NON-OBSTANTE CLAUSE

LEGAL FICTION
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY PROVISIONS
CONJUNCTIVE AND DISJUNCTIVE WORDS

UNIT 16- 17
 REVISION
RULES WORDS ASSOCIATED WITH RULES
LITERAL RULE TRUE MEANING/PLAIN MEANING/NATURAL MEANING/ORDINARY/PRIMARY
MEANING
GOLDEN RULE REMOVING AMBIGUITY OF LITERAL RULE
MISCHIEF RULE DEFECT/LOOPHOLE/REMEDY/inadequacy/limitation/PURPOSIVE APPROACH TO
GIVE EFFECT TO THE TRUE PURPOSE OF LEGISLATION

HARMONIOUS RULE CONFLICT BETWEEN MINIMUM 2 RULE/PROVISION

EJUSDEM GENERIS WHEN THERE IS CLEAR CATEGORY FOLOWED BY WORDS WHICH ARE NOT
CLEAR. EX: IN ANY CASE/ANY OTHER/SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES/SIMILAR
NATURE/OR ORTHERWISE /WHATSOEVER/

BENEFICIAL RULE BENEFIT TO A PARTICULAR CLASS

NOSCITOR A SOCISSIS ASSOCIATED WORDS TAKE MEANING FROM ONE ANOTHER
Non-Obstante clause
◦ Notwithstanding means despite; in spite of; without being
opposed or impeded by; nevertheless; however, regardless of.
◦ A “non-obstante” provision is a provision in a statute that
begins with the words ‘Notwithstanding anything contained’
and is often used in a statute to give an overriding effect to a
particular section or the statute as a whole.
◦ A non-obstante clause is used in legislative drafting to make an
1. exemption to or
2. To override the provision
◦ A non-obstante clause is generally appended to a section
with a view to give the enacting part of the section, in case
of conflict, an overriding effect over the provision in the
same or other Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause.
◦ It is equivalent to saying that in spite of the provisions or
Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause, the provision
following it will have its full operation or the provisions
embraced in the non-obstante clause will not be an
impediment for the operation of the enactment or the
provision in which the non-obstante clause occurs.
◦ When a provision of an enactment is made ‘subject to’ another
provision, it implies that the provision in question will adhere to
the other provision to which it is subject.
◦ A non-obstante clause, on the other hand, is a legislative device
for giving overriding effect to certain provisions over some
contrary provisions found in the same or another law, in order to
avoid the operation and effect of all such contrary provisions in
respect of which the non-obstante provision has been given
overriding effect. [Jawahar Sons Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. vs. State and
Ors., 2002]
◦ e.g. Section 129 of The CGST Act start with
◦ “Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, where any
person transports any goods or stores any goods while they
are in transit in contravention of the provisions of this Act or
the rules made thereunder, all such goods and conveyance
used as a means of transport for carrying the said goods and
documents relating to such goods and conveyance shall be
liable to detention or seizure and after detention or seizure,
shall be released,”
◦ It has a non -obstante clause. It overrides the entire CGST Act.
◦ Section 31 in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005
◦ 31. Penalty for breach of protection order by respondent.—(1) A breach of
protection order, or of an interim protection order, by the respondent shall
be an offence under this Act and shall be punishable with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine
which may extend to twenty thousand rupees, or with both.
◦ Section 32(1) in The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005
◦ (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (2 of 1974), the offence under sub-section (1) of section 31 shall be
cognizable and non-bailable
◦ Two provisions in the same Act each containing a
non-obstante clause require a harmonious
interpretation of the two seemingly conflicting
provisions in the same Act. In this difficult exercise,
there are involved proper consideration of giving
effect to the object and purpose of two provisions
and the language employed in each. Shri Swaran
Singh & Anr. v. Shri Kasturi Lal; (1977) 1 SCC 750]
◦ Section 106 OF COMPANIES ACT, 2013: Restriction
on voting rights.
◦ 106. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this
Act, the articles of a company may provide that no
member shall exercise any voting right in respect of
any shares registered in his name on which any calls
or other sums presently payable by him have not
been paid, or in regard to which the company has
exercised any right of lien.
◦ SAVE AS OTHERWISE PROVIDED means this law will
be effective unless, in a given circumstances, some
other existing law directly prescribes a different
result.
◦ Section 152 (2) of Companies Act 2013,Save as
otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every
director shall be appointed by the company in
general meeting.
◦ While trying to interpret NON OBSTANTE CLAUSE, one should not
go beyond the intentions of the legislature. This view was taken in
the cases of South Іndіa Corporatіon Pvt. Ltd. v. Secy., Board of
Revenue, Trіvandrum (1964)
◦ In the case of Bipathumma and Ors. v. Mariam Bibi (1966), the
Court took the view that non-obstante clauses do not have a
repealing effect. They do not completely supersede the other
provisions of law. Such a clause simply performs the function of
removing impediments created by the other provisions from
affecting the enforcement of the enacting part of the concerned
section it is attached to
◦ We can find a non-obstante clause in Section 32A of the Narcotics
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1958 as well. As per this
Section, “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in
force no sentence awarded under this Act shall be suspended or
remitted or commuted”.
◦ In the case of Maktool Sіngh v. State of Punjab (1999), a question
arose as to whether the High Court could exercise its powers of
suspending the sentence as granted under Section 389 of Chapter
XXІX of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
◦ The Supreme Court held that the High Court does not have
the power to suspend the sentence awarded under the
NDPS Act.
◦ To sum up, non-obstante clauses are one of the internal
aids present for interpreting a statute which helps with
interpreting two or more laws associated in regards to the
same field which appears to be conflicting.
LEGAL FICTION
◦ legal fiction is a fact assumed to be true by courts which, in fact, is not the case,
but is used to enable the courts to resolve matters before it or to apply a legal
rule.
◦ Lawyers and judges often use expressions like “it is presumed”, “it is implied”
and such other phrases or expressions which tend to bring in fictions, in a case,
almost unnoticed.
◦ Legal fiction is defined as:-
◦ 1. A legal assumption that a thing is true which is either not true, or which is
probably false.
◦ 2. An assumption of law that something which is false is true.
◦ 3. A state of facts exists which has never really existed.
◦ Section 12 of the Hindu Adoption and succession Act creates a legal
fiction. According to section 12 “ An adopted child shall be deemed
to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all
purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such
date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be
deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the
adoption in the adoptive family”
◦ Here the legal fiction has been created to give effect to the
relationship between a child and his adoptive parents. This fiction
confers a lawful right to the child adopted, to be considered and
thereby treated as the real child born in the adoptive family for all
purposes, including succession
◦ Another example of legal fiction is a famous maxim
Ignorantia juris non excusat which literally means
“Ignorance of law is no excuse”.
◦ This maxim is based on a fiction that every person
has knowledge of the law. The absence of such
fiction would generate confusion making it
impossible to enforce the law as everyone will claim
his or her ignorance of law.
◦ It is a well settled principle that the companies have a
separate legal existence. The emphasis is that
corporations are mere fictions introduced by the state
authority for certain beneficial purposes of society or
administration.
◦ Once the state has invested legal personality in a
company it would ordinarily be difficult to prove that
the crime has been committed and that the corporate
personality of the company was used as a mere facade.
◦ 157 OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACT: Transfer of certificate of insurance.—(1) Where a
person in whose favour the certificate of insurance has been issued in
accordance with the provisions of this Chapter transfers to another person the
ownership of the motor vehicle in respect of which such insurance was taken
together with the policy of insurance relating thereto, the certificate of insurance
and the policy described in the certificate shall be deemed to have been
transferred in favour of the person to whom the motor vehicle is transferred with
effect from the date of its transfer. 1[Explanation.—For the removal of doubts, it
is hereby declared that such deemed transfer shall include transfer of rights and
liabilities of the said certificate of insurance and policy of insurance.]
◦ (2) The transferee shall apply within fourteen days from the date of transfer in
the prescribed form to the insurer for making necessary changes in regard to the
fact of transfer in the certificate of insurance and the policy described in the
certificate in his favour and the insurer shall make the necessary changes in the
certificate and the policy of insurance in regard to the transfer of insurance.
◦ In New India Assurance Co. Ltd v Complete Insulation Pvt
Ltd, the Supreme Court held that legal fiction created
under S.157 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the transfer
of third party insurance is deemed to have effect from
buyer to seller.
◦ One must understand the distinction between a legal
fiction and the presumption of a fact. Legal fiction assumes
existence of a fact which may not really exist. However, a
presumption of a fact depends on satisfaction of certain
circumstances.
◦ One of the examples distinguishing legal fiction and
presumption is under Indian Penal Code wherein ignorance
of law is not an excuse is a legal fiction and a child below
the age of 7 years being incapable of committing an
offence under section 82 is a presumption of law.
◦ A legal fiction presupposes the correctness of the state of facts on which it is
based and all the consequences which flow from that state of facts have got
to be worked out to their logical extent.
◦ But due regard must be had in this behalf to the purpose for which the legal
fiction has been created.
◦ Thus, one must not stretch the meaning of a fiction beyond its legitimate field
or engraft one fiction upon another unless the legislature has specifically
provided for such a course of action.
◦ The twin principles of construction governing “legal fiction” include one
requiring the fictions to be taken to their logical conclusion and the other
confining them to their legitimate field - have to be harmonised dexterously.
MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY
PROVISIONS
◦ A provision in a statute is mandatory if the omission to follow it renders the
proceeding to which it relates illegal and void, while a provision is directory if
its observance is not necessary to the validity of the proceeding, and a
statute may be mandatory in some respects and directory in others.
◦ In DA Koregaonkar v State of Bombay it was held that, one of the important
tests that must always be employed in order to determine whether a
provision is mandatory or directory in character is to consider whether the
non-compliance of a particular provision causes inconvenience or injustice
and, if it does, then the court would say that, the provision must be
complied with and that it is obligatory in its character.
◦ Determination of Mandatory Provision Its determination depends upon
two points (a) Language of Statute or Enactment: and (b) Intention of
law.
◦ In respect to the performance of statute following words are used: shall:
▪ may: ▪ must: ▪ It must be lawful and ▪ As deems fit, etc. These words
should be understood in their natural sense while construing. Also, the
intention of the legislature should be kept in mind.
◦ When any statute uses ‘Shall’ then it shall be construed firstly as
Mandatory provision. Supreme Court said that while ‘interpreting the
word ‘Shall’, the intention of the legislature should be considered and to
know the intention of legislature, Content, imagination, etc. of statutes
should be considered.
1.The word ‘May’ represent optional or discretionary acts
or ifs provision. In other words. It could be said that the
word ‘May’ used in statute represents the discretionary
powers of performance of that statute or its provision
2.But. If liability has been imposed along with the
discretion of public authority in a statute, the word ‘May’
be construed as ‘shall’ or ‘must’.
◦In Sidhu Ram v Secretary Railway Board the Court had to consider the
import of Rule 1732 of the Railway Establishment Code. The relevant
portion of the Rule read thus— “where the penalty of dismissal , removal
from service, compulsory retirement, reduction in rank or withholding of
increment has been imposed, the appellate authority may give the
railway servant either at his discretion or if so requested by the latter a
personal hearing, before disposing of the appeal.”
◦The term 'may' must be taken in it naturally, i.e. in its permissive sense and
not in its obligatory sense. 'May and 'shall' are generally used in
contradistinction to each other and normally should be given their natural
meaning especially when they occur in the same section. Also in some
cases the word 'may' is used in such a way as to create a duty that must be
performed.
◦In GullipilliSowria Raj vs. BandaruPavani @ GullipiliPavani this Court while dealing with a similar issue
held as under:

◦“The expression “may” used in the opening words of

Section 5 is not directory, as has been sought to be argued,
but mandatory and non-fulfilment thereof would not
permit a marriage under the Act between two Hindus &
Section 7 of the 1955 Act is to be read along with Section 5
in that a Hindu Marriage, as understood under Section 5,
could be solemnised according to the ceremonies indicated
therein”
Conjunctive and Disjunctive words

Conjunctive and Disjunctive Words ‘or’ ‘and’: The word ‘or’ is normally
disjunctive and ‘and’ is normally conjunctive. However, at times they are read
as vice versa to give effect to the manifest intention of the legislature as
disclosed from the context. This would be so where the literal reading of the
words produces an unintelligible or absurd result. In such a case ‘and’ may by
read for ‘or’ and ‘or’ for ‘and’ even though the result of so modifying the words
is less favourable to the subject, provided that the intention of the legislature is
otherwise quite clear.
Example: In the Official Secrets Act, 1920, as per section 7 any person who
attempts to commit any offence under the principal Act or this Act, or solicits or
incites or endeavours to persuade another person to commit an offence, or aids
or abets and does any act preparatory to the commission of an offence’. Here,
the word ‘and’ in bold is to be read as ’or’. Reading ‘and’ as ‘and’ will result in
unintelligible and absurd sense and against the clear intention of the Legislature.
MIMANSA RULES OF INTERPRETATION
ATIDESHA AXIOM
SARTHAKYATA AXIOM
LAGHAVA AXIOM
ARTHAIKATVA AXIOM

UNIT 20
◦ The principles of interpretation of statutes mainly relied on in our law courts
are those dealt with in the works of Western jurists. However, in our country
we had developed from very early times a scientific system of interpretation
known as the Mimansa Principles and these were regularly followed by our
renowned jurists.
◦ Whenever there was any conflict between the Smritis e.g. Manusmriti and
Yagnavalkya Smriti, or ambiguity in a Shruti or Smriti, the Mimansa Principles
were applied. Most of these principles are rational and scientific, and in some
respects superior to the principles obtaining in Western Law.
◦ In ancient time people rather than worshipping the gods like we do today
used to perform some ritualistic Yagya i.e. sacrificial fire to the gods. With this
backdrop, Mimansa system was created in connection with Yagya
◦ With the change in time and language, language and grammar of the non-shruti part of the Sanskrit
literature were altered and made in accordance with the Panini grammar and hence was easily
comprehensible.

◦ But similar alteration was not permitted for shruti literature. One did not have the liberty to change the
language and grammar of the Vedas because it was considered to be sacred. In fact it was not even
written and was transmitted by oral tradition. Brahmanas too, form a part of the Veda and hence their
language too could not be altered and made in accordance with the Panini’s grammar.

◦ For the conduct of Yagyas in accordance with the rules they had to devise a system of interpretation to
resolve the conflicts, ambiguities, etc. in the Shrutis, which were aggravated by the archaic, pre-Panini
Sanskrit employed in the Vedic texts.
◦ No doubt the principles of interpretation were initially evolved to resolve conflicts that arose
in connection with the meaning of rules governing performance of the Yagya, but gradually
these principles came to be accepted for interpreting legal texts also which were mixed up
with religious rules in the Smritis.
◦ The Mimansa principles are in two respects superior to Maxwell's principles of
interpretation, viz.: (1) They can be utilised not only for interpreting statutes but also
judgments, whereas Maxwell's principles can only be used for interpreting statutory law.
◦ The Mimansa Principles distinguish between obligatory statements and non-obligatory
statements. The main obligatory rule is called a Vidhi which are basically rules or
procedures.
◦ The main non-obligatory statement is known as an Arthavada. An Arthavada is a statement
of praise or explanation. Most of the Vedas proper consist of Arthavadas. Arthavada is like
the preamble or statement of objects in a statute. An Arthavada has no legal force by itself,
but it is not entirely useless since like a statement of objects or preamble it can help to clarify
an ambiguous Vidhi, or give the reason for it.
◦ Six axioms of interpretation have therefore been developed for the interpretation of shastras 3They are:
◦ (1) The Sarthakyata axiom, which means that every word and sentence must have some meaning.
◦ (2) The Laghava axiom which states that that construction which makes the meaning simpler and
shorter is to be preferred.
◦ (3) The Arthaikatva axiom, which states that no two meaning should not be attached to a word or
sentence occurring at one and the same place..
◦ (4) The Gunapradhan axiom, which states that if a word or sentence purporting to express a subordinate
idea clashes with the principal idea the former must be adjusted to the latter, or must be disregarded
altogether.
◦ (5) The Samanjasya axiom which states that all attempts should be made at reconciliation of apparently
conflicting texts.
◦ (6) The Vikalpa axiom, which states that if there is a real and irreconcilable contradiction between two
legal rules having equal force, the rule more in accordance with equity and usage should be adopted at
one's option.
◦ Badha principle signifies exclusion by repugnancy. For example, a special law prevails over a general
law, a higher law prevails over a lower law, a clear law prevails over an unclear law.
◦ Application of Mimansa principles sometimes lead to different results. For example, there is a text of
Vasishta which says "a woman should not give or take a son in adoption except with the consent of
her husband". This has been interpreted in 4 different ways by our commentators.
◦ (1) The Dattak Mimansa holds that no widow can adopt a son because the consent required is consent at
the time of adoption, and the husband being dead no consent of his can be had at the time of adoption.
◦ Mithila School of Mitakshara, is of the same opinion, but for a different reason. According to him,
adoption can only be resorted to after performing the homa, and since a woman cannot perform the homa
with Vedic mantras, she cannot adopt.
◦ The Dayabhaga view is that the husband's assent is not required at the time of actual adoption, and
hence if the husband had given assent in his lifetime his widow can adopt after his death.
◦ The view of the Dravida School of Mitakshara is that the words "except with the assent of the
husband" are only illustrative, and hence assent of her husband's agnates or father-in-law's agnates is
sufficient.
◦ Apart from the above mentioned axioms of interpretation there are well-known general principles of
interpretation in Mimansa, viz.:
◦ (1) the Shruti Principle, or the literal rule.
◦ (2) the Linga principle (also called golden rule)
◦ In Sardar Mohammad Ansar Khan v. State of U.P. the controversy was as to which of two clerks
appointed on the same day in an Intermediate College would be senior, and hence entitled to promotion
as Head Clerk. Now there is no rule to cater to this situation. However, Chapter 2, Regulation 3 of the
U.P. Intermediate Education Regulations states that where 2 teachers are appointed on the same day, the
senior in age will be senior. Using the atidesh Principle of mimansa it was held that the same principle
which applies to teachers should be also applied to clerks, and hence the senior in age would be senior.
◦ The atidesh principle originated in the practical difficulty of performing certain yagyas. There are some
yagyas whose method of performance is given in detail in the Brahmanas. However, there are other
yagyas whose rules are not given any where, and these are known as vikriti yagyas. The question arose
how these latter are to be performed? The atidesh principle was created to resolve this difficulty, and
according to this principle the yagya is to be performed according to the rules of the prakriti yagya
belonging to the same genus.
◦ Tribhuwan Misra v. D.I.O.S. (1992) In this case the petitioner, who was the senior most teacher in an
Intermediate College, had filed a writ petition in the Allahabad High Court claiming that he should have
been appointed ad hoc Principal on the retirement of the previous Principal, but the management had
superseded him.

◦ Decision of the court: In which one of the Division Bench ruling held that; the senior most teacher
should be appointed as ad hoc Principal, whereas another Division Bench delivered held that it is the
discretion of the Management as to who is to be appointed. In this case the Samanjasya principle was
used to reconcile two apparently conflicting Division Bench rulings.

◦ It was explained that the former decision should be interpreted to mean that ordinarily the senior most
teacher should be appointed Principal, while the latter decision should be interpreted to mean that in
exceptional cases, viz., if there are grave charges against him, then can be superseded by a reasoned
order, though only after giving him a show-cause notice.
 TREATY INTERPRETATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (VIENNA
CONVENTION OF THE LAW OF TREATIES)

ARTICLE31 GENERAL RULE OF INTERPRETATION

ARTICLE 32 SUPPLEMENTARY MEANS OF INTERPRETATION
ARTICLE 33 INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES AUTHENTICATED IN TWO OR MORE
LANGUAGES

UNIT 22
◦ Vienna Convention of 1969, which codified the law of treaties, the
international treaty is “an international agreement concluded
between States in written form and governed by the international
law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more
related instruments and whatever its particular designation” (article
2, paragraph 1, letter (a).
◦ Another important document in this regard, the 1986 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International
Organizations or between International Organizations, extends the
international treaty scope, by including international organizations in
category subjects of international law that can have the role as part of
a treaty.
◦ There are at least three commonly acknowledged "schools" or approaches to treaty
interpretation, which correspond to methods of construction of any legal text—
including constitutions, statutes, and contracts.
◦ Textualist. The first school is textualism. All solid treaty interpretation begins with
the words of a provision itself, as they are commonly understood. VCLT Article 31,
in discussing treaty interpretation, calls for an examination of a text’s "ordinary
meaning.
◦ Intentionalist. Textualism can be a form of contextual reading of different
provisions in a treaty text, in order to reach a sensible result. Already one can see
a tension between the text of a treaty provision and the intent of the drafters.
However, the second, intentionalist, approach to treaty interpretation has never
been popular in international law.
◦ Teleological. That leaves the third school of interpretation: seeking to effectuate
the purpose of a treaty, rather than slavishly following the text or attempting to
divine the intent of the drafters. Known in international law as a teleological
approach, it can also be called purposivism. It is captured in the VCLT’s
requirement that treaties be construed in light of their "object and purpose" and in
view of "relevant rules of international law.
Rules and Principles of Interpretation of Treaties
1. The interpretation technique of the legal norm as regards the treaty interpretation requires four
interpretation methods:
2. Grammatical interpretation, requiring a legal standard international interpretation of the rules of
grammar on syntax, morphology, vocabulary;
3. Systematic interpretation, which involves the establishing of the international legal standard meaning of
a treaty by its relation to the whole text, to the legal institution or other provisions of international law;
4. Historical and teleological interpretation, which consists of clarifying the meaning of the terms of a
treaty taking into account the historical, social, political conditions, needs which led to the adoption of
the document in question and the purpose pursued by the states, as parties to the Treaty, in such case it
should be considered the preparatory work for drafting the treaty text, the debates about the draft treaty
within international conferences, exchanges of notes etc.
5. Logical interpretation, a method which leads to clarify the content of a treaty by the use of reasoning
and arguments of formal logics
◦ Fitzmaurice identified six principles of interpretation based on the
International Court jurisprudence mainly:
1. principle of actuality or textuality,
2. principle of the natural and ordinary meaning,
3. principle of integration,
4. principle of effectivness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat),
5. principle of subsequent practice and principle of contemporaneity.
◦ As we observe in the doctrine, most of these principles have been introduced
in the International Law Commissions proposals and they were adopted
“without changes” by the Vienna Conference in the articles 31 and 32.
◦ 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties establishes in article 31 the general rule
of interpretation of treaties: “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in
the light of its object and purpose”.
◦ Article 31 General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. .The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition
to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
◦ (a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty;
◦ (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the
treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a)any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation;
(c)any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations
between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that
the parties so intended.
◦ Principle of good faith is a fundamental principle of international law. Good faith in
international law has the usual sense, i.e., intention and consciousness of the compliance of
the attitude with the truth, with the rules of law.
◦ This provision is consistent with that contained in article 26 VCLT, that is pacta sunt
servanda.
◦ According to the principle of good faith the interpretation of any treaty must be made with
the intention of establishing the exact meaning of its regulations. In the matter of treaty
interpretation, good faith demands the compliance of the following requirements:
1. if the treaty is clear, the meaning should not change under the pretext of respecting the
spirit;
2. the used terms in the treaty must be assigned to their ordinary, natural meaning, and
they should be interpreted taking into account the object and purpose of the treaty;
3. to a term it will be assigned a special meaning if it is established that it was the intention
of the parties.
◦ In the situation where from interpretations under article 31 VCLT it is achieved to an
ambiguous meaning or obscure or the interpretation has led to a result which is
manifestly absurd or unreasonable, the article 32 provides the possibility of using
complementary means of interpretation, noting the preparatory work and the
circumstances in which the treaty was concluded. This solution can be approached
also to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31.
◦ Article 32 Supplementary means of interpretation
◦ Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to
confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31,
◦ or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable
◦ Article 33 Interpretation of treaties authenticated in two or more languages
1.When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally
authoritative in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in
case of divergence, a particular text shall prevail.
2.A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was
authenticated shall be considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or
the parties so agree.
3.The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic
text.
4.Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a
comparison of the authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the
application of articles 31 and 32 does not remove, the meaning which best reconciles
the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.