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INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

Contents
I. Ex Visceribus Actus ...................................................................................................................... 2
II. Ut Res Magis Valeat Qauam Pereat......................................................................................... 2
1. Avtar Singh V State of Punjab................................................................................................... 3
2. D. Salbaba v. the Bar Council of India (2003) SC ................................................................... 3
III. Literal Interpretation ................................................................................................................. 4
1. Tej Kiran Jain v N Sanjeeva Reddy .......................................................................................... 5
2. B.N. Mutto v. T.K. Nandi (Dr), (1979) 1 SCC 361 ................................................................... 5
IV. Golden Rule of Interpretation................................................................................................... 7
1. D Sai Baba v. Bar Council of India .......................................................................................... 8
2. G. Narayanaswami v. Pannersevan, (1972) .............................................................................. 8
V. The Mischief Rule of Interpretation .......................................................................................... 10
1. Smith v. Hughes , 1960 ............................................................................................................ 12
2. R.M.D Chamarbangwala v. Union Of India, 1957 ................................................................ 12
3. S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab, (2001) .............................................................................. 14
4. Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse, 2014 .............................................................................. 16
VI. Harmonious Rule of Interpretation ....................................................................................... 18
1. K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay ......................................................................................... 18
2. Gita Hariharan v. RBI ............................................................................................................. 18
VII. Rule of Ejusdem Generis ........................................................................................................ 19
1. Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche..................................................................... 20
VIII. Noscitur Sociis ..................................................................................................................... 20
1. K. Janardhan Pillai And Anr. V. Union Of India Air 1981 ..................................................... 21
IX. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius .................................................................................. 22
X. Generalia Specialibus non Derogant .......................................................................................... 23
1. Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I ............................................................................................................ 23
XI. Reddendo Singula Singulis ..................................................................................................... 24
XII. Presumptions in Statutory Interpretation .............................................................................. 24
XIII. INTERNAL AIDS .............................................................................................................. 26
XIV. EXTERNAL AID ................................................................................................................ 29

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I. Ex Visceribus Actus (The statute must be Read as a Whole)

1. Every part of the statute must be construed within the four corners of the Act. No
provision should be interpreted in isolation.
2. The elementary rule states that the intention of the Legislature must be found by reading
the statute as a whole.
3. To ascertain the meaning of a clause in a statute, the court must look at the whole statute,
at what precedes and at what succeeds, and not merely at the clause itself.
4. Every clause needs to be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the
Act, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to
the subject matter.

II. Ut Res Magis Valeat Qauam Pereat- (It may rather become
operative than null)
The maxim ‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’ means that it is better for a thing to have an effect
than for it to become void. The meaning of this maxim is that a provision should not be
construed in such a manner so as to reduce any other provision or statute to futility. In other
words, the language of the provision must be so interpreted that the law does not become a
dead letter.
To explain it further, whenever the words used in a provision are uncertain and imprecise and
are capable of bearing more than one meaning, thereby leading to ambiguity in the language
and possibility of alternative construction, then such a construction should be preferred by
which none of the provisions is turned inoperative.
The spirit behind this principle is that the courts are not encouraged to scratch a law for sheer
vagueness.
Basis of ut res magis valeat quam pereat
The maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat is based on the following principles and
presumptions:
• A statute should not be declared void for sheer vagueness.
• When the courts embark on interpreting a provision, the first and foremost necessity is
that the law survives.
• While pronouncing upon the constitutionality of a statute, the courts must start with the
presumption in favor of its constitutionality.
• The true interpretation of a provision or a statute is one that is in accordance with the
intention of the legislature. The intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise than to
give effect to all the provisions of the statute for achieving the object for which the law
was enacted.
• Adopting an interpretation by which any provision is rendered inoperative or
unworkable will be adverse to the legislative intent.
• The courts are to interpret the law, and the making and repealing of legislation is the
exclusive domain of the legislature. In such circumstances, any interpretation by which

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any provision or statute turns futile amounts to a rejection of law that is not within the
jurisdiction of courts.
• Courts can strike down a law on the ground of unconstitutionality but the courts cannot
introduce any vagueness or unconstitutionality in a provision by adopting a peculiar
construction or construing a provision in a particular manner.
Applications-
1. Avtar Singh V State of Punjab
Facts- In this case, the question arose regarding the interpretation of Section 39 of the
Electricity Act, 1910. The appellant was convicted for theft of electricity from the Punjab State
Electricity Board under Section 39 of the Electricity Act and the respondent proceeded against
him under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. In the appeal filed by the appellant, he
did not challenge the finding that he had committed the theft but only raised a question of law
that his conviction was illegal in view of certain statutory provisions.
Section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 provided that, “Whoever dishonestly abstracts,
consumes or uses any energy shall be deemed to have committed theft within the meaning of
the Indian Penal Code”. Hence, as per Section 39, an accused found guilty shall be punished
under Section 379 of the I.P.C.
Section 50 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 provided for the procedure for conviction in the
following terms: No prosecution shall be instituted against any person for any offence against
the Act…. except at the instance of the Government or an Electrical Inspector, or of a person
aggrieved by the same.
The appellant contended that he could not be convicted under Section 39 as the procedure for
conviction as required by Section 50 was not followed. According to the appellant, his
prosecution was bad and incompetent as it was not at the instance of the Government or an
Electrical Inspector or a person aggrieved by the theft.
Held- The Supreme Court held that since the offence is against the Electricity Act and not the
I.P.C., the procedure provided under Section 50 must have been followed. The conviction of
the appellant was set aside.
Thus, the Court, in this case, applied the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat and avoided
the construction that would have rendered Section 50 inoperative and futile.

2. D. Salbaba v. the Bar Council of India (2003) SC

The question of interpretation of Section 48AA of the Advocates Act 1961 came before the
Supreme Court in this case. The petitioner, a physically challenged advocate, was also running
an STD booth allotted to him in the handicapped person’s quota. A complaint was filed against
him alleging professional misconduct. On 20.2.2001, the Bar Council of India directed him to
surrender the booth but he failed to do so within the specified time period. The Bar Council of
India gave an order dated 31.3.2001 directing the State Bar Council to delete the advocate’s
name from the roll of advocates. The advocate subsequently surrendered the booth and filed a
review petition against the order of the Bar Council. His petition was dismissed on 26.8.2001

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on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The advocate filed an appeal before the Supreme
Court.
Section 48AA of the Advocates Act provides for the review of the decision/order of the Bar
Council of India within 60 days of the date of that order. While construing Section 48AA, the
Supreme Court held that the expression ‘sixty days from the date of that order’ must be read
so as to mean the date of communication, knowledge, actual or constructive, of the order,
sought to be reviewed. Reading word for word and assigning a literal meaning to Section 48AA
would lead to absurdity, futility and to such consequences as the Parliament could have never
intended. The provision has an ambiguity and is capable of being read in more ways than one.
We must, therefore, assign the provision a meaning __ and so read it __ as would give life to
an otherwise lifeless letter and enable the power of review conferred thereby being
meaningfully availed and effectively exercised.
While applying the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat, the Court thus interpreted Section
48AA to make it truly effective. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Bar Council of
India and the enrollment of the appellant was restored.

III. Literal Interpretation

Giving words their ordinary and natural meaning is known as literal interpretation or litera
legis. It is the duty of the court not to modify the language of the Act and if such meaning is
clear and unambiguous, effect should be given to the provisions of a statute whatever may be
the consequence. The idea behind such a principle is that the legislature, being the supreme
law-making body must know what it intends in the words of the statute. Literal interpretation
has been called the safest rule because the legislature's intention can be deduced only from the
language through which it has expressed itself.
The bare words of the Act must be construed to get the meaning of the statute and one need not
probe into the intention of the legislature. The elementary rule of construction is that the
language must be construed in its grammatical and literal sense and hence it is termed as litera
legis or litera script.
When the material words are capable of two constructions, one of which is likely to defeat or
impair the policy of the Act whilst the other construction is likely to assist the achievement of
the said policy, then the courts would prefer to adopt the latter construction.
A statute must be taken to mean what it says, and it must be remembered that, if the words of
a statute be plain and clear, it is not for the court to raise any doubt as to what they mean.
In Bihari Chowdhary v. State of Bihar (1984), it was held that, when language of the statute is
clear and unambiguous, the court must give effect to it without admitting any implication or
exception.
While interpreting legislation by applying the rules of literal interpretation, the following two
things must be considered strictly:
• Omissions of a statute need not be inferred.
• Each and every word of a statute should be interpreted and given meaning.

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Thus, it is to be noted that according to the general rule of literal interpretation, nothing can be
added to or taken away from a statute, unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference
that the legislature intended something which is omitted to be expressed.
While, interpreting the provisions of a statute, all parts of the language used in the statute shall
be considered. An interpretation which would leave, without effect, any part of the language
of a statute, will normally be rejected.

1. Tej Kiran Jain v N Sanjeeva Reddy

Facts- The appellants filed a suit against Shri Sanjiva Reddy (former Speaker of the Lok
Sabha), Shri Y. B. Chavan (Home Minister) and three members of Parliament asking for a
compensation of Rs. 26000, claiming that during the calling attention motion of the Lok Sabha,
they made Defamatory statements against Jagadguru Shankaracharya of Gover- dan Peeth,
Puri.
The motion was to discuss the behaviour of The Shankaracharya at The World Hindu Religious
conference held in Patna. He was reported to have remarked that Untouchability was in
harmony with the tenets of Hinduism and added that no law could come in its way, he was also
believed to have walked out while the National Anthem played at the event. The appellants
contended that the respondents “gave themselves up to the use of language which was more
commonplace than serious, more lax than dignified, more unparliamentary than sober and jokes
and puns were bandied around the playful spree, and His holiness Jagadguru Shankracharya
Ananta Shri Vibushit Swami Shri Niranjan Deva Teertha of Goverdhan Peeth, Puri, was made
to appear as a leperous (Sic) dog”.
Decision- The Supreme Court in its judgement elucidated that the meaning of Art. 105 as
explained in the constitution is pretty clear. It uses the word ‘anything’ which refers to
everything, further ‘in Parliament’ refers to during the sitting of the parliament when the
proceedings are in course. And in the present case, the parliament was in sitting and its business
was being transacted when the ministers made those comments. So, following Art. 105 of the
constitution, the courts have no say in the matter. In view of the clear provisions of our
Constitution we are not required to act on analogies of other legislative bodies. Hence, the
decision under the appeal was held to be correct and the appeal was dismissed.

2. B.N. Mutto v. T.K. Nandi (Dr), (1979) 1 SCC 361

Facts- The appellant, Shri B. N. Mutto, Inspector-General of Police, leased a property to the
respondent. The lease was for the use of the premises for residential and/or professional
purposes only and not for commercial purposes. Later, the landlord filed a petition for eviction
of the respondent on the grounds of misuser, sub-letting and bona fide requirement.
The first appellant, B. N. Mutto, retired as Inspector-General of Police on November 30, 1975.
While in office he was occupying premises allotted to him by the Government.
On September 9, 1975 the Government took a decision that Government servants who own
houses in the locality should vacate the Government accommodation allotted to them within 3
months from October 1, 1975. On December 9, 1975 a notice was served on the first appellant.

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A reading of Section 14A discloses that a right to recover immediate possession of premises
accrues to certain persons if the requisite conditions are satisfied. The conditions are: (1) the
landlord must be in occupation of any residential premises allotted to him by the Central
Government or any local authority; (2) such landlord is required by a general or special order
made by the Government or authority to vacate such residential accommodation or in default
to incur certain obligations on the ground that he owns in the Union territory of Delhi a
residential accommodation either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent
child. If the aforesaid conditions are satisfied a right shall accrue to such a landlord on and
from the date of such order to recover immediate possession of any premises let out by him. It
may be noted that the section does not require that the person who is in occupation of the
premises allotted by the Government should be a Government servant.
Bench View- The Court will not be justified in presuming that when the Government used the
word “person” it meant only Government servants. The rule as to construction of the statutes
is well-known and has been clearly laid down.
In the circumstances, the Court cannot help giving the plain and unambiguous meaning to the
section. It may be that the retired Government servants as well as others who are in occupation
of Government accommodation may become entitled to a special advantage. But the purpose
of the legislation being to enable the Government to get possession of accommodation provided
by them by enabling the allottees to get immediate possession of the residential accommodation
owned but let by them, the Court will not be justified in giving a meaning which the words
used will not warrant.
On the Question of Person- It is not clear as to why the right to recover immediate possession
is not confined to Government servants alone under Section 14A. It is clear that according to
Government’s policy statement the intention was only to require the Government servants to
vacate the premises allotted to them by the Government if they had their own houses in the
area. It cannot be said that it was by inadvertence that the Legislature mentioned persons instead
of Government servants and made the section applicable to persons other than Government
servants. It is stated at the Bar that Government accommodation is provided not only to
Government servants but also to Members of Parliament and other non-officials who occupy
important positions in public life. The Court will not be justified in presuming that when the
Government used the word “person” it meant only Government servants. The rule as to
construction of the statutes is well-known and has been clearly laid down.
The cardinal rule for the constructions of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed
according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves.
The Court has to determine the intention as expressed by the words used. If the words of statutes
are themselves precise and unambiguous then no more can be necessary than to expound those
words in their ordinary and natural sense.
Taking into account the object of the Act there could be no difficulty in giving the plain
meaning to the word “person” as not being confined to Government servants for it is seen that
accommodation has been provided by the Government not only to Government servants but to
others also.
On the Question of Residential Purpose- Section 14A contemplates the owning by the landlord
in the Union territory of Delhi a residential accommodation. If he owns a residential

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accommodation, he has a right to recover immediately possession of any premises let out by
him. The emphasis is on residential accommodation. If the premises are one intended for
residential accommodation it will not make any difference if the premises are let for residential
as well as other purposes. Even though the residential accommodation is let for professional or
commercial purposes the premises will not cease to be for residential accommodation. The
requirement in Section 14(l)(e) that in order to enable the landlord to recover possession the
premises ought to have been let for residential purposes is not there in Section 14A(1). Leave
to defend maybe granted when the landlord is not a person in occupation of residential premises
allotted to him by the CG and there is no order to vacate said premises.
In this view we agree with the High Court that it is not necessary in a petition for eviction under
Section 14A to satisfy that it was let for residential purposes only.

Limitations of Literal Interpretations: The general rule of interpretation of any statute with
the help of literal interpretation is that the interpretation cannot go beyond a certain limit. The
following are the limits in respect of the literal interpretation:
a) As a general rule the meanings provided for certain terms under the General Clauses
Act, 1897 have to be accepted unless a contrary intention is specified in the statute.
When a statute has provided special meanings to certain terms, the meaning provided
by the statute shall be taken into consideration for interpretation.
b) The words of legal import will be understood in their legal sense. Technical words are
to be given their ordinary technical meaning if there is nothing specified in the statute
itself.
c) Sometimes, the meanings of certain words undergo a change in the course of time.
While interpreting a statute, the words of the statute should be interpreted with a
meaning similar to that which the framers intended for at the time of legislation.
d) The last limitation is that words acquire significance from their context. The courts have
to endeavour to find out in which sense the words have been used in particular context.

IV. Golden Rule of Interpretation

Golden rule permits the plain meaning to be departed from if s strict adherence to it would
result in an absurdity.

It is a rule in the construction of statutes, that, in the first instance, the grammatical sense of
the words is to be adhered to. If that is contrary to or inconsistent with any expressed intention,
or declared purpose of the statute, or if it would involve any absurdity, repugnance, or
inconsistency, the grammatical sense must then be modified, extended, or abridged so far as to
avoid such inconvenience, but not further.
This rule is departure from the literal rule of interpretation.
Thus, where a literal interpretation of the statute would lead to such absurdity and
unreasonableness as to make itself evident, that, the legislature could not have meant what is
actually said.

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❖ Lee v. Knapp, 1967

Provision
Under Sec.77(1) of Road Transport Act, 1960 a driver causing an accident shall stop after the
accident.
Facts
In this case, the driver stopped for a moment after causing an accident and then moved away.
Applying the golden rule, the court held that requirement of the section had not been. followed
by the driver as he had not stopped for a reasonable period requiring interested persons to make
necessary inquiries from him about the accident.
❖ Adler v. George, 1964
Provision
You cannot obstruct a member of HM forces engaged in security duty in the vicinity of a
prohibited place.
Facts:
Adler gained access to a RAF station (a prohibited place within the meaning of the Official
Secrets Act 1920) and was actually within its boundaries. He obstructed a member of Her
Majesty's forces engaged in security duty in relation to the station.
Literal rule: would mean that Adler is not guilty because in the VICINITY of a prohibited
place' suggests NOT ON the premises but nearby.
Held:
The courts felt that this was not the Parliament's intention, and therefore the literal rule led to
an absurd literal meaning. Therefore, the GOLDEN rule was applied whereby it was held that
the defendant was guilty of the offense because "in the vicinity of" should be interpreted to
mean ON OR NEAR the prohibited place

1. D Sai Baba v. Bar Council of India (Discussed above)

2. G. Narayanaswami v. Pannersevan, (1972)
Facts
The appellant's election, held on April 11, 1970, to the Madras Legislative Council from the
Madras District Graduates' Constituency was set aside by a learned Judge of the Madras High
Court.
Grounds in HC
• The Appellant Narayana-swami, who had only passed the High School Leaving
Examination and was not a Graduate, could not be elected at all to the Legislative Council
from the Graduates' Constituency.

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• Secondly, it would be absurd and destructive of the very concept of representation of

especially qualified persons that an individual who does not possess the essential or basic
qualification of the electors should be a representative of those who is to be represented
because of this special qualification of theirs.
• “171 (1) The total number of members in the Legislative Council of a State having such a
Council shall not exceed one-third of the total number of members in the Legislative
Assembly of that State: Provided that the total number of members in the Legislative
Council of a State shall in no case be less than forty.
• (2) Until Parliament by law otherwise provides, the composition of the Legislative Council
of a State shall be as provided in clause (3).
• Of the total number of members of the Legislative Council of a State- (a) as nearly as may
be, one-third shall be elected by electorates consisting of members of municipalities,
district boards, and such other local authorities in the State as Parliament may by law
specify;
• as nearly as may be, one-twelfth shall be elected by electorates consisting of persons
residing in the State who have been for at least three years graduates of any university in
the territory of India or have been for at 'least three years in possession of qualifications
prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament as equivalent to that of a graduate of
any such university; (c) as nearly as may be, one-twelfth shall be elected by electorates
consisting of persons who have been for at least three years engaged in teaching in such
educational institutions within the State, not lower in standard than that of a secondary
school, as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament;
• as nearly as may be, one-third shall be elected by the members of the Legislative Assembly
of the State from amongst persons who are not members of the Assembly; (e) the remainder
shall be nominated by the Governor in accordance with the provisions of clause (5).
• The term "electorate,” used in Article 171(3), (a), (b), and (c), has neither been defined by
the Constitution nor in any enactment by Parliament. Section 2(1) (a) of the Representation
of People Act 43 of 1951, however, says:
“Elector,” in relation to a constituency, means a person whose name is entered in the
electoral roll of that constituency for the time being in force and who is not subject to any
of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 16 of the Representation of the People Act,
1950.”
• Section 16 of the Representation of People Act, 43 of 1951, lays down the qualifications of
an elector negatively by prescribing who shall be disqualified for registration in an electoral
roll. A disqualified person is one who:
(a) is not a citizen of India; or
(b) is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; or
(c) is for the time being disqualified from voting under the provisions of any law relating
to corrupt practices and other offences in connection with elections.

Whether the representative of the graduates should also be a graduate to stand in the
elections?
o The plain and ordinary meaning of the term "electorate" is confined to the body of
persons who elect.
o It does not contain, within its ambit, the extended notion of a body of persons electing
representatives "from amongst themselves".

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o Thus, the use of the term "electorate", in Article 171(3) of our Constitution, could not,
by itself, impose a limit upon the field of choice of members of the electorate by
requiring that the person to be chosen must also be a member of the electorate.

Held:-
We think that the language as well as the legislative history of Articles 171 and 173 of the
Constitution and Section 6 of the Representation of People Act, 1951, enable us to presume
a deliberate omission of the qualification that the representative of the Graduates should
also be a graduate.

In our opinion, no absurdity results if we presume such an intention. We cannot infer as the
learned Judge of the Madras High Court had done, from the mere fact of such an omission
and opinions underlying Article 171 of our Constitution, that the omission was either
unintentional or that it led to absurd results.

By adding a condition to be necessary or implied qualifications of a representative of the

Graduates which the Judge had really invaded the legislative sphere. The defect, if any, in
the law could be removed only by law made by Parliament.
We conclude that the appellant possesses all the qualifications laid down for such a
candidate. Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the Judgment of Madras High Court.

V. The Mischief Rule of Interpretation

When the meaning of the words in a statute is not plain and clear. In such cases, according
to this rule, the Judges are allowed to enter into the question of policy while interpreting
statutes. The origin of the rule lies in the Heydon’s Case.
According to it, judges have to go deep to see the intention of the legislature and object of
the statue to find out what is the mischief sought to be remedied by the legislature.

The mischief rule is a certain rule that judges can apply in statutory interpretation in order
to discover Parliament's intention. It essentially asks the question: By creating an Act of
Parliament what was the "mischief" that the previous law did not cover?

Consequent to this enunciation, the Mischief Rule is considered to contain the following
four parts:

i. What was the common law before the making of the Act;
ii. what was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide;
iii. what remedy has the parliament resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the
commonwealth;
iv. the true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges is always to make
such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy.

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Use of this Rule-

This rule of construction is of narrower application than the golden rule or the plain meaning
rule.
Legislative intent is determined by examining secondary sources, such as committee reports,
treatises, law review articles and corresponding statutes. This rule has often been used to
resolve ambiguities in cases in which the literal rule cannot be applied.
CIT vs. Sundaradevi (1957), it was held by the Apex Court that unless there is an ambiguity,
it would not be open to the Court to depart from the normal rule of construction which is that
the intention of the legislature should be primarily to gather from the words which are used. It
is only when the words used are ambiguous that they would stand to be examined and
considered on surrounding circumstances and constitutionally proposed practices.
Note- In Sri Ram Saha v State of West Bengal, it was held that a purposive interpretation may
permit a reding of the provision consistent with the purpose and object of the Act but the courts
cannot legislate and enact the provision either creating or taking away substantial rights by
stretching or straining a piece of legislation.
Application of the Mischief Rule:-
(1) This rule must be applied to find the real nature of the provision and intention of the
legislature.
(2) This rule is applicable when the language is capable of more than one meaning.
(3) It can be applied to promote the object of the statute and also prevent possible abuse of
power, when the statute contains more drastic provisions.
(4) The courts can use this rule in the context of changing social needs and values and fill the
lacuna in the legislation, to remove the mischief and particularly, the social mischief.
(5) This rule can be used when the earlier law on the subject is not sufficient to suppress the
mischief, by making a new statute or incorporating a new provision in the existing statute.
It is to be noted that when two interpretations are possible, the court must prefer the
interpretation which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislative intent.

Advantages -
1) The Law Commission sees it as a far more satisfactory way of interpreting acts as opposed
to the Golden or Literal rules.
2) It usually avoids unjust or absurd results in sentencing.
Disadvantages -
1) It is considered to be out of date as it has been in use since the 16th century, when common
law was the primary source of law and parliamentary supremacy was not established.
2) It gives too much power to the unelected judiciary which is argued to be undemocratic.

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3) In the 16th century, the judiciary would often draft acts on behalf of the king and were
therefore well qualified in what mischief the act was meant to remedy.
4) It can make the law uncertain.

1. Smith v. Hughes , 1960

Facts- The defendants were prostitutes who had been charged under the Street Offences Act
1959 which made it an offence to solicit in a public place. The prostitutes were soliciting from
private premises in windows or on balconies so could be seen by the public.

Held- She was guilty of the offence of soliciting ‘in a street or public place’ contrary to section
1(1) of the 1959 Act. Applying the mischief rule, it could be seen that her solicitations took
place in a ‘street or public place’ for the purposes of the Act.
View- ‘Observe that it does not say there specifically that the person who is doing the soliciting
must be in the street. Equally it does not say that it is enough if the person who receives the
solicitation or to whom it is addressed is in the street. For my part, I approach the matter by
considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act. Everybody knows that this was an Act
intended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the streets without being
molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in that way, it can matter little whether
the prostitute is soliciting while in the street or is standing in a doorway or on a balcony, or at
a window, or whether the window is shut or open or half open; in each case her solicitation is
projected to and addressed to somebody walking in the street. For my part, I am content to base
my decision on that ground and that ground alone. I think that the magistrate came to a correct
conclusion in each case, and that these appeals should be dismissed.

2. R.M.D Chamarbangwala v. Union Of India, 1957

Facts- The petitioners, who were promoting 'and conducting prize competitions in the different
States of India, challenged the constitutionality Of ss. 4 and 5 Of the Prize Competitions Act
(42 of 955) and rr. xi and 12 framed under S. 20 Of the Act. Their contention was that 'prize
competition' as defined in S. 2(d) of the Act included not merely competitions that were of a
gambling nature but also those in which success depended to a substantial degree on skill and
the sections and the rules violated their fundamental right to carry on business, and were
unsupportable under Art. 19(6) of the Constitution, that they constituted a single inseverable
enactment and, consequently, must fail entirely. On behalf of the Union of India this was
controverted and it was contended that the definition, properly construed, meant and included
only such competitions as were of a gambling nature, and even if that was not so, the impugned
provisions, being severable in their application, were valid as regards gambling competitions.
Held- The validity of the restrictions imposed by SS. 4 and 5 and rr. ii and 12 of the Act as
regards gambling competitions was no longer open to challenge under Art. 19(6) of the
Constitution in view of the, decision of this Court that gambling did not fall within the
purview of Art.19(i) (g) of the Constitution.

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View- On a proper construction there could be no doubt that the Prize Competitions Act (42
Of 1955), in defining the word 'prize competition' as it did in S. 2(d), had in view only such
competitions as were of a gambling nature and no others.
In interpreting an enactment the Court should ascertain the intention of the legislature not
merely from a literal meaning of the words used but also from such matters as the history of
the legislation, its purpose and the mischief it seeks to suppress.
In determining the legislative intent on the question of separability, it will be legitimate to
take into account the history of the legislation, its object, the title and the preamble to it.
And if we are now to ask ourselves the question, would Parliament have enacted the law in
question if it had known that it would fail as regards competitions involving skill, there can be
no doubt, having regard to the history of the legislation, as to what our answer would be. Nor
does the restriction of the impugned provisions to competitions of a gambling character affect
either the texture or the colour of the Act; nor do the provisions require to be touched and re-
written before they could be applied to them. They will squarely apply to them on their own
terms and in their true spirit, and form a code complete in themselves with reference to the
subject. The conclusion is therefore inescapable that the impugned provisions, assuming that
they apply by virtue -of the definition in s. 2(d) to all kinds of competitions, are severable in
their application to competitions in which success does not depend to any substantial extent on
skill. In the result, both the contentions must be found against the petitioners, and these
petitions must be dismissed with costs.

In Reema Aggarwal v Anupam (2004), the Supreme Court applied the suppression of mischief
rule to hold that the obvious objective of dowry prohibition law was to prevent harassment of
a woman who enters into a marital relationship and later on becomes victim of his greed for
money. The accused cannot be allowed to take shelter behind a smoke screen to contend that
since there was no valid marriage, the question of dowry does not arise. Instead in the face of
the object of the Act it would be appropriate to construe the expression 'husband' to cover a
person who enters into marital relationship and under the colour of such proclaimed or feigned
status of husband, subjects the woman concerned to cruelty or coerces her in any manner or for
any of the purposes enumerated in Sections 304B/498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860,
whatever be the legitimacy of the marriage.
In CIT v Sodra Devi (1957), the court observed that the legislature was guilty of using an
ambiguous term. There is no knowing with certainly as to whether the legislature meant to
enact these provisions with reference only to a male of the species using the words 'any
individual' or ‘such individual’ in the narrower sense of the term indicated above or intended
to include within the connotation of the words 'any individual' or 'such individual' also a female
of the species. Holding the words 'any individual' and 'such individual' as restricted in their
connotation to mean only the male of the species, the court observed that the evil which was
sought to be remedied was the one resulting from the widespread practice of husbands entering
into nominal partnerships with their wives, and fathers admitting their minor children to the
benefits of the partnerships of which they were members. The Income-tax Act sought to remedy
this evil. The only intention of the legislature in doing so was to include the income derived by

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the wife or a minor child, in the computation of the total income of the male assessee, the
husband or the father as the case may be for the purpose of the assessment.

3. S.R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab, (2001)

Facts- Respondent was appointed as minister in the state of Punjab on the advice of Chief
Minister. At the time of his appointment as a Minister, he was not member of the Legislative
Assembly in Punjab. He failed to get himself elected as a member of the Legislature of the
State of Punjab within a period of six months and submitted his resignation from the Council
of Ministers. During the term of the same Legislative Assembly, there was a change in the
leadership of the ruling party. A new chief Minister was appointed and again Respondent was
appointed as Minister on the CM advice. Respondent, who had not been elected as a Minister.
The appellant filed a petition seeking writ of quo warranto against Respondent. It was stated in
the petition that appointment of Respondent for a second time during the term of the same
Legislature, without being elected as a member of the Legislature was violative of
constitutional provisions and, therefore, bad. The Division Bench of the High Court vide order
dated 03-12-1996 dismissed the writ petition in limine. This appeal by special leave calls in
question the order and judgment of the High Court dismissing the writ petition in limine.
Law- “164. Other provisions as to Ministers. –
(1) The Chief Minister shall be appointed by the Governor and the other Ministers shall be
appointed by the Governor of the advice of the Chief Minister, and the Ministers shall hold
office during the pleasure of the Governor: Provided that in the State of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh
and Orissa, there shall be a Minister in charge of tribal welfare who may in addition be in
charge of the welfare of the Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes or any other work.
(2) The Council of Minister shall be collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly of
the State.
(4) A Minister who for any period of six consecutive months is not a member of the Legislature
of the State shall at the expiration of that period cease to be a Minister.
Under Article 164(1), the Governor shall appoint the Chief Minister exercising his own
discretion, according to established practice and conventions. All other Minister are to be
appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister. In view of the provisions of
Article 164(2) the Council of minister shall all be collectively responsible to the Legislative
Assembly of the State. This provisions, in a sense, indicates that members of the Council of
Ministers are collectively responsible. This, however, is subject to an exception provided by
Article 164(4) to meet an extraordinary situation, where the Chief Minister considers the
inclusion of a particular person, who is not a member of the Legislature, in the Council of
Ministers necessary. To take care of such a situation, Article 164(4) provides that if a non-
member is appointed a Minister, he would cease to be a Minister unless in a short period of six
consecutive months from the date of his appointment he gets elected to the Legislature.
View- Reappointment of such a person, who fails to get elected as a member within the period
of grace of six consecutive months, would not only disrupt the sequence and scheme of Article
164 but would also defeat and subvert the basic principle of representative and responsible
government. Framers of the Constitution by prescribing the time-limit of “six consecutive

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months” during which a non-legislator Minister must get elected to the Legislature clearly
intended that a non-legislator cannot be permitted to remain a Minister for any period beyond
six consecutive months, without getting elected in the meanwhile. Resignation by the
individual concerned before the expiry of the period of six consecutive months, not followed
by his election to the Legislature, would not permit him to be appointed a Minister once again
without getting elected to the Legislature during the term of the Legislative Assembly. The
“privilege” of continuing as a Minister for “six month” without being an elected member is
only a one-time slot for the individual concerned during the term of the Legislative Assembly
concerned. It exhausts itself if the individual is unable to get himself elected within the period
of grace of “six consecutive months”. The privilege is personal for the individual concerned. It
is he who must cease to be a Minister, if he does not get elected during the period of six months.
The “privilege” is not of the Chief Minister on whose advice the individual is appointed.
Therefore, it is not permissible for different Chief Minister, to appoint the same individual as
a Minister, without him getting elected, during the term of the same Assembly. The individual
must cease to be a Minister, if during a period of six consecutive months, starting with his
initial appointment, he is not elected to the Assembly. The change of a Chief Minister, during
the term of the same Assembly would, therefore, be of 145 no consequence so far as the
individual is concerned. To permit the individual to be reappointed during the term of the same
Legislative Assembly, without getting elected during the period of six consecutive months,
would be subversion of parliamentary democracy. Since Article 164(4) provides a restriction
for a non-legislator Minister to continue in office beyond a period of six consecutive months,
without being elected, it clearly demonstrates that the individual concerned appointed as a
Minister under Article 164(1) without being a member of the Legislature must cease to be a
Minister unless elected within six consecutive months. Reappointing that individual without
his getting elected, would, therefore, be an abuse of constitutional provisions and subversive
of constitutional guarantees. Every Minister must draw his authority, directly or indirectly,
from the political sovereign – the electorate.
The intention of the framers of the Constitution to restrict such appointment for a short period
of six consecutive months, cannot be permitted to be frustrated through manipulation of
“reappointment”.
India is a democratic republic. Its chosen system of political organization is reflected in the
Preamble to the Constitution, which indicates the source from which the Constitution comes
viz. “WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA”. By permitting a non-legislator Minister to be
reappointed, without getting elected within the period prescribed by Article 164(4), would
amount to ignoring the electorate in having its say as to who should represent it - a position
which is wholly unacceptable. The seductive temptations to cling to office regardless of
Constitutional restraint must be totally eschewed. The will of the people cannot be permitted
to be subordinated to political expediency of the Prime Minister or the Chief Minister, as the
case may be, to have in his Cabinet a non-legislator as a Minister for an indefinite period by
repeated reappointments without the individual seeking popular mandate of the electorate.
From the above discussion, it follows that reappointment of Shri Tej Parkash Singh, the
respondent, as a Minister with effect from 23-11-1996, after his resignation from the Council
of Ministers on 8-3-1996, during the term of the same Legislative Assembly, without getting
elected in the meanwhile, was improper, undemocratic, invalid and unconstitutional. His
reappointment is accordingly set aside though at this point of time, it is of no consequence. We

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have dealt with the issue because of its importance. The Division Bench of the High Court fell
in error in dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant in limine.

4. Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse, 2014

Facts-
• The marriage between the petitioner and the respondent took place according to Hindu
Marriage customary rites, following which the respondent resided and cohabitated with the
petitioner. While the respondent was pregnant with the petitioner’s child, a lady named
Shobha came to their house and claimed to be the petitioner’s wife.
• The respondent claims that the petitioner told her that if she wanted to live with him, she
should cohabit with Shobha and live quietly and peacefully with them or return to her
parent’s house. Since she was pregnant, she decided to live with the petitioner and Shobha
in the same house.
• The respondent had to undergo a lot of physical and mental torture on a regular basis at the
hands of her inebriated husband. The petitioner mistreated the respondent as he believed
that the baby in her womb was not his and accused her of having relations with someone
else.
• He also insisted that the respondent must have an abortion. As the petitioner’s mistreatment
and abuse became unbearable, the respondent returned to her parent’s residence. The
respondent’s daughter, Shivanjali (Respondent No. 2) was born on November 28th, 2005.
The respondents applied for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (CrPC), based on the abovementioned averments.
• The Trial Court issued an award of maintenance to respondent No. 1 at the rate of Rs.1000/-
per month and to respondent No. 2 at the rate of Rs.500/- per month, which was affirmed
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge.
• The petitioner appealed before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, wherein the
decision of the lower court was upheld and an order dated 28th February 2013 was passed.
The petitioner filed a special leave petition in the Supreme Court of India to appeal against
the judgement and order of the Bombay High Court.
LEGAL ISSUES-
• Whether the marriage between the respondent and the petitioner was legally valid and
whether she was the wife of the petitioner?
• Whether the respondent entitled to maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC?
Held- The Court held that for Section 125 CrPC, respondent would be treated as the wife of
the petitioner and opined that the petitioner cannot be allowed to deny the respondent the
benefit of maintenance by exploiting his own mistake. The apex court denied the leave to the
petitioner and dismissed the special leave petition.
VIEW-

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• The Court has impressed that if man and woman have been living together for a long time
even without a valid marriage, as in that case, term of valid marriage entitling such a woman
to maintenance should be drawn and a woman in such a case should be entitled to maintain
application under Section 125,Cr.P.C. [Issue 1]
• In a judgment it was held that the wife should know that second marriage with such a person
is impermissible and there is an embargo under the Hindu Marriage Act and therefore she
has to suffer the consequences thereof. The said judgment would not apply to those cases
where a man marriages second time by keeping that lady in dark about the first surviving
marriage. That is the only way two sets of judgments can be reconciled and harmonized.
{Issue 1}
• Purposive interpretation needs to be given to the provisions of Section 125,Cr.P.C. While
dealing with the application of destitute wife or hapless children or parents under this
provision, the Court is dealing with the marginalized sections of the society. The purpose
is to achieve “social justice” which is the Constitutional vision, enshrined in the Preamble
of the Constitution of India. Preamble to the Constitution of India clearly signals that we
have chosen the democratic path under rule of law to achieve the goal of securing for all its
citizens, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. It specifically highlights achieving their
social justice. Therefore, it becomes the bounden duty of the Courts to advance the cause
of the social justice. While giving interpretation to a particular provision, the Court is
supposed to bridge the gap between the law and society. {Issue 2}
• The Legislature while making a provision like Section 125 Cr.P.C., to fulfill its
Constitutional duty in good faith, had always intended to give relief to the woman becoming
“wife” under such circumstances.
• Thus, while interpreting a statute the court may not only take into consideration the purpose
for which the statute was enacted, but also the mischief it seeks to suppress.
• The court would also invoke the legal maxim construction ut res magis valeat guam pereat,
in such cases i.e. where alternative constructions are possible the Court must give effect to
that which will be responsible for the smooth working of the system for which the statute
has been enacted rather than one which will put a road block in its way. If the choice is
between two interpretations, the narrower of which would fail to achieve the manifest
purpose of the legislation should be avoided. We should avoid a construction which would
reduce the legislation to futility and should accept the bolder construction based on the
view that Parliament would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective
result. If this interpretation is not accepted, it would amount to giving a premium to the
husband for defrauding the wife. Therefore, at least for the purpose of claiming
maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C., such a woman is to be treated as the legally
wedded wife.

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VI. Harmonious Rule of Interpretation

The rule of construction is well settled that when there are in an enactment two provisions
which cannot be reconciled with each other, they should be so interpreted that, if possible,
effect could be given to both. The basis of this rule is that the legislature wants to avoid
confusion and ambiguity and ensure that both sections are applicable. An interpretation which
makes the enactment a consistent whole, should be the aim of the Courts and a construction
which avoids inconsistency or repugnancy between the various sections or parts of the statute
should be adopted. The rule follows a very simple premise that every statute has a purpose and
intent as per law and should be read as a whole.

1. K.M. Nanavati v. State of Bombay

K.M. Nanavati was accused of murder and held to be guilty by Bombay HC and given life
imprisonment. On the same day, Governor of Bombay passes an order under Article 161. The
sentence passed by the Bombay HC was suspended. Meanwhile, SLP was filed in SC against
the imprisonment order of the High Court.
Court View- It is true that the power under Article 161 is exercised by the executive while the
power under Article 142 is that of the judiciary; but merely because one power is executive
and the other is judicial, it does not follow that they can never be exercised in the same field.
It will be seen that the ambit of Article 161 is very much wider and it is only in a very narrow
field that the power contained in Article 161 is also contained in Article 142, namely, the power
of suspension of sentence during the period when the matter is sub judice in this court.
Therefore on the principle of harmonious construction and to avoid a conflict between the two
powers it must be held that Article 161 does not deal with the suspension of sentence during
the time that Article 142 is in operation and the matter is sub judice in this court.
Held- So long as the judiciary has the power to pass a particular order in a pending case to that
extent the power of the Executive is limited in view of the words either of Sections 401 and
426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Articles 142 and 161 of the Constitution. The order
of the Governor granting suspension of sentence could only operate until the matter became
sub judice before the SC. Appeal dismissed.

2. Gita Hariharan v. RBI

The petitioner married to respondent and a son was born. The divorce petition was pending
between the couple where petitioner demanded for custody of child.
The Petitioner applied for RBI Relief bonds in the name of her son Rishab, a minor at the time
of application and she signed off as his guardian.
A few days later, RBI rejected the application and asked the petitioner to produce an application
signed off by the natural guardian i.e., Rishab’s Father, or in an alternative, RBI asked her to
produce a certificate of guardianship declaring her as the natural guardian by the prescribed
authority in relevant procedure.
RBI also gave the reasoning behind this rejection, which was; Section 6 (a) of The Hindu
Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 does not allow the mother to be a natural guardian if the

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father is alive and as Rishab’s father is alive, only he can apply for the bonds. After this, Ms.
Githa Hariharan decided to take this to the Supreme Court as she thought this provision was
discriminatory and needed correction.
Issues-
1. The petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of Section 6(a) of the The Hindu
Minority and Guardianship Acy, 1956 which says father is the natural guardian of a
boy or an unmarried girl and after him the mother will hold guardianship.
2. The Petitioner wanted to invoke Article 14 and Article 15 to correct this provision.
Court View-
The word “guardian” and the meaning attributed to it by the legislature under section 4(b) of
the Act cannot be said to be restrictive in any way, and thus the same would mean and include
both the father and the mother this is more so by reason of the meaning attributed to the words
as “a person having the care of the person of a minor or his property or of both his person and
property…”. It is an axiomatic truth that both the mother and the father of a minor child are
duty-bound to take care of the person and the property of their child, and this having due regard
to the meaning attributed to the word “guardian,” both the parents ought to be treated as
guardian of the minor, As a matter of fact, the same wads the situation as regards the law prior
to the codification by the Act of 1956. The law, therefore, recognized that a minor has to be in
the custody of the person who can subserve his welfare in the best possible way- the interest of
the child being the paramount consideration.

VII. Rule of Ejusdem Generis

Means “of the same kind or species”

Where any Act enumerates different subjects, general words following specific words are to
be construed (and understood) with reference to the words that precede them. Those general
words are to be taken as applying to things of the same kind as the specific words previously
mentioned, unless there is something to show that a wider sense was intended. Thus, the rule
of ejusdem generis means that where specific words are used and after those specific words,
some general words are used, the general words would take their colour from the specific
words used earlier.
For instance, in the expression in consequence of war, disturbance or any other cause', the
words 'any other cause' would take colour from the earlier words 'war, disturbance' and
therefore, would be limited to causes of the same kind as the two named instances. Similarly,
where an Act permits keeping of dogs, cats, cows, buffaloes and other animals, the expression
'other animals' would not include wild animals like lions and tigers, but would mean only
domesticated animals like horses, etc.
The general principle of 'ejusdem generis' applies only where the specific words are all the
same nature. When they are of different categories, then the meaning of the general words
following those specific words remains unaffected-those general words would not take colour
from the earlier specific words.

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❖ Rule Applies When-

1. Statute contains an enumeration of specific words
2. The subjects of enumeration constitute a class or category
3. That class or category Is not exhausted by the enumeration
4. The general terms follow enumeration, and
5. There is no indication of a different legislative intent

1. Ashbury Railway Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche

Facts- The object clause of its MOA had stated that the object of the incorporation of the
company was ‘to make or sell, or lend, or hire, railway carriages and wagons, and all kinds
of railway plants, fittings, machinery and rolling stock; to carry on the business of the
mechanical engineers and the general contractors; to purchase and sell, as merchants, timber,
coal, metals, or other materials; and to buy and sell any such materials on commission, or as
agents.’
The directors of the company entered into a contract with Riches, wherein a railway line was
to be constructed in Belgium, and the contract was for the financing of the construction.
The Clause 4 of the object clause specifically mentioned that beyond the scope of the above-
mentioned clause, there was a need of a special resolution to indulge in any activity which was
beyond the scope of this clause of the object clause in the MOA.
However, the company superseded this requirement and agreed to give Riches the loan and
financing they needed to build the railway line. The contract which was thus ,entered into by
the company was ratified by all the members of the company. However, later on, the company
reneged on their side of the deal repudiating the contract that was entered into by the company
and Riches. Riches sued the company for the breach of the contract and claimed damages.
Issues- Whether the term general contractors used in MOA be termed for financing of the
construction.

VIII. Noscitur Sociis

Noscitur: to know and Sociis: Association.

Literal meaning: Noscitur a Sociis – “it is known by its associates”.

Merriam Webster: Unclear or ambiguous words - Meaning should be determined by
considering the words with which it is associated in the context.
• Where two or more words are associated together, they should take their meaning from one
another. In other words, the words take their colour from and are quantified by each other.
Example: Article 194(3) of Indian Constitution: Powers, privileges and Immunities of the
Legislature of a State, and of the members and the committees of a House of such Legislature.

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• Example: Section 2(4) of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act: Commercial
establishment: Means an establishment which carries on, any business, trade, or profession or
any work in connection with any business, trade, and profession.....
It is an immediate context rule

Conditions For The Application Of This Rule

• Lord Barcon: When the meaning of the word or phrase is doubtful or where a particular
expression when taken singly is inoperative. Example: Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act:
Transfer: Transfer in relation to a capital asset, includes the sale, exchange or relinquishment
of the asset or the extinguishment of any rights therein or the compulsory acquisition thereof
under any law."
o When the associated words have similar meaning.
o Where the intention of the legislature is not clear.
o Word or phrase capable of bearing more than one meaning

1. K. Janardhan Pillai And Anr. V. Union Of India Air 1981

Statute: Kerala Essential Articles Control (Temporary Powers) Act, 1961 and Essential
Commodities Act, 1955 • Sections: 2(a) and 2(a)(v)
Section 2(a): Define "Essential Article": An article (not being an essential commodity as
defined in the Essential Commodities Act, 1955) which may be declared by the Government
by a notified order to be an essential article.
Section 2(a)(v): Essential commodities: 'Foodstuffs including edible oilseeds and oils'.
Facts: Kerala State Government made an order on 20th March, 1976 and declared that 'Raw
Cashewnut' was an essential article under section 2(a) of the Act. Petitioners were engaged in
the processing of raw cashew nuts.
They filed the writ petition. According to them, the raw cashew nut is a foodstuff, which is an
essential commodity under the Central Act. Hence the order is ultra vires the State Act.
Question: Raw Cashewnut - Foodstuff - Noscitur a Sociis?
State Government:
1. The expression foodstuffs meant only those articles which could be directly consumed
without any kind of processing
2. They could not be called as foodstuffs in the strict sense and were not an essential commodity
under the Central Act.
Court:
1. Raw Cashewnut is a foodstuff under section 2(a)(v) of the Central Act.. Hence cannot be
declared as an essential article under Section 2(a) of the Kerala Act.
2. The declaration made by the State Government was quashed.

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3. Section 2(a) make it clear that the State Government can declare an article as an essential
article only if it is not an essential commodity under the Central Act.
4. The court applied the doctrine and said that "the term 'foodstuffs' is associated with edible
oilseeds which have to be processed before the oil in them can be consumed, so it is appropriate
to interpret 'foodstuffs' in the wider sense as including all articles of food which may be
consumed by human beings after processing"
Exceptions
This doctrine will not be applied:
• Where the arrangement of the words has clear meaning.
• Where the intention of the legislature is clear.
• Where the word is defined in the Statute.
• By using this rule, what is already excluded cannot be included.
• When the words are given a broader connotation intentionally by the legislature, this
rule cannot be used to narrow down the meaning of words

IX. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius

Meaning:- Latin Phrase

"When one or more things of a class are expressly mentioned others of some class are
excluded".
Example:-
If a Statute refers bus and trucks, it only refers to bus and trucks and will not include car or any
other transportation.
Mention of one or more specified things may be taken to exclude other same things.
The effect of this rule means that is a list of words is not followed by general words, the act
only applies to the words used in the list.
Where this maxim apply:-
This maxim will be applied where specific words are being mentioned in any statues or
enactment.
Where this maxim not apply:-
This maxim will not be applied where general words are mentioned along with specific words.
e.g. etc., Others, or any other general words.
Case Laws:-
R.V Secretary of State for the home deptt.- It was held by the Court, to exclude the father of
an illegitimate child from rights under immigration law at the time, because the definition
section specifically mentioned the mother alone.

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R v. Inhabitants of Sedgely – A statute raised taxes on lands, houses and coalmines. Court held
that it did not apply to limestone mines as there were not specifically mentioned nor did the
statute permits.

X. Generalia Specialibus non Derogant

Generalia stands from general;

Specialibus stands for special.

It means that general laws do not prevail over special laws or, the general does not detract from
specifics.
1. Suresh Nanda vs C.B.I
There are 2 acts that provide for impounding of passports:
• Criminal Procedure Code;
• Passports Act.
In this case, the petitioner lost access to his license as the result of the procedures of a case in
which he was the accused. His passport was seized by C.B.I., thus, he couldn’t travel.
In this case, there was a conflict between section 104 of CrPC and section 10(3) of the Passport
Act.
The court decided that:
Since impounding of passports are governed by special legislation namely the passports act,
normal CrPC provisions concerning impounding shall not be attracted, the courts or the police
can at best seize a passport, but for impounding (which is far more enduring and continuous
possession) passport authority would have to be approached– and the authority can take a
decision on whether it would be impounded or not…[11]
In this case, the scope of the law under CrPC was defined by saying that the courts or the police
cannot impound but can only seize a passport. As impounding a passport has far-reaching and
permanent consequences, special law provisions will prevail to provide a better remedy to the
petitioner.

Mechanically applying this maxim yields no good. It is important to note that:

• Special law and general law are to be assigned to acts according to the case in question.
• The intention of the legislature in enacting a specific law has to be taken into account.
• The courts should always check first if the doctrine of harmonious construction and
Principle of election can be applied or not before applying this maxim.

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XI. Reddendo Singula Singulis

Meaning:- Reddendo Singula Singulis is a Latin term that means by referring each to each;
referring each phrase or expression to its corresponding object.

Example:- Doctor, Engineer and chef in a restaurant. Here, "In a restaurant" only applies to
chef and not to Doctor or Engineer.
The Reddendo Singula Singulis principle concerns the use of words distributively. Where a
complex sentence has more than one subject, and more than one object, it may be the right
construction to render each to each, by reading the provision distributively and applying each
object to its appropriate subject.
Example:- If anyone shall draw or load any sword or gun, the word draw is applied to sword
only and the word load to gun only.
Example:- I devise and bequeath all my real and personal property to A.
It read "I devise all my real property and bequeath my personal property to A".
Case Law:-
Koteshwar Vittal Kamat vs. K. Rangappa Baliga, 1969.
In the construction of the proviso to Article 304 of the Constitution which read,-
"Provided" that no bill or amendment for the purpose of clause (b), shall be introduced or
moved in the legislature of a state without the previous sanction.
It was held that the word introduced applies to bill and moved applies to amendment.

XII. Presumptions in Statutory Interpretation

1. In favour of the constitutionality of Enactment

o Every legislation enacted by Parliament or State Legislature carries with it a presumption
of constitutionality. This is founded on the premise that the legislature, being a
representative body of the people and accountable to them is aware of their needs and acts
in their best interest within the confines of the Constitution
o The burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of
constitutional principles.
o It is well settled that courts will be justified in giving a liberal interpretation to the section
in order to avoid constitutional invalidity
Suresh Kumar Kaushal v. Naz Foundation:
“Another significant canon of determination of constitutionality is that the Courts would be
reluctant to declare a law invalid or ultra vires on account of unconstitutionality. The Courts
would accept an interpretation, which would be in favour of constitutionality rather than the
one which would render the law unconstitutional. Declaring the law unconstitutional is one of
the last resorts taken by the Courts”

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Once the respondents prima facie convince the Court that the enactment is unconstitutional
then the burden shifts upon the State to satisfy that the restrictions imposed on the
fundamental rights satisfy the test of reasonableness.
The courts should not put any unnatural or forced meaning on the words used by the
Legislature in the search for an interpretation which would save the provision from being
struck down.

2. Statutes are presumed to be in conformity with International Law

o It is presumed that legislature does not enact anything contrary to International Law or
common Law.
o All general terms in a statute are to be interpreted in a way that they confirm to
international Law standards.
o When two interpretations are possible the courts should lean in the favour of that
interpretation by which the statute comes into consonance with the Principles of
International law.
o However merely on the grounds that a law is in contravention of International Law, the
court may not declare an act ultra vires.

3. Presumption that the legislature does not commit mistakes or make omissions
o Every word in the statute has been used mindfully, intentionally and suitably.
o Language employed by legislature is proper and does not suffer from any mistake.
o Court must read the language as it is and give the most-plain meaning.
o Court can’t proceed on the assumption that the legislature does not know what it is saying
or that it has made a mistake.

4. Presumption that Legislature does not intend what is inconvenient and

unreasonable
o Intention of legislature is always fair and it does not do anything which is unreasonable.
o A construction by which inconvenience is caused should be avoided by courts.

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XIII. INTERNAL AIDS

The Internal Aids in the construction of statutes are derived from Long Title, Preamble,
heading, title, marginal notes, and interpretation clause.
1. LONG TITLE: The long title is a part of the Act and is admissible as an aid to its
constructions. The long title along with the preamble is a good guide regarding the object,
scope and purpose of the Act. The long title which often precedes the preamble must be
distinguished with the short title, the former taken along with preamble or even its absence
is a good guide regarding the object, scope and purpose of the Act. Long title ordinarily
starts with the words “An Act……”, although title is a part of the Act, it is in itself not an
enacting provision and though useful in case of ambiguity of the enacting provision, is in
effective to control their clear meaning.

2. Preamble: It is a part of an Act and is an admissible aid to construction but preamble is

expected to express the object, scope and purpose of the Act more comprehensively than
the long title. If any doubt arise from the terms employed by the Legislation, it has always
been held a safe means of collection of intention to call in aid the ground and cause of
making the statute and to have recourse to the preamble, which according to Chief Justice
Dyer is key to open the minds of the maker of the Act, and mischief which they intend to
redress. The Supreme Court has also enunciated the same principle about the preamble “It
is one of the cardinal principles of construction that where the language of an Act is clear,
the preamble must be disregarded though, where the object or meaning of an enactment is
not clear, the preamble may be resorted to explain it, the preamble may be used to indicate
to what particular instances, the enactment is intended to apply. Preamble to the
Constitution: The Supreme Court held that, “The Constitution, including the preamble must
be read as a whole and in case of doubt interpreted consistent with its basic structure to
promote the great objective stated in the preamble. Similarly, the repeal of a preamble
simpliciter will not affect the construction of the statute.

3. Heading: Headings are like preamble to sections. It cannot control plain words. It is a part
of statute. It is internal aid to interpretation. In Iquabal Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, the
Supreme Court held it to be important part and explains sections which immediately follow
them. The Headings are of two kinds, one prefixed to a section and other prefixed to a
group of sections. Where the language of the section or an Act is plain, it is not necessary
to have recourse to the general heading under which the section comes. The headnotes and
sections cannot cut down the express meanings of the word occurring in the section. The
headings of different portions of a statute can be referred to determine the sense of any
doubtful expression in a section ranged under any particular heading. The heading prefixed
to a section or sets of sections in some modern statutes are regarded as preamble to those
sections. They cannot control the plain words of statutes, but they may explain ambiguous
words. If there is any doubt in the interpretation of words. If there is any doubt in the
interpretation of the words of the section, the heading certainly help the court to resolve
that doubt held in Bhinka v. Charan Sigh. While construing a statute, the heading of the
section may also be referred to if any doubt arises as regards the nature of such enactments.
[W. B. Council for Higher Secondary Education v. Subhabrata Datta]. Headings can be
referred in construing an Act of the Legislature. One group is of a view that a heading is to
be regarded as giving the key to the interpretation and heading may be treated as preamble

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to the provisions following them, the other group is of the view that resort to the heading
can only be taken when the enacting words are ambiguous, however, heading prefixed to
sections cannot control the plain words.

4. Marginal Notes: Marginal Notes are the notes which are inserted at the side of the sections
in an Act and express the effect of the section stated. The Privy Council has ruled that the
marginal notes to the section of an enactment cannot be referred to for the purpose of
construing the Act. The Marginal notes cannot however, effect affect the construction of
the language used in the body of the section if it is otherwise clear and unambiguous. The
use of the marginal notes in interpretation of statutes is not uniform but majority has a view
that the marginal note appended to a section cannot be used for construing the Section
where language of marginal note is found misleading or inappropriate; the legislative intent
contained in the provisions should not be bypassed. Marginal notes appended to Articles
of the Constitution have been held to constitute part of the constitution as passed by
constituent assembly and therefore they have been made use in construing the Articles.
Marginal notes to the sections of a statute and the title of the chapter cannot take away the
effect of the provisions contained in the Act, so as to render those provisions legislatively
incompetent, if they are otherwise within the competence of the legislature to enact.

5. Punctuation: Punctuation mark is a minor element in the construction of a Statute and

there are some cases of punctuation when they occur they can be looked upon as a sort of
contemporanea (uncountable) exposition, when a statute is carefully punctuated and there
is no doubt about its meaning an importance is to be given to punctuation.

6. Illustration: Illustration appended to a section form part of the statute and although
forming no part of the section, are of relevance and value in the construction of the text of
the section and they should not be readily rejected as repugnant to the section. The Supreme
Court had in a case took the aid of the illustration appended to section 43 of the Transfer
of Properties Act for conclusion that the said provision applies to transfer of “spes
successionis” [only a mere chance of succession] and enable transferee to claim the
property provided other conditions of the section are satisfied.

7. Definitions Sections or Interpretation Clauses: In any statute ‘Definitions’ of certain

words and expressions used elsewhere in the boy of the statute are found commonly. The
object of such definition is to avoid the necessity of frequent repetitions in describing all
the subject matter to which the word or expression defined is intended to apply. A definition
clause may borrow definitions from earlier Act and the definition borrowed may not
necessarily be in the definition section but may be in some other provisions of the earlier
Act. All statutory definitions have to be read subject to the qualifications and should be
used for the purpose of that Act. Definitions from other Act cannot be borrowed and used
ignoring the definition contained in the Statute itself. Definitions may be of following
kinds: a) Restrictive and Extensive Definitions. b) Ambiguous Definitions. c) Definitions
are subject to a contrary context.

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8. Proviso:
a) Real Nature of proviso: Normal function of a proviso is to except something out of
the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein which for the proviso would
be within the purview of the enactment. It is said that “as a general rule, a Proviso
is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the
enactment, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. A proviso qualifies
the generality of the main enactment by providing an exception and taking out from
the main provision, a portion, which, but for the proviso would be a part of the main
provisions. A proviso must be construed in relation to the principle matter to which
it stands as proviso.
b) Not to be construed as excluding or adding something by implication.
c) Proviso to be construed in relation to the section to which appended.
d) Used as a guide to construction of enactments.
e) At time to allay fears.
f) At time fresh enactment
g) Proviso as Exception and Saving Clause.

9. Explanation: An explanation is appended to a section to explain the meaning of words

contained in the section. Explanations are normally inserted with the purpose of explaining
the meaning of a particular provision and to remove doubts which might creep up if the
explanation had not been inserted. It becomes part and parcel of the enactment. If the
language of the explanation shows a purpose and a construction consistent with that
purpose can be reasonably placed upon it, that construction will be preferred as against any
other construction which does not fit in with the description.

10. Schedules: Schedules attached to an Act generally deal with as to how claims or rights
under the Act are to be asserted or as to how powers conferred are to be exercised. They
form the part of the statute to which they are appended. They are added towards the end
and their use is made to avoid encumbering the section in the statute with matters with
excessive details. They often contain details and prescribe forms for working out the policy
underlying the sections of the statute. Schedules may also contain transitory provisions
which remain in force till the main provisions of the statute are brought into operation.

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XIV. EXTERNAL AID

While interpreting a statute, true intent of the legislation shall have to be gathered and
deciphered [succeed in understanding, interpreting, or identifying] in its proper spirit having
due regard to the language used therein. The external aids may be employed in the
interpretation of statute if the words and language employed are not free from ambiguity and
which cannot be cleared even by resort of intrinsic aids. There external resources deals mainly
with the history of the Act, both with the prior events leading to the introduction of the Bill,
out of which the Act has emerged and the subsequent events from the time of introduction until
its final enactment.
The following are the external aids employed in interpreting statutes:
1) Dictionaries.
2) Foreign Decisions.
3) Parliamentary History.
4) Text Books
5) Object and reasons of the Act.
6) Commissions/Enquiry Committee.
7) Parliamentary Debates.
8) Effect of Usage and practice.
The external aids may be employed in the interpretation of statutes if the words and language
employed are not free from ambiguity and which cannot be cleared even by resort of intrinsic
aids. This external resources deals, mainly with the history of Act, both with the prior events
leading to the introduction of the Bill, out of which the Act has emerged and the subsequent
events from the time of introduction until its final enactment.
The Supreme Court has used the aid of Parliamentary history in resolving questions of
construction but it can be said that the Supreme Court generally has enunciated the said rule of
exclusion of Parliamentary history in the way it was traditionally enunciated by English Courts.
But in few cases it has been held that legislative history within circumspect limits may be
consulted by the courts in resolving ambiguities [State of Mysore R. V. Bidop]. Legislative
history and precedent English statutes may be taken into consideration in giving beneficial
interpretation to the provision in an Act [National Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Swarn Singh]. In
determining legislative intent, even a Minister’s Budget speech was taken into consideration.
Parliamentary Debates: Parliamentary debates at the time of introduction of Bill may be used
as external aids in interpretation. In interpreting the term “prosecution” under Income Tax Act,
a minister’s speech at the time of introduction of Bill has been taken into consideration.
Law commission Reports – Commissions/Inquiry Committee: Reports of Commission or
inquiry commission preceding the introduction of a Bill have also been referred to as evidence
of historic facts or of surrounding circumstances or of mischief or evil intended to be remedied
and at times for interpreting the Act. For example in Mithilesh Kumari v. Prem Bihari Khare,
the Report of Law Commission preceding to enactment of the Benami Transaction

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(Prohibition) Act, 1988 was referred to and relied upon in holding Section 4 of the Act to be
retrospective. The court observed that where a particular enactment or amendment is the result
of recommendation of Law Commission of India, it may be permissible to refer to the relevant
provision. Books Published by reputed authors and decision of courts of similar types of
democratic political system may be also applied as external aid.

Priyanandan Kumar