the hub for commercial
activity in the UAE, so occasions where enforcement of a commercial issue would require implementation in another
emirate are not all that frequent.
214 Id.
215 See An Interview with Mark Beer, supra note 9.
216 See author interview with Mark Beer, June 8, 2014.
217 Id.
218 See correspondence from Mark Beer, August 18, 2014 (noting, based on his studying other arbitration
centers’ websites and in discussions with other arbitration lawyers, “that the claimant using the DIFC Courts typically
spends 100,000 AED or approximately $27,255 on court fees on a US$6.5m dispute, in comparison to: a) SIAC
[Singapore International Arbitration Centre] where the costs would be roughly AED 900,000 or approximately
$245,000; b). LCIA where the costs would be roughly AED 1.2 million or approximately $326,000. ([However, note
that the] LCIA charges on an hourly basis so its fees can vary dramatically based on the complexity of the dispute);
and c). the ICC where the fees would be roughly AED 1.6 million or approximately $435,000”).
219 Id.
220 Id. See also DIFC White Paper, supra note 47.
221 Id. The DIFC courts website lists all of the arrangements that have been signed between the courts and
other foreign jurisdictions. See
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c) are willing to respect and enforce judgments that emerge from the DIFC judiciary.222
Furthermore, on the point some lawyers make that arbitration judgments will be easier to
enforce abroad than court-rendered liability judgments, Beer has also been expressly informed
by experts and judges that the process for the enforcement of both types of orders is “for all
intents and purposes identical.”223
It is also important to remember that these agreements are to show the business markets
that there is great receptivity and legitimacy of the DIFC courts.224 If these courts were not held
in such high regard, and if enforcement was going to be a problem, then why would eminent
jurists from different jurisdictions even meet, let alone sign cooperative agreements that impact
their own reputations, with Beer and the judges from the DIFC? Beer’s charge is to do what is
best and just for parties engaging in commercial transactions, and he sees these memoranda as
helping to further this objective.
This attitude also explains his decision to support meetings with members of the Dubai
legal community, including arbitration lawyers, to discuss ways of “convert[ing] a DIFC Courts
judgment into an arbitral award, providing greater enforcement internationally under the
provisions of the New York Convention of 1958.”225 The choice between opting for the DIFC
judicial process or arbitration is not a zero-sum game, and by no means should these meetings
be interpreted as Beer or his staff having concerns about their mission.226 After all, the DIFC
courts regularly work with arbitration lawyers (particularly those using DIFC-LCIA arbitration),
namely when arbitral awards need to be ratified.227 Beer firmly believes that the DIFC court
process is more advantageous than arbitration, but he also fully knows that the latter is integral
to commercial legal practice in the emirate. Therefore, Beer welcomes opportunities to work
with the arbitration bar – especially since his ultimate objective remains providing the business
community with the comfort of knowing that the DIFC courts operate in a collaborative,
efficient, and commercially-friendly manner.228
IV. Implications
Although its population is just over two million, Dubai is an important case study for
practical and theoretical reasons.229 In the spring of 2014, Morgan Stanley Capital International
(MSCI), “a leading provider of investment support tools to over 6,000 clients worldwide,”230
classified the UAE as an “emerging market.”231 Perhaps more than anything, this decision

223 On June 11, 2014, Beer left the first author a voicemail message making this statement. See also id.
225 See DIFC Courts Consult, supra note 129.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Officially the population is 2, 275,815, as of August 3, 2014. Government of Dubai, Dubai Statistics
Center, http://www.dsc.gov.ae/en/pages/home.aspx.
230 See MSCI’s website, About Us, http://www.msci.com/#.
231
See Babu Das Augustine, UAE Gets Emerging Market Status, GULF NEWS.COM, May 15, 2014,
http://gulfnews.com/business/markets/uae-gets-emerging-market-status-1.1332815.
28

Krishnan & Purohit
further raised the market status of the UAE – and Dubai, in particular – and placed it in the
same conversation with other more traditional emerging markets around the globe.232 As Dubai
continues to grow as a hub for international business, its ability to offer investors and
commercial businesspeople a reliable, efficient, and fair judicial system will inevitably be
subject to enhanced scrutiny.233 By outlining the history of the DIFC judiciary, as well as how
it functions and how it is received and promoted, this study has provided an analysis for
stakeholders interested in learning about Dubai’s efforts to strengthen the rule of law on
international commercial matters.
This study will also gain the eye of court watchers and those who study judiciaries from
a more macro, theoretical perspective. Many years back, Martin Shapiro wrote his classic
treatise on courts and explained his “prototype.”234 An autonomous adjudicator, existence of
precedent, adversarial parties, and a judgment assigning a winner and loser, according to
Shapiro, define the paradigm of a court.235 Furthermore, for a judiciary to have legitimacy there
has to be a cultural milieu where it is accepted as a conflict resolver, social control mediator,
and lawmaker.236 The DIFC courts possess several, if not all, of these attributes. It is true that
there is one set of stakeholders – a contingent of international lawyers – that questions the
enforcement powers of the DIFC judiciary. But these lawyers’ attitudes are tempered by their
respect for the courts’ personnel, mission, and ambition to become the leading commercial
forum in the region. Recall also that there are international lawyers who dissent from any
skepticism of the DIFC courts, and there are other key players who strongly support this
institution as well.
One such principal player in this story is the state. The DIFC courts have the
imprimatur from the local Dubai judiciary, the Ruler of the emirate, and the President of the
UAE.237 The state established the DIFC courts, invited foreign judges, lawyers, and staff to
work within this parallel system, and has publicly and legislatively supported the institution
since day one. The state’s motivations are no secret: it seeks to promote confidence among
foreign investors that Dubai is a premier place in the region in which to conduct business, and
that a reliable and efficient legal system exists that operates in a fair and equitable manner.
Otherwise put, the DIFC judiciary – an institution based on Western common law principles – is
232 The BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) countries immediately come to mind, although the comparison
is obviously quite different, especially given the population differences. On the point of the rise in status of the UAE
after the MSCI rating, see Melvin Backman, Qatar, UAE about to Get Major Upgrade, CNN MONEY, May 29,
2014, http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/29/investing/qatar-uae-economy/. For a counter-point on quelling expectations,
see Nikhil Lohade, Expectations Mixed as MSCI Reclassifies UAE, Qatar as Emerging Markets, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL, May 15, 2014, http://blogs.wsj.com/middleeast/2014/05/15/expectations-mixed-as-msci-
reclassifies-uae-qatar-as-emerging-markets/.
233 For an important article on Dubai’s development, see Martin Hvidt, The Dubai Model: An Outline of Key
Development –Process Elements in Dubai, 41 INT. J. MIDDLE EAST. STUD. 397 (2008).
234 See MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 3-67 (1981).
235 Id.
236 Id. For others who have discussed this point in reference to Shapiro, see David D. Caron, Towards a
Political Theory of International Courts and Tribunals, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 401, 406-408; Tom Ginsburg &
Zachary Elkins, Ancillary Powers of Constitutional Courts, 87 TEXAS L. REV. 431 (2008); Joel B. Grossman,
Judicial Legitimacy and the Role of Courts: Shapiro’s Courts, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION RESEARCH
JOURNAL 9.1 (1984) 214-222; Herbert M. Kritzer, Martin Shapiro: Anticipating the New Institutionalism, in THE
PIONEERS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (ed., Nancy Maveety, 2003).
237 The President of the UAE here is mentioned because he issued the law that created the DIFC courts.
29

Krishnan & Purohit
in place to help legitimize the business environment of a country governed by an Islamic-based

monarchy.
That a foreign legal institution can be present in this type of situation is, by itself, not a
new phenomenon. There is a literature on how, for example, international arbitration forums
are operating in various countries that are non-democratic.238 As discussed above, arbitration is
a mainstay of commercial legal practice not only in Dubai but in the surrounding region as well.
In addition, over the years, various international tribunals have appeared in post-conflict
societies that are either not yet democratically governed, or are in the process of transitioning to
democratic governance.239
The DIFC courts, however, are qualitatively distinct from these instances, and for that
reason its contribution to the discourse is noteworthy. In this case, the state has affirmatively
opted to import a foreign court model into its political space, allowing it to adjudicate on
international commercial law matters alongside its regular judiciary. In the modern era of
globalization, this decision appears to be sui generis – but it is perhaps because of globalization
that such a decision has even occurred.240
Moreover, there are multiple queries that emerge from this research, including whether
other states might incorporate the DIFC courts model;241 whether the DIFC courts’ jurisdiction
might expand beyond commodification cases to other substantive justice matters; and whether
the DIFC court process might eventually supplant arbitration as the preferred means of dispute
resolution.
Perhaps the most intriguing issue relates to the independence upon which the DIFC
judiciary prides itself. Its autonomy is regularly touted by the state, and interested civil society
stakeholders see it as legitimate and independent as well. But what might happen if the DIFC
courts are ever perceived as issuing judgments that contravene the interests of the political
238 See, e.g., Charles N. Brower and Jeremy K. Sharpe, International Arbitration and the Islamic World: The
Third Phase. 97 AM. J. INT’L. L. 643 (2003); Massoud, supra note 10; Tani, supra note 10; Dezalay and Garth,
supra note 10; Schedler, supra note 10; S.R. Luttrell, Choosing Dubai: A Comparative Study of Arbitration under the
UAE Federal Code of Civil Procedure and the Arbitration Law of the DIFC, 9 BUS. L. INT’L. 254 (2008).
239 See, e.g., Caron, supra note 236; TIMOTHY WILLIAM WATERS, THE MILOSEVIC TRIAL: AN
AUTOPSY (2014); Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an International Judicial System, 56 STANFORD L. REV. 429
(2003); Lawrence R. Helfer and Anne Marie Slaughter, Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication,
107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997-98); Eric Posner and John Yoo, Judicial Independence and International Tribunals, 93
CAL. L. REV. 1 (2005).
240 The authors make this statement with some caution. Some may point out, for example, that Hong Kong has
a parallel judicial system (with the Chinese Communist Party present in the background), and that its handling of
commercial matters is often seen as the best in Asia. See Hong Kong Has Best Judicial System in Asia: Business
Survey, ECONOMIC TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-09-
14/news/28452070_1_political-interference-ipr-protection-indonesia-and-vietnam. But there are distinctions between
the Hong Kong case and the DIFC courts. Hong Kong, of course, inherited its British form of governance and law
from its colonizer, and thus there was no affirmative importation as in the Dubai case. In addition, Hong Kong has
not created a special, separate tier of commercial courts, as Dubai has, with its DIFC judiciary.
241 For example, further research might be conducted on the Qatar International Financial Centre Courts,
which came into existence in 2009 (see http://qicdrc.com.qa/). There may also be inquiries made on the proposed
new commercial common law courts in Abu Dhabi (see British Lawyers, supra note 9), and the new commercial
court in Singapore (see Lawrence Teh and Janice Ngeow, Singapore Sets Up International Commercial Court,
LEXOLOGY, March 31, 2014, http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=163e92b1-2d07-4420-b7f5-
de67cd63d45b).
30

Krishnan & Purohit
decision-makers?242 After all, the courts are a creation of the state, judgments are issued in the
name of the Ruler, and judicial personnel serve at His pleasure. It may be that the DIFC
judiciary possesses enough social and political capital to operate autonomously in perpetuity –
to date this seems to be the case. Yet times and circumstances can change, and if they do, then
how both the DIFC courts and overarching state apparatus respond will be of great interest to
those within and beyond the UAE.
242 On this point, a future project may wish to examine the Dubai World Tribunal (DWT), which sits,
coincidentally in the DIFC courts’ complex. The DWT is an institution that was created “to handle various matters
pertaining to the settlement of the financial position of Dubai World [which is a global, state-based, multi-billion
dollar investment company) and its subsidiaries.” (See http://dubaiworldtribunal.ae/about-the-tribunal/). According
to Mark Beer, the DWT has indeed issued judgments against the government. See correspondence from Mark Beer,
August 18, 2014. For scholarship on this general point made in the text, see generally TAMIR MOUSTAFA, THE
STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: LAW, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN
EGYPT (2007); TOM GINSBURG AND TAMIR MOUSTAFA, RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS
IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (2008); LISA HILBINK, JUDGES BEYOND POLITICS IN DEMOCRACY
AND DICTATORSHIP: LESSONS FROM CHILIE (2007).
31

Krishnan & Purohit
Appendix A (* = firms registered at the DIFC)243
Firm: From Established
Addleshaw Goddard LLP* UK 2012

Allen & Overy LLP* UK 2006
Amereller Rechtsanwälte Germany 2005
Arendt & Medernach* Luxembourg 2008
Ashurst LLP UK 2007
Baker Botts LLP US 2005
Baker & McKenzie Habib Al Mulla* US/Dubai 2014
Bennett Jones LLP* Canada 2010
Bird & Bird UK 2013
Bonnard Lawson Switzerland 2014
Bracewell & Giuliani US 2007
Brandford-Griffith Associes* France 2007
Brandi Partners Sao Paulo 2013
Chadbourne & Parke US 2007244
Clifford Chance LLP* UK 1975245
Clyde & Co UK 2009
CMS Cameron McKenna LLP UK 2012
Conyers Dill & Pearman* Bermuda 2006
Cotty Vivant Marchisio & Lauzeral* France 2010
Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle LLP* US 2008
Davidson & Co246 Switzerland/UAE 2008
Dechert LLP* US 2012
Dentons US/UK 1969
243 The authors compiled the list of firms using the following databases: DIFC Client Directory
(http://www.difc.ae/browse-directory); indexUAE
(http://www.indexuae.com/Top/Business_and_Economy/Services/Law_Firms/1); Martindale-Hubbell
(http://www.martindale.com/all/c-united-arab-emirates/all-law-firms-1.htm?c=N); The International Law Office
Directory (http://www.internationallawoffice.com/directory/); Linked In (www.linkedin.com); and The Legal 500
(http://www.legal500.com/c/united-arab-emirates/directory). The authors also received the names of some of the
firms from those who know the Dubai market, and then these firms were contacted to verify their presence and years
they were founded. Though Diane Hamade, supra note 41, has suggested that there are closer to 100 international
law firms operating in Dubai, the authors were only able to definitively locate seventy-three firms. The authors found
that there were a number of firms listed only in Abu Dhabi, or in other Emirates outside of Dubai, meaning that the
number of total firms in the UAE may be closer to 100. There are also a few firms that have started in Dubai, but now
have office outside of the UAE. Furthermore, a few firms that were registered at the DIFC in the years immediately
preceding the global financial crisis in 2008 closed their offices in the years immediately following the crisis. In 2012
and 2013, however, there seems to have been a slight uptick in major international firms establishing offices in
Dubai. The authors emailed The Government of Dubai Legal Affairs Department, but did not receive a confirmation
of the number of international firms currently practicing in its Emirate.
244 Chadbourne & Park resumed practice to Dubai in 2007 after a fourteen-year absence, having closed their
initial office in the Emirate in 1993. See http://www.chadbourne.com/newsevents/NewsDetail.aspx?news=490.
245 Clifford & Chance established their first office in the UAE in 1975.
246 This firm sees its Europe and UAE office as co-equals and does not designate one as a home office over the
other. See http://www.davidson-legal.com/.
32

Krishnan & Purohit
Dewey & LeBoeuf*247 US 2008

DLA Piper LLP US 2006
Dumon & Partners248 France/UAE 2012
D Young & Co. UK 2013
Eversheds UK 2011
Everys Solicitors UK 2006
Fragomen Del Rey Bernsen & Loewy LLP US 2008
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP* UK 2004
Gagrats India N/A
Gateley UK 2008
Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP* US 2007
Herbert Smith LLP* UK 2007
Hogan Lovells LLP* US/UK 2007
Holman Fenwick Willan LLP UK 2006
Hourani & Associates249 Saudi/UAE 1978
Ince & Co. UK 2006
Jones Day* US 2009
Kennedys UK 2006
King & Spalding* US 2006
King & Wood Mallesons SJ Berwin Hong Kong/UK250 2009
K&L Gates LLP* US 2009
Latham & Watkins LLP* US 2008
Lawrence Graham LLP* [Wragge & Co.]251 UK 2007
Linklaters LLP* UK 2007
Lecocq Associates252 Switzerland 2013
Loyens & Loeff* Netherlands 2007
Mandviwalla & Zafar* Pakistan 2007
Maples and Calder* UK 2005
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius253 US 2013
Nabarro LLP* UK 2014
Norton Rose Fulbright LLP*254 UK/US 2003
247 This firm is no longer solvent and is in bankruptcy proceedings. Furthermore, leaders within the firm have
been charged with financial crimes and its website is no longer operable either. The DIFC has not updated its site
and thus continues to list it.
248 This firm was known as Dumon & Arago, but it no longer exists in Dubai because its founder, Bertrand
Dumon, opened an eponymous firm (Dumon & Partners) that now operates in Dubai (and Lausanne and Paris). It is
difficult to ascertain whether the new firm considers itself as having been established in Dubai, or in France, as it
refers to itself as an “independent law firm.”
249 This firm sees its Saudi and UAE offices as co-equal. See: http://www.houraniassociates.com/home.html.
250 This firm was a merger between King & Wood Mallesons & SJ Berwin in 2013 and sees its strength as
having hubs in the UK and Hong Kong.
251 Note, this firm has changed its formal name to Wragge & Company, but the change is not yet reflected on
the DIFC website.
252 This firm has law offices in Europe but it is a business consultancy in Dubai, and does not dispense legal
advice.
253 In their Dubai practice, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius operate in association with Mohammed Buhashem
Advocates & Legal Consultants.
33

Krishnan & Purohit
Pinsent Masons UK 2008

Reed Smith LLP* US 2006
Rouse UK 1997
Saba & Co. Lebanon 1972
Simmons & Simmons* UK 2007255
Squires Patton Boggs*256 US 2013
Stephenson Harwood* UK 2012
Stibbe*257 Netherlands 2009
Taylor Wessing LLP* UK 2007
Tribonian Law Advisors Lebanon 2011
Trowers & Hamlins UK 1991
Vinson & Elkins LLP* US 2003
Walkers LLP* Cayman Isles 2005
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP* US 2009
White & Case US 2013
Zaid Ibrahim & Co.*258 Malaysia 2008
254 This firm is a merger between the Norton Rose, which was based in the U.K. and Fulbright & Jaworski,
which was based in the U.S.
255 Though Simmons & Simmons has been operating in the Middle East for over three decades, their first
Dubai office was established in 2005. In 2007, they shifted to the DIFC complex.
256 The firms Squires Sanders & Dempsey merged with Patton Boggs in 2014. The DIFC lists the firm as
Patton Boggs, but that is likely because it has not been updated.
257 D.W. Stibbe founded this firm in the Netherlands in 1911. However, it adheres to a model whereby it
shares its headquarters with its offices in Belgium and Luxembourg. See http://www.stibbe.com.
258 It is unclear what the status of this firm is. The firm’s website is no longer operable and according to THE
LEGAL 500 it does not have an office in Dubai, see http://www.legal500.com/firms/33468-zaid-ibrahim-co/30150-
kuala-lumpur#. Moreover, the firm is part of the ZICO Law Network, an organization with legal offices connected to
it. On the ZICO Law website, there is no listing for Dubai.
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Legal Studies Research Paper Series

A Common Law Court in an Uncommon Environment:

Jayanth K. Krishnan & Priya Purohit

Research Paper Number 300

AM. REV. INT’L ARB., forthcoming (2015)

This paper can be downloaded without charge from the

A Common Law Court in an Uncommon Environment:

This article analyzes a fascinating development – the emergence of English-speaking, American

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I. The Background and Context of the DIFC

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B. Structure, Purpose, and Workload

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25 Id. at all cites.

28 For a list of the five members, see

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Table 1: Court of First Instance Cases34

34 Data from the DIFC courts website https://difccourts.visionhall.eu/?Start=search#:7.

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II. Evaluation of the DIFC Courts by a Contingent of the International Bar

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B. Enforcement within Dubai47

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59 See cites at supra note 56. Cite interview data.

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C. Enforcement Outside Dubai but Inside the UAE

A second concern by international lawyers relates to enforcing DIFC court judgments in

67 Id. See also cites at supra note 56.

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D. Seeking Enforcement Beyond the UAE

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aggressive approach to their jobs as adjudicators – a troublesome possibility for vested

95 Id. at all cites.

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E. Alternatives to the DIFC Courts: Views on International Arbitration, the DIAC,

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The above discussion provides an overview of the sentiments that a contingent of

III. In Support of the DIFC Courts

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Average Waiting Time for the First Hearing

151 See Commercial Court, supra note 147, at 4.

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2. In-House Counsels and Supportive Foreign Lawyers

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166 See, e.g., author interview with respondent, June 5, 2014.

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202 See http://difccourts.complinet.com/net_file_store/new_rulebooks/d/i/DIFCC_protocol_dubaicourts.pdf.

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222 See author interview with Mark Beer, June 8, 2014.

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in place to help legitimize the business environment of a country governed by an Islamic-based

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Appendix A (* = firms registered at the DIFC)243