•

APIS:
•

THE CONGENIAL CONSPIRATOR

THE LIFE OF
I
COLONEL DRAGUTIN T. DIMITRIJEVIC

by David MacKenzie
,

EAST EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS, BOULDER

DISTRIBUTED BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, NEW YORK

1989
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EAST EUROPEAN MON OGRAPHS, NO. CCLXV
I

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface V
I
Acknowledgments Vll
..

Colonel Apis in Quotations

.
lX

To Molly Anna MacKenzie (1988- ) Cast of Characters Xl

and her generation Summary of Career of Colonel Dimitrijevic-Apis Xlll

Glossary of Serbian Terms XV

CHAPTER !-Introductory: Apis, Martyr or Murderer? 1

CHAPTER ll-Facing Their Open Graves (June 1917) 7
CHAPTER HI-Birth of A Bull 22
CHAPTER IV-Preparing the Coup (1900-1903) 31
CHAPTER V-Killing the King and Queen (May 28-29, 1903) 41
CHAPTER VI-Conspirator in Politics (1903-1908) 50
CHAPTER Vll-Apis and the "Black Hand" (1908-1912) 64
CHAPTER VIII-Zivkovic and the "White Hand," 1909-1912 76
CHAPTER lX-Maltese Fever and Balkan Wars, 1912-1913 87
CHAPTER X-Chief of Military Intelligence, 1913-1914 97
CHAPTER XI-The May Crisis, 1914 105
CHAPTER Xll-Murder in Sarajevo (June 1914) 123
CHAPTER Xlli-The Austrian War (1914-1915) 138
CHAPTER XIV -Albanian Golgotha (1915) 153
CHAPTER XV -Personal Matters (1914-1916) 169
CHAPTERXVI-Corfu Interlude (Spring 1916) 183
CHAPTER XVII-On the Salonika Front (1916) 194
CHAPTER XVlll-The Conspiracy Against Colonel Apis (1916) 207
CHAPTER XIX-The Lion is Caged (December 1916) 220

Copyright ©1989 by David MacKenzie CHAPTER XX-Awaiting Trial (December 1916-March 1917) 230
,

ISB Q-88033-162-3 CHAPTER XXI-ln Courtroom and Prison Cell (March-April 1917) 245
Library of Congress Catalog Card umber 89-80171 CHAPTER XXfi- Apis Testifies (April-May 1917) 263

PrinlCd in the United States of America

lJI
 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
IV
.

CHAPTER XXIII-Condemned to Death (May 23-June 12, 1917) 278

CHAPTER XXIV-Exonerated! (1918-1953) 297

310
CHAPTER XXV- The Verdict of History

31 7
Notes
365
Bibliography
388
Lndex

PREFACE

The idea of writing a biography of Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijevic-Apis,

Serbia's Colonel Oliver North, came to me suddenly as I was running one
day through Belgrade's streets in 1984. The throught struck me that there
was no complete, objective study of this controversial and mysterious

-
Serbian army officer, although many contemporaries considered him one
of the most powerful individuals in Serbia before and during World War I.
My Yugoslav friends and colleagues welcomed my idea warmly. Many had
relatives or acquaintances who had belonged to the awe-inspiring "Black
Hand" organization which Colonel Apis had dominated. For decades I
had investigated various aspects of the Serbian national movement which
culminated in 1918 in the formation of royal Yugoslavia. Having written
a biography of llija Garasanin, modern Serbia's ftrst major statesman, it
seemed logical to describe the life and times of Colonel A pis, a key ftgure
during the climax of Serbia's struggle for the liberation and unification of
fellow Serbs. That movement triggered World War I and the collapse of
Austria-Hungary, events in which Apis played a significant part. Enthu­
siastic support from Yugoslav friends speeded my work on this study.
Apis' career proved so engrossing that I felt a great eagerness and urgency
•

to complete the book. I hope it will be enjoyed on both sides of the

Atlantic.

David MacKenzie
Greensboro, North Carolina
1988

V
 I

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many persons and institutions contributed to the research and writing

of this volume. Grants from the Penrose Fund of the American Philosophi­
cal Society and the Research Council of the University of North Carolina
at Greensboro enabled the author to conduct research in Belgrade in the
summer of 1984. A grant from the International Research and Exchanges
Board in 1986 allowed the grantee to complete that research.
Dr. Vasilije Krestic, Director of the archive of the Serbian Academy of
Sciences in Belgrade assisted me to obtain the pertinent materials there
and supported my applications to work in the Archive of Serbia, the Arc­
hive of Yugoslavia, and the Military Historical Archive. Let me thank the
staffs of those institutions as well as those of the National Library in Bel­
grade; the Archives de Terre in Vincennes, France; Haus-, Hof-, und Staats­
archiv in Vienna; the Public Record Office in London; and the University
-

of lliinois at Urbana for their generous cooperation and assistance.

Dr. Liljana Aleksic of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Colonel
Petar Opacic at the Military Historical Archive provided many helpful
suggestions. Dr. Dragan Zivojinovic of Belgrade University and Mr. Sinisa
Dimitrijevic of Belgrade, and Mr. Boshko N. Kostich of Milwaukee, gave
the author valuable tips. My warmest thanks to go my longtime friend, Dr.
Radoslav Stojanovic of the Law Faculty of Belgrade University for sugges-
•

tions and assistance. My special gratitude goes to the Zdravkovic and

Lazovic families for making me feel fully at home in Belgrade.
Among my American colleagues especially helpful was Dr. Alex Drag­
nich, now of Charlottesville, Virginia, who read key portions of the manu­
script and provided very valuable suggestions. Dr. Waiter Luczynski and

..
Vl1
.. APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Vlll
.

Dr. Ann Saab of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro, read

portions of the manuscript and provided suggestions for its improvement.
The author takes full responsibility for any remaining errors. Special -

thanks go to my loyal wife, Patricia, for her suggestions, patience and

understanding while 1 traveled through Europe gathering material, then
isolated myself to write this book.Finally, I wish to thank Seth Hinshaw
for helping me with the index.

COLONEL APIS IN QUOTATIONS

1. Character and personality:

"That person is not only talented .... He is a type of magician.. . .

All come to him without a summons, without evident reason, as if at·

tracted by this man's magical power ."-"Solunska afera."
•

"Apis smiles because he's that way, because he is a giant, a hero, a lion .
Apis smiles because he knows they'll shoot him ....You don't know
such people: when they smile, they are the most dangerous." Colonel
Popovic.

"That man is indifferent to everything! His friends and comrades have

died but ...he seeks new people ....He will not rest until he fmds
someone ready to struggle and intrigue!"-"Solunska afera."

2. On the May Coup of 1903:

"The murder of the King will cause great damage to our personal repute
and peace both in the country and abroad. But time will reveal that it
[was]...a need of state."-Apis i n 1903.

"The party had reached its peak and empty bottles were crashing against
the walls when 'The Bull' [Apis] got up and jumped on the table shout­
ing: 'What are we waiting for! That pair in the palace must die so that
Serbia can live!"'-John Godwin in The Evening News.
3. On the "Black Hand ":

I
"I believe that the name ["Black Hand"] should be interpreted that
every member must be prepared to give his life for the unification of
Serbdom .... "-Apis to Salonika Court .

.
lX
X APIS: The Congenial Conspirator

4. On Death:
"I die innocent .. . . They found us guilty and deserving death for rea-
sons purely of internal policy . . . . I am convinced . . .that my death
.. .is necessary for the good of Serbia."-Apis to his nephew, Milan.

"I do not regret that I die from Serbian guns because it is for Greater
Serbia which I wish to see realized soon."-Apis to Colonel Dabic.
CAST OF CHARACTERS

5. On the Sarajevo murder:

1. Apis and His Family:
"Malobabic carried out my instructions, organized and carried rhrough
Dragutin T. Dirnitrijevic (Apis)
the assassination. Its chief participants were all in my service. "-Apis to
Todor Dimitrijevic-Apis' father
Salonika Court.
Jovanka Dimitrijevic-Apis' mother
6. Place in history: Jelena (Dimitrijevic) Zivanovic-Apis's sister
"He was the spirit, leader and organizer of the national-revolutionary Zivan Zivanovic-Apis' brother-in-law, politician
movement who always kept in mind . . . all regions where our people Milan Z. Zivanovic-Apis' nephew, Zivan's son
lived and were under foreign tyranny . ... He was a soldier and politi-
2. Leaders of the "Black Hand" (founded August 191 1):
cian, simultaneously the Garibaldi and Mazzini of the Yugoslav war for
a. The founders-
liberation." 0. Tartaglia, Veleizdajnik.
�

!) Ljubornir S. Jovanovic-Cupa-editor of Piedmont-civilian

"I have always in life done everything with the deep conviction that I 2) Bogdan Radenkovic, Macdeonian activist-civilian
am working for the good of the country, and that if I now had done 3) Velimir Vemic-officer
anything, I would say so openly . "-Apis to Colonel Stojkovic, 1917. 4) llija Radivojevic, Chairman-officer
5) Vojislav Tankosic, guerrilla chieftain-officer
6) Cedomir Popovic-officer
7) Dragutin Dirnitrijevic-Apis-officer

b. Original Central Executive Comrnitte-the above plus:

8) Ilija M. Jovanovic-officer
9) Milan Vasic, secretary of Narodna Odbrana-officer
I0) Milan G. Milovanovic-"Pilac" -officer

3. Serbian Rulers and political leaders:

Alexander Obrenovic, King of Serbia, 1893-1903
Peter Karadjordjevic, King of Serbia, 1903-I922
'
Alexander Karadjordjevic II, Prince Regent, 1914-22, King of
Yugoslavia, 1922-34
Djordje Karadjordjevic, older son of King Peter, Heir to throne, 1903-9
Nikola Pa5ic ( 1845-1926), head of Radical Party, premier and foreign
minister of Serbia and Yugoslavia

XI
0
 .. APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
X11
Ljubomir Jovanoiv6-Patak, Radical1eader, Interior Minister
Stojan Proti6, Radical leader, Interior Minister, issued Priority Decree
General Radomir Putnik, Chief of Serbian General Staff to end 1915
4. Other important characters:
Antic, Antonije: officer, an initiator of May Coup.
B1agojevi6, Alexander (Aca): "Black Hand" officer, friend of Apis.
Bogi6evi6, Milos: Serbian diplomat who defected to Germany, bio-
grapher of Apis.
Bozanovic, Milos: "Black Hand" officer, general, war minister.
DraSkic, Panta: "Black Hand" officer, Prince Alexander's adjutant.
DraSkovic, Milorad: Independent Radical leader.
Dunjic, Milan: commander of Salonika garrison.
Franz Ferdinand, Archduke: Austrian heir apparent, murdered in Sara-
Jevo.
Jankovi6, Radoje: "Black Hand" officer, poet, protested Salonika Trial.
J ovanovic, Slobodan: Outstanding Serbian histori�, politician.
JuriSic-Sturm, Pavle: "White Hand" officer, witness at Salonika Trial.
Kostic, Josif: "White Hand" officer, deadly enemy of Apis.
Lazic, Radoje: "Black Hand" officer, defendant at Salonika and Retrial.
Malobabi6, Rade: Serbian national activist, Apis' chief agent and friend.
Masin, Draga: Queen of Serbia, 1901-03, murdered in May Coup.
MiSic, Peter: May conspirator, chairman o( Salonika Lower Court, 1917.
Paunovic, Father Zdravko: military priest, confessed Apis at Salonika.
Popovic, Damjan: general, "Black Hand" leader, leader of May Coup.
Pro tic, J osif G.: assistant officer guard at Salonika Prison, 1917.
Radovanovic, Milorad Koca: "White Hand" officer, accuser of Peter
Zivkovic.
Simic, Bozin: "Black Hand" officer, a conspirator of 1903.
Stojkovic, Milan: chief officer warden of Salonika Officers' Prison.
Terzic, Bozidar: general, Serbian War Minister, 1916- 18.
Tucovic, Vladirnir: "Black Hand" officer, close friend of Apis.
Vasic, Milos: commander ofThird Army on Salonika Front, foe of Apis.
Vasiljevic, Prvoslav: Belgrade lawyer, Apis' defender in Retrial of 1953.
Vulovic, Ljubomir: "Black Hand" officer, executed at Salonika, 1917.
Zivkovic, Peter: "White Hand" officer, Guards commander, enemy of
Apis.
I
SUMMARY OF CAREER
OF COLONEL DIMITRIJEVIC-APIS
Entered the Military Academy's Lower Course September 28, 1893 in
26th Class, graduating August 2 , 1896 as junior lieutenant of infantry.
Promoted to first lieutenant of infantry August 2 , 1899.
Attended Military Academy's Higher Course (8th Class) from Septem-
ber 26, 1898 until October 15, 1900.
Promoted to junior captain of infantry Decembe 29, 1902.
Promoted to general staff captain flrst class June 29, 1905.
Promoted to general staff major August 27, 1908.
Promoted to general staff lieutenant-colonel January 14, 1913.
Promoted to general staff colonel October 1 , 1915.
Posts and duties:
Platoon leader of 1st battalion of 7th Infantry Regiment from August
2 , 1896 until October 20, 1897.
Instructor at non-corn infantry school from October 20, 1897 until
September 26, 1898.
Acting commander of 1st company of 24th battalion from October 15,
1900 until October 14, 1901.
Clerk in the General Staff from October 14, 1901. Transferred to the
General Staff May 20, 1905.
Student on state stipend .abroad from until November 27, 1906.
Served in the general military division of the General Staff November
27, 1906 until March 13, 1907.
Assistant chief of staff of Danube Division from March 23, 1907 until
October 3, 1907.
Xlll
 . APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
XlV

Assistant chief of staff of Drina Division October 3, 1907 until May 3,

1909.
Commander o f 1st battalion of 11th infantry regiment from May 3,
1909 until February 9, 1910.
Chief of staff of the Cavalry Division from July 24, 1910 until August
18, 1913 and Professor Strategy at the Lower Course of the Military Aca­
demy from October 15, 1910 until September 1912 .
Chief of the Intelligence Division of the operational section of the Gen­
eral staff from August 18, 1913 until July 1914 and Professor of Strategy GLOSSARY OF SERBIAN TERMS
at Lower Course.
During World War I he continued serving as Intelligence Chief until cetnik-guerrilla fighter

March 27, 19 15. Cetniks-royalist Yugoslav resistance during World War 11

Served as chief of staff of the Timok Army from March 27, 1915 until "Cma Ruka"-the "Black Hand"

March 10, 1916. Cmorukac-member of the "Black Hand' •

Served as assistant chief of staff of Third Army, then chief of staff until gymnasium-classical secondary school

December 16, 1916. komite-guerrilla figher

Vojno-istorijski arhiv, Belgrade
"Mlada Bosna"-"Young Bosnia," nationalistic Bosnian student group
Narodna Odbrana-National Defense, a Serbian national organization
formed in 1908 to oppose Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Hercegovina
Skupstina-Assembly in Serbia, later in Yugoslavia
Sumadija-"land of forests," the heartland of Serbia
"Ujedinjenje iH smrt!"-"Unification or Death!", the formal name of the
organization, founded in 1911 commonly called the "Black Hand."
vojvoda-chieftain, leader of guerrilla fighters
Vojvoda-general, commander-in-chief
Vidovdan-St. Vitus Day, June 15/28, the day when the Turks defeated
the Serbs at the Battle of Kosovo (1389) and when Archduke Franz
Ferdinand was murdered (1914).

XV

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APIS, MARTYR OR MURDERER?
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P�I5TINA ( so�'"'
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I \ Krsta Cicvaric in 1919 about Apis

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•

officer and national revolutionary. Known in Yugoslavia chiefly as the

MACEDOHIA \
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G O IN
leader of a secret Serbian national society nicknamed the "Black Hand,"
AlBANIA �
{ Apis from 1901 until shot by his own government near Salonika, Greece in
l June 1917, played a unique role in the Serbian army and politics. School­
GULF
,..

J GRfECE Of
mates called him "Apis" (The Bull) for his massive physique and dynamic

I ALONI energy; the nickname stuck. Entering the Military Academy in Belgrade at
J sixteen, he later became a General Staff officer. Little Serbia then was
ruled by autocratic King Al.exander Obrenovic whose repressive policies at
home and passivity abroad made him unpopular with nationalistic Serbs.
Young Lieutenant Dimitrijeyic-Apis rose swiftly to prominence after

SERBIA AND ADJACENT LANDS King Alexander in 1900 married Draga Ma�in. his ex-mistress. Humiliated
by their king's inappropriate match with an older woman of dubious re­
pute and indignant at his subservience to their national enemy, Austria-

1
2 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Hungary, Apis and young officer friends organized a farflung conspiracy.
They aimed to remove the Obrenovic royal couple from Serbia's throne
and end unworthy and unpatriotic policies. On May 29, 1903, 1 Junior
Captain Dimitrijevic-Apis led the conspirators to victory but was griev­
ously wounded by royal guards. For weeks Apis hovered between life
and death. The sensational murder of Serbia's rulers horrified Europe.
The May conspirators, relinquishing power promptly to civilian politi­
cians and the new king, Peter Karadjordjevic, continued to exert influence
behind the scenes. In 1906 senior conspirators retired from the army
under foreign pressure. Dominating the junior conspirators with personal
magnetism, Apis won over leading military and political figures and spur­
red essential army reforms. For a decade he remained a leading factor in
Serbian affairs.
Apis above all was a dedicated fighter and national revolutionary. He
favored uniting all Serbs into a Greater Serbia or a Yugoslavia2 much as
Prussia under Bismarck earlier had united most Germans in the German
Empire of 1871. During lengthy visits to Germany, Apis learned the
language, attended army maneuvers, and returned home impressed by the
army's discipline, power, and patriotism. Austria-Hungary's sudden an­
nexation of Bosnia and Hercegovina, two South Slav provinces, in October
1908 provoked a wave of patriotic fervor in Serbia, but Belgrade had to
accept the outcome. Efforts to unite all Serbis under Belgrade's aegis
seemed doomed. Seeking to dispel discouragement and apathy, a few
Serbian officers and civilians in May 1 9 1 1 organized the military society,
''Unification or Death!", soon nicknamed the "Black Hand." Persuaded
to join its Central Executive Committee, Apis soon became its chief
leader. He described its patriotic goals to Foreign Minister Milovanovic
securing his and the government's full support for its activities. Apis per­
suaded Prince Alexander Karadjordjevic, Serbia's heir apparent, to con­
tribute a sizable sum to the newspaper, Piedmont, which became the
"Black Hand's" strident public voice.
A severe illness contracted on a reconnaissance mission in Albania de­
prived Apis of any part in the .Balkan wars of 19 12-1913 which brought
Serbia much of disputed Macedonia. Later in 1913 Lieutenant Colonel
Apis was named head of the General Staffs intelligence division. Inside
Austria-Hungary his agents, headed by ex-insurance salesman, Rade
Malobabic, gathered extensive information for the Serbian high command.
•
Introduction 3
In May 1914 Apis spearheaded the officer corps' resistance to Interior
Minister Stojan Proti<�'s decree prescribing the priority of civil over mili­
tary authority in conquered Macedonia. That involved him in a bitter
power struggle with the Radical government artd Prince Alexander who in
June became Prince Regent. The Prince's intimates at the Serbian court
and in the army, led by Colonel Peter Zivkovic, formed the so-called
"White Hand" to combat the Apis group's vast influence.
Colonel Apis helped organize and direct the conspiracy to muder Arch­
duke Franz Ferdinand, the Austrian heir, on June 15, 1914 in Sarajevo,
Bosnia. His avowed purpose was to prevent or delay an Austrian attack on
Serbia, exhausted from recent wars. Instead, the Archduke's death trig­
gered the outbreak of World War I. Later, Bosnian guerrilla allies of Apis
plotted to kill pro-German kings, Constantine of Greece and Ferdinand
of Bulgaria. During World War I Apis participated in several key cam­
paigns, including the terrible Serbian retreat through Albania and sub­
sequent fighting on the Salonika Front. By then with many colleagues
killed in battle, Apis' faction was gravely weakened.
In December 1916 the Serbian exile regime on Corfu suddenly arrested
Colonel Apis and other surviving "Black Hand" leaders. Accused of trea­
son and attempted murder of Prince Regent Alexander, they were tried
by an officers' military court in Salonika the following spring. Convicted,
their sentences were confirmed by a higher military court packed with
their enemies. Despite vehement protests from Serbian opposition leaders
and Allied powers, Apis and two close colleagues, Major Ljubomir Vulo·
vie and the civilian, Rade Malobabic, were executed near Salonika. The
death sentences of six others were commuted to imprisonment. In postwar
royal Yugoslavia the tragic fate of Apis and the aims of the ''Black Hand"
were debated sharply, but King Alexander's authoritarian regime blocked
any rehabilitation of Apis and his friends. To vindicate his beloved uncle
as a Serbian martyr, Milan Zivanovic after World War Il launched a cam­
paign for a retrial. Held in Socialist Yugoslavia in 1953, the retrial ex··
onerated Apis and his codefendents.
Enough time has elapsed to permit the first objective assessment of
Apis' life and career. No longer do storms of controversy swirl so fiercely
around Apis and the "Black Hand," and abundant materials are available
to the biographer. Crucial is the extensive archive collection over many
years by Apis' nephew. After his death in 1978, that collection came to
 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
4
the Serbian Academy of Sciences in Belgrade. Including many previously
unpublished documents, it constituted the basis for Milan Zivanovic's
thesis and book on his uncle and the Salonika Trial. 3 A labor of love,
Zivanovic's work understandably was biased strongly in the Colonel's
favor. The only other previous book about Apis, brief and partisan, was
a superficial account by a Serbian diplomat and friend who defected to
Germany during World War 1.4 Portions of Vladimir Dedijer's work about
the background of the Sarajevo assassination cast new light on Apis' career,
important for twentieth century Yugoslav and European history. 5 Dedijer
included Apis' previously unpublished farewell letter to his nephew and
examined his alleged connections with Germany. For this biography the
author gathered data from Yugoslav, French, Austrian and British archives,
published documentary collections, newspapers, memoirs, and various
secondary materials.
Since his controversial execution near Salonika, Apis' role and that of
the "Black Hand" have been debated in Yugoslav and foreign historical
literature. Were they dedicated to legitimate patriotic goals outside Serbia
or to subversive agitation against Serbia's dynasty and regime? Did they
aim at a Greater Serbia by joining Montenegro and Serbs of Austria-Hun­
gary to Serbia, or a Yugoslavia-either a Serbian-led royal state like inter­
war Yugoslavia or a genuine federation of all Yugoslav peoples under a
republic or constitutional monarchy? His defenders insist that Apis was a
patriotic and loyal officer dedicated to Serbia's victory in World War I.
His enemies to the contrary claim that he was a traitor and assassin, per­
haps employed by Germany, who plotted to murder the Prince Regent,
overturn the Radical regime and Karadjordjevic dynasty and establish
military rule in Serbia.
Many controversies about Apis, the May conspirators, and the "Black
Hand" persist. What were their motives and political views? They have
been depicted variously as national revolutionaries, monarchists, repub­
licans, militarists, or even proto-Fascists. Some view Apis as a "grey
eminence" who determined all basic decisions and appointments in Serbia
from 1906 to 1914. If so, what explained his preeminence? If A pis' influ­
ence was so extensive, how could the Corfu government have him tried
and executed? Prince Alexander and the Radical Party, once Apis' warm
supporters, became his mortal enemies. Did they quarrel chiefly over
civil vs. military primacy, or control over the army? How significant was
Introduction 5
personal animosity and jealousy toward Apis by "White Hand" leaders
such as Colonels Zivkovic and Kostic?
Colonel Apis' role in the Sarajevo assassination plot remains disputed.
Can one accept his assertions in 1917 that he planned and organized the
murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand? Or did the initiative come from the
revolutionary youths of "Young Bosnia" who implemented the assassina­
tion? If Apis acted as initiator, did he seek to provoke or delay war with
Austria-Hungary? Can he be considered the key figure in the outbreak of
World War I?
Numerous issues arise from Apis' conviction in the controversial Salon­
ika Trial of 1917. For which crime or crimes did the lower military court
sentence him and his friends to death? Who prepared the Salonika Trial?
Critics allege that its organizers sought mainly personal vengeance, either
to remove dangerous opponents from the Serbian scene or to facilitate a
separate peace with Austria-Hungary by punishing organizers of the Sara­
jevo assassination. Was the verdict at Salonika based on fact and law or
was it judicial murder, as Apis' adherents allege? Why did Prince Alex­
ander, while commuting some of the sentences to imprisonment, refuse
to reprieve Apis and his two close friends? Was the Trial's target Apis the
individual, or the "Black Hand" as an organization?' Did exoneration of
Apis and his colleagues at the 1953 Retrial truly "close the case"? Then
why do the three who were executed remain outside Serbia in unmarked
graves?
The activities of Apis and his colleagues raise significant moral issues.
Whether assassination and war are justifiable to achieve widely held popu­
lar goals such as national liberation and unification remains debatable.
Intolerant nationalism employing murder and violence today appears less
heroic than it did in 1914. The May Coup required Apis and other officer
conspirators to violate oaths of loyalty to their king and commander-in­
chief. Were such actions criminal or justifiable by reason of state? Gavrilo
Princip by killing Archduke franz Ferdinand believed he had performed a
heroic and laudable act which resulted in creation of a unified Yugoslav
state; he remains a national hero. Was the Serbian national movement
which helped precipitate a great world war costing millions of lives morally
defensible? Should Apis, who claimed credit for leading the May Coup
against the Obrenovic and for planning the Archduke's assassination be
considered a national hero or the prototype of today's terrorists?
 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
6

The fate of Apis and his friends casts a new light on the royal Yugoslav
regime. Its founders and chief leaders: King Alexander Karadjordjevic;
Nikola Pasic, bearded patriarch of the Radical Party; Interior Minister
Jovanovic-Patak and Colonel Peter Zivkovic-organized the Salonika
Trial, insisting upon Apis' execution despite grave doubts about his guilt.
Preeminent at King Alexander's court throughout the interwar period was
General Zivkovic, a talented homosexual intriguer with a powerful hold
over the King. If these men indeed staged the Salonika Trial chiefly to
secure revenge and to consolidate their personal power, what does that
CHAPTER 11
reveal about the royal regime imposed upon the Yugoslav peoples in 1918?
King Alexander's assassination in Marseilles in 1934 and the swift collapse
of royal Yugoslavia before the Nazi invasion of 1941 might be considered
FACING THEIR OPEN GRAVES (JUNE 1917)

Apis' belated revenge upon his executioners. If Archduke Franz Ferdinand,

The thing is over . . ..The (Higher) Military
"the dead man of Sarajevo,"7 had long arms, so too did Colonel Apis.
These complex and interlocking issues are explored here in his study of Court has condemned me and my friends to
death .... Now I stand before an open grave
Dragutin Dimitrijevic-Apis and his times.Since that fateful June dawn out­
side Salonika where he and his two friends were executed abundant evi­ and do not know how many hours I will re-

dence has surfaced to justify a new and objective examination of his life main in this world . . ..I die innocent ....

and role. I am convinced ...that my death, and the

deaths of my friends, is necessary for the
good of Serbia.
Apis to Milan Zivanovic, June 12/25, 1 9 1 7

Salonika Officers ' Prison, June 12/25, Evening: Apis remained in ter­
rible suspense about the Prince Regent's decision. Several times that even­
ing, recorded Captain Milan Stojkovic, the prison commander, Apis had
called him to his cell to ask about the verdict.The previous time, having
flnished his last testament, Apis, agitated, was pacing the room. But Stoj­
kovic could tell him nothing. No decision would come that night, concluded
Apis. "He had had little for �upper and went to bed early, so when I came
to him with the priest at eleven PM, he was sleeping soundly.I awakened
him, and he roused himself and sat on the bed." 1
To Apis's amazement Father Zdravko Paunovic came in with the Cap­
tain.Then it dawned upon him.His worst fears were being realized: Prince

7
 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
8
Regent Alexander must have confmned his death sentence. But Apis shook
hands warmly with the aged priest, and Stojkovic left them alone. Until
that moment Apis had hoped the death sentences imposed by Salonika's
Lower Military Court upon him and his comrades, most of which the
Higher Military Court had upheld, might be commuted by the Prince to
imprisonment. Father Makarije had already heard his confession, so why
had Father Paunovic come to his cell so late? Would the verdict be carried
out that very night? Unknown to Apis, the organizers of the Salonika
Trial badly wanted a confession of guilt from the three to be executed:
Colonel Dirnitrijevic-Apis, Major Ljubomir Vulovic, and Rade Malobabic.
Yet Father Makarije, who had seen them, flatly refused to divulge what
he had heard in confession. Serbian law prescribed that before execution,
a priest should hear confessions of the condemned, administer commun­
ion, accompany them to the execution site, and hold a service at their
graves. When Father Makarije proved obdurate, Colonel Milan Dunjic,
Salonika garrison commander, upon instruction dispatched the aged
Paunovic who agreed to report everything to the authorities.
Father Paunovic began his account of his visit to Apis:
The room is large, the door open, well lighted by a lamp on a table
in the middle of the room.Dragutin [Apis] did not notice our en­
trance. He was lying on the bed his face toward the ceiling. An of­
ficer [Stojkovic] preceded me, went up to him and said: 'Colonel, sir!'
Jumping up hastily, Colonel Apis offered the priest both his hands, brought
him a chair, and urged him to be seated. Why had Paunovic come so late?
When the priest explained, Apis thanked him warmly:
So they have convicted us, but what our heads and lives will give
them I don't know. Do you know if the Crown has confirmed our
sentences and whether they will shoot all of us and when, or have
some at least been reprieved?
Paunovic pleaded ignorance. "Surely," objected Apis, "the verdict was
approved before they let you come to us tonight. That means we'll be
shot tomorrow . ...Have you been to see my other friends?" He had seen
only Vulovic and Malobabic, replied Paunovic. "That means we three are
finished!" exclaimed Apis.
Facing Their Open Graves 9
Paunovic knew that several other officers condemned to death by the
Salonika courts had been reprieved, but he intimated he would be seeing
all the convicted officers. Knowing Apis' distress that his friends from the
"Black Hand" would be shot because of him, ·the Serbian authorities
wished to prolong his uncertainty to the end. But Paunovic's admission
he had seen only Vulovic and Malobabic convinced Apis that just three
would face the firing squad."The fewer the better; that is how I had cal­
culated," said Apis. "Thus it is death! ...That means I should have died
in the war, but God did not grant that, wishing me to perish thus instead,
probably because the interests of Greater Serbia and Yugoslavia demand
it.All right, if it is to be so, then I will die calmly and easily. Believe me,
sir," he continued, grasping the priest's hand vigorously, "our intentions,
desires and activities were totally patriotic, but shit was drawn into the
organization . ...Thus everthing went wrong." Some "Black Hand" mem­
bers indeed had sinned. " ...When those devils got their toenails in,
everything went wrong and we ended up here .... "
If your intentions were solely patriotic, objected Paunovic, your deeds
should have been great and bright.Then why did you act secretly, inspir­
ing fear and doubt? Why did "Unification or Death!" become at birth a
scarecrow and bogeyman? Did not secrecy draw many into that dark
labyrinth for selfiSh and unworthy reasons, turning patriotic dreams to
dust? Apis sought to explain:
But it could not have been otherwise . ...We had already spilled
blood and carried out the revolution of May 29th [ 1903]. And
when we saw that we had been mistaken, then we thought we had
to do everything in secrecy.Since the cause was almost lost because
some comrades betrayed us, secrecy and caution became even more
essential ....But I never believed [Nikola] Pasic and Stojan Protic
and the Radical Party would oppose us?
•
Why did Radical leaders turn against the conspirators?, Paunovc inquir-
ed. And why did Apis blame them? The Radicals, stated the Colonel, ap­
proved the May 1903 coup initially. This toppled the Obrenovic rulers,
brought the rival Karadjordjevic dynasty to Serbia's throne, and the Radi­
cals to power. Then they quarreled with the 1903 conspirators, persecuted
and sought to eliminate them. "Unable to think of anything else, they had
10 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Facing Their Open Grave 11

to involve us in an assassination attempt and then cause our deaths.3 There­
fore I complain most about Pa5ic and Protic since we had not expected
this of them. They had suffered long from Obrenovic persecution; they
should have helped and reprieved us." Apis and his friends believed Inter­
ior Minister Ljubomir Jovanovic-Patak and his police had concocted the
entire Salonika Trial.
Why had Rade Malobabic been involved with the "Black Hand"? asked
the priest. Rade, Apis explained, was a dedicated Serbian agent in Bosnia
and Austria; the authorities accused him of shooting at Prince Regent
Alexander so they could condemn "Black Hand" leaders to death.
Thus my conscience is clear and I can die in peace. I am a person
good in spirit like my late mother, God forgive her, and therefore
have never done any evil to anyone. Why am I to be shot? I do not
know. I shall die peacefully, especially if and when the interests of
Greater Serbia and Yugoslavia demand it.
farewell to you, and through you to all our folk in Serbia, I ask you,
when that happy moment comes when you see them again, to em­
brace and kiss them and assure them how much I loved them all and
wished them every happiness and good fortune.
Referring to his imminent death and those responsible, Apis wrote:
I die innocent. They found us guilty and deserving death. That is
politics, and strictly for reasons of internal policy we must leave this
world. I shall die peacefully and with a clear conscience. I will feel
no pain because I am dying from Serbian weapons convinced I am
perishing only because the authorities have decided that my death
and the deaths of my friends is necessary for the good of Serbia. For
that cause I have always been prepared to give up my transitory,
earthly life.

Assuring his nephew he could be proud of his relative, Apis emphasized

Paunovic noted he must visit other convicted officers. Did Apis first wish
Milan's heavy family responsibilities:
to confess and take communion? He had not received communion for a
long time, responded Apis, nor would he now. He had harmed no one.
I hope that you knew me well and will be convinced that your uncle
Silence ensued as Apis pondered. As a priest and friend of his uncle did
was an honorable man with a good heart, a good soul, a boundlessly
Paunovic believe he should hear his confession? The priest claimed he then
enthusiastic Serb who believed in the better future of Serbdom and
delivered an entire sermon, persuading Apis to confess and take com­
the Yugoslavs .. .. And you be and remain always a good and honor­
munion.4
able man and an honorable Serb. I am convinced you will live in
Apis requested Paunovic to transmit to his nephew a farewell letter
more fortunate times and will not have to struggle as we have had to
and drafts of his remarks in court. he could do so, declared the priest,
struggle for Serbdom.That gives me hope that you, in your life, can
only if Captain Stojkovic agreed. They summoned the Captain and Pauno­
dedicate yourself more to our dear ones and work more peacefully
vic read him parts of Apis' farewell letter. Saying there was no need to
for your and our family's well-being.
read it all, Stojkovic returned it to Paunovic, authorizing him to give it to
Apis' nephew, Milan Zivanovic. 5 The package of notes Stojkovic would
Milan must cherish and protect its women and children while preparing llim­
deliver to Salonika commandant, Colonel Dunjic. Apis left other personal
self for a productive life.
effects and his last testament on his table.' •

Was it perhaps this passage which caused the architects of Apis' convic-
Colonel Apis' letter to Milan reveals his feelings after he learned that
tion and death to withhold Apis' letter from his nephew?
the Higher Military Court had upheld the death sentences of seven of
them. 7 With only a few hours to live:
I truely die innocent. In the future, if you fmd it necessary you can

All those hours I dedicate to our dear ones, to Serbia and to you, seek means to confirm this. When conditions are orderly and passions

dear boy. In my thoughts I am with you and embrace you alJ. Saying subside, you can seek also by legal means to confirm our innocence.

•
 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
12
For us that will have no significance, but you, if you wish, can at­
tempt it. In the court documents there are traces and you can easily
fmd the path you should follow to establish our innocence. I do not
leave this to you as a duty, but only bring it to your attention so
that you may know.
Somehow, young Milan discerned his uncle's desire for vindication, care­
fully concealed by those who doomed him. Milan would devote much of
his life to rehabilitate his uncle's reputation.
Apis exhorted Milan to "embrace my dear sister who protected and
nurtured me" and thank other family members for their "boundless love
towards me. Kiss the hand of our dear Dad and ask him to believe that I
always loved and respected him like my own father. "8
Now he would set out on the path taken earlier by his mother, Jovanka,
"who taught me to be good." Surely, on the other side he would find all
the deceased relatives and friends "who made my life on earth happy and
who eagerly await me once again. My path to eternity is much easier for
me since I know I am going whence they all departed earlier." His pain was
terrible, nonetheless, for leaving the living, especially "because I am un­
able to see you all once in person and to embrace you." Concluded Apis:
I am deeply moved by our parting, my dear little Milan, and embrace
and kiss you, my loved one, with all my heart and soul. My last wish
for all of you is that you be happy and accept calmly my tragic
death, just as I leave this world with a calm and clear conscience.9
Withholding this poignant letter comprised a terrible blot on Father Pauno­
viC's memory. From fear, servility or feebleness, he obeyed those who gave
him an unworthy mission, not his conscience and his God.
Leaving Apis, Paunovic went into the duty officer's office so tired,
nervous and upset he could barely stand. As he left that office, the other
convicted men were leaving another room where Salonika commandant,
Colonel Dunjic, had infonned them their death sentences had been com­
munted to imprisonment.
1 I: 55 PM.· In the room of the supervising prison officers, the Prince
Regent's decree amending the Higher Military Court's verdict was com­
municated to the others convicted in the Salonika Trial.1 0 Learning they
Facing Their Open Graves 13
had been reprieved, they grew animated. One shouted: "Long live the
Heir!" Major Velimir Vemic, originally condemned to death, proclaimed
loudly: "My wish is to use the remainder of my life to prove my innocence
and that I deserved mercy." The reprieved were· informed that next day
they could send thanks to Prince Alexander. Now after six months con­
finement, they could converse with one another, move more freely, and
receive visits.
When the others were summoned to receive this happy news, Apis re­
mained in his room, unaware of their departure. About 1 1 : 3 0 PM he sum­
moned Captain Stojkovic, who sent his deputy, Lieutenant J osif Protic,
who earlier had served under Apis. Protic found the Colonel sitting at his
table smoking. "Ah, there you are, dear Protic !" exclaimed Apis warmly
and offered him a cigarette. "And where is dear Stojkovic, are we going to
see him?" The Captain was busy, responded Protic, but would accompany
them to the execution site. "Well, thus my dear fellow, as you see I have
lost the game. I t is all over." Continued Apis nervously: "Look, you can
see I am now as quiet as a child, I'm not at all worried. Please smoke. I'm
smoking a lot since it is for the last time." After lighting Protic's cigarette,
Apis remarked:
Now there is something you can do for me. Greet Ljuba 'Patak'
(Interior Minister Ljubomir Jovanovic] . . . . Tell him he has won
the game, but let him watch out since if he has erred, his children
will atone for it. I blame him alone for being abandoned by my
people and friends. I erred, Protic, but I never expected them to sign
my death warrant . . . . But you'll see, I shall die quietly, complete­
ly peacefully.
Would Protic please transmit his last testament and a package of letters
and documents to his nephew? "I know you have to show all this lto the
authorities] . Then give wh�tever remains to my dear nephew so he'll
remember his uncle. I have no other descendants." Then Apis gave Protic
11
his most prized military decoration, the star of Karadjordje:
I know they'U strip me of my rank. I'll go with my stripes and cock­
ade, but I don't want to go to my execution with this decoration.
You are an officer, so I'll give this to you as a memento since I don't
•
14 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
want it to go to my family. You know, I wore it honorably for sev­
eral years, but then being engaged in this unfortunate political mat­
ter and things that were forbidden, unworthy things according to
them, I consider that I am, in their view, unworthy as an officer, so
I don't want to carry this on my fmal journey; keep it.
His briefcase and cigarette case would go to Captain Stojkovic. Gently,
Protic informed Apis they would be leaving for the execution site about
1 AM. Then Protic left the room, not trusting himself to look at the con­
demned Apis. 1 2
Just after 1 AM, related Stojkovic, he found Apis walking around his
room. He told him it was time to leave. Instead of putting on his blouse,
the Colonel looked at him questioningly. Commandant Dunjic and the
others were waiting for them below, insisted Stojkovic. Picking up a sum­
mer tunic he had never worn in prison, Apis asked hesitantly: "Are you
going to be with me?" As the Captain nodded, Apis quickly put on the
tunic and buttoned it. Suddenly changing his questioning, uncertain be­
havior, Apis smiled. He asked permission to bid farewell to comrades re­
maining in the prision and the guards. As he did so, the Colonel appeared
resolute, pleasant and wholly natural. But anyone who knew him well
realized his calmness was somewhat forced. Stojkovic discerned that the
Colonel still hoped for a last minute reprieve.
A fleet of automobiles awaited them below. Apis and the Captain
entered the second car; Major Vulovic and Protic the first; and Malobabic
and Priest Paunovic the third. All were accompanied by gendarmes. As
they entered the car, Apis pointed to the running board: "You've got
something broken there." Stojkovic sat next to Apis with a sergeant of the
guard; on his right was the Captain's orderly. Apis turned to him: "Ah, so
it is you, Yule! It is only right that you should now rest a little." Apis
cautioned the soldiers: "Just aim well at me!" He lit one cigarette after
another but spoke very calmly: "Do we have far to go? Where is this place?
Why are we going by night when the soldiers won't be able to see to aim?
They should wait for it to grow light." Asked Stojkovic: "Aren't you go­
ing to scold anyone even now?" Laughing, Apis said: "You know I often
told you about these people; this is their thanks after fourteen years, yet
they would be beggars if it were not for me."13 But if it would benefit
Greater Serbia, so be it. "Look at me, I am completely calm and fear
Facing Their Open Grave 15
nothing. This isn't the first time I have faced bullets; I faced them on May
29th [ 1903] " Then sharply, ironically: "Greet Vemic; he acted shame­
.
fully. I've already told you all that I did for him. I quarreled with my
friends because of him, believing him to be an honoi:able man." 14
Priest Paunovic, entering the third car with Malobabic and another
officer and a soldier, found it as dark inside as the interior of a jar. As they
left Salonika, nothing was visible. Where were they headed? Malobabic,
handcuffed, stared miserably before him, holding his hands in front of
his face as if in prayer. "I know Salonika well," he said, "but I don't know
where we are going, though it seems to me we are on the road to Mikra."
He was right. The procession turned off the Mikra road to a lonely ravine.
When they reached the turnoff at Bejas-kule, Apis queried: "How many
of us are there? This is really a big escort." Declared Captain Stojkovic:
"You, Vulovic and Malobabic; the others were reprieved." "The fewer
the better," responded Apis relieved. A little further on Stojkovic re­
marked: "I am surprised you didn't write something." Responded Apis:
"1 regret that 1 didn't have time to write a history of my activities, but
that would have taken me two years. I needed the energy and strength
for my work." Leaning toward Stojkovic, the Colonel said slowly:
I emphasized to you once that I may have erred by writing openly
in that letter and at those hearings that I planned the Sarajevo as­
sassination. I would say now that this is the main reason for my
death. 15
Looking at the caravan of automobiles, he remarked ironically: "That's
the way it is tonight. Still you see that this circus is officially pompous, I
and Radojlovic!"1'
The procession halted near the execution site. 17 Getting out of the auto­
mobiles,they proceeded on fqot for almost twenty minutes through a dark
ravine by the light of lanterns. Lieutenant Protic led the way, followed by
Vulovic limping on his bad leg, then Apis and Stojkovic. Apis asked if he
could converse with Vulovic, and when Stojkovic nodded, he joked: "How
is it going, Ljubo, can you make it? This is one form of night wartime ser­
vice." Protested Major Vulovic: "Look, Protic, where are you taking us
through this swamp?" Apis added: "Look, we are going alive into a black
16 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
pit." He requested Stojkovic to tell his family how he had looked during
these final hours. "Don't say that you were in command but were present.
I should have written something about you, but. . . " he broke off. Did he
wish to complain about anyone concerning the trial and impending execu­
tion? wondered Stojkovic. ' 'The whole thing was the work of Ljuba Jo­
vanocic," affirmed Apis. "And the assassination attempt was investigated
and arranged by Sotir Arandjelovic. Say that if asked when they seek to
rehabilitate us. The key lies in Temeljko and Djordje." 13 Then Apis add­
ed: "Greet Tuca and tell him to pay attention to my unfortunate nephew.
I am sorry for that child. Thus is fate, but what can one do?'"9 As they
arrived at the execution spot, Apis turned around, smoking and talking.
Vulovic queried: "But Dragutin, it looks as if it is only the three of us!"
"Yes, that's right, Lj uba, the others have been reprieved, and if so, that
is good."
Finally they reached the spot, then had to wait about twenty minutes
before the proceedings began. The first signs of dawn were appearing in
the east. Protic looked at his watch-it was 3:20 AM. A platoon of soldiers
was carrying out preliminary tasks aided by three lanterns. The fifteen
men assigned to the shooting were loading their rifles. Colonel Dunjic
examined the three graves which had been hastily and inexpertly dug. The
condemned officers stood about a yard in front of these gaping holes each
with a six foot pole in the middle. Apis went up to Lieutenant Colonel
Dabic to ask whether he had come to represent the military court. Dabic
replied that he would be reading the verdicts aloud. Several times Apis and
Vulovic requested that they wait for dawn, and that the soldiers take care­
ful aim so that their faces would not be disfigured; they were assured this
would be done. In a shaking voice Apis told Dabic: "Do you see, Ljubo,
what misfortune has overtaken me? Believe me, I am innocent." Dabic
replied that he was sorry for him as a friend and officer who could serve
the fatherland far more usefully but that the law required his death. With
evident joy Apis took up that idea:
Please tell my friends that I do not regret that I die from Serbian
guns because it is for Greater Serbia, which I wish to see realized
soon. Indeed, under the law I am guilty , and thus it had to be be­
20
cause I had strained relations too much and therefore had to fall.
Facing Their Open Grave 17
As the preparations proceeded, the three condemned comrades, reunited
after six months enforced separation, talked or whispered to one another.
In a loud whisper overheard by Paunovic, Malobabic lamented: "See where
you have brought me?" Replied Apis: "Well, maybe if you hadn't been
with us, we wouldn't be here either." Apis obtained Colonel Dunjic's per­
mission to speak with Father Paunovic. They went to one side where Apis
again urged the priest to deliver his farewell letter to his nephew and assure
his family that he had thought about them to the end. Then Vulovic came
up and gave Father Paunovic letters and messages for his wife.21 Looking
at the three graves in the dark ravine, Apis remarked in jest to Dabic: "Why
didn't they pick a better place for us, somewhere up above where one can
view the sea? You know there should be some scenery!" Apis was still
holding up well, noted Dabic, but he was greatly changed, very pale and
his voice shook. From time to time he consoled Malobabic, telling him
once: "Had you remained in Kursurnlje , both you and I would have re­
"22
mained alive.
Now the military tribunal assembled behind a table flanked with lan­
terns. The three condemned men stood before it near their open graves.
For the military court Colonel Dabic began to read the lengthy verdicts.
Wearing a pince-nez and black havelock, he read rapidly but fluently in a
cool, cynical voice. The doctor and priest stood to one side and the soldiers
formed a broad semi-circle. The condemned seemed not to be listening­
they had heard these charges many times. Apis continued to smoke one
cigarette after another, as the three whispered softly, smiled, and looked
at one another lovingly as the intimate friends they were. At one point
Dabic reprimanded Malobabic for whispering. When he read about the
attempt on Prince Alexander, the condemned looked at each other dub­
iously as if saying: that never happened! Apis said in an undertone to
Vulovic: "When we were united and powerful, the Regent wanted to place
himself at our head." Replied Vulovic calmly: "Apis, there is no point in
breaking our head over that. .The soldiers' bullets will take care of it."
About half way through the reading Malobabic, thin as a skeleton, and
with his fe ttered hands raised looking like a child praying, pleaded that his
irons be removed. That was done.
Above the nortl1ern end of the ravine , notes Brehm, one could see on the
other side of the dark, towering mountains a thin band of light moving
back and forth. From the distance came a faint rumbling through the night.
-
18 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
The [Saloni ka] front does not sleep," noted Apis. The officers at the table
looked up too and listened. "The French are constantly on guard,'' re­
marked Colonel Dunjic, "and the Bulgars, brought in after the last battle,
are tired and don't want to fight any more." Commented Vulovic: "The
dead man of Sarajevo has long anns. He reaches from the grave and catches
us all, one after the other." Declared Apis: "I only envy the man who will
see victory with his own eyes." He continued:
And if I had only experienced one thing, I would have to say that
life has been beautiful. Never, not even over there in eternity, will I
forget that day in December 1914 when we entered recaptured Bel­
grade. The people in the streets cried and grasped for joy as King
Peter drove through the streets, and his car rolled over the banner
abandoned by the Austrians and into the palace.
"Better not think about it," advised Vulovic. "Our fall thereafter was too
great. We haven't chosen a bad time to die . . . . It is better to lie a couple
of feet deep in the earth where one cannot hear the moans of despair."
Objected Apis: "But also one would not hear the victory celebrations."23
At one point in the reading Dabic stopped and asked for water. As he
put down the jug brought by a soldier, Major Vulovic turned to him:
"Namesake , please give me some too." After drinking, Vulovic turned to
Dabic: "Hopefully you don't have syphillis." Replied Dabic cynically:
"It is rather late now to worry about that." Persisted Vulovic: "The devil
only knows how much I was infected on Corfu, but I'd like to enter the
afterlife heal thy on my crooked leg." The officers laughed and even the
priest could not suppress a small grin.
"We will continue reading the verdicts," announced Colonel Dabic.
"Now comes the most boring part," groaned Apis, "the invented attempt
on the Prince Regent's life near Ostrovo." And indeed Dabic now intoned:
"In order to realize your plans, you tried to kill the Prince Regent. You
intended to murder the Premier, eliminate the Constitution and take poli­
tical freedoms away from the people." "Aha," noted Apis, "they are silent
about our supposed attempt to betray the Serbian front to the enemy."
Added Vulovic: "Clever brothers. They have squatted over this verdict
long enough to come up with something elaborate." During the lengthy
reading Apis smoked over forty cigarettes. With a wooden smile, he cracked
Facing Their Open Grave 19
rather forced jokes. He was constantly turning this way and that, looking
in all directions as if he were expecting someone . Until the end he never
lost hope of a reprieve and expected a car to drive up at any moment. Apis
had given away three packs of cigarettes to Protic for distribution to the
soldiers, but the reading dragged on so long that he ran out and had to
bum several from the lieutenant.
Finally, at 4:30 AM Dabic finished reading. It was still noticeably cool,
dew was falling, and the morning wind chilled the ravine. The soldiers rose
and struck their shoulders with their anns for wannth. The candle's faint
flames were extinguished. As Dabic closed his briefcase loudly, Apis
quiered: "Is it time to say farewell?" Dabic nodded. First Apis, then the
others came up to the tribunal table and greeted the officers. Apis stopped
in front of Colonel Dunjic: "You arrested me, Milan, you were my enemy.
You are on the other side, but I won't hold it against you. Believe me,
because facing death one does not lie, what has been read is simply un­
true." Colonel Dunjic shook his hand, looked down and remained silent,
as if tacitly agreeing with Apis. The latter went up to Father Paunovic
to thank him for consoling them. "Day after tomorrow is St. Vitus Day
[Vidovdan] . May God grant that Serbia will again soon celebrate that day
on the newly freed Field of Kosovo. "24 Embracing Paunovic, Apis then
took the priest's hand to kiss it. When the priest resisted, Apis pleaded:
"Please permit me to kiss you as I would father and mother." Paunovic
let him kiss his hand, and the other condemned did likewise.
Then Colonel Dabic ordered Lieutenant Protic to remove rank and
insignia from the condemned. Protic took the braid from their caps, their
cockades and epaulettes. Holding the whimpering Malobabic by the hand,
Apis turned and declared: "This is a good Serb and an honorable man;
believe me he is not guilty . Then looking at his friend, Apis said: "Only be
brave, Rade . . . . " Malobabic fell sobbing on Apis' powerful neck and
pressed his face on his broad chest. Rade kept his head lowered. He did
not wish to see darkness yietd to daylight as the sun emerged over the
edge of the ravine.
Now the three turned around. The cheerless grey wall of the quarry re­
semble d a split skull, notes Brehm, on whose peak a few red wisps of hair
still stood, as the sun had already bathed the bushes up above in red. It
was time for the denouement. The accompanying officers led the con­
demned men to the three graves. As Apis stood before the righthand grave,
-

20 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Facing Their Open Graves 21

he remarked: "Here too according to age and rank. I as senior officer will off. Shrieking vultures flew over the ravine with wings extended. "What's
stand to the right for my last report." Saying farewell to Captain Stojkovic happened has happened," declared one officer philosophically before
and shaking hands with Dabic and Protic, Apis leaped straight into his turning to go. "We have brought them down; should we one day fall into
grave. As if made of wax and holding a half-smoked cigarette, he looked their hands, then let the friends of Apis do the same to us." All those
young, decisive and powerful, recalled Stojkovic, "reminding me of us present, noted Paunovic, seemed embarrassed and humbled at this ter­
younger officers in the Turkish War. 25 In its first battles we were bold, rible sight.
contemptuous of death." Lieutenant Protic bound Apis to the pole in his
grave with a rope, as prescribed by law. Once bound, Apis objected: "This
grave is too small for me."2� Protic then blindfolded him, also according
to law. Remonstrated Apis: "But now I can't smoke." Protic responded:
"Go ahead and smoke." Vulovic had to be helped into his grave by Lieu­
tenant Protic. The soldiers carried the howling Malobabic and deposited
him in the lefthand grave. As a soldier began to blindfold him, Malobabic
protested piteously: "I want to see the sun!" Apis told him: "Let them
do it, Rade. The law requires it thus."
Now the pale wall of the quarry grew ever brighter though the light
•

hesitated to penetrate the corner of the ravine. The mystery of darkness

had succumbed to daylight. The three condemned stood blindfolded be­
fore the dark pilings as the soldiers marched back to their platoon. How
Apis looked then, recalled Stojkovic, bound to the pole, the kerchief not
yet covering his eyes, was poignant. "That facial expression, sad and ques­
tioning, with a terrible, glassy stare." After his eyes were bound, Colonel
Apis shouted: "Long live Greater Serbia! Long live Yugoslavia!"27 From
the neighboring grave echoed Vulovic: "Long live Greater Serbia. Greet
our children when you go . . . . "
But Captain Stojkovic had already raised his sabre, then commanded:
"Fire!" That first salvo killed Malobabic outright. Apis came loose from
the pole, his head supported by the left side of his grave. Blood poured
from his powerful frame, but he still lived. Vulovic moved his left arm.
After another volley, the doctor confirmed their deaths. 23 A pis was
stretched out nicely in his grave, recalled Protic; his arms were crossed
and his face calm and clear. None of the bullets had struck his head; the
soldiers, heeding the condemned men's pleas, had shot truly. Protic cov­
ered A pis' face with a black kerchief and placed his cap on his head; the
same was done for the others. The graves were filled in and Priest Pauno­
vic intoned a requiem. The soldiers then grabbed their rifles and marched

•

CHAPTER III
THE BIRTH OF A BULL
The inhabitants of Memphis and On . . . gave
the place of honour to the bull, worshipped
as Hapi (Apis) . . . . When he had been identi­
fied, his birth was carefully recorded, and he
was ceremoniously conducted into the
temples of Ptah. For the rest of his life he
was . . . loaded with honours, and when he
died the entire populace went into mourning.
Everyday Life in Egypt, p. 276
Early in August 1876 two Serbian boys were born in Belgrade to
mothers in very different circumstances, boys whose fates would be closely
intertwined. "On the eve of the Transfiguration, the newborn babe cried
in Cetinjska Street," recalled Apis' older sister, Jelena. His mother, Jovanka,
a cheerful, dignified and old fashioned woman, joked: "Oh, too bad the
Queen didn't wait for two or three days, then my son could have been
greeted by the roar of cannon." 1 ovanka did not suspect that her well­
developed, powerful male babe, Dragutin, would usher the newly born
prince to a premature death only twenty-seven years later, then himself
succumb to a firing squad authorized by a Serbian crown prince. For the
other boy was Prince Alexander Obrenovic, only son of Prince Milan
22
•
Birth of a Bull 23
Obrenovic. He flrst saw the light on August 2, 1876 in the old palace, torn
down after the 1 903 coup. The humble home where on August 5th new­
born Dragutin T . Dimitrijevic (later Apis) lay wailing would later be re­
placed by a beer factory. Jelena recalled that it was a dilapidated, one­
story adobe building typical of old Turkish Belgrade.
As these two infants entered the world, the small autonomous Princi­
pality of Serbia faced a grave crisis. Late in June 1876, amidst extravagant
expectations of victory, tiny Serbia and Montenegro declared war on their
suzerain, the sprawling Ottoman Empire. Several thousand Russian volun­
teers flocked to serve in Serbia's eastern army, commanded by retired
Russian General M. G. Cherniaev. He proclaimed the war a crusade against
the infldel Turks.2 Officially , tsarist Russia remained neutral in this war,
but Russians sympathized strongly with their embattled Orthodox Slav
brethren. By early August Cherniaev's army of poorly trained Serbian
peasants, taken straight from their plows, had suffered severe defeats. As the
Serbs fought desperately on their own soil against better trained and
equipped Turkish regulars, youthful Prince Milan Obrenovic appealed to
the European great powers to arrange an armistice .
Serbia in 1876 was an overwhelmingly agricultural little country of
about 1 ,400,000 people, carved from primeval forests and still officially
part of the Ottoman Empire. Belgrade continued to pay tribute money to
the sultan in Constantinople. After four centuries under direct Ottoman
rule, �e Serbs had first revolted in 1804 under Karadjordje ("Black
George") Petrovic , a prosperous pig merchant. That attempt failed eventu­
ally, but in 1 8 1 5 the Serbs rose again under Milos Obrenovic, a rival of
Karadjordje. Gaining a few victories, the clever Milos with Russia's diplo­
matic support became hereditary prince of a small, autonomous vassal
state. Until 1903 Serbia would suffer from the bitter rivalry of two con­
tending dynasties-the descendants of Karadjordje Petrovic and Milo§
Obrenovic, who ordered Karadjordje murdered in 1817. 3
By 1876 Turkish garris�>ns and citydwellers had departed and Serbia
enjoyed full autonomy. Most Serbs were small independent farmers living
in scattered villages in the "land of forests" (Sumadija). Only one in ten
lived in towns of which the largest was Belgrade , the capital, with some
30,000 inhabitants. Belgrade's rough cobbled streets and squat adobe
houses gave it a quaint Asiatic appearance. Since 1858 the restored Obreno­
vic dynastry ruled Serbia while in neighboring Austria-Hungary lived
•
24 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Pretender Peter Karadjordjevic, grandson of Karadjordje, whose adherents
in Serbia plotted for his return. Prince Milan, only nineteen when his son,
Alexander, was born, retained power precariously. He relied on a small
professional anny, swelled in wartime by a fanners' militia, and ministers
like haughty Premier Jovan Ristic, Serbia's leading statesman.
The Dimitrijevics were of Cincar (Vlach) origin, a people from Mace­
donia noted for energy and business acumen.4 Christening the new baby
Dragutin, the family left Belgrade hastily for Kragujevac, site of Serbia's
only arms factory. In that provincial town in the heart of Sumadija, Todor
Dimitrijevic, Dragutin's father, and his two brothers-all tinsmiths-pre­
pared cartridges for the hardpressed army. In October 1876 after Serbia's
defeat, the family returned to Belgrade. Late in 1877 Serbia fought the
Turks again as an ally of Russia and won some territory. The Congress of
Berlin ( 1 878) recognized her as fully sovereign and independent but con­
finned her complete dependence on Austria-Hungary. As a reward for
loyal subservience to Vienna, Prince Milan Obrenovic became king of
Serbia in 1882.
Little Dragutin, growing up with two older sisters, Jelena and Milica,
was loved and pampered by everyone in a family impoverished even by
Serbian standards of that time. When Dragutin was five, his grown-up
sister, Jelena, was hired as a schoolteacher in Kraljevo, a small south
Serbian town. Jelena took her mother, grandmother, sister and brother
to Kraljevo where Dragutin began primary school. In July 1884 Jelena
requested transfer to a larger town where secondary schools would be
available for her siblings and her father could practice his trade. Late in
1884 the family moved to Nis, but soon thereafter the father, Todor, fell
ill and died. Later, Apis almost never mentioned his father who apparently
played little part in his upbringing. Completing his primary schooling,
Dragutin began attending the NiS classical gymnasium in 1885, a disastrous
year for Serbia.5 Indignant over the unification of neighboring Bulgaria,
King Milan Obrenovic incautiously declared war. Only three days later the
Serbian army was humiliated at Slivnica. Only Austrian intervention pre­
vented the Serbs from losing territory. The Slivnica debacle, a devastating
blow to Serbian pride and prestige, contributed to King Milan's abdication
four years later.
When Dragutin and his family arrived, NiS was full of soldiers and
martial music. The athletic, well-developed nine year old ran continually
Birth of a Bull 25
after the soldiers and revelled in the sound of beating drums. While Jelena
nursed wounded from the nearby front, Dragutin accompanied groups of
soldiers to their assigned hospitals. Perhaps right then the idea of a mili­
tary career took root in the young Dragutin's mind. The fatherless and
ambitious youngster, surrounded with female love and attention, devel­
oped the profound need to prove his manhood. Jelena confirmed that
Dragutin was temporarily shattered by Serbia's defeat at Slivnica. Soon
rebounding, the energetic and restless pupil learned quickly in school and
always ended the year with excellent grades. Outgoing, loyal and gregar­
ious, Dragutin made many friends at school and got along well with his
teachers.
Soon Jelena, the family's sole support, was betrothed to Zivan Zivano­
vic, a politician and historian. They were married in Nis, then the entire
family moved permanently to Belgrade. Zivan Zivanovic grew steadily
more prominent and provided a comfortable, secure life for his adopted
family. From 1890 they resided in a sizable house at 21 Holy Sava Street.
There Jelena played a key role in Dragutin's upbringing. Until he reached
the highest (seventh) class in the gymnasium, Dragutin had not decided
definitely on a career. Then at sixteen in his final year of gymnasium, he
resolved rather suddenly to enter the cadet corps of the Belgrade Military
Academy. Jelena believed he was much influenced by a close friend,
Mihajlo Jovanovic. Constantly together, the friends entered the Academy's
26th class in 1 892.
A law of 1880 had transformed the fonner Artillery School into Serbia's
Military Academy.' A regular three year course-"the lower school"-
-
trained officers for all branches of service. A two year "upper school'
prepared officers for the General Staff and higher commands. Into the
"lower school" were accepted sixteen to twenty year old "youths of
good conduct." Gymnasium graduates were accepted readily ; others like
Dragutin had to take a rigorous entrance examination which tested them
in mathematics, sciences, geography, history, literature, languages, and
drawing. Imposing strict military discipline, the Academy demanded pre­
cision, accuracy and neatness, qualities which Dimitrijevic-Apis displayed
throughout his career. Cadets received pay according to their class and
standing. Already nicknamed ''Apis'' by his comrades for his powerful
build and dynamic energy, Dragutin proved an able and conscientious
cadet. He completed the lower school in 1896 standing sixth in his class,
excelling in everything but drawing.
26 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Dragutin displayed no particular interest in women either then or later,
recalled his brother-in -law. 7 Although enjoying their company, Apis never
expressed to family members any desire to marry. Dedicated early to a
military career and constantly in the company of cadets and officers, Apis
from age twenty-three became involved deeply in politics and conspiracy.
Apparently he never contemplated marriage or having a family of his own.
Throughout his life, his sister's family remained the center of his personal
world. Their home on Holy Sava Street always remained his headquarters.
Dragutin was close to and showed deep affection for all family members,
especially his sister's children with whom from age ten he had grown up.
Later, even his life insurance policy read: "In behalf of my sister's child­
ren." His mother, Jovanka, confirmed his warmhearted, affectionate
nature.
External events interrupted periodically Apis' dedicated military studies.
Serbia's humilitation and military weakness after 1878 helped explain the
young officer's decision to become a conspirator and national revolu­
tionary. Dependent on Austria after the Berlin Congress, King Milan
severed Serbia's ties with its former ally, Russia, which opposed him at
every turn. Milan's political opponents, notably the newly formed Radical
Party of Nikola Pasic with its broad peasant base sought Russian support.
Behind Radical moves Milan believed he discerned sinister Russian mach­
inations. For two decades after 1883 Serbia experienced bitter struggles
between crown and people, squandering its slender strength on internal
political quarrels. Initially the Radical Party was insurrectionary as in the
abortive Timok Revolt( 1 883), then gradually modified its program and
approach. By late 1888 King Milan neared the breaking point, feuding
bitterly with the popular Queen Natalija, Russian by birth, whom he
accused of plotting against him with Russia and the Radicals.
Prince Alexander Obrenovic , the young heir, was caught between
parents who loved him but hated one another. As they battled inexor­
ably towards divorce, Alexander told a tutor: " I am an orphan whose
parents are still alive."8 Before abdicating, King Milan issued the very
liberal Constitution of 1888. He calculated that it would reduce Serbia
to chaos and provoke his return with a free hand to crush the Radicals.
For four years Serbia was governed by a regency led by veteran Jovan
Ristic. Meanwhile Nikola Pasic, the Radicals' exiled leader, returned home
to popular ovations and in 1891 formed his first cabinet.
•
Birth of a Bull 27
During Dragutin's first year at the Academy , seventeen year old Alex­
ander Obrenovic in April 1893 abruptly ousted the regency, dismissed the
Assembly of which Apis' brother-in-law was chairman, and assumed full
royal power. So upset was Dragutin by these events, which he considered
unwise and unjust, that he almost abandoned the Academy. Shortsighted
literally and figuratively, though highly gifted and intelligent like his
father, Alexander proved even more obstinate and self-willed than Milan.
Swiftly he became the most disliked and unpopular of all Obrenovic
rulers. Mendacious and fickle, Alexander was a thankless, unreliable
friend and an arbitary king. He developed an exaggerated idea of his
power, executing his will arbitrarily and unscrupulously. Despising the
people, he scorned their political leaders and asserted his prerogatives. In
ten years of personal rule, he carried out three palace coups, abolished two
constitutions and suspended a third. He changed cabinets at whim, dis­
solved political parties, and created a virtual political vacuum in Serbia.
The Radicals, Serbia's most popular party, supported young Alexander's
coup against the regents. Going to St. Petersburg as a Russophile ambas­
sador, PaSic concluded that Russia's support was indispensible to Serbia's
international role and made no effort to conceal his belief. In the Russian
capital Pasic debuted successfully as a statesman, establishing influential
friendships which later proved invaluable to Serbia. Henceforth Pasic
believed that to progress and expand, Serbia must collaborate closely with
10
Russia.
From European exile ex-King Milan returned to Serbia in 1894 as chief
advisor to his son and army commander. He had Pasic removed as envoy
to Russia and increased pressure on the Radicals. Milan and his son-both
obstinate overgrown -children-provoked disarray in Serbia's domestic and
foreign affairs. National goals seemed forgotten as Alexander, at his
father's advice, abrogated the liberal Constitution and created a police
regime without significant popular support.
Ex-King Milan's attentio11 to army reform unwittingly fostered Apis'
career. As army commander he built up a privileged officer caste as a chief
pillar of his son' s bureaucratic absolutism. A greatly expanded officer
corps became the best paid element in Serbia. A new rapid firing rifle
restored the infantry' s confidence. Milan developed well-trained cadre bat­
talions. Junior lieutenants fresh from the Academy led companies, and
relatively young officers commanded battalions and regiments. Expanding
28 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
the military budget, Milan enlarged Academy enrollments and shortened
the lower course in a crash program to obtain more officers. About 500
graduated from 1898 to 1901. As enrollments in civilian secondary schools
declined, able but impoverished students rushed through the Academy's
open doors. Highly selective because of a large applicant pool, the Academy
attracted much of Serbia's intellectually ablest youth.
While the army asserted a major role in Serbia's domestic and external
affairs, 1903-17, the Academy became a major intellectual center. It
graduated hundreds of peasants' sons who spread their democratic, even
socialist ideas in the army. Opposing that, Milan sought to forge senior
officers into a Prussian-style military caste. However, young officers like
Apis espoused nationalist views and extended them to the entire army .
The ex-king failed to foresee that this new officer generation would
destroy his regime and dynasty, then help ignite the Balkans and all Eur­
ope in war. Fostering militarism as army reformer, Milan prepared the
ground for the destruction of the social conservatism he favored. 1 1
Graduating from the Academy' s lower course in August 1896, Apis
was assigned to the Seventh Infantry Regiment in Belgrade as a junior
lieutenant. He served there as a platoon leader for over a year, then as an
instructor at the non-commissioned officers' school. In September 1898
he enrolled in the Academy's higher course to prepare himself to become
a General Staff officer. While attending this military university, Apis was
promoted to first lieutenant of infantry on August 1899. 12
Two months earlier on St. John's Day, June 24, 1899, an unremarkable
Bosnian youth shot at ex-king Milan in his open carriage. Only grazing his
target, Knezevic was promptly arrested. Milan and Alexander exploited
this incident to persecute the Radicals, closing their newspapers, arresting
their leaders, and accusing them of complicity in an attempted murder.
Treating Radical leaders like common criminals, Milan demanded that
Pasic and Tausanovic be executed. When Russia and Austria, seeking Bal­
kan peace, intervened to save the Radical chiefs, Alexander backed away.
Pasic accepted responsibility for not preventing the shooting. No proof of
their involvement was uncovered, but a dozen Radical leaders were im­
prisoned and some mistreated in detention. Though widely criticized for
cowardice and opportu1,1ism, Pasic believed he had saved his life and those
of his colleagues. The draconian response to the St. John's Day attempt
left King Alexander politically isolated and discredited with the public.13·
Birth of a Bull 29
To the dismay of Milan and army leaders, King Alexander in July 1900
proclaim ed his intention to marry his mistress, Draga Ma8in. For years
rumors of the King's impotence had circulated in Belgrade; Alexander
wished to refute them!4 As a mere child Draga, daughter of Panta Lunje­
vica, former mayor of Sabac, had married a government engineer, Svetozar
Masin, a drunkard and gambler who treated her brutally. After his death
she received a small pension. When Queen Natalija, Milan's estranged wife,
settled in France in 1890, Draga became maid of honor at her villa in
Biarritz. Visiting his mother there in 1897, King Alexander fell hopelessly
in love with the seductive and ambitious Draga with the dusky, fiery eyes.
That autumn she returned to Belgrade, apparently as the King's mistress.
Repeatedly she pretended pregnancy to speed their marriage.
Infatuated with Draga, the King resolved to marry her over vehement
opposition by his father and other public figures. Interior Minister Djordje
Gencic told the King: "Sire, you cannot marry her. She has been every­
one's mistress-mine included." The King reportedly struck him across
the faceY On July 18, 1900 the official press announced their formal
engagement. The King himself apparently drew up this communique
which sparked popular shock and indignation. However, Radical leaders
agreed to approve the marriage if the King amnestied imprisoned Radicals,
exiled his father, and restored a constitutional regime .
King Alexander's problems escalated. In vain he sought political leaders
willing to support a royal marriage to an obscure, disreputable engineer's
widow. Rumors spread that she was a common whore. Finally, the King
persuaded AJeksa Jovanovic, an undistinguished judge, to head a "wedding
cabinet" of political nonentities. But with the officer corps hostile to the
marriage, no general would become war minister. Alexander thus selected
Milos Vasic, an ambitious lieutenant colonel, who consented to serve,
then promoted him to full colonel. Vasic urged the King to summon Bel­
grade officers, read them their loyalty oath, and threaten to dismiss any
who sought to interfere in his private affairs.
Shaken by protests of generals and politicians, Alexander realized
that without his officers' approval, he would be isolated and could not
marry Draga. Adopting VasiC's suggestion, he had the Belgrade comman­
dant order all officers to appear next day at the royal palace and installed
the subservient "wedding cabinet" in office. In parade uniforms his of­
ficers proceeded to the palace through a crowd of curious onlookers. 16
30 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator

Without preliminary remarks, the King took from War Minister Vasic
the "Rules of Service." ln a clear voice he read the text of the officers'
loyalty oath to the crown, then declared:

Recently in regard to my decision to marry the chosen of my heart

a repulsive rumor has spread that I am abnormal. I call on you, of­
ficers, to counter those voices strongly, aware of my rights that no
one can interfere in this personal affair of mine. That is why I sum­
moned you and that is ali i have to tell you. CHAPTER IV

The officers were stunned; an uncomfortable silence ensued. Suddenly a

colonel shouted: "Long live the King!" A few senior officers took up this
refrain, but the rest remained ominously silent. Shaking hands with his
gene rals, the King strode from the hall with War Minister Vasic and his
court marshal. The officers left the palace dejected, with bowed heads.
Noticing their downcast demeanor, the assembled crowd realized that ef­
7
forts to prevent the royal marriage had failed. 1
Junior officers left the palace in dismay without awaiting their senior
colleagues. As they proceeded homeward, their feelings of shock yielded
to indignation, first against senior officers for inhibiting them from speak­
ing out, then against the King for insulting their honor.
Filled with such negative thoughts, a group of junior officers stopped
before the residence of Pavle Marinkovic , Minister of Education, who saw
them exchange sarcastic smiles. Suddenly one of them, Lieutenant Dirnitri­
jevic-Apis, towering over the rest and shaking with anger, shouted: "Co­
wards! Scum! All this must be refuted and reversed!" Apis' exclamatory
outburst, expressing perfectly his comrades' humiliation and anger, galvan­
ized the rest. Roused as if from slumber, they proclaimed vociferously
their dissatisfaction with the royal decision. Dimitrijevic-Apis' spontaneous
and vehement explosion, critical of the senior officers and the King, fore­
shadowed his organization and leadership of the coup of May 1903. How­
ever, his outburst was no unthinking whim. At his brother-in-law's home
Apis for some time had been complaining to visiting officers and politicians
about evils being committed in high places in Serbia, including the King's
rumored impending marriage to his mistress. On occasion Apis had even
uttered threats which his family and friends dismissed as idle talk. Soon it
would become clear that his remarks had been meant most seriously. 1 8
PREPARING THE COUP
( 1 900- 1 903 )
The Serbian idea . . . had been up to then
wholly abandoned. The unfortunate secret
convention with Austria* and blind surren­
der to Austria's embrace was a most shame­
ful betrayal of Serbian traditions. Believing
that a change of regime and restoring the
Karadjordjevic dynasty to the throne would
solve the internal question, I realized also
that Serbia must once more in full measure
undertake her role as Piedmont not only of
Serbs but of Yugoslavs.
Colonel Apis in 1917
The festive wedding of King Alexander Obrenovic and Draga Masin on
July 23, 1900 in Belgrade's cathedral sparked the anti-dynastic military
coup of May 1903 organized chiefly by Captain Apis. Tsar Nicholas 11 of
Russia had agreed to act as goMather but sent no representative. Nonethe­
less, the Tsar's implied support for the controversial marriage foreshadowed
a political reorientation of Serbia towards Russia.
* The Convention of 1881 made Serbia dependent on Austria-Hungary
politically, diplomatically and economically for the next twenty years.

31
 32 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Soon after his wedding King Alexander moved to restore good rela­
tions with Russia and the popular pro-Russian Radical Party. On Queen
Draga's birthday-September 1 1th-he pardoned and released Radical
leaders imprisoned for the St. John's Day Attempt. The delighted Radicals
promptly placed themselves at the King's disposal. Soon after ex-King
Milan's sudden death in Vienna, the Serbian cabinet in February 1901
was reformed as a Progressive-Radical coalition; Russian influence was
restored fully. That April, pressed on by the Radicals and Russia's am­
bassador, Alexander issued a new constitution restoring regular free elec­
tions and civil liberties. In July elections the "Old" Radicals of PaSic and
Protic won control of the Assembly.1 To the King's dismay, a strong
democratic tide was rising in Serbia.
Meanwhile Queen Draga's behavior gravely imperilled the Obrenovic
dynasty. Extremely ambitious and dominant over the King, she thought
chiefly of her own position. At first the public seemed to accept her as
Queen, but she worried about the future. The infatuated king remained
devoted to her, but nasty rumors circulated about them. To secure the
dynasty, Alexander longed for a son especially since Draga had given her
first husband no children.
In December 1900 Draga told Alexander she believed she was pregnant.
The delighted king called in a Russian specialist who examined her and
predicted pregnancy. The palace promptly issued a communique about
the anticipated blessed event, and Alexander informed the Tsar. At of­
ficial prompting ladies' committees formed throughout Serbia to prepare
gifts for the Queen and her heir. But months passed and all signs of Draga's
pregnancy disappeared. Embarrassed by pesistent queries from the Russian
court, the King called in two Paris specialists who declared Draga was not
and could not become pregnant. This false pregnancy dealt the dynasty a
cruel blow and provoked a public scandal. It was widely believed the
Queen had perpetrated this hoax deliberately to deceive the King and
people. Rumors spread that Draga's brother, Nikodije Lunjevica, would
be proclaimed heir to the throne. Undermining the royal couple's credi­
bility, the false pregnancy triggered a political crisis temporarily ending
parliamentary rule in Serbia.2
Lieutenants Apis and Antonije Antic, recalled a colleague, Pavle Panko­
vic, 3 conceived the idea of removing the King and Queen. After the of­
ficers' audience with the King,4 they had discussed what should be done.
- \
Preparing the Coup 33
Serbia's cabinet and parties lay powerless, yet Alexander would not re­
nounce his queen. Apis and Antic agreed that the officers must take
matters into their own hands and remove Queen Draga from Serbia. Soon
realizing that both King and Queen must be expelled, they sounded out
their comrades. Serious discussion of a coup originated within a narrow
circle of junior officers in Belgrade.
Lieutenant Antic then served in the newly formed Fourth Cavalry
Regiment where officers enrolled in the Military Academy's higher course
did their practical work. One day after drill six officers sat in a cafe near
the barracks discussing the situation created by the royal marriage. 5 Apis
had urged that the royal pair be expelled, noted Antic. Concurring, the
others agreed to consult their close friends and form a society to achieve
that goal. Antic promptly informed Apis of this; next day they all met
and decided to proceed. By the summer of 1901 an officer conspiracy
was afoot with Apis as initiator and chief leader.
Lieutenant Pavle Pankovic, a reserve officer serving in the War Min­
istry's General Staff section, described his entry into the plot. Dining
frequently at the Officers' Club, he shared a table with officer-students
of the Academy's higher course and visitors who normally dined at home,
including Apis, Antic and Lieutenant Josif Kostic. "We often discussed
the political situation of Serbia created by the King's marriage and eagerly
read opposition newspapers, Odjek . . . and Srpska Zastava, all approving
the way they wrote ." Walking one evening with Apis, Pankovic criticized
the false pregnancy and rumors that one of Draga's disreputable brothers
might inherit the throne. "Fine, Pajcane," responded Apis. "Would you
like to join a society which would work to remove Alexander and Draga
from the throne?" When Pankovic nodded, Apis named several junior
officers in that society. Pankovic then joined their discussions. At first
they favored merely expelling the King and Queen, but since adherents in
Serbia would plot their return, by fall the officers had resolved to kill
them and thus resolve the dynastic issue.'
What would follow the royal couple's removal? Some officers favored
an English or German prince; another suggested Mirko, second son of
Prince Nikola of Montenegro; others desired a republic. But the rest,
headed by Apis, argued that Serbia had its own Karadjordjevic dynasty
and need not import a foreign prince. Why not enthrone the Pretender,
Peter Karadjordjevic, living in Switzerland, the land of liberty? After long
 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Planning the Coup 35
34

debate the officers agreed that Peter should become ruler. Credit for this, multiplied, army discontent escalated. Serbia and its people faced humilia­
claims Pankovic, belonged solely to Apis who refused to yield even if it tion, impotence and ruin. Young officers kept entering the plot, resentful

meant abandoning the entire enterprise. Without Apis neither Peter nor of official apathy over national goals and constant affronts to their patriot­

his heirs would have been enthroned. 7 ism. The King, they concluded, was seeking to · strengthen the dynasty

Young officers, confirmed Djordje Karadjordjevic, Prince Peter's elder solely by silencing opponents. 14 The conspirators believed they were sav­

son, even before the false pregnancy , had considered the King's marriage ing Serbia from inevitable destruction. The Serbian idea and cause had

to Draga a personal insult and planned to liquidate the dynasty. Draga's been wholly abandoned, noted Apis later. "The unfortunate secret con­

persecution of her public opponents fed their sense of outrage. To their vention with Austria, and blind surrender into Austria's embrace was a

disgust, Draga and her brothers paraded now as Serbia's first family. 8 most shameful betrayal of Serbian traditions." Only by a change of

The junior officers, driven by neither ideology nor greed, were convinced regime and dynasty, Apis believed, could the crisis be resolved. "I realized

King Alexander's marriage to a loose woman cast shame on them and on also that Serbia must once more in full measure undertake her role as

Serbia. 9 Piedmont not only of the Serbs but of the Yugoslavs." 15

In August 1901 seven founders of the military conspiracy met at Very early Apis assumed a dominant role among the young conspirators.

Lieutenant Antic's home.10 There Apis drew up a plan to murder the He met with them frequently in his room at the family home on Holy

King and Queen on Draga's birthday, September 1 1 th, during a celebra­ Sava Street." There he kept the initial membership list and oath, signed

tion scheduled at "Kolarac" restaurant in Belgrade. Unaccountably the by six junior officers, until its destruction. While lying ill in 1902, Apis

King failed to attend the party and the scheme was scrapped. Next the drew up the following written oath to bind the conspirators and dis­

conspirators planned to murder Alexander at fall maneuvers near Ub, but courage defections; it constituted their national and political program:

nothing came of it. 1 1

King Alexander faced growing army dissatisfaction. After his father Foreseeing the certain destruction of the country if the present

left in July 1900, he had slashed the military budget, pensioned off situation continues even for the shortest time and proclaiming as

several generals, and promoted his supporters. Discipline and morale chiefly responsible for all this King Alexander and his lover, Draga

sagged without strengthening royal control. By 1902 officer salaries were Masin, we swear and obligate ourselves with our signatures that we

months in arrears. The Serbian army , reported Austria's military attache, will kill them. To the throne of Serbia, bathed in blood by these

was poorly dressed, irregularly paid, and hungry. While the King blamed dishonorable ones, we shall bring Peter Karadjordjevic, grandson of

the dominant Radicals, King Milan's military machine disintegrated. the Chieftain [Karadjordje] and son of the legitimate prince, the

Stripped of many privileges, the officers became so disgruntled that the late Alexander Karadjordjevic.
2
army ceased to be a reliable support for the Obrenovic dynasty . 1
Relations between the army and the Radicals remained cool. From the Apis insisted that all conspirators sign this statement which reveals their

Radical Party's inception, argues Colonel Gojkovic, friction had been twofold aim: to kill the royal couple and restore the Karadjordjevic

chronic. Radical leaders, bitterly opposing the standing army , sought dynasty . 1 7 Neither the oath nor the officers' discussions suggested any
•

peasant support with anti-militarist slogans. By 1903 the army , except intention to create a republic or a military regime in Serbia.

the infantry, were woefully unprepared. Other branches were obsolescent, Approaching close friends, Apis and his comrades cautiously expand­

munitions scarce and uniforms antiquated. Radical-army tensions would ed the conspiracy. Recruitment proceeded slowly, handled by a select

persist until 1 9 1 7 . 1 3 few, including Apis and Antic. Only when the new member had explain­

Thus the anti-Obrenovic offlcer conspiracy developed against a com­ ed his attitude toward the Obrenovic and by signing the oath had risked

plex and stormy background. As new scandals involving the royal family his own and his family's fate, did the founders reveal the society's true

'\
 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
36
purpose. Thereby secrecy was maintained by the over 120 members who
joined in Belgrade and the interior.13 Only one officer who was approach­
ed refused to join the plot-he objected to murdering the King. Two
others dropped out later. That no one informed the regime Zivan Zivano­
vic ascribed to patriotism, loyalty to comrades, and hatred for the royal
couple. Only later did Zivanovic learn that Apis had concealed the mem­
bership list in an old stove in his home. Fearing discovery during the
March 1 903 disorders in Belgrade, Apis and Antic burned the list con­
cealing this from even close comrades. Thus all believed themselves still
bound by oath.19
ln November 1901 the young officers decided to invite cooperation
from prominent politicians and win support from various parties. AntiC's
uncle, former Interior Minister Djordje Gencic,20 arranged a meeting in
the vineyard of Aca Novakovic, a leading Belgrade lawyer. 21 Also pre­
sent were Jovan Avakumovic, General Jovan Atanackovic, and the promin­
ent Karadjordjist, Nikola Hadji-Toma. All agreed to join the conspiracy
but were not informed of Apis' secret list. Antic and Gencic maintained
ties between civilians and office rs, and in late December Gencic met at
Antic's with twelve officer conspirators. Most of the civilians had little
to do with the officers. Although some prominent politicians and military
leaders joined, the enterprise was still directed by Apis' original group,
apparently the only case in modern European history of a major, success­
ful coup organized and executed by junior officers.
During 1902 the officer conspirators decided to recruit key colleagues
throughout Serbia, mostly those without family responsibilities. Caution­
ing against broadening the plot excessively, Apis told Pankovic : "Great
ideas have always been the work of a few people." Among the new recruits
was a Foreign Office employee, Aksenije Rujanac-Bacet, an ardent Kara­
djordjist who agreed to agitate among the youth and ex-guerrillas. Panko­
vic acted as intermediary between Bacet and the officer conspirators. In
February 1902, as Pankovic passed before the Officers' Club, Apis sud­
denly rushed out: "Go this very morning to Bacet and tell him to conceal
and destroy everything he has on him which could compromise us; ap­
parently a search will be carried out." Apis was correct. That evening
investigators examined Bacet's office finding only a Karadjordj ist postcard.
Nonetheless, Bacet was expelled summarily from Belgrade and Pankovic
was ordered transferred to NiS.
Parparting the Coup
37
Before departure Pankovic parted from his friends at the Officers'
Club. Walking him to his quarters, Apis urged Pankovic to work for the
conspiracy in the NiS garrison and supplied him with names of conspira­
tors there. Soon Pankovic linked plotters in Nis an.d Belgrade.22 With a
nucleus headed by Majors Milos Bozanovic and Stevan Milanovic the
Nis garrison next to Belgrade developed the largest network of conspira­
tors. The two majors enlisted higher officers while Pankovic and his com­
rades recruited junior ones. By the end of 1902 thirty-six NiS officers
had joined, including judicial lieutenant Branko Gatalovic, infantry junior
lieutenant Velimir Vemic, and engineer lieutenant Bozin Simic. All of
them would later play key roles in Apis' career. This enthusiastic Ng
contingent drew up a plan to kill the King and Queen during a planned
visit there. Belgrade vetoed this explaining that the murders must occur
in the capital so that government could be seized immediately.23
The conspiracy spread to other garrisons. In the summer of 1902
Cedo Popovic was a company commander at Zajecar in eastern Serbia.
Lieutenants Apis and Milan G. Milovanovic traveled through Nego tin and
Zajecar ostensibly to attend a christening but actually to enlist officers of
distant garrisons in the plot. In Zajecar Popovic roomed with Milan Risi­
mic, Apis' close friend from the Academy. Sounding out both officers
at their quarters, Apis described Serbia's situation stating: "The evil can
only be wiped out by cutting out its roots." This, he alleged, was primarily
Queen Draga, secondarily the King, her blind instrument. Both were lead­
ing Serbia to destruction. "We comrades in Belgrade," declared Apis,
"have created a plot to remove them from the throne and the country,
if necessary by force. Do you also wish to enter the plot?" Both officers
agreed to join. 24
The conspirators realized they needed higher officers too. How could
lieutenants lead whole regiments without senior officers in command?
They recruited Colonel Alexander Masin, brother of Draga's deceased first
husband ; Lieutenant Colonel Damjan Popovic ; and Lieutenant Colonel
Peter Misic, commanding the Sixth Regiment in Belgrade.25 Erudite, ex­
perienced, and eloquent, Misic later would preside at the Salonika Trial.
Passed over for promotion, Misic had criticized King Alexander and his
regime vehemently until finally promoted to lieutenant colonel. The con­
spirators, impressed by his intelligence and decisiveness, hastened to en­
list him.2'
 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
38
Early in the summer of 1902 the Belgrade plotters insisted their NiS
colleagues all take an oath to remove the King. The latter complied, and
that winter Aca Novakovic, Belgrade's envoy, came to Nis to take the
signed oath to Belgrade . Declining to surrender it, several NiS officers took
the oath to the capital but then returned with it to Nis. After an urgent
coded telegram warned them that the plot might have been betrayed, the
NiS conspirators burned their oath in Major BozanoviC's office and urged
Belgrade to act swiftly before all was revealed.
Two young conspirators later prominent were junior lieutenants Voji­
slav Tankosic and Peter Zivkovic. Tankosic joined when flrst approached
and dedicated himself wholeheartedly to national activity ?7 It was Antic
who enlisted Peter Zivkovic, later Apis' implacable foe. Zivkovic was serv­
ing in the interior, but the conspirators arranged his transfer to Belgrade
as platoon leader in the Royal Guards cavalry squadron. Zivkovic's vital
task was to steal the Guard commander's keys, unlock the palace's main
gate, and admit the conspirators?8
i demise. Promoting a cult
Unwittingly the King prepared the way for hs
of his beloved Draga, he ignored growing opposition to the Queen and his
regime. Divorced from reality, Alexander interpreted all objections to his
marriage as treason?9 As pro-Karadjordjevic agitation grew, royal police in
March 1902 brutally suppressed student demonstrations in Belgrade. That
November the King dismissed the coalition cabinet replacing it with Gen­
eral Cincar-Markovic's obedient "neutral" government. Then Alexander
suppressed the liberal Constitution of 1901 despite Radical warnings that
this would doom his rule.
Amidst great tension occurred on March 23, 1903 massive popular
demonstrations in Belgrade to protest Alexander's intention to set up a
personal dictatorship. Involving almost half of Belgrade's 100,000 inhabi­
tants, this was the greatest public movement in its history. As crowds
marched down Prince Mihailo Street to the royal palace, the fearful King
ordered the garrison to retore order. The crowd greeted the advancing
soldiers sympathetically shouting: "Long live the army of the people!"
One squadron commander warned his men: "Watch out that you don't
step on anyone !" Near Kalemegdan Park a colonel disarmed a policeman
about to fire at the crowd. Between people and army grew evident under­
standing of their common misfortunes, confumed two months later by
the May Coup.30
•
Preparing the Coup 39
As the public let the troops pass, a peaceful outcome seemed likely.
But the impatient King ordered the streets cleared immediately . The
crowd's size and the narrow streets made this �possible. Before the
palace police, convered by troops, opened fire. At Kalemegdan Park this
bloody spectacle was repeated. Routed from their impoverished bar­
ricades, the students left behind many dead and wounded.
This needless slaughter mobilized all Belgrade against the King. A
..
similar event, "Bloody Sunday," would occur in St. Petersburg, Russia
in 1905. Now all sought to liberate Serbia from a brutal despotism. Two
days later the King briefly set aside the Constitution, dissolved the cabinet
and legislature , and declared invalid all laws enacted under that document.
Then to conceal his personal dictatorship he restored the Constitution.
Early in May general elections under a new electoral law returned all
official candidates. Both wings of the Radicals boycotted the elections
which produced a puppet Skupstina (Assembly).
The March Demonstration in Belgrade accelerated recruitment for a
conspiracy now including important senior offlcers and politicians. Dis­
missing army discontent as the work of a few disgruntled officers, the
King ignored profound dissatisfaction throughout Serbia.
The conspirators' decision to attack the royal palace the night of
May 28-29th, Apis told Zivan Zivanovic later, came when they realized
their men that night would control all key points. Apparently no one re­
called that May 29th was the anniversary of the murder of Prince Mihailo
Obrenovic in 1868. A visiting card received by Apis contained several
dates, including May 29th, underlined on the back. Conspirators would
have the duty in the palace, Guard, the cavalry, artillery, and in the
Sixth and Seventh Infantry Regiments. Apis then planned all the details
with a precision worthy of a professional General Staff offlcer.3 1
A week before the coup Lieutenant Milutin Lazarevic, Belgrade's envoy,
informed NiS conspirators that action would occur before the end of May
and instructed them to send several offlcers to the capital. Three offlcers
accompanied Lazarevic who had dynamite concealed in his briefcase, to
the NiS railway station. If necessary he would blow open the palace gates.
Next day Vemic, Simic, and two other officers departed for Belgrade.
Simic was to inform the Nis conspirators when the coup would begin so
they could mobilize.32
40 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Days before the May Coup Belgrade instructed comrades in interior
garrisons to proceed to the capital or prepare themselves for action. They
traveled to Belgrade on various pretexts, some without securing permis­
sion. A group of newly arrived officers congregated with Apis, then work­
ing at the General Staff. Later Apis told Cedo Popovic that during the
noon break, he, M. G. Milovanovic , and Todor Pavlovic were out walking
when up the steps from the lower town rushed Lieutenant Colonel Peter
Misic, commanding the key Sixth Regiment. Greeting no one, Misic, the
pessimist, turned angrily to Apis:
Why did you gather these officers? Don't you see that we are ac­
companied on all si des by spies and that our cause has failed? We
cannot do anything. Send those people back since otherwise we will
lose our heads. And I don't want to lose mine.
"Mr. Ueutenant Colonel," said Apis coolly, "everything is ready . Tomor­
row night we'll attack the palace, so our people will not return home. And
even if it comes to losing our heads, we will attack the palace. Don't for­
get," warned Apis sharply, raising his voice, "that if we fail and lose our
heads, yours will fall along with ours, so are you coming with us or not?"
"
"So that's the way it is!" exploded Misic. "So you are angry, retorted
Apis unperturbed. "But don' t forget that tonight at midnight, as we agreed,
you are to lead the battalion of your regiment to the palace." Emphati­
cally Apis added: "Do not forget that henceforth our lives are in your
hands." Turning away abruptly, MiSic plunged down the steps to the lower
town. "He is frightened. I just cannot believe it. But we mustn't think
about that." Declared Pavlovic ominously: "Dragutin , if we remain alive,
he
will never forget this." Heedless of this prophetic warning, Apis declar­
ed reassuringly: "Don't worry about it."33
The plot which Apis had largely conceived was now rip·e. His dynamic
energy and clear purpose had goaded his comrades into action. Retaining
leadership of a broad secret movement, Apis in his mid-twenties already
revealed qualities which would make him a dominant figure in Serbia for
the next decade. In this crisis he was magnetic, bold and incredibly cool.
-
CHAPTER V
KILLING THE KING AND QUEEN
(MAY 28-29, 190 3 )
The murder of the King will cause great
damage to our personal repute and peace
both in the country and abroad. But time
will reveal that it is not the result of our
vulgarity or hatred, but a need of state.
Captain Apis in 1903
��is �d the rest were ready to move. Conspirators occupied key
posttions m �elgrade and the interior. They had penetrated the King's
palace guard. However, Apis knew the coup could succeed only if the
�
royal ouple were killed quickly, the government seized, and a new regime
proclauned. Prolonged disorder or severe bloodshed could provoke Aus­
trian military intervention. With the King still guarded by his adjutant,
General Lazar Petrovic, a palace guard of three officers and forty-five
cavalrymen, and a police detachment, Apis' scheme seemed risky and
�e outcome uncertain. However, Serbia's situation brooked no delay.
King Alexander's despotism was creating choas, the populace was dis­
.
�ntled, the fmances lay in ruins, and national goals languished. Dynas­
tic and court scandals had wrecked Serbia's standing abroad. Apis and
other patriotic officers believed that unless the Obrenovic were removed
swiftly, the country faced destruction. 1
41
 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
42
Fearing betrayal, the conspirators resolved on May 26th to attack the
royal palace the night of May 28-29 (June 10-1 1 New Style). At mid­
night, if all seemed in order, Lieutenant Colonel Naumovic, the King's
aide and a conspirator, would send an envoy to the Officers' Club to
signal the advance. Under Apis' detailed battle plan, officer conspirators
were to remain at five nearby cafes, then gather at the Officers' Club
after 1 AM. When Colonel Peter MiSic's battalion arrived there, the
twenty-eight officers would advance on the palace whose main gate
would be opened by Lieutenant Peter Zivkovic. They would be support­
ed by three battalions of the Sixth Infantry Regiment, the entire Seventh
Regiment, and an artillery battery. A cavalry squadron would march
from barracks, isolating the palace from the rest of Belgrade. In overall
command would be Colonel Masin, Draga's ex-brother-in-law. It had been
decided that the King, Queen and Draga's two brothers must be killed
and troops sent to isolate the residences of the Premier and key min­
isters. Should this plan fail, the conspirators would retreat to nearby
Topcider Hill and appeal to the populace to revolt.2
Warnings of an impending military coup had poured into the royal
palace from Serbia and abroad. Serbian envoys in Vienna, Budapest, and
Sofia provided numerous details. From London Ambassador Cedomilj
Mijatovic, a dabbler in magic, informed the King that a local fortune­
teller had predicted a terrible tragedy. Anonymous letters from Serbia
warned the royal couple to be on guard. Such vague tips provided no
adequate basis to arrest suspected officers. Hard evidence of disloyalty
was lacking. Alexander merely increased the palace guard. Believing his
officers and people to be loyal, the King declared: "I am not afraid of
revolutions. If anyone rebels against me, I am ready to meet him sword
in hand at the head of my faithful army." That final day the King seem­
ed in unusually good spirits. He played croquet as Queen Draga watched
adoringly. At 8 PM the King and Queen dined with Premier Cincar-Marko­
vic and the Serbian envoy to Sofia. Then the royal couple sat on the
balcony in full view of passing crowds as a military band played in the
palace gardens. After they retired at 1 1 :30 PM the palace was plunged
into darkness. 3
At first the coup followed Apis' plan closely. It was an officers' revolt
with the troops involved only after the Obrenovic were killed. At the
Officers' Club had gathered all twenty-eight conspirators, mostly General
Killing the King 43
Staff officers. Some allegedly had imbibed liberally at the Club or at
other cafes.• Nervous and uneasy, they awaited the arrival of Colonel
MisiC's battalion. Just before 2 AM Apis rose and looked vainly toward
"Slavija" intersection for MiSic's promised troops: "Apis, where s
i your
Sixth Regiment?" queried Lieutenan t Ljuba Kostic. Apis realized he
must adhere to the 2 AM departure time regardless. Disregarding Kostic
and ending at a stroke his colleagues' anguished uncertainty, Apis order­
ed resolutely: "Gentlemen officers, double time forward!"5 Without
their leader's coolness and determination, concluded conspirator Vladi­
mir Tucovic , MiSic's tardiness might have doomed the entire conspiracy.'
Otherwise nearly everything followed the plan. The officers marched
rapidly to the palace some 550 yards distant and were joined there be­
latedly by MiSic's men. Some conspirators turned n
i to Crown Street to
enter the palace by the service entrance; others approached the main
gates on King Milan Street. Leading the latter was Captain Apis, a head
taller than the rest, striding along relentlessly, armed like the others with
a revolver. Though they arrived at the precise time agreed upon, no one
came to open the gates. Lieutenant Zivkovic had received explicit in­
structions. As minutes passed, the officers grew impatient, then worried.
Why didn't Zivkovic come to open the damned gates?, wondered Apis.
Finally, he heard the clanging of a heavy bunch of keys. Zivkovic ap­
peared, nervous and tremulous. As he fumbled uncertainly with the keys,
his hands trembled like leaves in a storm. "Faster, Zivkovic, faster!"
urged Apis impatiently. "Hurry! The guards can open fue on us at any
moment!" Lieutenant Radoje Jankovic chimed in: "Open up. Why are
you so confused?" Desperately , Zivkovic tried again and managed this
time to unlock the ponderous gates. At the surging officers' pressure,
they sprang open. Zivkovic was hurled roughly to the ground. Refusing
aid from the ever solicitous Apis, he slunk off, and no one heard or saw
more of him that night. 7 Never would Zivkovic forget his humiliating
and panicky confusion at th� gates, heightened by the comments of Apis
and his friends.
The fate of the enterprise now rested with the twenty-eight who burst
into the palace. Apis led them into a building where silence and darkness
reigned. The burly captain knocked urgently at a small side door to the
right of the main entrance from the palace courtyard. A low ranking
guardsman rose from a bench to answer Apis' summons. To the Captain's
44 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
query where the duty adjutant's bedroom lay, the orderly replied: "Over
there by the bear." As Apis hurried into the great hall, he encountered a
huge stuffed bear killed earlier by King Milan on a hunt, in an attitude
menacing enough to scare the casual visitor. Nearby was the door to the
telephone room where the duty adjutants slept.
Lieutenant Colonel Naumovic had been instructed to get the duty of­
ficer so drunk that he would fall asleep. Naumovic succeeded but drank
so much himself that he was sound asleep when the conspirators arrived.
Seeing the locked door before them and fearing betrayal, other con­
spirators used Lazarevic's dynamite to blow it open. Roused by the ex­
plosion, Naumovic awakened, remembered his assignment, and ran to meet
his comrades only to be shot down along with the duty officer.8
Now inside, the officers seized General Lazar Petrovic, the King's loyal
aide, renowned for his good looks. Petrovic consented to lead the con­
spirators to the King if he could dress first. Stalling as long as possible,
Petrovic momentarily distracted his guards and cut the electric cables. In­
stantly the entire palace was plunged again into darkness. Petrovic hoped
to give the King time to escape or conceal himself. However, the palace
was now ringed with troops and artillery, telephone and telegraph offices
in town had been seized, and guards posted at leading ministers' homes.
There was little prospect the royal couple could escape from the palace.
Meanwhile Apis, discerning someone disappearing in the dark recesses
of the righthand corridor, left his comrades and rushed off in pursuit. At
the end of the corridor he found wide stone steps leading to the ground
floor. Believing he might have spied the King, Apis hurtled down the steps,
revolver in hand, with no effort at concealment. Actually, the shadowy
figure had been a guard always posted there at night. Apis reached the
lower corridor which cut through the entire palace like a tunnel dividing
it off from the front rooms. Suddenly in that corridor two guards opened
fire at Apis from close range and he at them. Examining the scene later,
Apis' brother-in-law concluded that the guards had fired about twenty-five
rounds. Apis was wounded in three places as was one of the guards. Over­
coming the guards' resistance, his comrades rushed onward , leaving the
gravely wounded Apis covered with blood, supported against the wall.
With revolver in his undamaged right hand, Apis was prepared to take his
own life if the conspiracy failed. When Zivanovic asked him later why he
had not sought cover in a doorway of the lower corridor, Apis had replied:
Killing the King
45
"It would be disgraceful for an officer, even in that difficult situation, to
seek cover! "9
His wounds eliminated Apis from the fray, but h!s comrades completed
his plan successfully though brutally. Above the first floor shots still re­
sounded and the doors near the royal bedroom were blown in. A long de­
lay ensued until candles were fetched, enabling the royal couple to conceal
themselves. When the officers fmally reached their bedroom, it was empty
but clearly had just been vacated. Meanwhile a battalion of the Sixth
Regiment, passing through the palace gates, took over the courtyard. The
conspirators controlled the palace completely.
Where were the King and Queen? Were they concealed somewhere in
the palace, or had they escaped into the city? The conspirators grew jit­
tery. A search was conducted through all palace rooms and salons. Walls
were sounded and even struck with an axe. All in vain ; the royal couple
had vanished. The senior conspirators-Masin, Gencic and Novakovic­
grew alarmed. Fully anned, they awaited anxiously in the courtyard be­
low results of the search. Colonel Masin ordered the government seized .
Gencic and the others must proceed as if the Obrenovic were already dead.
Orders were issued to kill the Premier and War Minister.10 Young Lieuten­
ant Tankosic, later a prominent guerrilla leader, killed Queen Draga's two
brothers who were possible heirs to the throne. 1 1 Shooting continued in
streets near the palace between police and troops arriving from town.
The palace was ringed with troops, and artillery faced "Slavija" and
12
"Terazija" in Belgrade's center.
Searching the palace, his comrades found Apis in the dark corridor.
Exhausted from loss of blood, he called out weakly: "Come to me! It is
I , Dragutin." To be certain he added: "It is I , Apis!" His comrades carried
him carefully into the guardroom where he was bandaged. Apis would not
let them take him right to a hospital. "No, I wish to see the end of all
this!" With revolver in hand, he kept in constant touch with the progress
of the search, still determined.if necessary to commit suicide .13
As time passed, the conspirators grew tired, even frightened. Almost
two hours had elapsed since their initial break-in, and still no sign of the
King. Dawn began to break over Belgrade. The officers feared possible
revolt by troops loyal to the King. Then about 3:40 AM one conspirator
summoned Handsome Lazar Petrovic. Unless he took them to the King
within ten minutes, he would be shot. Knowing the palace well, General
46 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Petrovic probably had surmised where the royal pair were hiding. None­
theless, he took the officers once more all through the palace, calling
periodically to the King. With him went four conspirators including the
two senior officers inside the palace. Again they came to the royal bed­
room whose two windows faced onto the new courtyard. One officer
noticed draperies masking a double door on the side of the bedroom facing
the street. 14 Previously, the officers had paid that side no heed. As General
Petrovic brushed hastily past the draperies behind which he believed the
King and Queen were concealed, the officers ordered him to summon the
King again. With much trepidation this trusted King's man called out:
"Your Majesty !" There was no reply, but the royal pair were crouched in
that small space knowing death sought them. But the fuing had ceased and
his loyal adjutant was calling him The King may have believed a favorable
. The chief regicide had dined the previous day at the Zivanovic home.
change had occurred outside. He must have realized his hiding place had
been discovered. Thus when Handsome Lazar called again: "Your Majesty!
It is I , first adjutant, Laza Petrovic!", the King queried, "Who is calling
me?" "It is I, Laza, open to your officers." Relying on their oaths of
loyalty, King Alexander turned the key and appeared in the half-opened
doorway.
Events then occurred with lightning swiftness. No sooner did the door
open than Captain Mihailo Ristic fired at the King. As Alexander fell, Queen
Draga standing behind him threw herself onto him as if to shield him. A
shot from Captain Ilija Radivojevic's revolver killed her. A volley of shots
from the others followed. Thirty rounds were fired at the King and eigh­
teen at the Queen. The two corpses were stripped and sabred brutally.
One officer felled Handsome Lazar with a single shot. 15
What happened next caused much controversy and recrimination. The
King and Queen died about 3:50 AM. By one account, Captain Ristic
ordered their nude bodies picked up and thrown down into the garden
proclaiming: "Tyranny is no more!" According to Marcovitch, the bodies
were taken to the window to show the troops below and reassure the
conspirators in the garden. Accidentally or intentionally the bodies fell
or were hurled into the garden, a terrible and repugant act. Those who did
this, he added, were under a special psychosis. 16 Questioned later by
Zivanovic why he had ordered this done, Captain Ristic replied first that
he did not know. Then he declared: "So that it would be clear to all that
the King and Queen were no more, I ordered them thrown through the
window."17
Killing the King
47
From the garden the corpses were swiftly retrieved and taken to a room
on the lower level of the palace where an autopsy was performed. That
same morning they were taken in coffms to an antechamber, then buried
the next night without ceremony in the crypt of St. Mark's Cathedral in
111
Belgrade.
As the drama in the palace ended, other conspirators quickly eliminated
the ex-King's chief supporters and secured full control of Belgrade and
soon of all Serbia. At about 5 AM on Terazije Square in the heart of Bel­
grade, Ljubomir Zivkovic, leader of the Independent Radicals, told an as­
sembled crowd that the King and Queen had died in a family quarrel ! "This
great and terrible event," concluded Zivan Zivanovic, "was accepted by
the entire people, by some with equanimity, by the majority with joy."19
On May 28th Apis had brought home Captain Mihailo Ristic as an un­
expected guest. Zivan Zivanovic, who had met RistiC earlier in Nis, asked
why he had come to Belgrade. To consult a eye doctor, Ristic had replied
smoothly. After supper Apis and Ristic had gone into town to "sit a bit"
in a cafe . All had been peaceful when the Zivanovics retired. Then at dawn
knocks on the window facing the street had awakened Jelena Zivanovic.
Aroused by her exclamations, Zivanovic learned that the King and Queen
had been murdered. "So I knew where Dragutin was since his bed had not
been slept in." As the Zivanovics worried about Apis, up came Captains
Ristic and Radivojevic, who had shot the royal couple, with Antic and
others. Dragu tin, they reported reassuringly, had been lightly wounded,
nothing to worry about. Taking Radivojevic aside, Zivan Zivanovic learned
that it was much more serious. "Dragutin has indeed been wounded and
very gravely. He has been taken still alive to the hospital. I hope that he
� live." Cautioning him to say nothing to other family members, Zivano­
VIc gave the officers rakija (plum brandy) before they hurried back to the
palace.
Captain Apis had received. first aid in the guardroom where he was first
�
b� aged. He had been wounded in three places. The first bullet, striking
his nght thigh, remained inside the wound. The second one, aimed at his
left hip, had shattered on the hilt of his sword and thus did not penetrate
�e hip or damage any internal organs. The third wound was the gravest:
�t had struck the middle of Apis' chest, penetrated the breastbone, passed
JUSt above the heart, and exited from his left arm beneath the ribs. Worried
48 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Killing the King 49

about possible bleeding from the lungs or fatal rupture of a major blood
vessel near the heart, the doctors prescribed absolute immobility. For the
next ten crucial days, to inquiries by relatives and friends they only shook
their heads uncertain whether he would recover.'l0
Within hours of the royal murders the officer conspirators and their
civilian allies controlled Serbia's army and government totally. Their sup­
porters, backed by most Serbs, secured interior garrisons. That morning
was formed in Belgrade a provisional government, dubbed "revolutionary"
by the press. The conspirators promptly summoned representatives of all
political parties and begged them to form a national unity cabinet to
guide Serbia for the initial months. This cabinet's strongest individuals
were Stojan Protic and Ljubomir Zivkovic, leaders of the Radicals' two
wings. All in all the officer conspirators acted correctly by yielding power
immediately to political leaders. They attempted neither to seize power
1 the flame sprang the May tragedy and the wars to liberate the na­
themselves nor impose any set of policies upon Serbia. 2
Some politicians approached by the officers at first could not believe
that power was being handed to them. Initially Protic suspected it was a
trick in order to have him and his colleagues arrested. Ljuba Zivkovic, the
Independent Radicals' chief, harangued a Belgrade crowd:
Brothers, you should not believe that this is a military or army revo­
lution. The arn1y did this from the conviction that the Serbian
people would support this affair and did not wish to do anything
without or against the Serbian people.22
The murder of the King will cause great damage to our personal
repute and to peace both in this country and abroad. But time will
reveal that it is not the result of our vulgarity or hatred, but a need
of state.24
With live heirs, Alexander might have been spared. Now his demise seemed
an essential precondition for unifying Serbs and South Slavs.
Subsequently , his comrades credited Apis with the initiative, leadership,
and self-sacrifice which had insured the coup's success. Apis was linked,
afflrmed Tucovic, with Serbia's rebirth, begun by destroying the stagnant
Obrenovic dictatorship:
Driven by the vision of national genius which recognizes no obstacles,
Apis lit the revolutionary flame in the Serbian officer corps. From
i a
tion . . . , completed by the unification of our entire people n
single nation of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.'l5
Among the officer conspirators, agreed Milos Bogicevic, Apis stood out by
patriotism, consistency, and detennination to act. At the crucial moment
he had inspired courage ; thanks to him the coup had triumphed.2'

Nullifying King Alexander's decrees, the new unity government restored

the 1901 Constitution, Assembly and Senate. The Assembly then over­
whelmingly elected as king the elderly pretender, Peter Karadjordjevic.
Despite some younger conspirators' republican convictions, monarchy
seemed the only viable solution . Political conditions in Europe were such
that proclamation of a republic would have provoked opposition by all
great powers, giving Austria-Hungary a pretext to intervene militarily. 23
The Karadjordjevic dynasty was enormously indebted to Apis and his
friends for its restoration. The Obrenovics' tragic deaths had resolved a
century-long dynastic feud which had paralyzed Serbia repeatedly. Apis
had persuaded his reluctant comrades that the royal murders were essential:
-

Conspirator in Politics 51

Steed of The Times denounced the killings as typcial of backward Central

Asian khanates, as unique in recent history . Austria, he hinted, might be
empowered to "restore order" by force. Foreign . Secretary Lord Lans­
downe declared that Britain could have no dealings with anyone mpli­
i
cated in the murders. "The literally butchered bodies" of king and queen
had been "hacked beyond recognition," reported the British minister
from Belgrade . As such reports flooded the Foreign Office, British recog­
nition of the new regime became unthinkable. The Foreign Office in­
CHAPTER VI
formed the Serbian envoy in London :

As long as the officers who were compromised by the events of May

CONSPIRATOR IN POLITICS
29 are found in the direct company of His Majesty King Peter and
( 1 903-1 908)
in the most important state posts, Great Britain will not join into
regular relations with us. 3
For me he [Apis] is . . . a certain secret force
at whose disposition 1 have to place myself But Russia and Austria-Hungary, while opposing a radical Serbian
though my reason gives me no grounds to
republic, responded neutrally to the May Coup. Their emperors replied
do so.
favorably to official notification of King Peter's election. Russia's minister
Vladimir Tucovic in Ziv. 7 1 8 . •
in Belgrade swiftly recognized the new regime and greeted King Peter
when he entered Belgrade.4 Austrian leaders reacted calmly and some
As Apis lay in the Military Hospital fighting for his life, King Peter
even praised the conspirators for ending Serbia's dynastic strife. 5 Russia
KaradjordjeviC's parliamentary regime gradually assumed control over
and Austria viewed King Peter as presaging the moderate regime they both
Serbia. Arriving in Belgrade June 2nd, Peter was soon recognized as king
desired in Serbia.
by Serbia's giant neighbors, Russia and Austria-Hungary. Both powers,
London urged Belgrade to punish the regicides severely, but Lord Lans­
otherwise preoccupied, wished for calm and stability in Serbia. In a pre­
downe soon realized this was unlikely. King Peter lacked the authority to
carious position, the King felt compelled to confirm in office the pro­
challenge the officer conspirators who had brought him to the throne.
visional Avakumovic cabinet where conspirators held key posts. Even
Initially he intended to punish the assassins only to conclude that would
when a new cabinet was formed that September without conspirators, and
provoke civil war. The mayor of Belgrade declared: "The King will have
the latter lost their positions at court, the King still consulted them care­
to leave matters as they stand . . . . The chief conspirators . . . are extolled
fully before making appointments or major decisions. A true constitu­
by the army and people as liberators of the country."'
tional monarch, King Peter left important matters of state to his ministers
Captain Apis was one of those extolled. Taken to Belgrade's Military
and army leaders. 1
Hospital May 29th, he lay critically injured and immobile. His sister and
The murders of the Obrenovic, dramatized and exaggerated by Euro­
brother-in-law, seeing him briefly that morning, found him prohibited to
pean newspapers, brought condemnation from home and abroad. Tele­
speak by his doctors. But as anxious relatives, comrades, and friends
grams from several European capitals demanding execution of the regi­
crowded around, Apis could not long remain silent. He insisted on uttering
cides provoked Zivan Zivanovic to defend them vigorously? Wickham-
a few words, supplemented by hand motions. Encased entirely in protec­
tive bandages, he responded as loved ones approached. Recovery depended

so
-
52 APIS: The CongeniaJ Conspirator
now on good fortune and his rugged health. One day Apis mustered the
strength to discuss the May conspiracy with Zivan Zivanovic:
That I entered this affair, brother-in-law, was in part due to you. I
am a young man, and life is pleasant and happy , so I could have
devoted myself to it with my friends without worrying about poli­
tics and what the King was doing. But you . . . always described
how difficult conditions were and complained about the King's
actions . . . . Thus I also began to realize what was going on and at
first by myself, afterwards with my friends, to reflect about the
lamentable condition of our country and about how to end that
once and for all. Thus this conspiracy developed.
Then Captain Apis revealed his deep loyalty to and love for the Zivano­
vic family:
I could not reveal anything about it to you, although this often oc­
curred to me, particularly since we had to calculate also on possible
failure. And in such a case things would not have gone well for you
because I am a member of your family , and much has been said and
done in our home on behalf of this affair. So in such case I wanted
to be able to swear, if they brought you in for interrogation, that
you could declare in good conscience that you knew nothing about
all this . . . .
Pausing briefly to recover, the wounded man then resumed: "And now
that we have carried out what we sought to achieve, I don't mind if I
should die; it is all the same to me." Apis believed that the new regime
would pursue Serbia's national goals. "But you could at least have said
something," objected Zivanovic, "so that I too could have contributed
something." Slumping back exhausted, Apis merely said softly : "Well,
that's just the way it was."7
With Apis' recovery still doubtful, Zivanovic received a heart-warming
letter from Captain Milun Risimic. Earlier this close friend of Apis had
been a welcome guest at the Zivanovic home. During the May Coup,
Risirnic had taken over the post-office and telegraph station in Zajecar.
His letter reveaJs how the conspirators felt about Apis and his" family:
Conspirator in Politics 53
Honored Sir:
1 do not wish to upset you at such an unhappy time. I cannot be­
cause you raised our dear Dragutin: he is _your general. We have
known how to appreciate that. In the whole plan the first aim was
to put the unworthy ones to death; the second was not to disrupt
your home. All of us felt that need. And as much as we feared for
Oragutin, we feared equally for you, that nothing would happen to
you by chance. This provides proof to you how much we love you,
Oragutin, and your home.
Oragutin has entered our golden history. His wounds are noble. We
weep and are proud. On behalf of the officers here we beg you to do
all you can so that he will remain here with us. Our services are avail­
able;8 that is the decision of all of us. We beg you to tell the fellows
to inform me of any change in the noble Dragutin's condition. The
entire garrison and town [of Zajecar] seek information from me
about him , so I beg you to let me know. I will come there as soon as
possible. Console Dragutin's mother and sister.
Zajecar, May 3 1 , 1903 Milun greets your family
Zivanovic was deeply touched by such consideration in the difficult days
when his brother-in-law's life lay in the baJance. "From the morning of
May 29th onward their attentiveness towards us and my home has never
ceased. These rare people, so ideally honorable and unselfish, thus helped
me to surmount one of the most trying times in my life."9 Once released
from the hospitaJ, Captain Apis spent part of the winter of 1 903-04 on
convalescent leave in Nis where Captain Risimic was being treated for
tuberculosis.
Apis and the May conspirators became closely involved with the ruling
Karadjordjevic family. Right after the coup, recalled Prince Djordje, King
Peter's older son, two officer conspirators arrived in Vienna to escort him
and his younger brother, Alexander. to Belgrade. Lieutenant Peter Ziv­
kovic was assigned to Alexander and Lieutenant Antonije Antic to Ojordje.
This marked the beginning of ZivkoviC's fateful and lifelong association
with Alexander. Not long afte rward, Prince Ojordje was riding with a
group of officers, including the hot-tempered Zivkovic. Challenged to a
horse race, Zivkovic demurred. If his horse were injured, who would give
him another? He knew that Prince Djordje's steed had been the gift of a
-
54 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
foreign ruler. Turning abruptly to Zivkovic, the Prince retorted: "Some
know how to ride, and others only to open gates," a reference to Ziv­
kovic's "heroism" at the palace gates. Those present laughed loudly at
the Prince's sally, but Djordje realized that the morose Zivkovic would
10
never forget this slight. "Our quarrel is growing worse," he noted.
The conspirators' arrogance and incessant desire for recognition alien­
ated Prince Djordje. "Nor did Apis inspire much sympathy in me. Arro­
gant by nature, overly self-assured and uncompromising, it seemed as if he
loved to dominate." Officers were supposed to shun political activity, but
politics, noted Djordje, became Apis' guiding passion. No one questioned
h.is love of Serbia, agreed the Prince, but he revealed this strangely by
giving advice to experienced politicians, criticizing cabinet ministers, and
interfering where he had no business.
King Peter, related Djordje, saved Apis and other junior conspirators
from dismissal, as Radical leader, Nikola Pasic , demanded late in 1903.
Entering his father's office, the Prince heard Pasic insist that all officer
conspirators be expelled from Belgrade. Senior ones should be pensioned
and junior officers dispersed to interior regiments. The conspirators' revo­
lutionary aims, warned Pasic, imperilled Serbia's domestic peace and rela­
tions with Europe. He had decrees to this effect all ready for the King's
signature. King Peter listened attentively but objected to such a drastic
solution of a delicate issue. Moderate and opposed to hasty actions, the
King sought time to consult party leaders and ministers. Thus some
senior conspirators were pensioned in May 1904, but junior ones, inclu­
1 reforms in order to ach.ieve prosperity and Serbian unity. Under vigorous
ding Apis, retained their posts in Belgrade. 1
In August 1903 was uncovered a counterconspiracy led by Captain
Milan Novakovic of the NiS garrison against the May conspirators and King
Peter. After May 29th senior conspirators had occupied all important Bel­
grade commands, key cabinet posts, and positions at court. By intimida­
tion or transfers Colonels Alexander Masin, Damjan Popovic, and Peter
MiSic had silenced opposing officers. Novakovic , beginning his service in
NiS August 1 1 th, circulated a document among officers there demanding
that sixty-eight conspirators resign their commissions. By murdering their
commander-in-chief, they had "dishonored" their uniforms and violated
their oaths. Nis officers, exhorted Novakovic, must unite behind the slogan:
"Remove uniforms, they or we!"12
•
Conspirator in Politics 55
This news provoked an emergency cabinet meeting at the Interior Min­
istry. Joining Premier Avakumovic and Radical leader, Stojan Protic, were
four prominent conspirators: Apis, Colonel Masin, Lieutenant Antic and
Djordje Gencic. Captain Apis was sent to NiS to investigate the counter­
conspiracy . Arriving August 21st, he obtained Novakovic's proclamation ,
apparently by bribing a non-commissioned officer. Twenty officers who
had signed it, including N<Wakovic, were imprisoned; later twenty-seven
Nis officers were tried by court-martial. Novakovic argued that the May
conspirators had mutinied against, then murdered their king without justi­
fication. Continued conspirator control of the government, he asserted,
would provoke European ostracism of Serbia. Nonetheless, the court
sentenced him and an associate to two year prison terms. Uncovered by
Apis, the Nis affair split the officer corps and alerted the regime to the
urgency of army reform . 1 3
The counterconspiracy reflected officer discontent with the new
regime's policies and with the senior conspirators' favored status. The
latter, dubbing all opponents "contras," persecuted them and got some
expelled from the army. Rising friction ensued between senior conspira­
tors in power and junior ones led by the increasingly influential Captain
Apis. 14 More serious tensions developed between army officers and the
Radical Party which was now assuming political control. 15
Nikola Pasic and the Radical Party would play key but controversial
roles in Apis' life and career. The Radicals, affirmed a sympathetic bio­
grapher of Pa.Sic, considered the May Coup the prelude to basic domestic
leadership by Pasic, Protic and Lazar Pacu, the Radical Party presided
over Serbia's regeneration. Realistic and methodical, Pa.Sic had conceived
an ambitious program to liberate and unite around Serbia with its 2,500,
000 people some 4,500,000Serbis still under Turkish or Austro-Hungarian
rule. The Radicals revived national goals set a half century earlier by Ilija
Garasanin. Pasic implemented. domestic reform, revived national morale,
then raised Serbia's international prestige. 1' On the other hand, Pasic's
contemporary, Slobodan Jovanovic , emphasized PasiC's great skill in pre­
serving power despite a precarious parliamentary position. A great com­
promiser, Pa.Sic settled difficult issues by negotiation and delay. Preserving
comple te self-control in crucial situations, he remained patient and
CUnning.1 7
-
56 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Austria's minister in Belgrade depicted Pa5ic as perfidious and unreli­
able. His words and deeds, claimed Dumba, never coincided. Unpleasant
matters he simply denied or dismissed. Though a poor speaker, Pa�ic was
masterly at holding his party together and retaining power through cor­
ruption and maneuver. Revealing a consistent and farsighted belief in na­
tional unification, he surmounted all misfortunes. In mole-like activity,
exploiting national agitators whom he often sacrificed, he proved un­
equalled. Intolerant of rivals, especially in the military, Pasic became the
conspirators' most dangerous enemy, gradually undermining their position.
Once his Radicals controlled the government, Pa8ic relegated the senior
18
conspirators to the background.
King Peter, another chief actor, combined strengths and weaknesses.
This patriotic and liberal king, declared Samouprava, had inaugurated an
era of freedom and progress. Respecting the popular will, Peter let the
19
Radicals work freely for Serbia's benefit. But British and Austrian re­
ports stressed Peter's weakness and subservience to senior conspirators.
Appointing Colonels Masin and MiSic to top positions left him wholly in
the conspirators' hands, argued the British vice-consul. Thesiger deplored
Peter's "want of moral energy and personal courage united with a fear of
responsibility." After a year n
i power the King lacked real political sup­
port, and the conspirators controlled the army.2° The Austrian minister
praised King Peter for his great naturalism, personal dignity, and fearless­
ness in personal appearances while agreeing he remained the conspirators'
21
prisoner.
The highhanded behavior of some senior conspirators was alienating
public sentiment. PaSic exploited this to foster their conflict with other
officers and the Crown.22 Leading conspirators, fearful they might be
pensioned off or even tried for the royal murders, sought to perserve their
society and retain control of the army. Using the slogan: "All for one, one
for all," they refused to compromise. This blocked restoration of relations
with Britain and endangered Serbia's domestic stabilityY
Their defiance and continued hold over King Peter provoked a "Diplo­
matic Strike." Late in 1903 most foreign envoys boycotted court func­
tions in Belgrade and went on extended home leave. In December the King
promoted then removed conspirators from his court, but they continued
to dominate the War Ministry . Under that compromise Austrian and Rus­
sian envoys returned to Belgrade, but Lord Lansdowne complained that
•
Conspirator in Politics 57
the regicides had been neither punished nor condemned. London alone
refused to restore relations with Serbia. 24
During 1905 the officer conspirators divided . .As their seniors' influ­
ence waned, junior officers sought political support from the Independent
Radicals. Nikola Pa5ic, by winning over Colonel Misic, managed to split
the senior conspirators. That same year King Peter's position was imperill­
ed by forced dismissals of his private secretary and a relative. The precar­
ious state of the King and dynasty led some influential Serbs to favor a
foreign prince for Serbia. 25
In London the new Liberal cabinet refused recognition of King Peter's
regime until changing international conditions forced a reassessment. By
spring 1906, as Serbo-Austrian commercial antagonism rose and Germanic
domination of the Balkans loomed, Belgrade and London moved toward a
settlement. Dropping insistence that regicide officers be punished, Britain
demanded merely that senior conspirators be retired without receiving
other influential posts. 2' The Pasic government formed in April 1906
readily agreed and in June Anglo-Serbian relations were fmally restored.
Meanwhile Captain Apis, after passing written examinations for service
•
with the General Staff, obtained a leave of absence to study foreign mili­
tary institutions. He spent the year, 1905-06, in Berlin mastering German
and becoming closely acquainted with the training and organization of the
German army , Europe's most dominant military force. Apis secured an
invitation to attend the great army maneuvers of 1906 (Kaisermanover)
near Breslau in Silesia. On a bicycle placed at his disposition by the German
command, Captain Apis covered energetically great distances, examining
field dispositions from various vantage points. Afterwards, he submitted
a lengthy report praised by the Serbian War Ministry for its clarity and
perceptiveness. Upon return from Germany, Captain Apis was assigned to
the General Staff section of the War Ministry serving there from Septem­
ber 1906 until March 1907Y
Senior conspirator resignations, consolidating the dynasty and Radical
rule in Serbia, provided Apis with a unique opportunity to exert leader­
ship in army affairs. Surrounding himself with dedicated younger officers
and linked with senior commanders such as General Radomir Putnik,
Serbia's preeminent strategist, he achieved remarkable influence for one
so junior in rank. Applying lessons learned in Germany, Apis and his col­
leagues worked to improve the organization and training of the Serbian
-

58 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Conspirator in Politics 59

army. They exerted indirect pressure on cabinets and the Assembly to pro­ disregarding more senior colleagues. To him came written excuses of those

vide more funds and modem weapons. While highly useful in such en­ unable to attend. As the May conspirators dwindled in numbers, Apis re­

deavors and working unceasingly to achieve national goals, Apis proved cruited new celebrants.

rather naive and inept politically. His own political ideas remained obscure In manner and behavior, explained his friend, Vladimir Tucovic, Apis

and ill-defined, but with inborn combativeness he extended his influence exerted a well-nigh magical, irresistible power over his friends. Always

recklessly above the Crown and cabinet. This brought him inevitably into smiling, charming and approachable, he treated the gravest matters in such

conflict with Radical leaders. Both Pasic and elements at court began to a relaxed, lighthearted way that colleagues did not feel their gravity. Apis'

consider him a dangerous and irresponsible competitor for power; they ideas, thrown out casually without overt pressure were accepted as com­

suspected him not unreasonably of praetorian aims. Around Captain Apis mands to be obeyed. Apis never imposed his views; there was nothing

gathered national revolutionaries who favored ruthless struggle against despotic about him. His was a sympathetic nature created for struggle and
Austria-Hungary for Serbian unification. Opposing him were officers con­ intrigue. "Apis is not a man for discussion, analysis and effect," recalled

tent with the status quo and those seeking rewards for earlier services. another friend. "Philosophy and rhetoric are not his weapons; he does not

From this rivalry would later develop the "Black Hand" and "White employ logic. His conclusions and decisions fall nonetheless as axioms."

Hand" factions. 2� Realizing their impotence, theorists felt uncomfortable in his presence.

How did Apis acquire such a remarkable hold over fellow officers, even Apis would listen to his comrades, then place before them faits accomplis.

over those much superior in rank? "For me," explained one, "he [Apis) From his person emanated a self-confident ease with which he dominated

is something more than an ordinary person, a certain secret force at whose the thoughts of others.

disposal I am compelled to place myself although my reason gives me no

cause to do so." Though never elected as chief of the junior conspirators, That domination is so strong and irresistible that your logic is shaken

Apis led them naturally and irresistibly, as one friend confirmed: and seems false. You read in his ironical smile : 'You child of God,
isn't it clear to you that life is an adventure?' You submit and leave
-

I could fmd no justification for it either in his intelligence which he with bruised self-esteem.

certainly possessed, or in his eloquence which he utilized little, or

in his ideas which were often open to criticism, or in the greatness In Apis' antechamber swarmed young officers waiting to explain their

of his spirit which he did not reveal, but still he was the only one missions and to receive instructions. These impatient young people were

among us who solely by his presence was able to turn my thoughts imbued with an unquenchable desire to achieve. Apis was their idol, sup­

into his stream and with a few words spoken in the most ordinary plying moral nourishment, always promising something, and stimulating

manner could make out of me an obedient executor of his will. them to act. That waiting room was the center for creative and restive
spirits who rejected the status quo or calm and peaceful service. Whether

Casting a virtual hypnotic spell over friends and comrades, Apis to them old comrades from May 29th or new recruits, all were attracted to Apis

embodied by his dynamism and energy the Serbian national ideal and like moths to a flame. Like his, their precise goals were obscure. Catching

dedication to an unceasing struggle to achieve its goal.29 ideas in flight and enjoying his role as watchdog of the May Coup, Apis
awaited eagerly any opportunity to take up arms for the national cause or
Officer conspirators assembled every May 29th at Belgrade's "Kolarac"
restaurant. To those attending Apis symbolized the May Coup. Sharing exert influence. His program could be reduced to a word: STRUGGLE?0

beer and comradeship, they regarded these annual reunions as virtually a Opposing the Apis faction was a group of mostly older officers, promin­
ent under the Obrenovic. After May 29th they accepted obscure positions
holy communion. Invariably the genial host, Apis awaited and received all
or left the army temporarily. Once the new order consolidated itself, they
guests who seemed to feel the imperative need to seek him out, often

•
•
60 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
sought a part in it, often by fawning and flattery . The Apis group detested
them and combated their influence. During Serbia's national wars of 1 9 12-
1 9 1 8 , they were restored to army commands. BoZin Simic, a former
"Black Hand" colleague of A pis, cited a leading example: for years a trust­
ed figure at the Obrenovic court, he had been abroad on a personal mission
for King Alexander during the May Coup. A decade later, promoted to
general, he was the Karadjordjevic's family's closest advisor. Able to im­
pose himself on any regime and serve any king, he would work at the
Salonika Trial to destroy Apis. 31
From the turmoil of 1903-05 the Serbian army emerged improved and
democratized. Based on thorough reforms instituted earlier by ex-King
Milan, General Putnik and others, it became one of the best fighting
forces in Europe. Emphasized before 1 903 had been harsh discipline, the
Prussian goosestep, and numerous inspections and parades. Officers had
often spent spare time in drunken parties and read little. Able lower class
cadets entering the Academy after 1 900 demanded substance over form.
They revealed greater ability than earlier graduates to lead troops and grasp
theoretical concepts. After the May Coup some conservative oldsters were
weeded out; rigid discipline ended. The Russo-Japanese War (1904-05)
stimulated new officer graduates to adopt technological innovations and
utilize initiative. At the Academy antiquated "truths" were discarded, and
new approaches spread from liberal professors to troops in the field. As
training and equipment improved, morale and self-reliance rose .
Welcoming such reformist trends in the army, Apis spurned hallowed
legal fonns and traditional hierarchy. With his support old drones were
removed and younger, innovative officers replaced them. As a key member
of the General Staffs commission, Apis acted as a stimulator of change,
though few realized his role. Seemingly unconcerned with personal glory
and careful not to alienate sensibilities of superiors he influenced, Apis ap­
proached people so skillfully that they believed it was he who was adopt­
ing their suggestions. Bozin Simic, without citing specific evidence, gives
Apis great personal credit for preparing the Serbian army for the Balkan
wars and affirms boldly that war ministers from 1 906 to 1 9 1 3 were ap­
pointed largely through his intluence.32
Cabinets in Belgrade, officer conspirators, and private Serbian groups
were preoccupied then with an escalating struggle over Turkish-ruled
Macedonia with its mixed Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek population. After
Conspirator in Politics 61
the Turks suppressed the uprising of August 1903 came an upsurge of
Serbian nationalist activity. In Belgrade meetings were held and appeals
issued to aid embattled Serbs in Macedonia and Old Serbia with arms and
men. From Serbia small guerrilla bands, some led by officer conspirators,
began crossing the Turkish frontier into Macedonia. Initially poorly train­
ed and equipped, they were mostly destroyed by Turks or Bulgars. At
first Belgrade governments discouraged guerrilla activity there fearing it
might provoke great power intervention or Turkish reprisals. Growing ten­
sion over Macedonia hampered efforts to achieve a Serbo-Bulgarian al­
liance. 33
By 1 905 Serbian guerrillas in Macedonia and Old Serbia comprised a
small army. Nationalists and firebrands from various South Slav regions
flocked to Serbia to enlist. Trained in Belgrade or the south, guerrillas
crossed into Macedonia, operating there with n
i creasing success. Usually
wearing peasant clothing, they soon grew better trained and disciplined.
Fighting Turkish regulars only when unavoidable, Serbian bands held their
own, even dislodging Bulgar bands at times. As Turkish and European­
sponsored reforms proved ineffective, conditions in the south grew ever
more chaotic.
Apis and other officer conspirators became deeply involved in fostering
Serbian interests in Macedonia. Already in 1904, joining a secret commit­
tee corrdinating activities in the south, Apis hailed this as an essential
part of Serbia's role as the South Slav Piedmont. 34 Among the first Serb­
ian officers to lead a guerrilla band into Macedonia was Lieutenant Voji­
slav Tankosic, soon a renowned guerrilla leader. Subsequently in charge of
guerrilla training, Tankosic won widespread popularity for his fe arlessness
and enthusiasm.35 Another Apis comrade who began his nationalist acti­
vity there was Lieutenant Ljubomir Vulovic from a village near Kragujevac.
After the May Coup, Vulovic served as garrison officer near the Turkish
frontier and as a member of the Vranje secret executive committee helped
organize guerrilla bands. For years he engaged in bloody cambat as a guer­
rilla leader. 3'
On that same Skoplje Committee served a highly educated, Turkish­
speaking civilian, Bogdan Radenkovic. Formerly chief secretary of the
Serbian Metropolitanate, in 1 904 he became chief organizer of Serbian
national activity in Skoplje region. The Turks condemned him repeatedly
to severe punishment. 37 Later, he would help initiate the "Blacl_c Hand."
62 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Conspirator in Politics 63

During 1906 Serbian guerrilla activity in Macedonia sparked tension dynamism and political ambition. Officially, Apis worked to improve the
with Bulgaria. Thereafter serious disputes developed among the Serbs over army's organization, equipment, and mobilization procedures. His unof­
tactics and direction. Radenkovic's group wanted operations directed from ficial role was perhaps still more significant as undisputed leader of the
Belgrade while the Metropolitan of Skoplje urged independent guerrilla conspirators from 1 906. As such he exercised growing influence within
activities. Finally in 1908 unity was restored. 38 The substantial successes the army and its officer corps.
of guerrilla activity in the south convinced Apis and Radenkovic that Serb­
ian unification could best be achieved by revolutionary and military
action.39
While Apis was serving as the Drina Division's assistant chief of staff
in 1908, King Peter requested him and another officer to accompany his
unstable son, Prince Djordje, on a European trip. Surprised by this choice
since the King had often deplored the methods of officer conspirators,
Djordje set out reluctantly, resolved to maintain a cool official relationship
with Major Apis. During six weeks in Geneva, Switzerland, then in Italy,
however, Apis won over the young prince completely:

Especially friendly and intimate was Major Apis. At that time he was
my friend, but later he emerged as my opponent and an adherent of
my brother, Alexander, and played perhaps involuntarily a major
role in my life . . . . But during this trip Apis was friendly, natural, a
good friend and comrade . I especially liked his way of life: he loved
cafes , song, women, and on that trip took us to many places for
amusement.

Sleeping by day, Apis and Captain Pavlovic introduced the inexperienced

Prince to nightclub life. "In the evening they would decide where to go
next. I had money and they had experience, so the days passed pleasantly
and father believed I was visiting museums and art galleries . . . . " Prince
Djordje returned home believing Apis would remain his friend. He rejoiced -

that the Independent Radicals were in power. Pasic, his chief opponent,
had resigned, and his brother, Prince Alexander, was to study in Russia.
With him would depart Peter Zivkovic "whom I strongly wished not to
see at court near Alexander. "40
In the years after the May Coup Apis rose to military and political
prominence. He was then on excellent terms with King Peter and his sons
and gained the trust of General Putnik. The Radicals, Serbia's dominant
party, valued his patriotism and energy though distrusting his revolutionary

•
-
CHAPTER VII
APIS AND THE " B LACK HAND"
1 908-1 9 1 2
I was just an ordinary member and . . . warn­
ed that because I was busy with official
duties, I could not work on recruiting new
members . . . . Having ties with leading per­
sons in top positions in state service and the
army, I declared I would put all these con­
nections at the organization's service.
Colonel Apis at the Salonika Trial
To Serbs it came like a thunderbolt from a clear blue sky . On October
6, 1908 Austria-Hungary proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia and Herce­
govina. Exposing Serbia to virtual encirclement by the Dual Monarchy,
this stroke apparently ended prospects that these provinces, mostly South
Slav in population, would ever join with Serbia. This sudden move fol­
lowed Austria's failure to coerce Serbia p.
i the preceding tariff war. In
Serbia and other South Slav lands the annexation provoked an immediate,
massive upsurge of patriotic sentiment. Nationalist and revolutionary
organizations formed to combat Austrian imperialism and promote South
Slav unity. When public and legal mass organizations proved ineffective,
militants set up the secret, revolutionary organization, "Unification or
Death! " , nicknamed the "Black Hand." In that group Apis played a major
though controversial role.
64
The "Black Hand" 65
The Bosnian Annexation triggered formation in Serbia of Narodna
Odbrana (National Defense), a mass organization, which mobilized Serbs
to resist Austria-Hungary. Within a month local committees had sprung
up throughout Serbia, galvanizing its people. Over· 5,000 volunteers were
recruited from Serbia and abroad, prepared to cross into Bosnia and Herce­
govina to fight Austria. The Serbian regime backed this popular move­
ment announcing: "Belgraders! The fatherland is in danger! Austria threat­
ens to steal Bosnia and Hercegovina from us. We cannot and must not re­
main passive." 1 Belgrade ordered the Drina Division to organize defense
of the Bosnian frontier. As chief of staff to General I. Gojkovic, Major
Apis carried out that task successfully?
Narodna Odbrana advocated unification of all Serbs through militant
national policies including war. In Serbia the annexation provoked spon­
taneous general protest. Serbs prepared for self-sacrificing struggle, even
death. In the annexed provinces Narodna Odbrana was welcomed enthu­
siastically. Henceforth, Austria viewed Narodna Odbrana as highly dan­
gerous and rabidly Austrophobe. It was then a first-class revolutionary
organization supported by all opponents of the annexation, noted Cedo
•
Popovic. Youthful volunteers from varous regions trooped to Cuprija in
eastern Serbia for guerrilla training with redoubtable Voja Tankosic . Hard­
ened guerrillas proceeded from Macedonia to the Drina frontier. Serbs in
Bosnia and Hercegovina were convinced that behind the guerrillas would
march the Serbian army.3
Instead of war ensued divided counsels and public disillusonment.
.
Without Russia's military support, Serbia would have met quick defeat
by the Habsburg Empire. Milovan Milovanovic, Serbia's foreign minister,
realizing Austria's preponderant power, opposed war then, fearing it would
destroy Serbia. He foresaw that Serbo-Austrian antagonism would eventu­
ally provoke a general European conflict. In the Assembly he explained :
Russia is unprepared, so Serbia can oppose Austria only diplomatically.
Nikola Pa5ic, the Radic.al leader, deplored MilovanoviC's efforts to
secure minor territorial compensation for the annexation. As a committed
nationalist, Pa5ic kept always in view his long-term goal of Serbian unity.
Publicly bellicose but soon realizing Serbia could not then fight Austria,
Pasic fanned international indignation against the annexation . Meanwhile
Milovanovic , his rival in the Radical Party, toured major European capitals,
explaining Serbia's position. Once Austria-Hungary controlled the western
66 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Balkans, he warned, the small Balkan states would be enslaved. Unable
to thwart the annexation, Milovanovic nonetheless kept the Bosnian ques­
tion open. Thus his later statement under intense Austro-German pressure
that the annexation did not infringe Serbia's interests (manifestly untrue),
failed to damage much her prestige abroad.4
The negative outcome of the annexation crisis dismayed Serbs. Ignor­
ant of Serbia's weakness, they reacted angrily to Belgrade's promise to
live in peace with Austria and reduce its army . At Austrian insistence
Narodna Odbrana became a peaceful cultural society restricted to modest,
unobtrusive individual efforts. Serbian militants were profoundly disil­
lusioned. "In our view," Apis stated later, "Narodna Odbrana did not do
as much or what we considered necessary to do."5
A lull in national activity and public discouragement ensued. Compelled
to renounce the annexed provinces, Belgrade also halted guerrill a activity
in Macedonia where the Bulgars swiftly erased most earlier Serbian gains.
They and the Turks terrorized Serbs in Macedonia. Serb national workers
everywhere protested that Belgrade's inactivity would doom their cause .
Militants and revolutionaries, demanding radically different methods,
longed for a secret, militant organization.'
Former guerrilla leaders in Macedonia grew deeply worried. Whereas
some wished to seek concessions peacefully for Macedonian Serbs, older
leaders under Bogdan Radenkovic urged revolutionary struggle against
Bulgars and Young Turks. Late in 1908 a conference in Skoplje approved
this. Radenkovic was to explain this decision in Belgrade and seek Serbia's
assistance for guerrilla operations. Convinced that only revolutionary
action could save Serbs in the south, Radenkovic conceived a secret na­
tionalist organization to back the guerrilla movement. He shared his ideas
with three Belgrade militants: Voja Tankosic , the guerrilla chief; Cavalry
Captain Velimir Vemic; and Lj ubomir Jovanovic -Cupa, an idealistic pro­
Yugoslav nationalist. Deciding to form an organization for revolutionary
action outside Serbia, they met frequently to discuss the formation of
what became "Unification or Death!"7
However, some well-informed contemporaries ascribed the "Black
Hand'"s formation to Apis. Bozin Simic, close to him, emphasized that
officer conspirators then were agitating to resume guerrilla activity in
Macedonia and prepare the Serbian army for war. To achieve this and im­
prove military intelligence, Apis at first considered placing revolutionary
The "Black Hand" 67
activists in Narodna Odbrana and take it over from within. Abandoning
that scheme soon as impractical, Apis conceived instead "Unification or
Death!" to prepare the army for coming crises and gather around it na­
tional revolutionaries from all Yugoslav areas.8 Sinillarly, former Interior
Minister Ljubomir Jovanovic-Patak cited VemiC's postscript of March
3, 1 9 1 1 :
I got to look at a letter of Dimitrijevic [Apis] of January 1 9 , 1 9 1 0
which showed clearly that already then he not only knew about the
preparations [for "Black Hand"] but that he may have been the
instigator of the whole thing, but in any case one of the prime
movers. Here is one sentence : 'At the end let me remind you of the
undertaking about which we spoke and have already engaged people,
that in Berlin orders have been placed . . . . "9
Apis, argued J ovanovic-Patak, rarely came directly to colleagues to initiate
matters such as "Black Hand." Remaining in the background, he drove on
others until convinced it was their idea, they "accepted" their own pro­
10
posal.
Apis for his part claimed later that Vemic had first imformed him about
"Unification or Death!" in downtown Belgrade early in 1 9 1 1 :
He told me he had something to confide to me and requested that
I take it seriously and keep it secret. When I agreed, he said he would
introduce me to the people who had initiated that affair. Thus it
occurred that I met with Bogdan Radenkovic and the late Ljuba S.
Jovanovic, called Cupa. Probably the first time I saw them and
Vemic was in my office at the Cavalry Division where I was chief
of staff.
Apis learned that the three. were planning to form a secret nationalist
organization. With a heavy volume of staff work, Apis consented some­
what reluctantly to join them. Asked at Salonika whether he had helped
compose the "Black Hand" Constitution, Apis responded:
1 was neither picked for that work nor was I among those who drew
up the Constitution . . . . Lj uba lJovanovic-Cupa) did that, and 1
68 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
recall that he also provided a sketch of the Oath. Besides Ljuba, Bog­
dan also worked on the draft . . . . At that first meeting . . . they
agreed to work out a draft of the Constitution and when that was
ready, at meetings held at VemiC's apartment, each article was read
to everyone and the final wording was agreed to. In that regard there
was little discussion . . . . When the articles were fmally approved,
someone rewrote the Constitution and brought it to us for signature,
12
I believe, in Ilija Radivojevic's office . . . .
Apis thus joined the original seven man Central Executive Committee
of "Unification or Death!" As that board began work, he had remained
just an ordinary member, declared Apis. Lacking time to help recruit mem­
bers for the organization, he would aid them in his spare time "as my
personal sacrillce." Having close ties with top government and army lead­
ers, he would place all his contacts at the "Black Hand"'s service. "They
all seemed satisfied with this and did not elect me president and spared me
also from other duties in the Central Executive Committee." That Com­
mittee unanimously chose llija Radivojevic president and Velimir Vemic
secretary of "Black Hand."
Why had Major Apis entered a secret organization knowing that this
was forbidden to all military personnel?, queried Colonel MiSic at Salonika.
The desperate plight of Serbs in Macedonia and Old Serbia had impelled
him to do so, Apis explained:
The defmitive loss of Bosnia-Hercegovina and its people to Serbdom
. . . and the extinction of Serbian life which was to be completed
in the south under the new Turkish regime impressed me that this
was a desperate time for the Serbs. At that moment came Bogdan
Radenkovic . . . arguing the need for such an organization. ln Serbia,
the free Piedmont of Serbdom, he felt, little heed was being paid to
this. He was convinced Serbia must undertake solution of the
Macedonian question, argued that it could be aided by such an
organization . . . . Earlier, I had been involved personally in similar
secret committees [in Macedonia) so I was not worried about its
secrecy. I entered the organization especially because of Bodgan. 13
Thus Apis willingly subordinated his duties as an officer to his convictions
as a nationalist.
·The "Black Hand" 69
As to the "Black Hand'"s Constitution, Apis insisted that the founders
had envisaged revolutionary struggle solely outside Serbia's borders. Nor
should that document be interpreted literally: the president and secretary
never had possessed the absolute authority stipulated in the Constitution
to impose decisions on the membership. The "Black Hand," Apis stressed ,
had never undertaken illegal action in Serbia, and its external activities
had been plarmed with the Belgrade government's full knowledge and
approval. Apis had promised Foreign Minister Milovanovic to inform him
of all "Black Hand" activities and that the organization would do nothing
improper which might discredit the government. The name, "Unification
or Death!" signified that members must be willing to sacrifice their lives
if that were required to unite the Serbs. The mysterious initiation of mem­
bers involving a ceremony in a darkened room and an oath administered
by a hooded leader stemmed from the Freemason, Jovanovic-Cupa. Link­
ed closely by mutual trust and friendship, members of the CEC had
adopted the terrorist insignia of the bomb, knife and death's head because
of pressures of the Macedonian struggle. The secret and violent operations
in Macedonia, explained Apis, had precluded formal registration of the
"Black Hand" with the Serbian authorities. 1 4
Apis' status as a "threefold man"-an officer, leader of the May Coup,
and "Black Hand" member-had made him the logical link with the gov­
ernment:
When I entered the organization, I enjoyed the best relations with
the Crown . . . . I took on myself the task of acquainting the govern­
ment with the organization to a certain extent. Bogdan [Radenko­
vic] was our representative in the Foreign Ministry as its employee.
I informed Dr. Milovan Milovanovic about the organization, often
going to see him at his home or to his office in Belgrade and im­
mediately began to discuss our affairs with him.
Informing the Foreign Minister that "Unification or Death! " truly existed
and consisted chiefly of army officers, Apis did not give him its Constitu­
tion or operating code (Poslovnik) allegedly because Milovanovic did not
ask for them. After listening to Major Apis, Milovanovic had declared :
"Place, young friend, your 'Black Hand' at my disposal, then you will
soon see what Milovanovic will do for Serbia." He requested merely that
70 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
the organization do nothing detrimental to the general interest. "We pas­
sed directly to discussing negotiations with Bulgaria for an alliance, af­
firmed Apis. "When necessary I placed at MilovanoviC's disposition indi­
vidual members of "Unification or Death!" for essential work on our na­
tional tasks."15 During the winter of 191 1-12, the "Black Hand" became
virtually an instrument of the Serbian Foreign Ministry.
It was apparently Jovanovic-Cupa who had first urged Major Apis to
approach the Foreign Minister. At a CEC meeting Cupa declared: "We
must without fail go to Balacka [Milovanovic] and convince him that co­
operation with the Bulgars is necessary. " "But who should talk with him,"
queried Apis. "You," replied Cupa. "But I don't know him personally at
all. Besides, it would be inappropriate for me as an officer to talk with
him about such a matter." Then other CEC members insisted: "No, pre­
cisely you should go." Yielding goodnaturedly, Apis had a long talk with
Milovanovic. "Black Hand'"s goals, declared Apis, were wholly different
from those asserted by the Radical press. "Why don't you reply to them?"
asked the Foreign Minister. "It would be easy to reply," responded the
Major, "but it would not be suitable given the aims we have set to involve
ourselves now in a public polemic." Liking this answer, Milovanovic list­
ened attentively to Apis' further explanations. That was his first oppor­
tunity to talk with this remarkable young man. Later, Milovanovic often
repeated: "1 had never before met such a brilliant officer."''
Why had the "Black Hand" consisted mostly of army officers? inquired
Colonel MiSic at the Salonika Trial. Apis explained that the founders had
envisioned it as a mass popular organization :
Both Bogdan and I believed we would have time to enlist a vast
number of members . . . but the wars hampered this. Time was lack­
ing to achieve that ideal, and the mystical and difficult means of
inducting members would not allow us to do very much given the
short time. It was much easier to enlist officers as members than
civilians because officers were linked by comradeship and entered
the organization readily despite those mystical requirements, so the
organization became involuntarily chiefly a military one. 1 7
A lengthy exchange at the Salonika Trial between Chairman Misic and
Apis cast more light on the "Black Hand'"s nature and Apis' role within it.
•
The "Black Hand" 71
How did Colonel Apis believe, as suggested by its Constitution, that the
"Black Hand" would influence the Serbian government and public life?
That influence, responded Apis, would come of its.elf because those "key
elements . . . would all belong to the organization."
MWe: "What happened when the instructions of the CEC and the inter­
ests of the organization conflicted openly with state or private interests?''
Apis: "Personally 1 broke my oath concluding that the country's least
interest was greater than the interests of the organization."
Misic: "Did any members leave the organization in defiance of their
oath, and what happened to them?"
A pis: "I heard that Milan Gavrilovic in the Foreign Ministry left the
organization and apparently committed indiscretions in Dnevni list 1 8 [re­
vealing "Black Hand" secrets] . Nothing was done to him."
Misic: "Who contributed the idea for 'Unification's seal?"
Apis: "I did not since I was more a staff than a field operative."
Misic: "Why did you adopt as insignia of the organization a skull, cross­
bones, knife, bomb and poison, and what did each signify?"
Apis: "For me as an intelligent person those emblems do not have
such a frightening and negative look . . . because I served earlier on such
[secret] committees. In the first committee . . . where I began national
work, at one large meeting came amongst us a world-renowned professor
of [Belgrade] University who told us of the need for the bitterest struggle
in Macedonia 'to save Serbdom with bombs, knives and rifles.' That was
my national baptism. In my later work in the field, poison was used and all
guerrillas carried it both as a means of attack and to save someone if he fell
into enemy hands. That is why such emblems entered the organization's
seal and it was a sign that these people were prepared to die."
Misic: "The Constitution prescribed that every member had to report
everything he learned privately or officially to the organization."
Apis: "Each member had to decide on his own and on what basis if
something related to the organization or whether to report it. As to state
secrets, each member decided in each case whether to report them"
Misic: "Why did you decide to form an organization in obvious con­
flict with the laws of Serbia?"
Aps:
i "When revolutionary struggle was necessary , this explains our
conviction that such provisions and operations were the only way to save
Serbdom when threatened with extinction . . . . I did not feel for a moment

72 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
that the Oath would hinder me or take precedence over my oaths to king
and country."19
Apis' close friend, Major Vladirnir Tucovic, enlisted Major Panta Dras­
kic, later Prince Alexander's adjutant, into the "Black Hand." Assured
that Prince Alexander, higher officials, and top officers had already join­
ed, DraSldc decided to enter a secret, illegal organization. Soon he learned
that its true leader was Major Apis whom he praised later as "a fearless
individual and patriot whom one encounters only once in centuries." How­
ever, as reports multiplied about the "Black Hand"'s interference in poli­
tics, Draskic deplored "that our idealism was being profaned by some type
0
of political intrigue. "2
•
By the fall of 1 9 1 1 information about the "Black Hand" had leaked
to cabinet members, the press, diplomatic corps, and top officers. Colonel
Milos Bozanovic, Belgrade's commandant, at first was incredulous that
officers were involved in this mysterious group. To his questions Major
Josif Kostic exclaimed:
Don't you know? It is public knowledge. They are talking about it
in the cafes and public saying officer conspirators are in "Black
Hand," including I. Radivojevic, Dimitrijevic [Apis) , Tucovic and
eight officers from the gendarmerie.
But when Bozanovic called in Apis and Radivojevic, they labelled such
reports nonsensical inventions. "I asked all the officers J osif Kostic had
named whether they were in the "Black Hand," recalled Bozanovic , "and
all denied it."21
Press reports about "Black Hand" first appeared in Tribuna, a paper
close to Prince Alexander. Quoting a pirated circular from its CEC, Tri­
buna's editors wondered: "Who needs this? Is 'Black Hand' perhaps a
means to recruit enthusiastic young people under the guise of patriotism
for nefarious internal activities?" Soon providing more details about the
organization, Tribuna criticized it strongly and warned: "Unless they wish
their country to suffer the fate of Turkey or Greece, Serbian officers must
not enter such a political organization . . . . " Dissatisfied officers should
resign before engaging in political agitation. " . . . The Serbian Army,
which has great national tasks, must be spared such underground intri­
gues.'m Reflecting Prince Alexander's subsequent view, the newspaper
•
•
The "Black Hand" 73
affirmed: "There is absolutely no place in politics for officers-they have
their own sacred tasks. "23
With numerous reports about "Black Hand" appearing in Belgrade's
press, foreign diplomats were reporting about it to their governments.
With Austria-Hungary worried about Serbian nationalism, its well-inform­
ed minister, von Ugron, wrote: "There is much talk here about a sup­
posed officers' movement, but no one knows anything positive." This
"Black Hand", allegedly a patriotic group to operate outside Serbia in
order to unite all Serbs, was "really only a cover; its real purpose is to
intervene in internal affairs."24 Centering in the Belgrade garrison, this
officers' movement appeared directed against the ruling Radicals. "Among
them the chief role is supposedly played by General Staff Major Dragutin
Dimitrijevic . . . also prominent during the 1903 conspiracy." The "Black
Hand," added von Ugron in January 1 9 12, was causing more and more
public attention in Belgrade. Although its aims remained unclear, "its
existence is no longer doubted officially ." Allegedly, it had already sen­
tenced to death top Radicals, such as PaSic and Stojan Protic .25
The British minister in Belgrade, Charles Barclay, confirmed most of
von Ugron's findings, including his belief that the "Black Hand" officers
aimed to remove the Radicals from power and replace them with an
authoritarian government favoring a Pan-Serbian policy. "It numbers
among its members not only officers of all ranks but also civilians of
every station of life . . . . "2'
The "Black Hand" was most active and dynamic during its first year.
Major Vemic confirmed that its CEC met frequently and discussed plans
to assassinate King Ferdinand of Bulgaria and Prince Nikola of Monte­
negro as leading opponents of Serbian unification.27 In Belgrade its
leaders were busily recruiting new members, especially among younger
officers. Usually a recruiter merely needed to mention that "Black Hand"
was a patriotic organization seeking to unite Serbs, or "for work on the
national cause" and mention a few leaders, and officers would enter
often without further inquiry .2& During the Belgrade visit of Serbian and
Croatian academic youth from Zagreb in April 1 9 12, they met "Black
Hand" leaders and some were recruited. At the "Moskva" Hotel cafe in
downtown Belgrade a banquet was held for the young visitors. Apis pre­
sided over a long table around which gathered some twenty students. One
of them, Oskar Tartaglia, talked with J ovanovic-Cupa and Branko Bozovic,
-

74 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator The "Black Hand" 75

editors of Piedmont, the "Black Hand" newspaper, and met Apis. Tartag­
lia was deeply impressed by this imposing man who could win someone
over with a glance. Cultured and well-read, Apis had the exquisite man­
ners of a cosmopolitan, but was a laconic national revolutionary as well.
Wrote the young Croat admiringly:
outranked him and induce them to follow some course of action he had
resolved upon. With his formidable bulk, seemingly inexhaustible energy,
and clear dedication to the national cause , Major A�is, especially to young
officers and students, epitomized Serbia's martial values and the highest
ideals.

He was the spirit, leader and organizer of the national-revolutionary

movement who always kept in mind not just Serbia but all other
regions where our people lived and which were under foreign tyranny .
. . . He was a soldier and politician, simultaneously the Garibaldi
and Mazzini of the Yugoslav war for liberation.29

Informed confidentially about the "Black Hand," the enthusiastic Tar­

taglia was taken a few days later to Piedmont's offices where he became
the fust Catholic Croat to join the organization. 30
Resembling earlier and contemporary European nationalist organiza­
tions, the "Black Hand" sought by virtually any means to achieve a
Greater Serbia or a Yugoslavia. It contained within its ranks idealists and
ruthless terrorists, civilians and officers. Most of its leaders were young
and had had previous contacts with the nationalist South Slav youth. Apis
and other founders thus sought to build a revolutionary network among
South Slavs abroad. Potential friction loomed between the minority of
founders who were idealistic and pro-Yugoslav and mostly conservative
army officers, but that was disregarded during the euphoric days of 1912.
Apis soon became the chief dynamic force within the "Black Hand"
and its main link with the May conspirators. Surrounded in the CEC with
devoted friends, A pis was kept informed by them about the organization's
various spheres of activity: in Narodna Odbrana through Milan Vasic, a
member of both organizations; among guerrillas through Major Tankosic ;
and with intellectuals and youth by Jovanovic-Cupa. Apis' close ties with
Foreign Minister Milovanovic and General Radomir Putnik provided key
links with the Serbian government and high command. Still regarded
warmly by King Peter, he had persuaded Prince Alexander, now heir to
the Serbian throne, to contribute 20,000 dinars to the "Black Hand"'s
newspaper, Piedmont.
Apis had now attained the pinnacle of his power and influence. Even
his enemies admitted his uncanny ability to win over men who greatly

•

CHAPTER VIII
ZIVKOVIC AND THE "WHITE HAND"
1 909- 1 9 1 2
. . . Do you think that we risked our necks
so that the two of you l Alexander
Dj ordje] could quarrel and vie for the throne
as if it is some sort of toy? You are wrong
because we can risk our necks once again.
Apis to Prince Alexander, 1 9 1 1
As the influence of Apis and the "Black Hand" assumed alanning di­
mensions, serious rifts developed within the Serbian officer corps. Around
Crown Prince Alexander emerged an opposing group, soon dubbed the
"White Hand," designed to combat and eventually destroy Apis' organiza­
tion. Bitter factional struggles were accompanied by intrigues and plots
threatening to discredit the officer corps. Although Apis' group won the
initial skirmish with the "White Hand," their conflict would be renewed
later with fateful consequences. Organizing and orchestrating the cam­
paign against Apis was Peter Zivkovic.
The prelude to these quarrels was the controversy about the heir, Prince
Dj ordje Karadjordjevic. Since childhood Djordje, King Peter's elder son,
had suffered from severe emotional instability expressed in repeated phy­
sical outbursts against civilians, officers, and even foreign diplomats. As
such incidents multiplied, recalled Cedo Popovic, "We conspirators began
to worry about what would happen if he became king. Dragutin lApis]
76
The "White Hand" 77
expressed this fear particularly."1 For his part, Peter Zivkovic had never
forgotten the abortive "horserace" with Prince Djordje.2 Even the Prince
sensed his unsuitability as heir, writing in 1903: "The position of royal
.
prince is wholly strange to me.''3
Even before the incident leading to his abdication, Apis knew Prince
Djordje was unfit to be heir and that the succession should pass to his
younger brother, Alexander, then studying in Russia. Twice during 1907
leading conspirators including Apis, Tucovic, Zivkovic and Antic discus­
sed this without reaching a final decision. Learning of the conspirators'
preference for Alexander, Djordje blamed Apis and Tucovic. At a court
party he attacked Tucovic physically and had to be restrained forcibly.
Most Serbian political leaders now favored Alexander, and the conspirators
sent Apis to inform them that most officers likewise desired a change
of heir.4
Early in 1909 two scandals involving Prince Djordje forced a decision.
and
At a public demonstration during the Annexation Crisis the Prince made
a violent outburst against the Austrian ambassador, severely embarrassing
Belgrade. Several conspirators, led by Peter Zivkovic, then planned to
murder Prince Djordje. Dr. Moa�anin, the court physician, obtained
poison which was placed in a bottle of carbonated water which Djordje
was expected to drink during a motorboat ride on the Sava River. Initia­
ting the plot to poison Djordje, Zivkovic then involved Prince Alexander
in the affair. As the new heir, he would then presumably be wholly in
the conspirators' hands. Before the planned assassination Prince Alex­
ander left for Vienna supposedly for treatment, actually to remove sus­
picion he was involved. FoUowing him there, Zivkovic allegedly obtained
a letter from Alexander confinning his complicity. The day before Djordje's
scheduled outing, Zivkovic confided the whole plan to Apis. Appalled,
Apis told Zivkovic: "No, 1 am not getting involved in anything like that,"
and instructed Prince Djordje's orderly to pour out the poisoned water.
Thus Apis, far from plotting against Djordje, had saved his life. Soon
learning of the conspiracy , Djordje grew more paranoid than ever. 5
With plans afoot to remove him as heir, Djordje played right into his
opponents' hands. On March 10, 1 909 Captain Vemic of the conspirators
conferred with Prince Alexander's secretary about Djordje's possible ab­
dication.' Only two nights later Prince Djordje's valet, Kolakovic, was
rushed to the hospital with "acute hernia of the bowels," dying there
 •

78 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator The "White Hand" 79

March 1 7th. An anti-dynastic newspaper, Zvono, accused Djordje of caus­ Djordje, but the latter admired his brother greatly. Once he told Captain
ing his servant's death with a heavy blow. The official Srpske Novine re­ DraSkic: "That Sandro f Alexander] is as intelligent as God. He knows
ported merely that Kolakovic had fallen downstairs. 7 The Prince's out­ what Pasic is thinking ten rooms away."12 Djordje's temper tantrums
burst against Kolakovic, affirms Blagojevic, immediately followed the persisted. After the serious quarrel in January 1910 with the Belgrade

attempted poisoning. Djordje may have believed that Kolakovic was in­ police chief, King Peter wished to send his unruly son abroad indefinitely

volved and had forcibly opened his writing desk and stolen some personal but found no one to accompany him. After Djordje's return from a pro­
papers. Blagojevic learned later that Peter Zivkovic had rifled Djordje's vincial command in May, some newspapers claimed he was seeking con­

desk to forestall possible counteraction by the Prince and his friends. spirator support to reclaim his status as heir. Allegations in opposition

Press charges of homicide against Djordje sought to rouse public opinion papers seemed designed to intensify the brothers' feud. Their relations

against him. Although Djordje's friends obtained a statement in the hos­ grew so bitter that King Peter dared not leave them together.13
pital from Kolakovic absolving the Prince of blame for his injury, the press Prince Alexander remained prominently in public view during 19 1 1 .
campaign grew so scurrilous that Djordje decided to abdicate .8 At the request of the War Minister, General Stepa Stepanovic, but at

After the Kolakovic incident, Trisa Kaclerovic, a Social Democratic Apis' initiative, Alexander became Inspector General of the army, partly
Assembly deputy, talked with Apis over supper at the "Slavija" restaurant. to bring him into closer touch with it and its training. 14 By special kind­

After expressing negative views about the Prince, Apis asked: would the ness and favors, Alexander sought to build a following among junior
SO's raise the issue of Djordje's behavior? With other political parties officers,15 but his bad relations with the War Minister provoked doubts

avoiding the issue, argued Apis, it was vital to remove Djordje from the about his appointment. Alexander was seeking "to play a more active role

succession. His party, replied Kaclerovic , would present a draft statement without having the necessary military training or qualifications," re­

next day to the Assembly. Whom did Apis favor to replace Djordje as ported the Austrian minister. He was accused widely of excessive involve­

heir? "Certainly, Alexander," A pis declared. "But those who know him ment in personal issues, becoming the center of intrigues, and surrounding

well," objected Kaclerovic , "say his character resembles his uncle's, himself with dubious elements." Closest to him were Major Zivkovic of

[Prince ] Nikola of Montenegro ; that he is cunning, treacherous, selfish the Royal Guards and Captain J osef Kostic, his ordnance officer. 17

and vengeful , and that with him the country will gain nothing." Dissent­ Crown Prince Alexander Karadjordjevic was a complex amalgam of

ing vigorously , A pis insisted that Prince Alexander possessed all the positive and negative characteristics. Becoming heir in 1909, he remained

qualities required by a good ruler who could serve Serbia well.9 the dominant force within the dynasty until his murder in 1934. King

Prince Djordje's abdication was received calmly and favorably in Serbia, Peter was old and chronically ill ; Prince Djordje had lost his influence.

reported the British minister, indicating the dynasty's shallow roots. There Alexander's relations with Djordje revealed him as quarrelsome, impulsive ,

was relief that an incalculable factor had been removed.10 However, King and at times cynical, even cruel. But Alexander showed great kindness

Peter, after the cabinet meeting where it was decided, denounced the and generosity to peasants and soldiers, noted his capable duty officer,

abdication as a great mistake: "Djordje is of my blood while Alexander Major Draskic. As a youth Alexander had genuinely liked people; later

is of the blood of Nikola Petrovic lPrim:e of Mon tenegro J . " Chief benefi­ an entourage of selfish, even perverted people, feathering their own nests,

ciary of the shift was the sinister Zivkovic who fastened his tentacles over reinforced his poorer instincts, Draskic believed. Because of Dj ordje's

the new heir. 1 1 abdication and the King's ill-health, Alexander acquired great power very

Even abdication did not remove Prince Djordje wholly from public young. While valuing good and able advisors, he barred independent

concern. Relations between him and Alexander remained stormy. They thinkers. Relying often on the corrupt, malicious and perverted, he sought
to control them through their weaknesses. General Peter Pesic, appointed
quarreled often, sometimes violently, as brothers are wont to do, with­
out hating one another. Alexander did not object when people attacked his adjutant when the Prince became chief army inspector, confided

•

80 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Alexander, regularly stole valuable articles from his salon.18 In war Alex­
ander revealed great personal bravery and outstanding ability to command
troops in the field and win their loyal devotion. Very ambitious, Alex­
ander could be unscrupulous in pursuing power and was easily influenced.
As rumors spread about the "Black Hand," King Peter told Colonel
Bozanovic:
You know that my children are credulous and believe everything
they are told. But I have never been that way. 1 told him: 'Alexan­
der, don't believe everything that is said to you and about all those
subversive aims of the "Black Hand."' Don't believe it, it is absurd;
it would mean that those people are putting the knife to their own
throats. That is impossible. 19
Such credulity eased the path for intriguers, Peter Zivkovic and Josef
Kostic. Jealous of Apis, they sought to win over Alexander.
Aiding their growing hold over him was the Prince's personal attach­
ment to Zivkovic, perhaps involving even homosexual relations. "Clearly,
Alexander was not a ladies' man and did not know how to handle wo­
men," recalled Major Draskic. "For the over three years that I was in his
service 1 did not observe a single relationship with a woman."10 To Dras­
kic's amazement, the Prince employed with Zivkovic the familiar, "Thou,"
but used it with no one else outside his immediate family. The Prince and
Zivkovic, soon Alexander's only close friend, frequently talked long and
secretively.11 Soon they would be linked by common opposition to Apis
and his friends.
Peter Zivkovic had a profound and fateful influence on the lives of
both Apis and Prince Alexander.'22 Born in 1879, Zivkovic came from an
impoverished family in provincial Negotin. His parents, simple uneducated
people, provided little for him personally or materially. He grew up in
little Negotin's dusty streets, completing primary school and part of its
classical gymnasium. An able and ambitious student, Zivkovic overcame
great material privation to complete the gymnasium in nearby Zajecar.
Schoolmates made fun of his unusual timidity and shyness causing him to
isolate himself. As the only route to a higher education, Peter entered the
Military Academy in 1897 and completed its lower school in 1899. As a
junior lieutenant of cavalry , young Zivkovic was assigned to the Nis
•
The "White Hand" 81
garrison. In three years there he passed time in inactivity, drinking and
and carousing. Crediting their diffident comrade with a secret mistress,
his fellows failed to remark his utter avoidance �f women. Although
lacking martial qualities, he became a first lieutenant in 1902. From his
comrades, observing his indecisiveness, timidity, and servility toward
superiors, he earned mainly scorn and jeers.
ZivkoviC's great opportunity was the May Coup, but his role in it was
undistinguished.23 Bowled over ignominously onto the cobblestones when
the palace gates flew open, he had brushed off Apis' inquiries whether he
was hurt and disappeared into the night. Nonetheless, Zivkovic became
accepted as a bona fide conspirator, often drinking with younger officers.
Zivkovic found the elusive key to success and prominence in the Royal
Guard. Finding a milieu where military skills were secondary to appear­
ances, he soon grew influential by mixing with politicians and officers at
court. As the conspirators formed hostile factions, he remained neutral,
pursuing his career assiduously. As a conspirator Zivkovic completed the
Academy's higher school, assuring his further career in the Royal Guard .
Leading a comfortable and dissolute life there, he reinforced his ties with
leading politicians.
Involving Prince Alexander in the abortive plot against his brother,
Zivkovic had tightened his hold over the new heir. Then apparently he
triggered Prince Djordje's fatal outburst against his man-servant. A favorite
technique of his was obtaining documents and photographs to blackmail
potential victims later into compliance with his wishes. By inducing
Alexander to confirm in writing his part in the plot against Djordje, Ziv­
kovic bound the Prince to him for life.
How did Zivkovic outmaneuver highly intelligent men like Prince Alex­
ander and Apis? Zivkovic, recalled Draskic, without erudition or culture ,
"never did or read anything" and "lacked everything necessary to occupy
the positions he later attained." However, he proved diligent and persever­
ing in malicious undertakings. .Cowardly but impudent , he valued only
those who bowed and scraped before him. Zivkovic became the ego­
center of a group of disreputable, corrupt men who fawned upon him and
Prince Alexander. His power lay largely in his hold over the Prince which
he had acquired , affirmed Draskic, "in a very dishonorable way." Ziv­
kovic sought deliberately to wreck the careers of all who opposed or re­
fused to bow before him. "Unfortunately," commented Draskic, "I was
among those."24
 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
82
Prince Alexander reacted angrily to any criticism of his beloved "Pera,"
as shown by a quarrel with his brother late in 1 9 1 2 . Alexander dearly
loved Zivkovic, confirmed Djordje; in Belgrade lurid gossip spread about
their relationship. Thus to needle Alexander who had just refused him a
coveted military post, Djordje proclaimed publicly about Zivkovic: "He
certainly is no woman chaser. Guard your soldiers against him!" Swallow­
ing this bait, Alexander, when he next saw his brother, shouted angrily:
"Leave Zivkovic alone! If you continue to insult my officers, I will place
you before a court." Imperiously , Alexander ordered his brother out of
the room.l5
Apis unwittingly antagonized both Alexander and Zivkovic, which
eventually proved his undoing. Apis' personality and ambition conflicted
directly with theirs. The hot-tempered Apis sought struggle out of internal
need. Perceiving a goal, he would drive towards it relentlessly reckless of
consequences. Danger merely enhanced his boldness. Highly sociable
and always surrounded by friends, Apis never revealed much of himself
even to intimates. His was a closed and conspiratoral nature. By reputa­
tion he was rebellious and insubordinate, yet military superiors mostly
praised him as an exemplary and disciplined officer. Performing his of­
flea! duties to their full satisfaction, Apis engaged simultaneously in in­
visible activities bringing him into conflict with politicians and the royal
family.2'
Soon after Alexander became crown prince, Zivkovic perceived the
warm mutual regard between Apis and Alexander as a threat to his posi­
tion as the Prince's indispensable friend. During Alexander's bout with
typhus in 1 9 1 0, Zivkovic allegedly convinced the Prince that Apis was
his enemy and had infected him with typhus bacilli!27 Surprised that Apis,
highly skilled in personal relationships, had lost Alexander's friendship,
Slobodan Jovanovic asked him why. Apis explained:
Alexander is a Karadjordjevic and the Karadjordjevic cannot make
friends. He does not value anyone's friendship . . . . From people
he seeks not loyalty but flattery, and I am not a flatterer. I have
given the dynasty enough proof of my loyalty. If they ask me to
take off the Heir's boots, then fme, I won't and cannot do it. He has
orderlies to do that!
•
The "White Hand" 83
The habitually cool, self-possessed Apis grew very upset. "For a moment
I saw, instead of the everyday Apis, a hot-tempered and proud person,
conscious of his worth and power."28
Shortly before the "Black Hand" was founded, related General Milu­
tinovic, Prince Alexander was told that Apis had never supported his
dynasty. From the beginning Apis allegedly had urged bringing a foreign
prince to Serbia, even after Alexander became heir. Swallowing this
slander, invented by "Pera," the credulous prince, rushing to his auto­
mobile, drove straight to the General Staff and immediately summoned
Apis. Before the Major could close the door, the Prince exploded with
everthing that irritiated him about Apis. Listening calmly to Alexander's
tirade, the Major replied cooly:
Yes, and do you think that we risked our necks so that the two of
you l Alexander and Djordje J could quarrel and vie for the throne
as if it were some sort of toy? You are wrong because we can risk
our necks once again.
Clearly implied was another military coup. In fury Alexander rushed off
to see War Minister Stepanovic and urged him to remove Apis and his
close colleague , M. G. Milovanovic-Pilac, from Belgrade immediately. That
did not occur, but this incident, affirmed Milutinovic, initiated Alexan­
der's quarrel with Apis.29
Nevertheless, during much of 1 9 1 1 Apis and Alexander remained on
good terms. Alexander liked and valued Apis, recalled Colonel Tuc
ovic,
and met with him whenever possible. It was Apis who had form
ed the
Military Inspection Committee to involve the Crown Prince more
closely
with the army . At Apis' initiative was founded in Aug
ust 1 9 1 1 the na­
tionalist newspaper, Piedmont, and he induced Alexand
er to contribute
to it generously. During this period of
good relations, Apis allegedly urged
the ailing King Peter to abdicate in
Alexander's favor only to be blocked
by strong Radical opposition .30
Then late in 1 9 1 1 , hearing Alexander had
quarreled violently with War Minister Stepano
vic over a Colonel Barjak­
tarovic , Apis told the Crown Prince fran
kly he had acted foolishl y. From
then until January 10, 1 9 1 2
Apis shunned the palace ; his relations with
Alexander were severe d .3
1
 84 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Rumors circulating about the "Black Hand" deepened the rift between
Apis, the King and War Minister on one side, and Alexander and Zivkovic
on the other. Apis' action to prevent the poisoning of Prince Djordje,
claimed Blagojevic, had triggered Zivkovic's wrath. Then erupted the
"Black Hand" controversy. Vladimir Tucovic was instructed to inform
Zivkovic abut it and enlist him. When Tucovic revealed that the "Black
Hand" required of its members personal sacrifices, including frontier cros­
sings and guerrilla warfare, the cowardly Zivkovic took fright. He feigned
insult that Apis had sent a friend to enlist him and told Tucovic he would
decide after seeing Prince Alexander in Koviljac. There they doubtless
discussed the "Black Hand." Returning, Zivkovic questioned Tucovic
about it. With his five man group already fllled and with the public uproar
escalating daily, Tucovic declared evasively that "Black Had" did not
seem to be a serious movement. The wily Zivkovic, enlisting Kostic and
Antic as his instruments, met Tucovic at Hotel "Moskva." Did "Black
Hand" truly exist? they asked. Tucovic feigned ignorance saying he be­
longed to a patriotic organization, "Unification or Death!" "I asked you
to join and now you cowards do not dare to and instead ask me if it
exists."
To gain revenge on Apis for humiliating him over membership in the
"Black Hand," Zivkovic denounced him to War Minister Stepanovic for
founding a secret organization forbidden by military regulations. He and
Kostic spread exaggerated reports about "Unification or Death!", depict­
ing it as a subversive organization with ulterior aims and warning that
Prince Alexander opposed it. The Zivkovic campaign temporarily virtually
halted the organization's activities.32
Zivkovic had other reasons to oppose Apis. In the tension between
the Apis and Zivkovic fac tions, Apis, supported by King Peter and War
Minister Stepanovic, began to prevail. That induced the officers, Pavle
and Peter J urisic, to approach Apis and denounce ZivkoviC's clique. Peter
Jurisic told Blagojevic that Zivkovic was a passive pederast ; he begged
him to inform Apis. Realizing the gravity of this charge , Blagojevic urged
Jurisic to do so himself. At first Apis simply could not believe it, but sub­
sequent investigation convinced him that Zivkovic was indeed a pederast .
Informed by Apis, War Minister Stepanovic decided Zivkovic must be
•
removed from the court. Before acting, Stepanovic sounded out Prince
Alexander who vehemently opposed such a move. Blocked there , Apis
The "White Hand" 85
then persuaded King Peter to forbid Alexander's friendship with Zivko­
vic. At the King's insistence, Zivkovic and Kostic were to be transferred
to interior garrisons. Zivkovic counterattacked witJ:l reports denouncing
the "Black Hand" and Apis. Summoned by the War Minister to answer
"Pera's" complaint, Apis, denying all knowledge of the "Black Hand,"
accused Zivkovic of slander. 33
When Prince Alexander queried Apis about the "Black Hand," Ziv­
kovic had already told him Apis was its chief leader. Then when Apis
denied all knowledge of it, the Prince knew he was lying and readily be­
lieved Zivkovic's tales about its alleged dangers. He and Kostic reminded
Alexander of the fate of the Obrenovic and Prince Djordje. Alexander
was shaken and frightened. Already fighting the Radicals, Apis now had
to fight on two fronts. His pride prevented him from settling up with one
side. Nonetheless, on this occasion Apis prevailed. Backed by King Peter,
Foreign Minister Milovanovic, and General Putnik, who liked and respect­
ed him , Apis proved invulnerable then to attacks by ZivkoviC's faction.J-4
Colonel Milos Bozanovic, the Belgrade commandant and a May con­
spirator, investigated Zivkovic's charges. ln his memoirs Bozanovic detail­
ed his efforts to obtain solid information about "Black Hand." During
November 1 9 1 1 he concluded that it existed but contained no officers !
Thus when Apis and Tucovic denied all knowledge about such an organiza­
tion, Zivkovic, Kostic, and Barjaktarovic , who had begun the press cam­
paign against the "Black Hand," were proclaimed slanderers.35
During this investigation an opposing grouping, soon dubbed the
"White Hand" formed with Alexander's blessing to oppose Apis' "Black
Hand." Headed by Zivkovic and backed by the Heir, its nucleus com­
prised Kostic, Antic, and Dragutin Okanovic. Joining it were officers pen­
sioned after the May Coup: Milos V asic, Mihajlo Rasic, and friends of
Novakovic from 1 903 counterconspiracies. The "White Hand" was launch­
ed at a supper party at Belgrade's Hotel "Pariz" where Zivkovic gave a
speech. The "White Hand" posed as loyalists defending the throne against
subversion. It attracted former Obrenovites, opponents of Apis, and many
whose weaknesses blocked their advancement in the army.3'
Completing his investigation about New Year's, 1 9 1 2, Colonel Bo­
zanovic infom1ed the War Minister that some officers had misled Prince
Alexander into believing in a secret conspiracy against the dynasty. No
proof of such a subversive group had been found. As Belgrade's coriunander,
-

86 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator

Bozanovic argued he could not guarantee law and order unless those who
had filled the Heir's head with such slanders-Zivkovic , Kostic and Bar­
jaktarovic-were transferred ; King Peter approved this. Prince Alexander
strove in vain to prevent his friends' transfers. Finding the War Minister
and chief of staff obdurate, Alexander declared he would seek to recon­
cile leaders of "Unification or Death!" with Zivkovic and Kostic. The
Prince summoned Apis and his friends, but refusing any reconciliation,
they persuaded the Prince that he had fallen into a net of intrigue. As the
malleable Alexander and Apis' group reached a shortlived reconciliation, CHAPTER lX
the transferred officers proceeded reluctantly to their new posts. 37
However, the "White Hand" refused to yield. Alexander began receiving
letters condemning the transfers and attacking Apis. Suddenly Tribuna, MALTESE FEVER AND BALKAN WARS
which had supported Alexander, began criticizing him. From internal 1 9 12-1 9 1 3
exile Zivkovic threatened to expose Alexander. "The Heir most of all
feared Major Peter Zivkovic who had in hand a document which if made We helped you Albanians during your struggle

public would compromise him," wrote Bozanovic. Allegedly, Zivkovic against the Turks, so now we expect you to

had pictures of Alexander with a naked whore in Nice and letters con­ assist us when the Turks are threatening us.

fmning his knowledge of the "Black Hand" and flnancial contribution to Apis to lsa Boljetinac, August 1912

its newspaper, Piedmont. 38 Even in Negotin, Zivkovic retained the Prince's

With its enlarged, well-equipped army , Serbia defeated Turkey and Bul­
support, partly through blackmail threats.
garia in 1 9 1 2 and 1 9 1 3 and at the cost of heavy casualties won much ter­
"White Hand" leaders, all former friends of Apis, now hated him partly
ritory, population, and prestige. After helping prepare Serbia for these
because they had failed in any way to distinguish themselves. They ac­
wars, Apis could not flght in them because of a severe illness which nearly
cused the "Black Hand" of subversion, disloyalty to the dynasty, and
took his life. However, other "Black Hand" leaders distinguished them­
sowing discord in the anny. Apis' group in turn denounced the "White
selves on various battlefields.
Hand" as simple flatterers who criticized the Crown Prince in secret, or
In 1 9 1 2 the moribund Ottoman Empire was virtually driven from the
even, while drunk, in public.39 Lacking ideology or postive goals, "White
European continent. Defeated by Italy in North Africa, the Turks faced a
Hand"'s chief aim was to destroy the Apis group.
Balkan alliance and a major revolt by Albanian tribesmen. Russia's envoys
After their initial confrontation ended in Apis' triumph, Prince Alex­
in Belgrade and Sofia fostered Christian efforts to forge a Balkan league
ander, angry but powerless, went abroad for a month. Then King Peter's
though publicly opposing war. The Russians sought chiefly to build influ­
serious illness forced clarification of Alexander's relations with top mili­
ence and prestige in the Balkans thereby weakening their rival, Austria-
tary leaders. Early in March 1912 he finally agreed to meet with ten senior Hungary. ·

army officers. They decided that the War Minister must be a friend of the The Serbo-Bulgarian Alliance of Marc
h 1912 , cornerstone of the new
May conspirators; that Alexander would inherit the throne ; and that his Balkan League, was forg
ed by Foreign Minister Milovanovic aided by
entourage must be loyal to him and to anny leaders. Work on national Apis' "Black
Hand." Guiding Serbia skillfully through the perilous An­
goals would be pressed by the War Minister and chief of staff.40 That nexation Crisis, Milo
vanovic wisely preserved its strength for the Balkan
spring, as a major Balkan crisis brewed, internal bitterness and conflict in
Serbia subsided briefly.
87
88 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
wars. Five months of intensive negotiations produced a Serbo-Bulgarian
agreement over spheres of interest in Macedonia. That accord allowed
the two strongest Balkan states to create a league soon broadened to in­
clude Montenegro and Greece. Milovanovic wanted a Bulgarian alliance
chiefly to protect Serbia against Austria. Bulgaria's chief of staff declared:
"Austria will view the Balkan problem wholly differently if she knows
that behind the Serbian army stand 400,000 Bulgars." To save Serbia
from the deadly Austrian embrace Milovanovic had to yield much to
Bulgaria in Macedonia. Vienna aimed to create under its tutelage a large
autonomous Albania which would absorb the heart of Macedonia. En­
veloped on the north, west, and south by Austrian lands and dependencies,
Serbia would be cut off from the Aegean and Adriatic seas, doomed to
political and economic dependence. 1
In forging the Bulgarian alliance Milovanovic received crucial support
from Apis and the "Black Hand," but not from Piedmont, its newspaper.
Considering Macedonia vital to Serbdom's future, the "Black Hand"
sought through revolutionary agitation and guerrilla warfare there to foster
national unity against Bulgars and Turks. Earlier, Major Tankosic of its
CEC reportedly had threatened Milovanovic with death unless he pursued
militant foreign policies. Piedmont repeatedly denounced Milovanovic
even while Apis was aiding him. Describing Milovanovic as a lethargic,
weakwilled bureaucrat, Piedmont warned:
Our army has not won much yet, but it seems certain that our diplo­
macy as it is now can lose all that we have. If our fate depended
solely on the will of our diplomats, Serbia would soon lose its
independence.2
However, with the CEC's blessing, Apis was working in full accord with
Milovanovic who briefed him fully on the progress of Serbo-Bulgarian
talks. Despite Piedmont's fulminations, Apis assisted Milovanovic, consid­
ering the Bulgarian alliance an essential precondition for war against
Turkey. Without the defeat of Turkey, concluded Apis and his friends,
Serbs in the south faced destruction notably from wild Albanian tribes­
men and Young Turk militants. Thus Serbia and Bulgaria must cooperate ,
believed Apis, to defeat their common enemies. 3
•
Maltese Fever 89
During 1 9 1 1 -12 Major Apis encouraged the sophisticated but timid
Milovanovic to adopt a more decisive foreign policy. "An eloquent but
weakwilled intellectual," noted Slobodan J ovanovic,_ "can often be pulled
along by a bold and decisive man who otherwise lacks his intelligence or
eloquence: he is virtually hypnotized by the other's crude, elemental
strength." Impressed with Apis, the exemplar of Serbia's young officer
elite, Milovanovic abandoned his former disdain for the Serbian army. Re­
conciling "Black Hand" with the Foreign Ministry , Apis adhered flrrnly to
his aim: war against the Turks. Changing his own approach, Milovanovic
became Lrnbued with energy and a sense of urgency and grew much bolder.4
At Salonika Apis described their collaboration :
We passed directly to a discussion of negotiations with Bulgaria for
an alliance which was very soon thereafter concluded. When neces­
sary I placed at Milovanovic's disposition individual members of
'Unification or Death!' for necessary work on our national affairs. 5
Supplying Apis with funds for anti-Austrian propaganda, Milovanovic
maintained constant contact with him until his death in July 1912.'
For Milovanovic St. Petersburg's attitude was crucial. During the An­
nexation Crisis Russia's military unpreparedness and pacific counsels had
compelled Serbia to yield to Austria. Now Russia advocated a Serbo-Bul­
garian accord to protect both against Turkey and Austria-Hungary ; this
coincided with Milovanovic's own aims. Russia and Milovanovic viewed
a Balkan league as guaranteeing peace; Apis correctly regarded it as the
prelude to war. Then at its peak of influence, the "Black Hand" through
Piedmont pushed for war with Turkey.
Since July 1 9 1 0 Major Apis had been chief of staff of the Cavalry Di­
vision in Belgrade. That October he began lecturing on strategy at the Mili­
tary Academy. As Serbian preparations for war against Turkey neared
completion, Apis and several ':Black Hand" colleagues carried out perilous
reconnaissances in Turkish Albania and Macedonia. Learning that General
Putnik, Serbian chief of staff, needed to know where Albanian chieftains
stood on the war, Bozin Simic urged Apis to help gather such data on the
spot. "Fine," responded Apis. "Prepare everything needed for our jouney ."
Simic was summoned urgently to military headquarters in Belgrade, find­
ing General Putnik upset that Simic had persuaded Apis to cross secretly
90 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
into Turkish territory. "He could lose his head ! " exclaimed Putnik. His
fear for Apis' safety was well-founded given the bitter opposition to the
"Black Hand" in political and police circles. 7
Three groups of mostly "Black Hand" officers conducted these secret
operations from August 22nd to September 6, 1 9 1 2. Captain Sirnic's
group conferred with a leading Albanian chieftain on Karadaga Mountain.
A second, including CEC members M. G . Milovanovic-Pilac and Velimir
Vemic, collected valuable information in Macedonia for the Serbian army.
Major Apis' group, including Captain Milan Zavacil and a civilian, Bogdan
Radenkovic, was to cross the Serbian frontier southeast of Raska, examine
the terrain, and meet with the key Albanian chief, Isa Boljetinac. The Gen­
eral Staff needed to know attitudes of warlike Albanian tribes near Serbia's
southern frontiers. Would they support Turkey, remain neutral, or assist
the Serbs' southward drive?8
Apis' group left Belgrade by train and reached the Turkish border on
foot the evening of August 23rd. Isa Boljetinac had been informed the
Serbs were coming to meet him. One of his men met them at the border
but had neglected to bring Albanian dress to disguise the three Serbs.
That clothing awaited them at the first Albanian village. The Serbs plung­
ed across the frontier that night in their Belgrade garb. Arriving at dawn
at Zigolj village, they were taken by their guide to the home of a trusted
agent of Isa. The Albanian costumes were there , but Apis' outfit was
much too small. No Albanian clothing available covered his massive
frame, yet in Serbian uniform he would risk apprehension by the Turks.
That morning among the "Albanians" who set out along a mountain path
toward Boljetinac's headquarters strode a powerful individual dressed i
n lieving we cannot beat the Turks.
a strange potpourri of Albanian dress and parts of a Serbian uniform. It
was Apis. "He had one goal before him," recalled Zavacil, "and went
directly towards it without regard for anything else."9
That entire day they threaded their way carefully along a mountain
path parallel to the Ibar River. At times they met individual Albanians
who spoke with their guide, looking askance at the huge "Albanian" who
lumbered after him. Finally, they reached Boljetin village near Kosovska
Mitrovica, above which lay the camp of lsa Boljetinac, known for his dis­
obedience to the sultan. Received hospitably , the Serbs conferred with
Isa on a small plateau near the village. From there one could survey the
entire Kosovo plain and surrounding mountains as far as the Karadaga.
Maltese Fever 91
Isa talked mainly with Radenkovic, his former neighbor. Apis pressed Isa
to commit himself:
We helped you Albanians honorably during your struggle against the
Turks, so now we expect you to assist us when the Turks are threat­
ening us . . . . It would not be right for you to employ the weapons
we have given you against us.
As the Serbs made their case, Isa smoked, looked at the ground, and pon­
dered. He could not join Serbia against his Turkish overlords, explained
Boljetinac, but if the Turks invaded Serbia, he would remain neutral. If the
Serbs attacked, he might have to join the Ottomans. lsa kept his promise
not to betray his guests to the Turks. Apis' group proceeded to Djakovica
to meet other Albanian leaders, then safely recrossed the frontier. Apis
10
and his colleagues vindicated fully General Putnik's confidence.
Serbia's long anticipated showdown with Turkey was now at hand. Re­
turning to Belgrade , at a meeting of "Black Hand'"s CEC, Apis spoke of
future prospects:
We stand before a war with the Turks. With us are the Bulgars,
Greeks and Mon tenegrins. In Belgrade and Sofia are to be made
these days the fmal decision on war. Unfortunately , neither our nor
Bulgar governing circles are bold enough. As soon as one plucks up a
little courage for war, then the other hesitates and vice versa. It
seems even Hartvig [Russia's envoy to Serbia] does not favorwar be­
Pausing briefly after mentioning the pro-Serbian Hartvig, Apis resumed:
I am in constant contact with lGeneral] Putnik and Stepa lStepano­
vic] who are holding ou � well over that issue. But one cannot say
the same about the politicians and some other officers. Politicians
especially hesitate to accept responsibility for the war even though
they consider it essential and unavoidable. Why? Because they have
no idea of our young officers' fighting qualities. As far as l can, I
am encouraging them either personally or through others, but you
must do so too. Get in touch, I beg of you, with every influential
92 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
person you know, then given them as big an injection of courage
as possible.
Apis reminded his colleagues of the exalted position of the fighting quali­
ties of Turkish soldiers which had persisted for centuries among the Serb­
ian people:
Do not forget, gentlemen, that the generation among us which has
to bear the greatest burden of war grew up and was formed under
the influence of our terrible defeat at Djunis and Krevet l in 1 876] .
Thus it is necessary to take our young officers and soldiers into the
first battles so as to assure to ourselves immediately a moral pre­
dominance over the Turkish soldier. It is my unshakable conviction
that if we beat the Turks in the first struggles, our soldiers will be so
encouraged that they will drive the Turks without respite right to
the Aegean Sea. But if we are, to our misfortune, defeated in those
frrst encounters, our army will flee in panicky disorder to the Sava
and Danube.
Thus it was absolutely esse ntial, stressed Apis, that these initial encounters
prove victorious.
Thus instruct all your comrades and friends that in the first battles
on the frontier, without awaiting orders from above, to rush to the
aid of neighboring units so as to assure us of two or threefold num­
erical superiority over the Turks. That we young officers will always
11
be in the forefront of the soldiers in battle no one should doubt.
Apis' exhortations proved prophetic. Led to initial victories by their young
officers, the Serbian army, dispelling the myth of Turkish superiority,
amazed Europe with its prowess.
Just before Serbia's mobilization against Turkey, Apis had returned
from Albania optimistic and apparently heal thy . His friend, Pavle Panko­
vic, arrived at Cavalry Division headquarters near Vranje the third day
after mobilization began. Already there were the divisional commander
and Major Apis as chiefofstaff. One evening as Pankovic and other officers
were entering the canteen, a young man approached dressed as a guerrilla
Maltese Fever 93
fighter. Apis rushed to embrace him and invited him to supper. The youth
regrett ed he could not join them; his comrades awaited him nearby and
they had to go on. Apis embraced him again : "Go, Sanja, may you have
a good journey and become a hero." Then the officers realized this was his
older nephew, Alexander Zivanovic, an architecture student. Apis had
encouraged the boy, too young for army service, to enlist as a volunteer.
His father respected Sanja's ardent wish to serve his country. "We were
amazed at this action of Apis," recalled Pankovic, "in sending this child
into battle as we felt that since we were short of educated specialists, he
would prove more useful to Serbia by completing his education." To their
obj ections, Apis responded:
Not so. During these fateful days for our country and for our people
languishing under foreign rule, we must all without exception give
everything and even sacrifice what is dearest to us, since only in that
way will we succeed.
Respecting Apis more than ever, the officers fell silent. Despite the tragic
result, they believed he had been correct. Sanja died heroically in a frontier
battle; Belgrade named a street after him.12
On September 1 8th, after the entire Serbian army had mobilized, Apis
set out for Cuprija. Bidding a fond farewell to Sanja at Cuprija station, he
took up quarters with the Cavalry Division staff at Vranjska Banja. There
he fell ill of blood posoning and Maltese fever contracted in Albania. His
main symptom was periodic severe bouts of fever with temperatures as
high as 1 04 F . Though suffering severely , A pis insisted on performing his
duties. With the division he proceeded to the Turkish frontier near the
source of the southern Morava. As his fevers grew more frequent and
severe, his powerful horse , "Zvezdana," quivered all over while galloping.
The staff regarded Apis' illness with growing concern. War had already
been declared, and Serbian .artillery was bombarding Turkish frontier
posts. Apis' final task was to write out detailed marching orders for the
division . Then over his vigorous protests, but at the high command's in­
sistence, he was taken still protesting to the nearest railway station for
transportation to the Belgrade military hospital. News of his grave illness
dealt a severe blow to the Zivanovic family. Then came still sadder tidings:
Sanja had been killed the first day of the war on Mt. Lisica near PriStina.
 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
94
Then at Kumanovo Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Glisic, husband of Apis'
eldest niece, died bravely leading his regiment.13
Crossing the Macedonian frontier on October 6th, the Serbian First
Army defeated the Turks in a two-day pitched battle at Kumanovo. Two
days later it entered Skoplje, Macedonia's chief city. Occupying Kosovo
plain, the Serbs avenged their epic defeat of 1389 there at Turkish hands.
The Balkan allies triumphed everywhere over the outnumbered Turks. In
a single month, ending four centuries of Ottoman rule in the Balkans,
they threw the Turks back on Constantinople.
Apis was unaware of all this until later. Calm and cheerful when he
entered the hospital, he lapsed into delirium and his speech soon became
meaningless raving. With brief interruptions he remained unconscious over
three weeks, hovering between life and death. Reports spread that Apis
had been deliberately poisoned in Albania. Once his illness had been
diagnosed tentatively as a rare fonn of blood poisoning, his friends ap­
pealed to Dr. Cinn, a famous professor of bacteriology in Berlin, to treat
him.14 Cinn came immediately , remaining with the patient almost constant­
ly until the crisis passed. At first the doctors were pessimistic and pre­
pared the family for the worst. Only one patient in a thousand, the Zivano­
vics learned, recovered from such an illness. However, once again Apis'
powerful constitution responded. Only later, after testing Apis' blood
in Berlin did Dr. Cinn made a defmitive diagnosis of blood poisoning
combined with Maltese fever. The latter disease, unusual in Europe, was
contracted apparently from unpasteurized goat's milk drunk by Apis
in Albania.
By mid-November, now on the mend, Apis took profound interest in
the amazing news from the war fronts. Listening to his brother-in-law's
account of Serbian victories, tears ftlled his eyes. ''Thank God!" he said
quietly. His joy was tinged with sadness at being unable to participate in
a war so glorious for Serbia. His recovery was long, slow and difficult.
The Maltese fever left him so weakened that for months he could not
walk. In good weather he was taken out into the sunshine of the hospital
garden. There he lay for hours surrounded by ill and wounded friends
from various battlefields. Finally discharged from the hospital March 30,
1 9 1 3 , Apis was taken by car to the Zivanovics. Immediately thereafter
he left for Berlin on convalescent leave to continue treatments with
Dr. Cinn.15
•
Maltese Fever
95
Other leading Serbs were also affected profoundly by the Serbo-Turkish
War. Demonstrating outstanding ability to lead troops in the field, Crown
Prince Alexander displayed growing ambition and self-confidence. Lieut­
enant Colonel Prince Djordje fought valiantly and was twice wounded. He
received two stars of Karadjordje, Serbia's highest military decoration, for
bravery in action. Yet despite repeated requests, Djordje failed to obtain
an independent command.
When the same thing occurred in June 1 9 1 3 on the eve of the Serbo­
Bulgarian War, Prince Djordje asked Chief of Staff Putnik for a command.
Sympathetically, the venerable Vojvoda said he did not understand why
Djordje had not received one. "I can only tell you that you must seek the
reasons elsewhere , not here with us military men." Putnik's allusion was
clear enough, so Prince Djordje hastened to his brother. "Why do you need
a command?" queried Alexander. "You are wounded and need time to
recover. There are plenty of warriors without you." His reply was cruel
and insincere: the Serbian anny, depleted from the Turkish war, needed
every soldier and officer to face Bulgaria. Declared Alexander coldly :
"The war will proceed very well without you. Go to France and do some
walking. In Paris are many pretty women." He would approve an inde­
finite leave for Djordje. "I don' t believe the army will notice your ab­
sence." To this gratuitous insult, Djordje retorted by referring to Peter
Zivkovic's homosexual amours and Alexander's notorious friendship
with him. That same evening Djordje left sadly for France never again to
participate in Serbia's battles. 1'
Major Zivkovic, over whom the royal brothers had quarreled, just be­
fore the Turkish war was assigned to command the Timok Division's
cavalry. With the First Army at Kumanovo his cavalry did not participate
in the battle. Then his unit was sent with the Second Anny to aid the Bul­
garians capture of Adrianople. Since cavalry is virtually useless in sieges,
Zivkovic and his staff lived comfortably in a nearby town. He and his
officers spent many hours in .drunken orgies and revelry. At first little
attention was paid to this. Then one day a well-built young cavalryman
told his superior that Major Zivkovic had forced him to be the active
partner in homosexual acts with him. Pederasty was then regarded by
Serbs as extremely immoral. News of this affair fmally reached the Second
Army commander, General Stepa Stepanovic , who urged that Major Ziv­
kovic be courtmartialed. But then Adrianople fell, the army was withdrawn,
96 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator

and the Zivkovic trial postponed. Nonetheless, the knowledgeable pre-

- '

dieted this meant curtains for Zivkovic who sought frantically to use con-
nections to hush up the affair.
Realizing Apis' powerful influence in the army, Zivkovic came to him
as a humble penitent and begged Apis to save his career. Generously but
unwisely , Apis overlooked their previous quarrels. Recalling ZivkoviC's
role, albeit inglorious, in the May Coup, Apis concluded that expelling
him for homosexual acts would discredit the officer corps and the con­
spirators. Thus he employed his strong influence to shelve ZivkoviC's CHAPTER X
case. No courtmartial was convened, and Pera was saved. Instead of ex­
pressing thanks, Zivkovic continued his efforts to destroy Apis. 1 7
Apis dismissed cavalierly danger from that quarter. The Balkan wars CHIEF OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
left the "Black Hand'' with enhanced reputation but reduced numbers. 1 9 1 3- 1 9 1 4
Many of its ablest leaders had died in battle, and the wars virtually ended
8
"Black Hand'"s role as a cohesive organization. 1 Sitting behind the table with his huge body,
double chin and bald head, in the words of
a foreign journalist, he [Apis) looked like a
huge Mongol. Towards us 'Civilians' . . . he
spoke in that half-joking, half-serious tone of
voice in which cafe conversations are often
conducted.
S. Jovanovic , Moji savremenici, p. 409

Soon after Serbia defeated Bulgaria, Apis returned home from Germany.
Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel in January 1 9 1 3 while still in the hos­
pital, Apis that August was named chief of the General Staffs intelligence
division, perhaps partly because of "Black Hand"'s influence and prestige.
In that post Colonel Apis controlled a network of agents inside Austria­
Hungary which sought none too successfully to ascertain its military
strength and intentions toward Serbia. Apis was assisted by the two men
who would perish with him near Salonika: Rade Malobabic and Major
Ljubomir Vulovic, and by "frontier officers" like Colonel Cedo Popovic.
In Berlin, supervised by Dr. Cinn, Apis had spent four months conval­
escing from his illnesses. There he met with Dr. Milos Bogicevic, Serbia's
charge d'affaires and a personal friend. Bogicevic reported home that the
Bulgarian attack had altered the Balkan situation fundamentally. lsolating

97
 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
98
Bulgaria and Austria, it had prevented the latter from acting militarily
against Serbia. Added Bogicevic:
I enclose a survey of military operations prepared by Lieutenant
Colonel of General Staff Dragutin Dirnitrijevic, who is here on sick
leave. It would be wise to instruct him to send his military reports
from here and to have him deal with other military questions. Pre­
cisely during the Turkish War an expert military man was sorely
lacking. 1
Apis' repeated trips to Imperial Germany, his admiration for its military
organization, and pro-German articles in the "Black Hand"'s Piedmont,
appeared to provide a basis for claims by defenders of the Salonika Trial
that Apis before and during World War I worked for Gennany and sought
to betray Serbia.2 However, Vladirnir Dedijer recently refuted such asser­
tions convincingly . His careful examination of reports by German envoys
in Belgrade and of available German archives turned up nothing to sub­
stantiate claims of Apis' pro-German activity alleged by his enemies. 3
Prior to Apis' second visit to Germany, a number of articles in Pied­
mont praised German militarism and efficiency. Also Piedmont's origins
were linked mysteriously with Imperial Germany. Major Vemic, a founder
of "Black Hand," stated emphatically on January 25, 1 9 1 1 : "Tomorrow
Cupa [Ljuba Jovanovic-Cupa, Piedmont's founder] goes to Berlin for a
printing press." Some opponents of Apis claimed that this meant that
German militarist circles had purchased a printing press for Piedmont,
although they supplied no corroborative evidence.4 During 1 9 1 2 further­
more Piedmont, equating militarism with patriotism in Serbia, praised
German militarism extravagently. Its correspondent in Germany, writing
as "Davison," emphasized the vital role of the German anny in "regenera­
tion of the German nation," concluding that Serbia should follow suit.
He praised the League of German Youth (Jung Deutschland Bund), found­
ed in January 1 9 1 1 by General von der Goltz, to provide physical and
military training for youth and prepare it for military service. "Davison"
advocated that Serbia adopt the League's racist and militarist approach,
redolent of the later Hitler Youth, to achieve its goal of national uni­
fication:
Chief of Military Intelligence 99
The military and political position of the German Empire today
is such that the German people must not keep its hands in its poc­
kets and cannot bow to the false prophets of world peace. Let us
move from there and create for our army better conditions and a
better future. 5
However, Apis should not be held responsible for Piedmont's writings,
nor did its Germanophilia then involve disloyalty to Serbia. And while
Apis was in Berlin-apparently reversing its former pro-German approach­
Piedmont in April 1913 denounced Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg for
reflecting "the deceitfulness of the German race." "The peace of the
world," continued Piedmont, is threatened by that power [Germany ]
which has created an especially militaristic regime to which it gave the
strange name 'armed peace."' A "Pan-German torrent" now threatened
European peace; against it the Triple Entente (England, France and Rus­
sia) was preparing strong defenses. With their collective effort, "We Slavs,
especially in the Balkans, cooperate wholeheartedly and conscientiously."6
Inconsistent Piedmont was now supporting Serbia's bonds with the En­
tente powers.
Furthermore, even had Apis been pro-German then, argued Dedijer,
this proved no disloyalty to Serbia. During the Austro-Serbian tariff war
of 1906- 1 1 , Germany had aided Serbia to resist Austrian economic pres­
sure so Berlin could dominate Serbia's foreign trade. Closer Serbo-German
ties could be viewed as driving a wedge between the Central Powers, thus
lessening Austria's threat to Serbia's existence. Finally, Apis criticized
Germany openly in 1 9 1 3 for yielding to Vienna's demands that Austria­
Hungary be allowed to settle up with Serbia. 7
As intelligence chief Apis worked in the General Staffs headquarters
on the Kalemegdan, the crumbling, thick-walled Turkish fortress over­
looking Belgrade where the Sava and Danube rivers meet. Apis' office
was in the so-called "PaSin �onak" ("Pasha's palace") on the fortress
ramparts between the Upper and Lower town. From there one had an
excellent view of the trans-Danubian region and Austrian Zemun (Semlin),
lying just across the Danube.8
Presumably in that office Apis, newly installed intelligence chief, re­
ceived Slobodan J ovanovic, chief of the War Press Bureau and later a lead­
ing historian. The War Press Bureau, subject to the General Staffs
100 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
intelligence division, disclosed selected information to the foreign press.
Jovanovic had encountered Apis previously, but he never saw him alone
either on the street or in cafes. Apis was always accompanied by officer
friends who resembled bodyguards. His whole behavior and appearance
stamped him as a charismatic leader. He received Jovanovic graciously , "as
1 subsequently learned that he received everyone." Apis expressed him­
self rather indefmitely, often failing to fmish his sentences "as if he had
suddenly remembered that it would be best for him not to disclose every­
thing he knew." Apis had not recovered fully from recent grave illnesses
and was not yet wholly secure on legs which were all wrapped up and ap­
peared swollen. Unable to move around with his accustomed vigor, A pis
had grown fat ; his skin had an unhealthy pallor. Seated behind a massive
table, with his vast body, double chin and almost completely bald head,
the thirty-six year old Apis resembled a huge Mongol .
Toward us 'civilians' he adopted a very different behavior than to­
wards most officers. He spoke mostly in that hal f-joking, half­
serious tone of voice in which cafe conversations are often con­
ducted.9
Before Apis took over in 1 9 1 3 , Serbian military intelligence in Austria­
Hungary and the Serbian national movement there had been organized and
directed by Colonel Dirnitrije Pavlovic. He had coordinated the activities
on the Austrian frontier of six "frontier officers," mostly "Black Hand"
members. Pavlovic's headquarters were in Sabac on the Sava River; he had
agents operating in Srem and Croatia. Other such officers included Milan
Vasic, Kosta Todorovic, and Cedo Popovic, subsequent chroniclers of the
"Black Hand." Before Apis assumed his new post, these officers' top
agent was a civilian, Rade Malobabic.
Colonel Pavlovic, who knew him and his activities well, later provided
Milan Zivanovic with details about Malobabic. 10 A Serb born in Vrgin
Most, a small town in Croatia, Malobabic was trained as an insurance
agent. He became one of Narodna Odbrana's most active workers. At the
Zagreb Trial staged by the Austrian authorities in 1909, Malobabic was
convicted of treason against Austria and served a short prison sentence.
Once released, this ardent Serbian patriot purused his anti-Austrian intel­
ligence activities tirelessly collecting information everywhere and bringing
it to the "frontier officers."
Chief of Military Intelligence 101
Soon after becoming intelligence chief, Colonel Apis complained to
Dirnitrije Pavlovic that the General Staff lacked reliable agents and intel­
ligence operatives inside Austria-Hungary . Did Pavlovic know a reliable
.
Serbian patriot who could handle delicate and confidential missions in
Austrian territory? Pavlovic recommended Malobabic enthusiastically as
highly intelligent, dedicated, and mobile. Most important he engaged in
national work not for fmancial gain but out of idealism, enthusiasm, and
duty to Serbia. Repeatedly offered money for his national activities,
Malobabic always had refused it indignantly. Normally he even refused
travel expense money. Malobabic possessed precisely the qualifications
he was seeking, Apis told Pavlovic. Thus when Rade reported to Pavlovic
the latter sent him to Apis in Belgrade witl1 a covering letter. Receiving
him warmly, the Colonel talked with Malobabic at length, and informed
of his dedication, accepted him as the General Staffs chief agent for
Austria-Hungary.
What Pavlovic had told Apis about Malobabic was confirmed by an­
other national worker, Dr. Srdjan Budisavljevic , whom Pavlovic had earlier
introduced to Apis. This Serb intellectual, born in Croatia, had worked
with Pavlovic in the Serbian "Sokol" youth organization. Budisavljevic
then collaborated directly with Apis in national work and they became
good friends. Thus when "frontier officers," Pavlovic and Kosta Todoro­
vic, recommended Malobabic as chief agent in Austria, Apis had con­
sulted Budisavljevic. As a leading Croatian activist who knew MalobabiC's
work well, Budisavljevic had "vouched wholly for MalobabiC's honesty
and pure Serbian soul."
ln the fall of 1 9 1 3 , recalled Budisavljevic, he had come to Belgrade to
reach agreement with Serbian leaders on national issues and had met with
intelligence chief, Apis. After the Balkan wars, Apis told him, Serbia's
political and military activities, hitherto concentrated in Macedonia and
"Old Serbia" had shifted northwestward into Austria-Hungary . Needing
reliable operatives inside the Dual Monarchy , Apis had learned that Malo­
babic, ex-"traitor" and insurance agent, would undertake such a mission.
Budisavljevic, a defense attorney at the Zagreb Treason Trial, who knew
Malobabic well, confirmed that he deserved complete trust and would ful­
fill his assignments conscientiously. A pis could rely on him implicitly. 1 1
Colonel Apis assigned Malobabic the key task of creating a network of
Serbian agents in the Dual Monarchy . Apissent him repeatedly on missions
•
102 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Chief of Military Intelligence 103

to gather military intelligence. Malobabic often visited vital military centers

based on explicit written orders received from Apis or the Supreme Com­
like Sarajevo, Zagreb, Pesth, and even Vienna. From these missions he al­
mand.
ways returned with valuable information. Apis told Pavlovic in delight that
Rade had handled every assignment expertly . He relied increasingly upon
I believed that lthe High] Command saw better and farther than I
Malobabic's rare perceptiveness, resourcefulness, and ability to conduct
and knew more. For instance , a telegram would arrive: fifty rifles
the most sensitive missions. For these achievements and for his glowing
and two boxes of bombs arriving from Valjevo. Receive and keep
patriotism Apis loved Rade like a brother. He became the Colonel's right­
them until so-and-so comes. Help him to send these to the place he
hand man in intelligence operations.
indicates in Serbia or abroad. Each such dispatch had a confidential
Colonel Pavlovic provided some details. Rade labored hard to build a
number, a seal , and a signature . . . of someone I knew and trusted.
network of secret agents across the Drina going from one to another to
Most often Dragutin [Apis] had signed, but he concealed this by
give them instructions. Rade constantly encouraged his national workers,
adding: 'On orders of the chief of the General Staff.'
stimulating them to greater efforts. Rade traveled by car or on foot, some­
times along mountain paths at night to avoid patrols, resting by day at
All this was "for the holy future of our country;" those issuing these or­
agents' homes. To trusted national workers he delivered patriotic speeches
ders were all honorable and patriotic. "Dragutin, Vulovic, and all these
and instructed them how to destroy military objectives. Arrested repeat­
young Bosnians were for me the embodyment of patriotism and heroism.
edly by Austrian police, Malobabic always extricated himself skillfully and 14
All of us worked sincerely and honorably ."
displayed amazing coolness in the face of danger.
Colonel Apis' only published report during his tenure as intelligence
As a field operative Malobabic had few equals, wrote Pavlovic. He
chief praised and defended MalobabiC's work for the General Staff.1 5 Apis
sketched all important military objectives and brought back key data
thereby sought to refute accusations by the chief of Podrinska region that
about the strength, dispositions, and readiness of Austrian units and com­
Malobabic had operated as an Austrian spy. For several years, wrote A pis,
mands. While the Serbs were besieging Skadar in 1 9 1 3 , Austria concen­
Malobabic had acted as a Serbian age nt. Narodna Odbrana's Milan Vasic
trated troops along the Drina River and threatened to invade Serbia.
had considered him one of the best agents. During Austria's mobilization
Passing along the entire frontier on the Drina's left bank, Malobabic sub­
in Bosnia in 1 9 1 3 , Rade had performed outstanding services for "frontier
mitted to the Serbian command exact dispositions of Austrian troops.
officer," Colonel Pavlovic.
Detained several times by the Austrian authorities, Rade escaped each
time. Finally he swam across the frigid Drina, emerging in an old peasant
On the basis of these views and because I knew and valued Malo­
costume covered with ice! Such heroic exploits, concluded Pavlovic,
babic personally, because he proved most capable of gathering in­
12
deserved Serbia's highest reward.
formation about the Austro-Hungarian army, I gave him this task
In 1 9 1 4 Malobabic was the first to report to Apis Archduke Franz
with the General Staff. Since September of last year Malobabic has
Ferdinand's planned visit to Sarajevo and the concurrent Austrian man­
been working with the greatest good-will, energy and success as an
euvers in eastern Bosnia. These moves, he assured Apis, marked Austria's
agent of the General Staff.
fmal preparations for war with Serbia. During the Sarajevo assassination
and until Serbia's mobilization, Rade remained in the field crossing and
Malobabic's reports and work "deserve every praise," affirmed Apis;
recrossing the Austrian frontier bringmg back vital military intelligence. 13 aspersions cast upon him by the Podrinska chief were baseless. National
In Salonika Prison "frontier officer," Cedo Popovic, spoke about the leaders in Zagreb had assured Apis that Malobabic had the reputation of
dispatch of weapons across into Bosnia, and meeting and sending of Apis' being a patriotic Serb and they trusted him fully. In Croatia he had work­
spies who often swam across the Drina All this, emphasized Popovic, was ed with many members ofNarodna Odbrana who surely would have known

1 04 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
had Malobabic been a double agent. Military information gathered for Apis
he had "guarded like a treasure."
He lMalobabic] is doing all this from pure motives as a good Serb
and patriot, prepared for any sacrifice for the success of the Serbian
cause. I considered it essential to explain all this so it would be evi­
dent what kind of person we are dealing with and to whom this
division has entrusted collection of data . . . .
Despite this warm testimonial by the military intelligence chief, Malobabic
was arrested by the Serbian police slightly over a month later on suspicion
of spying for Austria!
Just before this report, resumed Apis, he had summoned Malobabic to
Belgrade for consultation on current operations. They had agreed on re­
liable routes for transmitting reports from Serbian agents under emergency
conditions. Malobabic had proposed that couriers and agents be armed
with hand weapons for self-defense. Apis had approved his proposal to
take four revolvers and ammunition with him . Rade originally was to have
recrossed the Drina. But since Major Vulovic was going to his new post as
commander of a frontier sector, they left together. Apis warned them not
to disclose their work of the General Staff unless it proved essential to
obtain some agency's cooperation. Leaders of Narodna Odbrana, Malo­
babic revealed, pressured him to disclose his dealings with the General
Staff. Apis admonished him to evade such inquiries but to try to work
with Narodna Odbrana. Rebuffing queries by Narodna Odbrana and the
Serbian police about the General Staffs secret operations, Apis urged his
superiors to block these. Other authorities should assist, not hamper,
General Staffs work. The police should be instructed to cooperate "to
avoid harmful consequences to the General Staffs work and needless ten­
sion and quarrels." Next day these requests were forwarded to the chief
of staff. 16 But Apis' best efforts could not prevent his top agent from
falling victim to bitter civil-military rivalry or to obtain adquate informa­
tion about Austrian military plans.
•
CHAPTER XI
THE MAY CRISIS, 1 91 4
Never at that time did I have any idea or
desire that the army take power into its
hands . . . . In this affair of the Priority De­
cree I had the same feelings . . . . I worked
for and wished strongly that the officers be
given satisfaction.
Apis in Salonik a, 1 9 1 7
While Apis was intelligence chief erupted a major internal crisis pitting
the officer corps and political opposition against Pasic's Radical cabinet
and Crown Prince Alexander. Obligated to both sides, King Peter was
caught in between. The May Crisis superficially was whether army officers
or civilians should have "priority" at public ceremonies in Macedonia. But
actually it was to decide whether civilian political parties or the army
would rule Serbia. The crisis threatened to bring down the cabinet, provoke
a maj or constitutional struggle and even civil war. As the officers' chief
spokesman, Colonel Apis played a significant but mysterious role.1
Victories over Turkey and Bulgaria had left Serbia triumphant, aggran­
dized, but drained physically and financially. Its leaders knew that peace
was required to restore Serbia's strength. After Bulgaria's defeat the Aus­
trian minister reported that Serbs were very optimistic and "dream of
Serbia's prestige and future greatness."2 Serbia's people and government,
105

APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
106
he wrote later, sincerely desired peace to recover from heavy wartime losses
and consolidate control over the new southern territories.
Wartime successes had strengthened the Karadjordjevic dynasty and en­
hanced Prince Alexander's personal prestige.4 The Serbian army was riding
the crest of a wave of assertive self-confidence and public approval. For­
eign observers were revising earlier negative assessments. The campaign in
western Macedonia especially had revealed a remarkable efficiency in
mobilization and deployment:
which enabled a force of nearly 300,000 men to be put in the field
within three weeks of the date of the order for mobilization . . . .
Though by European standards the Serbian army may present many
shortcomings, it is nevertheless a factor to be reckoned with. 5
Serbia's swift victory over Bulgaria in July 1 9 1 3 had confirmed this verdict.
Nonetheless, Serbia's official policy towards Austria-Hungary remained
highly circumspect. The British minister ascribed this to Premier Pasic
"who showed throughout the Balkan crisis the greatest prudence and fore­
sight." However, "Black Hand" leaders still aimed to attack Austria under
favorable conditions once Serbia was fully prepared.'
After Bulgaria's defeat Piedmont, the "Black Hand" newspaper, assert­
ed Serbia's national and imperial claims stridently:
Both wars which Serbia conducted had a national liberation character:
through them was finally confirmed our sovereign right to Old Ser­
bia and Macedonia . . . . All of Macedonia is filled with Serbian in­
habitants; virtually the entire Macedonian populace is distinguished
by purely Serbian racial characteristics and customs . . . .
Rejecting Bulgarian claims and denying the existence of a separate Mace­
donian people, Piedmont glorified Serbia's "civilizing" role in the south:
. . . One must introduce immediately a severe and secure regime in
the newly annexed regions. No prejudices must hold back our states­
men. No democratic or liberal considerations which would entail the
same system there . . . as prevails here [Serbia proper] should be
•
The May Crisis 107
heeded. Because in the new regions exist heterogeneous elements
and interests, one cannot consider giving them political rights.11
.
In Serbia the unity and dedication fostered by the Balka..11 wars soon
dissipated. Army leaders and Radical politicians both claimed exclusive
credit for recent victories and progress toward traditional national goals.
They clashed over control of the newly annexed southern regions and
over predominance in Serbia. 9
The War Ministry remained a focus in chronically troubled army-cabinet
relations. Becoming War Minister in January 1 9 1 3 General Miles Bozano­
vic, a May conspirator, encountered major problems which had plagued
his predecessors. Many Serb peasants, though proud of their martial past,
distrusted the army as an alien, unproductive arm of the modern state.
Given Serbia's vulnerability , they recognized it as a necessary evil. Thus
political parties withheld consistent support from the army; war ministers
at cabinet meetings were usually isolated, defending unpopular military
budgets. Precarious in coalition cabinets, their position became worse in
homogeneous Radical governments. Linked since 1903 with the May con­
spirators, war ministers had advocated reorganizing, reequipping and ex­
panding the army , meaning larger military budgets. After short terms of
office they had usually resigned disillusioned. Often they quarreled with
Stojan Protic, normally Interior Minister, an imperious, self-righteous
Radical leader. Soon after the Balkan wars Protic told General Radomir
Putnik, Serbia's venerable architect of victory: you are just a government
clerk! Protic instructed his police officials to prevent army officers from
interfering in their affairs. With Serbian political life dominated by per­
sonal interests, political parties often disregarded their principles. Parti­
sanship, sectarianism, and bitter intrigue flourished in newly democratic
10
Serbia.
General BozanoviC' s resignation triggered a severe cabinet crisis. The
last war minister appointed .through Apis' influence, he had failed to ob­
tain cabinet support for what he considered an adequate military budget. 1 1
Acting temporarily as war minister was Stojan Protic , the conspirators'
virulent foe. Because of squabbles over that ministry and the conquered
territories, even Premier Pasic, who the Austrian envoy affirmed, loved
power next to life itself, wished to resign. 1 2 When Serbian generals un­
animously rejected the war ministry , the Pasic cabinet had to offer the
post either to a junior colonel or to a civilian. 13

108 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
That crisis ended with the appointment as War Minister of Colonel
Dusan Stefanovic, a junior colonel, obscure May conspirator, and former
military attache in Bucharest. To lure him into office, the cabinet pro­
mised him an increased budget and a sizable state loan. This solution,
revealing Pasic's great tactical skill , assured the Premier more freedom of
action, though some viewed it as another capitulation to the officer con­
spirators. 14
Stefanovic's appointment failed to resolve civil-military tensions. Amidst
rumors that the cabinet might name a civilian war minister, key "Black
Hand" officers, including Apis, met in the Danube Division's staff room
January 1 5 , 1 9 1 4 to plan strategy. With police detachments on alert at
the royal palace, rumors spread that the government would retire Apis,
Ye mic, and other top "Black Hand" leaders. 15
When that dispute subsided, a grave r confrontation arose between cab­
inet and officer corps over "priority" in the new southern territories.
While a socialist newspaper accused army officers of directing a national
colonial policy to plunder those regions, 14 Piedmont denounced govern­
ment and police officials named from Radical loyalists of extortion.
Complaints of bribery and corruption, spurred by low salaries and soar­
ing living costs, poured into Belgrade from conquered Macedonia. 1 7
Serbia's administration of the region, reported British envoys, was dis­
gracefully bad since the Radicals had installed in power poorly educated,
corrupt cronies.•& Most civil officials sent to Macedonia in 1 9 1 3-14, af­
firmed an Apis colleague, were Radical proteges in search of loot who had
seized everything possible from the populace. When army officers sta­
tioned there objected, they conflicted inevitably with civil authorities.
After Major Alexander Blagojevic , a "Black Hand" member close to Apis,
accused a police scribe of theft, interior Minister Protic had him removed
from the army. 19
During and after the Balkan wars, the victorious Serbian army enjoyed
priority over civil authority in Macedonia while Belgrade debated the
proper administration for the new regions. Should there be continued
military rule, application of Serbia's democratic laws and constitution, or
interim civil administration by decree? The Pasic cabinet decided upon
this last option. 20 Since the population there was backward and diverse,
that may have been justified, but the Serbian officer corps objected to
the implementation.
•
The May Crisis 109
For months Piedmont had feuded with Interior Minister Protic and the
Radicals, accusing them of denying the army needed funds, dragging it
into party feuds, and quarreling with top officers. "Su ffering from delu­
sions," Protic allegedly saw praetorians in his sleep, and was undermining
public confidence in army leaders. Protic was a "disturber of the peace"
and a horsethie f (!) who must be removed from the cabinet. 21 But that
Proti6 was not just seeing "praetorian ghosts" Piedmont itself confirmed :
Militarism is not a synonym for patriotism, but militarism inter­
preted ratonally
i and democratically lsicj is a sign and measure
of patriotism. People's consciousness and strength is manifested
most strongly through militarism.22
In April 1 9 14 Protic issued a decree proclaiming priority of civil over
military officials in the new territories. This sudden move almost toppled
the Pasic cabinet and threatened to provoke a military coup. 23 The Prior­
ity Decree prescribed that civilian officials, often junior in service and
sometimes corrupt, would outrank senior officers at official functions.
Granting virtually unlimited authority to the civil police, the Decree con­
firmed the army's subordination to the state. Discovery on an officer of a
concealed weapon could bring him a twelve year prison sentence 24 The
cabinet, screamed Piedmont, was "a band of state anarchists" whose
decrees damaged the national interest, destroyed army morale, and rob­
bed the treasury . The Radical regime was incompetent and its foreign
policy disastrous. In Macedonia Protic's police was plundering the popu­
lation. Humiliating Serbia's glorious officers, the Priority Decree had
opened a gulf between police and army in Macedonia.25 The Interior Min­
istry promptly blocked Piedmont's dissemination throughout Macedonia.
The officers responded swiftly . Heightening their previous dismay at
trends in Macedonia, the Decree to them heralded arbitrary, corrupt civil
rule. Decorated commanders · felt insulted on state occasions by standing
to the left of district chiefs, their juniors in rank and responsibility. Gen­
eral Damjan Popovic , Skoplje's miJitary commander, flouted ProtiC's
Decree. Asserting precedence over the civil prefect at a review, he de­
nounced the Decree and demanded punishment of the prefect. Protic
thereupon instructed the War Minister to retire Popovic. Before ne left
Skoplje, the garrison's officers gave him a demonstrative farewell banquet
110 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator The May Crisis Ill

which influenced officers of other Macedonian garrisons. Arriving in Bel­ As the May Crisis deepened, the initial actors-Protic , Damjan Popovic

grade in early May, Popovic was elected chairman of the Officers' Club and Piedmont-were joined by Serbia's most powerful individuals and
in defiance of Protic. The government, believing only conspirator officers agencies: Apis and Putnik (army), King Peter and Prince Alexander

were involved, transferred the loudest protestors to the interior. But each (Crown), Pasic (cabinet), and the political Opposition. Apis and Putnik

passing day revealed an officer corps virtually united against the cabinet. became embroiled with the Crown and Radicals, their former allies. After
Several Macedonian garrisons petitioned to have the Priority Decree re­ General Popovic reached Belgrade, noted an Austrian report, secret meet­

scinded, and General Peter Bojovic, PopoviC's successor i

n Skoplje, sent ings of conspirator officers were held constantly "aiming to overturn the

a strong supporting telegram to the War Minister.2' Another test of government, if not something worse . . . . " Believing the "Black Hand"

strength loomed between the cabinet and officers led by "Black Hand." would pursue its goals unscrupulously, Minister Giesl feared violent erup­

Soon this dispute assumed broader political and constitutional dimen­ tions, "possibly the government's fall or a coup d'etat unless the govern­

sions. As Opposition leaders criticized Protic and backed the officers, ment . . . capitulates to the military party ."29

Premier Pasic faced a major political challenge. With a purely Radical A pis at first played no part in officer protests against the Priority

cabinet, Pasic was confronted with a potentially united Opposition. When Decree, recalled Colonel Milovanovic-Pilac. Everything occurred spon­

the Opposition walked out of the Assembly over ProtiC's Decree, the taneously. Only in mid-May did Apis become an intermediary between

cabinet clung to a precarious majority: if only seven Radical members General Putnik and officers in Serbia on the one hand, and officers in

were absent, no business could be transacted. King Peter was caught be­ Macedonia on the other. In Macedonian garrisons matters were already

tween Generals Putnik and Bojovic, who urged him to defend the army's ripe; there was no need to agitate. Officers in Belgrade, unsure how to

dignity, and Pasic who demanded a mandate to hold new elections. Royal proceed, either wished the Opposition to overturn the Radical cabinet or

refusal of this request, the Radicals argued, would violate the Constitu­ for General Putnik to apply pressure to the King if the Decree were not

tion. The King proposed compromise: if Pasic withdrew the Priority withdrawn. Milovanovic admitted that the officers had no right to resist

Decree, he would get his mandate. However, Protic refused, and Pasic a cabinet decree.30

would not sacrifice his colleague.27 Apis too reacted angrily to the published decree, and briefly had united

Belgrade officers meantime reacted indignantly to a harsh investigation most officers under his leadership. Why did he and other junior officers

of their Club. Protic alleged that this was the "Black Hand'"s power and head this movement?, wondered Misic. "We never had any right to do

fmancial base. Rumored were gross fmancial abuses at the Club, run by this," Apis explained, "nor were we called upon, but from the general

Cedo Jovanovic, a "Black Hand" leader. Early in 1 9 14 the directors re­ resistance to that insult, we took it upon ourselves to obtain satisfaction."

quested the War Minister to conduct an impartial investigation. Instead, This paralleled Apis' behavior in preparing the May Coup of 1903. Then

special investigators seized the Club treasury and books, and closed it too he had preempted the role of senior officers. How could Apis create

down. General Putnik protested this treatment of the Club as if it were such a furor in the army? "Explain by what magical means you as a lieu­

a bankrupt pauper; he ordered the seals removed. When General Damjan tenant colonel without relying upon the . . . "Black Hand" induced junior

Popovic, just elected the Club's new chairman, defied the Commission, it and senior officers to follow you?" queried Misic. Apis stated:

ordered him suspended. Thereupon all the Club's officers resigned in pro­
test. Piedmont urged the officer corps to demand ProtiC's immediate re­ I succeeded in making the disturbance in the officer corps that great

moval.28 By early May the issues of the Officers' Club, "Black Hand," through agitation. Naturally , I turned first to my closest friends
and Priority Decree were linked indissolubly in a civil-military power which I had among higher and lower officers and utilized them all.
struggle. The Organization was dead at that moment, and I did not think of
-
112 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
utilizing it anyway, and . . . we were aided by Opposition leaders.
Since the number of my friends was very great, the agitation suc­
ceeded quickly.31
The officers' response to Proti<S's decree crystallized when top ranking
officers in Skoplje-General Bojovic and Colonel Bozidar Terzic-encour­
aged other officers to act. That "Black Hand" officers stood out in that
movement resulted solely from the key posts they held: Apis in the Gen­
eral Staff, Milovanovic-Pilac in the War Ministry, and Colonel Lazarevic
as chief of staff in Skoplje. As leaders of the May Coup, they were already
well-known to the other officers. Their movement of May 1 9 1 4 lacked
overt political aims. Reflecting the entire officer corps, not a few extrem­
ists, it sought merely to defend legally the officer corps' dignity and amour
propre.32
Soon after General Popovic's removal from Skoplje, Apis acted. But no
longer was he nearly as dynamic, energetic, or decisive as before. Slowed
by illness, he had been sobered by family sorrows and the loss of many
dear comrades in war. Still, the cabinet and Prince Alexander considered
him their most formidable foe. Heading the "White Hand," Maj or Ziv­
kovic exploited Alexander's uncontrollable fear of Apis, that huge man
with the ironical gaze, to consolidate his stranglehold over the Prince. And
Apis' personal magnetism still operated. Around his famous table at the
"Kolarac" restaurant gathered numerous friends and acquaintances. Ever
the suave and courteous host, Apis with the eternal cigarette in his teeth,
smiled enigmatically as if all the rumpus did not concern him directly.
With lighthearted jokes he amused and disarmed admiring listeners. In the
restaurant's gardens skulked spies and police agents seeking clues to Apis'
impending moves. Watching them in turn were guerrilla fighters loyal to
Major Tankosic. Threats and comical confrontations exceeded actual
violence. Meanwhile Apis' supporters awaited decisive action impatiently.
"We have plenty of frie nds and sympathizers," !amen ted one, "but we
need fighters!"33
About mid-May Apis went to see General Putnik , army chief of staff,
telling him that the officers, angry over the Decree, should receive satis­
faction. Agreeing, Putnik consented to exert his powerful influence with
King Peter and approved Apis' efforts to secure support from the politi­
cal Opposition. 34 From Putnik's office Apis went to talk with General
The May Crisis 113
Peter Bojovic, new troop commander in Macedonia. His chief of staff,
Colonel Milutin Lazarevic, assured Bojovic that the officer corps opposed
the Decree solidly. Rejoicing, Bojovic told Lazarevic:_
Everything the officer corps feels, I feel also. If something is bother­
ing it, this must be stated legally. You [Lazarevic] must insist that
everything is done in a peaceful and decent manner, so there will be
no violation of order and discipline . . . .
Two days later Colonel Teric, assuming command of the Vardar Division
in Macedonia as BojoviC's subordinate, told Lazarevic that sharing the of­
ficers' feelings, he would do anything for their sake. "Still, I urge you to
see that everything is done legally. "35 Interpreting officer interests in
Macedonia, Lazarevic acted as chief link with A pis in Belgrade.
Once in Skoplje General Bojovic learned that General Putnik was ad­
vising the King to rescind or alter the Priority Decree. Apis urged his
friends in the south to reinforce this campaign by telegraphing the King
directly. In order to satisfy legal army procedure, Lazarevic requested
Putnik to authorize Macedonian officers to petition the King collectively
via the War Minister. Putnik approved, and on May 1 7th all unit com­
manders in the south, led by Colonel Milovan Plazina, assistant com­
mander of the Sumadija Division, went to see Colonel Terzic. He and Gen­
eral Bojovic were sympathetic, approving the way the officers' protests
were being conducted. Replies of divisional commanders confirmed that
most soutl1ern officers opposed the Decree strongly. General Bojovic tele­
graphed the War Minister May 2 1 st supporting warmly the officers' peti­
tion against the Decree and requesting him to grant their demands.36
Colonel Lazarevic , Bojovic's chief of staff, wrote Apis twice, fust on
May 17th:
Here the affair is finished. The commanders saw Bozo Terzic and he
associated himself fully with them, and this evening on behalf of all
officers of the Skoplje garrison saw General Bojovic. I had already
prepared General Bojovic for this and he accepted everything readily.
He declared that he was in full solidarity with the officers and would
make a proposal to the War Minister . . . .
 1 14 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator The May Crisis
115

Bojovic had added that he wished to send that message for all officers in I did this as an ordinary member of 'Black Hand
' which was not
the region as having a stronger impact. All of this had gone smoothly and directly involved in those talks with the politi
cians. The result of
without debate. "We won't have to reproach ourselves with having vio­ my negotiations with the Vojvoda lPutnikJ an� the
politicians was:
lated any principle or set a bad precedent."37 From Skoplje Lazarevic the Opposition decided to accept the government,
except for the
telegraphed Apis on May 21st: Social Democrats with whom 1 had no contact.
All this work had a
fully loyal character toward Court and Crown.41
This morning we sent the telegram which we spent all night coding.
From it you will see that Voja Zivanovic [Ibar Division commander] His sole obj ect, insisted Apis, was to satisfy the officers, yet his
actions
revealed himself a consistent coward . . . . We are sending you a seem incompatible with an officer's role in a democratic country.
With the
copy of our telegram . . . in case [War Minister] Dusan Stefanovic Radicals, cabinet, and Prince Alexander opposing him, Api
s relied on the
should conceal the original. Let me know if it is well composed and Opposition knowing he would succeed if it won a majority of Ass
embly
worded. Greeting to all our comrades from your seats in the next elections. Apis used his unique powers of persuasion
to
Milutin38 unite the Opposition. Spearheaded by Piedmont, it could then defeat
and
oust the Radical cabinet.42

Receiving Lazarevic's first letter, Apis replied that Putnik would go
straight to the King. But Putnik doubted King Peter could get the Decree
withdrawn because War Minister Stefanovic and officers hostile to Apis,
later organizers of the Salonika Trial, insisted that most officers had ac­
cepted the Decree. The whole affair, trumpeted Tribuna, was the work of
"adventurers" who should be removed from the army.39
Meanwhile Apis in a major political initiative conferred with Opposition
leaders. Meeting with Vojislav Veljkovic (Liberals), then with Milorad
During these negotiations Putnik summoned Apis
to his office and gave
him a tom note which Panta Tucakovic, a Belgrade
lawyer and Radical
envoy, had left on his office table. Putnik had instru
cted his adjutant to
collect the fragments and paste them on a sheet of
paper. Angered by the
note, Putnik asked Apis to show it to Opposition
leaders as an example of
Radical methods against him. Apis explained late
r that he had photo­
graphed the original, giving a copy to Oppositio
n leaders, Davidovic and
Draskovic. Apparently Tucakovic's notes for his
interview with Putnik
1t queried: was the Vojvoda working with the
0 '

DraSkovic (Independent Radicals), he stressed that now was the time for "Black Hand." "It is im-
the united Opposition to win power. Apis found them favorable to the probable he would deftle his great name
by friendship with such dirty
people." He should remain out of pol
officers' cause . "In this sense I also met several times with Dra5kovic and itics until the Priority affair was
resolved. "When politics enters the arm
Ljuba Davidovic at the Export Bank and with Dr. Veljkovic at the Vracar y it is fmished." Putnik did not tell
Apis what "devious methods" the Ra
Club and with Stojan Ribarac at Colonel Milan Tucakovic's home." In dicals were employing against him.43
On May 2 1 st General Bojovic wrote
constant touch with them and with Putnik, Apis carried messages back War Minister Stefanovic on behalf
of all officers in Macedon
and forth. In his discussions with the Opposition, they considered a mili­ ia:

tary coup as one extreme but possible solution to the crisis. independent
Lately there has come to my attention
Radical leaders, notably Draskovic, allegedly consented to undertake one, if a movement among officers
? f some garrisons to give expression to
their dissatisfaction over the
need be.40
mcorrect attitude of police officials involv
Apis' subsequent instructions to his Skoplje friends stemmed directly ed with them in service
and out of it and about some new
from those discussions. Opposition politicians, he affirmed later, would spaper writings against the officers
so as to create divisions amon
have welcomed "a little scandal" to oust the Pasic cabinet. Once in power, g them.44

they would "smooth it over." Apis claimed he had sought no authority :iedr:zont promptly published this message. Knowing that
Bojovic and
from "Black Hand" to deal with the Opposition: Utfilk were bac
king their petition, Macedonian officers were perfor
ming

•
116 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
their normal duties loyally to General Bojovic's full satisfaction. Colonel
Lazarevic told envoys from the Assembly, gove rnment and Court that the
officers had no political aims; no one favored military rule. Apparently
reassured, the envoys departed.45 So far matters were tending towards
. much more if 1 asked them to than they would undertake on their
compromise.
However, Prince Alexander reacted angrily to the officers' protest and
its publication in Piedmont. From Vmjacka Banja spa the Prince returned
suddenly to Belgrade and assumed a direct role. Having issued orders to
the army in the field for two years, Alexander refused now to remain
impotent, nor did he espouse his father's strict constitutionalism. Yielding
to the officers' collective petition would confirm his dependence on the
officer corps. Could one rule Serbia that way? Alexander's hatred of Apis
was growing, fostered by the Prince's self-se rving entourage.46
Thus the Pa5ic cabinet and Crown Prince ignored officer requests to
withdrew the Priority Decree. When Apis realized this , he apparently
sought to trigger the Pasic cabinet's fall by a "putsch" in Macedonia in­
volving replacement of some civil with military officials. The Macedonian
populace, Apis believed, alienated by ProtiC's corrupt officials, would
surely welcome this. Apis by then may have feared retribution from the
Pasic cabinet for his role in uniting the Opposition. Apis, believed Colonel
Lazarevic, intended not a full-scale military coup, but a dramatic gesture
which would topple the cabinet and force new elections. Then power
would pass legally to the united Opposition.47 Apis apparently resolved on
this without consulting the comrades later convicted with him at Salonika.
The Radicals claimed later that Apis had prepared a military power seizure
in both Macedonia and Serbia proper. Apis insisted, howeve r, he had
acted loyally towards Crown and Constitution and had never contemplat­
ed leading an army coup or setting up a military dictatorship.
At Salonika Apis declared that on May 26 or 27 he had written his
relative, Lieutenant Colonel Dusan Glisic, who was to show the letter to
Colonel Lazarevic, Vitomir Cvetkovic and Bozin Simic. Apis gave it to
Colonel Plazina, assistant commander of the Sumadija Division, who was
returning to Skoplje by train. He wrote it hastily so he could give it per­
sonalJy to Plazina. The "Black Hand" was not involved, asserted Apis,
since neither Plazina nor Glisic belonged. The crisis had reached a peak,
wrote Apis. Energetic action was required to satisfy the army officers.
The May Crisis
117
In the letter 1 said that if the old lPasic] cabinet remained in power
and the crisis were not resolved promptly, to act so the crisis would
continue . . . . 48 I expected that they lhi� comradesj would do
own .
Apis hinted what he had in mind: "I instructed my comrades in Skoplje to
persuade county and district chiefs to assume police power temporarily ."
He denied though that he intended any similar action in Serbia proper.
It would be only a partial military coup!
For the Salonika court Colonel Misic asked the Colonel:
Did you prepare a plan to lead troops of the Belgrade garrison with
your comrades from 'Black Hand' one night to the palace, force
King Peter to abdicate in favor of Heir Alexander, impose your men
on him as ministers and kill existing ministers, Stojan Protic, and
Dusan Stefanovic, only to renounce that plan when at the last mo­
ment Dr. Nikolaj Gavrilovic communicated to you on Terazija a pre­
pared police order to prevent such action and that you would all
lose your heads?
Apis denied this flatly; nor had he heard of any
such police order. N ikolaj
Gavrilovic, national activist and personal frie
nd, had met him at Hotel
London in Belgrade, near Terazij a, during
the crisis. Pleading with Apis
not to heighten tensions over the Dec
ree, Gavrilovic had warned: "Dear
frien d, I fear for your life."49
Other than Apis' voluntary testimony, the
Salonika court lacked proof
that he had planned an army
power seizure in Macedonia or Serbia. Apis
had instructed his friends in Sko
plje to remove a regional or district chief
and send him "bag and bag
gage to Belgrade," or in another version: "to
dismiss some county and dis
trict chiefs in the new regions and send them
to Belgrade with aJJ
their baggage, and here in Belgrade it will be our con
­
cern to smooth
over the affair."50 The latter suggested a major pow
er
transfe r in Macedonia
with Apis following it up in Belgrade.
Giving the letter to Plazina, Api
s accompanied him and Milovanovic to
Belgrade railway
station. Alone there with Plazina, Apis summarized his
letter to Glisic
stressing that he expected hs Skoplje comrades to act
•
118 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
energetically. Plazina doubted they would implement A pis' proposals.
"They will, they will !" exclaimed Apis. Rejoining his comrades, Colonel
Milovanovic inte�ected: "And what if they do not want to?" Apis told
Milovanovic he merely wished to satisfy the officers.51 But Colonel
Plazina, knowing what Apis' letter contained, testified at Salonika: Apis
had urged his friends "to remove the police authorities in the new regions
and inform o f this by telegram." But not even Plazina claimed Apis
him
. officer corps
had written: "Take power mto your h and s."52
Anyway , Apis' instructions were not carried out. Apparently, his friends
divulged them to no one, so the incident passed without immediate con­
sequences. From Skoplje on May 28th Plazina wrote Apis he had given
GlWc the sealed letter, but no action would be taken "because they were
all opposed to having the army seize power." Wrote Plazina:
As soon as I arrived here, I found Dusan lGlisic J , Milutin lLazare­
vic ] , Vitomir lCvetkovic] , and Bozin [Simicj and informed them
what we should do when an official report was received that the
cabinet had remained the same. All without exception are strongly
opposed to having the army take power into its hands in order to
compel the gove rnment to retreat. All fmd that this would bring
down hatred and condemnation upon them and would bring much
into question, and that those against whom they would be acting in
that sense would only gain . . . . Conduct yourselves there accord­
ingly. If any protest in some other form is necessary , then inform
us.sJ
Plazina interpreted Apis' instructions as urging a partial power seizure. Al­
though Apis argued that he sought merely to apply enough pressure to
topple the Pasic cabinet, he seems not to have realized how grossly that
violated his sworn role as a Serbian officer. Here was the chief of military
intelligence meeting surreptitiously with Opposition politicians! Apis
tried to explain:
My message to Skoplje was the product of conversations with op­
position parties about which those in Skoplje were ignorant, so when
they read my message about replacing police authorities, they
thought I had undertaken some daredevil step in Belgrade and there­
fore used those expressions to me rejecting his request. 54
The May Crisis
1 19
Lieutenant Colonel GliSic , to whom Apis' letter had been addressed,
responded also on May 28th:
Dear Apis,
Here there is not a single person who would agree
with your pro­
posal . . . . With it would be caused irreparable dam
age bringing into
question the most vital interests of the country, the
would be split as never before , and there s i no prospect that any­
thing good could come from what you have proposed. Ou
r aim is to
preserve solidarity in the officer corps here at least and
to strengthen
it, and then to fight against any government if it should
attack us.
Thus I ask you to renounce the path you are thinking
of following
since no one will accompany you on that path. This is the
honest
truth and you should realize it. We are obliged to bring
this calmly
to your knowledge so that you will not make any mistake
which no
one could correct and which would be fatal both for the
country
and for all of us. We are empowered by our comrades her
e to inform
you of this.
Your, Dusan 55
Apis could not persuade even relatives and comrades to engage in perilous
political adventurism.
Before the Salonika Trial, Colonel Plazina told the historian, Slobodan
Jovanovic, that Apis had favored temporary replacement of civil police
power in Macedonia with military authority. Perhaps he had believed this
would be merely a demonstration against the cabinet, but Plazina, more
cautious than Apis, viewed it quite differently. To remove a single county
or district chief and ship him to Belgrade "bag and baggage" would signify
beginning to replace all civil authority in Macedonia with military rule.
Even such a "little scandal" would bear all the earmarks of a putsch. The
PaSic cabinet, which the Opposition could not oust legally, would have
interpreted that as an attempted military coup. Consequently, Apis'
friends refused to obey his instructions.56
On the other hand, accusations made at Salonika that Apis had plot­
ted a full-scale military coup to destroy the regime and dynasty remain
unproven and appear far-fetched. Lacking Apis' letter to his colleagues in
Skoplje, we do not know his precise instructions. To cite ·'Black Hand"
•
120 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
statutes to prove Apis' subservice intent is most misleading. By May 1 9 1 4
"Unification or Death!" no longer operated as a cohesive organization.
Apis stated in Salonika under oath: "Never either then or later did it enter
my mind that the army should take power into its hands." After the 1903
Coup, he pointed out, the conspirators had restored power to the politi­
cians immediately and never thereafter had sought power. "In this affair
of the Priority Decree I had the same feelings and was very far from the
idea that the army should take power . . . . I worked for and wished strong­
ly that the officers be given satisfaction."57 His claims are supported some­
what by his intensive efforts to unite the Opposition so it could defeat the
Radicals at the polls. Why do that if he intended to have the army seize
power? Apis' ardent patriotism suggests he would avoid actions leading
to civil war, especially in 1 9 1 4 . In Serbia's weakened state, such a conflict
would have been an engraved invitation to Austria-Hungary to "restore
order" by armed intervention. However, Apis seemed not to understand
that his actions during the May Crisis were incompatible with his status as
a key military leader in a democratic society .
At the end of May everything hung in balance. All major power elements
in Serbia were locked in struggle; the public wondered how it would be
resolved. Many expected the "Black Hand" led by the enigmatic Apis to
triumph; its apparent strength had induced the Opposition to cooperate
with it. But once involved in political maneuvers, Apis lost his mysterious
aura and seemed less formidable to Prince Alexander and the Radicals.
Supported by War Minister Stefanovic and the "White Hand," the cabinet
drafted stringent measures against the Apis group. One decree would retire
many high "Black Hand" officers and transfer others to the interior; a
second would appoint their opponents to key posts in Belgrade. The gov­
ernment acted also to guard against . any coup attempt in Belgrade. The
"White Hand" assured the cabinet that Apis, lacking sufficient army sup­
port, would not act. But the plan to pension off or disperse the Apis
fac tion was blocked by Colonel Krsta Smiljanic, chief of operations. Fac­
ing possible Austrian invasion, Smiljanic opposed removal of so many able
army leaders. Vojvoda Putnik was old and ill , General Stepanovic had been
sidelined, and Generals Misic and Popovic had been retired. New removals
and transfers would imperil the army's defensive capacity.
As the crisis dragged on, Apis' friends grew worried. They discerned
their hero's uncharacteristic hesitation . Turned down by his Skoplje
The May Crisis 121
friends, Apis avoided confrontation with the cabinet. Realizing the battle
was lost, he sought compromise, sending Colonel Milovanovic-Pilac to
Prince Alexander with peace feelers. Milovanovic pleaded with the Prince
not to abandon his old conspirator friends and predicted catastrophe if
Pasic retained power. He intended to rule as well as reign, retorted Alex­
ander, but not with the conspirators; the Pa8ic cabinet must remain. But
he assured Pilac the Priority Decree would be withdrawn, Protic would
leave the cabinet, and Putnik might become war minister. Pilac would ob­
tain a post in the Chief Inspectorate, and Apis and his friends would keep
sa
their posts. Here was the outline of a compromise.
Russian intervention largely saved the Pa8ic cabinet. Refusing to sacri­
fice Protic, Premier Pasic had relied on a narrow Radical Assembly major­
ity to pass key measures. When he could govern no longer with it, Pasic
submitted his resignation. Russia stepped in to prevent his fall. Ambas­
sador Nicholas Hartvig, with vast influence in Belgrade, declared Russia's
Balkan policies required Pasic in office. The French hinted a Serbian Op­
position regime might not receive their financial backing. Aided by Prince
Alexander, Hartvig won over non-conspirator officers to a comprdmise.
Soon the public learned that the entire Pasic cabinet would remain. The
Opposition, divided over program, was outplayed by the wily Pasic. Dis­
illusioned with the conspirators, Independent Radical leaders concluded
Pasic was preferable to chaos. Accepting Prince Alexander's promises, Apis
informed his friends he would launch no risky adventures, then withdrew
into the shadows. His most devoted followers, receiving no explanation,
were alienated. Next day Piedmont wrote ironically: "It is easy for you
officers, you can always bargain , but what will happen to us civilians?"
King Peter, caught between cabinet and army and pressured by Russia
to retain Pasic, withdrew from active political life. Late in June he trans­
ferred his powers mostly to Alexander as Prince Regent. ProtiC's Decree
was withdrawn, but he kept office.59
Thus ended the May Crisis: The chief winners were Pasic and Alexander,
both now hostile to Apis. But Pasic had prevailed less from personal
ability and Radical strength than from Russia's support. Assuming royal
powers, Alexander resolved to destroy Apis and the conspirators, whom
he viewed as obstructing his authority in the army. He and the Radicals
had only deferred a fmal settlement with them. Upcoming elections, Pasic
122 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator

anticipated, would give him a strong enough mandate to break Apis' hold
over the officer corps. The confrontation between cabinet and officer
corps had undermined "Black Hand" influence. Except perhaps for the
Radicals, everyone was disgruntled at the outcome of the May Crisis,
marking the beginning of the end of Apis' prestige and political influence.

CHAPTER XII

MURDER IN SARAJEVO
(JUNE 1 9 1 4 )

Malobabic carried out my instructions,

organized and carried through the assas­
sination. Its chief participants were in my
service and received small honoraria which
I sent to them through Malobabic.
Apis to the Salonika Court, March 1917

Archduke Franz Ferdinand's murderin Sarajevo, Bosnia on June 15/28,

1914, most scholars agree, touched off World War I. Who was responsible
for that murder and the subsequent cataclysmic war has been debated ever
since. Was Serbia the innocent victim of Austro-German aggression? Or did
Serbia plan, or at least know an attempt would be made, to kill the Arch­
duke? Yugoslav scholars reject almost unanimously German and Austrian
assertions that Serbia deserved primary blame for the murder and for
World War 1. Yugoslavs still dispute who deserves "credit" for Franz Fer­
dinand's death and how much Belgrade knew about the plot, but they
tend to view the murder a� justified retribution for the annexation of
Bosnia. 1
Who conceived and executed the Archduke's assassination? Some Yugo­
slav historians affirm that revolutionary nationalist students of "Young

Bosnia" ("MI ada Bosna ") organized and carried it out with minimal aid

123
•
124 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
from Serbia's government or military .2 Others believe Colonel Apis and
the "Black Hand" prepared the plot. Apis' defenders, glorifying him and
"Black Hand" as martyrs and heroes, accept his declaration at Salonika
in 1 9 1 7 that he and his agents removed the Archduke .3 Defenders of the
Salonika Trial's verdict, affirming the Apis group's paramount role in the
Sarajevo murder, claim they relied on Germany to solve the Yugoslav
question.-4
Early in 1 9 1 4 Serbia's leaders agreed their country required years of
peace to recover from the Balkan wars, rebuild the army, and integrate
the south. Facing officer hostility and Opposition maneuvers, Premier
Pasic feared Serbia might not obtain such a respite. He warned General
Putnik confidentially that Colonel Apis' links with revolutionary Bosnian
students might endanger Serbia. 5 Apis in 1 9 1 3 had told Svetozar Pribice­
vic, a respected Serbian politician from Croatia, he feared Austria-Hungary
might attack Serbia before she recovered. "We still need several years of
peace," warned Apis. "Then after that we will come to you (in Croatia] . "
To Pribicevic this suggested Apis possessed sound common sense , whereas
the Radical leader, Lj ubomir Jovanovic-Patak, claimed he was emotional
and disordered. Surely Serbia's rulers must have known Apis' attributes,
argued Pribicevic. Would they install as intelligence chief someone without
common sense? Anyone slated for such a key post, he noted, underwent
a thorough investigation. Besides, Apis was very well known in Serbia, a
country where everybody seemed to know everyone else.'
From the Genera.! Staff, Apis, while opposing Protic's Decree, was in­
volved deeply in foreign policy though lacking detailed knowledge of
foreign affairs or true political understanding. He believed only terror­
istic methods were effective in achieving Serbia's national goals. Such
methods had succeeded in the Ottoman Empire, but Austria-Hungary was
quite different. Attempting terrorist actions there, Apis played light­
heartedly with fire and helped ignite a world war. Informed circles in
Serbia, blaming Apis for the assassination, deplored it. 7
That spring Apis became preoccupied with preparations to "greet"
Archduke Franz Ferdinand appropriately in Sarajevo. Agreeing Serbia
required peace, Apis and Pasic differed how best to achieve it. Pasic , the
politician, favored cautious and conciliatory policies. Apis, the national
revolutionary, viewing the Archduke as the chief obstacle to peace, con­
cluded he should be removed forcibly. Apis regarded the Archduke as a
Sarajev o 125
dynamic leader preparing a preemptive strike to crush Serbia and end its
leadership of the South Slav national movement. To Apis Franz Ferdinand
was the Austrian "war party's" irreplacable chief, the only Austrian leader
able to regenerate a disintegrating Dual Monarchy . By uniting South Slavs
of the Monarchy under a uniform, coordinated administration, the Arch­
duke might halt erosion of Austrian power and envelop Serbia. Vigorous
Franz Ferdinand as emperor instead of eighty-four year old Franz Josef
migllt delay Serbian unification indefmitely. Apis saw the Archduke's
inlrninent visit to Sarajevo, coinciding with Austrian maneuvers in eastern
Bosnia, as heralding an invasion of Serbia and southward advance to Sal­
onika. If the Archduke were eliminated, concluded Apis, peace would be
guaranteed indefinitely. Serbia could recove r fully and prepare for a show­
down with its traditional foe. By then Serbia's great ally, Russia, would
be ready to join with her in war. 8
Serbia's self-confidence soared after her victorious Balkan wars. No
longer would Serbs accept Austrian provocations supinely . The Habs­
burg heir's formal visit to Bosnia's capital on the anniversary of the Battle
of Kosovo (1 389), combined with maneuvers on the Drina, seemed de­
signed deliberately to insult and humiliate Serbia. Youthful Serbs, their
national feelings inflated by recent successes, faced the future fearlessly .
Nothing seemed impossible now, even defeating Austria-Hungary which
many Serbs assumed was now moribund like Turkey. Doubtless Apis was
influenced by such ideas, circulating then in Belgrade.9
Apis' concern over the Archduke's intentions in 1 9 1 4 seems confirm­
ed by some later assessments. In an interview in Paris Soir-Dimanche June
28, 1937 Dr. Max Hohenberg, the Archduke's eldest son, stated Franz
Ferdinand had intended turning Austria-Hungary into a federation of its
nations, "taking into account the interests of each individual people, and
solve the difficult Danube problem . . . . " Such a Vienna-led federation
"threatened the interests of some great powers which had their own ag­
gressive and annexationist plans." To block these, affirmed Hohenberg,
the German secret police collaborated closely with guerrillas in preparing
the Sarajevo murder. 10 lntinlating German complicity in the assassination,
Hohenberg supplied no supporting evidence.
Claiming Franz Ferdinand's policy of trialism-turning Austria-Hungary
m to a triple monarchy by unifying its South Slavs-had provoked his
murder, Apis' nephew told the historian, Luigi Albertini:

126 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Motives for the murder in Sarajevo should be sought in the Slavophil
policy of Franz Ferdinand. The Archduke fell victim to his trialist
views. Had he been able to realize his plan, Serbia would have had
to gravitate towards Austria-Hungary. Apis, a wise political thinker
lsic] , discerned the whole danger of the Archduke's plan. Austria
intended to achieve unification of the South Slavs within the frame­
work of the Danubian monarchy. Dimitrijevic lApis] , who spent
several months in the Serbian Embassy in Berlin, must have been
seriously worried when he learned about the policial plans of the
1
Austrian heir to the throne. 1
Only his admirers considered Apis a profound political thinker! With his
great political and revolutionary instincts, wrote Milan Zivanovic, "Apis
discerned the danger posed by such a ltrialist] policy, and the energy of
that potential monarch and understood what a danger threatened the
South Slavs."
Thus his decision ripened as soon as he saw an opportunity to re­
solve that question quickly and definitively. In his path stood Franz
Ferdinand and he removed him from it. At one stroke unification of
the South Slavs under the Habsburgs was eliminated forever from
2
the agenda. 1
Thus Apis' worshipful nephew.
Austro-Hungarian leaders in 1914 had decided to occupy Serbia, affirm­
ed Alexander Blagojevic, a "Black Hand" colleague of Apis. Soon Serbia's
General Staff, including Apis, discerned this scheme headed by Franz
Ferdinand. "I immediately proposed," recalled Blagojevic, "that this ques­
tion of our enslavement be solved by Franz Ferdinand's death. After dis­
cussion the CEC adopted this proposal which was executed precisely ac­
cording to plan." 1 3
The autocratic Franz Ferdinand gathered leading Austrian generals,
statesmen and journalists at his beautiful Belvedere Palace in Vienna. His
aim, wrote Ljubibratic, a Bosnian scholar, was to renew the Three Em­
peror's League (Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia), created by Chan­
cellor Bismarck in 1 8 7 3 . Considering Austria's liberal ally, Italy, an enemy,
the devoutly Catholic Archduke regarded the Church , army , and Austria's
•
Sarajevo 127
Germans as pillars of his future imperial rule. Strongly anti-Magyar, he
considered dualism insuring equality to the Magyars, fatal to the Mon­
archy. He wished to introduce trialism by creatin� a South Slav kingdom
to which later could be joined Croatia and Dalmatia, and still later a sub­
servient Serbia. As the Triple Monarchy's advance post in the march to
Salonika, Serbia would be totally absorbed. Premier Pasic, speaking to
Italy's Count Sforza about the Archduke's trialist schemes, declared: "It
was the only time in my life that I was truly scared." Franz Ferdinand,
noted Sforza, aimed to strengthen the Habsburg Monarchy, not satisfy
its peoples' aspirations. However, except for Catholic clericals in Croatia
and Bosnia who looked to the Archduke, Austrian Slavs no longer wel­
comed such dynastic solutions. Franz Ferdinand's trip to Sarajevo and the
Bosnian maneuvers were to reinforce that element. Rejoiced pro-clerical
Hrvatski dnevnik June 12, 1914:
He [Franl Ferdinand] comes to Bosnia as the commander of the
entire military strength of our great monarchy . . . as if he were
sending us and our enemies his loud message : 'Never shall Bosnia
leave the body of the Habsburg Monarchy!' The Monarchy's entire
power will defend the Bosnian lands to the end and the last breath. 14
Franz Ferdinand was the strongest advocate of a preventive war against
Serbia, wrote Yugoslav military historian, Colonel Peter Opacic. Many
European leaders viewed him as a fanatical and bellicose clerical. Around
the Archduke Austrian military circles had rattled their sabres on Serbia's
frontiers during the Balkan wars, awaiting some pretext for invasion.
Colonel von Bardolff, Franz Ferdinand's chief of staff, wrote late in 1 9 1 2 :
"The South Slav question can be resolved only by subjugating Serbia." A
month later Conrad von Hotzendorff, Austro-Hungarian chief of staff, also
proposed attacking Serbia. Since European conditions then precluded this,
Emperor Franz Josef blocked the Heir's proposed ultimatum to Belgrade.
But during 1 9 1 3 the Balkan League dissolved and Russian influence in
the region waned. 1 5
But Leopold Chlumecky, an Austrian scholar, insisted the Archduke's
plan had been wholly defensive. Fanatically pro-Austrian and seeing his
beloved Monarchy crumbling, he aimed to transform its military and legal
bases. In the Belvedere he marshalled the few who realized the urgent need
128 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
for basic reform. They clashed with the old Emperor and his entourage,
the Magyars, and conservative Austrian aristocrats. Adopting trialism,
Franz Ferdinand opposed annexing any Serbian territory, saying : "For
God's sake not that! Not a square kilometer of Serbian soil, not a single
Serbian plum tree!" Aiming to preserve, not conquer, he had even op­
posed annexing Bosnia and Hercegovina. His aims were understood better
in Belgrade than in Vienna. If the Archduke should become emperor and
implement his program, Serbian leaders realized, there would be no
Greater Serbia. With Croatia joined with Slovenes, Dalmatians and Bosnia­
Hercegovina into a united South Slav Habsburg bloc, the road to Greater
Serbia envisaged by Pa.Sic and Apis would be blocked. With the Monarchy
disintegrating internally, the Archduke advocated peace and sought ties
with powerful Germany. Out of a chaotic Monarchy he wished to create
a new and stable order. Serbian nationalists thus wished to eliminate him,
then await old Franz Josers demise as the signal for Austria-Hungary's
fln al dissolution.•'
" [Apis] actually decided upon that assassination and carried it out in
practice," asserted his nephew. Before leaving for Sarajevo, Gavrilo Princip,
the Archduke's young Bosnian assassin, received Apis' personal instruc­
tions and encouragement to conunit the murder. Apis' later execution
resulted primarily from his admission he had organized the plot, claimed
Zivanovic. Stated Apis early in 1 9 1 7 :
I emphasized once to you that perhaps I erred in writing openly [to
the Salonika court] that 1 carried out the Sarajevo assassination. 1
would say now on the basis of these hearings [at Salonika] that this
is the main . . . reason why I will be killed.
Zivanovic insisted that Apis' role in planning and implementing the mur­
der was predominant.17 Tluough guerrilla chieftain Tankosic who instruct­
ed the assassins in use of ftrearms and bombs, and other friends, Apis en­
abled the young Bosnians to commit their historic deed. Supplying them
with revolvers and bombs, he secured their passage from Serbian into
Bosnia. Those youths had prepared for their supreme sacrifice spontan­
eously and were organized by Bosnian revolutionary groups, "but Apis
directed their preparedness to its true goal."18 Following the tradition of
Zerajic, 19 Bosnian students had planned to murder high Austrian officials,
Sarajevo
129
especially in Bosnia, but their hatred had focused on General Oskar
Potiorek, governor of Bosnia. Apis convinced them "one must strike the
snake in the head" by killing Franz Ferdinand, n<?t replacable governors
or generals. Removing the Archduke, argued Apis, would doom the Mon­
archy's regeneration and reorganization and remove the main obstacle
to Serbian unity.20
Serbia's national revolutionary movement, wrote Zivanovic, centered
then in the General Staff. Enjoying General Putnik's unlimited support,
Apis held everything in his hands. By then the "Black Hand" and its CEC
allegedly no longer actually functioned and thus neither planned nor
implemented the murder:
In Serbia in all this the main and decisive role was played by Colonel
A pis with a few of his closest colleagues, all of whom were members
of 'Unification or Death !' and with the collaboration of Rade
Malobabic. 2 1
Malobabic, claimed Colonel Pavlovic , flrst informed Apis that Franz
Ferdinand would visit Sarajevo and lead maneuvers in eastern Bosnia.
These moves seemed preparatory to an invasion of Serbia.
Knowing that Serbia was exhausted from the Balkan wars and incap­
able of resisting the great Austrian strength and that Serbia must in­
evitably perish if it came to war then with Austria-Hungary , Maloba­
bic was the first to propose to Apis to kill Franz Ferdinand as the
leader of Austria's imperialistic Balkan policy and thus avert the
22
chief danger threatening Serbia.
Receiving assurances Russia would defend Serbia if she were invaded, Apis
decided to implement the plot, instructing Malobabic and Major Vulovic
to arrange for armed assassins to cross into Bosnia.23
A pis' letter to the Salonika Officers' Court in 1 9 1 7 , long kept secret,
affirmed strongly his leading role in the Sarajevo plot:
I enlisted Rade Malobabic . . . to organize for me an intelligence net-
work in Austria-Hungary . . . in agreement with Artamonov, the Rus-
sian military attache, who met personally with Rade in my presence.

130 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
After Rade had begun work, believing that Austria was preparing for
war with us, I thought that with the removal of the heir to the
throne , Ferdinand, the military party and current he headed would
lose strength, thus removing or at least delaying the danger of war
somewhat. For that purpose I hired Malobabic to organize Ferdin­
and's murder upon his arrival in Sarajevo. I decided on this definit­
ively only after Artamonov had assured me that Russia would not
leave us undefended if Austria attacked us.
Then came the controversial portion of Apis' statement:
Malobabic carried out my instructions, organized and carried through
the assassination . Its chief participants were all in my service and
received small honararia which I sent them through Malobabic.
Some of the receipts, wrote Apis, remained in Russian hands. "I received
money for this from Artamonov since the lSerbianJ General Staff did not
then have credit to conduct this n
i tensified work."24
Apis made his deposition to the court believing it would halt the Sal­
onika Trial?5 With Serbia fighting Austria-Hungary, he could not imagine
that confirming his initiative in the Archduke's murder could seal his
doom. Apis told the court the truth, concluded Ljubibratic, but not the
whole truth.2i
Apis' relationship with Russia, especially with military attache , Victor
Artamonov, remains disputed. Russia's General Staff and secret police,
allege some scholars, stood behind Colonel Apis as instigators of the Sara­
jevo murder.27 For his part, Apis claimed he decided on the murder only
after Artamonov assured him of Russian support for Serbia. "On this occa­
sion I did not communicate to Artamonov my intentions for the assassina­
tion, but found a pretext to seek his views about Russia's attitude ." 2a
In 1938 Artamonov for a German publication explained his role prior
to the murder. With "Black Hand" and the Serbian government at odds,
Artan10nov had dealt with Apis only officially and solely to obtain in­
formation: "I met with Mr. Dimitrijevic exclusively in his office at the
General Staff." His own General Staff had not instructed him to influence
Serbia's position. Departing for Switzerland on leave June 19, 1914, Arta­
monov later denied any part in the Sarajevo plot. Neither Russia nor
•
Sarajevo 131
Serbia, he affirmed, desired the Archduke's death.29 He returned to Bel­
grade July 1 5th, the day Austria declared war on Serbia.
However, Victor Serge, a Russian emigre revolutionary, claimed in 1925
that Apis' colleague, Bozin Simic, had told him:
Apis regarded it as his duty before undertaking decisive action, to
reach agreement with Artamonov. He informed him about the pre­
parations for the Sarajevo assassination. A few days later Artamonov
gave him his reply which went: 'Go forward! If you are attacked,
you won't be alone.' Artamonov sought precise instructions from
his superiors. 30
Simic's assertion seems improbable. A Russian promise to defend Serbia
would have come through the Foreign Ministry, not via Artamonov. Nor
would such a subordinate official's promise have been binding. From Arta­
monov Apis had sought no ironclad pledge, merely "his opinion." Despite
Apis' denial, Artamonov probably knew something about preparations for
the murder. While Artamonov was on leave, his tasks were assumed by
Alexander Verkhovskii, later War Minister in Russia's Provisional Govern­
ment. Recalled Trydar-Burzynski of the Petrograd Archeological Institute:
The [Sarajevo] assassination was prepared with the support of the
acting Russian military attache in Belgrade, Captain Verkhovskii
. . . a young man I had known for years . . . and who told me sin­
cerely the truth about the origins, preparation and execution of
the plot. 31
Dr. Vojislav Bogicevic, later chief archivist in Sarajevo, published re­
sponses by Apis' colleagues to his queries about responsibility for the mur­
der. Recalled Colonel Vojislav Gojkovic:
I affirm also that in that affair were involved only Apis, Vulovic and
Tankosic. Had anyone else tried to push himself into that threesome,
he is an ordinary boaster and I ask you to pay him no heed . . . . I
was very close to Apis, but still he never said anything to me about
it. Besides, had I been in his place, I would not have acted different­
ly. Only those who were to carry out the deed knew about it. Both
132 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
of them were very reliable and devoted to Apis. Had Tankosic not
been killed (in 1 9 1 5 ] he also would have been shot at Salonika?2
Another Apis associate argued that killing the Archduke was not Malo­
babic's idea. Writing Bogicevic in June 1 9 5 6 , Alexander Blagojevic affirm­
ed that he, not Malobabic, had persuaded Apis to order the murder com­
mitted in order to prevent war. In charge of an Albanian frontier post,
Blagojevic came to Belgrade on leave in April 1 9 1 4 . Meeting with Apis
and Major Vulovic in downtown Belgrade, Blagojevic accompanied them
to Apis' office in Kalemegdan fortress. "Well, now that 1 see you, chiefs,
what do you think?" asked Apis of his two "Black Hand" comrades. The
Colonel declared:
Up to now what we have done (in nationalist activity j has turned
out well, but what should we do now with Austria? She is making
formidable preparations against us. The danger is very great. She
wants to destroy us. We have reports informing us that their heir to
the throne, Ferdinand, is making dangerous preparations. Here is the
report of the Russian military attache, Artamonov, warning us about
decisions by Austrian and German military circles . . . to occupy us.
The Foreign Ministry has sent us a document of Ambassador Hartvig
speaking of the same thing and advising us to show great caution in
our operations towards Austria because Russia is still not prepared
militarily ?3
Far from provoking conflict with the Austrians, Russia sought to restrain
Serbia.
Malobabic, realled Apis, secured an appointment as headwaiter at the
Officers' Club in Zagreb. He described a party by officers of the garrison
where many toasts were drunk. The Archduke ended matters shouting:
"See you in Belgrade! Down with Serbia!" After Apis' account, Blagoje­
vic allegedly stated :
If it has gotten to the point when the fate of our people depends
on the will of one man or group of men, then down with them. Let
us be worthy sons of our people and work to crush this dragon
which wishes to devour Serbia.
Sarajevo 133
"How so?" asked Colonel Apis. "If no one else can be found," said Blago­
jevic, "let one of us [guerrilla chiefsj go there and thwart the designs of
that dragon." Responded Apis: "We must think this over seriously." But
Blagojevic persisted:
The late Bogd an l Zerajic] still has his followers, and Silja [Tanko­
sic] knows them well, and since they are right here in Belgrade,
someone should take it on himself to arrange this affair.
Nodding in apparent approval, Apis said: "I'll talk with Silja."34 Presum­
ably then Apis and Tankosic had worked out detailed plans for the assas­
sination.
Svetozar Pribicevic from Croatia idealized Apis then as the Serbian of­
ficers' most influential and determined leader. It was generally agreed, he
affirmed, that Apis was an idealist who sought no personal advantage, lack­
ed personal ambition, and was devoted to national interests. Certainly he
gave that impression . Ready to use any means to achieve South Slav unity,
he aimed to destroy Austria-Hungary and concentrated his attention on
preparing Serbia for a military showdown. Malobabic was Apis' best agent
in forging ties with South Slavs and preparing a national revolution. On the
other hand, Radical leader, Lj ubomir Jovanovic-Patak, cl aiming Apis
wanted the Archduke murdered, told Pribicevic that later he planned to
kill William Il of Germany too. Exclaimed J ovanovic-Patak: "He was a
bandit!"
Objecting to this, Pribicevic affirmed that the Serbian government dur­
ing his lifetime never accused Apis of plotting the Archduke's death. Only
after his execution did it allege Apis' participation in order to justify his
conviction for treason. Nor did Apis' alleged role prove he sought war or
believed killing the Archduke would provoke it. With Serbia's complicity
unproven, how could a murder by an Austrian citizen constitute a pretext
for conflict? Knowing Serbia. required peace in 1914, Apis defmitely op­
posed war, wrote Pribicevic. To have sought war then with Austria would
have been insane which Apis certainly was not.35
The pro-Radical scholar, Stanoje Stanojevic, depicted Apis negatively
as "a restless spirit full of desire for adventure . . . who was constantly
thinking up and planning plots and assassinations." He had aimed to kill
William II, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, and Prince Alexander. In his
134 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
account Apis emerges as a professional assassin, surely a gross mischaract­
erization. Major Tankosic, affirms Stanojevic, informed Apis in May 1 9 1 4
that he had just talked with envoys of Bosnian students determined to kill
Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. Consenting to this, Apis had authorized
Tankosic to train the youths to handle weapons. Ten days later they left
for Bosnia. Neither Apis nor Tankosic told anyone until June 2nd when
Apis convened a meeting of CEC.3' He told his colleagues he and Tanko­
sic had sent two youths to murder the Archduke who aimed to provoke
war with Serbia. After lively debate all CEC members except Tankosic
opposed that plan. At their insistence Apis agreed to try to halt the plot.
Whether he acted too late or the assassins refused to obey remains un­
certain. 37
That Apis organized the plot through Malobabic, wrote Dr. Vojislav
Bogicevic, was corroborated by a document in the Sarajevo archive. This
confirmed Apis' allegation that Malobabic took weapons for the assassins
into Bosnia. Even before World War Il, added the archivist, he had in­
formation that Apis had organized the Sarajevo murder, but he felt he
should not disclose it until Apis' report to the Salonika court had been
released. Bogicevic in 1953 published two earlier letters of Alexander
Blagojevic confirming that Narodna Odbrana, accused by the Austrian
ultimatum, had played no part in the Sarajevo murder. Right until that
event, its chairman, General Boza Jankovic, had wroked for the Austrian
military attache. "Those three great dead patriots lA pis, Vulovic and
Malobabic J ," affirmed Blagojevic, "are the only ones who prepared and
executed that affair . . . . "38 But Blagojevic, close to Apis, was not an im­
partial witness.
Defenders o f the Salonika verdict39 alleged that Apis believed the Cen­
tral Powers would win World War I and that the South Slav problem could
be solved by relying on Germany. Pro-Salonika writers emphasized Apis'
close ties with the Germanophile, Dr. Milos Bogicevic.40 Bogicevic alleged­
ly, during Apis' 1 9 1 3 stay in Berlin, introduced him to German army
leaders who "helped him write articles in German newspapers about
Serbia's problems." Calling Apis his "great friend," Bogicevic noted he
had impressed many higher German officers. Early in World War I, Bogi­
cevic spent much time at Apis' office in Kragujevac.41
The young Bosnians, not Apis, conceived and executed the Sarajevo
murder independently , claimed a Bosnian scholar: "not merely because
Sarajevo 135
Princip carried it out but because of all the participants he alone remained
consistent from beginning to end in executing the decisions reached."42
Gavrilo Princip, a national revolutionary, and Ned�ljko Cabrinovic, an an­
archist, inspired by previous attempts against top Austrian leaders,43 plan­
ned the Sarajevo murder. Apis' Salonika deposition cl aiming responsibility,
wrote Lj ubibratic, reflected his psychological state then and his belief that
this would undermine treason charges against him . "Young Bosnians" too
insisted they had initiated the conspiracy . Planning the murder, asserts
Ljubibratic, was Vladimir Gacinovic , a pro-Yugoslav Bosnian nationalist,
who believed killing Austrian leaders would provoke revolution, destroy
the Dual Monarchy , and free Bosnia. In Toulouse, France in January 1 9 1 4
Gacinovic outlined his plan to "Young Bosnian" leaders: first the Arch­
duke, then other Austro-Hungarian civil and military leaders would be
struck down thus rousing the Monarchy's Slavs to revolt.44
Gacinovic selected Princip to kill Franz Ferdinand, afflrmed Lj ubibra­
tic. Meeting him in Sarajevo early in 1 9 1 2 and again in Belgrade that sum­
mer, Gacinovic concluded Princip was determined, reliable and capable.
He proposed that Princip and the Sarajevo teacher, Danilo llic, compose
a plan to kill the Archduke. In February 1 9 1 4 Princip arrived in Belgrade.
Neither he nor his comrades, Cabrinovic and Grabez, joined the "Black
Hand" which barred minors and was no longer recruting members.45
In Belgrade Princip confided to Djuro Sarac, a fellow student at Sara­
jevo gymnasium, and sought his aid to obtain weapons.4' Reading a news­
paper late in March that the Archduke was coming to Sarajevo in June,
Princip assured Cabrinovic that they should murder him. Sarac organized
"Death or Life!", a seven member society resembling the "Black Hand,"
which recruited Bosnian youths and swore them to secrecy . Trifko Grabez,
Princip's roommate, believing the Bosnian maneuvers posed a deadly threat
to Serbia, asked to join the plot. Thus was formed their deadly troika. As
a fmal stimulus to murder, Gacinovic wrote them: "Forward lions!"47
The Bosnian youths decided to seek weapons from Apis' associate,
Major Tankosic. Eventually that gruff guerrilla chieftain, who had spurn­
ed previous requests of the young Bosnians to enlist, relented. Tankosic
trusted Sarac, who acted as the youth's envoy, since he had fought as a
guerrilla under Tankosic in the Balkan wars. Thus Tankosic provided wea­
pons, arranged through frontier officers for their shipment into Bosnia,
and secured Apis' consent. On May 28th the three conspirators had left
Belgrade by boat for Sabac.48
136 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Apis told a "Black Hand" associate, Colonel Cedo Popovic, in 1915
that initially he had accepted Tankosic's proposal to send the young Bos­
nian assassins into Bosnia, explaining:
I was convinced Austria would attack [Serbia J during 1914. I feared
that, believing that in case they attacked we would lose everything.
. . . Our army was almost all scattered in garrisons in southern Serbia
and on the frontiers of prewar Serbia . . . . That fear dominated my
feelings. I began to think what we should do to prevent Franz Ferd­
inand from executing his plans to attack Serbia.
Tankosic told Apis at his office in the General Staff:
Dragutin, there are several Bosnian youths who are pestering me.
Those kids want at any cost to perform some 'great deed.' They have
heard that Franz Ferdinand will come to Bosnia for maneuvers and
have begged me to let them go there. What do you say? . . . I have
told them they cannot go, but they give me no peace.
Apis hesitated. Would the young Bosnians succeed? Even if they did, there
would be complications and agitation, "but we would be saved." Thus
Apis replied: "Fine, Silja. Let them go!" He told Popovic he did not be­
lieve such an assassination would provoke a war.49
But then, affirmed Ljubibratic, Colonel Apis changed his mind:
When I, after some time, thought a little more about this, I decided
to try to return the youths who had left and in every way to prevent
the assassination. This attempt was made through the guerrilla, Djuro
Sarac.
Why the second thoughts? "At that moment," explained Apis, "I believed
that such an attempt could not succeed and that perhaps they would not
even undertake it." Dubious such immature youths could kill the Arch­
duke, Apis wished instead to employ TankosiC's seasoned guerrillas. En­
trusting that enterprise to Malobabic, Apis summoned him to Belgrade and
sent him to see Major Yulovic . So Princip's group would not undercut his
plan, Apis persuaded Sarac to recall Princip and his friends. Saracinstructed
Sarajevo 137
Danilo llic to return the Bosnian youths to Belgrade. Proceeding to Sara­
jevo, llic delivered Sarac's instructions, but Princip and Grabez refused
categorically to abandon their plans. "They did not wish to hear of this,"
Apis told Cedo Popovic.
Thus Apis halted recruitment of new assassins and put Malobabic in
touch with Princip's group. Malobabic met with Grabez at Tuzla, Bosnia.
When Grabez returned to Sarajevo, llic decided to help his young friends,
gave them weapons, and decided where the assassins should station them­
selves in Sarajevo. Alone of the young Bosnians Princip adhered consist­
ently to his resolve to murder the Archduke. When others failed or lost
heart, he c.arried out the assassination coolly. Aided by fortuitous circum­
stances, he killed the Archduke and his wife. At the subsequent investiga­
tion, Princip declared he had acted for revolutionary Yugoslav youth fight­
ing for national liberation. 50
The Sarajevo murder occurred despite the organizers' confusion and in­
decision. The Apis group and "Young Bosnians" both sought to eliminate
the Archduke , though for different reasons. Young Bosnian revolution­
aries led by Princip viewed the murder as inaugurating revolutionary strug­
gle to destroy the Dual Monarchy and free their homeland. Most shared
vague concepts of a republican, egalitarian Yugoslav federation. On the
other hand, Apis sought to prevent or defer an Austrian attack on Serbia
by removing the supposed leader of the war party. Apis believed Franz
Ferdinand's plan to unite South Slavs under the Habsburgs would doom a
Greater Serbia. As an organization "Black Hand" was impotent in 1914,
but Apis retained a powerful hold over key members who were close
friends. His assertion to the Salonika court that he had initiated the con­
spiracy and his agents had implemented it was exaggerated. His nephew's
claim that Apis deserves virtually sole "credit" for the murder was an un­
justified attempt to portray his uncle and friends as Serbian and Yugoslav
martyrs. Both Apis' group and the "Young Bosnians" contributed impor­
tantly to the Archduke's murder, but even without action by Apis, other
Bosnian attempts would likely have occurred. Assertions that Apis planned
the murder in order to overturn the Karadjordjevic dynasty lacked sub­
stance . Apis' actions stemmed rather from misreading Franz Ferdinand's
aims and Austrian intentions, hastening the Austro-Serbian war he had
sought to defer.

CHAPTER XIII
THE AUSTRIAN WAR
( 1 9 1 4-1 9 1 5 )
The Apis I knew at the Supreme Command
did not resemble the picture which the pub­
lic had created of him . He was neither hot­
tempered nor arrogant-he was more what
one calls 'a good comrade.' But one had the
impression that he was not merely that.
Slobodan Jovanovic,Moji savremenici, p. 410
Apis and most other Serbs did not believe war would necessarily result
from the Sarajevo murder. Only when Austria presented its formidable
ultimatum in Belgrade, did conflict appear inevitable . Several times pre­
viously an Austro-Serbian war had seemed unavoidable, notably in 1 909
and 1 9 1 2-13. Conrad von Hotzendorf, Austrian chief of staff, long had
planned to slay the Serbian dragon with one bold stroke . By 1 9 1 4 both
sides viewed their quarrel in apocalyptic terms. Austrian leaders sought to
defend a crumbling monarchy against lethal South Slav nationalism. Serbs
in Serbia and the Dual Monarchy considered it a sacred duty to liberate
and unite all Serbs even at the cost of assassination and war. 1
Until that terrible Austrian ultimatum prudence prevailed in Serbia.
Even ultranationalist Piedmont avoided praising the Sarajevo assassins,
ascribing Princip's action to oppression in Bosnia-Hercegovina. "His
138
The Austrian War 13 9
action is understandable and natural on St. Vitus Day [Vidovdan, the anni­
versary of Kosovo ) , but no one in Serbia has glorified his deed. "2 The
militaristic Archduke, affirmed Piedmont, had disregarded South Slav
aspirations in the Monarchy. Would his death end ·the war party's reck­
less course? " . . . Either Austria must yield to the demands of our demo­
cratic era or disappear," proclaimed the paper. 3
Governor Oskar Potiorek of Bosnia, who narrowly escaped the assas­
sins' bullets, wrote the day after the Archduke's murder: "The true evil­
doers are to be sought in Serbia."2 An Austrian diplomat in Sarajevo re­
ported: "The three young assassins seem to have sought to repeat the
drama of Kosovo Field . . . . I cannot yet blame Belgrade directly for the
murder, but indirectly it s
i surely responsible."3 He found little notice­
able regret in Sarajevo at Franz Ferdinand's death:
In streets and cafes people are exultant . . . saying it is God's judg­
ment for all the bad things Austria-Hungary has done to Serbia.
. . . We must take the first opportunity for a destructive blow
against her to give the Monarchy a fe w decades of calm internal
development . . . . Serbia must learn to fear us again . . . .4
However, it took three weeks before Austrian demands were presented
in Belgrade . Austria's hawks first won unconditional German support and
overcame Hungarian reluctance. Then Baron Giesl, Austria's minister in
Belgrade, submitted a forty-eight hour ultimatum to Serbia. It insisted
among other things that Austrian officials be authorized to track down
the Archduke's killers in Serbia. 5 Returning hastily to Belgrade, Premier
Pa5ic drew up a conciliatory reply accepting most demands. Serbia would
investigate the murder and punish the guilty , but would bar Austrian of­
ficials from its soil.' With Vienna insisting on unconditional Serbian
acceptance of the ultimatum, Minister Giesl, his bags already packed, left
Belgrade immediately, thus sexering diplomatic relations.
After Giesl's departure, Belgrade ordered full Serbian mobilization.
Colonel Apis, realizing now that war was likely, had worked intensively
at the General Staff to insure a smooth mobilization. That same evening
-July 12/25th-all General Staff officers except Apis entrained for inter­
ior Kragujevac, Supreme Command's new headquarters. Other Serbian
officers harangued excited crowds in Belgrade's streets and pro-war
140 APIS : The Congenial Conspirator
demonstrations erupted near the royal palace. Belgrade's arrest of Major
Tankosic, linked with the Sarajevo murder, provoked angry protests. 7 Re­
called Apis:
I was convinced positively the Russians would fight if Austria attack­
ed us. When the ultimatum was submitted, I went to see Tankosic
who was under arrest because of the ultimatum, at the staff of the
Danube Division command. There I told Tankosic, to comfort him,
not to fear because of his arrest, informing him that our brother
Russians would surely fight. 3
Why did Apis not go to Kragujevac immediately with the General Staff?
He affirmed later he had remained in Belgrade an extra day to confer with
his chief agent, Rade Malobabic. Soon after the Sarajevo murder, Rade had
showed up nervous and upset at Vaso RistiC's bank in Tuzla, Bosnia. He
blurted out: "The situation is very critical. I must cross immediately into
Serbia and have come to you for a recommendation on the safest place to
cross."9 He had just come from the murder site.
Malobabic now fell victim to Apis' feud with the Radicals. Apis had
suggested to Rade that "happier times" would soon come for their intel­
ligence operations. Later, the Colonel explained:
I talked with Malobabic about our internal affairs in [May] 1914
when the Priority Decree was under discussion. Both he and I felt
our work was being hampered by our authorities' bad will and for
well-known reasons I was not then well regarded by our authorities.
I told Rade then that I hoped after the planned elections, conditions
for our service would become easier and better. And I said that if
elections were not held, we would use different means. By this I sed the frontier there regularly. Gathering information there about Serbian
meant to bring a major issue before the Crown and seek its support
0
for our common work. 1
Thus Apis was prepared to exploit King Peter's strong obligations toward
the May conspirators to achieve his goals.
Other evidence indirectly supports Apis' claims about official obstruc­
tion of his intelligence work. Early in 1914 Prince Alexander allegedly
sought to bribe Vojvoda Putnik with gold to have Apis, Milovanovic-Pilac,
The Austrian War 141
and other leading conspirators retired from the army . According to his
daughter, Putnik had flatly refused to do that. 1 1 The Prince had told Pilac
that War Minister Dusan Stefanovic, although "stupid" was being kept on
because he did Alexander's bidding. Premier Pasic had supposedly said of
Stefanovic: "A good lad, he obeys everything!" 1 2 About the same time
Interior Minister Protic had admonished Ceda Jovanovic , an Assembly
leader, to cut all ties with Apis; Ceda had refused. 13 On the eve of war
Prince Alexander allegedly thought of having Apis murdered: "The Prince
told me June 16, 1 9 1 4 in the Danube Division's office that in sure hands
a single bullet would remove him." 1 4 However, Pilac was strongly biased
in Apis' favor.
MalobabiC's frenzied activities in June and July 1914 provoked lively
suspicions he might be a double agent. Early in June, Rade had come to
see Dr. Budisavljevic in Zagreb bringing Apis' confidential instructions. "I
told Malobabic all that I knew for communication to Apis," declared
Budisavljevic. Asked whether his dangerous national work had been com­
pensated, Rade said he required no payment. Budisavljevic felt a poor man
like Malobabic should be reimbursed. 1 5
At Salonika Colonel Misic intimated Malobabic in July 1 9 1 4 was spying
for Austria-Hungary . Why else would Malobabic just before war began
cross that frontier sector selected by the Austrian High Command for in­
vading Serbia? Had not he been instructed to reconnoitre Serbian troop
positions and arms depots and report his fmdings to Austria? Apis ex­
plained he had sent Malobabic across the Sava River to Loznica to confer
with Serbian frontier office rs. Rade had passed through that territory
frequently including during the Turkish war when Austria mobilized
in Bosnia. Knowing well agents and people on both sides of the frontier,
Rade did not need to reconnoitre it. Since 191 1 Serbian agents had cros­
troops, argued Apis, would have been a trivial task to assign Malobabic
in 1914. He could have deliv�red far more important information to Aus­
tria, but he would have gone there to observe troop concentrations only
had he been an Austrian agent. "But his past, his connections, and guar­
antees of his honorability from leading Serbs of that lMacvaJ region ex­
clude any such role for him," protested Apis.
Learning from intelligence sources that conflict with Austria seemed
imminen t, Apis had issued necessary instructions to Malobabic. After
142 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
meeting with Apis at the General Staff, Rade went to the Drina to confer
with frontier officers. Returning to Belgrade July 1 2th, the eve of mobil­
ization, he went to Apis' office that afternoon. Apis mentioned casually
to Rade that someone from the Belgrade police had asked for him. Rade
decided to go directly to police headquarters. To insure harmonious rela­
tions with the police, Apis had spoken earlier with Vasa Lazarevic, a police
official, and had described MalobabiC's work in a report to the General
Staff. He believed agreement had been reached, and that the Belgrade
police knew all about Rade. On July 1 2th A pis had arranged to meet with
Rade again next day at Cafe Imperial to work out details of MalobabiC's
wartime operations in Austria-Hungary. That s
i why Apis did not leave
that evening with the General Staff. They needed to arrange secret signals
so Rade could continue coordinating national activities in the Monarchy
and thus enable Serbian intelligence to recruit as agents Serbian soldiers
in the Austrian army.
Colonel Misic clearly remained unconvinced. Would Apis defer vital
work on mobilization just to confer with a supposed agent he seen the
previous day? How could the Austrians not have noticed Malobabic who
had been convicted of treason at the Zagreb Trial? A pis said:
Precisely for me as chief of that [intelligencej service there was
nothing strange about this. My work was truly made possible by
Austrian police stupidity, although they actually believed they were
perfect. I have proofs precisely from those days that the Austrian
police was functioning very poorly against my operations and that
16
our police was much more competent.
Malobabic never met Apis at the Cafe Imperial. Police offic ial Vaso
Lazarevic testified in Salonika that the Belgrade police arrested him that
very evening. Arriving in Belgrade on the last boat from Zemun, Austria,
Rade allegedly had aroused Commissar Prvalovic's suspicions because he
lacked proper papers. But how after the Sarajevo murder could Rade have
crossed into Serbia unhindered without valid documents?, asked MiSic.
Such crossings were possible though dangerous, insisted Apis. People com­
ing to his office from Austria sometimes had lacked them. But without
valid papers Rade had risked his life to cross and bring important data
to Apis. 17
The Austrian War 143
Confirming this, Malobabic said he had brought Apis the latest informa­
tion from Bosnia. The General Staff had already left Belgrade. In the Up­
per Town only Apis awaited him. Afterwards:
When I went to the office of the Belgrade city administration, they
arrested me, then took me under guard to southern Serbia. I had no
way to let Apis know about me. They put fetters on me and bound
me hand and foot. On all fours I lay on the stone floor [of Nis
prison I for a year. There was little food and the guards beat me
cruelly. I had to relieve myself on the floor. My beard grew down to
my waist . . . . A living corpse, 1 beat my head on the floor and
prayed to God to die. Often I howled from pain and my tears
18
flowed because l had never deserved this from Serbia.
Rade's pathetic account has the ring of truth.
When Rade failed to appear, Apis proceeded to Hotel "Balkan" where
he had said he would stay, but the porter told Apis that Rade had not
spent the night there. Fearing Rade's papers might prove compromising
for Serbia, Apis and the porter leafed through them but found nothing
important. Continued Apis:
I could not solve the riddle of Rade's whereabouts, but knowing he
was energetic, I concluded that when he had learned of [Serbianj
mobilization, he had returned to Austria since he knew well what to
do so as not to be prevented absolutely from returning. I was con­
stantly absorbed in such thoughts during the fust phase of military
operations believing Rade or his people would report, but there was
. . . . . 19
no trace of htm
For several months Apis vainly awaited word from Malobabic. Mean­
while his entire intelligence network inside Austria disintegrated.
•
I could not believe that Rade could have any business with the
police . . . knowing that with the police then was Vasa Lazarevic
who knew him and with whom l had spoken about Rade's dual ser­
vice and who Vaso knew was my agent. That is why I did not ask the
police where Rade was, especially since I was to leave that day for
144 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
the General Staff in Kragujevac and had other work to finish before
0
the train left that evening. 2
Apis insisted he had discussed Rade's status also with Colonel Krsta
Srniljanic, chief of the General Staffs military section. However, the
Salonika court stated that the War Minister had found no Apis report
about Malobabic. But in the stenogram of the Salonika Trial, Milan Zi­
vanovic discovered the following exchange between Colonel Misic and
Apis at the session of May 4, 1 9 1 7 had been deleted:
Misic: Colonel, you declared that Krsta Tucakovic as chief of Drina
Region submitted a document relating to Malobabic. You stated that
you submitted a report to the General Staff which was delivered to
the War Ministry in which you asked that the attention of the police
be attracted so as not to hinder Malobabic and to aid the operations
of the General Staff.
Apis: I submitted such a report because I was asked to. Colonel
Krsta Smiljanic . . . knows this. About this I went to Smiljanic and
informed him that this matter related to our activities in Bosnia.
Neither the War Ministry nor the Supreme Command, insisted Misic, had
any record of having received such information.21
The unfortunate Rade had been sucked unwittingly into Apis' quarrel
with the regime. The chief of Drina district, Tucakovic, had designated
Malobabic as suspicious solely because acting on Apis' orders, Rade had
refused to disclose his work for the General Staff.22 Moreover, Tucakovic
had personal and political motives to order Rade's arrest and lie about
Apis' report. Tucakovic testified at Salonika that Malobabic was an Aus­
train spy and double agent. A professional policeman and Radical, Tucako­
vic enjoyed the special confidence of Stojan Protic and Ljubomir Jovano­
vic-Patak, heading the Serbian police. At ProtiC's order Tucakovic as Sabac
district chief investigated how the Archduke's assassins had crossed into
Bosnia, confirming the roles of Apis, Vulovic, and Malobabic-the trio shot
at Salonika. A Serbian volunteer, Atanasije Sredojevic, believed Tucakovic
may have been a foreign {Austrian?) agent. While Tucakovic was district
chief at Obrenovac, Austrian and Bulgar agents had flocked there. He took
them to his apartment, claimed Sredojevic, to divide taxes collected from
The Austrian War 145
Macedonians operating in Serbia. Those same agents tried unsuccessfully
to get Sredojevic to help them counterfeit twenty dinar Serbian gold coins.
After Austria declared war, Tucakovic fled Sabac; precipitously letting
copies of his Sarajevo murder investigation fall into Austrian hands. His
unauthorized flight may have constituted treason since his "carelessness"
provoked a massacre of Serbs in Macva; Austria rewarded him generously .23
Fearing an immediate Austrian strike across the Danube, the Serbian
High Command left for Kragujevac the day of mobilization. But for three
days nothing happened. Prince Regent Alexander remained in his virtually
empty Belgrade palace . On July 15th Djurdje Jelenic, his personal secre­
tary, came from Ralje station with Premier Berchtold's telegram contain­
ing Austria's declaration of war. "A strange way to declare war!" exclaim­
ed the Prince's duty officer, Major DrCISkic. Was this still another attempt
to humiliate Serbia? Quickly they entered the Prince's automobile, drove
to Ralje, then took the train to NiS, Serbia's temporary capital. In the
Assembly next day Prince Alexander read Serbia's own war declaration:
war had begun to liberate and unite all Serbs and Croats. Pledges of sup­
port from Russia and France produced a mood of optimism.24
Conrad van Hotzendorf, Austria-Hungary's chief of staff, ordered Gen­
eral Oskar Potiorek to lead "a military parade" through Serbia to avenge
the Sarajevo murder. With seven army corps on the Drina River with 250,
000 men and 1 ,200 cannon, the ex-Bosnian governor launched the inva­
sion confidently on August 12th. Opposing him were 180,000 Serb
troops with 500 cannon; another 100- 150,000 youths and old men were
in reserve. Sending his main forces along the Jadra valley, Potiorek scored
a tactical surprise . The main Serbian army retired hastily to Valjevo. Ob­
serving with Prince Alexander the Serbs' disorderly retreat, DraSkic won­
dered if they could reach new positions and resist the Austrian surge . The
soldiers seemed poorly trained; some lacked uniforms. Heat and dust were
oppressive. However, Marshal Putnik had calculated correctly. At Cerska
(August 16-19) the overconfident Habsburgers suffered a shocking defeat.
A week later not one Austrian soldier remained inside Serbia! News of this
great victory caused ajubilant Prince Alexander to embrace General Zivojin
MiSic ecstatically. News of the great French victory on the Marne soon
thereafter "encouraged us to believe the war would soon be over."25
Panic reigned in shocked Vienna ; joy and amazement pervaded Allied
countries. Tiny Serbia had gained the first Allied victory of World War I .
146 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
The Entente then demanded that Serbia, to relieve hardpressed Russia,
launch an offensive into Austria. The Serbian army boldly crossed the
Sava and Drina rivers, entering the Srem in triumph before being halted.2'
Meanwhile Colonel Apis had gone to Kragujevac still as the General
Staffs chief of intelligence and head of the information bureau. During
his eight months there Apis' relations with Supreme Commander Prince
Alexander deteriorated until an open breach occurred early in 1915.
Colonel Zivko Pavlovic, Putnik's assistant and chief of the operations
divisions, instructed Colonels Apis and Cedo Popovic to create a guerrilla
volunteer corps. If the enemy penetrated Serbia's interior, it would remain
behind and conduct partisan warfare. Four detachments were to be form­
ed. The first under Major Tankosic, released from confmement once the
war began, would operate near Belgrade, retreating to barren Mt. Rudnik.
Captain Velimir Vemic's detachment would retire into the Golubinjski
Mountains. A third unit under Major Vojin Popovic Vuk would fight first
in Macva, then in Cer and Vidojevic. A fmal detachment led by Cedo
Popovic would resist in Zlatibor and Mt. Jelova. All closely associated
with Apis and "Black Hand," the commanders were experienced guer­
rilla fighters. On July 28th Popovic arrived in Uzice where he and Apis
began organizing the detachments. 27
Reports persisted of plots to kill Apis, so he remained well protected
by officer comrades. Milutin Tomic , later a Salonika witness, claimed he
knew a Montenegrin whom Major Pavle Jurisic-Sturm had approached
in Kragujevac to kill Apis and Milovanovic-Pilac, but the man had refused
the assignment?8 JuriSic-Sturm was prominent in Prince Alexander's
entourage.
In November 1914 embattled Serbia survived another major crisis,
provoked by a second powerful Austrian nvasion.
i Outmanned and out­
gunned, the Serbs fell back deep into the interior. Short of ammunition
and facing a better equipped, confident foe, Marshal Putnik realized Serbia
faced disaster unless artillery shells could be obtained promptly . In Valjevo
convened a meeting of the government and Supreme Command under
Prince Alexander on October 27th. Under existing conditions, warned
Putnik, prospects for successful resistance were slight; Serbia faced a
separate peace or capitulation unless essential supplies were obtair}ed. The
Pa5i6 government then sent desperate appeals to the Entente with dramatic
results. Receiving necessary munitions, Putnik ordered a counteroffensive
The Austrian War
147
which produced a second magnificent Serbian victory on the Kolubara
(November 3-6th). Once again the Austrians were expelled ignominiously
from Serbia. 29
Dr. R. A. Reuss, a pro-Serbian Swiss professor close to the Radical
regime and Prince Alexander, reported from Salonika that he had known
Colonel Apis since the war's beginning:
Extremely pleasant-even too pleasant-he made a strange impres­
sion on me despite his obvious intelligence . I knew what role he had
played in the drama of 1903, and I had a certain distrust of him .
With his sereni ty, this fat officer was a manipulator of men. S.
Jovanovic, who knew him well and with whom I was linked by
friendship, told me one day in the spring of 1 9 1 5 : 'You know, if
1 were chief of state, I would be suspicious of Dimitrijevic . He is a
dangerous man !'
Apis and his friends, asserted Reuss, pretending to be Francophile, before
intimates criticized the Allies bitterly and praised the Germans. 30
Slobodan Jovanovic , serving with the press bureau in Kragujevac, pro­
vided a rather different assessment:
The Apis I knew at the Supreme Command did not resemble the pic­
ture created about him by the public. He was neither hot-tempered
nor arrogant; he was more what one would call 'a good comrade.'
But one had the impression he was not only that.
Many people came to see Apis, continued Jovanovic, some because he re­
mained influential, others just to chat since he always seemed aimiable and
talkative. Sometimes his office resembled a vistors' bureau. Now and then
a political leader came. Ordering no one else admitted, Apis would remain
alone with his prominent visitor. Almost daily at dinner and supper he had
multiple guests. Rather than proceed to the High Command's rather distant
mess in Kragujevac, Apis reserved a small table at a nearby inn for himself,
Jovanovic, and an officer from operations. Their first day there, no sooner
were they seated then a group of officers fresh from the front burst into
the inn shouting: "Where is Lieutenant Colonel Dragutin's table?" Soon
the three diners were surrounded by unexpected officer guests, the table
-
148 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
was extended, and Apis presided as if over a banquet. I t was much the
same later when he arranged for his private mess. Planned for six, it al­
most always served considerably more. Loving company, Apis retained the
knack of stimulating conversation and creating a casual, convivial atmos­
phere. Partial to women and music, he drank only water, remaining sober
in the most bibulous company.
Getting to know Apis well personally and talking with his friends,
Jovanovic came to appreciate his other qualities. Invariably concerned
with his adherents' advancement and reward, he seemingly did not lift a
fmger for himself. Though brave and ambitious, he never blew his own
horn. Apis' efforts for his comrades reflected true friendship and leader­
ship, wrote Jovanovic. His comradeship, especially with military men,
was amazing. By the number of his friends, he resembled a table set for
a wedding banquet. Genuinely fond of his friends, Apis did not spare
them from danger, involving them in the most perilous enterprises. Tllis
dangerous quality in his friendship merely enhanced his attractiveness
and prestige.31
In Nis, the temporary capital, a new coalition cabinet was formed in
December 1914 after the Kolubara victory . Apis apparently took the
initiative for this and the first steps in its realization. 32 Since the outbreak
of war Premier P<lSic had wished to create a coalition regime to divide
responsibility among all Serbian parties. War Minister Stefanovic related
an incident which revealed Apis' persistent political influence. After
negotiating with Opposition leaders to form a coalition, Pasic declared
at a cabinet meeting:
When I made an offer to the leaders of other parties to enter the
gove rnment, they, headed by Lj uba Davidovic [Independent Radi­
t:alj went to Kragujevac to ask Apis. Apis told them they should
enter the government provided that from that government would
be excluded Stojan Protic, Velizar Jankovic, and Colonel Dusan
Stefanovic.
At Pasic's statement, Stojan Protic rose, swore at the "Black Hand" and
left the meeting. 33 Nonetheless, a coalition ministry was installed with
P3Sic remaining premier and foreign minister. Politically colorless Colonel
Radomir Bojovic became war minister. independent Radical chiefs, Milorad
The Austrian War
149
DraSkovic and Ljubomir Davidovic , became ministers of public works
and education respectively. "This new cabinet is stronger than the last
and should command the support of the whole Skupstina," reported the
British minister. Indeed, the Assembly approved 3.tmost unanimously the
new government's statement known as the Nis Declaration: Serbia's duty
is "to ensure the successful issue of this great struggle . . . for the libera­
tion and union of all our enslaved brothers, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes."34
What caused Colonel Apis' fateful breach early in 1915 with Prince
Alexander? Later, on Corfu to Slobodan Jovanovic the Prince enumerated
Apis' shortcomings and alluded to informants' denunciations which prob­
ably were more significant. In the army, Alexander heard, Apis was called
"the second heir to the throne" without whose advice Alexander dared do
nothing. Though not offended by Apis' refusal to pay him court, the
Prince was dismayed that among Serbian officers he enjoyed a prestige
Alexander still lacked, threatening his position as Serbia's future king.
Instead of following A pis' instructions, the Prince found himself heeding
the Colonel's advice, thus reinforcing his own insecurity . Zivkovic, the
omnipresent intriguer, exploited this cleverly . Apis had engineered one
royal murder, warned Pera. Might not Alexander be his next victim unless
he eliminated him?
In Kragujevac Apis' position was much weaker than before. On poor
terms with the Radicals and Prince Regent, he soon had to fight on two
fronts. King Peter, beholden to Apis, was semi-retired. Marshal Putnik,
Apis' chief supporter at the Supreme Command, was absorbed in daily
operations, frequently ill, and avoided personal involvements. Among
civilians Apis had few true adherents. His influence in the army waned
as the merciless scythe of war cut down his friends. As old comrades were
killed, their junior replacements lacked influence. For younger ambitious
�fficers, Apis was a dimming star. Those seeking advancement shifted
mexorably from him to the Prince Regent.35
TriSa Kaclerovic, a Socialist politician then in Kragujevac, one day
asked Laza Kostic, Apis' relative, how Apis was feeling. Fine physically ,
replied Laza, but his relations with Prince Alexander had grown un­
�leasant . Perplexed, Kaclerovic queried Apis at dinner. "Nothing special ,
JUst some disagreements," responded the Colonel curtly. Soon Kaclerovic
learned that Apis, after a quarrel with Alexander, had been transferred
to the Uzice Army. · A pis refused to discuss this in detail commenting
150 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
The Austrian War
151

��
enigmatically that once the war was over, they would settle ac unts.
After Kolubara the Serbian army, despite grievous losses and epidemics,
.
Delivered in Apis' offhand manner, this failed to dece1ve KacleroVIc who
remained a potent fighting force. Colonel Foumier, French military at­
warned: "1 fear, Dimitrijevic, that it is you who will remember Alex-
tache, reported in March 1 9 1 5 that Serbia still hl!d 238 battalions with
ander!"3'
180,000 men arrayed against Austria and another 55 ,000 men in Mace­
Thus, at the Prince's insistence, Apis was removed from Supreme Com-
donia. "This represents the Serbs' total and final resources." With morale
mand in March 1 9 1 5 and named chief of staff of the Uzice Army con­
remaining excellent "the Serbian army is still capable of great things."39
tairling only two brigades. With such feeble forces, even had he wished to,
Six months later that picture had changed little though in fourteen months
Apis could not have overturned the regime. Prince Alexander, noted
of war against a superior foe, over 1 1 0,000 Serb troops had been killed or
J ovanovic, though physically brave, had weak nerves. He could not stand
put out of action. 40
having near him men he feared or disliked. His entourage supplied Alex­
Abroad, the Pasic government still cultivated its strong ties with Petro­
ander daily with reports denouncing Apis. Even small comradely dinners
grad. Grand Prince Nikolai Nikolaevich, Russia's corrunander-in<hief,
at Apis' private mess were conjured into conspiratorial gatherings. The
giving warm support, emphasized Serbia would be richly rewarded after
realization that Apis lived in the same town and served in the same com­
Allied victory. Serbia need not worry about Bulgaria, he noted, since Italy
mand finally grew unbearable for the Prince.37
and Rumania would soon join the Entente.41 But to bring Italy into the
Major DraSkic, his loyal duty officer, described Alexander's entourage
war, the Allies that spring promised her Adriatic regions claimed by Serbia
then. Despite DraskiC's membership in "Black Hand," the Prince liked
and inhabited largely by South Slavs. Impatient at Serbian objections,
and valued him, telling Prince Paul: "That Panta is my shadow. He does
France's ambassador in Petrograd admonished Serbia's minister. Spalajkovic:
not leave me day or night. Any other person in that position would vex
me, but he is never tiresome." Dominating the entourage, "White Hand"
France entered the war to preserve Serbia's independence and inter­
leaders wanted Draskic replaced, but the Prince retained him until the
ests, not to realize all the ideals of Serbdom and Slavdom . Serbia will
Salonika Trial . Heading Alexander's staff was Colonel Djordje Ostojic,
receive a significant territorial increase and an outlet to the sea, but
intelligent, honorable, and non-partisan, who consistently told the Prince
France cannot fight because of Dalmatia.
the truth. Personal secretary Djurdje Jelenic though was a typical "White
Hander." Amoral and critical of everyone, Jelenic cursed Premier Pa5ic in
French sympathies thus far had lain with Serbia, but "you can easily lose
cafes and hated the "Black Hand." He filled the palace kitchen and cellar
them unless you take account of others' interests . . . . "42 Russian For­
with friends and relatives to shield them from service at the front. Boast­
eign Minister Sazonov insisted Serbia yield to Italy over the Adriatic while
ing of his indispensability, Jelenic had little real influence. Once Peter
defending Pa5ic as indispensable. "1 cannot say that all the wishes of some
Zivkovic arrived in Kragujevac, "White Hand" meetings convened regularly
exalted Serbian patriots will be realized," added Sazonov, "but I am cer­
in a Guards barracks; Jelenic was always present. They were already laying
tain you will get as much territory as you would normally acquire in a
the groundwork for a long anticipated showdown with Apis. Assisting
hundred years."43
Zivkovic run the Guards and "White Hand" was Lieutenant Colonel Pavle
In the Uzice Army Apis as chief of staff formed a Bosnian volunteer
Jurisic-Sturm, severely wounded at Cerska. Brave and ambitious, but shal­
battalion. Troops from various other units formed at Uzice three opera­
low and conceited, Jurisic drew up for Alexander's signature a list of of­
tive divisions. When Apis arrived there in early 1 9 1 5 , he found the rem­
ficers to be decorated including his brother and all his friends. The army
nant of Vemic's guerrilla detachment guarding army headquarters. Just
learned Jurisic had omitted deliberately many deserving officers proposed
. promoted to full colonel, Apis recalled: "We had to prepare immediately
by the1r
. umt commanders. 38

•
152 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
for our offensive and the Uzice Army was designated for operations to­
wards Sarajevo." A well-organized Bosnian volunteer force would assist
such an operation. With Supreme Command's approval, Apis recruited
Bosnian refugees who had withdrawn with Serbian forces, expanding a
platoon of partisans into a battalion. "I tried especially to recruit into this
unit Serbian Muslims from Bosnia, obtaining many from TankosiC's de­
tachment."""
By early 1 9 1 5 over 1 ,000 Bosnians were serving reluctantly in Austrian
garrisons. Anxious to assist in Bosnians liberation, they established links
with Narodna Odbrana and ''Black Hand," partly through the Serbian
embassy in Rome. Favoring their cause was Dusan Marinkovic, a Serbian
intellectual. Learning of his plans to foster the Bosnian liberation move­
ment in UZice, Minister of Police Jovanovic-Patak sought unsuccessfully
to induce him to gather incriminating information there about Apis. In
Uzice Marinkovic met Apis who received him warmly. Showing deep in·
terest in political conditions in occupied Bosnia, Apis revealed detailed
knowledge of events there. Marinkovic found Apis' young officers enthu­
siastic and hopeful about liberating Bosnia and other Serbian regions:
In these people I saw only enthusiastic patriots. I did not dream that
official [Radical] circles regarded them differently. I saw in Apis
and his friends people with wholly sincere intentions and discerned
nothing of which they were later accused. I knew there was nothing
suspicious about their ties with Bosnia.45
About that time Colonel Bozin Sirnic learned that a national activist
was languishing in NiS prison and concluded it must be Malobabic. Major
Vulovic found him there. Much agitated by Rade's lamentable physical
condition, he telephoned Apis who urged his army commander to release
Malobabic into his custody . Passing through channels, Apis' report ulti­
mately reached the Council of Ministers. In Zajecar Apis finally received
the reply that Rade's case was still under investigation.46 He was still
rotting in Nis prison when Bulgaria attacked Serbia that October.
CHAPTER XIV
ALBANIAN GOLGOTHA ( 1 9 1 5 )
Going along the paths through Albania sticks
in hand, men resembled sufferers who retain­
ed of all their property only a beggar's staff.
In that crowd I suddenly saw Apis. He was
tottering along on his uncertain legs, sup­
ported by a huge cane corresponding to his
weight.
S. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, p. 4 1 7
Until the fall of 1 9 1 5 the outnumbered Serbian armies defended their
country successfully against the Austrians, chasing them twice from Serb­
ian soil. General Potiorek, leader of those invasions, was then removed, his
health shattered. In the Austrians' wake a typhus epidemic carried off
over 130,000 Serbian soldiers and civilians. The Serbian army lacked
doctors, weapons, even clothing. Outnumbered more than two to one,
i t was even more inferior in artillery and fuepower. Then in the fall of
1 9 1 5 powerful Austro-German armies in the north and Bulgar forces in
the east all attacked Serbia.. As chief of staff of the new Timok Army,
Colonel Apis played a controversial part in a campaign ending with the
terrible retreat through Albania and Montenegro to the Adriatic Sea.
During 1 9 1 5 Serbia's allies sought to induce 1 taly and Balkan neu trals
-Bulgaria, Greece, and Rumania-to join the Entente. By the secret Treaty
15 3
'
154 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
of London (April 1 9 1 5 ) Italy agreed. Concluded without consulting Serbia,
it promised Italy parts of Dalmatia inhabited largely by South Slavs. To
lure Bulgaria into their camp, the Allies offered it Macedonian territories
annexed to Serbia in 1912-1913. In return after flnal victory Serbia would
receive Austria-Hungary's South Slav provinces: Bosnla, Hercegovina,
Slavonija, and the rest of Dalmatia. 1
In NiS the Pasic government faced a grave dilemma. Realizing combined
Austro-German-Bulgar assaults were likely, Pasic warned the Allies repeat­
edly of this danger but found them oblivious. Pasic had always relied
heavily on Russia's support, especially during World War I. In an extrem­
ity he might flout Franco-British advice, but never would he disobey
Petrograd. While dubious of Allies assurances about Bulgaria's neutrality ,
Pasic believed that if Serbia were attacked, the Allies would assist her
promptly and effectively. At first Pa5ic resisted Allied demands that Serbia
pledge Macedonian territory to Bulgaria. Facing losses on the Adriatic to
Italy, he argued, Serbia required Aegean access through the Greek port
of Salonika. Finally , under intense Allied pressure , he sought only the
Prilep areas so as to give Serbia a common frontier with Greece, but the
Allies insisted Serbia offer Bulgaria all Macedonian lands promised to her
in 1 9 1 2. Still protesting vigorously, PaSic consented adding the Allies
treated Serbia "like an African colony."2 Thus Pa5ic revealed again his
mortal fear of antagonizing Russia. 3
Serbian political and military leaders convened in Kragujevac on August
26, 1 9 1 5 . Beforehand Premier Pasic asked Marshal Putnik to outline Ser­
bia's military options. An Austro-German assault probably could be repel­
led, replied the Marshal , but if Bulgaria attacked too, Serbia would require
major assistance from Greece and the Allies. The Serbian Command pre­
ferred to fight Bulgaria rather than yield Serbian Macedonia. Relying on
Allied assurances, Pasic informed the Supreme Command September
2nd: "It seems that Bulgaria will not attack us." Only four days later
Bulgaria promised the Central Powers to invade Serbia five days after the
Austro-German offensive began! For their two front assault the Central
Powers had about 600,000 men with 1,656 cannon. Serbia and Monte­
negro could muster less than half as many.''
Serbian military leaders urged the NiS government to authorize a pre­
emptive strike if Bulgaria began to mobilize. The Supreme Command con­
centrated additional forces near Bulgaria's frontier. With its troops battle
Albania n Golgotha 155
ready, Serbia almost surely could have disrupted Bulgaria's mobilization
and defeated her in a few days. Instead the Allies admonished the Serbs
to concentrate against Austro-German forces in th� north. The Bulgars
would not dare attack, declared the Allies, and if they did, the Allies
would aid Serbia promptly. Russia opposed strongly any Serbian strike
against her beloved Bulgars. 5
When Bulgaria ordered mobilization, Marshal Putnik begged his govern­
ment to induce the Allies to halt a move clearly prefatory to an attack on
Serbia. Putnik proposed a twenty-four hour ultimatum to Sofia to halt
mobilization. If that were rejected, the Serbs should invade Bulgaria from
the west, Greece and Anglo-French forces from the south, and Russian
troops from the east. Adopting Putnik's plan, PaSic telegraphed Serbia's
envoys in Allied capitals urging such a course, adding: "Our Supreme Com­
mand refuses responsibility for the catastrophe which will ensue inevit­
ably if we do not act seriously and swiftly . . . . " At first France and
Russia, though refusing troops, seemed favorably inclined, but Britain re­
jected the Serbian plan categorically and drew its partners along. Without
Allied approval, Pasic and Putnik felt compelled to abandon a Serbian
preemptive attack.
Thus the Allies were partially responsible for the highly unfavorable
balance of forces faced by Serbia in October 1 9 1 5 . They had believed mis­
takenly they could win over Bulgaria by promising her some of Serbian
Macedonia. But Bulgaria's King Ferdinand, a German prince from Saxe­
Coburg, had decided much earlier to join the Central Powers if they ac­
cepted his territorial demands. 7 Victory would bring him all Macedonia
and perhaps eastern Serbia too. Ferdinand, the Serbophobe, parleyed with
the Allies only to conceal his true aims. By vetoing a Serbian preemptive
strike , the Allies had doomed Serbia to fight a hopeless two front war
and prevented a Serbian retreat southward. So slowly and halfheartedly
did they aid Serbia that their Balkan front against Bulgaria was formed
only after Serbia lay virtually conquered.
While pro-Allied Premier Alexander Venizelos of Greece encouraged
Allied action, France on September 1st first confirmed formally its inter­
est in sending troops to Salonika. on September 23rd, the day after Bul­
garia proclaimed mobilization, Lord Grey, the British Foreign Secretary,
noted that the Greeks and Serbian premiers had appealed for 1 50,000
Allied troops in order to coax Greece and Rumania into the war. The
156 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
British cabinet calculated, however, that 300,000 Allied troops and the
Greek army would be required for Serbia to resist a two-pronged inva­
sion and protect communications between her armies and Salonika. Such
an Allied expedition would seek to draw neutrals into the war, save Serbia,
and prevent Austro-German forces from linking up with the Turks. On
September 28th Paris decided to send troops to Salonika immediately; the
British concurred reluctantly. Two Allied divisions landed there October
5th. But pro-German King Constantine of Greece assured the Bulgars pri­
vately Greece would not oppose their invasion of Serbia, and Premier
Venizelos' sudden resignation after a quarrel with the King threatened
the entire Allied endeavor. 8
Dismissing objections by Pasic and the Supreme Command to a preemp­
tive strike at Bulgaria, the Apis group argued that Serbian forces could
have occupied Sofia, and knocked Bulgaria out of the war. With King
Ferdinand discredited, Alexander Stamboliski, the popular Agrarian leader
could have been released from confmement. For minor territorial conces­
sions a new Stamboliski goverrunent would likely have joined the Allies,
aborting the Austro-German offensive. Once Rumania and perhaps Greece
had joined the Entente, Serbia could have recovered her strength and con­
centrated wholly against the Austro-Germans. Surely the Allies would
have applauded a Serbian occupation of Sofia, argued the Apis faction.
At such crucial moments, it affirmed, bold action is imperative, success is
the sole criterion. Apis and his men blamed indecision by Pasic and the
Supreme Command for Serbia's subsequent conquest. 9
PaSic had counted on aid from Greece which had pledged military as­
sistance to Serbia against a common foe (presumably Bulgaria) if the Serbs
provided 1 50,000 men. With Serbia unable to spare such forces for the
Bulgarian front, Venizelos had persuaded France and Britain to supply
them. Lord Grey had declared in the House of Commons that if Bulgaria
attacked "England's friends" in the Balkans, Britian would aid them un­
reservedly. Understandably, Pasic interpreted this as a binding British com­
mitment to Serbia. But once Venizelos resigned, any idea of Greek aid to
Serbia ended, and King Constantine opposed having any Allied troops on
Greek soil. The French and British had to recast their plans for a Salonika
front. Could 150,000 Allied troops now be sent in?10
That was Serbia's perilous plight when Fieldmarshal August von Mack­
ensen launched a massive Austro-German offensive in the north precisely
Albanian Golgotha 157
at noon September 22/0ctober 5 with overwhelming force and a wither­
ing artillery barrage. Germany aimed to destroy Serbia and link up with
the Ottoman Turks. Powerful enemy forces crossed �he Sava River, report­
ed the French military attache in Serbia next day, penetrating the Macva
11
region near Mitrovica. On October 1st without a preliminary declaration
of war, Bulgaria attacked Serbia along the entire eastern front. Held up
initially by tough resistance by the Serbian Second and Timok armies,
further south the Bulgars penetrated deeply and soon severed Serbia's
12
lifeline to Salonika. By mid-October Serbia faced overwhelming enemy
forces with little prospect of timely aid.
When the Bulgars attacked, Colonel Apis was in Zajecar near the border.
The headquarters of the new Tirnok (formerly Uzice) Army had just been
shifted there. As the Bulgars advanced, soon from jittery NiS, belfagged in
expectation of arriving Allied troops, War Minister Rade Bojovic telephoned
Apis about the fate of the hardpressed Knjaievac. Speaking with Bojovic,
Apis pressed for MalobabiC's immediate release from Nis prison. "Don't
worry about anything," replied Bojovic, 'just hold on well there, and 1
will release Rade." Days later the Timok Army retreated westward pre­
venting Apis then from ascertaining his chief agent's fate.
Retiring to avoid encirclement, the Timok Army took up temporary
headquarters in Kursumlije. Also there was the Third Army staff where
Apis' close friend, Major Vulovic, was serving. Finding Malobabic in Kur­
sumlije free but under police surveillance, Vulovic obtained his uncondi­
tional release by signing a receipt on October 3 1 st. As chaos enveloped
threatened Kursurnlije, the police, grabbing VuloviC's receipt, gladly hand­
ed Rade over; Vulovic brought him straight to Apis . He and Vulovic were
appalled at MalobabiC's physical condition. Fettered to the prison floor
for over a year, Rade was covered with infected wounds. Embracing this
human derelict, Apis confided that the Serbs faced desperate problems.
"Seeing him completely wrecked physically and facing death, l urged him
to await the enemy in Kursumlije." But Rade implored him piteously not
to abandon him to Austrian vengeance. He preferred to go with the Serbs
even if he died on the retreat. "My resolve from that moment," testified
Apis later, "since 1 considered myself morally responsible, was to save this
person at any cost if I possibly could from the enemy and from death."
Apis arranged a ride for Rade to Prizren, then brought him a horse . Apis
and Bosnian volunteers loaded Rade on this steed, caring for him on the
158 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
difficult retreat to Orae. He arrived there very ill, so Apis persuaded Dr.
Velickovic of the Serbian medical corps to evacuate Rade to Corfu with
the wounde d. His efforts saved Malobabic from capture or death.13
Under relentless enemy pressure, the Serbian armies' position deter­
iorated rapidly. Premier Pasic on October 1 1 th had reported optimisti­
cally that the Serbs were repelling the Austro-Germans and that Allied
aid was imminent, but by the 22nd the British envoy reported: "The
situation on our front is more and more critical owing to lack of suf­
ficient troops." As the Germans advanced southward irresistibly, the
Bulgars pressed in from the east. The Serbian armies faced encirclement.
Pleaded the Pasic government:
If at the latest in ten days 1 1 4,000 to 1 50,000 Allied troops arrive
to aid us . . . we might prevent the Bulgar advance and await arrival
of more help . . . . We beg the Allied representatives to urge their
governments to help us . . . . If Serbia is crushed, the Allies will
require many more troops to vanquish our enemy in the Balkans.
. . . We have done all that we can. 14
"Skoplje is in Bulgar hands," Sir Ralph Paget reported next day. "The
position in the north also seems less favorable." Even a British brigade, he
pleaded, would raise Serbian morale. Admitting the situation was grave ,
Pasic still hoped vigorous Allied attacks from the south could repel the
Bulgars, retake Skoplje, and restore railway links between Salonika and
Serbia. 1 5
Allied efforts were tardy and feeble. Venizelos' fall had undermined
Franco-British efforts. British military specialists, concluding Allied aid
would arrive too late, wrote Serbia off. Lord Grey explained lamely that
he had promised to aid Greece if it joined the Allies, not Serbia. Later,
Paul Cambon, French ambassador in London , accused the Allies of com­
mitting "an unpardonable blunder" by vetoing Marshal Putnik's plan to
attack Bulgaria." On October 28th the Allies had only 5 1 ,000 men in
their Salonika force with one more French division en route. The British
contingent was not equipped for an active campaign. Concluded leaders
in London:
Albanian Golgotha 1 59
The disappearance of the Serbian army, however regrettable it may
be in itself, is of small military importance . . . . Victory (in World
War I ) can only be gained by the Allies defeating Germany, and any
diversion of forces from the theatre of war in France and Flanders to
the Near East is prejudicial to the Allied cause . . . . The numbers
despatched should be reduced to a minimum.
The British public shared French empathy for Serbia, but "military ques­
tions cannot profitably be governed by sentiment." The British General
Staff then opposed any major campaigns based on Salonika. 17
The British War Council and Cabinet, however, yielded grudgingly to
French insistence that Serbia be rescued, if the British role remained de­
fensive. Allied operations were not to be conducted beyond the Monastir­
Skoplje-l shtip-Salonika line and then only to restore links with the Serbian
army. If that operation failed, concluded London, Allied forces should be
wholly withdrawn. 1 3 British officers emphasized how exposed were
advanced Allied units supplied by a single Greek-controlled railway line.
If Serbian resistance collapsed, the Allies would face military disaster. 19
With their small forces and hesitancy, the Allies never envisioned the deci­
sive action Serbia required .
Abandoning Nis on October 29th, the Serbian government and diplo­
matic corps fled westward to Raska and Kosovska Mitrovica as the
Supreme Command announced the Bulgars had captured Kacanik Gorge
between Skoplje and Kosovska Mitrovica. The Serbian armies seemed
hopelessly penned in. Fighting desperately day and night, they managed
to withdraw onto Kosovo plain. Once again Serbia had succumbed to
an invader. 20
On a gloomy day in early November the entire army gathered at Ko­
sovo, recalled assistant railway inspector, Stefan Trifunovic. Morale was
sinking fast; all military reports were discouraging. The enemy kept pres­
sing in irresistibly. In this cheerless si tuation Colonel Apis, spying Trifuno­
vic at Urosevac station, came up: "Trifunovic , have you heard anything
about the French? Will they come and when?" Trifunovic in October had
traveled from Skoplje to Djevdjelije to await the first French detachment.
Entering Strumica he had seen some twenty military trains unload. Apis'
eyes shone with joy. "If only somehow I could obtain a report on how
many Frenchmen have so far reached our territory from Salonika; I would
160 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
give it immediately to Dobrivoje (Nikolajevic] ." Nikolajevic, head of the
telegraph service, promptly informed Trifunovic that many French trains
with war materiel and troops had already arrived. Trifunovic rushed hap­
pily to see Apis in his office in a railway car. Timok Army commander,
General Gojkovic, was with him. Embracing Trifunovic, Apis exclaimed:
"Listen, this is a valuable document and will bring joy to us all. I ask you
to communicate it immediately to all your railway workers." Continued
Apis:
You know that it will be a great good fortune for us if the entire
army knows of the arrival of the French since it will raise the morale
of the troops, and the army will begin the journey to Albania in
larger numbers. The way it is now many are abandoning their units
21
and fleeing.
. not retreat southward and would have to retire through Albania and
Desperately, Apis and the others counted on a powerful Allied offen-
sive . One Serbian minister appealed to the Allies:
. . . Serbia has now struggled for more than six weeks on every front,
day and night, without respite, isolated, invaded on all sides, threat­
ened with annihilation, and exhausted by her desperate efforts
against superior and ever increasing enemy forces.22
Without immediate Allied aid the Supreme Command considered the situa­
tion grim: "The attempt to break through via Skoplje faces certain
failure ."23
Serbia's government and Supreme Command crowded into tiny Raska,
a cradle of Serbian civilization. After capturing Kacanik Gorge and driving
back the Second Army, the Bulgars threatened to cut off the Serbs' retreat.
Fieldmarshal von Mackensen, thrice having nearly encircled Serbia's north­
ern armies, had pressed the Belgrade defense force into Jakovica ravine.
The only escape route apparently had been severed. Gloom prevailed in
the Supreme Command. Marshal Putnik lay ill , so the crucial decisions
fell to his assistant, Colonel Zivko Pavlovic. Miraculously he found the
key. The Second Army repulsed the Bulgars at Leskovac, capturing their
artillery . All three Serbian armies then escaped without losing a single unit.
Leaving PavloviC's office, Prince Alexander exclaimed joyfully to Major
Albanian Golgotha 161
DraSkic, his duty officer: "All the others were shitting from fear. Only
Zivko (Pavlovic) was self-possessed, tireless and coolheaded."24
Marshal Putnik ordered the Timok Army to try and penetrate Bulgar­
controlled Kacanik Gorge, retake Skoplje, and join up with the Allies
which he still believed were advancing to meet the Serbs. November 4-7
the Timok troops, in an operation planned partly by Apis, with tremen­
dous effort in execrable weather struggled up the heights, forced the Bul­
gars to evacuate positions dominating the gorge, and captured Mt. Zegavic.
A French attack might have defeated the Second Bulgar Army and cap­
tured Skoplje. But the French could not advance, so reluctantly the
Supreme Command ordered the Timok Army and other troops to break
off the battle."i!S
The Serbian government had explained to the Allies that unless the
Timok Army could break through and link up with them, the Serbs could
Montenegro.2' Next day from Prizren the Supreme Command issued its
last directive from Serbian soil:
. . . The subsequent retreat of our army must be carried out through
Montenegro and northern Albania to the Adriatic shore to the line
of Drac-Skadar, leaving the necessary forces to close routes leading
from Pec, Djakovica, Prizren, Debra and Struga . . . to the Adriatic.
On that line our army is to be reorganized and supplied with food,
clothing, weapons and munitions . . . . Our subsequent action will
depend on the condition of our army as well as on the general politi­
cal and military situation of our allies.
All artillery and vehicles which could not make this difficult retreat were
to be destroyed. Since morale and discipline had deteriorated, comman­
ders must explain and justify the retreat. Serbia had sacrificed and suffer-
ed too much to yield: .
Capitulation would be the worst situation . . . and would doom
us completely . . . . The country has not lost its existence . . . as long
as there are the ruler, the government and the army . . . . Persuade
everyone this retreat is a national necessity . . . . In these difficult
days our salvation lies in endurance, patience and extreme sacrifice
162 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
by all with belief in our allies' victory. Thus we must hold out to the
end.27
Top Serbian military leaders convened in Pec to decide how to imple­
ment this order. Food was lacking; personnel and horses were exhausted;
soldiers were fleeing en masse ; and deserters were seling
l their weapons to
the Albanians, stated Milovanovic-Pilac's minutes. 23 Civilian refugees
mingled with troops on clogged roads. Even slight enemy pressure com­
bined with winter, mountains, hunger, and attacks by Albanian tribesmen
could make the situation hopeless.29
Serbia's path to Golgotha led through formidable mountains and ice­
choked goat paths of Montenegro and Albania to the Adriatic. The Serbian
army by mid-November had vanished like a phantom into mountain fast­
nesses. The troops, some almost barefoot, were buffeted by cold rain, sleet,
and wind driven snow. They took only the food they .could carry on foot
or horseback. Before Lj um Kula the roads, crowded with artillery and
vehicles, turned into bogs of clinging mud. There all artillery, automobiles,
and heavy baggage were destroyed except for a few horse-carried mount­
ain guns. 30
Under a foreboding Novembersky officers and men faced the looming
mountains hungry, cold, and tired. Struggling along Albania's paths, as­
sisted by sticks or canes, recalled Slobodan J ovanovic , "men resembled
sufferers retaining of all their property only a beggar's staff." In a miser­
able crowd of retreating soldiery he suddenly spied Colonel Apis:
He was tottering along on his uncertain legs,31 supported by a huge
cane corresponding to his weight. He looked immense with two
mackintoshes thrown over his heavy military overcoat.
In that stumbling throng J ovanovic managed only a brief talk with Apis.
The Albanian retreat, he said, was the best available alternative. He had
feared Pasic could lose heart and sue for a separate peace. Military defeat,
Apis pointed out, could be overcome, capitulation could not. "These
words revealed his patriotism but also his extreme mistrust of Pasic ," con­
cluded Jovanovic.32
Pasic and his ministers traveled to the coast in comfort careful to stay
ahead of the enemy. They endured silent or vocal reproaches of Serbian
Albanian Golgotha 163
soldiers ascribing this disaster to Pasic's failure to preempt Bulgaria's mobil­
ization. King Peter and Marshal Putnik, ill but resolved to share their
troops' hardships, were carried across Albania's mountains. Even in this
terrible time tension simmered between the Prince Regent's court and the
"Black Hand." General Jordan Stajic told Major DraSkic: early in the re­
treat Apis stood in an automobile in his havelock with the ever present
cigarette in his teeth. Saying something to Court Marshal Ostojic, Apis
stared angrily into his face and approached very close to him. Backing
away from the massive colonel, Ostojic had his hand on his revolver?3
As the Serbian army retreated, the Allies prepared to liquidate their
Balkan involvement. Stated a British cabinet report:
The General Staff without hesitation urges vacating Salonika as
quickly as possible . . . . All further transport of troops to Salonika
should be instantly stopped and all Allied troops in Serbia should
at once be withdrawn to Salonika and evacuation of Salonika should
proceed as fast as possible.
Great danger faced Allies forces still n
i Macedonia, stated a report to the
i grave risk that the enemy can cut off
Cabinet two weeks later: "There s
our army and isolate it from Salonika. Allied forces both in Serbia and
Salonika are in extraordinary danger. Reembarcation must be begun at
once."34
Supreme Command's directive on retreat to the Adriatic exposed the
battered Serbian anny to incredible privations. It could easily have dis­
solved into a leaderless mob. But that rarely occurred. Some soldiers sur­
rendered or deserted, but most retained resolute belief in eventual victory .
The Timok Army of Apis, in better shape than most units, retreated
through Albania in constant contact with the enemy, preventing a Bulgar
breakthrough at Elbasan and thus enabling other units to retreat. It pro­
tected the port of Drac (Durazzo) where food supplies were landed and
from which some units were evacuated. Timok troops also guarded units
retiring toward Skadar (Scutari) and Ljes. Defending the approaches to
Orae until February 9, 1 9 1 6 , they were the last Serbian units to evacuate
the mainland. Retreating Serbian forces reached the Skadar-Drac line pre­
scribe d by the Supreme Command by early January. The last Serbian units
left Montenegro after its capitulation. The emaciated Serbs, still resisting,
awaite d food and evacuation at Albanian ports?5
164 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
There was one disgraceful exception to that rule. When the Timok
Army commander ordered the Cavalry Division, resting in Kavaja, to re­
lieve exhausted troops defending Drac, the divisional commander and
four regimental commanders flatly refused. Allegedly, the Division's per­
sonnel and horses were too tired. But they were much better off than
those still on the line. Masterminding this flagrant insubordination was
regimental commander, Colonel Peter Zivkovic . He initiated the refusal
and persuaded the others to go along. Because Zivkovic was protected by
Prince Alexander, the disobedient officers later received only a month's
suspended prison sentence! The Prince refused to allow his indispensable
friend and "White Hand" leader to be branded a coward for evading duties
which half dead soldiers were performing loyally. 36
During December Skadar became headquarters for top Serbian leaders
and the Supreme Command. Pasic and his ministers arrived November
28th, Prince Alexander two days later, then the diplomatic corps, King
Peter, Vojvoda Putnik and his staff. Slobodan Jovanovic and two officers
were the first from the Supreme Command to reach that port. After the
rugged, empty region they had traversed, Skadar was like the promised
land. Dogs were barking and spring beckoned in the fresh sea air. The
whole town with its lovely Catholic church was orderly and charming.
Once in Skadar Alexander and Pasic, keeping the cabinet unchanged, re­
placed the entire Supreme Command. Pasic threw all blame for catastrophe
on the military. Relieved abruptly of his duties, ostensibly to recover his
health abroad, Marshal Putnik yielded to his assistant, Colonel Pavlovic .
The Prince and Pasic evidently considered the old Vojvoda an obstacle
in their path. 37
As Prince Alexander and his entourage approached Skadar they heard
the distant thunder of Austrian naval guns bombarding Allied ships carry­
ing food to nearby San Giovarmi for starving Serbian soldiers. Skadar and
San Giovanni were bombed daily by enemy planes. In Skadar Prince Alex­
ander fell ill, was operated on, and remained there a month recuperating.
Even while lying ill, he sought to save Serbian soldiers by caring for them
at his palace. Then an Italian motor launch took him to Drac where he
expedited evacuation of Serbian troops. Alexander's prestige then was un­
equalled among Serbs.38
The Serbian army could not be reorganized n
i Albania as Supreme
Command had hoped. French military attaches, Fournier and Fran9ois,
Albanian Golgotha 165
recognized that swift Allied evacuation of the Serbs by sea was indispen­
sable. The army had disintegrated, telegraphed Fran9ois; it lacked food,
munitions, and supplies. If the enemy pressed fo�ard, the remnants
would be destroyed or captured and Serbia forced to yield. "The only
solution," agreed Fournier, " . . . is to transport the remnants . . . to an
island or to Italy where it can be reconstituted."39
Colonel Apis' role in the retreat remains disputed. His partisans affirm
that he executed all orders and displayed great generosity to his col­
leagues. When the Timok Army's staff halted at Suva Reka, recalled
Major Nicholas Arandjelovic, the food situation was critical. Major Vojin
Maksimovic, chief supply officer, reported this to Apis as chief of staff;
they quarreled heatedly. Friendly with both, Arandjelovic calmed them
down and they proceeded more calmly to Drac. There Apis assessed for
General Gojkovic the performance of all staff members during the retreat.
Maksimovic, he affirmed, had been an exemplary, irreplacable supply of­
ficer, praise which brought tears of joy to MaksimoviC's eyes. Apis' com­
ments were the more remarkable since Maksimovic had strongly opposed
the May Coup. Commented General Gojkovic:
Dragutin lApisj and Vojin lMaksimovic] are two of the finest
flowers of our army. Neither has it in his makeup to be vindica­
tive. Dragutin could not go against his conscience, and Vojin fully
deserved such a good evaluation . . . . 40
But others accused the Apis group of plotting in Drac to overthrow
Serbia·s dynasty and regime. Veljko Zecevic testified later that Apis ex­
horted Bosnian volunteers gathered around him in Drac to clean up
Serbia's domestic affairs and crush evil. Later, in Korekijani on Corfu
Apis supposedly told Zecevic : "It is a pity that all of you [volunteers]
will perish since we have very important matters to settle in the country ."
Later in Salonika A pis explained:
1 never spoke to the Bosnians about any evil in Serbia or about its
removal. 1 told them that I regretted they would all die and that
there would be no one to settle accounts after us. I understood this
cleaning up, as they did also, as meaning our accounts affecting the
Serbian people . . . ,
166 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
that is creating a Greater Serbia. Apis denied plans to use the Bosnian
volunteers for internal action, but "when they gathered around me, espec­
ially during our retreat, I could not renounce helping them to flee with
us and escape falling into enemy hands."41
Kosta Pecanac, a reserve officer serving under Colonel Boza Jankovic
and later a guerrilla leader, asserted years later that in Orae Apis and his
friends plotted to overturn the regime. Coming to Pecanac's regiment,
Malobabic told him Apis and Milovanovic-Pilac wanted to see him in
Skadar. At a small cafe Pecanac allegedly met Pilac acting as Apis' emis­
sary. Serbia had collapsed totally , stated Pilac, and the Pasic government
foolishly adhered to the Allies' hopeless cause. The Germans, continued
Pilac, respected Serbia's heroism and would guarantee her freedom and
independence in prewar boundaries. Pilac advocated an immediate separate
peace with the Central Powers and sought Pecanac's support. Despite
Pecanac's declared loyalty to the Allies, Pilac pestered him incessantly
thereafter with such appeals. Lieutenant Ljubornir Kojovic confided to
Pecanac that the Apis group was preparing "terrible things" in Skadar. A
great plot was ripening. "Conspirators in Skadar had established ties with
the Germans and had held important talks there about our fate."
Talking later with Apis and Pilac, Peeanac learned the conspirators
planned to await the arrival of King Peter and Prince Alexander in San
Giovanni, then act openly against them. After killing Assembly delegates
who refused to support them, they would seize control of the army and
oust the government and dynasty. But Prince Alexander did not embark
in San Giovanni , ruining the conspirators' plans. Apis and company sup­
posedly were terribly angry but impotent. On Corfu and in Salonika later
they resumed their plotting, recruiting officers on every side.42 Pecanac's
account remains uncorroborated and suspect, although it may have some
factual basis.
Had the "Black Hand" truly wished to ldll Prince Alexander and ex­
ecute a coup, the retreat presented some opportunities. Units guarding
the route along which Alexander and his ministers passed from Skadar to
San Giovanni were commanded by "Black Hand" members. The route's
most dangerous section was guarded by the guerrilla detachment of Voj­
voda Vuk, very sympathetic to Apis.43
Meanwhile Apis continued serving as the Timok Army's chief of staff.
His forces had to defend the port of Orae, and Apis was the last Serbian
Albanian Golgotha 167
officer to embark from there for Corfu in February 1 9 1 6 . The Austrian
vanguard was already at the town's gates when Apis turned over its de­
fenses to the arriving Italians.44 Casting doubt on Pecanac's account, this
suggests Apis executed his duties conscientiously to the last.
When it grew clear the Serbian army could not reorganize in Albania,
the Serbs and Allies debated possible destinations. Pasic urged the Allies
on December 1 1 th to evacuate the army to Salonika so that after reorgan­
ization it could bolster the Allied front. While this was discussed, the
French sent a military mission under General Mondesir to Albania to
ascertain the situation and arrange evacuation. From the Italians, anxious
to seize control of Albania, Mondesir encountered obstruction and delays.
With Montenegro's collapse , the Serbs' removal from the mainland grew
urgent. Mondesir apparently first proposed the Greek island of Corfu as
the best destination. With Greek permission, the French occupied the
island with elite units. Acceptable to the Allies and Serbs, Corfu satisfied
the Italians by removing the Serbs from Albania. But the exhausted Serbs
had to march overland through swamps to Orae and Valona; hundreds
more died. The Serbian government on January 1 9 , 1 9 1 6 embarked for
Corfu and the troops followed. Healthier men were sent to Corfu , the
island of salvation, the wounded and moribund to Vido, dubbed the island
of death.45 About 145,000 soldiers were evacuated-Serbia's remaining
army.
In Skadar King Peter witnessed a poignant military review. The old
monarch sat with Allied officers on the balcony of the Supreme Command
headquarters as the troops ftled past. "It was a march of live corpses,"
wrote the deeply moved French writer, Henri Barbusse. In correct military
formation and perfect alignment with hand weapons and regimental
colors, this ghastly army stalked past the assembled dignitaries. Through
their bared bones, which alone gave them a human look, protruded yellow­
ish, coarse , cracked sldn. Their skulls were inordinately large for their
emaciated bodies. Thousands later died on Vido despite the best efforts
of French doctors and nurses. French ships set out regularly with a grisly
cargo of wasted corpses for burial at sea.4'
The catastrophe of 1 9 1 5 shook the Serbs' confidence in Nikola Pasic ,
but the Allies still considered him the indispensable leader of national
resistance. His position with the Allies secure , Pa8ic could defy Serbian
civilian and military opponents. With Independent Radical leaders in his
16 8 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator

cabinet, Pasic had some protection against the Apis group which had relied
on them politically. Prince Alexander, having reshaped the Supreme Com­
mand to his taste, disliked Pasic intensely but could not oust him ; his feud
•
with the "Black Hand" had higher priority. Apis and his friends, failing to
realize they could not simultaneously oppose Pa5ic and Alexander, drove
them into reluctant partnership.'n Soon would strike the hour of reckon­
ing for Apis and the "Black Hand."

CHAPTER XV

PERSONAL MATTERS ( 1 9 1 4- 1 9 1 6 )

Guard your health and work so that the time

you spend there far from all who are dear to
you will be as valuable as possible for your
future life . Find a place in a good home,
study French, go to some school and see
how the French youth studies so you can be
useful to your country.
Apis to Milan Zivanovic , Apri1 1 6 , 1 9 1 6

Throughout his short and turbulent life Apis was so absorbed in mili­
tary and political activities that he never married or even had a true love
affair. But though very self-controlled, he revealed deep affection for
people of both sexes and a profound interest in others. From age ten he
was a loyal, considerate member of the family of his sister, Jelena, and her
husband, Zivan Zivanovic. He considered their home on Holy Sava Street
in Belgrade his own and always remained in close contact with his relatives.
During Zivan Zivanovic's internment in Hungary in 1 9 1 5 - 1 8 , Apis as­
sumed personal charge of hi� nephew, Milan Zivanovic. Too young at
sixteen to be called to the Serbian colors, Milan in May 1915 joined his
uncle in Uzice as a volunteer and accompanied the Timok Army staff on
the Albanian retreat. Sent to study in France in 1 9 1 6 , Milan conducted an
extensive correspondence with his uncle. Apis lavished more attention and

169
170 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Personal Matters 171

affection upon Milan than many men do on their own children. Young Receiving everyone graciously , he was a careful, patient listener. His pre­

Milan, reciprocating fully his uncle's concern, dedicated much of his life cise, skillful execution of varied and complex tasks revealed great organiza­

to clear Apis of charges brought against him in Salonika. Fortunately, tional ability. During physical danger or crises, Apis remained cheerful and

their correspondence and several Apis letters to his niece, Stanislava positive exerting a favorable influence on others. · He viewed the most

Glisic, survived and provided insight into Apis' character and family dangerous situations with optimistic confidence and rarely complained

relationships. or blamed others for failure. If the interests of the army or country de­

Apis' appearance, despite his massive size, failed to reveal his unique­ manded, he would work day and night. Colonel Apis possessed all the

ness. Men resembling him superficially could at times be encountered in qualities required by an outstanding general staff officer, concluded

Serbia. Only after a person knew this was Apis, noted Vladimir Tucovic, Arandj elovic. 3

were his interest and curiosity aroused. When Tucovic met him, Apis was Dedicated to the Serbian national cause , Apis spurned wealth or per­

already a man of mystery, reputedly having secret powers to mesmerize sonal gain, affirmed Milan Zivanovic. Neither flattery nor bribery would

men. This mystique was fostered more by the romantic aura around him deflect him from a course he believed in. For him the interests of Serbia

than by the man himself. A gifted friend wrote: and its people preceded personal and family affairs. Believing his family
should participate in the struggle for national liberation and unity, Apis

Whenever I met him, and I invariably wish to do so, I obtain the im­ refused to shield it from danger or sacrifice. To be Apis' friend was dan­

pression that I have met 'a true man.' Such meetings awakened in gerous. It meant marching with the vanguard where the peril was greatest

me a secret feeling of obedience. At such moments I was prepared without hesitation."' But he never asked others to assume risks he would

to become his soldier. not accept himself.

Zivan Zivanovic, Milan's father, reminisced fondly about his famous

Added one of Apis' comrades from the May Coup of 1903: brother-in-law. Apis was warrnhearted, talkative, and involved with people,
confirmed Zivanovic. Visits with the family for him represented essential

That person is not only talented but something more . He is a type of relaxation from arduous military and political activities. At home Apis

magician. When he is not present, all is empty; when he enters, every­ never discussed official business, worries, or problems. Thus the family

thing livens up, and we all crowd around him. All come to him with­ was often surprised by events which overtook him. His surviving letters

out a summons, without evident reason, as if attracted by this man's home, confirming a sincere and deep concern for all family members,

magical power. 1 contain only rare references to war or national issues. Allusions to his
health and feelings are few and generally optimistic.

Predictably his relatives and friends provide a laudatory picture of Apis Within the family, wrote his brother-in-law, Apis expressed his engaging

the man. He spoke in short, quick sentences, avoiding lengthy or complex sense of humor. Convival evening gatherings in cafes and restaurants where

explanations, recalled his adoring nephew. Apis' ideas, expressed suc­ he told lighthearted jokes was a chief means of relaxation. Apis would

cinctly, were clear, precise and penetrated to the heart of a matter. Ex­ sometimes become so jolly a.pd expansive that casual acquaintances mis­

pressed very simply, his words were easily remembered? Apis measured took his natural ebullience for intoxication. Throughout life, confirmed

his words carefully, confirmed fellow staff officer, Nicholas Arandjelovic. Zivanovic, Apis drank strictly water and black coffee, never alcohol . A

Without speaking heatedly or raising his voice, he aroused his listeners' heavy and determined smoker, Apis avoided swearing or indecent language

interest. Apis knew what to say and how to say it without antagonizing even in anger or jest. His kindness to servants was proverbial. Orderlies

his interlocutor or damaging his self-esteem. Most people were impressed and grooms became blindly devoted to him, rem aining in his service for
by his cogent reasoning, strong convictions, and devotion to duty.
172 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
years. "These small matters are very characteristic of a man who was above
all a soldier and an officer."
As an officer Apis was exemplary in obeying orders and deferring to
those senior in rank, Zivanovic stated . Despite his great influence, Apis
avoided whatever might injure his superiors' amour-propre. Shunning
boastfulness, he talked little about events he had been involved in. Those
considering Apis extreme , pathological or mentally unbalanced were either
mistaken or motivated by hatred or jealousy. Sincere patriotism was the
chief motive for his public actions, affirmed Zivanovic. Apis' aim was
freedom and well-being for Serbia and its people.
Famous early in life, A pis was exposed constantly to requests for favors
from comrades and outsiders. Attentive to all, he granted all honorable
requests that he could, involving himself in considerable material sacrifice.
Unusually generous, he shared his money and cigarettes with comrades
or supplicants. This won him the respect and devotion of many. Sincere,
disinterested attentiveness to others and their needs goes far to explain
his vaunted "magical" power in interpersonal relations.
Apis was unusually intelligent and knowledgeable. He spoke and wrote
French well, utilized German easily after his second Berlin stay, and also
read Russian. In his home library were many works on military affairs in
those languages. He read much general literature too but never discussed
his favorite authors with his brother-in-law.5 Apis knew much, agreed
his nephew, but his actions resulted more from revolutionary instinct
than cold political reason. But he did not act emotionally or impulsively.
Apis reached major decisions coolly after studying relevant details. "He
bore in himself that unquenchable flame of revolutionary creativity
without which there would be no progress in the world."'
Neutral observers and opponents noted shortcomings which led Apis
into repeated errors of judgment and unwise decisions. 7 Often provoking
fury and hatred, Apis had plenty of enemies. As an ambitious man with
power and influence, he was often unscrupulous and manipulative and
could also be arrogant. Occasionally he lost his temper and committed
unwise acts. He can be accused of political naivete, recklessly sacrificing
others, and being too certain he was right. Unbending pride hurt Apis in
his crucial relationship with Prince Alexander, especially when he spurned
the reconciliation offered by the Prince. Too often Apis did not realize
the consequences of his decisions and actions. His faults, though seemingly
Personal Matters 173
few compared wtih the virtues enumerated by his admirers, nonetheless
contributed significantly to his ultimate fate.
Three letters of Apis to his niece in 1914-15 reveal his profound con­
cern for the family's well-being. Stanislava was the widow of Lieutenant
Colonel Alexander GliSic, killed at Kumanovo in October 1 9 1 2 . From
temporary Supreme Command headquarters in Valjevo, Apis wrote her
in Kragujevac where most of the family settled just after World War I
began. Apis' sister remained behind in Belgrade to care for their mother,
Jovanka, who died during the Austrian bombardment and was buried in
the capital. Wrote Apis:
Far from all of us, not cared for by us in her last hours, our torment­
ed mother was released from her suffe rings. How heavyhearted l am
not to be able to see her any more. No longer will ! be able to look
at her face, good and pleasant even while she suffered the worst
pain. 1 t is even harder and sadder for me that I was unable to say
goodbye to her . . . . May she rest in eternal sleep next to our dear
Sanja. 8 Her dear spirit will always be with us, and her goodness and
sacrifices for us we shall always remember even if life is miserable
for us. Yes, our mother lived for others and if there is a God and his
right prevails after death . . . our mother will deserve it fully.
To arrange a funeral for his mother Apis wrote Dobrivoje Bakic, a former
Belgrade official serving with Supreme Command, but Apis himself could
not attend it. From Valjevo he often called his brother-in-law, Naum
Kostic, a hotel owner in Kragujevac, to ask about the family. "It is enough
for me to know that all of you are well. Protect Nenuska, my golden one,
guard her like the apple of your eye. She is . . . our chief solace. "9
That October Apis wrote in another letter to Stanislava:
1 am fm e except that I nave gained much weight. You won't recog­
nize me because I have gained so much. My legs serve me well, and
I do my work easily though there is too much. So don't worry about
me. Since Mama10 has been with you, J have felt relieved in mind.
Stay all together, then it will be easier to endure misfortune.
He longed to hear all but little Nenuska's accomplishments and urged his
174 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
niece to write more frequently . Apis exuded characteristic optimism about
the army's and Serbia's prospects:
Things stand well with us. Our army is good and worthy, so you
have nothing to fear. In a short time everything will be better, and
even the most traitorous will realize how glorious our army is. Don't
listen to rumors spread by the cowardly . . . . There is no longer any
danger nor can there be any for Serbia. We have performed our tasks
honorably, and now things should improve more and more.
Sometimes Apis called Uncle Naum in Kragujevac to refute false rumors
of impending Serbian defeat, "forged in some evil pro-German society."
He had been out of sorts recently , plagued with sad memories about
family members killed in action two years earlier-Sanja Zivanovic and
Alexander Glisic. "Under the impact of new tragic losses of so many of
our friends, the pain becomes ever harder to bear."
How was his nephew , Milan, "the hero of the bombardment?" queried
Apis. Before J ovanka's death, Milan had gone to Belgrade with his mother.
Spending several days there during the Austrian bombardment, they had
then returned to Kragujevac with Dobrivoje Bakic. In the midst of the
bombardment, young Milan had walked around Belgrade, as Bakic told
Apis upon their return . 1 1
Apis third letter to Stanislava in March 1 9 1 5 found the family in Les­
kovac whence it had fled during the Austrian offensive of November 1914.
Briefly and matter-of-factly Apis informed her that after serious differ­
ences with Prince Alexander, he had been transferred to Uzice. Persistent
leg problems prevented him from riding horseback, but he need not do
that at his new post. His orderly was giving him regular rubdowns. "I will
be going to my new post in a few days." Reverting to family concerns,
he wrote:
I talked to Dad [Zivan Zivanovic ] today, and he feels it best for you
to remain where you are [in Leskovac] . Don't worry about me and
take care. All that I wish is that we all remain well . . . . I hope to
be able to come from Uzice to see you or at least to hear from you.
. . . How is Nenuska? I miss her most of all . . . . God willing, in
two months you will be back in Belgrade.12
Personal Matters 175
Milan Zivanovic's reminiscences written in Nice, France in 1 9 1 6 and
Apis' letter to him there revealed their close bonds forged during the Al­
banian retreat. Late in 1 9 1 5 Milan enlisted as a volunteer in Uzice. Ac­
companying his uncle to Timok Army headquarters in Zajecar, he went
with him on the Albanian retreat. 13 After a month's stay in Elbasan, Al­
bania, they had to leave suddenly for Tirana in mid-December. The staff
was to move out at 4 AM, wrote Milan; the operational division and supply
wagons an hour later. They started auspiciously on a fme highway, but
soon it dwindled to a narrow path along which they struggled from rock
to rock. Nice warm weather deteriorated swiftly : a cold east wind blew
into their faces, then rain came down in torrents. The eleven hour trek to
Tirana left the young volunteer exhausted. Further along that Albanian
route, reported Milan:
Everyone's life was in danger and each thought only of himself . . . .
At several places on this route 1 saw soldiers sitting next to a fire to
get warm. At their feet, literally piled one on top of another lay
their dead comrades. Hunger, frost, rain, snow, marching, exhaus­
tion . 14
Reaching Corfu early in February 1 9 1 6 , Milan contracted typhus. When
Apis arrived from Orae, Dr. Milan Stajic informed him his feverish nephew
must go straight to a hospital. Apis rushed off to see an old acquaintance,
chief of the French medical mission on Corfu. Explaining the situation,
Apis urged that Milan be sent to the French hospital in Ahileon. To ac­
commodate his friend, Colonel Rangona s
i sued the necessary orders. Next
day Milan and Dr. Stajic, now also down with typhus, were taken by car
to Ahileon. Hot and bundled up, Milan awoke much later to see his uncle
and two doctors gathered anxiously around him. At first in the almost
empty hospital, he shared a room with Dr. Stajic, then many more patients
were brought in. When he had recovered somewhat, Milan sent work to
Apis in Koreldjani. After a long delay which reduced Milan to desperation,
Major Nicholas Arandjelovic , Apis' close friend, came to Ahileon. "Hey
there, young fellow!" shouted Arandjelovic cheerfully, "Colonel Dragutin
sent me to get you out of the hospital." Much relieved , Milan got into a
car which took them to Corfu town, then to Korekijani village , Timok
Army headquarters. Recalled Milan:
 176 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Dragutin and all the rest came out, and we went into a house. A
large table was covered with documents, pens, and my typewriter.
How happy I was to see all my old war comrades, the old General
[ Uija Gojkovic] , Dragutin, Captain Veljkovic . . . .
Realizing his nephew was still too weak to sit and talk with them, Apis
within minutes had his bed prepared. Milic, Apis' orderly, led Milan gently
into his uncle's quarters:
It was a largish room some three meters square with two beds, a
large dresser with a mirror, and Dragutin's army trunk. I remember
every detail of what seemed to me then the most wonderful room in
the world.
Apis and the others forbade the convalescent to do any work and con­
stantly urged him to eat well. "The weather was wonderful and sunny,
and I felt better with each passing day."
The Supreme Command had informed General Gojkovic that his Timok
Army, having completed its mission, would be dissolved. February 28th,
1 9 1 6 was the sad day when that army ceased to exist. Entering his auto­
mobile, the old General drove slowly away, tears streaming down his
cheeks. Apis and an orderly remained behind to complete paper work. On
March 2nd he and Milan drove to Corfu where Milan received the title,
"junior sergeant of cavalry." 15 But soon volunteers under eighteen were
released from the army to continue their schooling. Apis insisted Milan
go abroad to study and arranged his nephew's passage to England, but
Milan refused to go there. They compromised on Nice, France, so Milan
could remain closer to Salonika. Apis and Milan parted forever on March
1Oth at the Corfu pier. Dissatisfied at leaving the army and his uncle,
Milan agitated constantly to return to Salonika, but Apis always put
him off.
Meanwhile Serbia had been occupied totally by Austria and Bulgaria.
As a high Serbian official, Zivan Zivanovic was deported to Nezider, Hun­
gary, where he remained interned until the war ended. The Austrians en­
tered his vacant house in Belgrade. Finding nothing incriminating, they
nonetheless destroyed ZivanoviC's and Apis' private libraries, carried off
the furniture, then demolished the house. The other Zivanovics fled to a
village near Krusevac for the rest of the war.''
-
Personal Matters 177
Apis' correspondence with Milan, the most extensive of his life, reveals
a warm protective concern and profound love for his young nephew.
Prior to his arrest in December 1 9 1 6 Apis wrote Milan nine letters, receiv-
.
ing twenty-eight and a few postcards from him. Apis sent all his letters to
Nice where Milan studied for over a year at the French lycee. The fall of
1 9 1 7 he transferred to the newly opened Serbian gymnasium in Boileau,
France, graduating with his comrades in February 1 9 1 9 . 1 7
Apis first wrote Milan from Corfu April 1 6 , 1 9 1 6 , confirming receipt
of his nephew's letters from Naples, Vetimilia and Nice. Apis' first letter
was taken to Nice by Major Grgur Mitrovic of the Third Army staff where
Apis served as assistant chief of staff. He admonished Milan to guard his
health, study hard, and utilize his time so he could serve Serbia better. He
would defray his nephew's expenses:
Your letters will help me to bear more easily the loneliness I have
felt ever since you left. Put everything in your letters, even the most
trivial happenings. That will be our conversation.
Milan should not expect long letters since Apis would be very busy, and
"as you know, writing is difficult for me. But by your indulgence you will
obligate me to take up my pen . . . . " Indeed, it did. Some of Apis' letters,
thoughless frequent than Milan's, were quite extensive. "I am fme and well
situated in the [Third Army] command," Apis reported. Along with Grgur
[Mit rovic] I am virtually relaxing here . . . I am bathing in the sea daily."
The amazing revival of the Serbian army, seemingly moribund only two
months before, put him in good spirits. "Our army has recovered remark­
ably. It is a pleasure to look at the soldiers. In the camps one hears songs,
and they are full of hopes for a return to our dear country." Through
Vlada llic, an emigre friend in neutral Geneva, Switzerland, Apis received
news about his family in Krusevac. "Apparently, they are well and it is in
God's hands when we will meet with them." Apis remained optimistic that
changing fortunes of war would make that occur soon. With the mails
unreliable , he urged Milan to number all letters and postcards. He sent
many embraces "to my little Milan."18
Apis' letter from Corfu of April 28th was taken to Milan by Lieutenant
Colonel RadiSa Nikolic. Colonel Zivkovic had named him adjutant on the
Third Army staff apparently to spy on Apis and obtain papers which could
178 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
be used later to compromise him. Lieutenant Colonel Radovanovic-Koca
claimed that Zivkovic had instructed Nikolic to induce someone to poison
Apis, but the hireling lost his nerve. Apis seemingly did not then suspect
Nikolic or he would not have asked him to deliver letters, money, and mes­
sages to Milan. With money sent with Mitrovic and Nikolic, noted Apis,
Milan could pay for his trip through Italy and for his quarters and school­
ing in Nice.
From one of Milan's letters the solicitous uncle realized his nephew
found their separation most difficult. Thus he left open Milan's return to
the army once it entered action on the Salonika front. To Milan's prodding
for permission to return, Apis wrote soothingly:
I understand you, and it isn't easy for me either. I too found it easier
to bear things when you were with me, but still you needed to leave
Corfu, get away , and spend the time which remains before we return
to our country in a place where you can see and study something.
The oppressive loneliness which you feel in such difficult circum­
stances is even more onerous for our people in Serbia. I know that
you will experience difficult moments and suffer much, but my
dear Milance, you must be a hero . . . and endure.
Heroes, Apis explained, were not only those exposed to physical danger,
but also people able to bear severe mental suffering. Milan's parents had
borne many trials stoically during the war.
For the love of them you must bear up too. When we return, they
need to have the solace that you continued your education besides
helping us in the army. Therefore resolve and make the effort to
remain there for some months. Stay there until we here and in Sal­
onika are prepared to go forward.
That would be at least another two to three months, confided Apis. "We
still have plenty of work here and in Salonika before we have everything
in order."
Apis noted he had received word from Milan's father in Hungary and
the family in Krusevac that all were well and, asking about them, Apis had
instructed Vlada llic in Geneva to send them money. Also working to
Personal Matters 179
restore links with those in occupied Serbia was Lieutenant Colonel Stevan
Sapinac, Apis' classmate from the Academy, 19 convalescing in France
from war wounds. "I wrote him to make contact with Dad whom he
knows and respects greatly." The darkness would gradually lift, "but dawn
cannot come until we return and are all together again and embrace." As
to Milan's complaints about Nice, Apis admonished:
About your lodging and companions . . . let me give you this advice.
You are there only temporarily and your friends are accidental.
Don't worry about what they are like, just be what you have been
up until now. I also have had bad company, but it never deflected
me from my path. You have the power, even in unpleasant com­
pany, to remain the Milance who always has been able by his be­
havior and work to win the sympathy of his surroundings and those
in them.
Would Milan please write tl1eir friends in Switzerland who had created and
were maintaining contacts with his father and the family in Serbia? As
for himself, Apis confirmed he was fme, walking five miles a day and
swimming an hour in Corfu's warm waters. But Third Army staff lacked
the warm, close personal relationships of the former Timok Army .20
Apis' fmal letter to Milan from Corfu of May 8th was brief. He gave it
to a captain who would greet Milan in Nice and see how he was faring. "I
await news from you impatiently. Be patient there another two months."
I will tell you when you can come to me." Preparations for the move to
Salonika were proceeding well. "I must hurry in order not to miss the
ship." Third Army staff was now moving to the Salonika front.21
After a lengthy gap, Apis wrote Milan October 22nd from Vostarane
near the Serbian border where Third Army staff was then located. By tl1en
he had received twenty-four letters from his diligent nephew. Early Octo­
ber, confessed Apis, had been d.ifficult for him. A year earlier Serbia had
been defeated, and still earlier:
Our dear Sanja and good Leka departed from us in those days [in
October 1 9 12] , and our house was destroyed [in 1 9 1 5] , and last
year we had to abandon our loved ones to severe oppression and de­
part for abroad where we suffer spiritually. We must have the strength
180 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
to bear all this. In that strength lies the greatness of our people, and
you as a son of our tonnented people must fmd this strength and
hold out . . . .
Apis had believed they would soon be returning to liberated Serbia; now
it was apparent that happy day would be deferred indefmitely. When
Milan felt sad or discouraged, he should see Colonel Sapinac who would
comfort him. His legs felt better all the time, wrote Apis, and their horses,
2
including Milan's "Bliher," were fine. 2
On November 1st Apis wrote Milan again from Vostarane :
You will recall those happy days at home when we were all together.
On [Holy Mrata, November 1 1 th] do some good deed such as going
to church and lighting a candle praying to God that our suffering
will pass as soon as possible and that our enslaved people will be
preserved . . . . We must all remain at our posts til this is over-you
in school and I here at the threshold of our country.
Serbian forces had just defeated the Bulgars near Bitolj , Macedonia. "Thus
our revenge goes steadily though slowly forward." He was sending Milan
some twenty photographs showing Third Army staff and what Serbian
soldiers were enduring.23 From Stanislava Apis had received a postcard
through the Red Cross. "Please inform General Staff Colonel Dragutin
Dimitrijevic that his people are all well and wish to receive news from
him and Milan. Krusevac, September 9."24
Apis wrote again on Holy Mrata, a date once dear to the family, now
sad after its grievous losses:
Pray to God we will see each other again and all gather together in
our house. This is the sole desire for me and for all of ours which I
can send you.
By the next year, Apis hoped, the family would be together again. Had the
victory at Bitolj been fully exploited, he affirmed, their hopes of a swift
return home might have been realized. "But you can be proud of what we
are all doing and what the Serbian army is achieving here . . . . " Learning
that Zivan Zivanovic and Naum Kostic were in the same internment camp
Personal Matters 181
at Nezider, Apis had instructed Swiss friends to send them food and
money. At least he and Milan were now receiving news from them and
could send them things. "That is some consolation and a light in the dark-
. .
ness we 1ve
! m.,25
Apis expressed dismay on November 20th at not receiving all Milan's
letters but rejoiced at Zivan Zivanovic's recent card. "Our poor Dad! What
he must endure in old age having to write in German from a Hungarian
internment camp." Apis' joy over recent Serbian victories was tinged with
sadness:
In truth I lose some good friends every day, and with each day there
are fewer Serbian soldiers, but the glory of the little Serbian army
grows every day. Bitolj is ours. The Bulgars are paying heavily. I am
26
hopeful things will improve steadily.
In his correspondence Apis' patriotism shone brightly. He seemed deter­
mined to struggle on to final victory .
"For three days I have been preparing to write you," explained Apis
December 3rd, "but something or other had prevented me from doing so
the whole day, and in the evening it is the telephone. Now I have a few
moments of peace and take these to write you." He would continue writ­
ing Milan every ten days. He praised Milan's letter of November 2 1 st:
In it you were a true hero. I like that. We must bear all difficulties
heroically. The times are great, and we must reveal ourselves to be
equal to them.
Milan must prepare himself "for the future of our wonderful country which
will emerge from these bloody days as a renewed Greater Serbia . . . . "27
In his final letter to Milan from the Salonika front December 1 2th Apis
chided him for negative think.ing. Apis advised him, whenever schoolwork
permitted, to go to the theater. mo\·ies. or see cheerful friends like Colonel
Sapinac. From Stevan Acimovic, a Belgrade lawyer in Switzerland, Apis
had received three reassuring postcards from Stanislava. Little Nenuska
now was four. "My legs are springy as a deer's," wrote Apis, "and I have
trimmed my stomach a good deal just by eating less." As to reports he
would soon be removed from his post, Apis commented:
182 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator

From all sides they are proposing me for some trip to your area on
some military-diplomatic mission, but I believe these are just rumors.
At least up to now there is nothing positive. -

Swamped with staff work, he had broken off his brief letter five times al­
ready to answer the telephone. "My staff here are all well . . . . The horses
are fine." He ended his letter there to avoid arousing the suspicion of the
"Bratislav censor."23 CHAPTER XVI
That very day Interior Minister Lj ubomir Jovanovic-Patak requested
War Minister Terzic to investigate Apis and the "Black Hand." His arrest
followed swiftly . A pis had not suspected that he faced imminent detention. CORFU INTERLUDE (SPRING 1 9 1 6 )
The authorities then severed all ties with his relatives.

That man lApisj is indifferentto everytl1ing!

His friends and comrades have died, but no
matter, he seeks new people. All of us can
die and . . . he will continue to work with
new people, and he will not rest until he
fmds someone ready to struggle and intrigue.
Ziv. 7 1 8, "Solunska afera."

Leaving the port of Orae early in February 1 9 16, Colonel Apis spent
the next montl1s on sunny Corfu recovering from the retreat and winding
up the Timok Army's affairs. While the Serbian anny was being reorgan­
ized, old politic�1 quarrels and intrigues resurfaced. The protagonists were
Regent Alexander, Premier Pasic, and the "Black" and "White Hand"
groups. That spring they jockeyed for position.
Arriving on Corfu somewhat earlier, Slobodan Jovanovic was summon­
ed to his first audience with Prince Alexander. "He could hide his thoughts
but not his feelings," recalled the scholar. "1 discerned immediately that
he could stand neither Pasic nor Apis." Having purged Supreme Command
and refilled it with his own · men , 1 the Prince Regent now wished to re­
move Pasic too and obtain a government he could control. Hampering
Alexander's ambition to rule, not just reign like King Peter, were Pasic
among politicians and Apis among officers. Alexander told the historian
later he had found no way to remove Pasic .

183
1 84 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
One evening Prince Alexander suddenly asked Jovanovic how he view­
ed Apis. Many attributed his influence in the army, replied the historian,
to the failure of the King or Radicals to direct it. When Peter I adopted
a hands-off attitude, someone had had to lead the army. The conspirators,
led from 1 906 by Apis, had assumed that role. Pampering the conspirators
at first, the Radicals in 1 9 1 4 had provoked a showdown with them over
priority while the army was extremely popular. In peacetime Apis and the
conspirators had caused grave problems for the King and government,
but during the war they had fought loyally and courageously . Royal
authority over the army should be restored, Jovanovic agreed, but not by
creating within it the Prince's partisan "White Hand." Retorted Alexander:
a bad situation prevails in the army; its source is Colonel Apis whom one
can neither trust nor believe . Though less angry with Apis than with Pasic,
the Prince obviously suspected and fe ared the mysterious Colonel. How
could Alexander have turned so completely against his former friend?
Jovanovic attributed it to constant denunciations of Apis by Alexander's
entourage and the Prince's incapacity for deep and lasting friendships. 2
The news of Apis' arrival spread swiftly over luscious Corfu . Flocking
to see him at cafes he frequented were officer friends, supplicants, and the
Prince's spies. There was a regular parade of visitors all one afternoon and
evening. Apis had to rise constantly from his table to greet them. Despite
severe wartime losses, his adherents and enemies mobilized on little Corfu.3
But Apis now was a cooling star whose rays no longer dispensed real
warmth. As his power waned, association with him became dangerous.
Many feared they might be buried if his power collapsed. "Do you see
that man," a friend of A pis told Tucovic, pointing to the relentless Colonel:
That man is indifferent to everything! His friends and comrades have
died, but no matter, he seeks new people. All of us can die and sor­
row will not overcome him. He will continue his work with new
people and will not rest until he finds someone ready to struggle
and intrigue.4
Those who understood the political game unfolding behind the beautiful
scenery knew that the Priority struggle had resumed. The Serbs' love of
intrigue triumphed over wartime disasters, hunger, and the enemy. While
boatloads of emaciated corpses from Vido, the isle of death, continued to
•
Corfu Interlude 185
be dumped at sea, conspiracy hung like a dark cloud over Prince Alexan­
der's court. Apis was depicted there as more dangerous than Fieldmarshal
Mackensen, the Bulgars, or a typhus epidemic. Driv�n from his country,
Prince Alexander felt overshadowed and humiliated by Apis. The Colonel
was a phantom worse than defeat and expulsion. What would his kingdom
be worth if he must share power with Apis?5
On Corfu Slobodan Jovanovic, long friendly with Apis, discussed his
perilous predicament with him. Apis was at odds with Alexander and the
Pasic regime. Such a three-cornered contest could not long persist: two
factions eventually would combine and destroy the third. Repair swiftly
your relations with one or the other, exhorted Jovanovic. But A pis be­
lieved neither of the others, because of their vulnerability, would initiate
action. Still without deep roots in the army, Prince Alexander was backed
solidly only by "White Handers" whom Apis scorned as no match for his
friends. And Pasic, facing hostility , even hatred from an army blaming
him and his government for its defeat, suffering and exile , dared not risk
conflict. And he intended no political action, Apis reassured J ovanovic .
Clearly capable of conspiracy, even murder, the Colonel, concluded Jo­
vanovic, would commit them only to achieve a popularly approval goal.
Prepared to shed Serbian blood only for patriotic causes, Apis realized
that after the Albanian Golgotha the army had lost its halo of glory.
The Prince Regent, concluded Jovanovic , remained undecided with
whom to settle first, Pasic o r Apis. Initially, Alexander considered moving
against Pa5ic, thet:t at the nadir of his political career. Prior to his hasty
embarcation from San Giovanni for Corfu, leaving hundreds of wounded
on the beaches, the Premier had hastily concealed his venerable beard. On
Corfu Prince Alexander conferred with Svetolik Jaksic, editor of Stampa,
who advised him to form a largely officers' government under Vojvoda •
Zivojin MiSic with J ovan J ovanovic-Pizon as foreign minister. With Alex­
ander's approval, Jaksic traveled to Europe to win Allied support for such
a regime. Purportedly, Slobodan J ovanovic was to receive a cabinet post.
Hearing of this, Apis advised the scholar not to join such a government :
Misic, J ovanovic [Pizon] and J aksic were all open or secret Progres­
sives.' Using wartime conditions as an excuse, they would want to
introduce a personal regime such as existed under [Alexander]
Obrenovic. We conspirators will not allow that. We did not kill

186 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Alexander Obrenovic in order to have Alexander Karadjordjevic rule
as he once ruled. We indeed are against Pasic , but that is only be­
cause he thinks more of his party than of the people and the country.
In place of him we would like to see in the government truer demo­
crats and patriots, not resurrected Progressives. 7
Apis' opposition complicated creation of a Misic cabinet.
In the above highly significant statement Apis outlined succinctly his
own political views. It undercuts his opponents' uncorroborated assertions
that he wanted a military dictatorship for Serbia. From this declaration
Jovanovic concluded Apis would cooperate most happily with Independ­
ent Radicals. For years he had enjoyed good relations with their leaders,
Milorad Draskovic and Ljubomir Davidovic, members of PasiC's coalition
cabinet. During the Priority Dispute Apis had collaborated closely with
them. His aim now, as in 1 9 1 4 , seemingly was to bring the Independent
Radicals to power and limit Prince Alexander to constitutional rule. From
the Independents he sought in return the free hand to formulate army
policies accorded him earlier by the Radicals. Did Apis have defmite plans
to achieve these goals, or to act against Pasic and Protic? Later, with Apis
in Salonika prison, Slobodan Jovanovic assured Pasic that Apis would
never serve under a personal, autocratic monarchy. "In his own way,"
affirmed J ovanovic , "he [Apis] too is for democracy ." After pondering
a bit, perhaps how he would fare in an Apis-led democracy , Pasic remind­
ed the historian that during the Serbo-Bulgarian quarrel in 1 9 1 3 , "Black
Handers" had threatened to kill him.8
On little Corfu besides the army was the Supreme Command and Ser­
bia's government-in-exile. Lesser officials and the Assembly had gone on
to France. As government and Supreme Command rubbed elbows un­
easily, surrounded by disillusioned soldiers, the ministers felt uncomfort­
able and vulnerable. In the army, as before the Priority Dispute, seethed
discontent with the Pasic cabinet. Many officers were dismayed that only
the Supreme Command had been purged as if i t alone had caused Serbia's
misfortune. Most conditions for an army coup existed except a leader. Had
Apis attempted one he would have had to face Prince Alexander and the
Radical regime. But hard evidence is lacking that Apis envisioned a mili­
tary takeover on Corfu or later on the Salonika front. And Pasic displayed
his usual remarkable resilience and ability to survive . His government
•
Corfu Interlude 187
cracked down hard on Jaksic and his supporters, inducing Alexander to
abandon them. Jaksic , Jovanovic-Pizon and their friends lost their posts
on Corfu.
At the Salonika Trial, Apis provided indications of his role and aims on
Corfu. To Chairman MisiC's questions whether he had met there with the
"Black Hand" and its CEC, Apis reiterated : both had long since dissolved.
"With all those with whom I met on Corfu I met not as members of 'Uni­
fication or Death !' but as friends and comrades." Such meetings were
chance encounters or comradely suppers at Corfu restaurants. 9 Two such
parties that he recalled particularly were at St. George Hotel and "Doboj"
restaurant in large diningrooms with many other guests present. At the
"Doboj" were fifteen to twenty officers, including some who soon left to
serve with the Serbian Volunteer Corps in Russia. The dinner at the St.
George included several "Black Hand" leaders, notably Colonels Milovano­
vic-Pilac, Antonije Antic, and Vladimir Tucovic. "At these parties we en­
gaged solely in comradely conversations over some wine, mostly about up­
coming reorganizations of our army on Corfu," affirmed Apis. Political
matters had not been discussed, nor were significant decisions reached.
Apis denied flatly that his group had discussed any anti-governmental
actions, much less plans to kill the Prince or Pasic :
Personally, I did not meet with army friends where any such matters
were discussed and felt that such decisions when the Serbian people
and army. were in such a terrible state would be monstrous, that any­
one undertaking such terrible crimes would have to be insane.
informed on Corfu by the new chief of staff, General Peter Bojovic, of
rumors "Black Hand·· was plotting a coup, Apis assured him: "These were
false reports by spies . . . the ''Black Hand" was a defunct patriotic organ­
ization.'' Declining to meet with Prince Alexander, Apis instructed Colonel
Milutin Lazarevic , a "Black Hand" member, to inform him that he, Apis,
would adhere strictly to his military duties. Through Lazarevic Apis
urged the Prince "to believe in our loyalty and willingness to bear any
sacrifice in order to resurrect our country . . . . From that moment� I
. .
acted in no way to violate the Supreme C omman der' s desues. "10 Ap1s had
missed his best chance for reconciliation.
188 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
A Salonika witness, police scribe Tihomir Maric, alleged he had over­
heard Apis and friends at Hotel St. George affum that the Serbian regime
must be changed and power taken into their hands. Returning to Serbia,
the "Black Hand" would form a new regime aided by some Independent
Radicals and Liberals. "That witness," objected Apis, "must have had un­
usually well-developed hearing." From his room Maric supposedly had
overheard Apis and his friends conversing in a large diningroom with other
guests present. He would have had to recognize each speaker by voice,
knowing which ones belonged to "Black Hand" and its CEC. In his testi­
mony, Apis added, Maric included officers such as K. Ristic who had never
been at St. George Hotel.
Another Salonika witness, D. Colovic, affirmed that Apis had confer­
red secretly with him and eight other Bosnian volunteers in Korekijani
village on Corfu. The Bosnian volunteers, arriving from Drac to join Timok
Army's staff at Korekijani, had camped in a nearby field. Never had he
met secretly with them there. The staff had had only three rooms at
Korekijani, explained Apis, one for the army commander, another for
Apis, and a tllird for two other officers. The office had been in the ante­
room where General Gojkovic, Apis, and others worked day and night.
With no place to hold general meetings, open or secret, Apis had talked
with the volunteers individually. It was evident from Colovic's testimony
11
concluded Apis, that he had no idea why the Colonel was in Korekijani.
Witness Milan Ciganovic, a Sarajevo assassin, made several wild and un­
substantiated charges involving Apis. Allegedly, Apis had sent Bosnian
volunteers, Bosko Arezina and Nezir to NiS to steal a large sum of money.
Exploded Apis:
This is a base slander by Ciganovic against the late Bosko. I never did
such things in my life nor would I have had reason to do so. Cigano­
vic's entire testimony is colored; he seems to have said whateve r he
thought would protect him.
At Hotel Angleterre in Salonika, testified Ciganovic , Apis told him later
with the Bosnian, Djuro Sarac, present, tlut internal Serbian issues could
not then be solved, but when they reentered Serbia, matters must be set­
tled promptly. Denying making such statements, A pis accused Ciganovic
of abandoning national work to become a paid police informer. Apis had
Corfu Interlude 189
told him in Korekijani, persisted Ciganovic, that Prince Alexander was sur­
rounded by undesirables. Such domestic evil must be eliminated, Apis had
said, before external national action could be undertaken. Apis denied
thls flatly. Ciganovic also alleged A pis had contrasted the "sensible poli­
cies" of William 11 and pro-German kings of Bulgaria and Greece with
those of Serbia's regime. "If I mentioned those rulers in conversation,"
retorted Apis, "it could not have been to praise them since their aim is
only to damage Serbian interests."12 Chairman MiSiC's efforts to confurn
Apis' collaboration with the Central Powers proved abortive.
An entry in the diary of Branko Bozovic, former Piedmont editor, for
February 2 1 , 1 9 1 6 , read: "Conversation with Tuca [Yladimir Tucovic) :
trip to Dragutin [Dimitrijevicl and conversation in camp." Questioned
by Misic, Apis confinned Bozovic had come to see him at Korekijani.
Once they were alone Branko had asked Apis whether he had messages
for age nts in Athens. When A pis denied knowing any, Bozovic protested:
"It seems to me . . . you do not wish to participate further in our public
life." Replied Apis: "I feel before us now stands one great task: liberation
of our country, wll4;h is ali i am thinking about." "I am not saying you
need do anything now," persisted Branko, "but I ask you to retain your
interest so that after the war we can plunge again into active struggle." In
postwar Serbia· he hoped to reactiviate Piedmont as a nationalist organ.
Seeing before him a journalist gravely ill with tuberculosis, Apis replied
reassuringly : "Fine, fme, Branko. After the war there will be time and
opportunity for struggle, only let us get the war over successfully first."13
On Corfu Apls relaxed with daily swims in the ocean. A powerful swim­
mer, he remained in the water up to an hour and swam far from shore. In
March when A pis became assistant chief of staff of the new Third Army,
he found an old friend, Rudolf Mihl, a fellow gymnasium student, also
serving there. Because of Mihl's German origin, Apis called him by the
endearing nickname, "Schwabe,"14 and joked with him constantly. A
very obese 285 pound non-swimmer, Mihl long resisted Apis' blandish­
ments about going swimming with him. Finally , he agreed to go along
but remained cautiously in shallow water. One day, needled by Apis, Mihl
accompanied other swimmers to the end of the shallows. But there was a
sharp drop off and Mihl foundered. Apis swam to him immediately and
pulled him safely to shore. Having swallowed much water, "Schwabe"
gasped like a dying fish. Since Mihl was renowned for eating heavily and

190 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
drinking much wine, Apis joked afterwards: "For the first time in his life
the Schwabe drank water and salt water at that!" Mihl never again swam
either in salt or fresh water and indeed had drunk very little water in his
lifetime! 15
Shepherded and nurtured by Apis on the Albanian retreat, Rade Malo­
babic had reached Corfu safely. Major Radoje J ankovic, an A pis colleague,
later for a Belgrade newspaper described Malobabic on Corfu. On March
27, 1 9 1 6 , wroke Jankovic, "we were walking with Apis on the esplanade
at Corfu." It was delightfully warm, people clustered on the benches lining
the walkway. "Look there," Apis exclaimed, "that s
i Rade Malobabic!"
Rade came up, shook hands, and was introduced. Of medium height, he
was young, thin, yellowish, with short brown hair, a small moustache,
sunken cheeks and sharp beard. Rade's eyes were tired and his face sad.
Marks of long suffering were etched deeply into a face suggesting a strong
character. The entire man seemed suffused with painful memories. When
Apis spoke about Rade, he was transformed by warmth and enthusiasm:
There is a man with one of the fmest characters I have met in my
entire life. By his services he had performed things of inestimable
value for us in the General Staff. Despite all that our Belgrade police
arrested and imprisoned him for a year, concealed and cruelly tor­
tured in prison. 1'
On Corfu Colonel Milojko lvkovic related a significant episode about
Apis. One evening a cavalry captain, Blagoje Milovanovic, who before the
war had served under Ivkovic, came to his tent. They were close friends.
That evening they talked at length and drank much wine. His tongue
loosened, Milovanovic declared: "Listen, Milojko! For several days I have
wanted to tell you a very major and important thing." He fell silent. Pres­
sed by lvkovic, Blagoje resumed : "They are looking for people whom one
can trust, who are reliable and decisive to carry out a great, great affair. 1
know you to be such a person, so now I have decided to disclose this
matter to you." The Blagoje blurted out: "We have to fmish off these
b. _ _ _ ds!" Puzzled by this violent outburst, Ivkovic querie d : "Whom are
you referring to, I don't understand you." "What do you mean you don't
understand?" exclaimed Milovanovic. "The 'Black Hand,' who else? They
have become unbearable with their arrogance and unruliness. I myself have
•
Corfu Interlude 191
experienced this, and I remember what you told me about the incident of
your brother, Dragisa, with Apis."
During the Albanian retreat, they had arrived at Orae, explained Iv­
kovic, He had been with the Morava Division while his brother, Artillery
Captain Dragga lvkovic, served on Timok Army's staff. Indignantly ,
Dragisa informed his brother that Apis had sent his orderly with a newly
arrived guerrilla lieutenant. Captain DragiSa was already asleep when Apis'
orderly burst in saying Colonel Apis insisted he yield his bed to the lieut­
enant. When DragiSa refused, Apis summoned him immediately. How did
the Captain dare ignore his order?, shouted Apis. He ordered him per­
emptorily to give up his bed. The goodnatured peaceable captain complied
reluctantly . Milojko, critical of his brother for yielding, was incensed
at Apis. ,
"The time has come for somebody to take care of them and fmish them
off!" exclaimed Milovanovic indignantly. "How do you mean fmish them?"
queried Milojko. "Simple," replied Milovanovic. ''To fmd people, as you
put it, who are brave, decisive and trusted . . . then kill them." "But,
friend, do you mean now?" objected Milojko incredulously. "Under these
conditions?" "Of course. The sooner the better. Now it will be easy to
achieve."
Profoundly shocked, Colonel lvkovic remained plunged in thought.
Then he protested: "Don't you realize that would be a great crime . . .
against our country and army?" Avoiding his gaze, Blagoje said much
disappointed:
Since when have you changed? Remember when you told me about
them [Black Hand J and how terribly you hated Apis for mistreating
your brother; how they were all self-willed and arrogant; how they
humiliate all those who are not with them? And now all of a sudden
you are defending them!
Disputing such an interpretation, Ivkovic then delivered this eloquent and
convincing statement:
I haven't changed at all. I am not defending them, nor am I for them.
I still believe that among them are many who not only have faults
but have committed crimes for which they must answer and suffer
 •

192 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Corfu Interlude 193

punishment. But to kill them all and now, in such circumstances,
that would be madness and a terrible crime against our country and
cause a fearful scandal before the entire world. Because you must
admit that no matter what shortcomings some of them suffer from,
nonetheless among them is the cream of our officer corps both in
training and other military capacities. Among them is a very large
number, indeed a majority, who are among our best prepared and
most capable officers. Precisely Apis himself . . . by general and
unanimous conviction is the best, most talented, best prepared and
most capable. And precisely now when there remains of our army
somewhere in Europe ; the Prince seemed to welcome the idea. Soon there­
18
after Jankovic left for Russia.
As the Serbian army reorganized, the Allies debated the issue of the
Salonika front. They concluded that a reorganized Serbian army could
help retain their foothold at Salonika. French Admiral de Robeck and
British General Mahon agreed two additional divisions would make Salon­
ika virtually impregnable. The Serbs could get them to Salonika before
serious [Central Power] operations begin against Allied lines.'' 19 At an
inter-Allied conference at Chantilly Fieldmarshal J offre of France pro­
posed sending another 1 00,000 Allied troops to the Salonika front.
.

only about 100-1 20,000 men, all are required to save our enslaved Strongly opposing this, the British command urged that its forces in
homeland, now when we have lost everything and the Allies are Greece be withdrawn as soon as the Serbs could replace them.2° Fortun­
feeding and supporting us. When we have rested up, the hour will ately, for Serbia's future, it was the French, consistently loyal to their
come to liberate our homeland. Now under their wings and in their Slav comrades-in-arms, who prevailed in inter-Allied councils.
embraces, to kill each other off and feud among ourselves? That
would be an unforgivable crime against our army and country which
needs all the saviors they can fmd! . . . I favor having any of them
who deserves it punished after we return home before a regular
court. But now-no way and not in any easel

Listening to Ivkovic's harangue, Blagoje Milovanovic became terribly

red in the face . Then he exploded: "Milojko, up to now I considered you
one of our bravest officers, and valued you as a man of character, but now
l am completely disillusioned with you because l see that you speak as a
coward." He spat on the ground in fury. Miloje warned Blagoje he must
be drunk. "Otherwise I would break this bottle over you head." This in­
cident, lamented lvkovic, had destroyed their friendship of many years. 1 7
About this same same time Major Radoje Jankovic confided to Colonel
Tucovic his long conversation with Prince Alexander. They had decided
Jankovic should travel to Russia and serve with the Second Serbian Divi­
sion as the Prince's expert envoy and write for Russian newspapers. They
had discussed Apis at length. Alexander declared angrily he was ready to
flush Apis down the drain. When chief of staff, General Peter Bojovic, had
urged Apis to become reconciled with the Prince, Apis had instead sent
Colonel Lazarevic as a peace envoy. He himself, stated Jankovic, had done
his utmost to assuage Alexander's obvious hatred of Apis. As their in tee­ I

view ended, Radoje suggested the Prince name Apis military attache

CHAPTER XVII
ON THE SALONIKA FRONT
( 1 916)
[A pis] as assistant chief of staff of this army
. . . carried out the tasks entrusted to him
quickly and with complete dedication. His
execution of General Staff work was clear'
decisive and energetic.
Colonel Mihailo 1 ovanovic, Third army
chief of staff, March 9 , 1 9 1 7
As the Third Army's assistant chief of staff Colonel Apis proceeded to
Salonika in May 1 9 1 6, then north to the front near the Serbian frontier
in Macedonia. For about five months he served in a Serbian force of
about 140,000 men. Refitted· and reequipped by the Allies, it took its
place side by side with French, British and a few Italian and Russian
troops to fight chiefly against Bulgarian units. The climax of this tour of
�u �y was a Serbian offensive which captured Mt. Kajmakcalan, then Bitolj
. mander-in-chief of Allied troops, will exercise this command in the name
ms1de Serbtan Macedonia. While on the Salonika Front, Apis was inun­
dated with staff work, often spending day and night on or near the tele­
phone. Minding his own military business, he hoped his enemies would not
bother him. He had little time or opportunity to engage in political activity.
194
Salonika Front 195
A Supreme Command report of March 1 0 confirmed: "Reorganization
and preparations of our army makes progress daily, and the time is ap­
proaching to raise the issue of its correct role in coming operations." Three
armies containing six Serbian divisions were being formed. The Bulgars re­
mained the chief obstacle to a Serbian return to their homeland. Most
German units had been shifted to other fronts, and Austria's role on the
Salonika Front remained modest.1
On March 1 , 1 9 1 6 on the Salonika Front the French had five infantry
divisions, an engineer division, and one of heavy artillery with a total
strength of 1 20,000 men. The British had 1 50,000 there and in Salonika.
The Allied commander-in-chief was General Maurice Sarrail, with little
reputation as a strategist and indifferently qualified to perform his ardu­
ous duties. Out of favor with General Joffre , he had been virtually exiled
to the Balkans. Sarrail was an abler politician than military leader having
many ties with the French parliament and Foreign Minister Delcasse. In
Salonika leading politicians and foreign ambassadors clustered around him.
At first Sarrail was negative about the Balkan campaign and the Serbs.
After the Allied retreat of December 1 9 1 5 , he had advocated total Allied
withdrawal from Salonika. Paris had vetoed that and by spring 1 9 1 6 Sar­
rail's mood changed. As Serbian units arrived in Salonika, he adopted a
warmer attitude toward France's valiant little ally.2
Prince Regent Alexander sought to secure some freedom of action for
Serbian forces operating under Allied command. On a trip to Paris in
March 1 9 1 6 he refused to place the Serbian army under unconditional
Allied control. During the spring and summer he and the Serbian govern­
ment after difficult negotiations reached a compromise with the Allies.
Serbian forces under Alexander as supreme commander were to serve
under General Sarrail according to the formula: "General Sarrail, com­
of Prince Regent Alexander and the Allies." This left the Serbian govern­
ment authority to withhold i1s troops if particular operations were not
viewed as being in the national interest. 3
Preempting a planned Allied attack, the Bulgars on August 5 , 1 9 1 6
launched a powerful offensive forcing back the Serbs in heavy fighting.
Halting the enemy drive, the Serbs then counterattacked. On August 17th
began the struggle for control of Mt. Kajmakcalan, rising to 8,225 feet.
The key to the entire Salonika Front, it was defended by a Bulgaro-
196 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
German army of over 160,000. Enemy positions in mountains and for­
ests appeared impregnable, but the Serbs counterattacked and on Septem­
ber 12th reached the peak of Kajmakcalan. On September 20th they cap­
tured the key position, "Starkov Grob," and aided by French forces
crossed the Cema River. Preceded by Franco-Russian forces, the First
Serbian Cavalry Regiment entered liberated Bitolj inside Serbian Mace­
donia November 6th. The Serbs regained a slice of their territory as hopes
mounted for a breakthrough into Serbia proper. Then the offensive halt­
ed: Serbian losses were so severe that their three armies dwindled to two.
In December 1 9 1 6 uneasy calm descended over the Salonika Front, per­
sisting until the Serbian breakthrough of late 1 9 1 8 . 4
Colonel Apis helped plan the Serbian advance. His telephone reports
to fellow Third Army officers, whose texts are preserved in Belgrade's
Military Historical Archive, suggest his total absorption in military matters.
At 8:50 AM August 7th Apis informed "Black Hand" colleague, Colonel
Milovanovic-Pilac, that the enemy was advancing on Eksisa and Sorovica;
Serbian forces were falling back. But at 6:30 PM he telephoned Colonel
Maric that the Drina Division was bombarding Kajmakcalan and infantry
had occupied Koratepe and Ploca. 5 A Bulgarian prisoner disclosed that
two Bulgar regiments, refusing to fight, had been sent to the rear to be
restored to discipline. That evening Apis reported sharp enemy attacks : "On
the left wing they are driving our battalion from its forward positions."'
Reacting to early Serbian reverses, Chief of Staff General Bojovic com­
plained that the Danube Division especially had not fought well in battles
of August 4-7. Every commander, he warned, was expected to have any­
one shot who fled the battlefield. 7
In the following days Apis reported more strong Bulgarian attacks and
Serbian reverses. Telephoning Colonel Maric August 9th, he noted that
Bulgar attacks beginning at midnight against the 1 7th and 18th infantry
regiments had driven the Serbs back to their main defense lines. F ortun­
ately, a few Serbian reinforcements were arriving from Vardar Division. "In
general the si tuation s
i satisfactory." Later though: "The Bulgars are
attacking on the entire front, especially from Gomicev and on our ex­
treme left." Apis emphasized the enemy's superiority in artillery .3 Su­
preme Command, summarizing operations August 4- 1 5th, denied the Bul­
gars had achieved much since their losses were twice those of the Serbs.
"Bulgar prisoners reveal low morale. They say openly that they do not
Salonika Front 197
want to fight for the Germans and the Turks."9 But on August 15th Col­
onel Maric deplored the Third Army's position:
.
The terrain is rocky and without water; we are subjected to heavy
enemy [art illery J fire. Losses are considerable. Such a situation is
becoming untenable. Morale of the troops remains unbroken, but
10
we cannot count on this for long.
Then enemy pressure subsided. General Milos Vasic, newly appointed
Third Army commander, praised the 17th Regiment highly for repelling
enemy attacks heroically on August 8-9th with huge enemy losses. After
the enemy offensive, Apis warned:
On the entire front is noticeable the terrible stench of disintegrating
corpses. Perhaps we should conclude a truce of three to four hours
in order to bury the dead. If we await the start of our own offen­
sive, we won't be able to hold out in our positions.11
Meanwhile Apis continued to protect and conceal Rade Malobabic from
the Corfu and Salonika authorities. When Apis left for Salonika in early
May, Malobabic remained on Corfu. "l could no longer worry about him
nor did 1 write anyone about him," testified Apis. Before leaving for Rus­
sia, Major Radoje Jankovic issued Malobabic a document in French author­
izing him to leave in late May for Third Army staff in Salonika so Apis
could fmd him a civilian post.
From Salonika Rade went to Third Army staff in Ostrovo where Apis
arranged for him to operate a small grocery shop for Serbian officers and
men. Apis told the Salonika court about meeting with Rade about August
25th:
At the time we had already moved to Ostrovo village. Without any
special reason I told Major Yulovic : 'When you see Rade, tell him to
come and see me or send someone to call him.' At noon that day
Rade came to see me. This was a few days after our arrival in Ost­
rovo village on about August 20th . . . . When he came at noon I was
busy and •asked him to come back after supper that evening. At that
time I left the office while soldiers were cleaning it and walked in
1 98 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
front of the building close enough so that I could hear the telephone
if it rang.
Walking with Malobabic near the staff building, Apis warned he must fm d
him a job elsewhere . He did not tell Rade that General Vasic, Third Army
commander, seeking the storekeeper's post for his brother, was making
trouble. "Please if I cannot continue what I am doing now," said Rade,
"I wish to enter the army." Looking at his emaciated friend, Apis said he
would fmd him non-military duties. He never intimated that Rade would
receive secret work, as Malobabic confirmed in court. Declared Apis
warmly:
1 could not tell you immediately to which work I would send you
because I did not know myself until I had found something. Since
I was not angry with you, nor you with me, you continued to send
me sausage and cheese [from the store] , and so we lived well.
The courtroom audience laughed appreciatively.
Soon thereafter Apis learned from Bratislav Stojanovic, Third Army
postal censor and a school friend, that others had interpreted Rade's in­
stallation as storekeeper in Ostrovo as motivated by Apis' desire to make
money. Denying this vehemently , A pis affirmed he had never been mater­
ialistic and was merely seeking suitable employment for Malobabic.12
A couple of days later, testified Rade, Apis informed him he must leave
Ostrovo quickly. "Go immediately and choose a village nearby where you
can hide, then return and tell me . . . where you will be going. You can
leave your things and merchandise and return for them later." Asked why
he had insisted Rade leave the store, Apis replied: "I had no intention nor
need to remove him especially urgently," but Rade was being accused
falsely of overcharging and quarreling with soldiers.
For me Rade's departure from Ostrovo was not linked with any date
or hour, but 1 had decided to remove him from the store and hide
him somewhere where he could live quietly and where I would not
be involved in his work even morally. I allowed him to continue to
work so he would have some money at war's end. I began to worry
then about my family in Serbia and had a nephew in France to sup­
port, so I could not put Rade on my payroll or support him.
Salonika Front 199
Apis realized he must not antagonize General Milos Vasic, his superior,
who wanted the storekeeper's job for his brother. His relations with Vasic,
who had opposed Apis and the conspirators sine� 1903, were already
strained. Since the store was right near Third Army staff, Vasic knew
Rade by sight and had been in his store. He also knew Rade was a close
friend of Apis. 14
Thus before Third Army staff left Ostrovo, stated Apis, he instructed
Malobabic to go to his friend, Colonel Alexander Stojsic, brigade com­
mander in nearby Batocin village. Why did Apis not simply instruct Major
Vulovic, chief of the police information division, to order Malobabic to
leave Ostrovo immediately? A pis explained:
My friendship and dealings with Rade and my protection of his per-
son ruled out that method . . . . That would have been disloyal to a
person I was protecting . . . . Rade lacked a permit for the job of
storekeeper obtained by the formal procedure prescribed by Salon­
ika, but he did have a permit from his division.
Rade had to move quickly, A pis felt, to avoid trouble from the Salonika
authorities and possible arrest. He denied discussing political matters with
Rade on Corfu or in Salonika. 15
On September 7th Apis gave Rade a letter he had written to Colonel
Stojsic who knew about Apis' troubles with General Vasic:
Dear Aco,
I have long considered to whom to entrust Rade, my storekeeper,
then decided it best to send him to you. You know him from Corfu
and he knows and likes you, so he will be best off with you and can
remain with you until better days come. I ask you most sincerely to
watch over him . . . . This man has suffered so much innocently that
you must guard him at any cost . . . . It is the sad story of an honor­
able, strong worker for our Serbian cause who was repaid in a ter­
rible way. Besides this could only have happened with us, not among
any other people on earth . . . . Give him brotherly protection, I beg
you . . . . You can have him with you as a non-combattant volunteer.
. . . For well-known reasons, it is inconvenient for him to remain
with me, and you are closest to me . . . .

200 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
When this letter was read in the Salonika court, Chairman Misic queried :
"Why did you write such a letter revealing your puzzling and excessive
concern about Malobabic and his health? Responded Apis: "Evidently, I
remained true to my moral obligations to Rade and sought to keep him
alive at any cost." What was "the better time" Apis alluded to? "I count­
ed on better days for Malobabic when he could come into the open, look
everyone in the eye, and ask for their excuses for what had happened to
him. That would be when Serbia had become Greater Serbia." Why had
it been so necessary that Malobabic survive when so many Serbs died in
the war? asked MiSic. Malobabic, explained Apis, out of patriotism had
served Serbia with unusual dedication.
This question of the honor of one man in whose fate l was involved
was so important to me that I considered his life most precious. I
did not intend thereby to minimize the sacrifices which the Serbian
people bore or to argue that his life was more valuable than those
who died on the battlefield. 1'
Dispatching Rade to Colonel Stojsic but fearing he might be rearrested ,
Apis concealed his whereabouts from the authorities. He cautioned Rade
repeatedly to avoid Salonika. Thus when Supreme Command wrote Gen­
eral Vasic September 23rd asking Apis and Vulovic to state what they
knew about Malobabic and if they knew where he was, Apis feigned
ignorance: "Malobabic has never been in the staff of this lThird] army,
nor has he served here for a moment." Why had Apis misled his com­
mander and the Supreme Command? Apis explained:
I kept silent on purpose . . . and in this case deceived my superiors.
I did so because I did not wish to yield Rade to the authorities and
was fully convinced my army commander and especially Supreme
Command knew that Rade was with me. The reasons for my vio­
lations of regulations Jay in my interpretation of my moral duty to
Rade whom I was protecting against further prosecution.
Apis believed Malobabic would be arrested if he entered Salonika. That
was why Rade's old foe, Kosta Tucakovic, chief of Supreme Com­
mand's police section, was inquiring about him. "By what right do you
•
Salonika Front 201
act on your own hook when your superiors' views differ from yours?"
asked Misic. "Not by any law," retorted Apis, "But by the well-known
right of initiative to preserve the general validity of orders and instruc­
tions." Out of human considerations, Apis rejected blind obedience to
•
supenors.
On August 29th (September 1 1 New Style), just before a major Allied
offensive, occurred an alleged incident with grave implications for Colonel
Apis and "Black Hand." On a tour of the front Prince Alexander's auto­
mobile was supposedly fued upon near Ostrovo. Months later Apis'
enemies claimed he had planned to assassinate the Prince with Malobabic
as his instrument. At Salonika MiSic asked whether Apis had seen Malo­
babic or Muhamed Mehmedbasic on August 29th. Responded Apis:
August 29th of last year held no special significance for me, and I
heard about the supposed assassination attempt here in court from
the investigator. I absolutely do not remember seeing Malobabic or
Mehmedbasic during those days or conversing with them on that day.
Asked where he had been about 5 PM on the 29th, Apis replied: "I did not
leave the staff at all for anywhere . . . I kept a book of telephone calls, so
if it survives, one can see from that, or if not, then from the diary of
operations." A report of General Vasic of September 20th, noted MiSic,
ordered Apis to secure Ostrovo, but even after that rifles and revolvers
had been fued repeatedly nearby. Apis denied receiving such an order. He
and the chief of staff had done their best to halt random fuing, mostly by
Allied officers and soldiers, at wild game. 17
Seeking to link Apis with "Black Hand" colleagues who had visited him
in Ostrovo shortly before August 29th, MiSic asked whether Colonel Milo­
vanovic-Pilac and Major Radoje Lazic had spoken with him officially then
in Ostrovo. Unable to recall the precise date of their visit, Apis knew that
after the First Army's arrival in the area, those two officers had passed
through Ostrovo, perhaps shortly before the Allied offensive of August
30th. He did not recall them coming to supper together ; Lazic indeed had
not come for a meal. "We talked about tasks facing us and them in the
8
staff," explained Apis. 1
Colonel Milovanovic-Pilac's fmal statement to the court also provided
no exact date. Reaching Ostrovo about 6:30 PM, he found three colonels-

APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Stevan Milovanovic, Peter MiSic, and Pantelije JuriSic-discussing military
matters with Apis. Milovanovic-Pilac had then a<:companied the three to
army mess to see General Vasic, securing there permission to have supper
with Apis. He had left about 9:30 PM. Next day Milovanovic-Pilac was to
take his brigade to army reserve west of Ostrovo. Passing through it to
acquaint himself with troop dispositions, he had ordered his chief of
staff to obtain detailed information from army staff. After breakfast with
Apis, he had gone to obtain information on troop movements from the
commander of Vardar Division.
Had I planned to speak to Dimitrijevic about an assassination or a
coup, I would have concealed my arrival and the time. I would have
had supper with the army commander [General Yasic] to eliminate
suspicion, then spoken that evening quickly with Dimitrijevic and
would not have aroused suspicion by requesting permission to have
supper with him. Nor would I have gone [to him] a second time
thus attracting even more attention since that evening Dirnitrijevic
could easily have left his company on some excuse to accompany
me.1 9
MilovanoviC's account seems highly probable.
Prince Alexander frequently made long automobile tours of the front.
On August 29th, recalled Major Draskic, he had remained at the front until
evening, returning in a jolly mood. At supper Alexander and General Juri­
sic-Sturm, who had accompanied him, related that their French chauffeur,
Marquis d'Avari, had been frightened by shots he felt had been fired to­
wards them. At supper the whole affair was treated very humorously ;
lighthearted jokes were directed at d'Avari's timidity. The shooting inci­
dent was not mentioned again that evening or in the next days, confirmed
Draskic. No one attributed significance to such a common occurrence.
Jurisic-Sturm, DraskiC's Academy classmate, who normally related every­
thing which happened, said nothing to him about it. Had there been an
assassination attempt, concluded Draskic, Supreme Command and front
security would have been notified immediately, but they were not.20
As Serbian commander-in-chief, a major Allied offensive, not personal
security, absorbed Alexander's full attention then. On August 23rd Gen­
eral Sarrail had instructed the Serbian Supreme Command to join in a
•
Salonika Front 203
general offensive to begin August 30th, and noted optimistically: "We
have marked superiority at all points and a twofold superiority in artil­
lery ."21 Sarrail did not anticipate a complete break�rough since muni­
tions' supplies were limited, but he expected "good success."22 On the
eve of this offensive Prince Alexander exhorted the First Volunteer
Division:
We want revenge on the Bulgars for their treacherous attack from
the rear [October 1 9 1 5 ] , for their betrayal of Slavdom, for atro­
cities against our wounded and children. We want to go over the
dead Bulgars back into Serbia and resurrect it. We want to liberate
all Serbs and Yugoslavs and create a free, powerful and great Yugo­
slavia.23
Apis' telephoned dispatches chronicled that offensive's heartening pro­
gress. Already by dusk on August 30 the Drina Division had taken Kara
Tepe and Devojacko Brdo on the Brodska's right bank.24 At 9:45 PM Apis
telephoned: "The attack is going well. Preparations have been made to at­
tack the main defense line at Kajmakcalan."25 "From this morning," he
signalled September 1st, "the bitterest fighting is proceeding over Kaj­
makcalan itself." His frequent battle reports recorded the Serbs' successful
attacks over mountainous terrain against strong Bulgar resistance. "The
struggle at Kajmakcalan is continuing hand to hand," he reported Septem­
ber l Oth?' On the 13th he exulted:
The battle ended about 6 PM. The Drina Division with its right
column held its position on Kajmakcalan's highest peak, the Bori­
sov redoubt. Officers and men of the Drina Division held on valiant­
ly. According to Bulgar prisoners, their losses in today's fighting
were terrible. Because of their corpses, one could not pass through.
On our sides losses were severe, and one can say that this day be­
longs to the bloodiest of the war. 27
Only on the 1 7th could Apis confirm: "The whole of Kajmakcalan was
taken with two rows of trenches. Prisoners were taken from several regi­
ments and four mountain guns . . . . "23
204 APIS: The Congenial Conspiral.Or
Such stunning Serbian victories reaffirmed Allied confidence in the
Serbian army . In October Serbia's military attache in London reported
to Supreme Command: the British would send eight more battalions and
four field batteries to Salonika.29 A month later General Ra�ic, Serbia's
military envoy in Paris wrote Prince Alexander that General Sarrail would
obtain the troops and commanders he required. Twenty-three Allied divi­
sions would remain on the Salonika Front. "Our victories have produced
an excellent mood among political and military people. War in the Balkans
will continue energetically from north to south until Bulgaria collapses."30
In November severe fighting on Serbian sectors produced more suc­
cesses. But after Bitolj's occupation (November 6) the Serbs revealed deep
exhaustion and morale was deteriorating. On November 16th Apis tele­
phoned:
Since yesterday the Bulgars have been attacking our units strongly
at Crni Vis. Two of their attacks were repelled, but the third enjoyed
some success . . . . The enemy forces are superior . . . . The view
prevails that Third Army needs somehow to be reinforced, so please
examine that possibility immediately .31
Responded Colonel Maric: "Supreme Command has no reserves to send to
Third Army."32 On the 18th Apis was on the telephone from 9:30 AM to
9:55 PM, one of many extremely long days of duty?3 Two days later he
reported the Drina Division's capture of Gruniski and Budimiracki Heights.
"The enemy retreated in disorder to Starvina, and our troops continued
energetic pursuit . . . . "� Then a curious lull settled over the entire front
facilitating the arrest of Apis and his friends.
Deteriorating Serbian morale after four months' combat without signifi­
cant relief or reinforcement induced Chief of Staff Bojovic to write army
commanders November 9th: "The Supreme Commander wishes to be in­
formed personally by army commanders about our army's total situation."
They were to meet personally with Prince Alexander to give him full data
on numerical strength, operations, losses, armaments, and supplies. 35
Late in 1 9 1 6 the Allies' political and military situation remained highly
uncertain. War weariness had deepened after military reverses on various
fronts. Pa5ic instructed his London envoy, Jovan Jovanovic-Pizon, that the
Salonika Front 205
French should not count on the Serbs unless they provided them military
relief_3' Pasic assessed the army's plight:
.
Today [December 19th] the War Minister wrote me from Salonika
arguing, as does the Heir, the absolute need of rest by the Serbian
army . . . . During this short time, he argues, the Serbian army has
lost half its effectives ; weariness and apathy have set in and flight
threatens to become general despite all possible measures . . . . The
War Minister asks that the entire Serbian army be withdrawn to the
rear for rest and reorganization for new important operations. 37
Jovanovic-Pizon reported persistent rumors about upcoming Allied talks
with the Central Powers for a negotiated peace.311 All this influenced
significantly Colonel Apis' fate.
How effectively did Apis serve Serbia on the Salonika Front? 1n Bel­
grade's Military Historical Archive are conflicting evaluations of him as
Third Army chief of staff, both from March 1 9 1 7 when he already faced
trial. Thus Third Army chief of staff, Colonel Mihailo Jovanovic had no
reason to praise Apis. His positive evaluation endangered his own career
and revealed honesty and courage:
[Apis] carried out the tasks entrusted to him quickly and with com­
plete dedication. His execution of General Staff work was clear,
decisive and energetic. He grasps orders given extremely quickly , and
in every situation is in full command. By his training he deserves
promotion to the next higher rank. 39
Not surprisingly General Vasic, Third Army commander, assessed Apis
very negatively. A political foe since 1903, Vasic was named Third Army
commander by Prince Alexander in August 1 9 1 6 partly to control and spy
on Apis and his friends. A positive evaluation of Apis in March 1 9 1 7 might
have wrecked VasiC's career. "As soon as 1 took command of the Third
Army," he wrote, "I noticed what his further service only confirmed: he
[Apisj is unreliable in service." Apis had failed to execute instructions
promptly-an allegation Colonel Jovanovic had refuted. "He is a bad staff
officer." Seeing Apis at Belgrade railway station July 1 2 , 19 14, Vasic had
said reproachfully : "Evidently, the General S taff kept the goverment poorly
206 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator

infonned about the Austro-Hungarian anny and regime ." Apis had re­
sponded : "Don't worry, Colonel, we have taken good precautions, and it
[Austria-Hungary ] is not such a great power." "From this," commented -

Vasic, "I discerned how dangerous Dimitrijevic was for our national inter­
ests in such an important post. There constantly came into the staff per­
sons who had no official business there and were not members of the staff."
Furthermore, Apis was so preoccupied by his distorted political ideas,
affirmed Vasic, that he became "absentminded for military service."
Finally, his health was too poor for anny service. "Because of all this he is CHAPTER XVIII
harmful for the military service and does not deserve promotion."40
General Vasic provided no specific evidence to support claims Apis
was an unreliable staff officer. Evidence to the contrary seems prepon­ THE CONSPIRACY AGAINST COLONEL APIS
derant. VasiC's chief example was drawn from Apis' service with General ( 1 916)
Staff in 1 9 1 4 when he was indeed much involved with political matters.
But Apis' avowed enemy found nothirtg substantive to include in his nega­ The general feeling was that they had pre­
tive evaluation. pared a trap for the lion, but there was
Indications are that Colonel Apis perfonned intensive, loyal, and valu­ amazement at the lion's incaution and at
able service for Third Army staff. He helped plan and report its operations the temerity of the hunters . . . . Prepara­
in Serbian offensives from August until mid-December 1 9 1 6 . His extreme­ tions for that lion hunt had been undertaken
ly long hours there, confirmed by his telephone reports, refute General long before .
Vasic's assertion of ruined health. Hard evidence is lacking that he engaged Ziv. 7 1 6 , "Solunska afera."
in anti-regime activities on the Salonika Front.41 Meanwhile his enemies
were plotting to remove him and his "Black Hand" friends from their "The Committee of Ten for the Liquidation of Colonel Apis." 1
posts and bring them to trial. 1 . Full members:
a. Colonel Peter Zivkovic
b. Colonel Josif Kostic
c. Colonel Dragoljub Jeremic
d. Gene raJ Pavle J uriSic-Sturm
e. Lt. Col. Radovanovic-Koca
f. Colonel Dragutin Okanovic
g. Colonel Milutin Jank.ovic
h. Lt. Col. Milan Gavrilovic
i. Lt. Col. Radak Radakovic
j. Lt. Col. RadiSa Nikolic

207
 208 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
2. "Associates "
a. Lj ubomir J ovanovic-Patak, Interior Minister
b. Dj uro Jelenic, Prince Alexander's secretary
c. Jovan Cirkovic, government political commissar
d. Kosta Tucakovic, chief police section Supreme Command
e. Major Zivojin Trivunac
f. Major Sreten Todorovic
g. Dragisa Stojadinovic , photo section Supreme Command
h. Milan Nikolic
Right after becoming Prince Regent in June, 1914, Alexander had
sought to oust Apis and his friends from Supreme Command and other
responsible army positions. Beginning with Apis' removal from Supreme
Command and Marshal Putnik's replacement, this pu rge continued on
Corfu and at Salonika during 1 9 1 6. Alexander's evident purpose was to
remove rivals who might contest his control over the army and state. 2
During 1 9 1 6 Alexander's court and the Radical regime prepared strenu­
ously to settle up with the Apis group. They sought to accomplish this
before returning to Serbia where Apis might secure public and Opposition
support and be protected by regular laws and courts. On Corfu then in
Salonika they created a police system, dubbed later by opponents the
"Salonika regime," recruiting hundreds of spies and infornters to gather
derogatory information about the Apis group. "The Committee of Ten
for the Liquidation of Colonel Apis," guided by "White Hand" leaders,
Zivkovic and Kostic, coordinated these activities. The omnipresent Salon­
ika police was subject to Interior Minister Jovanovic-Patak and directed
tactically by Kosta Tucakovic. After Sveta JaksiC's efforts to arrange an
officers' cabinet failed, Alexander and Premier Pasic told the hunters to
trap the lion. 3
"On Corfu I saw Apis before his departure for Salonika leaving the of­
fice of the newly appointed war minister, Bozidar Terzic," recalled Col­
onel Vladimir Tucovic. Speaking to him frankly, Terzic urged Apis to re­
nounce all political activity and avoid everything except performing his
military duties. No more politicking in the army would be tolerated,
warned Terzic. Apis denied any current political involvement but told
the War Minister he would not abandon his profound interest in the Ser­
bian national question. Finding no basis for cooperation, Terzic and Apis
-
The Conspiracy
209
parted, each strongly defending his own position. Neither evinced real
desire to compromise and reach agreement.
When Tucovic asked him about his plans, Apis de�lared:
We must tell our friends to devote themselves to their military ser­
vice since the main problem is to extricate ourselves from cata­
strophe by returning to the homeland, and that moment will surely
come. If we survive it, then we can get together and talk.4
Apis reiterated this sensible idea to all trusted friends, without whom he
could undertake nothing, before the alleged attempt on Prince Alexander
and right until his arrest. His friends on the Salonika Front recalled no
allusion or hint to a military coup or assassination. Had Apis intended
something he surely would have mentioned it to intimates. Thus if Apis
were plotting something, he did so alone. Yet Apis, a fme organizer and
careful planner, was too sensible to act alone.
Facing a strong enemy at the front with the Serbs dependent on the
Allies, what could Apis have gained by a military coup or by killing Prince
Alexander on Greek soil? Such an action would have doomed the Serbian
army, prevented a return to Serbia, and undermined the national cause.
Was Apis bargaining with the enemy, as some writers allege?5 Could he
expect cooperation from Austria after helping murder the Archduke?
Could a "Black Hand" leader negotiate with the Central Powers for the
Serbian and Yugoslav unification they had sworn to prevent? Yet unifi­
cation had been Apis' main goal ever since the 1 903 coup. He knew very
well his hands were then bound against any independent action. Perhaps
Apis hated Prince Alexander, though this is most doubtful, but he would
not plot his death thus undermining the Salonika Front and blocking
national unity. Nor does Apis' behavior indicate any such intentions. Ap­
parently indifferent to impending danger, he prepared no resistance. The
lion remained i n open view, fully exposed to the hunters. Had Apis con­
cealed plans from his close friends, surely he would have destroyed in­
criminating documents, but he did not do so.
Some of Apis' friends now turned from him . The 1903 conspirators
were no longer carefree youths with little to lose. Some had compromised
with the regime in power. Many who had won promotions and decora­
tions in recent wars wished to keep them. Why face needless risks by
210 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
following Apis' sinking ship? Others, weary of ceaseless struggle, longed
for peace and rest. Apis was not one to promise or provide these. Tireless­
ly propelling his damaged legs on tours of the front with his eternal cigar­
ette in his teeth, at each stop now he met new and indifferent comrades.'
Lieutenant Colonel Radak Radakovic, a leading defector from Apis'
camp, was promised a key post by the "Salonika regime." A supporter of
the May Coup, he had once been a friend of Apis. Without real evidence,
Radakovic had concluded that his failure to win promotion had been Apis'
fault. Defecting from his mentor, Radakovic was utilized by Apis' foes.
The "White Hand" arranged his appointment as commandant of Corfu, a
post which gratified his frustrated ambitions. Daily he ran to Prince Alex­
ander with denunciations of Apis and basked in the court's warmth . One
day Radakovic queried Tucovic how Apis and the "Black Hand" could be
shorn of influence. "I was amazed that at Court amidst a national cata­
strophe this was considered a 'burning question,"' wrote Tucovic. Either
this was a terrible hallucination or a predetermined goal based on fear.
They met again in Salonika. As Corfu commandant and close to Prince
Alexander, Radakovic revealed that the campaign against Apis preoccu­
pied their attention. The ideal solution, said Radakovic, would be to
compromise ''Black Hand" leaders in their official military duties as if
"their incapacities had caused their eventual misfortune." Superior Bulgar
forces had just forced the Danube Division to retreat near Gornicev. Soon
its commander and the Third Army chief of staff, both Apis men, were
removed. Encouraged by this success, Radakovic urged use of that tech­
nique as one way to break Apis' influence. "The time is approaching,"
he warned enigmatically, "when what we spoke about will be done.''7
Charged with preparing destruction of the Apis group was Interior
Minister Jovanovic-Patak's "Salonika regime," centering in that Greek
port but with tentacles reaching to Corfu, and even France and Switzer­
land. Coming to Corfu in January 1916, J ovanovic-Patak laid foundations
for this police regime, aided by Mihailo Rankovic, a former Assembly
deputy, and Colonel Dragutin Okanovic. Already in Nis JovanoviC's min­
istry began to utilize numerous spies and informers and conduct arbitrary
arrests and torture. An initial victim was Rade Malobabic. Former history
professor Jovanovic-Patak believed the Radical Party had given him carte
blanche to establish a miniature autocracy and destroy its enemies. His few
reputable subordinates were exiled from Corfu or watched by obedient
The Conspiracy 211
flunkeys, Ranko Trifunovic and Jovan Cirkovic. Colonel Okanovic recruit­
ed spies in the army, on Corfu , then in Salonika and at the front. The
"Committee of Ten's" influence pervaded the army. Few dared probe its
activities because of the fear it fostered. Soon without its consent little
was decided in the army . Later that spring the Interior Minister took up
headquarters across the street from the Supreme Command in Salonika.
There and in the War Ministry, JovanoviC's minions accumulated data to
incriminate the Apis group, while the Interior Ministry virtually dictated
to the military authorities. 3 This "Salonika regime" became a vital ele­
ment in the growing conspiracy against the Apis group.
The other major factor was Prince Alexander's entourage led by the
"White Hand." In spring 1916, recalled Major DraSkic, when Prince Alex­
ander came to Salonika, Colonel Zivkovic assumed total control of palace
affairs. Immediate changes were made in its staff and Guards without
consulting court marshal, Colonel Ostojic. In the palace cellar appeared
suspicious types, ex-guerrillas, and riffraff rarely found in decent places ;
they spent entire days drinking. Later, DraSkic realized they were the
Salonika Trial's chief "witnesses." Among ZivkoviC's friends and collab­
orators in the palace were Lieutenant Colonel Pavle JuriSic-Sturm, Major
Sreten Todorovic, and Major Zivojin Trivunac, recruited on Corfu . Rada­
kovic joined this team in Salonika becoming Prince Alexander's chief spy. 9
Once in Salonika Colonel Zivkovic purchased a house near the palace,
surrounded by gardens and a high wall. Zivkovic turned it into a miniature
fortress with electric alarms and a guard at each gate. Before going to
France on leave, at Colonel Jurisic's advice, Draskic paid his respects to
"Pera." Reluctantly , he entered that mysterious residence "where sur­
rounded by walls and guards sat that sinister man, chief decision-maker
in the Salonika Affair, in which he directed every thing without ever taking
responsibility , never appearing either as prosecutor, witness, or accuser."
Like a spider, Zivkovic spun his dark web. Draskic then had no idea what
Zivkovic was planning. Posing .merely as the Prince's obedient and humble
servant, "Pera" urged Draskic repeatedly to ask Alexander for this and
that. However, Draskic knew Alexander addressed only "Pera" as "thou.''
ln the palace Zivkovic did whatever he pleased, asking no one. In public
-
Zivkovic flattered and praised Draskic, but Major Sreten Todorovic con-
fided: "We all know you are a sworn "Black Hand" member and Peter
lZivkovic] is doing everything possible to throw you out of the palace,
but the Prince likes you so much that Peter can do nothing to you.''
212 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
All at once, continued Dra�kic, documents and telegrams marked mys­
teriously, "ANO" began appearing at the palace. Drailic was told to give
them all unopened to Major Trivunac who entered them in an inventory
with the same strange marking. One day Zivkovic told Dra5kic impor­
tantly: "Just think, those 'Black Handers' wanted to kill the Heir!" To
Draskic's surprised queries, Zivkovic added mysteriously : "You'll soon
see!" His palace cronies confirmed that the documents related to the
"Black Hand." Premier Pasic , Trivunac revealed, had insisted the mater­
ials to be marked "A�", selecting "A", Alexander's first initial. Thereby
Pasic sought to conceal his role in the conspiracy and undermine the
Prince Regent.
By now Draskic was also disillusioned with the "Black Hand." On
Corfu he had noticed that some of its leaders, especially Milovanovic­
Pilac, acted haughtily . What right did Apis have to interfere in political
matters in "Black Hand's" name without informing other members?
Most of all to blame were the unfortunate ministers who did not
dare retire Apis. Had they done so, everything would have quieted
down and ended without great convulsions. We know very well that
even the greatest power among us becomes absolutely impotent up­
on retirement like Samson when his hair was cut.
Instead Serbia and Alexander suffered terrible misfortunes threatening to
discredit them abroad just after everyone had applauded the Albanian
10
saga.
In early spring 1 9 1 6 Colonel Tucovic realized a major political storm was
brewing. On Corfu he heard constant rumors that something major was
being prepared against Apis. Hearing his own name mentioned, Tucovic
decided to see Prince Alexander. In June he asked War Minister Terzic to
arrange an audience. At court he talked at length with his friend, Colonel
Pavle Jurisic-Sturm who spoke very frankly . "You 'Black Handers' are to
blame for all our misfortunes," declared Jurisic. "This is the unanimous
view. Against you especially are Prince Alexander and many of the Radi­
cals." Continued J uriSic prophetically:
It is known that Apis is the chief one to blame for everything, but
he had helpers who served as his instruments. It is known that many
The Conspiracy 213
officer members of your society entered the organization from ideal­
istic motives. They did not dream that something else was concealed
there . . . . Thus it i
s felt that in liquidating it to act as follows: Apis
and some others will be severely punished, perhaps by death. Others
will be punished less harshly, and the rest will be pensioned off, part­
ly spared. This will be done before reentry into the country [Serbia] .
In that manner the Sarajevo murder will also be liquidated.
Evidently by June 1 9 1 6 Prince Alexander and his circle had decided ten­
tatively to arrest Apis and his friends and try them on charges bringing
death to the ringleaders. JurisiC's reference to Sarajevo is intriguing: did
some Radicals envision a possible separate peace with Austria-Hungary?
Such charges against "Black Hand" were wholly false, protested Tuco­
vic. Purely patriotic, it had never acted against the dynasty or country.
These denunciations stemmed from ignorance and intrigue turning the
Prince against Apis and the organization. Tucovic denounced such liquid­
ation plans during a war aiming to achieve what all Serbs favored: Greater
Serbia or Yugoslavia. To this JuriSic remarked:
It was thought to liquidate Apis summarily because he is known as
the leader of the entire thing, and if he died, everything would be
all right. One officer with a Karadjordje star offered to liquidate
Apis, but it was decided not to do that. There must be a trial with
public punishment which will be imposed also on the others.
ic had spoken the truth. An honest man of character,
Tucovic believed Juris
he could not have invented all this. JuriSic-Sturm, wearing a Karadjordje
star, must have volunteered to kill Apis, Tucovic believed. Juri�ic added:
"We will make Alexander great, then he will make the country great."
Tucovic related this entire conversation to Apis.
Extreme ambition, Tucovic concluded , had induced the patriotic Juri­
sic-Sturm to join Zivkovic's nefarious schemes. Believing himself destined
for a major postwar role, he had attached himself to Prince Alexander's
rising star. But soon after the war, as a disillusioned nervous wreck, JuriSic
resigned from the Yugoslav army and committed suicide, leaving a politi­
cal testament condemning Prince Alexander and conditions on Corfu . His
brother, Peter, later made a state councillor through Zivkovic's vast
214 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
influence, kept that document which confirmed Apis had neither plan­
ned nor organized the alleged attempt on Alexander's life. Pavel had talk­
ed with the French police who had followed the Prince's car on August
29th. Hearing shots, they had stopped when Alexander did, examined
11
the whole area finding nothing and nobody.
General Damjan PopoviC's letters to his wife, Mileva, described graphi­
cally sinister conditions on Corfu and in Salonika during 1 9 1 6 and the net
being woven for the Apis group. After PopoviC's arrest, the French, co­
operating with Serbian police, seized the letters in Lyons. From Corfu on
May 1 7, 1 9 1 6 Popovic, a leading May conspirator, had written:
Here the situation is worse than it was before May 29 [ 1903] in
Serbia. That is why I am not getting your letters. A whole batta­
lion of gendarmes is commanded by Lt. Col. Milan Gavrilovic. Also
some are commanded by Lt. Col. Radak Radakovic , local com­
mandant here, and also a person of trust [a sarcastic reference] .
A month later, Popovic wrote: "For us the situation is very unfavorable .
. . . Spies watch us everywhere . . . following me and all who talk with
me." Again on September 26th: "They are urging officers not to be
friendly with me . . . . They don't understand our feelings, and believe
that in our work some plans are concealed even though we are doing
nothing." After the War and Interior ministers left for Salonika two days
later with a proposal to create a special court-martial for officers, the Gen­
eral commented: "They are preparing a noose for someone, the unfortun­
ates." Popovic heard that both Pa5ic and Protic had opposed that proposal
1 cannot believe this is the desire and will of the Heir but rather of
the nonentities who surround him . . . . The intent is to destory our
comrades, drive them into a corner and prevent any activity or influ­
ence by them on state affairs. 1 2
Milovanovic-Pilac's prison diary claimed that "White Hand" leader,
Lieutenant Colonel Milorad Radovanovic-Koca, had quarreled violently
with Peter Zivkovic. Before witnesses he accused Zivkovic of firing at
the Prince's automobile on August 29th so A pis would be blamed. After
"preparing" and "prompting" witnesses for the Salonika Trial , Zivkovic
The Conspiracy 215
told Radovanovic that if Apis were not condemned to death, he, Zivkovi c ,
would poison him. 13
The "Committee of Ten" now viewed the Apis qu�stion as urgent. After
the Ostrovo incident they transformed the Prince's view of an affair he
had earlier dismissed lightheartedly. With the "White Hand" conjuring up
visions of terrible danger to his life, Alexander denounced the "Black
Hand" leaders:
I looked through my fingers at them, gave them positions; they
scolded me, swore at me, threatened me, and fmally shot at me,
then 1 decided to turn the matter over to the courts.
Did Alexander truly believe that Malobabic, at Apis' instructions, had fired
at him? Even after Apis' arrest, when Tucovic mentioned the Ostrovo inci­
dent to General Mirko Milosavljevic, later chairman of the Salonika High
Military Cotrrt, he queried laughing: "What assassination attempt?" The
question remained whether Apis and his friends could be implicated in
that attem pt. 14
At the Salonika Trial Apis denied emphatically any link with the affair.
He lacked any motive to harm a Prince who had been his benefactor and
saved his life:
I had no role in preparing such a repulsive affair. I had no personal
reasons to wish the Heir's death. On the contrary , for many years 1
was one of the young people closest to the Heir. From this time my
memories are of the warmest. The Heir's benevolence towards me
was such that I believe few can claim anything comparable. Valuable
presentes which I received from the Heir I still keep as proofs of his
good will towards me. The Heir is godfather to my little grandniece
[Nenuska] , the late Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Glisic's child.
Besides, that I am alive. today, surviving the most terrible disease
[Maltese fever] I have only the Heir to thank. By telegram he order­
ed that I be treated, that the doctors stay with me until my recovery,
and he constantly asked about the course of my illness. All expenses
for my treatment, involving several thousand dinars the Heir assum­
ed personally. In view of all this 1 would have to be the fiercest and
most bloodthirsty of wild beasts for such an ideas to occur to me. 15
 216 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Once his entourage persuaded Alexander the A pis group could be link­
ed with the shots fired at Ostrovo, the "Committee of Ten" affirmed that
Rade Malobabic, Apis' protege , had fired them intending to kill the Prince.
Understanding legal matters poorly, Alexander considered such an attempt
likely. King Peter had noted his son's unusual gullibility. Since proofs to
convince a regular military court were lacking, the Committee planned to
hail Apis and his colleagues before a special court martial requiring less
proof. But such courts then could try only enlisted men, not officers.
Thus on September 23rd, Colonel Gojko Pavlovic, chief of Supreme
Command's legal division, and Dr. Moacanin, the Prince's physician, ar­
rived on Corfu proposing a special court martial for officers. The doctor
brought the news that the Prince Regent had been the target of an abor­
tive assassination. Chiding the government for failing to protect him, Alex­
ander demanded War Minister TerziC's removal . This sensational news
provoked much sympathy on Corfu, but PavloviC's idea of a special court
martial met strong cabinet opposition. All ministers except Terzic and
Jovanovic-Patak opposed such a court, and the Indepenelent Radicals
threatened to resign . Stojan Protic obj ected to its illegality, and Pasic
refused to sacrifice his coalition cabinet. Blocked over the special court,
Apis' enemies temporarily renounced ideas of placing him on trial. Talk
about the assassination attempt ceased abruptly .1'
This gave Apis and his friends only a brief reprieve. Interior Minister
Jovanovic-Patak soon urged War Minister Terzic confidentially to move
decisively against "certain officers" suspected of plotting a military coup
and to murder the Heir. The War Minister turned this over to Supreme
Command which authorized Colonel Pavlovic to activate the "Committee
for the Liquidation of Colonel A pis" led by Colonels Zivkovic and Kostic.
It promptly ordered the arrest of Apis and his "Black Hand" colleagues.17
Prince Alexander and the "White Hand," not the Pasic government now
resolved to try the Apis group. The Prince believed that Apis, Vulovic, and
their "Black Hand" thugs intended to murder him. Apis' past as a regicide,
the unruly Vulovic, and daily denunciations by police spies and "White
Hand" so upset the Prince that he could no longer distinguish truth from
fiction. Minister J ovanovic-Patak told him Apis had ordered the Archduke
murdered in order to provoke war, then planned to assassinate Emperor
William 11 and other crowned heads. Apis, he affi rmed, was a maniacal mur­
derer. Apparently the Heir concluded Apis was a paranoid criminal type
The Conspiracy 217
too dangerous to be left at large . The Prince's entourage , interpreting his
least move as a dangerous conspiracy, was amazed that Apis had not acted
.
agamst them. 1 3
Slobodan Jovanovic saw Apis sometimes in Salonika. At their fmal
meeting shortly before his arrest, though realizing the "White Hand" was
intriguing against him, Apis showed no concern. If he kept quiet and did
his job, Apis believed at worst they could only send him abroad. He heard
rumors he would be named military attache in Belgium or Spain. He con­
sidered it unlikely they would put him on trial . They might hire assassins
to shoot or poison him, but he had taken precautions against that. 1 9
Meanwhile Apis and his friends were being shadowed , spied upon, and
criticized at the front. General Vasic, Third Army commander, sent nega­
tive reports to Supreme Command as it strove to build a case of alleged
insubordination and neglect of his duties against Apis. Vasic claimed Apis
had violated his order banning boat travel on a lake near Ostrovo, then he
had allowed highly suspicious persons to move freely around the staff,
such as Father Peter Anastas. Testified Apis at Salonika:
I saw the priest for the first time at [Third Army] staff when he
returned from the commander [General Vasic) , but I had no deal­
ings with him. l hear such accusations from my army commander
for the first time here in court and did not know this while I was
doing my duty day and night that he was writing such reports about
me. Now I understand why I am in detention if my commander
began intriguing and framing me already in September. The proxi­
mity of my commander to me was unpleasant . . . . Only now do I
understand some of his references then. Once he said to me: 'Did
you intend to play politics?' Sometimes when some of my friends
came to the staff, he would remark ironically: 'Surely you have
come especially to have dinner with Colonel Dimitrijevic� . . . As
you see, all this is mere trivia.'l0
Well informed about the anti-Apis agitation was Atanasije Sredojevic, a
lifetime national activist and veteran of intelligence and police work.21
When Major Vulovic became chief of Third Army intelligence, Sredojevic
became his assistant: they both worked directly under Colonel Apis. As
head of Supreme Command's police section, Kosta Tucakovic organized
 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
218
systematic spying on Apis and his friends on Corfu, then on the Salonika
Front. Protected by the lnterior Minister, Ranko Trifunovic-Tucakovic's
colleague and subordinate-had arranged the murder of Bosnian volunteer,
BoSko Arezina, then blamed it on Major Vulovic, causing his dismissal.
Failing to enlist Sredojevic in his spy network against Apis, Tucakovic
intrigued to remove him from Third Army. Right after VuloviC's dismissal
Supreme Command assigned Sredojevic to the front although because of
war injuries he had been classified a non-combattant. Apis refused to ex­
ecute that illegal order. Reassigning him to Third Army staff, Apis blocked
Tucakovic temporarily. Thus Sredojevic learned many details of the con­
spiracy against Apis before he too was arrested.22
Soon before Apis' arrest Vladimir Tucovic talked with him at Vasilica
near Salonika. Did the Colonel sense things closing in around him? Apis
just shrugged: "I'm not doing anything bad, but if they want to ruin me,
I cannot oppose them, but I doubt it is true." Warned Tucovic :
I believe they will search you soon, and if they fmd anything, they
will arrest you. If you have something to destroy which needs to be
preserved, give it to me to take to Corfu because they are sending
me back there.
"I have nothing significant except the constitution of our organization,
'Unification or Death!' which no longer exists," replied Apis. "I ll keep
'
that with me, then if they fmd it, they will see there is nothing to it." That
proved to be an unwise and fateful decision. "I see all that is happening,"
continued Apis, "and if I return alive to the country [Serbia] , someone
will have to answer for what they have done to the Supreme Command,"
meaning the summary dismissal of Marshal Putnik and his entire staff.
The Salonika authorities, Apis affirmed, had gone up a blind ally with
Malobabic. "From fear they want at any cost to make him out as guilty
since they don't know what else to do and how to justify themselves."23
Soon after that, Milutin Jovanovic, a Foreign Ministry official and
PasiC's nephew, visited Tucovic on Corfu. Apis' assignment as military
attache had been arranged with the Belgian king, he reported; he would
soon leave to assume his new post. Believing that would end tension with
Alexander, Tucovic rejoiced and awaited Apis on Corfu. When news of
Apis' arrest came instead, he realized Jurisic-Sturm had spoken the truth:
a well-conceived plan was being implemented.24
The Conspiracy 219
Until late November some regime leaders opposed Apis' arrest and trial.
Jovanovic-Patak telegraphed Premier Pa5ic November 30th in code urging
pensioning off Apis. He opposed a trial as injurious to army morale and
.
that of the Serbian people , and as ruinous to Serbia's reputation with the
Allies. J ovanovic-Patak hinted that he was under strong pressure, apparent­
ly from the Prince, to conduct a criminal investigation of Apis. "Please
give me your views immediately in strictest confidence . Draskovic agrees
with my viewpoint." Trying Apis and his friends, warned the Interior
Minister, would endanger the coalition government.25 For an eleventh
hour compromise between Apis and Alexander, Milorad Dra5kovic would
have been the logical choice. Having praised Apis' patriotism and talents
on Corfu, the independent Radical leader also enjoyed Alex<mder's favor.
Yet he and his colleagues avoided mediation for fear of damaging their
party.26
Days before his arrest Apis received by unknown hand Major Vulovic's
highly incriminating letter, later used against them. Written November
27th but unaccountably reaching Apis only two weeks later, it denounced
the Prince and the dynasty . Why did Vulovic, who knew the Prince had
been Apis' benefactor, dare send him that letter? asked MiSic at Salonika.
Why had Apis not shown this diatribe to the authorities? Knowing of Apis'
loyalty toward the Heir and dynasty , replied the Colonel, Vulovic must
have counted on Vulovic's friendship and loyalty :
As soon as I received the letter, I did not share its views for a moment
nor his suspicions and therefore put the letter in my wallet deciding
to deliver it to Colonel Peter Zivkovic. I wanted to send him this
letter so he could inform the Heir. I received the letter only De­
cember 13th and had to send it by some special means or await
Zivkovic's arrival.
Before he could do either, he had been arrested.27 An uneasy calm prevail­
ed on the Salonika Front, the hunters awaited impatiently the signal to
cast their net over their quarry's head.

CHAPTER XIX
THE LION IS CAGED
( D ECEMBER 1 9 1 6 )
. . . Colonel Dimitrijevic intentionally and
with definite plan recruited individuals and
worked to carry out the assassination of the
Heir, overthrow the present regime . . . and
introduce the supreme power of ten to fif­
teen men dependent on this military organ­
ization and eliminate all those standing in
the way, especially Premier Pasic.
Colonel Gojko Pavlovic, December 14, 1 9 1 6
Apis' arrest at Vostarane village o n December 1 5 , 1 9 1 6 followed months
of assiduous work by the "Committee of Ten." Its timing related closely
to the overall European military and political situation and domestic
Serbian considerations. Very significant was an Allied decision in mid­
November to launch a Balkan offensive the next spring to liberate Serbia
and Rumania. To Prince Alexander and the Radicals time to settle ac­
counts with Apis seemed to be running out. Emperor Charles' accession to
the Austro-Hungarian throne and possible separate peace talks may also
have spurred the Serbian regime to move swiftly against Apis.
Late in 1916 World War I entered a critical phase. Almost everywhere
the Allies had suffered significant reverses. Rumania had been forced out
220
The Lion is Caged 221
action. In Russia military defeats and political and economic disintegration
heralded the coming revolution. If Russia left the war, Allied chances of
victory would dwindle and the Pasic regime would lose its staunchest sup­
porter. The United States was still months away fro·m joining the Allies.
Profound war weariness pervaded the belligerents promoting ideas of a
compromise peace short of the decisive victory which to many seemed
unattainable. At the Allied conference in Chantilly near Paris on Novem­
ber 15-16, 1 9 1 6 plans were laid for a spring offensive to expel the enemy
from Serbia and Rumania and achieve victory in the Balkans.
Early in November died eighty-six year old Franz J osef I, emperor of
Austria-Hungary since 1848. His successor, Emperor Charles, relatively
young, pacific and flexible, aimed to save his thone by removing the Mon­
archy from the war. On November 1st began Franco-Austrian talks, and a
month later Charles reaffirmed his willingness to parley ; France now pro­
posed specific issues for discussion. 1
From the Bitolj victory in early November the Serbian army emerged
exhausted and depleted. In its ranks remained only 27,000 active fighters;
the rest were in hospitals or rear areas. Hopes of a breakthrough in to oc­
cupied Serbia faded. As the army lay in virtual narcosis, the "Committee
of Ten" worked its secret will.2 On Corfu and in Salonika spread rumors
of threatened army mutinies.
By this time, recalled Drailic, Prince Alexander had resolved to get rid
of the Apis group at any cost. Before the return to Serbia, it was rumored,
the "Black Hand" would erect "a gate of sabres," allowing into the home­
land only those it approved of.3 By November 20th Alexander and Pasic
had learned of the planned Balkan offensive. Preparations for Apis' arrest
and the Salonika Trial, affirmed Vasiljevic, began right afterwards. Prince
Alexander seized his last favorable opportunity to destroy the Apis group.4
How did Pasic and the Corfu government view the situation? The cab­
inet, alleged Milorad Draskovic, feared chiefly Apis, Vulovic and Milo­
vanovic-Pilac. 5 Some claimed .that Pasic no longer believed in Allied vic­
tory, concluding the Central Powers were likely to prevail. By liquidating
the Apis group, the Corfu regime could create favorable conditions for a
possible separate peace insuring Serbia at least her prewar boundaries.
Peace feelers were being sent through Prince Sixte de Bourbon-Parma,
Emperor Charles' relative , and Stojan Protic's secret mission to Switzer­
land was connected with this, claim some accounts. Such a view, argued
222 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Vasiljevic later, was one-sided and mistaken. An astute politician, Pasic
always had at least two solutions to every problem and invariably left
himself an escape route. In November 1 9 1 6 Pasic probably still believed
in eventual Allied victory but viewed a separate peace with the Central
Powe rs as the alternative. Austro-French talks beginning December 2/ 1 5th
provided no direct pretext for arresting Apis since Pasic and Alexander
only learned about them subsequently. But those conversations influenced
them to move ahead aggressively with the Salonika Trial. 6
Two of his trusted officers-Lieutenant Colonel Radovanovic-Koca
and Colonel Pavle Jurisic-Sturm-warned the Prince that executing Apis
would insure his martyrdom. "Our people love political martyrs," de­
clared Radovanovic. If Apis were killed, some day his bones would mock
Alexander from the palace balcony. Radovanovic doubted Apis had plot­
ted against the Prince: "A pis would never have bribed someone to carry
out an assassination; he would have done it himself and started a revolu­
tion too." Jurisi6 agreed, but Alexander was unswayed: "Both of you are
young and naive and don't know anything," was his rejoinder. If the Heir
asked front line officers, persisted Radovanovi6, he would realize they had
been correct. 7
Top Serbian government and military leaders exchanged several docu­
ments paving the way for the Apis group's arrest. First came the Interior
Minister's lengthy communication ("prezidijal") to the War Minister on
December 1 2th : a
Already while our army was on Corfu , i t was observed that one
group of our officers was conducting political agitation and making
preparations for actions contrary to the Constitution and laws and
damaging to the interests of the country and its people. Here in
Salonika we acquired precise information . . . and the conviction
grew that unless their activities were halted, they could have serious
consequences for the fighting strength of the Serbian army and the
future of the country.
The Apis group's foreign activities were "strictly confidential" and must
be investigated separately and secretly . Apparently, this was to conceal
the "Black Hand's" patriotic goal of unifying the Serbs. "Their internal
activity," continued Jovanovi6-Patak, "had the aim of changing by force
The Lion is Caged 223
the legal order in our country and its form of government." To achieve
this had been undertaken various "impermissible activities" by Bosnian
revolutionaries from the late Vojin Popovi6-Vuk's guerrilla detachments.
"From the beginning leading this subversive circle stood Colonel Dragutin
Dimitrijevic." Holding responsible and influential positions, Dimitrijevic
had carried out numeous illegal and baneful actions.
The chief objective of Apis and company, continued the Interior Min­
ister, was to seize power illegally through those Bosnian revolutionaries.
They had skillfully won over and recruited active and reserve officers for
action at a favorable moment.
Their first task . . . was to overturn by force the present regime and
legal order with the Karadjordjevic dynasty, and instead of constitu­
tional monarchy to introduce a regime whose highest power would
be held by ten to fifteen selected persons who would accept this mili­
tary regime. All those hindering or in the way of their plan were to
be removed by force, and Premier Pasic was one of the first.
The Interior Minister never referred here to Apis' organization as "Unifica­
tion or' Death!" or "Black Hand" because its constitution and statutes had
not yet surfaced.
In February 1 9 1 6 on Corfu, affirmed the Interior Minister, Apis had
told the Bosnian youths that the Serbian regime in exile was in disorder.
Rulers such as William 11 of Germany, Ferdinand of Bulgaria, and Con­
stantine of Greece were pursuing "sensible" policies. Prince Alexander,
Apis claimed, had surrendered to an intolerable entourage. Before under­
taking external action, Serbs at home must be freed from such evil influ­
ences and Premier Pasic must be killed. But the Bosnians had refused to
'
involve themselves in Serbian internal politics. Thus Apis had turned to
members of fanner Serbian national organizations then in Greece. Then
occurred the "event of Sep�ember 12,"9 about which J ovanovic-Patak
pleaded ignorance, which also must be investigated.
Since such "subversive activities" were punishable under Serbian law
and endangered the state, J ovanovic-Patak urged War Minister Terzic to
authorize the arrest of the Apis group. Since most were officers, further
.10
action and investigation must be handled by the military
224 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Receiving this formidable "prezidijal" next day, December 13th, War
Minister Terzic sent it straight to the Supreme Command requesting fur­
ther legal action and confidential investigation. Terzic urged emphatically
that "such evil be destroyed at the roots in order to prevent execution of
these dangerous and harmful intentions." 1 1
Terzic's message reached Supreme Command later that day. How rapid­
ly a bureaucracy can operate when its leaders' vital personal or profes­
sional interests are at stake! In this case Prince Alexander evidently had
prearranged everything. Chief of Staff Bojovic promptly ordered Colonel
Pavlovic, chief of Supreme Command's legal division, to examine im­
mediately the Interior Minister's "prezidijal" and "supporting documents''
by Mihailo Rankovic and Jovan Milosavljevic, then submit to him next
morning his written views on legal action. 1 2
In an incredible burst of speed by the normally dilatory legal branch
Colonel Pavlovic submitted his written report next morning, December
14th. Obviously he had lacked time to check the veracity of these docu­
ments. Based on the "prezidijal" and "supporting reports," Pavlovic con­
cluded that:
. . . Colonel Dimitrijevic intentionally and with defmite plan recruit­
ed individuals and worked to carry out the assassination of the Heir,
to overthrow the present regime and legal order and the Karadjordje­
vic dynasty and to introduce the supreme power of ten to fifteen
men which would depend on this military organization and elimin­
ate all those standing in the way, especially Premier Pasic . 1 3
Mihailo Rankovic, a former Assembly deputy, until 1 9 1 2 had belonged
to the Independent Radical Party, then joined the Radicals and "Black
Hand," recruited by J ovanovic-Cupa, Piedmont's first editor. Becoming a
police provocateur by his own admission, Rankovic on November 25,
1 9 1 6 wrote to Prince Alexander in Salonika:
When You, the government and army left for Corfu lin January
1 9 1 6 ] , these people lApis group] gathered around them young
people, national workers, and enthusiastic youths from still unlib­
erated regions in Orae and prepared an organization whose purpose
and aim was that neither His Majesty , the King of Serbia, nor You,
The Lion is Caged 225
nor the government should return to Serbia, but instead to establish
the rule of a military republic. Among those who prepared this
odious affair the chief role was played by General Staff Colonel
Dragutin T. Di.mitrijevic, artillery major Ljubomir R. Vulovic; the
others recruited for this were all Bosnians . . . . 1 4
The Prince allegedly sent this letter right to Supreme Command.
Only on December 1 2th was the report by J ovan Milosavljevic, a police
agent of Supreme Command's intelligence section, submitted to his sup­
eriors. A former Belgrade student and journalist, Milosavljevic had written
for Slovenski Jug, Jovanovic-Cupa's pro-Yugoslav student newspaper.
Sworn into "Black Hand" by Jovanovic-Cupa, he had been in Rankovic's
"Black Hand" cell.
I am reporting stories which are circulating that on Corfu the of­
ficers accused here [sic] met with Bosnian volunteers and prepared
a coup . . . . From my meeting with volunteers Milan Ciganovic and
Djuro Sarac and from conversations held with them I learned that
some of the Bosnians separated from their Bosnian friends and that
Colonel Dimitrijevic turned them away from executing national
tasks advising them that first it was necessary to clean up our in­
ternal affairs. 1 5
This document's date and the channels it passed through reveal it as a
hastily concocted political denunciation to provide a "legal basis" for
action against Apis. Legal division chief, Colonel Pavlovic , accepted these
reports, based solely on hearsay, as bona fide and accurate without check­
ing their veracity .''
Colonel Pavlovic's report of December 14th comprised the sole legal
basis for prosecuting Colonel Apis and his chief associates. Its crucial
passages read:
. . . Colonel Dimitrijevic intentionally and with definite plan recruit­
ed individuals and worked to carry out the assassination of the Heir,
overthrow the present regime . . . and the Karadjordj evic dynasty
and introduce the supreme power of ten to fifteen men dependent
on this military organization . . . .

226 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Confirming this were Mihailo RankoviC's report, the Interior Minister's
"prezidijal" of December 1 2th, and MilosavljeviC's report.
Aiding the Colonel in this work were Colonels M. G. Milovanovic,
Dragomir Z. Stojanovic, Sr., and Vladirnir Tucovic ; Lieutenant
Colonels Bozin Simic, Velirnir Vemic and Vojislav Gojkovic , and
Major Ljubomir Vulovic . For the execution of this plan were re­
cruited: Nezir Hadzi Nalic, Milan Ciganovic , BoSko Arezina, Djuro
Sarac, Vladet Biblija, Muhamed Mehmedbasic, Mustafa Golubic, and
Veljko Zecevic . . . . Against Colonel Dimitrijevic criminal investi­
gation should be begun immediately under Articles 85 and 87 during
which he is to be confined; he is to be arrested immediately . . . . 17
Colonel Milan Dunjic, Salonika's military commandant, now named
chief investigator, was instructed to take Apis into custody .18 The War
Minister, informed by the Interior Minister of the Apis group's "subversive
intentions and activities," had reported them to Supreme Command "so
legal action would be taken to destroy this evil in its roots and prevent
dangerous and murderous actions against our state." 19
About noon December 15th the Salonika commandant arrived in Ost­
rovo armed with warrants to search Apis' personal effects and arrest him
if anything incriminating were found. At Third Army staff in nearby Vos­
tarane Colonel Apis was conducting normal military duties. Besides much
regular work, he had written his nephew in France not realizing it would
be the last letter Milance would receive from him. His arrest did not
come as a great shock. Later, Apis told Captain Milan Stojkovic , com­
mandant of Salonika Officers' Prison, that friends, notably Colonel Tuco­
vic, had warned him repeatedly. "They told me, I knew I was going to be
20
arrested."
When Colonel Dunjic appeared in Vostarane , he found Apis not very
surprised to see him. Dunjic ordered him to open his military trunk ; Apis
so instructed his orderly, Milic Ilic, who kept its keys and regularly hand­
led its contents. "I know personally," recalled Apis' nephew, "that Apis
did not know precisely what was in the trunk." Shocked that an officer
had come to search his colonel, Milic at first could not unlock the trunk.
Reassuringly in his habitual jovial manner Apis tapped Ilic on the shoulder:
"Don't worry Milic. The Colonel just wants to see what we have in our
•
The Lion is Caged 227
trunk, so open it up so he can see for himself that we are not hiding any-
'
thing." Apis turned smiling to Dunjic: "He was confused by you, wonder-
ing God only knows what will happen now that you have-come with such
a request." Always the genial host, Apis instructed Milic to bring cognac ;
2
Dunjic accepted a drink. 1
Most items in the trunk were trivial personal effects, money and letters.
However, Dunjic, an old enemy of Apis, could not restrain his joy at fmd­
ing copies of "Black Hand's" constitution and rules, and a list of its CEC
with their original signatures. Before the astonished Dunjic unfolded the
mysteries of the "Black Hand" society ; he was the frrst outsider to plumb
its secrets. Other potentially incriminating documents were Major Vulovic's
incautious November 27th letter to Apis, and letters from Colonels Plazina,
Lazarevic, and Lieutenant Colonel Glisic confirming Apis' intention in
May 1 9 1 4 to remove civil officials in Macedonia.22 For Dunjic and his
superiors this was a goldmine. Now it was certain Apis would be arrested
and imprisoned.
The first "Black Hand" leader arrested, Apis was taken under guard to
Salonika Officers' Prison. Apis' closest colleagues and friends were soon
removed from the front, then arrested. This was purely precautionary lest
they act on Apis' behalf. Those aware of Supreme Command's secret
operations, noted Tucovic, knew how it had decided whom to remove.
First members of the court camarilla fingered their personal enemies, then
reached collective agreement. Many battalions, regiments, even entire
army brigades were stripped of leadership as their commanders were re­
moved and deported or imprisoned. Cloaked in secrecy, these moves pro­
voked consternation and confusion in Serbian and Allied ranks. Fantastic
rumors spread in Salonika and at the front about treason, mutiny, opening
the front to the enemy, and secret contacts with the Central Powers. Cur­
iously, almost nothing was heard yet about an attempt on the Prince's
life. The entire Salonika Front was thrown into uncertainty Y The "White
Hand" seemed to place settlem.ent of personal scores ahead of the war and
the Serbian cause.
The news of Colonel Apis' arrest spread rapidly along the front. No one
knew why it had occurred. When his own removal from command follow­
ed immediately , Colonel Milovanovic-Pilac realized his arrest was imminent.
He issued a hasty farewell message to his troops :
228 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
The reason for my removal is unknown to me. In parting from you
officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, let me urge you as
your former commander and as a Serb: that you, mother Serbia, our
dear homeland, should remain always before your eyes?"
Other officers and even civilians were soon arrested and imprisoned or
deported to French North Africa. Regimental commander Colonel Cedo­
mir Popovic, hospitalized for a severe illness, was taken from the hospital
straight to Salonika Officers' Prison. And Bogdan Radenkovic, Serbian
vice-consul in Athens and a "Black Hand" founder, ill with acute tuber­
culosis, over his superiors' protests, had to travel to Salonika without
25
escort and was promptly imprisoned. Colonel Dunjic requested author­
ization from Supreme Command to detain and investigate other Apis
men: Colonel Tucovic , General Damjan Popovic, and Lieutenant Colonel
Vitomir Cvetjovic, since intercepted or confiscated correspondence re­
vealed their ties with the accused. Considered especially incriminating was
a letter of Cvetkovic to General Popovic from Corfu in 1 9 1 6 :
1 hope that consciousness will be awakened among our troops as
during May 29th [ 1903] to deal with the good-for-nothings . . . .
Here people are lacking whom we can work with, and very much
26
could be done . . . .
At dusk on December 16, 1 9 1 6 Colonel Apis arrived at Salonika Of­
ficers' Prison, noted the diary of Captain Milan Stojkovic, prison com­
mandant. "He tried not to appear upset, but precisely this betrayed that
he was upset." Stojkovic ushered Apis into his cell. Apis first noticed the
crossed iron bars on the windows. Suddenly he felt like a prisoner. He
looked dubiously at the bars and shivered: "How cold it is!" Were the
windows in proper repair? He spent an entire hour just walking around
the room. When Apis told the guard that his orderly would bring his
things, the guard warned: ' "That is up to the commandant." At 7 PM Apis
lay down fully clothed on his back, covered with his military overcoat,
and pondered. When water and a glass were brought, he refused them.
Apis fell asleep at 9 PM and slept right through the night.
On Colonel Apis' first full day at the prison he rose at 7 AM and lit a
cigarette. When Captain Stojkovic remarked he had· drunk none of the
The Lion is Caged 229
water, Apis asked "angrily and impudently" : "Have you regulated my
diet?" Stojkovic without replying took out his cigarette case, casually lit
a smoke in front of Apis, then departed. The Colo1_1el's personal effects
had arrived meanwhile. "He will get them this afternoon," noted Stoj­
kovic, "so he will learn patience and polite behavior." Psychological war­
fare between prisoner and jailor had commenced.
Apis stood long at the window plunged in thought. Only the roofs of
a few houses were visible. Then he walked nervously around his solitary
cell until 1 1 AM when Stojkovic invited him to walk in the courtyard .
"Thanks very much," responded Apis smiling, but he demurred. The Col­
onel ignored the obvious fact that his dinner had been pulled apart and
inspected before being given to him. The commandant then summoned
him to be interrogated by chief investigator, Colonel Dunjic. "Right
away!" replied Apis pleasantly . Afterwards, saying he was bored, A pis
asked the Captain to give him something from his trunk to read. "What
class are you from [at the Academ y) ?" queried Apis. "Why aren't you a
major?" Silently Stojkovic gave him a volume of Pushkin's poetry in Rus­
sian, an Italian dictionary, and other trifles. "Why can't I have my razor?"
inquired Apis. "So you won't kill yourself." "Oh, don't fear that," said
Apis smiling. "For me all this is just a joke; a bullet will kill me, so I won't
kill myself." Taking the things Stojkovic handed him , he offered the
Captain conserves and tobacco. "Help yourself, please, to whatever you
like. I prepared these for my family since I believed we would soon return
to Serbia . . . . " Smiling in turn, Stojkovic responded: "And you were
mistaken about that."
Apis read Pushkin until about 10 PM. Leafmg through the great Russian
poet's works earlier, Stojkovic discovered they had been read carefully. All
passages mentioning freedom had been underlined in colored pencil, ap­
p
parently by A is, as was the phrase: "Suicide was frequent in antiquity."
In Apis' trunk also evidently read carefully was a Russian translation of
John Stuart Mill's classic essay, On Liberty. 27

CHAPTER XX
AWAITING TRIAL
( DECEMBER 1 9 1 6-MARCH 1 9 1 7 )
What, my falcon, can't you understand that
Apis can even enjoy prison? Well, you see
that he can. One can do anything when one
wants to . . . . No, brother Serb, I am glad to
see you and that you are my jailor.
Apis to Lieutenant Josif Protic in
Salonika Officers' Prison
At Salonika Officers' Prison, as his chief colleagues were brought in one
by one, Colonel Apis soon settled into a routine. For three months all re­
mained in solitary confinement, supervised by Captain Stojkovic and his
assistant, Lieutenant Josif Protic . "We settled down and set our course "'
recorded Stojkovic in his extensive daily notes, compiled for Colonel Ziv-
kovic. "He [ApisJ acts very friendly, is always smiling, and gets up when­
ever I come in. He gets angry only when sometimes I knock on his door.
At first he would reply : 'Come in! Now he is silent and thinks I am j ok­
ing." For Zivkovic the Captain described Apis' behavior as a prisoner:
He doesn't lie down during the day; he reads, mostly sits, does not
utilize the walking time in the courtyard, doesn't speak to the guards.
230
Awaiting Trial 23 1
He goes to bed at ten PM but takes a full hour to fall asleep; he gets
up at eight or nine AM.
At first, noted Stojkovic, A pis questioned everything. ;,1 see that you don't
dare drink the water," remarked the Captain. "No, please," replied Apis
evasively, "I don't drink even a half glass of water in twenty-four hours."
But Stojkovic heared he feared being poisoned.
Were any of his friends at the prison? asked Apis. Soon he learned that
between December 19th and 2 1 st Colonels Milovanovic-Pilac, Cedo­
rnir Popovic and Lieutenant Colonel Vernic, all founding fathers of the
"Black Hand," had arrived, followed by the gravely ill Radenkovic.
The prisoners pleaded for newspapers but could read only a military
journal, Ratni dnevnik. To control them easier Colonel Zivkovic, the
spider, deliberately kept the prisoners isolated from the outside world.
Apis once asked for Ratni dnevnik "to see if there is anything new at the
front." One day with studied casualness he asked Stojkovic: "Is the in­
vestigating commission at work?" Instructed to be evasive , the Captain
replied: "I don't know." Concluded Stojkovic: "Evidently he is getting
impatient."
·Stojkovic had orders to watch the imprisoned officers constantly. His
diary recorded Apis' activities on December 23rd:
Dirnitrijevic arose at 7 AM, washed wrote something. At 1 1 AM he
requested Russkii vestnik [a Russian journal] from his trunk and
some matches. Also he asked for Push.kin's works. I feel that he can
no longer pretend and I am awaiting that. He ate heartily at 12: 15.
After dinner he read and wrote the whole afternoon. He failed to
use his walk time either morning or afternoon. He is nervous and
angry that I don't assign him a regular soldier to prepare his cof­
fee and that I hang over his head whenever there is someone in his
room. I ordered the sergeant to fix him coffee at 3:30 PM. He order­
ed the soldier to come back at 9 PM and remove his boots. Since his
orders are not binding on me, he had to undress himself at 9:30 PM.
Five days later the Captain wrote: "Dimitrijevic drinks much black coffee.
A soldier needs to cook it for him every hour. Two days ago I found in his
room a junior sergeant whom he had summoned to prepare coffee but

232 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
who in no case is supposed to enter his room alone." The authorities under­
standably feared Apis' personal magnetism.
Initially, Stojkovic refused Apis' requests to shave himself, then relent­
ed and gave him his razor. "He thanked me profusely and offered me cigar­
ettes." Asked if he needed anything, Apis replied: "Thanks a lot, I have
everything. As you see, I prepared myself well for this expedition." Was
the investigation commission working on his case? "You will see that no­
thing will come of all this [court case] . "2
As days stretched into weeks, reported Stojkovic, the prisoners grew
bored and anxious; they wanted urgently to talk with someone. Relieving
the monotony after the New Year was the arrival of Lieutenant Josif
Protic, assigned as Stojkovic's assistant, and then of Major Ljubomir Vulo­
vic. Lieutenant Protic had to awaken Stojkovic, recovering from one of his
frequent drunken binges in Salonika, to report Vulovic's arrival. "Who
now?" reacted Stojkovic irritably. "That Colonel Pavlovic has gone crazy.
He's going to arrest half the General Staff. If things go on this way, we'll
have to fmish the war with corporals and sergeants." Still groggy , the Capt­
ain ordered Protic to show the formidable Vulovic to his cell. The Major
walked in aided by a cane. As Protic helped him unpact his trunk, Vulo-
.
vie started back amazed. "Is it Protic? Are guerrilla fighters the guards
here?" Protic , who had known Apis in Macedonia, explained hastily that
he was the only guerrilla fighter at the prison. Colonel Dunjic had assigned
him there.3
Young Protic arrived at Salonika Prison to encounter Colonel Apis, for
him an admired, almost legendary figure . He found Apis almost wholly
bald but as imposing as ever. Around the ears, where he still had some hair,
it had been cut short. Apis appeared healthy enough, although his sore
legs were wrapped up. The Colonel invariably wore impeccably lacquered
boots and full military uniform. On his chest was the Star of Karadjordje
presented to him personally by King Peter.
That first day after assuming his new duties Lieutenant Protic made a
tour of the prisoners' rooms. Apis was heating coffee. He looked up in
joyful amazement. "Where did you [using the familiar "thou"] spring
from? . . . Where did they fmd you to be my jailor? . . . But I'm glad.
Better than some good-for-nothing. Surely 'That One' ['Black Handers'
now referred regularly to Prince Alexander as 'Onaj') didn't s�nd you.
This must be DunjiC's affair." Protic told Apis about his family back in
•
Awaiting Trial 233
occupied Serbia. Apis, lighting another cigarette, resumed enthusiastically:
"You see, my Protic, how small our little Serbia is-we all know one an­
other. We mourn every death." Apis continued : "What, my falcon, can't
you understand that Apis can even enjoy prison? Well, you see that he can.
One can do anything when one wants to," he added smiling broadly. "It
seems only yesterday that I took you from school and sent you with Vuk
[Popovic , the guerrilla leader] to Turkey to kill or be killed. So, brother
Serb, I am glad to see you and that you are my jailor." Embracing Protic
with a powerful bear hug, Apis shook him delightedly.
"Colonel, Sir," gasped poor Protic, released from this crushing embrace,
"is it true that you wanted to kill the Heir? Excuse my asking, but . . . . "
"Go ahead, just ask away ," exclaimed Apis. "Since you are asking me, it
means you don't believe much of what they accuse me of. So, Protic , I'll
tell you as if I were confessing before God. Do you remember those days
in late May 1903 when you were a junior sergeant? What did I do then for
the dynasty? And do you remember what happened to me then? I was
wounded and the wound festered. There would have been so saving me
had they not transported me hurriedly to Vienna and had the doctors
there not operated immediately. Right? Who paid for my treatment and
for saving me? Peter Karadjordjevic paid 22,000 dinars in gold out of his
own funds . . . . Now how could I raise my had against his son? What kind
of swine would I be to take revenge on him who saved my life?"
"You are right!" exclaimed Protic.
"Or let's turn things around," resumed Apis. "Let's say I am a criminal
and good-for-nothing hiding behind this uniform. Would I be . . . Apis who
organized that assassination attempt so idiotically as the prosecutors and
judges claim? At least I know how to kill him whose head must fall, right?
l am no cretin!" Apis cautioned Protic to obey all orders whatever he
thought privately ; his superiors might be testing him. Apis declared philo­
sophically: "And remember that even if they convict us as innocent men,
God will claim repayment . . . , Everything in nature equalizes itself . . . .
Every murderer will sometime be killed."4
Apis' spirits were raised immeasurably by frequent talks with Protic ,
but he was depressed to hear Vulovic too was in custody. Tucovic reacted:
"So even Ljuba? It means we are all here now! The pumpkin has really
burst. This means that 'That One' had decided to eliminate us. Now there
is no one alive who can prevent them from imposing their will ."

234 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
As Protic came with this unwelcome news, Apis again was preparing
coffee. Protic pretended to remonstrate: "Colonel, Sir, you are constantly
cooking coffee. Up to ten times a day. Won' t it ruin your health to have so
much coffee and cigarettes?" Then Protic quickly closed the cell door.
Apis understood he had something important to say. About Vulovic's
arrest Apis stated: "That means they will carry this thing to the end, to
the last man. 'That One' has decided to exterminate us. Thus there is no
honor in this world, everything is lies and deception!" Protic noticed Apis
was not in good form.
No, it is not just a bad mood, my falcon. But rather disillusionment
with people, with everything-justice, truth, and life. Today I've
been doing much thinking. I have inventoried past events and people.
And do you know what I have concluded: life is one great pile of
dung! Only suffering, worry, torture, a constant rifle recoiL And the
worst is when you understand that you have remained alone, that
everyone has abandoned you, that they have all lied to you and dis­
carded you like an old cleaning rag . . . . So let's drink coffee and
smoke . Only coffee and tobacco are of constant quality !5
Lack of mail from his family since his incarceration may have provoked
Apis' pessimistic outburst. He attributed this wrongly to their forgetful­
ness, even believing his beloved Milance had abandoned him . Actually ,
Milan and the others wrote him loyally throughout his imprisonment. But
at Colonel Zivkovic's express instructions their letters were intercepted.
Apparently, the spider derived sadistic pleasure from Apis' isolation and
suffering.
As weeks slipped by without defmite word whether they would be tried
or released , Captain Stojkovic detected growing depression and boredom
among the prisoners. He found them rather naive too about the upcoming
trial:
Earlier, I thought Dimitrijevic and Milovanovic were knowledgeable
about ancient and recent history, but I was mistaken. They both
think and have emphasized they can say in court all they have done.
They forget that even Danton could not say what he wanted but
could only answer questions put to him . . . .
•
Awaiting Trial 235
When a postcard he had addressed to his nephew was returned, Apis re­
solved not to write him further. Later, he asked again if he had received
anything from Milan. Next day Stojkovic recorded: "Dimitrijevic declares
he would drink a glass of poison without a word if he is disturbing anyone
and if he believed he was causing trouble to others." Was Zivkovic trying
to drive him to suicide? Later, Apis requested a talk with chief investi­
gator Dunjic to assure him he was innocent: he had always served Alex­
ander devotedly and would never have let anyone try to murder him .'
Colonel Dunjic talked with Apis January 22nd, and next day was pre­
sent at hearings related to his case . Afterwards Apis spoke optimistically
with Stojkovic about things he would need during a prison term. Later, he
asked impatiently if the trial was imminent. 7
Interrogations of the accused were held mostly at night, 0ften lasting
nearly until dawn. Prisoners were accompanied to the interrogation room
by a guard and an officer. Since Stojkovic and Protic were the only prison
officers and Stojkovic was often in Salonika d rinking, Protic usually had
to take them. The lengthiest interrogations were of Apis, Vulovic, and
Malobabic, the three destined for execution. Next longest was that of
Milovanovic-Pilac, Apis' personal friend from the Academy . Reserved and
distrustful of Protic, he asserted one day: neither Apis nor Vulovic could
have organized the clumsy "attempt" on the Heir. "If you want to kill
someone, you don't fire at his car from a distance. You go up and throw
a bomb. Even a child knows that!" Not realizing Protic had served under
Apis, Milovanovic, his hand on Protic's shoulders, said: "You who surely
aren't burdened with personal friendship toward Apis as I am, are prob­
ably also more objective about the present situation . . . . Do you, Protic,
believe Apis wanted to kill Alexander?" "I don't know," evaded Protic.
He knew he was in a madhouse where no one knew who was working for
and spying on whom. "I am certain," persisted Milovanovic, "he would
never raise a hand against Alexander. Apis is a specialist and would never
do such a thing so idiotically . . . . We know how . . . . " Suddenly Milo­
vanovic stopped, looked around fearfully, and fell silent. In explaining
unwittingly he had let something slip out. But Protic gave no sign he had
noticed.
Soon afterwards Protic took Colonel Tucovic to an interrogation, re­
turning him to his cell just before dawn. Tucovic persuaded the Lieu tenant,
contrary to regulations, to stay and talk. When Protic confumed he had
236 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
known Apis officially and privately, Tucovic expressed amazement at his
assignment to guard them. Considering Protic one of them, Tucovic talked
with him more openly. Apis was being accused of giving blood money to
Bosnian volunteers, especially Mustafa Golubic, Tucovic revealed. Protic
warned him not to discuss such things before investigators or in court.
Tucovic jumped up impulsively and embraced Protic:
You truly are that Smail-aga, guerrilla from Macedonia, and Apis
man you represent yourself to be. And I thought you were some spy
from 'That One' because it did not enter my head 'That One' would
allow a guerrilla to be a jailor to 'Black Hand' members . . . . Now
run off before anyone sees us. 8
Prince Alexander and the "White Hand" pushed the Apis investigation
relentlessly, but some Radical leaders at first seemed reluctant to try the
"Black Hand" leaders. From abroad Pasic had requested Supreme Com­
mand to place Apis at his disposition for a foreign mission. The reply
came: Apis has already been arrested. That may have been PasiC's way to
avert suspicion that he had helped organize the Salonika affair.9 "White
Hand" leaders, excluding the last "Black Handers" from the Prince's en­
tourage , acted more aggressive ly. General Mirko Milosavljevic, one of
them, told Slobodan Jovanovic : "As long as military operations last, we
[' Black and White Hand'] will work together as brothers; as soon as opera­
tions cease, it will be as if the devil got into us!" The "White Hand" now
dominated the Interior and War ministers. 10
Accusations against the Apis group were carefully orchestrated . A week
after Apis' arrest, Chief of Staff Bojovic sent an order to all Serbian of­
ficers castigating those few who in those critical days for the homeland
had lacked any sense of duty:
Driven on by excessive ambition for power, they began to criticize
. . . and agitate against the state administration and policy, to under­
mine authority, destroy legal order, and ruin morale and discipline
in the army with the apparent aim of taking over full political and
nilitary power . . . . 1 1
1 how I felt when the contrary was confirmed, that the event occur­
Awaiting Trial 237
Next day the Interior Minister urged that investigation of the imprisoned
officers develop material for a public trial . 1 2 However, the special investi­
gator's report on results of the interrogations of the arrested officers was
only completed March 12, 1 9 1 7 . 1 3
·
Investigation of the "attempt" on Prince Alexander's life dragged on
and on. Colonel Pavlovic, chief of the Supreme Command's legal division
came to Salonika Prison more and more disgruntled. Unless interrogations
and signed admissions of guilt were completed swiftly, he faced dismissal.
Pavlovic goaded Lieutenant Protic to rush the accused to interrogations.
As an Academy classmate of several of the arrested colonels, Pavlovic
knew they would not admit things they had not done. He also interrogated
Bosnian volunteers, formerly of "Young Bosnia" or the "Black Hand,"
arrested for working with Apis. 1�
Confidential correspondence between Premier Pasic and Interior Min­
ister Jovanovic-Patak that winter suggests strongly that the Corfu govern­
ment invented the attempt to kill Alexander in order to impose the death
penalty on Colonel Apis. On January 24, 1917 the Interior Minister de­
scribed to Pasic the alleged attempt on the Prince near Ostrovo on Sept­
ember 12, 1916, Old Style! His letter of February 8th to security chief,
Ranko Trijunovic, also gave the date as September 12. J ovanovic-Patak
telegraphed Pasic March 2nd from Salonika : "With the help of my col­
leagues, the assassins have been discovered and are now in my hands. Links
between them and Colonel Dirnitrijevic and Major Vulovic are clear." But
when Pasic communicated that message to the cabinet next day, this
version promptly collapsed. That very day he received the Interior Min­
ister's telegram:
I have just experienced a great unpleasantness. As you know Col­
onel Pavlovic on Corfu designated September 1 2th as the date of
the assassination attempt. When I came here [Salonika] , I heard on
the contrary that this [attempt] had occurred at the end of August,
so then naturally I asked him who knows the truth [presumably
Prince Alexa nder] . I received the reply just as Pavlovic had stated
it and have worked on that assumption up to now. You can imagine
red on Javandan [August 29, old style ] . I do not know the cause of
 238 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
this error in communication and have not yet decided what conclu­
sions to draw from this matter. 15
Jovanovic-Patak' s "discovery" imperilled nearly completed plans for the
Salonika Trial. Thus Pasic next day, March 4th, telegraphed him:
Received your telegram. As to the day of the attempt, you should
not draw any conclusions. I must communicate the telegram to our
colleagues. Infonn me urgently what motivated him whom you
asked to designate the exact date of the event [the Prince] to state
something contrary to what you say you have now confirmed.
Below that enigmatic message , Pasic's secretary had added: "Pasic told me
to attract your attention to this : can one state that the attempt occurred
on September 12th New Style? Inform him immediately what you think,
whether it would be good to say this, so he can think i t over and decide­
Filipovic."1'
Confusion deepened as Jovanovic-Patak telegraphed PliSic March 6th:
I could not obtain infonnation how this error about the date of the
attempt occurred. To my query they replied: 'I just don't know
where that came to us from. Possibly it occurred because of the
Gregorian calendar, although the beheading of John the Baptist
[usekovanje ] corresponds to the 1 1 th, not the 12th of September.
That demolished Pasic's idea of solving the discrepancy by juggling old and
new style dates, differing then by thirteen days. But for Pasic it had be­
come so crucial to substantiate the assassination attempt and link the Apis
group with it that dates became secondary . J ovanovic-Patak had to accept
August 29/September 1 1 th! Then Pasic and he, not realizing key tele­
grams had survived, ordered their correspondence burned to conceal this
deception from historians. 17
The driving force behind the Salonika Trial, agreed most contempor­
aries, was the spider, Colonel Zivkovic. Unknown to the public, he re­
mained in the shadows, seemingly unflappable. From him nothing could
be hidden or withhe ld. Copies of everything learned at interrogations and
all correspondence flowed to him. At the end of each day Zivkovic knew
Awaiting Trial 239
all that had transpired and held everything in his hands, communicating
significant matters to the Prince with his comments. His vast power stem­
med from Alexander's utter confidence in him. All attempts by the jealous
or righteous to undennine his authority or reveal hirri as a ruthless homo­
sexual shattered against the Prince's unshakable trust. Any struggle or
intrigue against "Pera" became ipso facto disloyalty to the Prince and the
dynasty.13
Nonetheless, Zivkovic required all his feminine wiles and vigilance to
protect his invisible web. After Apis' arrest, the apparent harmony pre­
valent among several factions at the Prince's court ended abruptly. A deep
chasm opened. Having captured their prey, how would the hunters divide
the spoils of the chase? Intrigue and mutual jealousy flourished among the
courtiers like ragwee d. They agreed Apis must be liquidated, but what
then? Who would assume Apis' mantle in the army? Could the Prince's
secretary, Jelenic, who considered Apis' arrest the culmination of years
of effort, outplay the slick "Pera"? 19
Lieu tenant Colonel Radovanovic-Koca, splitting with the "White
Hand" that winter, claimed Zivkovic had planned repeatedly to have Apis
poisoned. Major RadiSa Nikolic told Radovanovic that Zivkovic had sent
him to Third Anny staff in 1 9 1 6 to arrange Apis' murder. When that fail­
ed, Nikolic was ordered to poison Apis himself, but he refused. Zivkovic
realized Nikolic dared not perfonn this deed. On a Salonika streetcar in
January 1 9 1 7 Zivkovic hinted to Radovanovic he had installed Stojkovic
and Protic as jailors so one could poison Apis. Indeed, S tojkovic once de­
clared: "Apis must admit the affair [attempt on the Prince?) because he
is badly mistaken if he believes he will emerge alive from prison." Colonel
Kostic, Zivkovic's crony, confided to Tucovic earlier that the officer corps
could not allow Apis to live.20
In Zivkovic's carefully guarded Salonika residence the Salonika Trial
was prepared, affirmed Radovanovic. Through its rear doors, Zivkovic
remained in constant touch wjth the palace and Alexander. During the
Trial defense lawyers trooped into ZivkoviC's salon to prepare their ques­
tions for court.21 Milenko Stojic, a Belgrade lawyer, later confinned that
Zivkovic and Colonel Pavlovic had been the Trial's chief initiators. They
often conversed inside the palace, and some two months before Apis' ar­
rest had held a long secret conference.22 Under Zivkovic 's direction the
"Committee of Ten" continued to collect at the front and in Salonika
240 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
"witnesses" to testify against the Apis group. Official and volunteer spies
prowled the front catching incautious conversations. Self-styled "friends
of the court" hastened to make oral and written denunciations to the in­
vestigators. 23
By early March investigation of Apis and the "Black Hand" were com­
plete,l-4 but the inquiry into the attempt against the Prince remained
incomplete and confused . Seven months after the supposed murder at­
tempt a commission fmally examined the site near Ostrovo, by then
greatly altered. No real fmdings resulted , and most of those in the know
realized no assassination had been attempted. Those preparing the Trial
knew this best of all . Prince Alexander seemed tired and apathetic, endan­
gering the whole affair. In alarm Pera Zivkovic complained to Alexander's
secretary : "The Prince doesn't want to do anything thing." Retorted
Jelenic cyncially : "The Prince has nothing more to do but rather those
idiots on the Investigating Commission."25
An important witness being readied for the Trial was Nezir Hadzi
Nalic, a Bosnian Muslim. Later, he admitted that Mihailo Rankovic , as­
sociated with the "Committee of Ten," had prepared all his testimony.
Nalic's Bosnian associates, BoSko Arezina and Muhamed Mehmedbasic,
paid dearly for rejecting Rankovic's overtures. " . . . We were deceived,"
Nezir stated, "because they told us that Bosko [Arezina] had been killed
by Dragutin l Dimitrijevic I and the same could happen to us. We believed
this lie and thus doomed the greatest Serbian patriots." Learning later that
Arezina had been killed on orders of the Corfu police, Nalic repudiated in
court his statements to investigators but too late to help A pis and Vulo­
vic. "My conscience gnaws at me," Nalic told an officer interned at Bizerte
in 1 9 1 8, "so make this public."2'
As the investigation neared completion, the "Salonika regime" purged
the military courts which would try Apis and review the verdict. With un­
seemly haste the regime replaced all regular judges with ones who would
reach the "proper verdict." The new appointees were mostly bitter enemies
of Apis or plucked from obscurity or retirement. Their entire future re­
mained hostage to the Trial's "happy" outcome. Colonel Peter MiSic,
highly intelligent and expert in military law and a leading 1 903 con­
spirator, was named chairman of the Lower Military Court. By what moral
right could a conspirator against the Obrenovic judge a case of conspiracy
and treason? Retired from the army in 1906 at British insistence, then
Awaiting Trial 241
excluded by Apis from conspirator ranks, MiSic burned for revenge upon
his former comrades. The Trial was a fmal opportunity to salvage his
wrecked career and achieve a general's rank. F ascina�ed by his own voice,
egotistical and despotic, he aimed to dazzle the courtroom with his bril­
liance and prove his superiority over defendants he mostly despised. But
he was an unpredictable individualist who might turn the Trial into a
circus.27
Named president of the High Military Court was "White Hand" leader,
General Mirko Milosavljevic, a bitter opponent of the May conspirators.
When Prince Alexander became army inspector general in 1 9 1 1 , he had
named Milosavljovic his personal adjutant "to spite Apis." An intimate of
the Prince, he was a well-trained officer who could be relied on to be duly
"thankful." Even he had been incredulous about the "attempt" on the
Heir's life.
Most other judges on both courts, having old accounts to settle with
Apis or the "Black Hand," sought rewards for loyal service to the Radical
regime. At the Salonika Front one colonel had exclaimed: "If they make
me a judge, I'll cut off all their heads!" Somehow this remark was "over­
heard," and soon he was named to the High Military Court! Also appoint­
ed to that august body was Colonel Kostic, for years Apis' most fanatical
foe. Surely common sense and justice dictated his exclusion from the
highest military tribunal?5
Military and diplomatic events meantime reinforced the regime's deter­
mination to liquidate the Apis group while minimizing Allied objections.
General Sarrail, remaining commander-in-chief in Salonika partly because
of consistent Serbian support, knew who had saved him. Soon after Apis'
arrest he declared ingenuously: the Salonika affair is strictly "an internal
Serbian matter." This gave Prince Alexander a French carte blanche to
deal with the Apis group, rejoiced his secretary ?9 The Salonika Front's
future and Serbia's hopes remained shrouded in doubt. Serbia was delib­
erately excluded from the Allies' Rome conference about Greece and the
Balkan theater, noted Pa§ic in mid-January. Reportedly Italy had refused
to reinforce a front doomed to remain secondary and defensive. Exploded
Pasic:
This means the Allies have defmitely adopted the view that victory
is to b(; won only on the main fronts! . . . In my view, only an
242 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
energetic offensive on the Salonika Front can bring a quick Allied
victory . . . . Our political and military representatives must empha­
size constantly the vital importance of the Balkan theater and the
Salonika Front.30
Informing Allied governments of Apis' arrest, P3Sic sought their permis­
sion to search the premises and persons of his associates abroad, including
Cedo Jovanovic, former director of the Belgrade Officers' Club, then liv­
ing in London. 31 The charge that Apis and friends had prepared a mutiny
on the Salonika Front, soon dropped for lack of evidence, aimed apparent­
ly to win Allied acceptance of the Trial.
Franco-Austrian parleys meanwhile sparked reports that a compromise
peace might be in the works. Serbia's envoy in London informed Pasic :
The negative reply to the appeal of the Central Powers for peace
negotiations has not halted continued rumors about peace as a fact
which is to occur during 1 9 1 7 . These reports come from a com­
pletely reliable source and are confirmed by those having sure con­
nections with governing circles in Berlin.
German peace terms reputedly n
i cluded restoration of Serbia with access
to the Adriatic Sea through northern Albania. 32 Prince Six.te de Bourbon­
Parma informed Paris in February that Emperor Charl�s would sanction
revival of an independent Serbia under Karadjordjevic rule only if Serbia
promptly dissolved all organizations which had conspired against the Dual
Monarchy and if the Allies guaranteed her future correct behavior. The
Pasic government sought a scapegoat in case agreement with the Central
Powers proved necessary ; clearly Apis filled the requirements.33
Officers serving with the Serbian Volunteer Corps in Russia also became
involved in the Salonika affair. Soon after Apis' arrest, War Minister Terzic
ordered four of his colleagues there-Lieutenant Colonels Bozin Sirnic,
Vojislav Gojkovic, Alexander Srb, and Major Radoje Jankovic-searched,
relieved of their posts, and returned to Salonika forthwith.J.4 But Volun­
teer Corps commander, General Mihailo Zivkovic , replied that Jankovic
had refused to answer questions about "Black Hand" or provide a state­
ment. 35 J ankovic , a sophisticated and highly literate officer sent to Russia
Awaiting Trial 243
by Prince Alexander, became the leader of Serbian officers in Russia op­
posing the Trial and defending Apis.
The Pasic regime also had to take account of views of other Serbian
political parties about the arrests and impending trial. Independent Radi­
cal leaders, Lj ubomir Davidovic and Milorad Draskovic, and Progressive,
Vojislav Marinkovic-all members of the coalition cabinet, had collabor­
ated closely with Apis during the Priority affair. What did Draskovic parti­
cularly, who on Corfu had called Apis "a marvelous patriot," think of his
imprisonment? DraS'kovic to be sure had criticized Apis' tactless behavior
toward the Prince Regent on Corfu, attributing it to the Colonel's rashness
and volatility . On excellent terms with Alexander and welcomed at court,
DraSkovic, as the Trial neared, remained silent about the Salonika affair.
He sought to scotch any rumors of continuing ties with Apis to prevent his
party's involvement in the Trial. Alexander and Pasic blocked any criminal
charges against the Independents who in return did not impede the investi­
gation of the Apis group.3'
The state prosecutor's formal charges were communicated to Apis and
his codefendants on March 1 7th. Accused of treason, plotting seizure of
power, and attempted murder of the Prince Regent, most faced death
sentences or long prison terms if convicted. Apis was shocked and upset,
noted Stojkovic . "He walked around constantly , more than usual, plunged
in thought." Calming down, Apis stated later that day: "If we are tried
properly , they will merely have to say: 'Go home gentlemen ! ' " Thankfully
only a few of his friends had been accused; presumably the rest could
testify on their behalf. "They should state they were not ordered to do
anything, nor did they do it."
His friends now began holding Apis responsible for their plight. But
Milovanovic-Pilac rejoiced: from the indictment a twenty year prison
sentence seemed the most he could receive . He blamed Apis for their pre­
dicament:
With Dragutin 1 can no longer have the same relations as before. He
should not have kept the [' Black Hand'] statutes. I asked him al­
ready on Corfu whether he had destroyed everything. They would
not have anything on us if they had not found those. Just wait until
I see Dragutin!
244 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator

Very upset over the indictment, Colonel Vemic told Stojkovic: "Dragutin
is guilty for all of us if he really did something. We will have to settle up."37
When the accused sought able lawyers to represent them, they encount­
ered jesuitical tricks from the regime. Under military law accused officers
could select defenders only from the trial site. The authorities simply
transferred officers they selected, or declared them unavailable or ill . 38
When Apis selected Cedomir Vohoska to defend him, a doctor suddenly
diagnosed chronic rheumatism and ordered him to remain at least a week
in bed!39 Such tactics damaged the credibility of the Trial, limiting the de­ CHAPTER XXI
fendants' choice to less competent officers and those who would "coop­
erate" with the court. Probably this made little difference since Prince
Alexander and the "Salonika regime'' had predetermined the defendants' IN COURTROOM AND PRISON CELL
guilt. MARCH-APRIL 1 9 1 7 )

Nearby were the prisons and the accused

were brought to the courtroom under guard .
Once 1 saw Apis being brought to the court
building. He went quickly up the stairs with
his eternal cigarette in his teeth, in an easy­
going manner . . . . Clearly he was in full
control of himself.
Ziv. 7 1 6 , "Solunska afera."

Finally the Salonika Trial began. It would last two months-March 20th
to May 23, 1 9 1 7-in eighty-two semi-public sessions where all ten de­
fendants and over one hundred witnesses testified.1 The outcome was
never in doubt, merely the severity of the sentences. The Salonika Trial
was a product of Serbian internal strife between military leaders and
politicians and personal animosity between Prince Alexander and Apis.
Once Apis provided a secret written admission of responsibility for the
Sarajevo assassination, his fate was sealed beyond question. That admis­
sion seemed to assure the survival of Alexander and Pasic if they had to
conclude a separate peace.
The Lower Military Court consisted of Chairman Colonel Peter MiSic,
Judge Colonel Mija Filipovi c ; auditor, Jovan Jovanovic ; and clerk of court,

245
246 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Captain Boiidar Katanic. Some senior officers, offered positions on the
lower or higher military courts, refused categorically warning that if as­
signed there they would judge strictly according to law. Informed of the
personnel of the Lower Court, the accused did not exercise their legal right
to exclude judges on the basis of personal bias.
It soon became evident Misic had become chairman not to insure a fair
trial but to steal the spotlight and wreak vengeance. An avowed enemy of
two defendants-Apis and General Popovic-Misic should have declined to
serve. Apis displayed remarkable naivete. As MiSic's colleague in the May
Coup, he apparently did not believe Misic would exact vengeance, so he did
not seek his exclusion. Throughout the Trial, working assiduously for a
guilty verdict, MiSic displayed bitter hatred for the defendants whom he
often mistreated. Prohibiting them even from rising during court recesses,
MiSic allowed "the public" to deride them and witnesses to change oral
testimony in court.2
Chairman MiSic put on quite a show. By turns he philosophized, played
with words, shouted angrily, or turned everything into farce. Sometimes
he was a tyrant, at other times a cynic. Since the charges against the ac­
cused could not be proven, he based his case on suspicion, doubt, and in­
nuendo. Documentary evidence of guilt all came from the past: "Black
Hand" statutes and membership lists, and a few notes and letters from the
Priority Dispute. None of that supported charges of alleged mutiny on the
Salonika Front or the "attempt" against Alexander's life. After "Black
Hand's" demise as an organization, Apis and most of its other leaders
fought valiantly for Serbia; many died in battle. Thus Misic, to construct
a plausible case, had to somehow link past and present, distort previous
events, and present them as causes of supposed recent occurrences. He had
to deny the nationalist credentials of "Black Hand" and its leaders by bar­
ring all mention in court of their national work. The "Black Hand" had to
be portrayed as a ruthless band of robbers and assassins aiming only to ter­
rorize innocent Serbian citizens and seize political power.
Aiding Misic in his difficult task were the Prince, Colonel Zivkovic, and
the Radical movement. From the Radicals he received political directives ;
from the Heir's entourage came tactical instructions. Every evening Colonel
Pavlovic's staffsupplied advice and directives for the next day's procedures.
The War Ministry's minions collected additional incriminating data to
In Courtroom 247
supplement a slender body of evidence. Of dubious legality, such measures
eased Misic's path by restricting his area of responsibility .3
The roles of chiefjudge and auditor were secondary . Colonel Mija Filipo­
vic, a former regimental commander on the Drina frontier, had faced
criminal prosecution for ordering two of his soldiers killed. By agreeing
to serve as judge, all charges were dropped; afterwards he received a lush
divisional command in Belgrade. As auditor, Colonel Jovan Jovanovic
merely followed orders and signed the verdict.
The Lower Military Court convened in a rented Greek building of small
capacity. The court, accused, attorneys, and witnesses took up most of
the space. Those finding no seats inside lounged in corridors or courtyard.
Roughly half the "public" were civilian or uniformed spies, dependent on
the ' 'Salonika regime'' and anticipating convictions. They acted boldly,
even provocatively. This was the hostile audience Apis and his friends had
to face. Most honorable Serbs were at the front.
Not far away was the Officers' Prison. The accused were brought daily
to the courtroom under guard. Recalled the author of "Salonika affair":
Once I saw Apis being brought to the court building. He went quick­
ly up the stairs with his eternal cigarette in his teeth, in an easy
going manner as if wishing to reduce the impression of the gravity
of the moment. His face was slightly darkened; one could detect
tiredness. But clearly he was in full control of himself and had lost
none of his moral strength.
Arrayed against him, Apis realized, were the most despicable elements
from the Salonika Front. In the courtroom was played out a tragedy
staged by the Prince, Zivkovic , and the Radicals. The judges were con­
scious and paid actors. As Apis remained cool and unruffled, Chairman
MiSic grew increasingly irritated, shouting as if to drown the voice of con­
science . The accused occupied the two front rows; behind them sat their
defense lawyers. Among the "public" were police officers, malicious joy
etched on their faces as they awaited death sentences. During Apis' testi­
mony, a senior officer of engineers beat out a loud death march on his
bench!
Chairman Misic proceeded according to plans forged in the Palace and
Zivkovic's house. He was instructed to spare all political leaders from

248 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
involvement as witnesses or accusers. Conspicuously absent from the indict·
ment were Independent Radical leaders whose well-known ties with the
accused were concealed. Appended to it were the "Black Hand" statutes
edited to omit all mention of national activities outside Serbia. But the
published list of its members caused a sensation. Included were men prom­
inent in government and diplomacy, even PasiC's nephew. Would these
people be tried eventually as traitors or revolutionaries? The government
decided wisely that most "Black Hand" members were "confused patriots,"
misled by the CEC's evil leaders. Although "Black Hand" was labeled
treasonous, many former members remained in service or were promoted.
Some officers who never joined "Black Hand" were nonetheless interned
in North Africa. Thi s left many people perplexed. The defendants were
kept to a minimum. As the circle around Apis narrowed, Chairman MiSic
understood perfectly he was expected to deliver Apis' head to the execu­
tioner. Without that the entire trial would become a pointless parody of
justice.4
Lieutenant Colonel Radovanovic-Koca, breaking with the "White Hand,"
confirmed Pera ZivkoviC's key role. Writing Prince Alexander notes about
events in the courtroom and what was planned for next day, Zivkovic
asked for additional instructions. Alexander responded with similar writ·
ten notes. Koca believed Zivkovic kept these to maintain control over the
Prince . Every evening Zivkovic conferred with the Interior Minister on
overall strategy.5 Zivkovic likewise received daily reports from Stojkovic
and Protic on the defendants' behavior.
The Salonika Trial centered chiefly around three issues together corn·
prising Apis' "crimes" : his alleged leadership of the subversive "Black
Hand"; his conspiracy to overthrow the Pasic government and Constitu­
tion by armed coups; and the attempted assassination at Ostrovo. Crucial
though concealed was Apis' role in the Sarajevo murder.'
The P<!Sic cabinet's decisions on Corfu March 24, 1 9 1 7 set guidelines
for the Trial. The "Black Hand," as subversive and criminal, was to be
wholly dissolved. To be tried were only those who had planned coups
and assassinations. For political reasons belonging to "Black Hand" was
insufficient to bring investigation or trial. Disciplinary and administrative
actions were to be undertaken promptly to liquidate all traces of "Black
Hand." All officials were to be asked: did you belong, when did you join,
who enlisted you, did you pay dues or enlist others? Divulging all they
•
•
In Courtroom 249
knew about the organization, officials had to promise to renounce their
oaths and all ties with "Black Hand." Those falsifying their answers
would be investigated and tried.7
The chief witnesses for the Trial were selected deliberately. Milan Cig·
anovic, trainer of Sarajevo assassins, Princip and Cabrinovic, received a
choice : testify at Salonika against the accused or as an Austrian citizen be
remanded to Vienna for certain trial. He was suitably rewarded for his
testimony. Another witness, Krsta Mile tic, then a village judge, subse­
quently became a cabinet minister. As a patriot and Radical he considered
it a sacred duty to compromise Apis. Another witness, Pop J anjic, branded
as a liar by a fellow witness, later became an Assembly deputy, then its
secretary. Velimir Vlajic , witness and ordinary ruffian, after the Trial hob­
nobbed with Radical leaders and grew wealthy. To testify against Apis
insured exemption from the perils of the front and a brilliant subsequent
career.8
Early in Apis Pasic informed his ambassador in London about the start
of the Trial. The "Black Hand" and the attempt on the Prince's life had
been fully investigated. The accused had sabotaged Serbian political life.
After the Albanian retreat they had "agitated among our troops and re­
fugees against our government and ruler." Spreading defeatism, Apis and
his friends had prepared to kill those hindering their overthrow of regime
and dynasty in order to set up a ten man military oligarchy . "Assure the
government there," concluded the Premier, "this trial will not damage the
general cause and our army will be the stronger for it."9
The two officer jailors described the defendants' reactions and state­
ments in their diaries, sending daily accounts to Colonel Zivkovic. On the
eve of the Trial Apis, no longer ebullient, told Stojkovic:
You know, today I read a little but thought more. It is interesting
how this prison influences a man. It occurs to me to repent, but then
I recoil remembering that a man who works for an ideal cannot
do that.
Apis had hoped Lieutenant Colonel Jovanovic would direct the Trial rather
than that "ruthless and heartless sophist," Misic. Examining his laundry,
Apis burst into tears, reminded apparently of a loved one. Colonel Milo·
vanovic, looking already doomed, implored Stojkovic to stay and talk.
250 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Bogdan Radenkovic, the civilian, was preparing his defense : "I am con­
vinced my friends did not do what they are accused of." Remarked Col­
onel Cedo Popovic: "1 never knew about anything except (the 'Black
Hand's'] foreign activities."10
Lieutenant Protic conducted much of the actual supervision of the
prisoners. The fat, self-important Stojkovic , an alcoholic with an eternally
red nose, was addicted to French cognac or whatever was available. About
noon when his previous night's hangover let up, he would start complain­
ing about his "sick kidneys." Protic would remark considerately: "Captain,
if you are having a kidney attack, let me take the prisoners for a walk."
If he were seriously hung over, Stojkovic would agree. Otherwise , he
would say: "No, Smail-aga,11 I'll do it, today is my turn." Still, usually it
was Protic who went to each isolated cell where the officers were incar­
cerated. After Protic had lingered in Apis' room just before the Trial, Stoj­
kovic admonished: "Listen, Smail-aga, you are staying rather long with
Glava ['The Head,' a nickname for Apis] . Watch out that Glava doesn't
win you over. You are still young and green and were his guerrilla, so,
Smail-aga, watch your step!" To ProtiC's complaints about Stojkovic's
provocative use of his nickname, Smail-aga, Colonel Dunjic replied :
Protic, just look after your work and do as I instruct and advise. Let
Stojkovic do h si thing and call you Smail-aga if he wishes. Certainly
2
he will never deserve such a nickname. 1
Both supervising officers witnessed a surprising transfonnation of pri­
soner attitudes during their confmement. Some shifted from complete
loyalty and devotion to Apis, to mudslinging, hatred, and even betrayal.
Colonel Milovanovic-Pilac, hitherto one of Apis' closest and most loyal
comrades, underwent a particularly deplorable change. After the Trial's
second day, he told Protic: "It ['Black Hand'] was a monstrous organ­
ization . . . a true conspiracy against the Crown and Heir . . . . They want­
ed total power." Pretending naive te, Protic queried: "Who are they?"
"Why, Apis and those people from the CEC. Let me tell you, they said
openly they would throw the dynasty and Pasic government out of Serbia
on their ear." Remonstrated Protic: "Forgive me, Mr. Milovanovic , but
didn't you belong to that CEC?" Responded the Colonel:
In Courtroom 251
Yes, I did, Protic , but you see that is my greatest disappointment.
. . . I had no idea about that. Also, I never came to the idea of kill­
ing the Heir. And Apis? Well, you heard what he said in court? 'I
.
ordered that, I said that, yes I thought that, etc.' He must be crazy ,
and that will cost him his head. Let them kill him but why all of us?
,
Desperately anxious to save his neck, the fickle Milovanovic wondered :
why should I suffer? He pleaded ignorance of what had been done:
Oh, Dragutin, Dragutin, you dear fellow, what did you drag us nto?
i
. . . And do you know, Protic, that Dragutin is basically a coward?
I will tell you why. I have known him since the Academy. He always
played the role of head, of leader. Even while we were still corporals.
. . . But do you know what he is in fact? A coward, cow-ard ! . . . He
was able to give orders, sign orders, order everyone killed, but per­
sonally couldn't even kill a flea. He didn't dare even crush a flea be­
tween his two fmgers, as if the sight of blood nauseated him.
Protic stared in amazement at the pudgy Milovanovic. About Apis Protic
had heard good things and bad, myth and reality. But that a childhood
friend and Academy comrade could speak about him so derisively! "You
must be joking," muttered the Lieutenant. "What kind of a joke is it when
heads are literally flying?" retorted Pilac. "It is, really, a struggle for power!
And there is no joke about that. Only you know that each should eat what
he himself cooked up. Tomorrow it's my turn to answer questions from
Colonel Misic. I'll tell all . . . . Let each man pull his own chestnuts from
the fire . . . . Here heads will fall like pumpkins." Without a word Protic
rushed from MilovanoviC's cell slamming the door angrily behind him.
Half aloud he said: "Truly heads will roll ! How could they not roll when
such people exist among one's old comrades!" Thereafter Protic remained
aloof from Pilac.
But Protic was attracted strongly to Colonel Cedornir Popovic, a swarthy,
strongly built man who had served as a "frontier officer" on the Drina
obeying Apis' instructions. 1 3 Late at night they tried to sort out what was
happening. Why were ten of Serbia's ablest and most patriotic officers
languishing in prison awaiting condemnation while their country lay en­
slaved, its army decimated by casualties and the war's outcome hanging in
 252 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
the balance? Could this possibly be the right time for a Serbian power
struggle? "This won't turn out well, Protic," declared Cedo. "This entire
circus is not being held to scare children. Dragutin won't survive this; he'll
pay with his head, and in order to deceive people, others will have to leave
this world with him. Somehow I'm the most logical choice." Objected
Protic: "But Colonel Cedo, why you? And why Dragutin even?" Con­
tinued Protic: "Yes, Colonel Apis is always in such a good mood, always
smiling, but I believe nonetheless he knows best of all . He has such con­
tacts even here in prison that surely he knows what his fate will be." Said
Cedo:
Oh, my brother! Don' t you see this is all a mask, a game? Apis smiles
because that's the way he is, because he is a giant, a hero, a lion.
Apis smiles because he knows they will shoot him! I have known
him ever since 1903. He smiled that evening in the Officers Club as
if he was going to a wedding . . . while affirming that he would die
killing Alexander [Obrenovic] and that whore, Draga. You don't
know such people: when they smile, they are most dangerous . . . .
For planning the Archduke's murder at Sarajevo, concluded Ceda, they
would remove Apis' head. The next night Ceda revealed that Major Voja
Tankosic, ignoring Apis' clear instructions to return the assassins to Serbia,
had gone ahead with the murder. Had Tankosic lived, the heat now might
be off Apis and other "Black Handers." "There, now you know why Apis
must suffer," continued Ceda. "Voja is no more, he was lucky and was
killed by the enemy . . . ; our own people will kill Apis and us . . . . It
was destined to be that way." Ceda declared himself ready to die if it
would help save Serbia. 14
Colonel Ceda had learned that a foreign journalist had asked if some
Serbian officers had plotted an army mutiny. Premier Pa.Sic had replied:
"It s
i true. Those fools wished to kill me and Heir Alexander, cause revolt
in the army , and conclude a separate peace with Austria." Laughing, Ceda
asked Captain Stojkovic : "Did we really wish to kill Pa.Sic?", adding
ominously: "When Pa.Sic as premier right during our trial gives such a pre­
cise and categoric statement to a foreign journalist, he is pronouncing the
death penalty upon us in advance." During a court recess that day, after
judges and "public" left the courtroom, Ceda told Apis: "Dragutin, you
•
In Courtroom 253
must not be deceived. We will surely all be condemned to death. Startled,
Apis looked at him sharply:
-
Don't be insane! That won' t happen. This is only a legal comedy.
They will convict us of something pro forma and ship us to Africa
until the end of the war. Then each will go his own way. 15
When everyone knew the accusations against Major Vulovic-helping
Apis organize the attempt on the Heir's life, Tucovic told Protic:
I'm going crazy ! Oh, Dragutin! Oh, Vulovic, you s.o.b.! Ljuba, you
are Apis' evil spirit! You and not Alexander will cost him his head!
If Ljuba had not been with Apis, none of this would have happened.
That Vulovic is the Devil himself! 1'
Major Radoje Lazic, "Black Hand's" last secretary, was the flrst defen­
dant to testify in court (March 21 -22). Ceda rejoiced Lazic had gone first
and been honest. As Lazic confirmed that "Black Hand" no longe r existed,
Apis made no objections-Lazic had hesitated, always worrying "what will
Petrograd and Vienna say?" Pilac wondered whether to abandon Apis or
believe he knew what he was doing; he would try to explain away having
cursed Prince Alexander. I t would be an honor, stated Vulovic, to be made
a martyr by the Karadjordjevic. He had premonitions that at his execution
he would fall shouting: "Fire ! Long live Serbia!"
During Ceda Popovic's testimony (March 23-24) when he stated: "I can
state honestly I did not feel the ['Black Hand's'] influence," Apis ears
turned crimson. He squirmed in his chair and half turned toward Ceda. Re­
turning from court, Ceda confirmed he had noticed Apis' disapproval and
admitted he head expressed himself badly.
Next day Apis remarked: "Heh, Ceda, you should tell about operations
in the Sandjak [of Novipazar] and show what the Organization did. So far
no one has described the whole thing." Smiling, Apis added: "I will have
to correct all this." Ceda should not have denied "Black Hand's" role,
agreed Vernic; he should have described his part openly. Colonel Ceda
prophesied: "One will be shot and that is Dragutin ; the rest of us will be
punished less severely . Dragutin will be shot not as a 'Black Hand' member,
 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
254
but as an ordinary man." After Ceda's testimony, Vulovic commented:
It is bad, but I won't allow innocent people to suffer for what I said
and did. I am an open person and truly said and did much. I didn't
know the members of the CEC or that Dragutin was in it. What I
did, I did on my own.
Pilac complained that the authorities had revealed nothing about "Black
Hand's" patriotic activities, "but that was what the society was for." Said
Apis during a recess: "Yes, the weather s i changeable. Have you heard
what MiSic can do on his own hook? . . . The cannons are aimed at me, so
now we will struggle." Vemic growled: "That Apis created so many mis·
fortunes for his comrades that in his place I would kill myself."
Apis placed high hopes on Radenkovic's testimony and liked his begin­
ning. "You'll see what basis he will place everything on. Bogdan is intel­
ligent." After Bogdan's initial hearing (March 26), Apis remarked: "This
case of ours will turn out to be ridiculous." The testimony so far had
seemed strange, but it was growing evident they had done nothing sub­
versive. When Radenkovic fmished, Apis remained dissatisfied. Why didn't
they ask Bogdan about "Black Hand's" Constitution and its purpose?
Everything had fallen away which would have exonerated the organiza­
tion. Later though he praised Bogdan's testimony and Chainnan MiSic's
tact. All the defendants, predicted Apis, would be released for lack of
proof. "They cannot find anything." Apis spoke at length to Stojkovic
about his national work and his great future project of Serbia's union
with Bulgaria.17
During the Salonika Trial's rather uneventful initial week rumors cir­
culated the prosecution was preparing a surprise to buttress an obviously
shaky case. That "surprise" came on March 27th. The state prosecutor
rose abruptly and read an indictment dated March 24th, accusing under
Article 87A of the criminal code Rade Malobabic and Muhamed Mehrned­
basic, just that day brought into court, of shooting at Prince Alexander
at Apis' instruction:
Rade Malobabic was the chief culprit and Muhamed his accomplice
in carrying out an assassination attempt against the Heir to the
throne about 5 PM on August 29 /September 1 1 , 1 9 1 6 on the road
•
In Courtroom 255
from Ostrovo to Vladovo by firing from a rifle while the Heir was
returning from the front by automobile.
The "surprise" was the greater since few in the courtroom knew until
then of any attempt on the Heir's life, even less one involving Serbian of­
ficers. Why had this vital event been so long concealed? Why had those
involved not been accused immediately? Why had no immediate investi­
gation of the si te been conducted? By the time the alleged crime locale
was examined seven months later, it had been transfonned. The defense
was shocked to learn that all the accused were considered MalobabiC's
accomplises. To the defenders' astonishment the sole eyewitness to the
shooting was a certain Temeljko Veljanovic from Bitolj region. Imprisoned
for allegedly murdering Lazar Misic in Ostrovo, Veljanovic had been re­
leased immediately after telling investigators about the assassination at­
tempt several months after the event. Released simultaneously was another
Salonika witness, Djordje Konstantinovic. Both witnesses admitted killing
Lazar MiSic, but no body could be found!
The way the attempted murder of the Heir had been perpetrated, ac­
cording to the indictment, was highly original. It was the first known at­
tempted assassination by rifle at distance of over 300 yards against a
a
moving automobile. Furthennore , the alleged assassin, Malobabic, had
never handled a rifle nor served in the anny ! No assassination in Serbia
had ever been committed with a rifle . Mostly revolvers had been used from
very close range. There had been European assassinations by knife, bomb,
poison and revolver, but never by rifle.'8
Colonel Apis expressed skeptical interest. Who had been arrested? How
had it been done? "What could one gain, 1 ask you, by killing the Heir to
the throne while the King is still alive? Would I act in such a way? As an
old conspirator would I arrange things so stupidly? Apis commented to
Stojkovic: "This is either a personal act of vengeance against the Heir or
arranged especially by those who wanted to bring us here, headed by
Ljuba [Jovanovic-Patakj ."19
Three men claimed to have heard shots flred at the Heir's car near Ost­
rovo. Lieutenant Colonel Pavle Jurisic-Stunn of the Heir's entourage and
Marquis d'Avari, his chauffeur, agreed they had heard two shots fired to­
wards the car. But was that an assassination attempt? Soldiers and civilians
-Bu!gars, Turks, Greeks, and Serbs-were constantly firing weapons nearby.
 256 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Temeljko Veljanovic testified he had heard firing directly at the auto­
mobile, but he differed with earlier witnesses about the number of shots
and persons seen on the spot. Affirming first the Heir's car was closed,
later he could not remember. His testimony was confused and suspect
since he had been freed from prison after talking to investigators. The
latter disregarded the French police report on the incident, although they
had followed closely behind the Heir's car. At the defendants' request,
the court fmally secured that French report only to have the Interior
Minister rule it out as "insignificant ! " Of the three "witnesses" only Vel­
janovic testified he had seen Malobabic shoot at the Heir's car. D'Avari
stated he had seen only shepherd boys at the scene. The French police
affirmed they had searched the entire area immediately without fmding
Veljanovic . In the indictment Apis, Vulovic , and Tucovic were named as
accomplices in the attempted murder, but none admitted it. With only
one questionable eyewitness to Malobabic's actions, there was no legal
proof of the attempt, so none of the defendants could legally be design­
20
ated as accomplices.
The day of the shooting, testified Veljanovic, he had been on the road
to Ostrovo carrying a box of grapes. Sitting down beside the road to rest,
he saw an automobile approach. From a stone house a man emerged with
a rifle, fired twice at the car, then disappeared. That had been Rade
Malobabic. Veljanovic's tale was probably invented. Right after the inci­
dent, the Prince's car had stopped abruptly. The Prince and Pavle JuriSic
had exrunined the area on foot fmding no one! Nor had anyone else seen
Veljanovic in the vicinity that day. What an opportunity for an assassin:
his intended victim was walking around a deserted site! Veljanovic had
"recognized" Malobabic at a distance of 1.000 feet I When he tried to say
this in court, Chairman Misic hastily interrupted to prevent having the
distance mentioned.
Chairman Misic, emphasizing Malobabic's close ties with Apis, the
plot's alleged instigator, suggested those relations were suspicious, even
subversive. He depicted Malobabic as an Austrian spy, a suspicious vaga­
bond pursued by the Serbian police, then taken by Vulovic and Apis,
protected and concealed. Afterward, Apis had hidden Malobabic from
the authorities so he could murder the Heir. Why else conceal and defend
such a criminal type? Lacking real evidence of Malobabic's spying for
-
In Courtroom 257
Austria or presence near Ostrovo on August 29, Misic sought by innuendo
to discredit both Malobabic and Apis.21
A subsequent account by Lazar Milosavljevic, a retired official, tended
to conflffil that the Salonika authorities had invented the murder at­
tempt. Peter Jurisic let Milosavljevic read this letter from his late brother,
Pavle JuriSic-Sturm:
Peter, I can fmd no peace. My conscience is torturing me because I
testified in court at Salonika that there was an attempt on Alex­
ander's life. I was sitting next to the chauffeur [D 'Avari] when
Alexander went past S. Banjica to Ostrovo to the Third Army staff,
and suddenly the automobile stopped, gendarmes jumped out and
searched the vicinity claiming that someone had fired from a height
right at Alexander. I saw and heard nothing, but I had to testify
the way they wished. I am convinced that there was no attempt,
but because of my testimony I have no peace of mind.22
Soon thereafter Pavle Jurisic-Sturm committed suicide.
After Malobabic's interrogation in court, Radoje Lazic commented:
"I'm afraid of that brother MiSic. He grabs so blindly onto an idea and
wishes to twist it the way he believes." Apis sought to encourage all his
colleagues, but the unstable Vemic boasted he would shoot Apis in open
court if they gave him a gun. Captain Stojkovic overheard Apis to say on
March 28th:
This is a state inquisition. This is what a perfidious policy can lead
to. That a Serbian court can try Sarajevo assassins is terrible. Do
they know that people will write all about this? Why don't they
just give us twenty years imprisonment instead of conducting this
circus?
If he had participated in the alleged assassination plot, he would say so
openly. "He who did it should come forward and tell all freely."23
Once Malobabic had been accused formally of shooting at Alexander,
his relationship with Apis became crucial. Questioned by MiSic, Apis de­
clared he could clarify fully his ties with Rade only by explaining their
role in the Sarajevo assassination. But the authorities wished to conceal
258 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
their part in the Archduke's murder and "Black Hand's" national role.
The trial was suspended for Easter. During that recess Assembly chair­
man, Andra Nikolic , and Chairman MiSic urged Apis to withdraw his de­
mand to be heard on the Sarajevo affair. Appealing to his love of country,
they argued that Serbia's national interests would be damaged. Instead
his statement on Sarajevo should be submitted secretly to the court in
writing. Out of patriotism, renouncing an opportunity to win public sym­
pathy by explaining orally his and Malobabic's role in the Sarajevo plot,
Apis complied. In open court his testimony could have gravely embarras­
sed the Pa�ic government. 2_.
The accused were placed in a paradoxical position: the government
appealed to their patriotism to remain silent about their national work
so it could convict them of treason ! This clever trick deprived Apis and
the others of their chief weapon. Omitting all references to national
activity outside Serbia, the court deprived the "Black Hand" of all justi­
fication ; then it could be depicted as subversive and terrorist. Misic's
chief task was to divert attention from Colonel Apis' work for Serbia
to foster the myth that he and the other defendants were murderers, rob­
bers, and ruffians.25
Apis' report to the Salonika court, which it concealed carefully, ap­
parently doomed him, Vulovic and Malobabic to death sentences. In it
Apis took fully responsibility for organizing the Sarajevo assassination.
Pasic held this document in reserve in case of a separate peace with
Austria-Hungary . Then Apis would become the scapegoat for causing
World War I and Serbia's defeat letting the Radicals absolve themselves
of blame and responsibility. Beogradski dnevnik's editor, Krsta Cicvaric,
in his subsequent polemic with Stojan Protic, referred aptly to Apis'
report as "the killer document" which insured his death.2'
Apis wrote the court that he realized from the indictment Malobabic
and Mehmedbasic were accused of trying to murder the Prince Regent.
Thus he must explain his relationship with them. Heading the General
Stafrs intelligence section, he had instructed Malobabic with the concur­
rence of Russia's military attache, Colonel Artamonov, to organize a net­
work inside Austria-Hungary. After Rade began work, believing Austria
was preparing to attack Serbia, Apis felt that if the Archduke were killed,
the Austrian hawks would be paralyzed and war delayed or averted.
"Therefore I instructed Malobabic on occasion of the planned coming of
In Courtroom 259
Ferdinand to Sarajevo to organi
ze his assassination." Executing Apis' orders,
Malobabic had organized and implemented the Sarajevo murder. Mehmed­
basic, the only Muslim Serb involved in the plot, fled to Montenegro, then
0
joined Apis in Uzice. "Linked by such great moral obligations with these
people, I did everything possible for them, disregarding regulations and
rules. "27
Once the Serbian authorities received this document with Apis' promise
not to utilize it at the Trial, they proceeded with their cruel plans. Later,
Kosta Tirnotijevic, a one-time cabinet minister, told Apis' nephew, that
early in April 1917 Prince Alexander asked him whether one could rely
upon Apis' pledged word. When Tirnotijevic replied unhesitatingly and
affinnatively , Alexander took a letter from his pocket purportedly from
Apis about vital state issues. He said that much depended on Apis' promise.
When Tirnotijevic reiterated that the Prince could rely completely on Apis'
word, Alexander returned the letter to his pocket. Tirnotijevic believed
this was Apis' letter about the Sarajevo assassination.23 Thus the Prince
relied on Apis' honesty to have him convicted of treason and murder!
Apis believed, Stojkovic reported to Colonel Zivkovic, that his report
would confuse the Salonika court. "Now they will have to devour me with
all the kids!" he exclaimed enigmatically, smiling like a naughty boy.
Again he spoke warmly about Malobabic and Mehmedbasic and hoped
everything might still turn out well. Perhaps the Trial would be broken off
in the national interest. A disciplinary court could retire the defendants
from military service , then call it quits. For his part Tucovic considered
a twenty year sentence certain but he hoped the entire affair would be
reviewed later. He expressed sympathy for Apis and Milovanovic, blamed
for a phony assassination attempt. Vulovic too agreed that the attempt
had been staged while Vemic blustered: "If they don't take his [Apis']
head off, I will settle up with him."29
Apis then wrote a long, emotional letter to Prince Alexander seeking a
reconciliation in order to save his and his friends' lives. Next day, discus­
sing this with Stojkovic, Apis declared jauntily he had told the Prince : in
such political cases the ruler could squash the court's verdict. Easter was
the natural season for that. Reminding Alexander of their old friendship,
Apis had poured out his whole soul. Getting all this off his chest, Apis was
in an exalted mood. Now optimistic about the prospects, he smiled, laugh­
ed, jumped gaily from one subject to another. The Prince, he felt, was in a
260 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
difficult position. Would Alexander want to push matters to extremes
when everything could be settled without harm to anyone? Not vengeful
himself, Apis could not understand how others could harbor ideas of
vengeance. "It amazes me there aren't any sensible people outside who
could end this business." Otherwise the country would plunge into an
abyss.30
"Moved to the depths of my soul," began Apis' letter to the Prince ,
"I take pen in hand and open my heart and soul to my Sovereign." Deny­
ing any role in the alleged attempt on his life, Apis wrote : "I am dumb­
founded by the accusation of an attempt against Your Highness' life in
Ostrovo, and wholly innocent in that affair, I saw with horror that two
additional persons, both close to me, had been brought to the prisoners'
dock." He explained briefly his relations with Malobabic and Mehmed­
basic. Apis said he had suffered much from being accused of plotting Alex­
ander's life :
I would have to be, Your Highness, not a person, not a beast, but
a monster if I even thought of doing any harm to your person. Could
I who watched all night the lighted windows of your sick room in
Belgrade, who with dread and heavy heart swore in Your ante­
chamber to Your doctors to do everything possible to save Your life,
could I possibly desire Your death? My feelings of boundless devo­
tion for Your Highness, all my hopes and visions of Your greatness
and for the good fortune of Serbia and the Serbian people which I
held for so many years could not pass so readily. They left ineffac­
able impressions in my soul so that I would have to be the son of the
Devil to become your murderer . . . . Could I possibly consider rais­
ing my hand and desiring the death of the godfather of that child
[Nenuska] who is so dear to me, whose picture now stands before
my eyes on my table in prison? . . . My moral world can only be
restored by the assurance that Your Highness does not believe this
and that this entire affair is a deliberate, unintentional, or unfortun­
ate undermining of all the ties which bind me with Your Highness.
If accusations that he plotted to murder Alexander came from those
seeking revenge upon him "and who are doing Your Highness no special
good either" -a veiled reference to Zivkovic and the "White Hand" -then
In Courtroom 261
Apis declared that he understood. He wished merely to recover the Prince's
favor. "I understand people. They are secondary to me in this whole af­
fair." If restored to favor, he would devote his entire being to serve Alex­
ander and the cause they both believed in so stronglY: Serbian unification.
Apis accepted blame for differences which had produced their current
confrontation:
I admit that I am much to blame . . . for failing to come to Your
Highness and destroying all those intrigues at the start . . . . Admit­
ting this, let me merely beg Your Highness for forgiveness and enter­
tain the hope that Your Highness has retained a drop of favor for me.
About "Black Hand" Apis explained : "That secret organization was
established with pure intentions, Your Highness, when Piedmont was
founded." He had entered "Black Hand" created by a Turkish subject,
Bogdan Radenkovic, who placed all his hopes in Serbia.
I entered that organization in those days when I enjoyed Your High­
ness's full trust and when I was prepared to do everything for Your
Highness' greatness. I entered the organization . . . with full belief
that by working in it I would be serving you personally.
Now he hoped for the Prince's mercy and generous spirit. Assuring Alex­
ander that all of "Black Hand's" work and his work in it were ·'pure and
loyal," he had preserved its Constitution to show the Prince. Now investi­
gation had revealed it no longer existed as an organization ; its members
by their work and sacrifices in battle had revealed that "Black Hand" had
lacked any ulterior motives. Its officer members had always been and
would always be wholly loyal to the Prince.
Apis urged Alexander to halt the Salonika Trial and absolve him and his
friends of unfair accusations of treason and murder:
Your Highness, I implore You to halt this affair. You must not allow
a Serbian military court for officers to complete the verdict of the
Austrian court in Sarajevo . . . and place the brand of treason on the
brows of officers who dreamed ofliberating the entire Serbian people
for the glory of Your name . . . .
•
 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
•

262

Your Highness, begging You for all this before this great holiday and
knowing that Your august mercy n
i quashing the indictment against
us can bring us joy . . . . we will all fmd new strength to devote our­ -

selves wholeheartedly to Your Highness's service. In that hope I re­

main to Your Highness with boundless feeling and love,

On Great Thursday Always true and devoted

March 30, 1 9 1 7 Dragutin T. Dirnitrijevic
In Salonika Colonel of General Staff31
CHAPTER XXIl
Now confident, Apis entrusted this letter to Captain Stojkovic for trans­
mission to Prince Alexander.
APIS TESTIFIES (APRIL-MAY 1 9 1 7 )

I have always in life done everything with

the deep conviction that I am working for
the good of the country, and so if 1 now had
done anything, I would say so openly.
Apis to Stojkovic

Colonel Apis' dramatic appeal to the Prince produced no tangible re­

sult or reply. After Easter the Trial resumed with General Damjan Popo­
vic's testimony . But the high points in its latter stages were testimony by
Rade Malobabic and Apis himself.
While awaiting a response from the Heir, Apis hoped the regime would
suspend the Trial rather than pressing to a verdict helpful to no one, Serbia
least of all. "They could place us before a disciplinary court for our mem­
bership in the organization, discharge some and pension others, especially
those in the CEC, and let others go their own way." Entering "Black
Hand" allegedly because of the Prince, Apis now believed he was a victim
of his patriotic actions. He seemed to lack the fire he had shown when the
Trial began, noted Stojkovic. Jumping abruptly from one subject to an­
other, he often repeated himself. In prison Apis spent most of his time
reading newspapers, sitting on his cot, and arranging things. Even during
serious conversations he often cracked jokes.

263
264 APIS : The Congenial Conspirator
Apis reacted casually to General Popovic's incautious correspondence
with his wife, Mileva, which the prosecution utilized to assert that on
Corfu the Apis group had planned a coup. "One shouldn't take the Gen­
eral's letters so seriously," objected Apis. "They are an old man's scrib­
bling, childish. Was there any point in writing that to his wife."
Meanwhile Vemic delivered this bitter diatribe against Apis:
You, Dragutin, have deceived me a hundred times during my life and
I should have abandoned you long since. If you really did something
and it is evident you did, I no longer regard you as a person and will
not forgive you even in the grave. You are a liar; you think one thing
and say another. You didn't dare act on your own hook . . . . You
knew I was a Karadjordjist and therefore you didn't dare tell me
anything. We'll settle up.
Scornfully Vemic turned away. Apis, very pale, merely repeated softly:
"I beg you, I beg you, you will see that it is not so."
On April 6th, amidst complete silence, Malobabic testified in court.
This was the climax of the Trial so far. Some defendants now began to be­
lieve an attempt on the Heir's life had actually been made, planned by
Apis and Vulovic . Agitated at MalobabiC' s statements, Major Vulovic
listened closely , took notes, whispered to himself, frowned and fidge ted.
Apis too displayed considerable emotion chewing his lips and writing con­
stantly . Twice his ears turned crimson, noted Stojkovic. Never previously
had he acted that way in court. Declared Apis afterwards: "Let them
judge us as they wish and eliminate anyone who hampers them. 1 stand at
your disposal. I am only sorry for the other honest people if they are re­
moved . . . when the country needs them." If all "Black Hand" members
were punished, disaster might overtake Serbia. Apis still hoped for recon­
ciliation or compromise :
I don't believe the Heir will force this to the end. We must still part
without great suffering . . . . Let everyone go and do his own work
without bearing any malice in himself. I have always in life done
everything with the deep conviction I am working for the country's
good and that 1[ I now had done anything, I would say so openly.
(Italics in text.)
Apis Testifies 265
Then Apis spoke about life and death, at first calmly and philosophi­
cally, then with n
i creasing heat:
Today we are here, tomorrow we are not, the day after who knows
where we will be? So it goes, one notes, an eternal struggle among
people in life . Each person has his passions, but they cannot under­
stand someone who lives spiritually. They want me to become the
object of their hysteria.
Why did they-the regime-fear him so, why had they turned on him? "If
I bother them so much, I am ready to bow to them and go wherever they
like, but why all this comedy?"
Listening incredulously to Rade's testimony of April 8th, Apis wonder­
ed: "Who taught Malobabic to lie that way?" But why should MiSic now
insist that Rade reveal everything he had said to Apis? "But the bigger
circus the better, let them fmd whomever they can . . . ," the Colonel
declared. During a recess Apis said he would like to tell the regime : "I
know what you want . . . death, so good, why all these formalities?"
Laughing he added: "So their consciences will be clear." During Malo­
babiC's testimony, he bounced constantly on his right leg to show his dis­
pleasure and smoked furiously.
After Rade's testimony even Tucovic seemed to believe some charges
brought against Malobabic and Apis:
I look at Dragutin in court and he looks suspicious to me. The thing
is clear: Malobabic was in Ostrovo August 29th, that is a fact . . . .
Dragu tin is ruining us all. Malobabic will incriminate them [the ac­
cused] terribly, and it is evident it s
i all true except that they in­
vented the meeting in camp.
However, Apis continued to insist Rade was a dedicated national worker:
Have you noticed what a clever badger he is in court? He says every­
thing in order to leave me a free hand. All he has said so far contains
half truths, and the other half will let me explain the entire matter.
266 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Apis Testifies 267

Apis remained angry at Rade's arrest which had disrupted his intelligence world. The unification of Serbdom will prove very expensive, but at

operations in the Dual Monarchy. "And that state prosecutor babbles on least it will be united.

and was never in service. When I meet him after this [trial] , I'll tell him:
'You are a real idiot or a man without heart and feeling.'' • Once again he admitted his grave mistake in not going to the Prince in

His own testimony, said Apis, would dispel all uncertainty. However, 1 9 1 6 , show him the "Black Hand" documents, and become reconciled:

Radenkovic echoed feelings of most defendants: "Malobabic is a tramp

who lies terribly and has become wholly tiresome." Rade, he concluded, I am wholly to blame that I sent Milutin [Lazarevic) and did not

"is the chief culprit and assassin ." Vemic agreed. Even Apis at times now go personally to the Heir and bring him all those documents. He

criticized Rade: "A perverted type. I'll explain everything, but it looks would have embraced me and everything would be different now.

strange now." But he compared Mehmedbasic with Russian revolutionaries

am
Major VuloviC's testimony provoked varied reactions and much acri­
willing to do anything for the great national cause. "I sorry for Dragu­
mony from his fellow offiers. "See how well Ljuba defends himself," re­
tin," noted Vulovic sadly , "he is a person of such incalculable worth." 1
The accused continued to debate the testimony of Malobabic and joiced Apis. "One feels his honesty and pride . . . . " To Tucovic things

Mehmedbasic. Commented Vemic: "I believe Muhamed is telling the truth, were now clear: "They are going to kill all those who were involved in

and that scoundrel, Malobabic, is the assassin, then sought to blame Mu­ the assassination attempt, and they are Dragutin, Ljuba Vulovic, and I am

hamed. They are Dragutin's people." Vulovic agreed Malobabic was the the third ; all the rest will get six months detention . . . . " Curiously, he

main culprit. "He is Dragutin's tool." He continued: included himself in the plot but omitted Malobabic. Sympathized Tucovic :

They are both simple people and cannot explain matters. When Poor Lj uba, it seems to me he is being sandbagge d. He says every­

Dragutin and I testify, we will clarify everything. For me the worst thing and clearly is distracted. The affair has become terribly con­

thing is that they are accusing me of dirty deeds. I must defend my­ fused . . . . We'll see what Dragutin has to say, but that MiSic is a

self; it is not essential to be tried under the penal code's most heartless person.

severe articles.
Milovanovic was negative: "Vulovic is a terrible person. He has lost his

One day Supreme Command ordered all defendants photographed as mind . . . . Ah, Dragutin, you dragged us all here. Why didn't you kill

they left the prison for court. Dragisa Stojadinovic, Jovanovic-Patak's yourself?"2 Divisions among the accused were deepending.

brother-in-law and later a leading defender of the Salonika Trial, headed Major Vulovic was the most defiant, dangerous and impudent of all the

the photography section. Why photograph us now?, wondered the officers. Salonika defendants, affirmed Protic , but he was utterly loyal and devoted

They swore ferociously. Vemic particularly disliked having his picture to Apis. Not a day passed without Vulovic asking about his comrade.

taken . Apis virtually exploded, turning all yellow in the face. It seemed to "How is he? Does he need anything? Does he have coffee and tobacco?

confirm their darkest fears about the outcome of the Trial. You must not allow him to lack for anything or God will punish you all!"

Shortly before beginning his own testimony, Colonel A pis made some Protic assured Vulovic repeatedly that Apis lacked nothing; he was seeing

significant statements overheard by Captain Stojkovic: to it personally. "Then greet him , Protic, on my behalf every day," said
Vulovic. ''Tell him Ljuba will never abandon him . No matter what hap­

The atmosphere [in Europe] was such [in 1 9 14] that someone was pens, our fates are linke d." Vulovic denounced the charges against them as

bound to ignite it, and when the war broke out it lighted the entire ridiculous, the witnesses as false:

268 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
What more do they want from me? I admitted I wrote a letter in
which I called Prince Alexander a beast, a vulture, a carrion. I swore
at him, but I didn't want to kill him. I would have admitted it if I
had, but I didn't. If I had, then crazy (Prince] Djordje would again
become heir to the throne. 3
During the Trial and in the verdict Vulovic was depicted as "Black Hand's"
hit man, Apis' blind instrument, an immoral officer without character, the
man with "dirty hands." Out of a national revolutionary and war hero, the
court sought to create an ordinary criminal and to take away his honor."
Awaiting transportation back to prison April 25th, Pilac again denounc­
ed Apis. Turning to Stojkovic, Milovanovic cursed his friend for bringing
them all to trial. Apis was a swine acting pleasantly toward everyone, then
slicing them down the back. Pilac was haunted by terrible fear that he was
doomed along with Apis and Vulovic .
Colonel Apis' long awaited week of testimony began fmally April 25th.
Did he intend to utilize his confidential report of March 28th? queried
Chairman Misic. No, he did not, replied Apis.5 Mmc realized he could pro­
ceed safely without fear of compromising the Prince Regent or the govern­
ment.
Next day Apis testified about the founding and nature of "Unification
or Death !", responding fully and frankly to the Chairman's probing, often
provocative questions. Yes, he had written his friends in Skoplje in 1 9 1 4
about the Priority Decree, but he had not urged a seizure of power.' The
accused stared intently at Apis as if with his words he could dispense sal­
vation to them all. But after that first session, only Tucovic was fully satis­
fied: "Well, will the state prosecutor now abandon the case?" Milovanovic
was angry, the others expressed dismay, and Lazic felt Apis had insulted
him. Next day when the letters to his Skoplje comrades were read, Apis
again denied any intention of a coup claiming he had merely sought to
give the officer corps deserved satisfaction. "Black Hand" had had no
revolutionary aims in Serbia, he afflrmed. Throughout the day Chairman
MiSic kept attention riveted on "Black Hand" as an allegedly terrorist
organization.
The court asked Apis on April 29th about the tom note in Putnik's
office, and it was read.7 Then MiSic probed Apis' relations with Malo­
babic, especially on the Salonika Front. Afterwards in prison, noted
•
Apis Testifies 269
Stojkovic, Apis acted especially genial and unperturbed. Reacted Vemic
angrily:
If Dragutin crossed himself and said: 'I am Orthodox,' I wouldn't
believe him and would say: 'You are lying, you're a Muslim.' I don't
believe anything he says any more. We'll settle up.
But when Apis looked at him in court, Vemic averted his eyes like a guilty
child. Still admiring Apis and hoping for the best, Tucovic affirmed: "Dra­
gutin doesn't know how to defend himself (in court] ; he says everything
honestly . . . . Someone s
i going to have to lose his head."
At subsequent sessions Chairman MiSic explored in great detail Apis'
dealings with Malobabic, especially hiding him at the front. MiSic casti­
gated Rade as disreputable and an Austrian spy. On May 2nd, with Apis
and Malobabic face to face, they confirmed nearly everything they had
testified to. Their relationship remained one of mutual trust and af­
fection. 5
Apis criticized severely General Milos Vasic as Third Army commander
in 1916, noted Stojkovic. Vasic, Apis alleged, had little idea what occur­
red at the front, since he had spent his time mostly with French and Brit­
ish officers, gorging himself. Major Milan Nikolic, replacing Vulovic at
Third Army staff, had recruited many witnesses in Ostrovo for the Trial.
Apis expressed full satisfaction with Chairman Misic-he was correct, at­
tentive, even helpful . In prison, while other defendants walked in the
courtyard, Apis sat on a stone, his head between his knees. Smoking con­
stantly and eating heavily, Apis now complained of deteriorating health
and disturbing dreams.
Some comrades now rallied to Apis' defense. Declared Major Lazic:
That Dragutin was the spirit of the army. Everything in which the
army succeeded was his work. All night and all day he waited on
the telephone while now MiSic insults hm
i with: 'What did you do
that was useful?' That is shameful .
Even Vemic took
. a milder tack: " . . . Now it is clear to me that Malo-
babic led Dragutin by the nose, but he [Apis] didn't realize it and be-
lieved in him blindly ."9
270 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Lieutenant Protic confirmed Apis' remarkable frankness in court and
private conversation. In court he knew he was revealing state secrets. Vulo­
vic was just the opposite. Reacting to one Apis disclosure, he warned:
"Dragutin, watch out! You mustn't thus . . . . This is a military court, but
they aren't reliable." On the stand Vulovic said repeatedly: "That is a state
and military secret, so do not force me to untie the sack we are all sit­
ting in."
Nonetheless, .Apis remained frank, declaring one day: "I know that
America has entered the war on our allies' side; I read it in the news­
papers." A furor erupted in the courtroom among accused, judges and
guards. "Accused, do you mean you are receiving newspapers in prison?"
asked MiSic. Apis nodded. His revelation got Protic in trouble with Colonel
Dunjic who barked : "How is Apis getting newspapers in his cell?" Protic
shrugged. "If you don't know, then who is whose jailor?" "I don't know,
Colonel, how Mr. Dimitrijevic got the papers or who supplied them," re­
plied Protic, "but in my presence he neither read nor showed them." Only
later, shortly before Apis' execution, Protic learned that Captain Stoj­
kovic had secretly brought Apis newspapers using the money "to treat his
0
ill kidneys." 1
Protic attended the Trial regularly and took detailed notes. When Apis
quoted Foreign Minister Milovan Milovanovic: "Place , young friend, your
Black Hand at my disposal, then you will soon see what Milovanovic will
do for Serbia," a voice, apparently of Colonel Zivkovic, rudely inter­
rupted: "He is lying . . . . Why involve deceased heads of government in
court who cannot confirm it?" Chairman MiSic gavelled for order in the
court. All reference to this incident was deleted from the stenogram of the
Trial since it would undermine prosecution claims that "Black Hand" had
been wholly subversive and secret from the government.
Over coffee Apis spoke with Protic about J ovanovic-Cupa's role as
Piedmont's founder and in the Serbian national movement:
Do you know what a Serbian visionary he was, my falcon? An ideal­
ist, a true nationalist, and at the end of national fanatic and mystic .
. . . Cupa was a Freemason and wrote our organization's Constitu­
tion with reference to the Freemasons. Thus he wanted secrecy,
though everyone knew about 'Unification or Death!' That's why
he introduced the secret oath in a darkened room.
Apis Testifies 271
Though Protic often discussed Jovanovic -Cupa with Apis, he denied all
knowledge of Freemasonry. Yet on a fmger of his right hand, Protic wore
1 -
a small gold ring like those of the Masons. 1
Two defendants confirmed Apis' naive and fatal trust in the sinister
Pera Zivkovic. Captain Stojkovic carried messages back and forth between
them. Apis had nothing to fear, purred Zivkovic reassuringly. The Trial
was all the Radicals' work. Prince Alexander would soon halt it if Apis
did not cross him. Dutifully Apis remained silent about his relations with
Alexander, never once criticizing him during the Trial. "That was Ziv­
kovic's influence," asserted Tucovic. After they learned the verdict, Apis
confirmed this, stating: "You don't have to fear, Peter [Zivkovic] will
put everything in order." Commented Tucovic: "How naive Apis
was."12 The former intelligence chief had been lured into the spider's
dark web. When Tucovic wondered how they would live in African in­
ternment, Apis declared: "Don't worry about that, it is guarantee d. We
will get money through Peter Zivkovic. Be patient and quiet at the Trial.
See you don't antagonize anyone and don't worry at all."13
This desire to act like good little boys may explain the defendants'
failure at Salonika to defend properly the national idea or the "Black
Hand's" work or to seek exclusion of hostile judges. Seemingly count­
ing on the regime's chivalry , they limited themselves to personal defense
without baiting their opponents. 14 Apis' behavior at the Trial, agreed
Slobodan Jovanovic , was neither perceptive or skillful. Was Apis so con­
vinced of his innocence that he feared no personal enemies among the
judges or outside? Why did he keep his relations with them on such a
loyal and cooperative basis? He treated the judges as sincerely as if they
were spiritual comrades. Apis apparently counted on ZivkoviC's former
friendship and present assurances. But livkovic , set on revenge , may have
believed also that interceding for Apis could imperil his standing with
the Heir. 15
In the courtroom and his . secret report to the court Apis accepted
maximum responsibility for "Black Hand" activities and for plarming
the Sarajevo murder. Throughout he revealed himself a generous and
honest frie nd seeking to spare his comrades. As to Sarajevo, clearly he
exaggerated his role. Feeling guilty for involving colleages in the Salonika
Trial, he sought thereby to salve his conscience. On his way to execution
he told Stojkovic: "If I had a hundred lives, I would not regret losing
272 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
them as much as I regret that because of me perished so many true friends
and comrades," and broke into tears. 1 ' Often the other defendants acted
repentant and self-condemnatory and blamed others. Thus they created
the impression of being guilty of something. Whatever others wished to
renounce or deny, they blamed on Apis. Most declared they had operated
under his influence or leadership. To his eternal credit Apis took every­
thing upon himself and constantly encouraged his colleagues. 17
At the Trial 102 witnesses testified formally or had statements read,
all for the prosecution. Not a single defense witness was called, nor was
anyone summoned whom the defendants requested to testify in their
behalf. Despite intense official pressure, about twenty of these witnesses
refused to give false testimony; their statements often favored the ac­
cused. General Vasic, Apis' former commander, had recruited most of
them in order to discredit Apis and his friends. Apis expressed resentment
at beingjudged by Vasic and the "witnesses" he had gathered:
I am not a vengeful person and never took revenge on anyone, but
I cannot stand that demon. Just think that some Temelj ko, Vasilj
and Gajdaci would decide my fate. But why worry and get all upset?
There were also professional provocateurs expecting personal gain. The
letter of one, Mihailo Rankovic, to Prince Alexander, had served as one
18
formal basis for the Trial.
Now believing he would be imprisoned, Apis regarded everything
"philosophically," wrote Stojkovic. The witnesses' task would be to con­
firm Malobabic's role as assassin. "To be consistent, I'll attack them,"
said Apis, "Tuca will join in, then the others." Speaking apparently to
the Captain, Apis declared:
Believe me that I don't have a bad heart. I treat all people with a
generous heart, but when something is essential in the general inter­
est, I work not for myself, not for my good, but for the good of
the whole people which I love more than anything in the world.
That's the way I am made, only to work unceasingly , that is my
pleasure. You see that even my closest friends don't understand me
until I explain it to them. I can see they are angry with me now, but
Apis Testifies 273
still they are all honorable people who don't understand the whole
affair which I need to explain to them.
.
He did not intend to defend his action in detail in his fmal speech to the
court; the time for that, Apis believed, would come later.
The ten defense lawyers presented pleas for their clients on May 18-
19th. Lieutenant Colonel Milan Radojevic provided a rather insipid de­
fense of Colonel Apis:
The officers on trial are accused of preparing to assassinate the
Heir to the tluone and seeking the forcible overthrow of the dy­
nasty. But all participated actively in the coup of May 1903 which
brought the dynasty to the throne. Thus it seems risky without in­
controvertible proof to accuse them of seeking its overthrow.
The chief proof of a planned coup, the prosecution had alleged, was the
"Black Hand" and its statutes. "My client pointed out that he and his
comrades had the opportunity to do this in 1903 yet did not even con­
sider undertaking such an act." After the May Coup Serbia had estab­
lished a democratic regime with one of Europe's most liberal constitu­
tions. When "Black Hand" was founded in 1 9 1 1 , all the accused officers
were in favor at the royal court. Occupying key posts in the Serbian
army , they enjoyed the regime's full favor and benefits. Why would they
found an organization to overthrow the system which provided them with
.
rank and influence? Admittedly, the defendants had associated with Bosn-
ian volunteers, including murderers, but the accused were all sincere
patriots. Even before other Serbs, they had crossed the frontiers to fight
Serbia's enemies. Thus their association with Bosnian revolutionaries was
natural and logical. As intelligence chief, Colonel Dimitrijevic had good
reasons to recruit for spying adventurers like Malobabic . Association with
bad people constitutes no proof of guilt. Colonel Dimitrijevic may have
founded the "Black Hand,"20
but I cannot support the merciless punishment urged by the court.
Court verdicts normally range between the maximum and minimum
set by law. If one takes into account the motives of the accused in
founding ·unification or Death ! ' , one must accept their defense
274 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Apis Testifies 275

that its aim was purely patriotic. This honorable goal should serve to
nor had the 1903 conspirators ever spoken of "settling up" with him . As
extenuate their violation of the law?1
to Apis:
-

Apis was ill-served by a timid defender readyto admit that his client was at
I can assure the court that Colonel Dirnitrijevic never by the slight­
least partially guilty. Much evidence was available to prove Apis innocent
est sign gave me any reason to believe that he had prepared anything
of most charges brought against him .
against the Heir. If I had, I would have urged him against it and in­
On May 23rd Apis delivered his fmal statement to the Salonika Court.
formed whomever necessary .
The accused had founded "Unification or Death!" exclusively as a patrio­
tic organization operating outside Serbia. It had been dissolved in fact
All the accused officers, continued Pilac, had risked their own and their
once Serbia entered war against Turkey in October 1912. The court should families' necks to restore the Karadjordjevic dynasty. All except General
separate carefully the organization's work from its members' acts as in­
Popovic had belonged to the "Black Hand." Since their best guarantees of
dividuals. As an individual, not as "Black Hand" or CEC member, Apis future security lay in the Karadjordjevi6 dynasty, none could possibly
affirmed, he had agitated against the Priority Decree. He had never intend­
benefit from killing the Heir or changing the dynasty. All had worked
ed the army to seize power. As proof, Apis cited conversations with op­
ardently for the national cause. Half the CEC had died gloriously on Serb­
position political leaders at his Kragujevac office in October 1 9 1 4 when he
ian battlefields; the rest had worked for Serbian unity. How could anyone
urged concentrating all political power in the government. He explained believe they could now oppose it? His unblemished twenty-two year
the gathering of Bosnian volunteers at the Uzice staff in 1 9 1 5 as he had
record as an officer suggested that he had not plarmed treason at the war's
earlier. He denied all reports of Branko Bozovic's coming to Uzice. He cal­
most critical moment.
led untrue Ciganovic' s assertion that Tankosic had sent him 500,000 dinars
after crossing into Bosnia. About a supposed "Government of the National
I repeat and give my solemn word which I have never previously
Council" Apis had heard first during interrogation .
broken that I am wholly innocent of the matters I am accused of,
The Colonel denied any part in the supposed attempt on the Heir. He
that I know absolutely nothing either about preparations for a coup
had had no quarrel with the Prince. Again speaking warmly of Malobabic,
and murder of the Premier or Heir and even less that I participated
Apis questioned the validity of testimony against him by Veljanovic and
in this. I entrust my life and honor to the court . . . . I must bear
Konstantinovic . Apis accepted culpability for belonging to the CEC of a
the consequences of my carelessness in signing "Black Hand' s' '
secret society, even though patriotic, admitting that no state can permit
Constitution?3
such secret organizations. He accepted blame as an officer interfering in
politics but denied he had done anything to damage the army or Serbian
In Allied countries reactions to the Salonika Trial were mostly unfavor­
unity. He expected the verdict would reflect the pure spirit of the law. 22
able.l4 Vladirnir .Lebedev, Navy Minister n
i Russia's Provisional Govern­
Colonel Milovanovic-Pilac's lengthy fmal statement largely coincided
ment established in March 1 9 1 7 , wrote in June: "During the last days of
with Apis' and defended him. Joining "Black Hand," he had merely glan­
my stay in Salonika they began arresting the best Serbian officers such as
ced through its statutes and never saw them again until the Trial. In
Dimitrijevic, Vemic, etc." The late Russian ambassador, N . G . Hartvig,
"Black Hand" he had violated no laws except for entering a secret organi­
noted Lebedev, had characterized "Black Hand" as "most popular, un­
zation . Pilac denied engaging in any anti-dynastic activity. On the Salonika
selfish, idealistic and patriotic and whose aim was solely unification and
Front, never favoring a coup of change of dynasty , he had "dedicated my­
liberation of the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian peoples." The most honorable,
self in my new post to tireless work with my colleagues to recover our
idealistic, and self-sacrificing South Slav elements, he continued, had
homeland." Even in anger, contended Pilac, he had never cursed the Prince
grouped themselves around Colonel Apis and his friends.25
276 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Reports reaching the British Foreign Office about the Trial were mostly
critical?' "I learned yesterday that the trial of General Popovic and eight
other officers has been going forward for the last fortnight," reported
Edgar Davies April 27th. It was difficult to learn details as the authorities
claimed it concerned only the Serbs. "In the Serbian army, I hear, there is
much uneasiness and disapproval on account of so many officers of good
standing being removed."27
Colonel Arthur Harrison, former British military attache on Corfu, re­
ported dismay and unrest in the Serbian army and among refugees at the
removal of many officers and officials, including some of the "most ef­
ficient Serbian officers and many of the cleverest and enlightened Serbian
officials." Anyone in the army who dared protest was liable to imprison­
ment or internment. Kindred Slav peoples were furious at this treatment
of those Serbs "whom they look to as most fitted to pull them together
in a renovated Serbia at the conclusion of the war." The Trial could pro­
voke revolution or a schism in the army. Harrison heard that Prince Alex­
ander was powerless and held in ignorance by his entourage. "The situa­
tion is fraught with danger for the cause of the Serbs and Allies and if
not speedily settled may jeopardize the position of Salonika.' '28
In a "Memorandum on the Serbian Situation" Harrison affirmed that
the PaSic cabinet, afraid of losing power, was behind the Salonika affair:
The officers arrested are all men who wish for a regenerated and en­
larged Serbia. The alleged attempt against the Heir was not a real
attempt but a put up job arranged so as to give colour to the arrest
of various Serbian officials. 29
The defendants were being tried for belonging to a secret society:
The Society was formed entirely for patriotic reasons and was not
antagonistic to the Serb government. In prison are eight Serb of­
ficers and about fifty have been interned at Bizerte, practically all
senior officers and the best and most patriotic in the Serbian army.
If the defendants were executed, predicted Harrison, neighboring South
Slavs might prefer Austrian rule to a Radical Serbian regime. 30 ·
Apis Testifies 277
Professor R. W. Seton-Watson, a leading British scholar, in May drew up
a memorandum about the Trial's significance for British intelligence. He
could not assess the officers' guilt or innocence since the entire affair was
shrouded in secrecy, but the actions of the Serbian government "against
so many officers of high merit and distinction" were having deplorable ef­
fects. Provoking doubt and suspicion among Serbs, the Trial threatened to
cause a split in the army.31
To counteract such Allied views, Premier Pasic wrote his ambassador in
London defending the Trial as legal, public, and just. The defendants were
accused of preparing a coup to eliminate constitutional monarchy and
introduce military rule. They had sought to murder the Prince Regent and
had committed various other crimes. This had all been confirmed by num­
erous documents, 100 witnesses, and the defendants' partial admissions.
Original documents had been found proving that "Black Hand" was a sub­
versive organization which had plotted to turn Serbia into a reactionary
military dictatorship.32 But Pasic and the Corfu regime realized they could
not maintain this official version of the Trial for very long. For them it
became crucial to conceal then liquidate the Salonika affair before it
damaged irreparably relations with the Allies upon whom Serbia's exile
regime remained wholly dependent.

CHAPTER XXIII
CONDEMNED TO DEATH
(MAY-JUNE 1 9 1 7 )
You heard the verdict! As to all the others,
I don't believe they will be shot. 'That One'
may reprieve them. But as for me, even St.
Peter can no longer save me!
Apis to Lieutenant Protic
The day before the Lower Military Court's verdict was to be announced
there was rising tension among the accused. Estimating he would get six
months to three years, Vemic believed the mortally ill Bogdan Radenkovic
would be freed altogether. Vemic counted much on Chairman MiSiC's fair­
ness. Major Vulovic awaited the verdict calmly: his heart trouble was
worse. Milovanovic was writing his final statement. Apis felt no proof had
been supplied of the attempt on the Heir and thus that the alleged assas­
sins would be exonerated . But they would all be punished for belonging to
the "Black Hand." He expected ten years: "When I see where they will
send us after the verdict, I'll send the address to my nephew. I am much
worried about that boy. I see that the poor fellow doesn't dare write to
me." 1 A pis stili worried about Rade: "If Malobabic and Mehmedbasic are
punished for attempted assassination, it would be a terrible verdict, in­
conceivable. "2
278
Condemned 279
Late in the evening of May 23rd Chairman Misic rose and motioned to
the other judges to rise too. In a monotone, stroking his hair several times,
he began reading the verdict. Everyone in the courtroom fell deathly
.
silent. Apis stared fixedly at the judges. After Misic pronounced nine
death sentences, the courtroom reacted: "A-a-a-ah!" None of the con­
demned uttered a word. Apis turned yellow as wax. As the judges with­
drew into a back room and the public filed out, he leaned on the table:
I didn't know both of those articles brought the death penalty. So we
are to be shot? Let's see if the Heir will sign that. In his place I
wouldn't sign it. To shoot nine officers, brothers. No regime, not
even the bloodiest would do that.
When could he request mercy? Since the Heir was then on Corfu , could he
do so by telegram? The entire trial had left Apis with the impression that
the charges were baseless. Thus he found the harsh sentences incom­
prehensible:
Do you know what it means to shoot us when today all are fighting
against the death penalty and then to shoot so many of us, that is
indeed terrible. Just think of going for one's entire life along a clear
path, to have a definite goal before you, then go to be executed;
that is truly terrible.
At 1 : 30 next morning Apis lay in bed still unable to sleep.3
Soon after they returned from the courtroom, Protic made rounds of
the officers' cells where he heard varied reactions to the verdict. Comment­
ed Colonel Tucovic:
Oh, they are only trying to scare us. In Serbia even small children
would curse 'That One', even if he won the war and extended the
country to Vienna and Pesth. Where, I ask you, do they dare shoot
so many officers? He may be crazy , but he is not stupid.
Colonel Apis told Protic in a suspiciously normal voice: '·My falcon, here
take some money, as much as you need to buy me coffee tomorrow for
fifteen days." When Protic sought his reactions, Apis replied:

280 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
You heard the verdict! As to all the others I don't believe they will
be shot. That One' can reprieve them. But as for me, even St. Peter
can no longer save me! I know and feel that. Just buy coffee and
cigarettes. Buy more cigarettes, enough for a month, let some be left
over. Anyway, you know how much I smoke and drink coffee every
day. Then come, my falcon, we'll drink together. It is sweeter with
company.
Tucovic said he would seek clemency and advised all to do likewise.
The Heir would not want them all shot. "I thought they would take Dra­
gutin's head and Lj uba's," reacted Pilac. ' 'but here we'll all go under the
ice. In the High Court are Mirko [Milosavljevic ] and Josif [Kostic ) , and
they'll finish us off; the matter is settled." Lazic criticized Apis for keep­
ing the ''Black Hand" Constitution: "As soon as I saw that our case had
begun, I destroyed everything immediately." Shocked at his death sen­
tence, Ceda Popovic told Apis: "Malobabic, the Constitution and Regula­
tions brought us the death penalty, but I destroyed everything from the
organization when I went off to war." He was sorry for surviving wives
•
and children; otherwise it mattered little to him. Shrugging, Malobabic
turned to Apis: "My head wasn't any too secure anyway !" Nonetheless,
the condemned all wrote pleas for mercy to the High Military Court.4
The Lower Court had convicted eleven persons, including two civilians
(Malobabic and Radenkovic), nine to death. The court declared "Unifica­
tion or Death!" had been founded to overturn the "existing order," estab­
lish a dictatorship, and murder the Prince Regent and Premier Pasic. Malo­
babic was convicted of shooting at the Heir in a plot Apis had planned.
Colonel Apis was condemned to death for probable participation in the
murder attempt. Legally the court could convict him only of a lesser
charge, noted Slobodan Jovanovic. Since he did not admit planning the
attempt, two eyewitnesses were supposedly required under military law
for a death sentence. 5
The Lower Court's decision caused a sensation. The broader public did
not expect death sentences. Even Apis' opponents believed capital sen­
tences were undeserved. Serbian society. tired of conspiracies and fearing
praetorianism. were cool toward ''Black Hand" and Apis' political activ·
ities, but most people believed ordinary disciplinary measures would bring
irresponsible army elements to heel. Why condemn officers to death for
•
Condemned 281
killing an Austrian Archduke? Isn't that why we are fighting? queried
Serbian officers and men. The verdict shocked especially fighters on the
Salonika Front- the view prevailed that the Trial had been arranged by
·
enemies thirsting for Apis' blood. 6
Two days after the Lower Court's verdict, Captain Stojkovic found
Apis exhausted and depressed. Unable to read anything, he walked con­
tinually around his room or sat at his table plunged in thought. Feeling
very low, he begged his jailors to come and talk.
Constantly I fmd myself amazed and cannot believe it. Is is possible
after flfteen or twenty years of work to stand before a shameful
and criminal grave? What will the High Military Court declare? Can
it really order nine people to be shot? Formally that means to
slaughter us like lambs. That is terrible.
What were the others doing?, Apis asked Stojkovic. How did they feel?
Apis himself felt acute responsibility for their plight. Had Rade requested
clemency ? Writing his own appeal, Milovanovic wondered if Apis had sent
one. "I don't know what to write," complained Pilac. "What is the point,
what can I say when I am innocent?" Exhausted, his eyes lifeless, Vulovic
kept repeating: "I am innocent, they are spilling an innocent man's blood;
it will go hard on them."7 Protesting his innocence , Malobabic considered
it a great honor to be condemned with Apis, though he feared death
terribly.
On May 29th Colonel Pavlovic of the legal division rushed up asking for
Vernic. Was he acting on a tip? Pavlovic ordered Protic to make sure Vemic
was in his cell. Hurrying there, Protic, horror-struck, saw that Vernic had
fled. "A fme thing!" exploded Pavlovic. "The Heir will shoot us person­
ally!" Alerted by then, Colonel Dunjic, Salonika commandant, immedi­
ately ordered the other prisoners fettered. Lieutenant Protic with Corporal
Vukasin went from cell to cell to attach the fetters. He found Apis stand­
ing next to his table, a cup of coffee in one hand and a cigarette in his
teeth. As the jailors produced the heavy fetters, Apis grew deadly pale.
For the first time he was truly upset. Himself in a state of shock, Protic
explained: "Vernic has escaped, so this is just a precaution." Unhesitating­
ly extending his anns, Apis stressed: "You must carry out your orders,
Protic." Making the fetters secure, Protic rushed from Apis' room his
 282 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
head bent. How shameful! Colonel Apis, a national hero, condemned to
death and now handcuffed too!
Pilac reacted violently: "Aha, he ran off like a big coward! Catch that
cavalry today ! All you cavalrymen are cowards . . . . A Serbian officer
doesn't flee his own military prison. Never!" Worst of all reacted Lazic ,
ready to fight Protic and Vukasin rather than submit to handcuffs. In
rushed Colonel Dunjic and aimed his loaded revolver at Lazic's head. Lazic
spat and reluctantly extended his hands. The prisoners' rooms were kept
open; they all lay on their beds with guards pointing revolvers at their
heads. "Where is Captain Stojkovic?" asked Dunjic ominously. Stojkovic,
fighting a hangover, was in a half sitting position as Dunjic approached .
Instinctively feeling danger coming, he groaned loudly. "Listen, you
drunken tramp!," began Dunjic.
Stojkovic was saved from certain disaster when an automobile drove up
with a recaptured and chastened Vemic. Dunjic handcuffed him person­
ally, assigned him a new cell, and ordered a very meek Captain Stojkovic
to accompany him. Protic ordered the guard to leave him and Vemic
alone, then asked the crestfallen Vemic why he had tried to escape. "You
have caused trouble for all the prisoners, me, and the entire guard. The
Supreme Command threatened Dunjic that he would occupy your place
if you were not recaptured." "Oh, Josif!" wailed Vemic, "and what will
my comrades say?" "They will accuse you of cowardice . . . . Do you
know that they have all been handcuffed? Do you know that in each cell
a guard stands at the prisoner's head witl1 a loaded revolver pointed
at him?"
Vemic began weeping copiously. "Did they even handcuff Dragutin?"
Protic nodded. Vemic sought to explain:
I'm miserable, Protic. I had to flee. I couldn't stand it any more.
. . . You can't imagine how it is to live with the knowledge that
you are going to be shot . . . . Because of false and rigged accusa­
tions . . . because of higher political aims and world politics. Do
you understand, Josif?
As Protic wondered how he had escaped, Vemic explained he had found
that part of his wall was constructed shoddily. "This is a poorly secured
prison, Protic. I didn't think one could escape so easily from a Serbian
Condemned 283
army prison . . . . Where are the outside guards?" Vemic, Protic's first
commanding officer, continued confidentially: "Perhaps the prison was
poorly guarded deliberately . . . . Haven't I proven by this escape that we
are criminals, revolutionaries, and regular regicides?;'
Vemic had b�en recaptured peacefully by a military patrol which found
him hiding behind the dresser in a house of prostitution ! A cavalry officer
caught in a brothel-what would Colonel Pavlovic say? For three days the
prisoners remained fe ttered and closely guarded. Their handcuffs were
removed only for eating or going to the bathroom. Protic felt terribly
about Apis whose huge body produced copious perspiration which soaked
his bed. Open wounds began to fester around his inflamed armpits. Finally,
the softhearted Protic could stand it no longer. He went straight to Col­
onel Dunjic and asked for a transfer right to the front, even behind enemy
lines. Dunjic stared at him in amazement. What had prompted his unusual
request? Replied Protic: "I'll tell you openly, as if to a father, Colonel. I
cannot look at fettered Serbian officers any longer. I no longer have the
nerve to see my superiors suffer with irons on their arms." Dunjic looked
up at Protic . Asking him to wait, he talked at length with someone on the
telephone, apparently the War Minister. Returning, he ordered: "Remove
the fetters from all but Vemic. Leave his on a while longer."
Apis was more upset when they removed his fe tters than when they had
been put on. He turned his head to one side so Corporal Vukasin would
not see the wet marks around his eyes. When the handcuffs fell off, he
walked around like a locomotive, slapped his hands, and massaged his
joints. In silence Protic looked quickly away. For him those past three
days had been the worst of his life. Only officers of that time knew how it
felt to see a fe ttered comrade, particularly one he admired as much as Col­
onel Apis. "Stop a minute, wait!", called Apis cheerfully, as Protic moved
towards the door. "Now I can smoke and cook coffee. Let me treat you,
Protic." Often the Lieutenant drank coffee with Apis, but now he had
more urgen t business. "Excijse me, Colonel, but 1 must remove the fetters
from the other prisoners." "Fly off, my falcon! Hurry, remove the fetters
from the others. Fetters are for cattle and wolves, not for officers. Quick­
ly! And I'll cook up the coffee and wait for you."
The only prisoner who had not cursed Vemic for fleeing and causing
them such heartache was the reputedly brutal Vulovic. Now with his fet­
ters removed, he was aimiable, joking: "What do you say, Pro tic? They
284 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Condemned 285

caught Vemic with a whore in a brothel, behind the dresser! . . . That is affairs." Meanwhile the condemned should remain quiet and patient.

purely Serbian and just like the cavalry !" Reading an article in the French newspaper, L 'fndependant, Apis was

Soon Protic returned to join Apis who had cooked coffee in a half liter struck by a passage calling them traitors and assert ing the Serbian army
.
i real coffee . . . . So sit down, Protic, for goodness sake,
container. "This s would benefit greatly by their removal. Only now, being condemned

brother, sit! Let's drink coffee and smoke. My God, how nice it is not to to death, did he appreciate how precious human life was. "Thus I hope

be bound! You see how little a person needs to be satisfied." Protic they won't want our blood, still one thought spins constantly in my head:

looked admiringly at Apis. The Colonel, a bald, goodnatured giant, spoke the verdict of death." The article had stated: "Remove them," but that

softly and properly. Unlike his comrades, he neither swore nor raised his did not mean execution. "Why should they do that, what satisfaction

voice. "So they have left fetters on Vernic. Oh, the fools! What are they would there be in that?" But Tucovic, after reading a Serbian article and

trying to do to us?" sighed Apis. having L l' ndependant translated, changed his own view: "Now we are
finished. You see this will spread through Europe, and the Heir won't

You know, Protic, I have been expecting this for a number of days pardon us in order to preserve his reputation and will sacrifice us as his

now, ever since they read us the verdict. I see well that this prison recent friends in the country's interests." But their execution would solve

is insecure , dilapidated, that the commander of guards is a drunkard, nothing: "They should know that we have frie nds who will not abandon

that you are kindhearted, that we are not guarded by regular soldiers our cause even if we are no longer here."

but by police unfortunates who can't hit a man at ten feet. I noticed He was not an evil person though certain actions suggested he was un­

all that and think I know why it is so. You know, Protic, it looks as scrupulous, Apis told Stojkovic. His political interference had been wrong,

if someone wanted us to flee, then seize us, perhaps even kill us dur­ he admitted, so the Heir and Radicals were angry at him. In an orderly

ing flight. Oh, they are clever, my falcon. country, Apis agreed, such actions could not be permitted, so they must
be punished. Let them send him to hot North Africa, and he would not

Apis then showed Protic the inferior workmanship in his room. I f one blame his judges. Apis broke down in tears. Later, he said:

leaned against the wall, the bricks would fall in. "But I won't do that.
I'm not a fool like Vemic was. I am not going to flee . . . . It will be con­ Sometimes I think of nothing for half the day and don·t know my­

firmed that I am not guilty !"3 self what I am thinking. During the second half of the day I look

Observing Apis walking around his cell or reading at his table, Stoj­ out into the corridors at those guards, examine their faces and won­

kovic wrote: "He has not yet lost all hope that a reprieve lies at the end der which of them will kill me. Then I wonder why they are going

of this." Apis wanted the others also to feel that way and avoid stupid to kill me, why am I to blame, and why allow him to become a

actions like that of "that peasant, Vemic" who had demeaned them all. murderer even in the line o f duty?

Considering Vemic very limited mentally, Apis forgave him: "He doesn't
realize we are political prisoners; from court we came into confinement; Added Apis: "I wanted to participate actively in politics, so all that was

from prison we will go again to the palace . . . . " Apis had thanked bound to catch up with me." But why were the Heir and his entourage so

Dunjic for removing the handcuffs. Meanwhile · vemic lay bed, his face terribly afraid? Commented Stojkovic :

turned towards the wall to avoid looking anyone in the eye.

The officer prisoners gyrated between hope and despair. On May 3 1 st His conversations, despite all his caution, always manifested a strong

Apis told Stojkovic he was confident he would not be shot. As a political feeling of sympathy for his friends . . . . He does not know what will

prisoner his life would be spared. They would all be imprisoned, "but become of them and what they are thinking, whether they blame

when we enter Greater Serbia, they will release us and attend to their own him and complain against him. For him this is a deep concealed pain
286 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
from which he has suffered constantly since the day of his arrest and
which has grown stronger and was revealed during moments at the
trial when during recesses he was attacked by the other accused.
How would theh execution be carried out? Apis asked Stojkovic. Would
their insignia of rank be removed? "And a crowd will gather, won't it, to
watch the circus for nothing!" He laughed. Pilac, recalling how well he had
once stood with the Heir, feared now he would be doomed because of his
close ties with Apis. "The Heir doesn't believe in Dragutin at all, and what
is more he is right." Vulovic believed he would soon be executed-no one
could expect mercy from the Prince. "Let me tell you, he has all the quali­
ties of his grandfather, Nikola."9 He and Apis would surely be shot; the
others would go to prison. By now the convicted officers were very anxious
0
to see one another. 1
The trip to Corfu of several members of the London-centered Yugoslav
Committee seemed a favorable omen for the condemned. Recalled Hinko
Hinkovic, a prominent Croatian nationalist leader:
We members of the Yugoslav Committee followed this quarrel with
great concern wishing somehow to achieve mercy. Independent of
the humanitarian aspect, we were all firmly convinced that execu­
tions would echo destructively and to the great detriment of our
national aims and among the Allies.
Knowing Malobabic personally , Hinkovic confll1Tled that Rade and his
friends had acted heroically at the 1909 Zagreb Treason Trial. But on
Corfu Hinkovic found that Stojan Proti<�, for one, had a low opinion of
Malobabic. "We, Precani 1 1 did not interfere [in the Salonika verdict ] ,
knowing the sensitivity of the Serbs who considered it their internal mat­
ter." 12 Apis and his friends could expect no aid from the influential Yugo­
slav Committee.
The guard awakened Lieutenant Protic about 3 AM. Vemic needed to
see him urgently . "Either take these [fetters] off or kill me," he pleaded.
Protic promptly replaced the heavy fe tters with lightweight French hand­
cuffs. Vemic thanked him profusely as if he had been pardoned. Next day
Dunjic ordered Ius handcuffs removed. With Captain Stojkovic still "suf­
fering from his kidneys," Protic made the rounds. He had been instructed
Condemned 287
to grant prisoner requests for food and tobacco, but now Vemic urged him
to go to Salonika. "Ask Pera Zivkovic whether I am to be shot. I know
Zivkovic knows what will happen to all of us." Sine� in 1903 Vemic had
secured his release from detention in NiS, Protic considered it a moral
duty to honor this request. As he waited in Pera's elegant Greek salon,
Zivkovic marched in proudly, arrogantly arrayed in civilian clothing
featuring a purple silken blouse. And how were his dear old friends? Did
they need money? What were they saying? Pera would not let Protic
respond. As self-important as ever, Zivkovic never engaged in conversa­
tions with subordinates. Instead he commented on and answered his own
questions:
Oh, they are terrible criminals, Protic. Just think! They wanted to
kill, his Highness, the Heir . . . . If I had my way, I wouldn't shoot
them. I would crush them like eggs! They wanted a republic and
founded a subversive society . . . . Killing kings seems to have be­
come a habit with them. And they wished to liquidate Pasic.
Glancing at a large wall clock, Zivkovic announced before Protic could
utter a word that he must go dine with the Heir. When Protic fmally man­
aged to submit Vemic's request, Pera closed the door and said conspir­
atorially: "Let this remain between us, Protic. Don't tell a soul. Tell only
Vemic: he won't be shot. You may tell him this only tomorrow after 9
AM. Clear? Now go." At 8 AM next morning the High Military Court's
decision commuting Vemic's sentence to imprisonment was read to all the
assembled prisoners. 13
Meanwhile four Serbian officer-associates of Apis with the Volunteer
Division in Russia sought valiantly to save the condemned from execu­
tion. Leading their campaign was Major Radoje Jankovic, a highly culti­
vated poet, fluent in French and knowing Russian. First J ankovic tele­
graphed War Minister Terzic .and Interior Minister J ovanovic-Patak on
Corfu , protesting the Lower Court's death sentences. When his colleagues,
Lieutenant Colonel Bozin Simic, Alexander Srb, and Vojislav Gojkovic, ar­
rived in Petrograd, the four worked together. "We did all we could, up­
setting heaven and earth, out of loyalty sending messages first to our
government." When that brought no response, they composed memoranda
and appealed to leading world statesmen and rulers. They wrote letters to

288 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
leading newspapers in Russia, France and England . On May 27th they
wrote the British ambassador that the attempt on the Prince and the Sal­
onika Trial had been staged by Apis' enemies:
Colonel Dimitrijevic is the most beloved officer in Serbia. I t is pre­
cisely in him that the ideology of national unification has been em­
bodied . . . . By his intelligence and loyalty he has always been the
center of the democratization of the Serbian army . . . . His great
friend, Colonel M. G. Milovanovic, is known as the most solid force
in our General Staff. 14
Thus Apis' loyal "Black Hand" comrades.
Next the four drew up a "Memorandum" affirming that those con­
demned to death had all been accused unjustly of seeking to transform
Serbia into a republic. "We can state unreservedly that the Salonika affair
had already been prepared and officially organized with a definite political
I
aim." False witnesses and informers had incriminated the accused. On
May 23rd the four requested their ambassador in Petrograd to urge Prince
Alexander and the cabinet for the sake of Serbia's future to end the
Salonika Trial immediately and free the defendants. After Serbia had been
liberated, they could be retried. If a verdict had already been pronounced,
an immediate retrial should be held with judges named by Allied gov­
ernments. 15
The Foreign Ministry of Russia's Provisional Government, the weak
democratic regime established in March 1 9 1 7 , '6 fearful the Trial would
endanger the Allied cause, advised the Serbian exile government to be
moderate and humane. After Novoe Vrem a.
i a leading liberal Petrograd
newspaper, had warned Serbian leaders that the Trial could undermine
their cause and alienate the Russian public and Provisional Government,
Foreign Minister M . 1 . Tereshchenko telegraphed his envoy on Corfu
June 1 1 th:
The general consul in Salonika informed us that eight officers ac­
cused of treason and attempted murder of Heir Alexander have been
condemned to death. Without going into the accusations or guilt of
the officers, which is an internal Serbian affair . . . point out to
Pasic that execution of the death penalty wi!J cause here without
•
Condemned 289
doubt under present circumstances an outburst of indignation, heat­
ed attacks on Serbia, and perhaps hostile street demonstrations. We
strongly wish to avoid this so as not to cast a shadow over the friend­
ly and brotherly relations of Russia and Serbia. 1 7
Responding to public sentiment, the Provisional Government had previous­
ly abolished the death penalty in Russia.
The final effort of the four Serbian officers was a telegraphed appeal to
the King of England June 1 1 th:
. . . Death sentences have been pronounced on the best Serbian of­
ficers and the greatest friends of the noble allies and protectors of
the Serbs. This unfortunate and reactionary action by the Heir and
his government presages for the heroic Serbian people the greatest
troubles within future Serbia. We beg Your Majesty to prevent the
execution of this unpardonable crime against the greatest Serbian
patriots unjustly accused and tendentiously judged.18
However, Pasic realized that his regime could disregard warnings by four
expatriate "Black Hand" officers and by the Provisional Government
which had little power outside Petrograd and Moscow.
On June 17th, not knowing the executions had already occurred, For­
eign Minister Tereshchenko instructed his envoy to inform Pasic that un­
less the death sentences were commuted, there would be great indignation
in Russia against the Serbian regime. Pasic claimed that this warning ar­
rived too late adding that in no case would the Russian protests have
halted the executions since the guilt of the condemned had been amply
proven.19
London also had taken some rather timid steps to dissuade the Serbs
from executing the convicted officers. On June 5th the British embassy in
Petrograd telegraphed its envoy on Corfu to urge commutation of all death
penal ties because of the bad effects they would produce in Allied coun­
tries. Ambassador Buchanan requested the envoy to ascertain all charges
against the condemned, adding: "Allied governments cannot remain indif­
ferent to measures which have so direct a bearing on the conduct of the
war."2o
All efforts abroad failed to save Apis and his friends. Since unworthy
men controlled the Salonika regime, concluded Major Jankovic, no amount
290 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
of intervention could have changed the outcome. "A type of hysteria wove
this poisonous net around your heads, all in the name of saving the Kara­
dj ordjevic dynasty which we had brought into power and protected and to
which we wished no harm . "2 1
In Salonika meanwhile the High Military Court had reviewed the Lower
Court's draconian verdict. Before the Salonika Trial, its membership had
been changed completely. Its new chairman was Colonel (soon General)
Mirko Milosavljevic, a leading counterconspirator and "White Hander."
His colleagues were Colonels Josif Kostic, a vitriolic foe of Apis, and
Stevan Miletic, named a judge after pledging to "cut all their heads off."22
With three avowed enemies of Apis on the High Court, his death had been
predetermined.23 However, the fourth judge, Lieutenant Colonel Branko
Gatalovic , conversely was thoroughly honest and trained in law. Before the
Apis case reached the High Court, Gatalovic was pressured to declare him­
self ill; he would merely damage himself by judging the case objectively _2'4
Early in 1 9 1 7 Rudolf Mihl, the "Corfu swimmer," had been assigned to
the High Court as a typist. Sitting in an antechamber during its sessions,
Mihl overheard snatches of Gatalovic's bitter quarrel with Colonel Kostic
on June 5th. They called each other terrible names. Gatalovic kept repeat­
ing: "I will not become a murderer by sentencing innocent men to death."
Cursing him, Kostic threatened to take his head "together with those rob­
bers who will be killed no matter what you say." When their dispute
threatened to degenerate into fisticuffs, Chairman Milosavljevic intervened.
Colonel Vlada Jovanovic urged Mihl: go to Gatalovic , calm him down,
and tell him not to oppose death sentences since "not only would he save
no one's head but merely endanger his own." Very upset, Gatalovic told
Mihl: "Those murderers want to make me a murderer too, but . . . I won't
sign Apis' death sentence even if it costs me my head. "25
When the High Court voted, Chairman Milosavljevic's voice proved deci­
sive . Gatalovic argued vainly: Serbian law expressly forbids a death sentence
based on circumstantial evidence; two witnesses are required to prove mur­
der by assassination. He then filed a dissenting opinion: "the death penalty
2 confirmation the death sentences had been upheld. Not trusting the wily
is not based on the law," a courageous act which cost him dearly. 6
On June 8th with the High Court's decision imminent, Stojkovic found
Apis unusually depressed. He had neither shaved, changed clothes, nor
used his eau de cologne. Apis still counted on outside friends and Serbia's
democratic traditions to win him a five to twenty year sentence if he were
Condemned 291
classified a political prisoner. How was Pilac bearing up? "You know that
he is a very sensitive person whereas I am not and so they call me an ani­
mal. Anyone who seeks to live actively and work must be ready for any­
thing and to bear all." Apis placed hope in Independent Radical leaders,
Davidovic and DraSkovic. Even Pasic might dislike death sentences. As to
the Prince Regent:
We all out our hopes in that Alexander . . . . Kings always make the
mistake of fe aring people of worth and gather around themselves
courtiers useful for hunting, dinners and such things, but not for
basic serious work . . . .
Later, Apis commented: "Let them eliminate me and do what they wish,
but I believe they probably won't dare undertake such a terrible step as
execution." He asked Stojkovic: "Tell me honestly, where will they send
us to prison?" Ljuba Vulovic still cracked rather forced jokes. Milovanovic,
expressing deep hatred for the Prince and dynasty, swore at everyone,
blaming the whole world for his sad plight. He admitted having cursed the
Heir terribly. Malobabic declared smiling: "I thought I had joined an elite
force, but they turn out to be criminals !"27
The High Court issued its verdict later that day. Ceda Popovic and
Radenkovic, earlier condemned to death, received twenty years; General
Popovic's term was n
i creased from fifteen to twenty years. The death
sentences of the rest-Apis, Milovanovic, Lazic, Tucovic, Vulovic, Vemic,
and Malobabic-were all confirmed. However, under Serbia's Constitution,
the Prince Regent possessed final power to reprieve anyone condemned
to die. The seven all prepared mercy pleas.
The High Court's decision split the Corfu coalition cabinet and caused
its dissolution. Cabinet members Davidovic and Draskovic fmally stirred
from their suspicious lethargy. Davidovic, Independent Radical chairman,
waited until a foreign envoy informed him of the High Court's decision .
•
Surprised, Davidovic hastened to Premier Pasic, but he insisted he had no
Pa5ic's assurances, Davidovic promptly sought out Prince Alexander, then
on Corfu. In a good mood, the Heir invited Davidovic for a ride in his
automobile. During the drive Alexander confirmed that the High Court
had confirmed seven death sentences. What was DavidoviC's reaction? As
292 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
party chief, replied Davidovic , he could give no official opinion. The Heir,
he learned, had already spoken with Pasic who had advocated "complete
execution of the verdict." Pasic had deceived him, Davidovic realized, in
order to confront Independent Radical ministers with the fait accompli
of executions.
Davidovic argued for clemency for the condemned. As a friend of the
dynasty, he stressed the fateful consequences of executing the seven of­
ficers. With the blood of political criminals one could not consolidate
throne or dynasty . Listening to his pleas, Alexander grew steadily angrier.
Finally, he shouted: "What, you are defending those who sought to kill
me!" A poisonous silence ensued. When the Prince calmed down, David­
ovic again pleaded for mercy. Everyone would hail such a generous royal
gesture. The Heir halted the car, opened the door, and forced out the
shocked Davidovic. As the Prince Regent continued his drive, the Inde­
pendent Radical chainnan had to walk all the way back to the town of
Corfu !
After that incident the non-Radical ministers opposed the High Court's
verdict. On June 9th Davidovic , DraSk.ovic and Marin.kovic resigned. Chair­
man Davidovic refused to let other Independent Radicals enter the coali­
tion cabinet. Pa5ic promptly submitted the entire cabinet's resignation. At
the advice of the Assembly president, Andra Nikolic, the Prince Regent
then requested Pa5ic as leader of the strongest party (Radicals) to form a
homogeneous cabinet; he did so next day. Going to him on pretext of
saying farewell, Davidovic and DraSkovic again interceded with Alexander
for mercy. Receiving them coldly, the Prince declared: "You need not
have come since you have already resigned." An unfavorable impression
would be produced at home and abroad, they insisted, by executing any
of the condemned. Alexander brushed them off curtly: "You are free to
go; I do not wish to see you again .'m
At its initial meeting Pasic's new all-Radical cabinet decided to have
Apis, Vulovic and Malobabic executed, but urged clemency for the others.
An attending minister took notes in that meeting. After reading the ver­
dicts of both military courts, the Justice Minister urged that the cabinet
recommend to the Crown to commute the death sentences to twenty years
imprisonment except for the three principals. Premier Pasic nodded agree­
ment. Then one minister argued that the three death penalties should be
examined carefully: "Let us look around ourselves a little and examine the
Condemned 293
position we are in now. We have lost our homeland . . . ; our people at
home are enslaved." The minister continued emotionally :
My skin crawls at the shedding of Serbian blood, the blood of our
officers, by Serbian hands. Are we going . . . to bury their bodies in
the ground of those poltroon Greeks? Just think how that would
discourage our army.
And everyone seemed to be opposed to such executions:
. . . This shedding of brotherly blood would make a bad impression
on our Allies and the rest of the civilized world . . . . Know that all
other parties in the Skupstina oppose execution of the death penalty.
What poisons the whole atmosphere even more is the conviction of
innocent men since it was not correct under law and the verdict was
unjust and dictated by personal revenge.
Premier Pasic hastened to interrupt the minister's plea. Thanking him
for the feelings he had expressed, Pasic arged that the external situation
had become critical. According to reports he had received the past few
days from Serbian envoys in Allied countries:
The military position of our allies has deteriorated and
the victory of
our enemies is considered inevitable in the shortest time. [Author's
italics.] Thus we are destined to succumb in the struggle. Negotia­
tions for peace will begin soon and we and our party friends will
confront the greatest danger.
The Austrian and German courts, warned Pasic somberly, considered the
Radicals their greatest enemy. Cleverly, he linked the High Court's verdict
with the Sarajevo assassination, The Central Powers, claimed Pasic , had
proofs that the Archduke's assassination had been prepared by Colonel
Apis and his friends. "Both Austrians and Germans are so angry at us that
they won't allow us to return to Serbia, will confiscate our land and turn
us and our leading friends over to the courts." Thus it was essential to de­
fend the Radical Party by being implacable toward Apis and his friends.
Since Apis had given the Salonika court a written admission that he had

294 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
prepared Franz Ferdinand's murder, it was essential for the Serbian regime
to condemn him publicly and execute him and his chief accomplices,
Vulovic and Malobabic.
Then we can· tell Austria and Germany . . . that we killed him im­
mediately proving that we condemned the assassination. At issue
here is our skin or theirs. This matter will tolerate no delay because
events can surprise us.
Pa5ic begged them to accept the Justice Minister's proposal .
Dead silence descended over the cabinet meeting, then PasiC's plea was
accepted without further objection. Only two weeks later, recalled the
minister, a high Foreign Ministry official informed them that Pa5iC's state­
ments about the grave military and political situation had been invented.
That same day the minister learned that Apis had provided written admis­
sion of responsibility for Sarajevo in return for a promise of clemency .29
Pasic had secured his object by deceiving flrst Apis, then his Radical
colleagues.
Alexander and Pasic were responsible for confmning the three death
sentences, affirmed Slobodan Jovanovic. Why did Pasic split from the
Independent Radicals over the executions and doom the coalition cab­
inet? Facing talks with the Yugoslav Committee about a future Yugoslav
state, a coalition regime would have strengthened Pasic's position. Pasic
had acted under in tense pressure from the Prince Regent, a Radical min­
ister, Momcilo Nincic assured Jovanovic. The Heir first insisted that
the convicted seven be executed, but Pasic induced him to reprieve all
three. Pasic could not save them because Alexander made a personal issue
over Apis, Vulovic and Malobabic. But had Pasic joined Independent Radi­
cal demands for clemency, countered Jovanovic, Alexander would have
had to yield. He could not have dismissed a Pasic coalition cabinet since
neither the Yugoslav Committee nor the Allies would have dealt with an
irregularly constituted cabinet. Thus Pasic had his own reasons to elimin­
ate the three. Paramount was Apis' admission to the Salonika court that
he had organized the Sarajevo plot. Pa5ic and Stojan Protic considered it
vital to safeguard the dynasty, Radical Party and themselves, pledging
Serbia's future correct behavior toward the Austrians by shooting Sara­
jevo's organizers. To cleanse thei r party in case of a separate peace, Pasic
and Protic agreed to deliver Apis' head to Yienna.30
•
Condemned 295
In 1922 Stojan Protic conflrmed that Apis' secret report to the Salon­
ika court had prevented his reprieve :
As far as the late Dimitrijevic is concerned, the main thing is that he
admitted to the court that it was he who had organized the Sarajevo
assassination which gave Austria the excuse to declare war against us.
Thus Protic virtually admitted that the Pasic government during a war
against Austria considered Sarajevo a crime and its organizers criminals.
"Can one conceive of a more monstrous political act of treason against
Serbia than this?" queried Apis' nephew. 31
Jovanovic discussed Apis' execution with Alexander in I 9 I 9 . Pressed to
speak frankly, Jovanovic, whom Alexander respected as lawyer and his­
torian, told the Prince that Apis' death sentence had been judicial murder.
Startled, the Prince claimed never to have previously heard such a view:
I am a military man; I am not versed in law, so I consulted those
legal advisers I had in Salonika on my staff. They all assured me the
death penalty of Apis was irreproachable legally. After that I had to
consider the Apis case purely militarily . From that viewpoint Apis
could not have been reprieved. For an officer there can be no greater
crime than to plot in wartime against his commander-in-chief.
Did Alexander really believe Apis and his friends had conspired against
all him? Seeking supreme authority over the army and convinced this was a
but legitimate aim, the Prince had ignored the Salonika Trial's flagrant ir­
regularities.
But Pa5ic and his colleagues surely realized them. Pa5ic's behavior often
is explained by Austrian demands to punish Sarajevo's organizers as a
peace condition. Only after Apis' execution, Pasic believed, would Vienna
permit Radical and Karadjordjevic rule in a restored Serbia. Thus Apis
was killed not for plotting against the Heir, but to insure Radical sur­
vival. 32 Alexander's reply to a clemency appeal from Lady Paget, wife of
the former British minister to Serbia, appears to confirm this:
Those people are an evil for the country. For a long time they have
obstructed state work with their subversive intentions. Besides that
296 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
they were prepared to murder Pasic and me. But they were sen­
tenced more for those former, state reasons . . . and therefore cannot
be reprieved. 33 [Author's italics.j
The fmal page of Captain StojkoviC's diary has notes·made on June 1 2 ,
1 9 1 7 , a few hours before the three condemned were executed. Vulovic
was packing his things, writing letters, and cracking jokes about being shot
He wished to entrust two confiden tial letters to General Popovic , whom he
was sure would be spared. Though still hoping for clemency, A pis now felt
like ·'a useless man without soul, limbs, or head." Ten days before his
arrest, he had dreamed of being attacked by a terrible spider which aimed
its frightful yellow eyes at his head. Protecting himself with a rapier, Apis
awoke shaking and upset The previous day his mirror had fallen and
shattered.
The fear of death in which I am now I would not wish on my worst
enemy. Now it is clear to me why people campaign against the death
penalty . I lie down but suddenly a grave appears before me eyes. I
turn and feel in my soul a terribly painful pressure.
Why was this inflicted on him who had always forgiven men their weak­
nesses? "But I still blame no one, believe me . . . I am not angry at people;
I know them."34 Soon thereafter Apis and Vulovic learned they would be
executed next day.
At five minutes before midnight on June 12/25th the other convicted
were told the Prince Regent had commuted their death sentences. All had
I
been silent awaiting the decision. Once Alexander's decree had been read ,
they suddenly revived and grew talkative. One of the reprieved, apparently
Lazic , shouted: "Long live the Heir!" Several others took up that shout35
•
-
CHAPTER XXIV
EXONERATED! ( 1 9 1 8- 1 95 3 )
During all this time the bones of the three
national martyrs . . . have lain buried in un­
marked graves in the shadow of shame and
dishonor . . . . The moment has come to re­
move the curtain concealing that dark judi­
cial crime . . . and remove the blot from the
faces of the Salonika martyrs . . . .
Interpellation to the Premier of Yugoslavia,
1945
Soon after the execution of Apis, Vulovic and Malobabic, their families
and supporters began vigorous efforts to overturn the Salonika verdict.
Once Apis' surviving colleagues were released, they reinforced demands by
the opposition to exonerate Apis and the "Black Hand." Only after thirty­
six years and a change of Yugoslav regime did they succeed. While King
Alexander, advised by Peter Zivkovic , ruled Yugoslavia the Salonika case
remained mysterious and closed.1
After the executions, Regent. Alexander and the "White Hand" consoli­
dated their power. Placed by Alexander at the head of the officer corps,
Zivkovic turned the Serbian army into the Prince's obedient instrument.
The Radicals had eliminated the "Black Hand" only to have the "White
Hand" intervene in Serbian politics, eventually bring down Pasic, and end
297
 298 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Radical predominance. Ln 1929 state leadership shifted from the political
parties to King Alexander and non-party advisers under Zivkovic . Pa�ic
surely did not forsee such a result of the Salonika Trial?
ln 1 9 1 8 Pa�ic appeared triumphant. Preventing formation of a new
coalition cabinet despite Allied pressure, he reasserted Radical supremacy.
In parliament on Corfu that spring Opposition deputies attacked Pa�ic as
"a criminal and a murderer," but he just laughed . When Interior Minister
J ovanovic-Patak addressed the Skupstina, the entire Opposition walked
out rather than hear "the murderer of Salonika." Documents presented
to the Assembly painted an appalling picture of corruption in his "Sal­
onika regime." Efforts to form a coalition cabinet broke down as the Op­
position refused to enter one containing Jovanovic-Patak or Stojan Protic.
PaSic gladly broke off talks and formed another homogeneous Radical
cabinet. After the breakthrough on the Salonika Front in October 1 9 1 8 ,
PaSic and Alexander swept into Belgrade with Serbia's victorious army.
Utilizing police power, the Radicals consolidated authority and claimed
full credit for victory.3
Apis' colleagues remained in Salonika Officers' prison. They were ap­
palled at the garbled, distorted account of the Trial contained in the of­
ficial version issued in Salonika early in 1918. "Monstrous! . . . A mass of
Lies and inaccuracies!", exploded Milovanovic-Pilac.4 Most Serbs in Salon­
ika, they heard, realized the Trial' s charges hati been false. Realizing their
mistake, the authorities soon withdrew the book and even destroyed
published copies. ln October Milovanovic noted R. W. Seton-Watson's
article in Der Kurier, a Swiss newspaper, praising "Black Hand" mem­
bers as patriots and castigating the Heir and the Radicals for their conduct
of the Salonika Trial. In France Apis was being praised as a remarkable
leader.5 On November 21st, soon after World War I ended, Ceda Popovic
learned he had been pardoned and would be released immediately. "We
figure now that we will all be pardoned," noted Pilac, "but without having
our rights restored."6
Public pressure intensified to release the other convicted officers. In
February 1919 the Radical cabinet prepared an amnesty decree, but the
Prince refused to sign it. Then on March 29th Stojkovic told them the
Prince Regent had relented and they would soon be released. The Yugo­
slav parliament debated whether the four Serbian officers, convicted in
Russia in absentia should be amnestied. 7
Exonerated! 299
Colonel Peter Zivkovic, weathering another crisis, consolidated his hold
over army and court. In March 1918 two former ''White Handers," Pavle
JuriSic-Sturm and Radovanovic-Koca, accusing him of repeated homo­
sexual acts, sought to force him from the army. Both ·officers were dissat­
isfied with "rewards for services rendered," and Jurisic-Sturm sought to
replace Zivkovic as the Prince Regent's chief adviser. According to the
Serbian criminal code (Article 206): "Unnatural relations between men
as well as with animals are punishable by imprisonment . . . and loss of
civil honor." Homosexuality was also grounds for expulsion from the
army. Before accusing Zivkovic openly of pederasty, Radovanovic-Koca
sent an envoy to Prince Alexander. If Zivkovic left the Royal Guard
voluntarily and went abroad, Koca would not press charges. But Zivkovic
decided, with Alexander's full support, to turn the tables on his accusers.3
The two officers believed they could find numerous witnesses among
Zivkovic's former lovers to testify against the gay Colonel, but they badly
miscalculated his power and hold over Alexander. Zivkovic had J uriSic­
Sturm removed from the Guard and posted as military attache to Athens,
scotching his ambitions and contributing to his subsequent suicide.9 Rado­
vanovic-Koca too soon realized Pera had an unbreakable hold over the
army. When he accused Zivkovic formally of homosexual acts with army
personnel, Pera promptly sued him for slander. It was Radovanovic, not
Zivkovic, who went on trial. In court, swearing all his charges were true,
Koca also revealed Pera's sinister role in the officer corps and the Salonika
Trial. 10
This sordid quarrel stunned the Serbian emigre community. As Rado-
vanoviC's trial neared its end, it grew evident he would be found innocent.
Suddenly an automobile drew up before the courtroom , the trial was sus­
pended, and the judges were driven straight to the Prince's palace! When
the trial resumed, with the aid of false witnesses, Radovanovic was con­
victed and sentenced to ten years. 1 1 The spider had swallowed another
victim.
Zivkovic emerged triumphant. Djurdje Jelenic, the Prince's long-time
secretary, was removed summarily , and all other attempts to undermine
"the Yugoslav Rasputin" failed. From then until King Alexander's assas­
sination war ministers were Zivkovic's nominees and followed his instruc­
tions. In royal Yugoslavia Zivkovic exercised more influence in the army
than Apis in prewar Serbia. Without true combat service, Pera obtained

300 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
every decoration and distinction. Promotions came to him ahead of time
and out of turn. By-passing senior, decorated battlefield commanders, he
became a divisional, then a brigade commander. Under King Alexander's
personal regime after 1929, Zivkovic became premier and interior minister,
then was promoted to anny general and war minister. 1 2
But not even Pera Zivkovic could lay the ghosts of Salonika to rest.
Early in 1920 two Belgrade opposition newspapers, Pravda and Beograd­
ski dnevnik, each ran a long series of articles describing the nefarious acti­
vities of the Corfu-Salonika regime. In lead articles Editor Krsta Cicvaric
of Beogradski dnevnik depicted Colonel Apis as a national hero compar­
able to Karadjordje, Serbia's George Washington and ancestor of Prince
Alexander. However, Pravda's editor considered such praise excessive:
"Colonel Dimitrijevic was unquestionably an able general staff officer,
was very active, a good organizer, but during his lifetime he committed
many mistakes; he was a pathological case."13 Even more critical of Apis'
enemies though, he described the evils of the "Salonika regime" in detail.
He demanded that the "White Hand," including Pera Zivkovic, Peter Misic,
Okanovic, and Ljubomir Dabic, who had split the Serbian officer corps,
be expelled from the army and tried for their misdeeds.14 But Prince
Alexander would not permit that.
Facing rising criticism from Belgrade's outspoken press, Interior Min­
ister Jovanovic-Patak in a series on the "Black Hand" in semi-official
Samouprava defended and justified Radical actions and the Salonika
verdict. The Democrats 1 5 had launched against him, PaSic and Protic a
bitter campaign, "both repulsive and foolish." The opposition press,
claimed Jovanovic-Patak, describing falsely Radical actions toward the
Apis group, had argued that the convicted were wholly innocent. Yet only
two days before his execution, Colonel Apis, admitting his guilt, had beg­
ged Prince Alexander humbly for clemency: "I have erred, and erred
much, and it remains for me only to beg Your Highness to grant us mercy,
to forgive me and aid me in this terrible hour." Thus the "evil deeds" of
A pis and his friends had been proven clearly ni and out of court, affirmed
Jovanovic. To cover things up, their friends had confmed the discussion to
the attempt on the Heir and death sentences. The Pasic cabinet at Salon­
ika had to choose between interests of state and one guilty individual
who placed himself above his country and its laws. The convicted had
brought their execution upon themselves by committing unpardonable
•
Exonerated! 301
crimes. "We suffered terrible consequences because of them." "Interest
of state" barred Jovanovic-Patak from disclosing details. 16
When the Interior Minister's series concluded, Pravda's editor comment­
ed acidly: "Denying any misdeeds in his ministry, Jovanovic boasts pomp­
ously about it. Concerning the "Salonika regime" there is nothing. Radi­
cals have always believed their party is identical with the state." 1 7 This
polemic brought into the open much which had been concealed. Data
about the "Salonika regime," confirmed by neutral observers and in Skup­
stina debates, damaged the ruling Radicals.
Two years later the disreputable pro-regime newspaper, Balkan, publish­
ed excerpts from mercy pleas sent by Apis and other convicted officers to
Prince Alexander in order to prove they had admitted their guilty ab­
jectly . 1 8 Milovanovic-Pilac complained to Balkan's editor that he and his
comrades had been depicted falsely as cowards fearing death.
. . . Because of Apis who even when dead is given no peace, let me
say: they wanted to take our heads in the most terrible manner and
before doing so to proclaim us traitors to the sacred Serbian idea, to
take away our honor through the so-called 'Salonika verdict.'
All who knew Apis, wrote Pilac, realized that his plea to the Prince reflect­
ed no fear of death. Wounded in the May Coup of 1903 and told he might
die, Apis had replied: "I do not regret dying since the [national] goal is
achieved." Apis had found it hard to face execution by Serbs for some­
thing he had not done but had accepted it nonetheless. His behavior at the
execution, eyewitnesses confirmed, had been heroic. 19
In royal Yugoslavia opposition leaders and surviving Salonika defendants
raised inquiries and sent appeals to parliament for a retrial. Stojan Ribarac
(Liberal) asked Premier Pasic what proofs the government possessed when
I criminal investigation against Apis began. What evidence did it have that
"Black Hand" had acted subversively in Serbia? Had the attempt against
the Heir been proven? Were the death penalties legal? If not, how would
the government act to rehabilitate men irmocently convicted?20
Surviving "Black Hand" leaders sent a lengthy appeal to the Yugoslav
parliament in June 1922:
Five years have passed since the famous Salonika Trial as a result of
•
 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Exonerated! 303
302

which some of our comrades were shot, others imprisoned, some ar­ this blot from us. The foundations of our country have been built from

rested without legal decision, pensioned, sent to Afric a, and interned the bones of our dead comrades."22 But the Regent also apparently did

in s
i land prisons . . . . For five years the entire official press and its not reply.

organs have written against us repeating the insolent slander begun Perhaps the most perceptive of former "Black Hand" officers doubted
the efficacy or wisdom of a retrial. Writing a fellow officer from Italy in
by the Salonika court and regime.
1 9 1 9 former Major Radoje Jankovic stated:

Silence now by the survivors would merely confirm they had done wrong.
The signatories reaffmned that "Black Hand" had been solely a patriotic The success of our national cause provides Apis and his comrades the

organization operating outside Serbia. They had entered it believing as halo of martyrdom which is the greatest punishment for their mur­

officers and citizens they could devote themselves to national work. The derers. The death of Apis is an historic injustice, and from such an

Salonika verdict that "Black Hand" members were in touch with the accusation the murderers cannot save themselves no matter how

enemy and had conspired against the dynasty was a repulsive slander. The they may distort history.

petitioners detailed many violations of legal procedures at the Salonika

Trial. Concluding that its verdict had been "legal murder with premedita­ Receiving the Colonel's message urging revision of the case as "our only

tion," they requested parliament "to give us full satisfaction for injustices salvation," Jankovic concluded that every reason spoke against a retrial.

and slanders against us . . . . "21 There was no response . No one believed they were traitors to Serbia; all knew they were patriots

After King Alexander was murdered in Marseilles in October 1934, ex­ who had suffered innocently . In Serbia and abroad the Salonika Trial was
described as an inexcusable act of force. "Those who will blame us none­
General Vojislav Gojkovic, former "Black Hand" leader, urged War Min­
ister Zivkovic to correct injustices committed against Serbian officers at theless-our opponents-will not have their minds changed by a retrial."

the Salonika Trial: However, if one occurred, they had copious and convincing documenta­
tion. Many witnesses would appear in their behalf and former Salonika

Of three innocent men who were shot, two participated in the May advisers were turning against the Crown.

Coup which brought the present dynasty to the throne. Apis was the
Who can remove Apis and Vulovic from their graves? What I regret
soul of the May conspiracy and without him there would never have
from the depths of my soul is that a retrial cannot restore them to
been a May coup.
life. And I fear that . . . their present moral grandeur as murdered
patriots may emerge tarnished from a retrial because I simply do not
It was high time to retry the Salonika case and exonerate wrongly convict­
believe in full justice in our courts.
ed Serbian patriots:

Apis was incapable of the deed for which he was shot since above all For historic vindication of the dead officers no trial was needed and migl1t
even harm their reputations. As things stood, "our patriotic work during
he was a patriot scarcely equalled in our en tire country. When shot
the last twenty years is complete, historically significant and cannot be
he shouted: 'Long live Yugoslavia!' Even facing the grave his patriot­
negated."23
ism never wavered.
No revision of the Salonika verdict proved possible in royal Yugoslavia.
General Zivkovic eventually retired, but from behind the scenes he contin­
Since Zivkovic did not deign even to reply to his appeal, Gojkovic wrote
ued to control the regime through generals he had promoted. After the
Regent Paul Karadjordjevic the following spring wondering why the War
coup d'etat of March 27, 1941 overthrew the pro-Axis regency of Prince
Minister had not responded. "Your Royal Highness . . . it is time to remove
304 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Paul Karadjordjevic, General Du�an Simovic's new government resolved to
rehabilitate Apis and his friends. 24 Before such plans could be implement­
ed the Nazi invasion of April 6 , 1941 destroyed the Simovic government
and royal Yugoslavia, scotching any rehabilitation effort. During World
War 11 some architects of the Salonika affair, such as General J osif Kostic,
collaborated with Axis occupiers by serving the Nedic regime in Serbia.
Others like General Zivkovic fled abroad where he became a leader in the
royal Yugoslav exile government in London. Gaining the trust of British
leaders, Zivkovic was named acting supreme commander. He died in
France in 1947, a bitter enemy of new socialist Yugoslavia.25
With the triumph of Communist-led Partisans led by Josip Broz Tito
over the royalist Cetniks and the establishment of socialist Yugoslavia
in 1 945, agitation revived to retry the Salonika case. An interpellation to
Yugoslavia's premier in 1 945 referred to it as "the most shameful crime
in Serbian history."
During all this time the bones of the three national martyrs have lain
in unmarked graves in the shadow of shame and dishonor . . . . We
feel that the moment has come to remove the curtain concealing
that dark judicial crime . . . and remove the blot from the faces of
6 sor: the Karadjordjevic dynasty and the Radical Party:
the Salonika martyrs . . . . 2
After Yugoslavia's liberation, Milan Zivanovic , Apis' beloved nephew,
dedicated his efforts to exonerate his uncle and began writing articles
about him for Belgrade newspapers. His "The Twenty-sixth of June 1 9 1 7
in Salonika" stigmatized the Salonika Trial as "simple murder," planned
on Corfu in 1 9 1 6 , in order to consolidate the power of the Prince Regent
and the Radicals. 27 Milan prepared a doctoral dissertation , "The Salonika
Trial of 1 9 1 7 ," utilizing copious materials from Apis' friends and "Black
Hand" survivors. 2a
A lengthy speech by lawyer, Dragoslav llic, prepared for delivery in the
Yugoslav parliament in 194 7 indicated that agitation for a retrial enjoyed
official support. Since socialist Yugoslavia, following the Soviet Union of
Stalin, was then a centralized, one-party state, lliC's speech required official
sanction. His stated purpose was to rehabilitate victims of the Salonika
Trial whose essence as a "legal crime" remained a riddle to the Yugoslav
public because of the wall of secrecy erected around it by the royal regime.
Exonera ted! 305
Ilic praised Colonel Apis as a major historic figure, a born revolutionary,
the predestined leader of the patriotic, revolutionary "Black Hand."
Around the latter's two main figures-Apis and Radenkovic-had gather­
ed "young, bold officers and civilians representing everything most intel­
ligent and most noble in the officer corps and citizenry of Serbia."
Hie's objections to the Salonika Trial resembled those of its interwar
critics. Membership in "Black Hand," he argued, provided no basis for
convicting officers of treason since its statutes portrayed it as patriotic,
not subversive. No legal basis had existed for accusing it of plotting
against the dynasty or gove rnment. Nor had it been truly secret since
the Interior Minister, informed about it in 1 9 1 1 , had instructed his police
not to disturb it. The Trial had violated accepted judicial principles that
everything pertinent for and against the accused should be presented in
court. Numerous witnesses had testified falsely at Salonika, coached by
the ' 'Committee of Ten." Ilic cited a note from Peter Zivkovic to Rado­
vanovic-Koca suggesting that witnesses had been "prepared" to give false
testimony. Both military courts had been packed with defendants' foes
and their verdicts predetermined by the "Salonika regime ." The Salonika
Trial, concluded Ilic, had been based on invented or distorted charges.
i dicated that the new regime's true target was its predeces­
The lawyer n
They [the convicted] paid with their lives or long years of prison
for the ambition, love of power, impatience, and low inclinations
of a future ruler-dictator and the greed for power of a corrupt
i moral and perverted Court camarilla. I
political party and an m
am happy if I have unmasked a godless crime and removed from
the names and faces of innocent people a severe stain which has
burdened them for over twenty-five years. 2a
A retrial, wrote Slobodan Jovanovic from political exile, became es­
sential as soon as the Salonika verdict was issued. Pasic and Stojan Protic
had stated that Apis had been denied mercy because of a document which
for "higher reasons of state' ' must remain secret. To condemn men to
death by secret documents violated elementary principles of law. But
Jovanovic questioned whether a Communist regime bitterly opposed to
306 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Exonerated ! 307

the Radical government which conducted the initial trial could hold an Prior to the Retrial, a Sarajevo newspaper interviewed seventy-seven

impartial retrial. 29 year old Radoje Lazic, sole surviving Salonika defendant, who spoke of

Late in 1952 Interior Minister Alexander Rank.ovic, a leading Serbian his arrest and the Salonika Trial. Prince Regent Alexandef, claimed Lazic,

figure in the Tito regime, received a letter which Major Vulovic wrote was already then a sinister individual. Jealous of ApiS' popularity, he and

just before his execution and gave to Lieutenant Protic. It suggested the his favorite, Zivkovic , forged plans to destroy Apis. The entire Salonika

enire Salonika Trial had been staged and the defendants innocent. Ran­ Trial had been so awkwardly prepared that it had resembled theater more

kovic ordered an investigation, and Protic confirmed Vulovic' s allega­ than reality .31

tions. Requests for a retrial then were submitted by Radoje Lazic, Apis' The famous Dreyfus Case, often compared with the Salonika Trial,

nephew, and Vulovic's widow. Dragic Mirkovic, assistant public pro­ caused a great furor in the France of its time, observed Zagreb' s Vjesnik.
secutor of Serbia, after examining the Salonika Trial records, proposed Thanks to efforts by the writer Emile Zola, it ended in revision. But the

that the Supreme Court of Serbia hold a retrial. Salonika affair was not just legal error but premeditated judicial murder.

In the preliminary investigation new evidence was collected . In Janu­ Prince Alexander's clique and the Radicals had plotted to destroy an of­

ary 1953 Temeljko Veljanovic and Djordje Kostantinovic , supposed ''eye­ ficers' group critical of their domestic and foreign policies. Led by Apis,

witnesses" to the attempt on the Prince Regent, confirmed they had those officers had been leading fighters for South Slav unification. Their

testified falsely under duress. ''Everything stated in court against Major conviction was a precondition for concluding a possible Austro-Serbian

Vulovic and Muhamed Mehmedbasic, " stated Konstantinovic , "was writ­ separate peace. 32 Such articles in the carefully controlled Yugoslav press

ten for me by the government commissioner, Ranko Trifunovic . . . . " suggested that the verdict of the Retrial, like Salonika's, was foreordained.

The investigators ascertained that testimony about the defendants' al­ Serbia's Supreme Court would surely reverse the Salonika decisions.

leged plans to overturn the Radical regime, introduce military rule, and As the Retrial began, an article in Sarajevo's Oslobodjenje: "Clearing up

kill the Heir and Pa§ic had been false. One witness, Pragisa Stojanovic, the legal crime of Alexander Karadjordjevic," confirmed this. The Retrial's

declared in February 1953: principal targets evidently were King Alexander, his entourage, and the
Radical Party. Ostensibly its purpose was "to establish the truth, correct

At Salonika was being carried out a bloody settling up between the an historic injustice to the accused, and bring into the open a historical

Karadjordjevic dynasty and those people who had brought it to the falsification." Before the Serbian Supreme Court were documents treating

throne . . . . It was clear to me that the main role in all this was all aspects of the Salonika Trial and revealing its architects and their pur­

played by Peter Zivkovic . . . through people such as Ranko Tri­ poses. Present at the Retrial, noted the paper, were families and friends of

funovic, Kosta Tucakovic and Jovan Cirkovic, all government the accused, contempararies of Colonel Apis, and former soldiers.33

agents . . . . The fate of Apis was decided the moment of his Public sessions of the Retrial began June 2, 1953 at the Serbian Supreme

arrest. Court in Belgrade . This unprecedented event aroused great public interest.
Declared Public Prosecutor Mirkovic in his opening speech:

Stated Public Prosecutor MirkoviC's proposal to the Serbian Supreme

Court: If for any reason innocent people were convicted, the public pro­
secutor i
s empowered and duty-bound without regard for the elaps­

New evidence uncovered, statements of Veljanovic, etc., and other ed time to demand repetition in full l of testimony ] in order to cor­

facts brought out in this proposal are sufficient to cause a change recent an unjust verdict.

in the legal verdicts of the Lower Military Court and Higher Mili­
tary Court for Officers in favor of the accused .30 At the Salonika Trial, he noted, only evidence believed to be damaging to
308 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
the accused was presented. Witnesses were pressured to give false testi­
mony in return for promotion, payment, or release from prison.
That same day Radoje Lazic testified before the Supreme Court:
In my view, based on my deepest convictions and knowledge , the
Salonika Trial was constructed not to discover the truth or examine
facts and reach concrete conclusions, but only to take Dirnitrijevic­
Apis' head.
The others had been included "to construct a legal bluff' and deceive
public opinion abroad. Prince Alexander had initiated the Salonika Trial :
"It was his idea and his affair."J.4 Apis never advocated taking control of
Serbia, stated Lazic , and urged his friends repeatedly to scotch such ru­
mors. Insisting army morale must be preserved, he opposed involving it
further in politics. There had been no plans for a military coup or to mur­
der the Prince Regent. 35
In court extensive excerpts were read from testimony at Salonika re­
vealing how Prince Alexander, Peter Zivkovic, Pasic , and J ovanovic-Patak
had staged the Trial. "The former 'giants' appeared in their roles as in tri­
guers and criminals," commented the daily, Politika. 36 Next day was read
a description of the dramatic court duel between MiSic and Apis as the
Chairman sought in vain to get the Colonel to admit guilt. Apis had as­
sured the Salonika court that neither he nor "Black Hand" had committed
the criminal acts they were accused of.37
By June 6th, reported Politika, interest in the Retrial was so great that
hundreds thronged the court to hear the proceedings. Then began testi­
mony from surviving witnesses. When he had returned to Salonika, stated
Radovanovic-Koca, Zivkovic had told him: "While you have been there in
[North] Africa, I have been here preparing witnesses and working hard on
the trial." "Against whom?" Radovanovic had queried. "Against Apis,"
responded Zivkovic. "Now I'll take his head." Radovanovic explained : "I
was an intimate of Peter Zivkovic until I grew convinced that it (the
Trial?] concerned a fllthy affair."38
Summarizing revelations thus far in the Retrial , Politika concluded that
the "Black Hand" had committed none of the crimes alleged by Prince
Alexander and Pasic. The Prince's entourage had sought to eliminate of­
ficers blocking Alexander's autocractic rule. Most witnesses confirmed
Exonerated! 309
that the Apis group, lacking broad Yugoslav views, stressed liberation of
Serbian areas under foreign rule. Working solely for Serbian national inter­
ests, they remained silent about South Slav equality. Nonetheless, con­
cluded Po/itika, Apis and his followers "were far removed from people like
Alexander, Zivkovic, Pasic, and the clique around them," although "Black
Hand" lacked any deep popular roots. 39
The final summations by the public prosecutor and Apis' defender,
Prvoslav Vasiljevi6, on June 1 2th were virtually identical. The evidence had
demonstrated the validity of the Retrial , declared Prosecutor Mirkovi6, and
the dishonesty of the Salonika courts and investigative organs. Since King
Alexander and Zivkovi6 would have been revealed as judicial murderers,
the case could not be retried in royal Yugoslavia. This Retrial had generat­
ed ample evidence for a just verdict. There was no proof the accused had
planned a coup in May 1 9 1 4 . The admissions of Veljanovi6 and Konstan­
tinovic and correspondence among Radical leaders had revealed no plot to
kill the Prince Regent. The Salonika Trial, agreed Prvoslav Vasiljevic, had
marked the end of parliamentary democracy in Serbia. Inaugurating the
autocratic rule of Alexander Karadjordjevic, it had "prepared the way for
his monarcho-fascist dictatorship of June 6, 1929."40 The Retrial's chief
purpose apparently was to condemn royal Yugoslavia rather than to re­
habilitate Apis and the "Black Hand."
On June 16, 1953 Svetolik Lazarevic , chairman of the Supreme Court
of Serbia, pronounced the verdict. The decisions of both Salonika military
courts were overturned and nullified. All defendants were declared inno­
cent of all charges made against them.41 In a legal proceeding as dubious as
the original Salonika Trial, Apis and his friends were exonerated. But the
executed trio still lay in unmarked graves outside Salonika.

CHAPTER XXV
THE VERDICT OF HISTORY
He was a major historic figure, a born revo­
lutionary, an amazin g mixture of soldier and
politician, realist and romantic . . . . He was
the greatest son the Sumadija has produced
for the last century . . . .
D. llic to the Yugoslav Parliament in 194 7
There were other Serbian army colonels
with greater military knowledge and ex­
pertise . . . . . Apis failed to perform his as­
signed duties as chief of Serbian intelligence
and aimed to become a dictator and lord it
over the army.
Colonel Peter Opacic to the author,
June 1986
Apis has been glorified extravagantly by admirers, relatives, and col­
leagues and vilified unduly by enemies and opponents. He remains one of
the most controversial figures in modern Yugoslav history. Admirers,
viewing him as a martyr to the Serbian national cause, considered Apis
a dedicated national revolutionary, a spiritual architect of modern Yugo­
slavia. Critics accused Apis of being a ruthless terrorist and traitor, a re­
actionary praetorian who repeatedly sought power and aimed to turn
310
Verdict of History 311
Serbia into a military dictatorship. On the personal level, worshipers cited
his alleged unselfishness, modesty, dedication, and praised him as an ex­
emplary patriot and family man. Comrades lauded .him ·as an intelligent,
courageous, hardworking officer who followed orders and deferred to
superiors. Detractors denounced him as inordinately ambitious, ruthless,
and unscrupulous. There is likewise a total divergence of views as to his
significance. Partisans credited him with inspiring and directing the May
coup, reforming the army and preparing it for wars of national liberation,
and masterminding national-revolutionary activities abroad. Critics con­
fmn that no low ranking officer could exert predominant n
i fluence in the
army and allege that Apis did more to divide than to unite Serbs and
Yugoslavs.
Uninvolved in bitter controversies in Serbia and Yugoslavia which con­
tributed to such divergent assessments of Apis' character and significance,
the author will construct here a balance sheet based on evidence collected
for tltis volume. Presented first will be a summary of the views of admirers
and critics of Apis among Yugoslav writers and scholars. Then at least
tentative answers will be supplied to questions posed at the beginning of
this volume. Finally, this neutral observer will seek to assess Apis as man
and leader.
Previous admiring biographers, Milan Zivanovic and Milos Bogicevic ,
depicted Colonel Apis as Serbia's dominant military figure between 1903
and 1917, involved positively in all key events occurring there, and per­
sonally as an exemplary, saintly , and heroic character. "Apis died like a
hero in the knowledge he had always acted honorably and well," wrote
his nephew. Admitting he had sometimes selected the wrong road, Apis
affirmed-and Milan Zivanovic agreed-that he had always acted in good
faith, convinced he was doing whatever Serbian and Yugoslav interests
required. Thus Apis, he asserted, should be placed among Yugoslavia's
leading creators. Apis died "without fear, hesitation, or suffering," believ­
ing his mission in life had been completed. Quoted by Apis' nephew was
a statement by the respected English scholar, R. W. Seton-Watson: "Dim­
itrijeviC' s enthusiasm for the achievement of the Yugoslav idea caused him
to be remembered in every home in Serbia."1
Writings of Apis' brother-in-law and of a "Black Hand" colleague ex­
emplify laudatory views of him as a man and leader. According to Zivan
Zivanovic, Apis' helpfulness and human concern won him nearly universal
312 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
devotion and respect which persisted long after his untimely death. Exert­
ing a "magnetic force" over his comrades, he acquired a broad circle of
friends and admirers among officers and politicians in Serbia and abroad .
His outgoing, winning personality and the May Coup's outstanding success
began to transform Serbia's political, military, and economic situation
and accounted for his great personal influence. He had led that coup out
of deep love and concern for Serbia. The cooperation Apis received from
military and political leaders, stressed Zivanovic, came volunt�rily , not
from fear or pressure. Exerting vast influence in the anny and over govern­
ment leaders from 1903 until 1 9 1 6 as Serbia's "grey eminence," Apis
nonetheless subordinated himself properly to his army superiors and to
political leaders. "The strength of his influence stemmed from his forceful
arguments in support of a proposal or desire."2 Former "Black Hand"
leader, Captain Pavle Pankovic, who knew Apis for almost twenty years,
recalled he had agreed unhesitatingly to participate in the May Coup
"because I was firmly convinced that everything Apis does or intends to
do is solely for the good of the country." On another occasion Pankovic
stated: "In all his undertakings Apis was outstanding. He was the hinge
around which all events turned." Apis' devoted efforts contributed greatly
to "Black Hand" goals of liberating and unifying all Serbs. 3
Prvoslav Vasiljevic, Apis' defender at the Retrial , reflects the moderate
defense of Apis' role and views which emerged after World War Il. Com­
paring "Black Hand" to nineteenth century European nationalist organi­
zations in its romantic struggle for national liberation , Vasiljevic afflrmed
that Apis' national views were broader and more progressive than those
of the organization. Concluding that true unification involved more than
Greater Serbia, Apis aproached ever closer to the Yugoslav idea, working
closely with Croatian and other South Slav leaders. Thus Apis' national
views had diverged markedly from the Serbia-first, hegemonistic, exploita­
tive approach of King Alexander and Pasic. Morally purer than theirs,
Apis' view was "devoid of calculation, of proflt, and of plans to enslave
other Yugoslav peoples." As the strongest leader of "Black Hand," Apis
"in his work was so independent that he did many things without the
knowledge of the CEC . . . . " Thus, whereas "Black Hand" was not "pro­
gressive" as an organization, Apis, while belonging by virtue of his politi­
cal views to the bourgeoisie , "was a progressive individual insofar as his
actions and those of his organization contributed to destruction of the
Verdict of History 313
enslaving powers of Austria-Hungary and Turkey and the liberation and
uniflcation of the Yugoslav peoples.""
However, soon after the Retrial two leading Yugoslav scholars asserted
that neither "Black Hand" nor Apis had held progressive views or played
a progressive role . While praising the Retrial's verdict as correct, they char­
acterized the "Black Hand" as a reactionary, chauvinistic, and militarist
organization and described Piedmont, its official organ, as reflecting Apis'
views. 5 Similarly , Borba, official paper of the Yugoslav Communist Party ,
noted that whereas King Alexander had adopted barbarous means against
Apis and friends in the Salonika Trial, tl1at did not signify that Apis or
"Black Hand" were true national revolutionaries. "Black Hand's" program
of August 1 9 1 1 in Piedmont had opposed democratic freedoms and
espoused praetorianism. A Zagreb newspaper compared Piedmont's mili­
tarist ideology to that of the Pan-German League. "Black Hand's" Con­
stitution had been attacked justifiably by Croatian leaders like Hinko
Hinkovic for espousing Greater Serbian hegemony by designating Croatia
and Slovenia as "Serbian lands. " 6
Some Yugoslav officers have criticized Colonel Apis severely for mili­
tary shortcomings and for involving himself and the anny deeply in poli­
tics. Other Serbian colonels displayed greater military expertise, argued
Dr. Peter Opacic, especially since Apis focused so greatly on political
activity. Apis' role in anny reorganization and refonn after 1904, dramati­
zed by "Black Hand" colleagues, was actually minimal since he held low
rank. Instead these refonns should be ascribed to earlier efforts by King
Milan and General Putnik. As chie f "Black Hand" leader, Apis headed a
subversive military faction which undennined army unity. His elevation
as chief of military intelligence may have resulted partly from "Black
Hand" pressure. Nor did military intelligence flourish under his direction:
he failed to perfonn all assigned tasks or to gather full infonnation about
Austrian military plans in 1913-14. Hig11ly ambitious, Apis and his friends
were promoted rapidly with little regard for length of service. Apis' aim
after 1906, affumed Opacic, was to dominate the army and seize power.
His political role was strictly illegal. Since his behavior was inexcusable
and divisive, the Serbian regime had adequate grounds to act against hin1
and the "Black Hand."7
Let us now attempt to supply answers to questions raised at the begin­
ning of this study. Colonel Apis and the ·'Black Hand," at least in their
314 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
own perception, were undoubtedly patriotic, working mainly outside of
Serbia to liquidate remnants of Turkish rule and destroy Austria-Hungary.
Most "Black Hand" leaders were Greater Serbian nationalists, though a
few such men as Bogdan Radenkovic and yuba Jovanovic-Cupa, two of
its founders, were idealistic protagonists of an egalitarian Yugoslav federa­
tion. Apis himself, at first favoring a Greater Serbia, evolved later quite far
in the direction of Yugoslavism and enjoyed excellent relations with Croat­
ian leaders.
Apis and his associates appear to have been innocent of most charges
brought against them at Salonika but guilty of violating military regula­
tions and of impermissible political activities. Thus the Retrial's verdict
will likely stand, although it was not reached by accepted judicial pro­
cedures. There is no convincing evidence Apis ever envisioned seizing total
state power or creating a praetorian dictatorship in Serbia. But there are
intimations in his messages to his friends in Skoplje in May 1 9 1 4 that he
favored removing certain Radical civilian officials in Macedonia in the
interests of the army and the public. Failing to obtain support from his
comrades, he abandoned the scheme. Had he and the "Black Hand" been
resolved to strike, there were opportunities to establish a military regime
in 1903, May 1 9 1 4 , and December 1 9 1 5. On none of these occasions did
Apis or the others draw up definite plans to act. On Corfu and at the Sal­
onika Trial he seems not to have even considered undertaking a military
coup. In general Apis favored strong, effective civilian rule responsive to
the popular will, not military rule. His political ideology was never clearly
defmed, but he did not share the chauvinism and praet9rianism of ele­
ments which took over Piedmont after Jovanovic-Cupa's death.
All evidence suggests that no attempt against Prince Alexander's life
occurred in August 1 9 1 6 . If any such plans existed , Apis surely had no­
thing to do with them. Lacking any discernible motive to murder his
former benefactor, especially amidst a war of national survival, Apis was
too competent a conspirator to plan anything as amateurish as the alleged
attempt to kill the Prince. Similarly, Apis' strong patriotism and actions
appear to exclude any betrayal of Serbia to the Central Powers or arrang­
ing a separate peace with Austria. The Salonika Trial, planned deliberately
by Prince Alexander's entourage and Radical leaders, was revenge by the
"White Hand" and the fmal showdown in the civil-military conflict. Prince
Alexander had concluded the Apis group had to be destroyed before he
could control the army and rule Serbia.
Verdict of History 315
Apis' role in the Sarajevo assassination was secondary and far smaller
than he himself claimed in his report to the Salonika court. The initiative
for the Archduke's murder stemmed from revolutionary·"Young Bosnia"
which had committed similar acts previously . They and Malobabic per­
suaded and drew along Apis whose aim while participating in the as­
sassination plot was to prevent or delay war with Austria-Hungary. After
discussing this issue in the "Black Hand's" CEC, Apis sought belatedly to
recall the assassins and prevent the murder. In the entire Sarajevo affair
Apis revealed uncharacteristic vacilation and indecisiveness.
As a man, family member, and ardent patriot Apis possessed many ad­
mirable and well-nigh unique qualities which made him a remarkable in­
dividual. His ability to win the loyalty, support, and love of others was
virtually unequalled. He made the most difficult and dangerous under­
takings appear simple, and never did he ask others to undertake some­
thing he was not prepared to do himself. Apis' constant encouragement
of others, his loyalty and devotion to family members, especially to his
nephew, Milan, and grandniece, NenuSka, reveal him as a warm and moral
human being in private life and as an admired military comrade . Nowhere
was this revealed more graphically than in Salonika Prison where he won
over both his officer jailors. Apis was able to infuse followers with an
energy and courage which they otherwise lacked. Without his direction
and driving energy, "Black Hand" soon lost its influence and dissolved.
However, Apis, as Slobodan Jovanovic noted, lacked true political ability
or discernment, nor did he possess the flexibility to adapt to changing
political circumstances. 8 This was shown especially during the Priority
Dispute which dealt his influence a strong blow. Likewise , Apis was poor
at realizing the consequences of his actions and the inappropriateness of
means he often adopted in his incessant struggles. Once Prince Alexander
became de facto ruler of Serbia in June 1 9 1 4 and showed he could pro­
vide military and political leadership, Apis' star faded rapidly. No longer
coul d he function as the irresponsible and dominant power in the army
he had been under King Peter.
Colonel Apis revealed grave shortcomings as an officer and committed
acts incompatible with his status. His perpetual involvement in politics
and conspiracy , to which he seemed drawn irresistibly , was intolerable to
any regime based on primacy of the civil over military authority . And
those political activities absorbed so much of his time and energy that he
316 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
proved unable to carry out his military assignments with the thoroughness
and precision for which his training as a general staff officer had prepared
him. This was most evident during his tenure as chief of the intelligence
division of the General Staff when he failed to obtain adequate informa­
tion about Austro-Hungarian invasion plans.
Apis' political significance , far greater than his often exaggerated mili­
tary role, was based more on his execution in Salonika than on his role at
Sarajevo. It was his untimely death, viewed as intolerable and totally un­
just by his comrades and Serbian nationalists, which bestowed upon him a
notoriety and reputation out of all proportion to his actual achivements.
Had the Serbian exile regime followed the advice of some of its members:
either to post Apis abroad as military attache, or retire him and his chief
colleagues from the army, his prominence would swiftly have faded. It
would have been equivalent to cutting Samson's hair. Instead, the Radicals
and Alexander provided him with a halo of martyrdom by shooting him
for crimes they could not prove in court, rather than removing him for
severe violations of military discipline which he readily admitted. It was
his enemies' unwise and unprincipled actions, not his own accomplish­
ments, which made Apis a unique historical figure. His tragic death made
Apis a famous and disputed name in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Whatever his
faults of judgment or behavior, Apis died courageously proclaiming his
belief in Serbian and Yugoslav unification. Ironically he had done more to
divide Serbs and their army than to unify them.
Apis fell victim to his remarkable naivete, optimism, and faith in people.
He proved willing to accept assurances of the thoroughly dishonorable
Colonel Zivkovic rather than offers of reconciliation by the able Prince
Regent he had previously supported loyally. By renouncing his only valid
defense against the Salonika charges, he doomed himself and his closest
comrades to death. Apis succumbed to the dark underside of human char­
acter, revealed by "White Hand" intrigue, to the insatiable thirst for
vengeance by the "Yugoslav Rasputin."
•
NOTES
Notes to Chapter I
1. 1 May 29th is the "Old Style" date of the Julian calendar used in
many Greek Orthodox countries, including Serbia and Russia, until l918.
The "New Style" date of the Gregorian calendar employed in Western Eur­
ope and the United States for this event is June 1 1th. "Old Style" dates
have been utilized here for events in Serbia and Russia until 1 9 1 8 unless
otherwise indicated.
2. To contemporary Serbs Greater Serbia suggested uniting Serbs of
Bosnia, Hercegovina, Montenegro, and the Vojvodina (part of Hungary)
with the independent kingdom of Serbia. Yugoslavia, besides those terri­
tories, would include Croatia, Slovenia, and Dalmatia. The term, Yugo­
slavia, means land of the South Slavs. Some believed therefore that the
Bulgars, a South Slav people, should likewise be included within it.
3. Milan .Z. Zivanovic, Pukovnik Apis. Solunski proces hiljadu de­
vetsto sedamnaest (Belgrade, 1955) (Colonel Apis. The Salonika Trial of
1 9 1 7. ) An English summary appears on pages 7 15-733.
4. Milos Bogicevic, Le Colonel Dimitrijevic-Apis (Paris, 1 928) and
Le proc es de Salonique, juin 1 9 1 7 (Paris, 1927).
5. Vladimir Dedijer, Sr.zrajevo 1 914. 2nd edition, 2 vols., Belgrade
1978. This was was published originally in English as The Road to Sara­
jevo (New York, 1964).
6. The author intends to write a sequel: The Black Hand on Trial,
dealing specifically with that organization and its fate.
317
 318 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Notes to Chapter 1 1 319

7. That phrase was employed by Bruno BreJun in Apis und Este (so 4. Milan Zivanovic argues persuasively that since the entire Apis­
fing es an) (Munich, 193 1 ?). Paunovic conversation, according to Captain StojkoviC's precise account,
lasted only twenty minutes, and the "sermon" which the priest inserted
Notes to Chapter 11 in his report, would have taken an old man slow of speech that long to de­
liver, clearly Paunovic "rewrote" and considerably expanded his report
1. This account of the death of Apis and his friends is based primar­ afterwards. Furthermore his primitive "sermon" could not have persuaded

ily on four eyewitness reports prepared for the Serbian authorities, i.e., for Apis, argues Zivanovic. Instead his uncle must have decided upon confes­

Prince Alexander and Colonel Peter Zivkovic. Those by Paunovic , Dabic, sion and communion as an ancestral rite to provide solace as he faced a
and Stojkovic were published in full with explanatory notes by Milan Zi­ tragic death.
vanovic in his Pukovnik Apis, pp. 5 7 1 -95. Lieu tenant ProtiC's "Last hours 5. Instead, Paunovic turned over the latter to Colonel Dunjic who
of those condemned to death" ("Poslednji cas osudjenih na smrt") is in doubtless transmitted it to the Prince Regent. In the first draft of his own

Ziv. 1963. Another version of Protic's account is Stevan Zec, "Vojnici report, notes Milan Zivanovic, Stojkovic wrote that Apis had asked him
gadjaj te dobro!" Duga, No. 324, June 1986, pp. 67-72. Another signifi­ whether he could give Paunovic "a letter to my nephew," then in the fmal

cant though controversial source for the execution is Bruno BreJun's "Hin­ version changed this to a "last testament." Clearly, Stojkovic avoided men­

richtung des Apis" from Apis und Este ( 1 93 1 ). This literary version by an tioning the letter so no one would learn of it and so Paunovic could trans­

Austrian novelist with a military background, agrees in all fundamentals rnit it to Apis' nephew. When the latter saw Paunovic in Nice, France in

with the eyewitnesses. The latter, viewing things from various vantage the fall of 1 9 1 7, the priest said nothing about such a letter but communi­

points, disagree only on minor details. They had been instructed to record cated some of its contents to him orally. Thereafter, Paunovic had averted

every word and action by Apis and his friends in the hours before execu­ his gaze whenever he encountered the nephew in Belgrade (Pukovnik Apis,
tion. Most thorough is the report of Captain Stojkovic, commander of the pp. 567-77).

Salonika Officers' Prison, who had sent detailed reports during Apis' six 6. This package, kept by Prince Alexander, was found in 1941 by

months incarceration there to Prince Alexander and Zivkovic. He knew Apis the invading Germans, and some of its documents were published by Hans

far better than most and in this final report revealed clear sympathy with Obersberger in Auswdrtige Politik (July 1943). Apis' last testament was
him . In cases of dispute among the eyewitnesses, the author has relied published in several places between the two world wars.

chiefly on StojkoviC's and Protic's accounts. The other significant source 7. This letter, returned with other documents relating to Apis from

is Apis farewell letter to his nephew, Milan Zivanovic , which the latter Austria in 1975, was first published by Dedijer in Sarajevo 1914 (II, 338-
never received, first published by Vladirnir Dedijer in Sarajevo 1914 (2nd 340).

ed., Belgrade, 1978, l l , 33840). Additional data were culled from "Crna 8. Zivan Zivanovic, Milan's father and Apis' brother-in-law, a promi­ \
uspomena," Ziv. 6 1 2 ; "Solunska afera," Ziv. 7 1 6 ; S. Jovanovic, Moji nent Serbian politician and historian, was then interned in Austria.

savremenici (Windsor, Canada, 1968), pp. 67-68; Milos Bogicevic , Le pro­ 9. Dedijer, Sarajevo 1914, 11, 340.
ces de Salonique( Paris, 1928), pp. 94-96; and Ljubomir Dabic, "Streljanje 10. Besides the three prin�ipals were convicted Damjan Popovic, M.

pukovnika Apisa," Politika, June 26, 1922, p. 3. G. MilovanoJic, Radoje Lazic, Cedo Popovic, Vladimir Tucovic, Vladimir

2. Pasic and Protic were the chief leaders of the Radical Party of Vemic, Bogdan Radenkovic, and M. MeJunedbasic .

Serbia which held political power for most of the period, 1 903- 1 9 1 8 . 1 1. This was a top Serbian military decoration named after Kara­

3. This refers to the alleged attempt by members of the "Black djordje Petrovic, leader of the first Serbian insurrection against the Turks,
Hand" to assassinate Prince Regent Alexander near Ostrovo, Greece on 1 804-13, and ancestor of Prince Regent Alexander.
August 29, 1 9 1 6 (O.S.). 12. Zec, "Gadjajte dobro!", Duga, No. 324, Belgrade, June 1986.
320 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
13. Apis was referring, noted Milan Zivanovic, to the Karadjordjevic
dynasty which he and his comrades had restored to power in May 1903.
At that time Peter Karadjordjevic, who became King Peter I, was living in
straitened circumstances in Swiss exile.
14. Apis was referring to Lieutenant Colonel Velimir Vemic, a found­
er of the "Black Hand." Apparently, Vemic's bitte1 attacks on him in front
of his friends during recesses of the Salonika Trial prompted this unchar­
acteristically sharp criticism.
15. Apis referred, notes Zivanovic, to his letter to Prince Alexander
of May 30, 1 9 1 7 explaining his role in the assassination of Franz Ferdin­
and in Sarajevo. See below Chapter XXI. Apis suggested that Prince Alex­
ander was personally responsible for his death.
16. Colonel Radoje Radojlovic, at Prince Alexander's instruction, was
buried on Corfu in 1 9 1 6 with special honors. Quickly shifting sides after
the May Coup of 1903, Radojlovic had become a trusted friend and sup­
porter of Alexander.
17. There is some disparity in the· times cites by various eyewitnesses
about their arrival at the execution site, but it was between 1 :30 and 2:30
AM.
18. Apis claimed that the entire affair had been arranged in advance
by Radical leaders and by his enemies among the officers. Captain Arand­
jelovic had been an investigator in Salonika just before the triaL Temeljko
Veljanovic and Djordje Konstantinovic were key prosecution witnesses
who later recanted their testimony. See below Chapters XVlll, XX and
XXIV.
19. This refers apparently to Colonel Milan Tucakovic, commander
of the Vardar Division of the Third Army.
20. Both Dabic and Paunovic in their reports sought to include an
admission of guilt by Apis. Earlier, Dabic had recorded Apis' belief that
Serbia required his death because of the Sarajevo assassination and the
Serbian government's efforts to arrange a separate peace with Austria.
Thus Zivanovic ftnds it puzzling that Apis should tell Dabic that his death
resulted from "excessively strained relations" with Serbian political leaders
and thus from diffe rences over internal policy.
21. Paunovic never carried out these requests. After his role as an
agent of the Salonika regime had been revealed, he avoided even chance
meetings with Milan and Zivan Zivanovic, nor did he deliver VuloviC's
bequests to his wife. •
Notes to Chapter li 321
22. Major Vulovic had found Malobabic there in October 1 9 1 5 acute­
ly ill of tuberculosis. Apis had urged him to remain at Kursurnlje, but Malo­
babic had insisted they take him along so he would not be hung by the
Austrians.
23. Vulovic, the pessimist, anticipated Serbia's def�at and resultant
misery whereas Apis, ever the optimist, foresaw victory in World War I
for Serbia and the realization of his dream of Greater Serbia and Yugo­
slavia.
24. This was the site near the present Albanian frontier of the famous
Battle of Kosovo of June 15/28, 1389 where the Serbian army of Prince
Lazar was defeated by the Ottoman host of Sultan Bayezid "the Thunder­
bolt." Curiously, that defeat was celebrated ever after by the Serbs as a
day of glory because of their heroic resistance against overwhelming odds.
Significantly, the Sarajevo assassination of 1 9 1 4 occurred on Kosovo' s
.
anniversary.
25. The first Balkan War of 1 9 1 2 in which the Balkan League defeat­
ed Turkey.
26. There are various versions of this. According to Brehrn, Apis
stated: "You haven't made it deep enough . . . but at least it is long
enough."
27. According to Protic, Apis shouted: "Soldiers aim truly! Long live
Yugoslavia!" Vulovic shouted: "Long live Serbia!" Duga, No. 324, p. 7 1 .
28. Eyewitness accounts differ considerably over Apis' death. Pauno­
vic claimed that Apis and Vulovic remained alive after two volleys and the
doctor's examination requiring additional shots. Wrote Stojkovic: "I order­
ed another salvo la set.:ond one J since those two were not yet dead and in
an instant it was over." According to Dabi¥'about twenty shots had to be
ftred at Apis and Vulovic who suffered a considerable time before dying.
Recalled Protic: "After the first volley, Apis fell, the rope broke, but he
did not die yet. After another volley , the doctor confirmed his death."
Brehrn's account seems exaggerated: "Vulovic hung forward and beat with
his arms around him: "Bad, bad! Shoot again please . . . lApis] stood up
his bonds displaced: "End it brothers. Make an end."
No1es 10 Chapler Ill
1. Materials about Apis' childhood and education are rather sparse.
322 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Most useful were the memoir of his siste r, Jelena: "Sestra o bratu" in M.
Zivanovic , Pukovnik Apis, pp. 64345, and Ziv. 1 94 1 , "Iz zivota Pukov­
nika D. D. Apisa," by Zivan Zivanovic . Also valuable were P. Pankovic ,
"Prevrat izvrsen 29. maja 1903 g." Ziv. 1985, by a fellow officer con­
spirator ; Ziv. 209 1 , "Apis . . . ," by M. Zivanovic, and his "D. D. Apis,"
Ziv. 1927.
2. See D. MacKenzie, The Lion of Tashkent: The Career of General
M. G. Ch emiaev (Athens, Georgia, 1 974).
3. An excellent general account of Serbia's development is M . B.
Petrovich, A History of Modern Serbia, 1804-1918 (2 vols., New York,
1976). Briefer is Fred Singleton's A Short History of the Yugoslav Peoples
(Cambridge, England, 1985).
4. On the Cincars see D. J . Popovic, 0 cincarima (Belgrade, 1937).
5. Jelena Zivanovic, "Sestra," in Zivanovic, Pukovnik Apis, pp. 643-
44. Information about Jelena Dirnitrijevic's efforts during 1884 to secure a
transfer from the Kraljevo school is contained in several documents, inclu­
ding three letters by her to the Minister of Education, in AS, Ministry of
Education, f. XXXI, July-December 1884.
6. On the Military Academy see Spomenica 70-godi!njica Vojne
Akademije, (Belgrade, 1925), and GliSic, Program predavanja djeneral­
!tabnog (Belgrade, no. date).
7. Ziv. 1 94 1 , Z . Zivanovic, "Iz zivota Pukovnika D. D. Apisa."
8. Herbert Vivian, The Ser)Jian Tragedy (London, 1904 ) , pp. 40, 43.
A British officer who visited Serbia in 1896 and 1902 and was decorated
by the King, he was very pro-Obrenovic and eulogized Alexander and
Draga, dedicating his book "to the memory of his most gracious Majesty,
King Alexander 1, Patriot, Statesman, hero-Rest in peace."
9. Ibid., pp. 40-50; Ziv. 1 9 4 1 . For details on the Milan-Natalija
troubled relationship and its impact on Alexander see Sava Grujic, AS,
PO 82.
10. Lazare Marcovitch, "Nikolas Pachitch ," unpublished manuscript,
1955.
11. Marco, "Pripremanje 29. Maja 1903," NE, XV, br. 12, pp. 405 - 1 3 ;
ibid., "Preporod srpske vojske i borba za ujedinjenje," NE, XVI, br. 2.
1 2. VIA, Belgrade. Colonel D. T. Dirnitrijevic's official service record.
13. Ziv. 7 ; "Beleske Tucovica"; Ziv. 8 , "Papers of Col. Ceda Popo­
vic"; Ziv. 6 1 7 , B. Simic, "Ujedinjenje ill smrt!"; Marcovitch, Pachitch.
Notes to Chapter Ill 323
Noted a prominent contemporary , Aca Novakovic: " . . . The attempt
against King Milan was the affair of his son, Alexander and Draga Ma5in,"
Tribuna, Aug. 1 9 , 1 9 1 1 .
14. Ziv. 4, "Beleznik Andra Djordjevica." In October 1897 Djordje­
vic, Minister of Education, was informed by Dr. Sirna Lozanic, a Belgrade
physician, that the King was impotent. Allegedly a girl had been taken to
him for his pleasure, but Alexander had proven totally incapable.
15. Vivian, op. cit., pp. 66 ff. ; Ziv. 8, Papers of C. Popovic .
16. z. Zivanovic, Politicka istorija Srbije. . . , 4 vols., Belgrade, 1923-
25, IV; S. Jovanovic , Vlada A leksandra Obrenovica (2 vols., Belgrade,
1929-31), 11, 1 3 6 ff. ; Ziv. 8, Popovic. For a general account in English see
i Between East and West (Stanford, 1954), pp. 1 ff.
Wayne Vucinich, Serb a
17. Ziv. 8, "Oko veridbe i zenidbe . . . ," Popovic papers.
18. Ibid.; "Sestra o bratu," Pukovnik Apis, p . 644.
Notes to Chapter I V
1. Those elections confirmed the Radical Party's split as younger
more radical elements led by Ljubomir Zivkovic defected to form the
Independent Radicals. However, Pa5ic's "old" Radicals won 84 out of 130
Skupstina seats and the Progressives 26. ZivkoviC's rebels, opposing a coali­
tion with the Progressives or any cooperation with King Alexander, advo­
cated uncompromising struggle against the King. S. J ovanovic, V/ada Alek­
sandra Obrenovica, II, 21 8-22 1 . For background of the May Coup in Eng­
lish see W. Vucinich, Serbia Between East and West, pp. 7-23 and A.
Dragnich, Serqia, Nikola Pasic and Yugoslavia, pp. 54-58.
2. On the false pregnancy, see Vucinich, pp. 1 8 - 1 9 ; J ovanovic , V/ada
Aleksandra, II, 1 7 1 ff. ; Z. Zivanovic, Politicka istorija, IV, 24749.
3. Ziv. 1985, P. Pankovic , "Prevrat z
i vrsen 29. maja 1903 g."
4. See above, p. 00.
5. These included infantr.y captains Radomir Arandjelovic and Milan
I. Petrovic, lieutenants Dragutin Dulic, M. Marinovic-Piga and Antic.
6. Destroying the Obrenovic dynasty would leave the Karadjordjevic
family unchallenged.
7. Ziv. 1985, Pankovic .
8. Djordje Karadjordjevic, lstina o mom iivotu (1969), p. 149.
9. M. B. Petrovich,A History, ll, SOS.
324 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Notes to Chapter IV 325

10. The seven were Apis, Antic, Milan Marinkovic, Nikodije Popovic, suggested that politicians be recruited for the plot. Atanackovic recom­
Radomir Arandelovic, Milan Petrovic, and Dragisa Dulic. mended Gencic as an enemy of Queen Draga. Agreeing, Gencic consented
11. Vucinich, p. 47; DragiSa Vasic, Devetsto treca, pp. 54-S S ; J ovano- to sound out other politicians in September 1902.
vic, Vlada Aleksandra, ll, 351-52. Vivian affmned that Colonel Masin recruited by Gencic, possessed "ani­
12. Ziv. l 987, Pankovic. mal courage." Ma5in allegedly "invented every sort of calumny against
13. V. Gojkovic, "Radikali i vojska," NE, XVIll ( 1928), pp. 324-27. Queen Draga and even accused her of poisoning her first husband. He is a
14. Cedo Popovic, "Organizacija 'Ujedinjenje ill smrt!' Uzroci i nacin squat, villainous looking man . . . [with] shifty eyes and a cruel, wolfish
postanka," NE, XV, br. 12 (June 1 1 , 1927), p. 397. mouth." Servian Tragedy, pp. 93-94.
15. Ziv. 3803, "Uzroci majske zavere 1903 g." 26. Ziv. 8, Popovic Papers.
16. "Sestra o bra tu," Zivanovic, Pukovnik Apis, p. 644; Ziv. 2091. 27. Ziv. 38, "Vojislav Tankosic."
17. i. Zivanovic, Po/iticka istorija, IV, 343-4 7. 28. Ziv. 40, "Petar Zivkovic."
18. Commented Vivian: "The plot . . . was engineered with diabolical 29. Novakovic stresses his intimate relations with King Alexander
cunning. Fully two years were spent in preparing it. A few discredited prior to his marriage, then their relationship deteriorated into dislike. He
politicians and unruly officers, moved by private resentments and greed attributed Alexander's infatuation with Draga to a lack of normal tender
. . . pledged themselves to kill the King and Queen (p. 88). He listed the feelings toward women. "That was Alexander's lack which caused his
original conspirators as Djordje Gencic, Colonel Masin and Dragornir Rajo­ destruction and that of the dynasty!" The King and Queen by their acts
vic (p. 92), but they entered the plot later. "Surely never can a conspiracy dragged their country in the mire to such an extent that it was shameful
to kill a King and Queen have been known beforehand by so many people to admit one's nationality abroad." Tribuna, September 3-5, 1911.
(p. 95). The Servian Tragedy. 30. Ziv. 617, Bozin Simic, "Istorija 'Ujedinjenji ili smrt!"
19. Zivanovic, IV, 346-47. 31. Zivanovic, Politic ka istorija, IV, 346 and note.
20. Vivian stressed GenciC's "inordinate vanity." "As a minister, his 32. Ziv. 1987, Pankovic.
airs and graces were the standing jokes of [Belgrade] , his wild ambitions 33. Ziv. 8, Popovic Papers.
kept growing by leaps and bounds." Servian Tragedy, p . 92.
21. NovakoviC's detailed account of the May Coup's preparation-"ls­ Notes to Chapter V
povesti o prevratu 29. maja 1903 g," was published by Tribuna in 47 in­
stallments in August-September 1911. He emphasized the role of civilian 11 Ziv. 3808, Milan Zivanovic, "Uzroci Majske zavere 1903," letter
leaders. Antic, he claimed, "was a rather limited person . . . who absolutely to NIN, February 1960.
lacked his own views . . . and did precisely what Gencic instructed him to 2. Accounts of the May Coup in English included: Herbert Vivian,
do." Tribuna, August 22, 1911. The Servian Tragedy (London, 1904); Chedomile Mijatovich, A Royal
22. Ziv. 1987, Pankovic. Tragedy . . (New York, 1907), and Wayne Vucinich, Serbia Between
.

23. Ibid.; Va�ic, pp. 63-64. East and West . . . , pp. 46-70. .In Serbian, see D. Vasic, Devetsto treea . . .
24. Ziv. 8, Ceda Popovic Papers. (Belgrade, 1925); Z. Zivanovic, Politicka istorija, IV, 329 ff.; and S. Jo­
25. Ln his account of the May Coup, appended to Dumba to Foreign vanovic, Vlada Aleksandra Obrenovica, 11, 338 ff.
Minister Goluchowski in A. Radenic, ed., Austro-Ugarska i Srbija, 1903- 3. Vivian, pp. 95-98; Austro-Ugarska i Srbija, I, 58, Pomiankowsky
1918 (Belgrade, 1973), pp. 303-10, Colonel Mi�ic noted that meetings of to von Beck, June 15, 1903: "Alexander was totally informed of the nega­
the conspirators' "Main Committee" convened in General Atanackovic's tive mood against him in the Sixth Infantry Regiment . . . . The King very
and Colonel Damjan PopoviC's homes. At one meeting a relative of Antic often received threatening letters and warnings. On the day before the
326 APlS: The Congenial Conspirator Notes to Chapter V 327

murder two letters arrived informing the King of the imminent execution 15. Jovanocic, Vlada Aleksandra, II, 367-70; Vasic, pp. 88-89.
of the conspiracy." 16. Ibid.; Marcovitch , p. 66. Wrote Vivian: "The conspirators were
4. Vivian, p. 99. "It was a great carouse: many bottles of wine and mad with drink and excitement and can scarcely have known what they
slivovica (plum brandy) were consumed. The officers' faces were red, their were doing." (p. 1 05).
eyes sparkled like wild beasts." 17. Z. Zivanovic, IV, 353-54; Marcovitch, p. 66.
5. Z. Zivanovic notes in Politicka istorija, IV, 34 7 that MiSic , luke­ 18. Austro.:Ugarska i Srbija, I, 49, Porniankowsky to War Ministry ,
warm about the conspiracy, had intimated he might not participate fur­ June 12, 1903.
ther. Apis warned him he had signed the conspirators' oath and that if 19. Ibid., I, 6 1 , Pomiankowsky to von Beck, June 1 5 : "It cannot be
the coup failed, he would surely share their fate. That may have persuad­ doubted that the great majority of the army approved the conspiracy and
ed him to implement, albeit tardily, his scheduled role. was determined somehow to remove the King and Queen." Zivanovic, IV,
A dramatic but grossly inaccurate account of the coup in The Evening 329-30, 353 note; Vucinich, p. 5 9 ; Vasic , p. 1 1 3 .
News (London) of December 1 , 1955 was entitled: "The Echo That Kill­ 20. Zivanovic, IV, 333-34.
ed 20 Million." Crediting Apis with indirect responsibility for World War 21. Ibid., pp. 355-56; Marcovitch, pp. 67-68. The new cabinet inclu­
I, Godwin described him as "a shadowy figure, half thug, half patriot with ded: Premier Jovan Atanackovic (Liberal) ; Foreign Minister Ljubomir Kal­
a weakness for brandy." (A pis was a teetotaller!). "On the broiling hot jevic (a Conservative Austrophile); Interior Minister Stojan Pro tic (Radical);
night of June 1 1 , 1903, Apis staged a hectic drinking session at a Belgrade Justice Minister Ljubomir Zivkovic (Independent Radical); War Minister
club for 84 fellow officers [sic] . The party had reached its peak and empty Jovan Atanackovic, a conspirator; Communications Minister Alexander
bottles were crashing against the walls when 'The Bull' got up, still sober Ma5in , the conspirators' military commander.
in spite of the enormous quantities of brandy he had consumed [sic] . In a Vojislav Gojkovic, a conspirator, asserted that for the only time in
voice shaking with simulated fury he announced he had defmite informa­ world history leaders of a successful military coup had relinquished power
tion that Queen Draga was plarming to seize the throne for one of her two voluntarily and promptly to politicians: "Radik.ali i vojska," NE, XVIII
brothers. A bellow of rage answered him and Dirnitrijevic jumped on the ( 1 928), p. 326.
table shouting: 'What are we waiting for? That pair in the palace must die 22. Ziv. 8, Popovic Papers.
so that Serbia can live!' Swords leaped from scabbards, pistols were drawn 23. Ziv. 6 1 7 , Bozin Sirnic, "Ujedinjenje ili smrt-1; ibid., "Pripremanje
and the swarm of drunken officers followed Dirnitrijevic to the palace." 29. Maja 1903," NE, XV, br. 12 (June 1 1 , 1927), pp. 416-19; A. Musulin
Evidence is lacking that any of the 28, not 84, officers was drunk or that von f om �rje, Das Haus am Bal/platz, pp. 124-25.
Apis publicly exhorted them to kill the royal couple. 24. Ziv. 6 1 8, Simic, "Ujedinjenje-11."
6. Ziv. 7, " Notes to Vladimir Tucovic ." 25. Ziv. 7 1 8 , Tucovic? , "Apis."
7. "Crna i Bela Ruka," Beogradska nede/ja, No. 173 in Ziv. 3289; 26. M. Bogicevic, Le Colonel Dimitrijevic-Apis, pp. 28-30. On the
Ziv. 40 and 620, "Petar Zivkovic"; Vasic, Devetsto treca. other hand, Vladimir Dedijer, the well-known Yugoslav historian, felt Apis
8. Marcovitch, "Pachitch," p. 64; Z. Zivanovic, IV, 34849. reflected the contradictory tendencies of Serbian militarism which from
9. Ibid., p. 349. 1903 contributed to liberating Serbs and South Slavs. Dedijer quoted Serb­
10. Ibid., p. 350. ian Social Democrat leader, Dusan Popovic: "This was a revolution in
1 1. Ziv. 38, "Tankosic." which was felt the lofty historical spirit of a national movement and low
12. Vucinich, p. 5 7 ; Z. Zivanovic , IV, 350. hatred by a handful of the dissatisfied."-Dedijer, Sarajevo 1914, 2nd ed.,
13. Ibid. II, 78-79; Dedijer and Pavicevic, "Dokazi," Misao, July 1953, p. 222. Prvo­
14. Vucinich affums that Velirnir Vemic noticed the doors behind slav Vasiljevic, Apis' defender at the 1953 Retrial, wrote on the May
the draperies where the royal couple was concealed.
328 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Notes to Chapter VI 329

Coup's flftieth anniversary that: "Apis, as its organizer and inspirer, ap­ Consul Thesiger expressed an almost equally negative view of Pasic whose
peared on the political stage of Serbia in whose later struggles, successes past political life had been "broadly marked by the betrayal of friends and
and defeats he would play a leading role." Formerly treated merely as a party to his own interests." Thesiger to Lansdowne, May 3 1 , 1905, No.
military conspiracy, the Coup marked the end of despotism and the estab­ 27, quoted in Radovich, op. cit., pp. 1 69-70.
lishment of bourgeois parliamentary democracy. Only the officers could 16. Lazare Marcovitch, "Pachitch," pp. 72-77; See also Dragnich, pp.
resolve the deep political crisis because the political parties 'lacked the 6 1 ff.
will and boldness to undertake revolutionary popular struggle."' Vasilje­ 17. S. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, "Nikola Pa5ic," pp. 19-21.
vic, "Srbija u 1903," Politika, June 2 1 , 1953, p. 6. 18. Dumba, pp. 233-35, 207-08.
19. Nikola P. Pa!ic (Belgrade, 1937), pp. 48-52.
Notes to Chapter VI 20. Radovich, pp. 7 1 ff.
2 1 . Dumba, pp. 193-94.
1. For a general view of Serbia's political situation after the May 22. Ziv. 718, "Apis" (by Vladirnir Tucovic?).
Coup see Vucini ch, Serbia, pp. 6 1 -70; M. Petrovich, A History, II, 534 23. J ovanovic, Moji savremenici, "Pasic ," pp. 29-3 1 .
ff., and Dragnich, Serbia, pp. 61 ff. 24. Edward Legge , King Edward in His True Colours (London, 1 9 1 2),
2. "Ima li krivice u dogadjaji od 29. maja?" Trgovinski glasnik (Bel­ pp. 8 1 -82.
grade), June 1903, mentioned in Z. Zivanovic, Politicka istoruja, IV, 337- 25. Thesiger to Lansdowne, January 18, May 27 and 3 1 , 1905, in
338. Radovich, pp. 1 68-72. Public pressure was widening conspirator rifts. Col­
3. Frances Radovich, "Aftermath to Regicide," pp. 22 ff. onel MiSic headed a majority demanding self-sacrifice by senior conspirators'
4. Constantin Dumba, Dreibund und Entente-Politik in der A/ten but six of them, including Colonels Popovic and Ma5in, refused adamantly
und Neuen Welt (Zurich and Vienna, 1931), pp. 192-93. to resign. Thesiger to Lansdowne, November 1 5 , 1905, No. 55.
5 . Radovich , op. cit., p. 38, citing Plunkett to Lansdowne , June 12, 26. These included Colonels Masin, D. Popovic and MiSic , Lieutenant
1903, No. 158. Colonels Solarevic and Lazarevic, and Major Ljubomir Kostic.
6. Ibid., pp. 59-60. 27. VIA, Service record of D. T. Dirnitrijevic ; Ziv. 1941, z. Zivano­
7. z. Zivanovic, IV, 334-35. Zivanovic adds that he had paid no vic, "D. Dimitrijevic-Apis."
heed to a number of hints dropped by Apis in casual conversation about 28. Ziv. 7 1 8, "Apis." M. BogiceviC's account in Le Colonel Dimitrije-
the plot. vic-Apis is based very closely on this account.
8. Risimic and his comrades, explained Zivanovic, offered to help 29. Ziv. 718, "Apis."
defray the costs of Apis' treatments and hospitalization. \ 30. Ibid.
9. Zivanovic, IV, 337, 339. 31. Ziv. 6 1 7, Bozin Sirnic, "Ujedinjenje." This seems to refer to Gen­
10. Djordje Karadjordjevic, Istina o mom tivotu. p. 196. eral Mirko Milisavljevic, the High Military Court's chairman in 1 9 1 7.
11. Ibid., pp. 200-03. 32. Ziv. 6 1 7. Sirnic clearly exaggerated the Apis group's influence.
12. Dumba, op. cit., pp.
194-95 ; D. Vasic, pp. 1 79-80; A. Todorovic, Officer conspirator Vojislav Gojkovic blamed the Radicals and Pa5ic for
Zivot i rad Novakovica (Belgrade , 1907); Vucinich , Serb a,
i pp. 70-74. obstructing modernization of the Serbian army after 1903.
1 3 . Ziv. 617, B. Simic (Marco), "Ujedinjenje ili smrt" ; Vasic, pp. 33. For a general account of the Macedonian imbroglio see Vucinich,
176-8 1 . pp. 122 ff. and Petrovich, A History, ll, 544-48. On Serbian guerrilla bands
14 . Slobodan J ovanovic, Moji savremenici, "A pis," pp. 29-30. see Narodna Odbrana. a patriotic Serbian weekly published in royal Yugo­
15. Ziv. 2067, M. z . Zivanovic, "Kritika Apisova rada." British Vice- slavia, and A. Jovanovic, ed., Spomenica dvadesetpetgodiinjice oslobod-
 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Notes to Chapter VII 331
330

jenja Juine Srbije (Skoplje, 1937), notably pp. 271-325. Also see Ziv. 11. Apis was named to that post July 24, 1910. VIA, Service record

1985, Pankovic, "Prevrat izvrsen." of D. Dimitrijevic.

34. Ziv. 1937, Z. Zivanovic, "Dimitrijevic-Apis." 12. Ziv. 3 , "Iskazi i odbrana . . . Apisa" ; TPO, pp. 1 77-80. Vernic on

35. Ziv. 38, "Vojislav Tankosic." February 22, 1 9 1 1 wrote about bringing Apis into plans for the new

36. Ziv. 34, "Major Ljubomir Vulovic." organization: "At the 'Moskva' cafe TankosiC, Bogdan and I agreed to

37. Ziv. 37, "Bogdan Radenkovic." See below, Chapter VII. bring in Apis and Ilija Radivojevic. At 1 0 PM I found Apis at the 'Grand

38. Vucinich, pp. 1 22-32, 1 5 5-60. Hotel,' explained our idea for 'Black Hand' and proposed that he join us.

39. C. Popovic, "Organizacija 'Ujedinjenje ili smrt!," NE, XV, br. 12, He agreed in principle without hesitation."-Ziv. 6.

pp. 397-98. A CEC member, Cedo Popovic, noted Tankosic had summoned him to

40. Dj. Karadjordjevic, Istina, pp. 196-98. VemiC's apartment March 3, 191 1 where all were gathered who knew
about the proposed organization. "There we made the fmal decision to

Notes to Chapter VII found the organization. Six days later we seven as original founders signed
the Constitution worked up from the draft of Bogdan, Cupa and Tankosic."

1. B. Bogie, Ci/jevi Narodne Odbrane (Belgrade, 1 934). On the An­ Soon added to the CEC were Ilija Jovanovic-Pcinjski, Macedonian guerrilla

nexation and its impact in English see Petrovich, A History, II, 554-62 and leade r; Major Milan Vasic , secretary of Narodna Odbrana; and Colonel of

Dragnich, Serbia, pp. 94-98. See also D. Ljubibratic, Mlada Bosna i Sara· General Staff M. G. Milovanovic-Pilac-Popovic, "Organizacija," NE, XV,

jevski atentat (Sarajevo, 1964), pp. 33-35. 401-05.

2. Ziv. 1940, "D. T. Dimitrijevic-Apis. " 13. Ziv. 3 , "Iskazi i odbrana."

3. C. Popovic, "Organizacija 'Ujedinjenje ili smrt," NE, XV, no. 1 2 14. Ibid.

(June 1 1 , 1927), pp. 398-99. 15. Ibid.

4. S. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, pp. 252-56. Marcovitch, Pachitch, 16. "Cma i Bela Ruka," Beogradski Nede/ja, in Ziv. 3289.

pp. 96-107 is most sympathetic with Milovanovic and Pasic. Commented a 1 7. Ljubibratic, Mlada Bosna, p. 40.

subsequent founder of "Black Hand," Velimir Vemic : "We agreed that of 18. A Belgrade newspaper.

the politicians Balacka [Milovanovic ] was the most intelligent but lacks 19. Ziv. 3 , "lskazi i odbrana." I have shortened some of Colonel

character."-Ziv. 6, Vemic Diary, September 19, 1908. MisiC's questions while retaining their original meaning.

5. Ljubibratic , Mlada Bosna, pp. 34-35. 20. SANU 1 4 2 1 1, Panta DraSkic , "Moji memoari."

6. C . Popovic, "Organizacija," NE, XV, 400-02. 21. Ziv. 5, Diary of General Milos Bozanovic .
22. "Cma Ruka," Tribuna, October 23 and 24, 1 9 1 1 .
-

7. Ibid., pp. 402-05 ; Lj ubibratic, pp. 35-36. Vemic's diary entry of

March 3, 1 9 1 1 points to Radenkovic as chief initiator: "With Silja [Tanko­ 23. Ibid., November 5 and 8. But Mali iurnal, a Belgrade paper close

sic] and Bogdan I met at "Kasina" and agreed to form a club with revolu­ to the official conspirators, declared November 4: "We affirm categorically

tionary aims . . . Bogdan will work out the statutes according to those of th t 'Black Hand' is an invention of pro-Austrian reporters . . . to compro·
\
the Burschenschaften and Carbonari, then we will discuss them . . . " Ziv.6. mise Serbian officers." Three days later this paper wrote: "If 'Black Hand'

8. Ziv. 6 1 7 , Simic, "Ujedinjenje ." really existed and resembled the Mafia, we do not think there would be of­

9. Lj. Jovanovic-Patak, "SmiSljanje i pripremanje Cme Ruke," Samo­ ficers in it."-"Crna Ruka," November 7.

uprava, January 3 , 1920. 24. HHSA, P. A. Serbien XlX/62, November 12, 1 9 1 1 , No. 94A, von

10. Ibid., January 1 , 1920. Dragoslav Ilic viewed "Unification or Ugron to Aehrenthal.

Death!" as a spontaneous expression of patriotic enthusiasm among the 25. Ibid., XlX/62, November 1 3 , No. 95A; XIX/63, January 29,

Serbs: Ziv. 2062, UiC's speech of 1947.

332 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Notes to Chapter VIII 333

1912, No. 1 OB. The Russian military attache was also reporting about 14. Ziv. 5, "Diary of Miles Bozanovic. Excerpt for 1 9 1 1 ; PRO FO
"Black Hand" to the General Staff. See MOEI, Series 11, Part 1 , Arta­ 37 1 1 1219, Charles Barclay to Grey, No. 1 8 , March 16, 19 1 1 . Added Bar­
monov to General Staff, January 1 7 and 28, 1 9 1 2. clay: "The chief reason, I am told, is to make the Prince known in the
.

26. PRO FO 37 1 1 1472, Barclay to Grey, January 25, 1 9 1 2 , No. 5 army."

and February 1 , No. 6. 15. HHSA, P. A. Serbien XIX/63, von Ugron to Berchtold, January
27. Ziv. 6, Vemic Diary, entry of August 30, 1 9 1 1 . 1 5 , 1 9 1 2 , No. 3A.
28. Ljubibratic, p. 37. 16. Ibid., XIXI62, Ugron to Aehrenthal , November 14, 1 9 1 1 .
29. 0. Tartaglia, Veleizdajnik (Split, 1928), pp. 26-28. 1 7. SANU 1 1 45 1 , General Dragutin Milutinovic's reminiscence.
30. Ibid., pp. 24-26. 18. SANU, Dra8kic, pp. 44-47.
19. Ziv. 5 , Bozanovic diary, p. 46.
Notes to Chapter VIII 20. SANU, Dra8kic, p. 54.
21. Ibid., p. 137.
1. Ziv. 8, Popovic Papers. 22. A hostile but credible brief biography by Aca Blagojevic (SANU
2. See above, pp. 53-54. 13609 I 1 , "Kratka biografija") provides the fullest information on Ziv­
3. Djordje Karadjordjevic, Istina, pp. 154, 196. kovic . There is a brief entry on Zivkovic in Enciklopedija Jugoslavije,
4. Ziv. 7, "Beleske Tucovica." VIII. See also Ziv. 40 and 620, "Petar Zivkovic," by M. Z. Zivanovic,
5. Accounts of this attempted murder concur on the main points: also hostile accounts; and SANU, Draskic's memoirs.
SANU, 142 1 1 , DraSkic Memoirs; Ibid., 13609 / 1 , "Kratka biografija 23. See above, pp. 000.
demona Jugoslovenske ideje u mundiru." Zivkovic asked Apis, affirms 24. SANU, DraSkic, pp. 240-44.
Blagojevic, to keep the letter he had obtained from Prince Alexander. At 25. Djordje Karadj ordjevic, Istina, pp. 3 7 1 -72.
flrst Apis refused. Next day when he asked Zivkovic for it, the latter said 26. Slobodan Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, "Apis," pp. 40-4 1.
he had destroyed the letter. Actually, Zivkovic kept it, informing Alex­ 27. Ziv. 620, "Petar Zivkovic."
ander later he had it in a bank with instructions to publish it abroad if 28. S. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, "Apis," pp. 43-44.
anything happened to him . Also Ziv. 3289, "Cma i Bela ruka." 29. SANU, Milutinovic reminiscence.
6. Ziv. 6, Vemic diary. 30. Ziv. 7, "BeleSke Tucovica."
7. PRO FO 3 7 1 /733, Whitehead to Grey, No. 37, March 27, 1909. 31. Ziv. 5 , Bozanovic diary, p. 22.
Another variant was: Dr. Sondermaier killed Kolakovic intentionally 32. Ziv. 7, "Beleske Tucovica."
while operating on him . 33. SANU 13609 I 1 , Blagojevic, "Kratka biografija."
8. SANU 13609 I 1 , Blagojevic, "Kratka biografija." 34. Ziv. 7, "Beleske Tucovica." Tucovic was appalled at the bitter
9. Ziv. 1936, Trisa Kaclerovic to M. Z. Zivanovic, no date. enmity among former intimate friends and the nefarious means employ­
10. PRO FO 371 /733, Whitehead to Grey, No. 39, April 1 , 1909. ed, notably by the Zivkovic clique, to achieve their aims.
11. Ziv. 7 , "Beleske Tucovica." 35. Ziv. 5 , Bozanovic diary, pp. 23-25. "What was worst," lamented
12. SANU, Draskic, p. 5 1 . Bozanovic, "was that the Heir stood at the head of those officers who at­
13. PRO FO 3 7 1 1982, Whitehead to Grey, January 20 and'May 26, tributed deliberately subversive aims to us. They had so filled his head
1 9 1 0, and Sir Ralph Paget to Grey, September 29, 1910. British diplo­ that he was convinced we were against him and the dynasty."
matic reports from Serbia in 1 9 1 0 described Prince Djordje' s antics in 36. Ziv. 718, "Apis," by V. Tucovic?
detail. 37. Ziv. 5, Bozanovic diary, pp. 43-44.
334 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
•

Notes to Chapter X 335

38. Ibid., pp. 47-49. 17. SANU 1 3 609 I 1 , Blagojevic, "Kratka biografij a."
39. Ziv. 2062, llic speech; S . Jovanovic , "Apis," p. 4 3 ; Svetozar 18. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, "Apis," p. 32; Ziv. 3, "Iskazi."
Pribicevic, Diktatura Kralja Aleksandra, p. 303.
40. Ziv. 5, Bozanovic diary, p. 55. Notes to Chapter X

Notes to Chapter IX 1. DSPKS, Vl/2, SANU,ed. Du�an Lukac (Belgrade, 1981), pp. 638-
4 1 , Bogicevic to Pasic, June 24/July 7, 1 9 1 3 .
1. S. J ovanovic, Moji savremenici, pp. 266-6 7. 2. Especially DragiSa Stojadinovic's unpublished manuscript, "Srbija
2. Pijemont, December 8 , 1 9 1 1 , "Predstavnik nase diplomacije." i Nemacka u svetskom ratu," discussed by Dedijer in Sarajevo 1914 II,
Later, it reiterated: "With the coming to power of Milovanovic , Serbia 197 ff. A chief source for pro-Salonika historians was the official, Tajna
clearly renounced her national aspirations . . . . He is fatal for Serbia." prevratna organizacija . . . (Salonika, 1 9 1 8). Others holding this view inclu­
January 12, 1912, "Grobna ploca Srbije." ded D. Jelenic in Nova Srbija i Jugoslavija and Ljubornir Jovanovic-Patak,
3. Jovanovic, p. 272. an architect of the Salonika Trial , in articles in the Radical newspaper,
4. Ibid., pp. 273-74. Samouprava during 1920.
�

5. Ziv. 3 , "Iskazi i odbrana." 3. Dedijer, Sarajevo 1914, ll, 197 ff.

6. M. Bogicevic, "Die serbische Gesellschaft . . . ," BM, IV ( 1926), 4. Ibid., p. 199; Ziv. 6, Vemic diary .
p. 665. 5. Dedijer, Il, 202, Piejemont, April 3, 1 9 1 2 and "Davison's" article
7. VIA, DimitrijeviC's service record; Ziv. 3289, "Crna i bela ruka." of March 6, "Marsal Gale i nemacka omladina" in Dedijer, II, 200-01 .
8. Ziv. 4019, "Rad organizacije"; Ziv. 7, "Beleske Tucovica." 6. Pijemont, April 3 , 1 9 1 3 and April 1 8 in ibid., p. 203.
9. M. Zavacil, "Na izvidjanju . . . ," Politika, October 22, 1922, 7. Dedijer, ll, 203-06.
pp. 6-7. 8. Ziv. 1941, 2. Zivanovic, "Iz zivota."
10. I bid; Ziv. 1 9 4 1 , Z. Zivanovic, "Iz Zivota." Apis family only 9. S. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, pp. 406-10.
learned about this highly secret reconnaissance mission later. 10. Ziv. 35 and 536, on Rade Malobabic .
11. Ziv. 3289, "Crna i bela ruka." 1 1. Ziv. 35.
12. P. Pankovic , "Secanje na Apisa," in M. Zivanovic, Pukovnik 12. Ibid.
Apis, pp. 648-49. Pankovic had agreed to enter the May Coup at Apis' 13. Ibid.; V. Bogicevic, "0 Radi Malobabicu," Sarajevski atentat, pp.
urging "because I was convinced that everything he did or intended to do 1 26-27.
was for the good of the country. All during our friendship, I could never 14. S. Zec, "Bele senke Crne ruke," Ill and IV, Duga, June 1986.
find he had done anything ill-advised or damaging to Serbia. He was an 15. DSPKS, VII/2, ed. Dedijer and Anic (Belgrade, 1980), Royal Ser­
idealist, extremely honorable, open, accessible, brave , and intelligent . . . . bian General Staff, Intelligence Division to Operational Division, Belgrade,
I would have done anything he asked without reflection." (p. 649). June 8/21, 1 9 1 4 , pp. 363-64. .
13. Ibid., pp. 648-49. 16. Ibid., p. 366, Colonel Zecevic to Operational Division, June 9/22,
14 . Slobodan J ovanovic affirmed: Heir Alexander himself summon­ 1914.
ed Dr. Cinn paying all medical costs himself Moji savremenici,
- "Apis,"
p. 32. Notes to Chapt er XI
15. 2. Zivanovic, "Iz zivota."
Ziv. 1 9 4 1 ,
16. Djordje Karadjordjevic , Istina, pp. 370-72. 1. On the May Crisis see Dragnich, op. cit., pp. 75-79. A recent
336 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Notes to Chapter XI 337

Serbian treatment is Dusan Batakovic , "Sukob civiljne i vojne vlasti . . . ," 19. Ziv. 7, "Beleske Tucovica" ; P. Vasiljevic in Politika, July 5 , 1953.
JC, 1 982-83, pp. 477-9 1 . See also V. Vuckovic, "Unutrasnje krize Srbi­ 20. PRO 3 7 1 /2099, Crackenthorpe to Grey, 1 9 13 Annual Report;
je . . . ," IC, XIV-XV, 184 ff. and Ziv. 7 1 9 , "Konflikt 1 9 1 4 g." ibid. to ibid., November 1 8 , 1 9 1 3 . •

.
2. HHSA, Serbien XIX/64, Ugron to Berchtold, August 1 3 , 1 9 1 3 . 21. Pijemont, January 5 , 1914, "Zasto Radikali nascru na vojsku".
3. Ibid., XIX/66, Giesl to Berchtold, no. 54A, April 10, 1 9 1 4 . 22. Ibid., January 3 1 , 1914, S. Krcevinac, "Protiv anti-militarista."
4. PRO FO 3 7 1 / 1 748, Paget to Grey, June 6 , 1 9 1 3 , 1 9 1 2 Annual Italics are Pijemont's.
Report. 23. HHSA, Serbien XIX/66, Ugron to Berchtold , May 8, No. 67A.
5. Ibid. 24. Ziv. 12, "Zabeleske Milovanovica-Pilca."
6. PRO 371 /2099, Crackenthorpe to Grey, 1913 Annual Report. 2 5. Pijemont, May 5, "Cast danasnjeg kabineta" ; May 6, "Vlada i
7.Pijemont, July 28, 1 9 1 3 . Ziv. 2024, "Crna Ruka i nacionalno Kruna"; May 8, "DvogodiSnji bilans."
pitanje," Borba, July 1953. 26. Ziv. 12, "Zabeleske ,"; PRO 371 /2099, Crackenthorpe to Grey,
8. Pijemont, September 1 , "Kakav rezim u Novoj Srbiji." No. 95, May 10.
9. Ziv. 719, "Konflict 1914 g.", probably by Colonel Vladimir 27. S. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, pp. 1 99-200; DDF, Serie 3, X,
Tucovic, a close friend of Apis, or another well-informed contemporary. Doscos to Doumergue, June 4, 1914, p. 495.
10. Ibid. 28. Pijemont, March 27-3 1 , "Oficirska zadruga," five leads on the Of­
11. Bozanovic fell after securing by dubious means a royal pardon for ficers' Club issue. See also "Crna ruka i nacionalno pitanje," Borba, August
Major Velirnir Vemic, a "Black Hand" leader. The officer corps backed 26, 1953; Dedijer and Pavicevic, "Dokazi," No vi Misao, July 1953.
Vernic, who had been convicted of killing a disobedient soldier, but the 29. HHSA, Serbien XIX/66, Giesl to Berchto1d, May 8, No. 67A.
cabinet had disavowed the pardon. The British minister viewed this affair 30. Ziv. 12, "Zabeleske ."
as a cabinet revolt against "Black Hand" influence. PRO 371 /2098, 31. Ziv. 3, "Iskazi i odbrana"; TPO, pp. 169-70. Members of the
Crackenthorpe to Grey, December 3 1 , 1 9 1 3 ; 2099, ibid. to ibid., No. 1 2 , CEC of "Black Hand" once discussed the Priority Decree informally at
January 17, 1914. TankosiC's without reaching any decision.
14. Ibid., 3 7 1 /2099, ibid. to ibid., January 26; HHSA, XIX/66, Giesl 32. Ziv. 12, "Zabeleske. "
to Berchtold, January 6 , 7, 20, 1 9 1 4 . The "Black Hand" viewed Stefano­ 33. Ziv. 719, "Konflikt."
vic as a renegade bribed by the Pasic regime: Pijemont. May 2, 1914, 34. Ibid. Declared Apis: "I told him [Putnik] that l would immedi­
"Portret vladinog sluga," affirming this "miserable" new war minister had ately inform the Opposition and asked him if he would be on my side and
pensioned off able generals for political reasons. support this effort through his powerful influence with the King."
15. Vuckovic, "Unutra5nje krize," pp. 184 ff. ; OUA, VII, No. 9260; 35. Ziv. 12, "Zabeleske."
Ziv. 6, Vemic diary, entry of January 27, 1914. 36. Ibid.
16. Radnicke Novine (Belgrade) had a series of articles on this ques­ 37. TPO, p. 594; Zivanovic, Pukovnik Apis. p. 9 1 .
tion during 1 9 1 3 . 38. TPO, p. 596.
17. Pijemont. May 6, 1 9 1 4 , "Vlada i Kruna"; May 8 , "DvogodiSnji 39. Ziv. 12, "Zabeleske."
bilans." 40. B. Neskovic, lstina o Solunskom procesu (Belgrade, 1953), pp.
18. PRO 371 /2099, Peckham to Crackenthorpe, February 4 and 158-60; Vuckovic, "Unu trasnje ," p. 181. Understandably , Draskovic
March 4, 1914, from Skoplje. Crackenthorpe wrote Grey February 2nd: denied this at the Salonika Trial, but he did not deny discussing overturn­
"The Serb regime in Macedonia offers as fair a prospect of ultimate im­ ing the Pasic cabinet with Apis.
provement of life there as any alternative regime." However, in his Annual 41. TPO, p. 172; Ziv. 3, "lskazi."
Report for 1 9 1 3 the minister took a much more pessimistic view (No. 59,
19 14).
338 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Notes to Chapter XII 339

42. Ziv. 719, "Konflikt." 2. See D. Lj ubibratic, Mlada Bosna i Sarajevski atentat (Sarajevo,
43. VIA, Pop. V, K. 480; Zivanovic, Pukovnik Apis, pp. 23 1 ff. Ziv. 1964); V. Maslesa, Mlada Bosna (Sarajevo, 1964); B. Jevtic, Sarajevski
3, "Iskazi." atentat (Sarajevo, 1924); and B. Cerovic, Bosanskie ?mladinci i sarajevski
44. VIA, Pop. V, K. 480, f. 1. atentat (Sarajevo, 1930).
45. Ziv. 12, "Zabe1eSke." See M. Zivanovic, Pukovnik Apis; M. Bogicevic, Le Colonel
3.
46. Ziv. 719, "Konflikt." Dragutine Dimitrijevic-Apis and Le proces de Salonique; and C. Popovic,
47. Ibid.; Jovanovic , Moji savremenici, pp. 406-07. "Organizacij a 'Ujedinjenje ili smrt' ," NE, XV, no. 1 2 .
48. Apis had spoken earlier with GliSic at the "Kolarac" restaurant 4. Especially TPO,· D. Stojadinovic, "Srbija i Nemacka . . . ," cited
and had intimated the need for forceful action. by Dedijer, Sarajevo 1914, Il, 197 ff. ; S. Stanojevic, Ubistvo austrijskog
. .
49 . - IV. 3 , "I S
Z k azt.
"

presto/onaslednika Ferdinanda (Belgrade, 1923); and Dj . Jelenic, "Vidov­

50. Vuckovic, "Unutrasnje," p. 1 8 1 ; Zivanovic, Pukovnik A pis, p. danski atentat 1914 . . . ," Politika, March 26, 1926.
220. 5. Ziv. 719, "Konflikt." Pa5iC s letter to Putnik could not be locat­
'

51. Ziv. 12, "Zabeleske . " ed by the author.

52. Zivanovic, Pukovnik Apis, p. 220. 6. S. Pribicevic, Diktatura, pp. 298-99. Other Serbian army leaders
53. VIA, Pop. V, K. 480, f. 2. likewise favored peace, Pribicevic learned at Srbobran, leading Serbian
54. Ziv. 3 , "Iskazi." publication in Croatia, which he edited.
55. VIA, Pop. V, K. 480, f. 2 ; Zivanovic, Pukovnik Apis, p. 219. The 7. S. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, pp. 406-07.
third letter from Colonel Lazarevic to Apis read: "Bitolj and Novi Pazar 8. Ziv. 4019, "Rad Organizacije,"; Ziv. 719, "Konflikt."
commands have reported in. What you have instructed cannot take place.
9. Ibid.
About this Plazina and Dusan have already written, and I have nothing 10. Dedijer,Sarajevo 1914, 197.
more to say. Greetings to you and Pilac from your Milutin." The three 11. Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914 (3 vols., New York,
replies to Apis were published in Srpski G/asnik (Salonika), June 4, 1 9 1 7 1952-57), Ill, 87. Apis spent several months in Berlin convalescing in
as "Pokusaj prevrata u 1 9 1 4 g."; Ziv. 4384. 1 9 1 3 , but not "in the Serbian embassy."
56. J ovanovic, Moji savremenici, pp. 445-47. 12. Ziv. 207 5, "Smrt Pukovnika Apisa i Sarajevski atentat."
57. Ziv. 3, "lskazi ." 13. Ziv. 684, "Moj rad . . . ," Blagojevic's autobiographical account
58. Ziv. 7 1 9 , "Konflikt." which he gave to Milan Zivanovic in 195 1 .
59. Ibid.; Jovanovic, pp. 199-202; HHSA, Serbien XIX/66, Giesl to 14 . Ljubibratic, M/ada Bosna, pp. 165-66; Pribicevic, pp. 299-300.
Berchtold, May 29 and June 6, 1 9 1 4 , Nos. 77B and 108 and June 1 7 . 15. P. Opacic, "1zgovor za pocetak svetskog rata," Politika, June 28,
1984.
Notes to Chapter Xll 16. L. Chlumecky, "Franz Ferdinands Aussenpolitik," BM, Xll (June
1934), pp. 455-66.
1. The literature on the Sarajevo murder is massive. In English see J . 17. Ziv. 2067, M. Zivanovic, "Kritika Apisova rada."
Remak, Sarajevo (New York, 1959) and V. Dedijer,
The Road to Sarajevo 18. Ziv. 209 1 , .Z. Zivanovic, "Licne podatke o Apisu"; Ziv. 2075, M.
(New York, 1966) and R. W. Seton-Watson, Sarajevo (London, 1926). A
Zivanovic, "Smrt Pukovnika Apisa."
recent Yugoslav bibliography is N. TriSic, Sarajevskiatentatu svjetlu biblio­ 19. Bogdan .Zerajic in protest against Austro-Hungarian rule of Bosnia
grafskih podataka (Sarajevo, 1964). The most complete treatmentis Dedi­ attempted abortively in June 1 9 1 0 to murder General Varesanin, governor
jer, Saraje11o 1914 (2 vols., Belgrade, 1978). of Bosnia, then committed suicide. See P. Bogicevic, "Atentat Bogdana
\

340 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Notes to Chapter XII 34 1

Zerajica," GIDBiH (Sarajevo), N, 1954. Major Milan Vasic affirmed fiery Serbian patriot "entirely lacking in balance or common sense , ruth­
there were two attempts in 1 9 1 2 to organize the Archduke's murder. less in ambition." Learning of Russia's probable support of Serbia, Apis
Vasic was then Apis' close colleague. Ziv. 4019, pp. 9-1 1 . on June 2/15 convened the CEC and told it he had sent l'ankosic's Bos­
20. Ziv. 2075, "Smrt." nian pupils to kill the Archduke. Since he and Tartkosic were the only
21. Ziv. 4019, "Rad Organizacije." members favoring this, Apis agreed to abandon the plan. Either he tried
22. Ziv. 35, Colonel PavloviC's reminiscences about Malobabic. to recall the assassins or neglected to act. Short of holding the assassins
23. Ziv. 34, "Ljubomir Vulovic." in Serbia forcibly, wrote Seton-Watson, even Apis probably could not
24. Apis to Salonika court, March 28, 1 9 1 7 in F. Wtirthle, Die Sar- have prevented their action. Despite Apis' connection with two assassins
ajewoer Gerichtsakten (Vienna, 1975), unpaginated. via Tankosic , there is no proof he conceived a plot initiated apparently
25. M. Zivanovic, Republika, December 18, 1945. inside Bosnia. Declared "Young Bosnian," Borivoje Jevtic, later: the
26. Ljubibratic, Mlada Bosna, p. 138. Sarajevo murder was "not the work of an isolated individual in national
27. Dedijer, Sarajevo 1914, I , 29, 430. Dedijer informed the author exaltation, but of the entire youth of Bosnia." The murder, noted Seton­
about a secret dossier on Apis prepared by the Okhrana for Nicholas 11 Watson, was the sixth in four years against Austrian leaders, all by Serbs
stating that Dr. Branko Pavicevic had obtained a copy on a research visit and Croats from the Monarchy , none connected with Serbia. An article
to Kiev. The author could obtain no infom1ation on this from Pavicevic. of 1922 asserted that Apis' organization of the Sarajevo murder gave
Affirming initially that the murder was organized by Serbian military Austria the pretext to declare war on Serbia. "A private person, an ordin­
intelligence (Apis) at Russia's order, a Soviet writer later withdrew that ary citizen, arbitrarily . . . dragged his country into war despite the
claim-N. P. Poletika, Saraevskoe ubistvo (Moscow, 1930), ix; Voznik­ wishes of its responsible leaders"-Radikal, March 25, 1922, "Politicka
novenie pervoi mirovoi voiny (Moscow, 1964), pp. 236-37. zmca."
28. Wtirthle, Die Sarajewoer. 38. V. Bogicevic, "Jos nekoliko . . . , " Oslobodjenje, June 1 7 , 1953.
29. V. A. Artamonov, "Erinnerungen an meine Militarattachezeit in 39. Especially S. Stanojevic, Dj. Jelenic, D. Stojadinovic, and Lj .
Belgrad," BM ( 1 938), pp. 588-602. Jovanovic. See note 4 above.
30. Serge in Clarte (Paris, 1925). In his Memoires d'un revolution­ 40. Milos Bogicevic came from a prominent Serbian family which
noire de 1901 a 1941 (Paris, 1 95 1 ) , pp. 198-99, Serge claimed he obtain­ backed the Obrenovic dynasty until King Alexander in 1900 removed
ed his information from Bozin Simic and Milos Bogicevic. See Dedijer, Milos' father as minister in Berlin. Supporting the May Coup, Milos was
Sarajevo, I, 430. educated in Vienna and obtained a doctorate there. He served in the
31. Ljubibratic, Mlada Bosna, p. 163. Serbian diplomatic corps in Paris and Berlin where he belonged to the
32. V. Bogicevic, Sarajevski atentat. Pisma, pp. 1 25-26. Eulenberg Club which was close to William ll. During World War I he
33. Ibid., pp. 1 20-22; Bogicevic, "Jos nekoliko podataka . . . ," defected to Germany .
Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), June 1 7 , 1953, p. 4. 41. Dedijer, Sarajevo, Il, 1 98-99; M. Bogicevic, Le Colonel, p. 1 2 .
34. Ibid. 42. Ljubibratic, Miada B9sna, p. 163.
35. Pribicevic, Diktatura, pp. 293-302. 43. See Dedijer, Sarajevo, I, 205 ff.
36. With no executive post in the CEC, Apis had no authority to 44. Lj ubibratic, pp. 14647.
convene a meeting; he claimed it no longer met as such in 1 9 14. 45. Ibid., pp. 14748.
37. Pribicevic, pp. 299-300. Wrote the British scholar, R. W . Seton­ 46. Sarac's manuscript biography, wrote Lj ubibratic, was in Matica
Watson in "Murder in Sarajevo," FA, I l l (1925), pp. 500-06: Apis decid­ Srpska Library in Novi Sad. It had been edited by Dusan Slavic, a Bel­
ed to forestall an Austrian attack by a sensational terrorist act. He was a grade writer, who often met with Sarac and other national activists.
342 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Notes to Chapter XIII 343

47. Ljubibratic, pp. 1 5 1-53. 12. Ziv. 10, Diary of Milovanovic-Pilac, entry of February 23, 1 9 1 8 .
;

48. Ibid., pp. 153-55. 13 . Ziv. 692, "Razni podaci."

49. C. Popovic, "0 Sarajevskom atentatu," Novosti, June 28, 1924. 14. Ziv. 1 0 , Milovanovic-Pilac diary, May 30, 1918. -
50. Ljubibratic , pp. 159-64. 15. Ziv. 35, Dr. Srdjan Budisavljevic on Malobab.ic.
•

16. Ziv. 3, "Iskazi."

Notes to Chapter XIII 17 . Ibid.
18. Ziv. 35, on Malobabic.
1. General accounts in English about Serbia in World War I n
i clude 19. Ziv. 3, "Iskazi."
M. Petrovich, A History, 11, 6 1 2 ff. ; Fred Singleton, A Short History of 20. Ibid., session of April 30, 1 9 1 7.
the Yugoslav Peoples (1985), pp. 1 14-30. Yugoslav accounts include Milan 21. Ibid., sessionof May 4 and Milan Zivanovic's comments.
Zelenika, Prvi svetski rat 1914 godine (Belgrade, 1962); Zivan Zivanovic, 22. Wi.irthle, Die Sarajewoer.
Srbija u ratovima (Belgrade , 1958); S. Djuric and V. Stevanovic , eds. 23. Ziv. 1 5 , A. Sredojevic, "Podaci o Solunskom aferu."
Go/gota i vaskrs Srbije, 1914-1918 (2 vols., Belgrade , 1986). Most com­ 24. SANU 142 1 1 , Draskic Memoirs.
plete is Veliki rat Srbije za os/obodjenje i ujedinjenje Srba, Hrvata i Slo­ 25. Ibid.; Ziv. 4215, M. Zivanovic , "Kapija kod Soluna." On Battle
venaca (32 vols., Belgrade , 1926-29). of Cerska see Milan Radenkovic,
Cerska operacija 1914 (Belgrade, 1953).
2. Pijemont, June 18, 1914, "Posle Zerajica-Princip."; June 20, Georg Markus claims in Der Fall Red/ (Vienna, 1984), pp. 1 9-20, that
"Austrija i Juzni Sloveni." Marshal Putnik knew most plans and dispositions for a possible Austrian
3. Ibid., June 22, "Austrijski problem," p. 1 ; "Austrija protiv offensive because of treason committed by Austria's Colonel Alfred Red!.
Srbije," p. 2. 26. Ziv. 4215, "Kapija"; .Z. Zivanovic, Srbija u ratovima, pp. 14041.
4. HHSA, P.A., I, Liasse Krieg, K. 810, Potiorek to Minister Presi­ 27. Ziv. 8, "Cedo Popovic's war reminiscences" ; Ziv. 38, Tankosic;
dent, June 29, from Sarajevo; Ibid., Lorcha to Berchtold, June 29, No. Ziv. 6, Vemic Diary, entry of January 27, 1 9 1 5 .
97A and June 30, No. 98. 28. Ziv. 10, Milovanovic diary, October 2, 1917.
5. i S. B . Fay,
The Austrian ultimatum of July 10/23rd is n The 29. Bitka na Drini (Belgrade , 1969), pp. 4 16-32. On
Mitar Djurisic,
Origins of the World War (2 vols., New York, 1928 and 1966, 11, 269- the Battle of Kolubara see also Kolubarska bitka, I. I . , Zbomik Radova,
73). Reacted the Serbian Zastava of Novi Sad in Hungary : "Austria­ Knj. 3 (Belgrade, 1985).
Hungary has created a fait accompli. If Serbia agrees to everything de­ 30. Archives de Terre (Vincennes (henceforth ADT), "Note de M. le
manded of her, then she will lose much of her national independence." Professeur R. A. Reiss sur le complot serbe," September 20, 1917, attach­
-Zastava, July 12/25, No. 153, "Na prelomu." ed to a report of Carbonnier, French military attache at Serbian General
6. Ljubibratic, Mlada Bosna, pp. 185-86. Headquarters in Salonika to the War Minister (Paris), September 23, 1917.
7. Kissling, "Die serbische Mobilrnachung im Juli 1914," BM, X, I t was published by Dubravka Stojankovic as "Rudolf A. Reis o Solun­
1932, pp. 681-86. A Serbian account contends Belgrade ordered its army skom procesu," /G, 1984, 1-2,.pp. 99-107.
mobilized only after Giesl's departure at 6:30 PM on July 12/25: Jovan 31. S. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, pp. 408- 1 1 .
Jovanovic in Politika, February 8, 1932, No. 8530. 32. D. Jankovic, Introduction to Zapisnici sednica Ministarskog sa-
8. Ziv. 3 , "Iskazi." veta Srbije, 1915-1918 (Belgrade, 1976).
9. V. Bogicevic, Sarajevski atentat, pp. 1 26-27. 33. SANU, Draskic Memoirs, pp. 25-26, related by Dusan Stefanovic.
10. Ziv. 3, "Iskazi." 34. PRO FO 371 /2460, C. des Graz (Nis) to Grey, December 8 , 1914.
11. Ziv. 1 1 , Diary of Milovanovic-Pilac, December 22, 1919. 35. S. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, p. 4 1 6 .
 344 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Notes to Chapter XVI 345

36. Ziv. 1937, TriSa Kaclerovic to M . Z. Zivanovic. 4. S. Skoko, Vojvoda Radomir Putnik, II, 228-36. Serb forces on all
37. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, p . 4 1 7. fronts in October 1 9 1 5 numbered 247,257 men and 685 cannon of which
38. SANU, DraSk.ic Memoirs, pp. 124-40. 94,784 with 226 cannon faced Bulgaria. Serbia's ally, Montenegro, had
'
39. ADT, K. 7 1 7, No. 2, Fournier to Cabinet du Ministre, March 53,000 men and 159 cannon (p. 236).
15, 1915. 5. Ibid., p. 236; Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, pp. 1 73-74.
40. Ibid., ibid. to ibid., September 22, 1 9 1 5 . At the start of World 6. WO 106/1402, Letter of Serbian Minister November 1 9 1 5 ; Sko
War I, noted Fournier, the Serbian army totalled about 450,000 men plus ko, 11, 228 ff. On September 12/25 Foreign Minister Sazonov was given
35,000 men of the class of 1 9 1 5 . Remaining in September 1 9 1 5 were Pasic's telegram insisting that Russia authorize an immediate Serbian pre­
about 300,000 combattants, and the only remaining reserve, the class of emptive attack on Bulgaria. Sazonov replied he would consider that "as
1 9 1 6 , was being called to the colors. grave a crime as action by the Bulgars." MOEI, Series lll, vol. VIII, Part
41. AJ , fond J . J . Pizona, Kutija 80/2, Report of Colonel D. N ilic 2, Sazonov to Trubetskoi, September 12/25, No. 780, p. 366.
from Petrograd, March 28, 1 9 1 5 . Minister Spalajkovic warned P3Sic that 7. Gerald Silverstein, "The Serbian Campaign of 1915," AHR,
the Nis government needed to refute the myth that Serbia's aims were LXXIII, No. 1 (October 1967), pp. 5 1 -69.
aggressive but rather reflected efforts to achieve common ideals of the 8. Ibid.; CAB 1 7/ 1 3 1 , "Precis . . . regarding the Anglo-French Ex­
liberation and unity of all South Slavs-Spalajkovic to Pas
i c, March 7. pedition to Salonika," and "Extracts from Allied Conferences."
42. AJ , f. Pizona, K. 80/2, Spalajkovic to Pa5ic, April 2 1 , telegram. 9. Pribicevic, Diktatura, pp. 304-05.
43. Ibid., ibid. to ibid., April 24, telegram No. 705. 10. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, pp. 202-05.
44. Ziv. 3 , "lskazi." Among Bosnians remaining with the Uzice staff 11. ADT, 7N 719, Carton 2302, Colonel Foumier to War Minister,
were Nezir, Ciganovic, Djuro Sarac and Mustafa Golubic. from Kragujevac, October 6/19.
45. Dusan Marinkovic, "Jedan susret sa 'Apisom' is saslusanje kod 12. Skoko, PU!nik, 11, 238 ff. ; MOEI, Series lll, vol. VIII, Part 2, No.
ministra policije," Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo), May 1 6 , 1 9 5 3 , p. 5 . 914, Trubetskoi to Sazonov, October 1 / 14, p. 492.
�

46. Ziv. 3 , "Iskazi."
Nores ro Chapter XIV
I. The Allies informed Serbian leaders that Bulgaria's cooperation
was needed and asked them to promise to cede to it part of Serbian
Macedonia if Sofia joined the Allies. Russia's minister to Serbia warned
Pasic rejection of this demand would threaten Serbia's future and rela­
tionship with Russia. MOEI, Series Ill, vol. VIII, Part 1 , No. 429, Four
Power Declaration, July 22/ August 4, 1 9 1 5 ; Trubetskoi to Sazonov, July
22, No. 434, telegram, p. 555.
2. When Minister Trubetskoi objected to that phrase, Pasic declared:
"I believe Russia did everything it could . . . but it cannot expect the im­
possible from us." MOEI, vol. Vlll, Part 2, Trubetskoi to Sazonov, August
3/16, No. 522, p. 86.
3. Jovanovic , Moji savremenici, pp. 202-05 ; Pribicevic, Diktatura.
13 . Ziv. 3, "lskazi, April 29 session; Ziv. 35, Malobabic; TPO, p. 3 5 1 .
14. WO 1 06 / 1400, C. des Graz (NiS), telegrams October 1 1 , 22.
15. Ibid., Sir Ralph Paget telegram, October 23 ; Consul Greig (M on­
astir), October 27; C. des Graz (NiS), October 27.
16. Jovanovic , Moji savremenici. pp. 204-05 .
17. WO 106/ 1335, "Military Position of the Allies in the Near East
(October 1915)." A fonner British staff officer in the Balkans wrote
Colonel Hankey privately October I 5th opposing any large expedition to
Serbia: "For our army, requiring more transport than any other, difficul­
ties would be insuperable if we sent out a large force . . . . Our new armies
are only armed men with little discipline and led by inexperienced officers.
. . . It will be playing the German game to detach troops from here l west­
ern front] and send them out there."-CAB 17/ 1 1 3 .
18. WO 106/1335, "Expedition to the Near East.'.
19. CAB 1 7I 1 1 3, "Summary of the Situation in Macedonia," and
comments of Lieutenant General A. J . Murray, British chief of staff.
 346 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Notes to Chapter XV 347

20. WO 106/1400, Sir R. Rodd (Rome) to War Office, October 29. 47. Jovanovic , Moji savremenici, pp. 174-75, 4 1 7-18.
On the Allied diplomats' trek from NiS to the Adriatic see A. Boppe A la
suite du gouvernement serbe (Paris, 1 9 1 7). Serbia's defeat at the Battle of Nores 10 Chapter X V •

Kosovo ( 1389) doomed the medieval Serbian kingdom.

21. Ziv. 1962, Stefan Trifunovic to Zivanovic, February 1 1 , 1946. 1. Ziv. 7 1 8, "Apis," by Vladimir Tucovic?
Explained Trifunovic: "To preserve memories about a great man like Apis, 2. Ziv. 207 1 , M. Zivanovic, "Smrt Pukovnika Apisa."
everything must be gathered which is known about him . . . . " 3. Ziv. 1 93 1 , N. Arandjelovic, "Pukovnik Dragutin Dimitrijevic."
22. WO 106/ 1402, November 25, 1 9 1 5 . C.I.G.S. 4. Ziv. 207 1 , "Smrt."
23. ADT, K. 7 1 6 , Fournier to War Ministry (Paris), November 8 / 1 2. 5. Ziv. 194 1 , Zivan Zivanovic, "Iz zivota."
24. SANU, Draskic Memoirs, pp. 1 5 1 -52. 6. Ziv. 2067, M. Zivanovic, "Kritika Apisova rada." Dragoslav llic
25. Ziv. 3718, M. Zivanovic , "Povlacenije preko Albanije 1 9 1 5 g." in a 194 7 speech asserted Apis had been an amazing mixture of soldier and
26. WO 106/ 1403, "Serbian Military Situation,"November 24, 1 9 1 5 . politician, had been unselfish, dedicated, self-sacrificing, but with a healthy
27. VIA, Pop. 3 , K. 3 , br. 25, November 12 (25); Ziv. 3718. ambition-Ziv. 2062.
28. VIA, Pop. 3 , K, 3 , br. 25, December 1 / 14, Skadar. 7. See SANU 14,520, Kosta Pecanac, "Moja ispoved"; ADT, "Note
29. Ibid., Milovanovic's notes from November 18/December 1 meet- du Professeur R. A. Reiss sur le complot serbe"; Ziv. 207, lvkovic's ac­
.
mg. count.
30. Ziv. 4215, "Kapija kod Soluna." 8. Alexander Zivanovic, Milan's older brother and Apis' nephew,
31. Apis still suffered after-effects of the Maltese fever. was killed in October 1 9 1 2 the first day of the Serbo-Turkish War.
32. J ovanovic, Moji savremenici, pp. 4 1 7 - 1 8 . 9. Jelena, daughter of Alexander and Stanislava Glisic, born a month
33. SANU, Draskic Memoirs, pp. 1 5 7 , 154. No precise date was before her father's death. Ziv. 3194, Apis to Stanislava GliSic (Valjevo),
.
g�ven. August 29, 1914.
34. CAB 1 7 I 1 1 3, "Situation of Allied Forces in Serbia and at Salon- 10. Jelena Zivanovic, wife of Zivan and Apis' elder sister.
ika," by Colonel M. P. A. Hankey, November 23/Decernber 6, 1 9 1 5 . 11. Ziv. 3 1 95, Apis to Stanislava (Valjevo), October 1 1 , 1914.
35. Ziv. 3718, "Povlacenije." 12. Ziv. 3 1 96, ibid. to ibid., March 20, 1 9 1 5 .
36. Ziv. 42 1 5 , "Kapija kod Soluna." 13. Ziv. 1085, "Uspomene Milana Zivanovica" (Nice, May 1 9 1 6).
37. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, p. 4 1 8. 14. Ziv. 1085, ibid., notebook 2, Nice, June 1 9 1 6.
38. SANU, DraSkic Memoirs, pp. 1 5 6 ff. 15. Ibid.
39. ADT, K. 7 1 9 , Fran9ois and F oumier telegrams; L es armees fran- 16. Ziv. 209 1 , "Apis."
qaises dans la grande guerre, VIII/ 1 , annex 3 (Paris, 1927), pp. 2, 8-9. 17. Ziv. 3197, Note of Milan Zivanovic.
40. Ziv. 193 1 , N. Arandjelovic, "Pukovnik Dragutin Dimitrijevic." 18. Ibid., Apis to Milan Zivanovic , April 16, 1916 (Corfu).
41. Ziv. 3 , "Iskazi," May 4, session. 19. On the way through Albania during the Serbian retreat, notes
42. SANU 1471 /2, Kosta Pecanac , "Moja ispovest," November 29, Milan Zivanovic, Sapinac had been attacked by Albanian tribesmen and
1933. robbed of everything. In Elbasan Apis had given him money and a coat.
43. Ziv. 2 1 8 , "Narodna Skupstina." 20. Ziv. 3 198, Apis to Milan, April 28 (Corfu).
44. Ziv. 194 1 , Zivan Zivanovic, "lz Zivota." 21. Ziv. 3 1 99, Apis to Milan, May 8 (Corfu).
45. Ziv. 3 7 1 8 , "Povlacenije." 22. Ziv. 3200, Apis to Milan, October 22 (Vostarane).
46. Ziv. 4 2 1 5 , "Kapija"; Dj. Karadjordjevic, lstina, p. 375. 23. Ziv. 3201 , November 1 (Vostarane).
 348 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Notes to Chapter XVII 349

24. Ibid. 17. Ziv. 207, "Jedna karakteristicna episoda iz vremena za pripreme
25. Ziv. 3202, November 11. Solunske afere," by Colonel Milojko Ivkovic .
26. Ziv. 3202A, November 20. 18. Ziv. 7, "BeleSke Vladimira Tucovica."
• 27. Ziv. 3203, December 3, 9 PM. 19. CAB 1 7 / 1 3 1 , January 17, 1 9 16, to Colonel Hankey .
28. Ziv. 3204, December 12. Apis evidently realized that his cor­ 20. Ibid., "Precis of recent proposals by the French GHQ and British
respondence was under surveillance. General Staff on Salonika."

Notes to Chapter X VI Notes to Chapter X VII

1. In Skadar on December 30, 1916 the Prince Regent formally re­ 1. VIA, Pop. 3, K. 3, br. 25, Report of March
10, 1916. For the Sal­
placed Marshal Putnik with General Peter Bojovic as chief of staff, and onika campaign in English see Alan Palmer, The Garden ers of Salonika
General Bozidar Terzic became war minister. On Corfu Colonel Peter Pesic (New York, 1978). In Serbian see Petar Opacic, Srbija i Solunski fronr
'

a crony of Alexander, replaced Colonel Zivko Pavlovic as assistant chief (Belgrade, 1984) and his popular Solunski front (Belgrade, ( 1 978), and M.
of staff. Skoko, Putnik, 11, 29 1 . Alirnpic, Solunski front (Belgrade, 1967).

2. S. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, pp. 4 1 8-20; Dragoslav Jankovic, 2. VIA, Pop. 3, K. 3, br. 25, "Operacijski dnevnik operativne odel­
"0 radu srpske vlade . . . ," in Zapisnici sednica Ministarskog saveta Srbije, enja Vrhovne Komande od 10. marta do 6. juna 1 916," reports of March
1915-1918 (Belgrade, 1976), p. 62. 1 0, 22, 26 and mid-May 1916;Armees [rancaises, VIII/2, pp. 1-3.
3. Jovanovic , p. 42 1 . 3. Alirnpic, pp. 94-95; Opacic, Srbija, Chap. 1 and Solunskifront, p.
4. Ziv. 7 1 6, "Solunska afera." 55; Nikola Popovic, Srbija i Rusija, 1914-1918 (Belgrade, 1977), p. 267.
5. Ibid. 4. Ziv. 4215, "Kapija ;Armees francases,
" i Vlll/2, pp. 8-16.

6. Contrary to their name, the Progressives had been a conservative, 5. VIA, Pop. 3, K. 3, br. 25, Colonel Dimitrijevic to Colonel Milo­
pro-monarchist party without significant popular support in Serbia. vanovic, 8:50 AM, August 7/20; Dimitrijevic to Maric, 6:30 PM.
7. Jovanovic, p. 426 ; Dj . Karadjordjevic, fstina, pp. 375-76. 6. Ibid., Dimitrijevic to Colonel Kalafatovic, August 8, 4 PM; Di­
8. Jovanovic, pp. 426-27; Jankovic, "0 radu," Zapisnici, p. 62. mitrijevic to Milovanovic, 6:50 PM.

9. Radoje Lazic, then the only surviving Salonika defendant, con­ 7. Ibid., Order of General Bojovic, No. 4040 (Salonika), August 9.
firmed this at the 1953 Retrial. Oslobodjenje, June 3 , 1953, "Rasvetlja­ 8. Ibid., Dimitrijevic to Maric, 10: 1 5 AM and 3:45 PM, August 9;

vanje sudskog zlocina Aleksandra Karadjordjevica." Dimitrijevic to Kalafatovic, 3:45 PM; same to Colonel Pesic, August 13,
10. Ziv. 3 , "Iskazi," session of April 28. 4 PM .

11. Ibid., Apis asked the court to call as a witness Colonel Milutin 9. VIA, Pop. 3, K. 14, "Resume of operations," August 4-15, 1916.
Vukicevic, housing officer of the Timok Army, to confirm his account. 10. Ibid., K. 3, br. 25, "Operacijski dnevnik," Colonel Maric to Chief
12. Ibid., session of April 30. of Staff, Supreme Command, August 1 5 .
13. Ibid., session of May 4. 1 1. Ibid., Dimitrijevic to Maric, August 19, 7 AM.
14. "Svaba" in Serbo-Croatian. "Schwabe," comparable to "Kraut" 12. Ziv. 3, "Iskazi," session of May 2, 1 9 1 7.
in English, was a common slang term in Serbia for a German. 13. ln 1901 Colonel Milos Vasic was the only senior officer who
15. Ziv. 6. Introduction of Milan Zivanovic to Vemic Diary. agreed to serve in Alexander Obrenovic's so-called "wedding cabinet." As
16. Ziv. 3 5 , on Malobabic; Radoje Jankovic, "Rade Malobabic," in War Minister he ordered army officers to collect contributions for the
Dnevnik (Belgrade), April 24, 1921. "future heir" supposedly expected by Queen Draga.
350 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Notes to Chapter XVIII 35 1

14 . Ziv. 35, On Malobabic. 36. AJ, Jovanovic-Pizon, K. 8/43, No. 8957, Nikola Pasic to Jovano-
15. Ziv. 3 , "Iskazi," session of May 3. Chairman MiSic cited Malo­ vic-Piion, December 19.
babic's testimony that Apis had told him on Corfu that the Serbian poli­ Ibid., Pasic to Jovanovic-Pizon, December 1 9 .
37.
tical system would have to be changed by elections or by "other means." 38. Ibid., Jovanovic-Piion to Pa5ic, December 23.
16. Ibid., session of May 4. 39. VIA, Pop. V, K. 483, f. 1 , br. 1 2 , "Ocene za pukovinka Dragutin
17. Ibid., session of April 30. Dimitrijevica od strane Natelnika Stabe 3 . Armije, Pukovnika Mihailo Lj.
18. Ibid., session of May 4. J ovanovica, March 9, 1 9 1 7 .
19. Ziv. 246, "Zavrsna rec . . . Milovanovica." 40. Ibid., General Milos Vasic, "Ocena," March 1 0 , 1 9 1 7 .
20. SANU, Draskic Memoirs, pp. 14-15. 41. Ziv. 246, "Zavrsna rec." Testified Colonel M . G. Milovanovic at
21. VIA, Pop. 3 , K. 1 5 , br. 1 , General Sarrail to Serbian Chief of Salonika, who had been closely associated with Apis on the Salonika
Staff, (August 25)/September 7, (August 30)/September 1 2 , and (August Front: "I can assure the court that Colonel Dimitrijevic never by the
24)/September 7, No. 478. slightest sign gave me any reason to believe that he had prepared anything
22. Ibid., General Bojovic to Prince Alexander, (August 26)/Septem- against the Heir or the existing regime."
ber 8.
23. Ibid., Prince Alexander to Commander, First Volunteer Division, Notes ro Chapter X VIII
(August 29)/September 1 1 .
24. Ibid., Dimitrijevic to Kalafatovic, August 3 0 , 4 : 10, 9: 45 PM. 1. Dedijer, Sarajevo 1914, ll, 125-26. The author compiled the list
25. Ibid. to ibid., August 3 1 , 9:25 PM. of "associates."
26. Ibid. to ibid., September 10. 2. Politika, July 1 7 , 1953, article of Prvoslav Vasiljevic.
27. Dimitrijevic to Maric, September 1 3 , 2 1 : 40 (9:40PM). 3. For the "Salonika regime" see especially Beogradski dnevnik
28. Dimitrijevic to Kalafatovic , September 1 7 , 4 PM. (Belgrade) which ran long series of articles starting in mid-January 1920.
29. VIA, Pop. 3, K. 150, f. 5 , Nikolajevic (London) to Serbian Su­ 4. Ziv. 7 1 6 , "Solunska afera." TucoviC's name appears on the last
preme Command (Salonika), October 1 1 . page of this informative expose, which apparently he wrote.
30. Ibid., General Ra5ic to Prince Alexander, November 4 I 17, No. 6 1 5. Dedijer, Sarajevo 1914, 1 1 , 197 ff. discusses Dragisa Stoj adinoviC's
(from Salonika). unpublished "Srbija i Nemacka . . . . " In M. ZivanoviC's archive (Ziv.
31. Ibid., Pop. 3, K. 1 6 , br. 1 , "Operacioni dnevnik od 1 4 . novembra 1 88 1 ) is a mysterious anonymous paper suggesting relations of some
do 10. decembra," Dimitrijevic to Kalafatovic, November 1 4 , 4 PM; Dimi­ "Black Hand" members with German officers in Salonika.
trijevic to Maric, November 16, 2:40 PM. 6. Ziv. 7 1 6 , "Solunska afera."
32. Ibid., Maric to Dimitrijevic, 4:40PM. 7. Ibid.
33. Ibid., Dimitrijevic to Milovanovic, 9:30AM; Dimitrijevic to Maric, 8. Pravda, January 14 and IS, 1920, "Solunski rezim"; Beogradski
9:55 PM. dnevnik, January 1 6 and 29, 1920, "Odbor desetorice."
3�.:- Ibid., November 20, Dimitrijevic to Maric, 9:45 PM. 9. SANU, Draskic Memoirs, pp. 1 5 - 1 7 .
35. Ibid., K. 140, f. 8, General Bojovic to Army Commanders, No­ 10. Ibid., pp. 1 8 ff.
vember 9. On November 27th, noting he had requested relief for the ex­ 11. Ziv. 7, "Beleske Tucovica."
hausted Serbs, General Ra5ic reported that 90,000 French troops were 12. Ziv. 14, "Excerpts from General Damjan Popovic's letters." TPO
awaiting embarcation for Salonika-Ibid., K. 150, f. 5 , Ra5ic to Prince published some in incorrect order to incriminate Apis and his friends.
Alexander, No. 696, November 27. 13. Ziv. 1 1 , MilovanoviC's Diary, December 18, 1 9 1 7 and August 10,
1919.
352 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Notes to Chapter XIX 353

14. Ziv. 7 1 6, "Solunska afera." Nores to Chapter XIX

¥

15. Ziv. 3, "lskazi."

16. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, pp. 429-30; Ziv. 7 1 6; Ziv. 520, 1. For general political and military history of World. War 1 see Alan
"Radnja oko obrazovanj a prekog suda . . . ," apparently by Dr. Moacanin, Clark, Suicide of the t:mpires: The Ballles on the Eastern From, 1914-18
September 23, 1 9 1 6. Colonel Pavlovic gave War Minister Terzic a proposed (New York, 1 97 1 ); W. R. Griffith, Tile Great War (Wayne, N.J., 1 986);
draft law on a special court and related the "attempt" on the Prince, in and James Stokesbury, A Short History of World War I (New York, 1 9 8 1 ) .
which Apis allegedly had been involved. Initially, Terzic replied: "Then we 2. Beogradski dnevnik, J anuary 29, 1920. "Odbor desetorice-hap-
must finish them," but later he warned Pavlovic: "Things won't be so sim­ senje Dragutina Dimitrijevica."
ple since lawyers of the Ministry think differently." Opposition leaders 3. SANU, Draskic Memoirs.
raised legal obj ections as did Premier Pasic . 4. Politika, July 1 7 , 1953, article of Prvoslav Vasiljevic.
17. Ziv. 7 1 6 , "Solunska afera." 5. Ziv. 1 0, Milovanovic's Diary, entry of December 18, 1 9 1 7.
18. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, pp. 428-29. 6. Politika, July 17, 1953, Vasiljevic article ; Ziv. 598, "Ponuda Aus­
19. Ibid., pp. 427-28. trije za separatni mir."
20. Ziv. 3, " I skazi ," May I session. 7. Ziv. 632, "Podaci dobiveni od M. Radovanovica-Koce," May 19,

21. Introducing Ziv. 1 5 , Milan Zivanovic explained that Sredojevic, 1921.

from Novi Pazar sandjak, had joined the Serbian national movement in
1905. So he could organize an agents' network, Sredojevic was named to
the Interior Ministry. On the Salonika Front first with Vojvoda Vuk's
volunteers, he worked later with Major Vulovic in intelligence. After his
arrest, he was sent to Salonika Officers' Prison, then was interned in
Bizerte until the war ended. Briefly restored to service, he soon retired
and died in Belgrade in 1937.
22. Ziv. 1 5 , "Data on witnesses in the Salonika affair . . . ," by Sre­
dojevic in a voluntary statement of 1 9 1 9 in Belgrade.
23. Ziv. 7 1 6 , "Solunska afera."
8. AS, "Solunski proces," F. 4, 2097, Interior Minister to War Min­
ister, December 1 2, 1 9 1 6 ; Ziv. 463, "lzvod o radu Gospodina Ministra
Yojnog po krivicu Pukovnika A pisa." Interior Minister, December 1 2, No.
1 9 1 , Confidential, "prezidijalno. "
9. Even if this was a new style date, when converted into old style
it would become August 30th, not coinciding with the day when the as­
sassination attempt allegedly occurred.
10. AS, "Solunski proces," F. 4, 2097, Interior Minister to War Min­
ister, December 1 2.
1 1. Ziv. 463 War Minister to Supreme Command, December 13.

24. Ibid.; D. Jankovic, "0 radu," Zapisnici sednica, p. 63. At the pro­ 12. Ibid., Chief of Staff Supreme Command (General Bojovic) to
posal of the War and Interior ministers, the Serb cabinet October 25th Colonel Gojko Pavlovic, December 1 3 , No. 1899, Confidential.
decided to request Belgium to accept Apis as its military attache. 13 . Ibid., Colonel Pavlovic to Supreme Command, December 14.
25. Borba, June 1 1 , 1 9 5 3 , p . 7, "Poverljiva prepiska izmedju Pasica 14. Ibid., Mihailo Rankovic to Prince Alexander Karadjordjevic, No­

i Lj ube Jovanovica . . . . " Only in November 1 9 1 6 did Alexander and vember 25 / December 8 (Salonika); M. Zivanovic, Pukovnik Apis, pp.
Pasic agree to remove Apis from the front-V. Vuckovic, "Diplomatska 69-70. •

pozadina," JRMP, ll ( 1 959), p. 250. But D. Jankovic considers it more 1 5. Ziv. 463, Jovan Milosavljevic to Police Section, Supreme Com-
likely they agreed on tlus in September or October-"0 radu ," Zapisnici mand, December 1 2 /25, 1 9 1 6.
sednica, p. 63. 16. Zivanovic, Pukuvnik Apis. pp. 70-7 1.
26. HHSA, Nachlass Milosa Bogicevica. 1 7. Ziv. 463, Colonel Pavlovic to Supreme Command, December
27. Ziv. 3 , "Iskazi," April"30 session; Vulovic to Dimitrijevic, Novem­ 14/27.
ber 27, 1 9 1 6. 18. Ibid. On December 1 6/29th the Supreme Command in a confi­
dential document No. 1 9 1 9 asked the War Minister to assign temporarily
 354 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Notes to Chapter XX 355

to the service of Colonel Dunjic Lieutenant Colonel Milivoje Joeic to assist 12. Ibid., Interior Minister to War Minister, December 23, Strictly
him in conducting the investigation . That same day Joeic came to Dunjic Confidential.
and the investigation of A pis and his colleagues began immediately. 13. Ibid., Pop. 5, K. 482, F. 2, br. 27, "lzveHaj narocitog odredjenog
I
19. Ibid., War Minister to Supreme Command, December 13 / 2 6 ; Ziv. islednika Vrhovne Komande o rezultatima ispita . . . ," March 26.
4137. 14. Protic Memoirs, Ill.
20. Ziv. 3205, Diary of Stojkovic , entry of March 8 , 1 9 1 7 ; Zivanovic, 15. Borba, June 1 1 , 1953, "Poverljiva prepiska"; M. Zivanovic, Pu­
Pukovnik A pis, p. 82. A recent popular treatment of the arrest and events kovnik Apis, pp. 500-07.
before and after is Bogolj ub Pejcic, "Solunska proces 1 9 1 7. Hapsenje na 16. R. R. Filipovic was PasiC's office chief on Corfu. See Pribicevic ,
frontu," Jntervu, January 2, 1987, pp. 47-50. Diktatura, pp. 3 1 4 - 1 5 and Zivanovic, Apis, pp. 499-507.
21. Zivanovic, Pukovnik Apis, pp. 8 1 -82; Stenobeleike Solunskog 17. Milan Zivanovic affirms that Pasic thus predetermined a fatal out-
procesa, p. 1033, "Saslusanje ordonansa Milica llica." come of the Salonika Trial-Ibid., pp. 506-07.

22. Zivanovic, Pukovnik Apis. pp. 82-83 lists the contents of Apis' 18. Ziv. 620, "Petar Zivkovic."

trunk. 19. Ziv. 7 1 6, "Solunska afera."

23. Ziv. 7 1 6, "Solunska afera." 20. Ziv. 632, "Podaci od . . . Radovanovica-Koce." Zivkovic alleged­

24. Zivanovic,Pukovnik Apis, p. 87, citing article of M. G . Milovan­ ly told Koca: "Why did I install as jailors Mica S tojkovic and J osif Protic

ovic in Beogradski dnevnik. i f not to poison him?"

25. Ibid., pp. 87-88. 21. Ibid.
26. Ziv. 463. 22. Ziv. 692, Milenko Stojic, "Razni podaci."
23. Ziv. 7 1 6 , "Solunska afera."
-

27. Ziv. 3205, Diary of Stojkovic.

24. VIA, Pop. 5, K. 483, F. 2, "Dokumenti o istrazi po delima ofi­
Notes to Chapter XX cira-zaverenika": K. 484, F. 3, "Dokumenti po krivici Dragutina Dimitri­
jevica."
I. Ziv. 3205, Stojkovic Diary, entries of December 18-22 , 1 9 1 6 . Ziv. 7 1 6 , "Solunska afera."
-

25.
2. Ibid., entries of December 23 and 28, January I , 1 9 1 7. 26. Ziv. 4 1 20, "Podaci o svedocima u Solunskoj aferi . . . . "

3. Ibid., January 8 ; S. Zec, "Bele senke Crne Ruke-I I l ," Duga, No. 27. Ziv. 7 1 6, "Solunska afera."

320, June 1986 (henceforth Protic Memoirs). 28. Ibid.

4. This is the onJy account mentioning treatment of Apis in Vienna 29. Ziv. 10, Milovanovic Diary, entry of January 3 , 1 9 1 8 .
in 1903. His brother-in-law , who visited him at Belgrade Military Hospital, 30. AJ, Pizon, 80-9-25, Pasic to Jovanovic-Pizon, January 1 5 , 1 9 1 7 ,
made no reference to this. No. l 9 1 .
5. Protic Memoirs, ll, Duga, No. 3 1 9, May 1986; Ill, No. 320. 31. PRO FO 3 7 1 /2870, des Graz to Foreign Office , January 13. On
6. Ziv. 3 205, S tojkovic Diary, entries of January 1 1 - 1 7 , 1 9 1 7. January 5 des Graz had reported: "The Serb government has information
•

7. Ibid., entries of J anuary 1 8 - 2 1 . from Salonika indicating the existence of plotting against the government
8. Protic Memoirs, 11. and the Prince Regent. Serbian military authorities at Salonika have in­
9. Ziv. 7 1 6, "Solunska afera." stituted an enquiry and one or two officers have been arrested."
10. S. J ovanovic, Moji savremcnici, pp. 450-54. 32. AJ, PiZon, 30-843 [Jovanovic-PiZon] to Pasic, December 23,
11. VIA, Pop. 3 , K. 474, F . 1 , Order ofCh iefof Staff to all officers 1916.
'
December 22, 1 9 1 6 (Salonika). 33. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, appendix 3 ; Ziv. 206 1 .
 356 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
34. VIA, Pop. 5, K. 16, F. 1 , War Minister Terzic to Commander of
the Serbian Volunteer Corps in Russia (Odessa). That search turned up
nothing incriminating: ibid., Terzic to Supreme Command, December 30;
Pop. 3 , K. 4 74, br. 38, War Ministry Order No. 6905 to military attache
in Petrograd, no date given.
35. Ibid., K. 474, F. 3, General Zivkovic to War Minister, March 14,
1917. J ankovic wrote later he had learned of the arrests of Apis and the
others in February 1 9 1 7 . Learning then of Pasic's secret circular on trying
"traitors" in Salonika, J ankovic promptly telegraphed Prince Alexander
urging him to block the Trial. The reply he received convinced him that
the Crown was working with the government to remove Apis' head. Thus
Jankovic decided to remain in Petrograd in order to try and save his ar­
rested comrades. Ziv. 369, Jankovic to Dear Colonel, June 26, 1919.
36. Ziv. 716, "Solunska afera."
37. Ziv. 3205, Stojkovic Diary.
38. AS, "Solunski proces," F. 11-3, "Razna prepiska za vreme procesa
u vezi optuzenih."
39. Ibid., No. 1 1 02.
Nores ro Chapter XXI
1 . A complete stenographic record of the Trial is in AS, "Solunski
proces," F. 16-19. Many documents from the Trial are in M. Zivanovic,
Pukovnik Apis. A general account favorable to Apis is M. Bogicevic, Le
i de Salonique (Paris, 1927).
proc�s
2. Ziv. 7, "Beleske Tucovica." Much more on the court, judges, and
witnesses will be included in the author's planned sequel, The Black Hand
011 Tral.
i 25. Ziv. 716, "Solunska afera."
3 . Ziv. 7 1 6, "Solunska afera."
4. Ibid.
5 . Ziv. 1 3 and 632, "Podaci." Radovanovic-Koca broke with the
"White Hand" once he realized the nature of its intrigues against the ac­
cused at the Trial. He had sworn at Colonel Okanovic and Colonel M.
Gavrilovic, associated with the "Committee of Ten," and recorded their
personal ties with Premier Pasic. At the insistence of Interior Minister
Jovanovic-Patak, Radovanovic was then transferred to the front at Bitolj.
6. Ziv. 716.
Notes to Chapter XXI 35 7
7. Ziv. 4 77, Circular of Pasic.
8 . Ziv. 604, "Witnesses at Salonika," by Milan Zivanovic.
9. AJ, Jovanovic-PiZon, 80-9-1 3 1 , Pa�ic to Jov�novic-PiZon, April
2, 1917 (wrongly dated March 2).
10. Smail-aga, the name of a valiant guerrilla fighter against the Turks,
had been young Protic's nickname as a guerrilla fighter in Macedonia. Al­
though a complimentary term, it suggested as Protic realized, that Stoj­
kovic suspected that he sympathized with Colonel Apis and other officers
under whom he had served previously .
12. Protic Memoirs, 11.
13. See above, Chapter X, pp. 000.
14. Protic Memoirs, Ill.
1 5 . Ziv. 8, Papers of Ceda Popovic.
16. Protic Memoirs, IV.
17. Ziv. 3205, Stojkovic, entries of March 20-26.
18. Ziv. 590, "Veliko iznenadjenje 27. marta."
19. Ziv. 3205, Stojkovic.
20. Ziv. 296, "Bele�e za govor."
2 1 . Ziv. 716, "Solunska afera." Slobodan J ovanovic agrees that the
assassination attempt was improbable and unsubstantiated. Had the French
police report contained anything which incriminated Apis or Malobabic,
the Interior Minister would have hastened to deliver it to the Salonika
court. Moji savremenici, pp. 438-39.
22. Ziv. 395, Lazar Milosavjlevic, "lstina o 'Austrijskom �pijunu '
Radu Malobabicu."
23. Ziv. 3205, entry of March 28, Stojkovic.
24. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, p. 43 1.
26. Beogradski dnevnik, January 1 , 1920, "Dokument-ubica," lead
by Krsta Cicvaric.
27. See above chapter 12, pp. 1 29-3 1. Text of Apis to Salonika Court,
March 28, 1 9 1 7 in Zivanovic, Pukovnik Apis, pp. 556-59.
28. Ziv. 2075, "Smrt Pukovnika Apisa i Sarajevski atentat."
29. Ziv. 3205, Stojkovic.
30. Ibid., entry of April 5th.
3 1 . Ziv. 1933, "Vase Kraljevsko Visocanstvo," March 30, 1917.
358 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Notes to Chapter XXlll 359

Notes to Chapter XXII Notes to Chapter XXIII

1. Ziv. 3205, Stojkovic Diary, entries of April 6-1 1. 1. Actually, as Milan Zivanovic confirmed, he .had written letters
2. Ibid., entries of April 1 7-22. and postcards to his uncle throughout the Trial, but none were delivered
3. Pro tic Memoirs, IV. apparently in order to heighten Apis' moral anguish.
4. Ziv. 34, Vulovic. 2. Ziv. 3205, entry of May 22nd.
5. TPO, p. 167. 3 . Ibid., entry of May 23rd.
6. See above Chapters VII and Xl for Apis' testimony. 4. Ibid., entry of May 24th.
7. See above, Chapter XI, p. 1 1 5 .
5 . Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, pp. 433-34.
8. TPO, pp. 199-209. 6 . Ziv. 7 1 6 , "Solunska afera." Pasic supplied an official version of
9. Ziv. 3205, April 30th entry prepared by Lieutenant Protic.
the Lower Court verdict to his London ambassador: "They [the Apis
10. Protic Memoirs, Il.
group] incited hatred . . . against the existing order, killed civilian youths
11. Ibid.
and children . . . conducted robberies . . . and prepared to introduce a
12. Ziv. 7, "Beleske Tucovica."
medieval military oligarchy by ten to fifteen officers . . . . They tried to
13. Ziv. 8, "Papers of Ceda Popovic ."
murder the Heir, eliminate the Constitution, take away civil rights and end
14. Ziv. 7 1 6, "Solunska afera."
Serbia's existence."-AJ, PiZon 80-9-44, Pasic to J ovanovic-Pizon, May 29,
15. S. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, pp. 43940.
1 9 1 7. No concrete evidence supported PasiC's assertions. For comments
16. Ziv. 7, "Beleske Tucovica."
of i)fficers and men at the front about the verdict see Dirnitrijevic, Srbija
17. Ziv. 7 1 6, "Solunska afera."
jaca od smrti (Kragujevac, 1970), pp. 200 ff.
18. Ziv. 3814, "Solunski proces i politicka emigracija"; Ziv. 3205. 7. Ziv. 3205, entry of May 25th.
19. Ibid. 8. Protic Memoirs, ll.
20. Apis was neither its founder nor head of its CEC. 9. Nikola, or Nicholas I, prince of Montenegro, 1860-1910, then king,
2 1 . Ziv. 199, "Godpodu sudije," by Lt. Col. Radivojevic; TPO, pp. 1910-18. He was extremely vain, ambitious, inconsistent and insecure . See
396-98.
John Treadway, The Falcon and the Eagle (1983).
22. Ibid., pp. 404-05. 10. Ziv. 3205, Stojkovic Diary, entries May 29-June 2nd.
23. Ziv. 246, "Zavrsna rec M. G. Milovanovica," May 20, 1 9 1 7 . 11. Precani were Serbs and Croats living north of the Danube and
24. On this issue see the author's The Black Hand on Trial.
Sava.
25. Volja Naroda, June 14, 1 9 1 7 , No. 30. 12. H. Hinkovic, /z velikog doba (Zagreb, 1927), pp. 287-88. On the
26. PRO FO 371 /2870, des Graz to Balfour, April 25 and 26. Yugoslav Committee see D. J ankovic, Jugoslovensko pitanje i Krfska Dek­
27. Ibid., Davies to General MacDonough (from London), April 27. laracija 1 9 1 7 godine (Belgrade, 1967).
28. Ibid., May 1 , Colonel Harrison to Sir G. R. Clark, Confidential. 1 3 . Protic Memoirs, lll.
29. Ibid., Harrison to Clark, "Memorandum on the Serbian Situa- 14. VIA, Pop. 5, K. 478, F. 2, br. 45, May 27/June 9, B. Sirnic, A.
tion," May 14. Srb, V. Gojkovic and R. J ankovic to Sir George Buchanan (Petrograd).
30. Ibid., "Memorandum," May 18. 15. Ziv. 397, "Memorandum," June 10, 1 9 1 7 (Petrograd).
3 1 . Ibid., May 22, Intelligence Bureau. 16. Created from liberal members of the Imperial Duma (parliament)
32. AJ, J ovanovic-Pizon, 80-944, Pa5ic to J ovanovic-Pizon, June 2 . after overthrow of the tsarist monarchy, it lasted until November 7, 1 9 1 7
(New Style).
360 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
17. Ziv. 401 , Tereshchenko to Pelekhin, June l l /24th.
18. PRO FO 371 /2870, Serbian officers to King of England, June
1 1 /24th.
1 9 . Ziv. 402, Tereshchenko to Pelek.hln, June 1 7 /30, secret telegram;
Ziv. 407, Pelekhin to Tereshchenko, June 20/July 2 ; Ziv. 648-652.
20. PRO FO 3 7 1 / 2870, Buchanan to C. des Graz, June (5)/18, no.
197.
2 1 . Ziv. 369, R. Jankovic letter of June 26, 1 9 1 9 ; VIA, Pop. 5 , K.
489, F. 2, br. 3 1 , "Zapisnik po nasem radu u Rusiji . . . ; br. 32, Jankovic
drafts to Albert Thomas and Sir George Buchanan, May 25 and 27, 1 9 1 7.
22. Ziv. 1 1 , Milovanovic Diary, entry of August 28, 1 9 1 9 .
23. Ziv. 7, "Beleske Tucovica."
24. Ziv. 1 l , Milovanovic Diary, entry of October 1 7 , 1 9 1 9 . Gatalovic
himself supplied that information.
25. Ziv. 6, Vernic Diary, ZivanoviC's introduction ; Ziv. 7, "Beleske
Tucovica." Later, Colonel Stevan Miletic told Tucovic his conscience
bothered him for having voted for death sentences when it was obvious
to him the entire trial had been staged. He had been assured that such
action was essential "to save the country and the dynasty."
26. Ibid.
27. Ziv. 3205, Stojkovic Diary, entry of June 8 / 2 1 .
28. Ziv. 7 1 6, "Solunska afera." The official version was published as
"Kominike Kraljevske Srpske Vlade," Srpske Novine, June 26, 1 9 1 8. On
June 10/23 Pasic informed his London ambassador that the coalition gov­
ernment had fallen. Learning of the High Court's verdict, Davidovic and
Dra5kovic had told the Prince in private audience they would resign unless
he commuted all the death penal ties-AJ, Pizon, Pa5ic to J ovanovic-Pizon,
June 10/23, telegram 1 55.
29. Ziv. 202, "Izvod iz zapisnika Ministarske sednice na Krfu povo-
dom smrtnih presuda . . . "; Ziv. 203, "Jedan istoriski dokumenat."
30. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, pp. 434-35.
3 1 . Ziv. 2075, "Smrt Apisa"; Ziv. 206 1 .
32. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici. pp. 477-82.
33 . Ziv. 1 1 , Milovanovic Diary, entry of December 1 5 , 1 9 1 9 .
34. Ziv. 3 205, Stojkovic Diary, entry of June 1 2/25, 1 9 1 7.
35. Ziv. 298, "Nacalniku sudskog odeljenje Vrhovne Komande," Lt.
Col. Lj. Dabic to Gojko Pavlovic, Chief of Legal Division, June 1 3 , 1 9 1 7.
Notes to Chapter XXIV 361
Notes to Chapter XXI V
1 . For general treatments of royal Yugoslavia see Dragnich, Serbia,
Niko/a Pa!ic, pp. 137 ff. and his First Yugoslavia (Stanford, 1983); F.
Singleton, A Short History, pp. 1 3 1 - 7 1 .
2. S. Jovanovic, Moji savremenici, pp. 450-54; Ziv. 3814, "Solunski
proces is politicka emigracija"; SANU 14336.
3. Ziv. 4 2 1 5 , "Kapija"; Ziv. 1 6 , "Neuspeli pregovori . . . "; i. Zivan­
ovic, Poli1 icka islorija, IV, 363-64.
4. Ziv. 10, Milovanovic Diary, entry of April 1 5 , 1 9 1 8. He was refer-
ring to TPO (Salonika, 1 9 1 8).
5 . Ibid., entries of April 1 7 and October 6, 1 9 18.
6. Ibid., entries of November 21 and 28, 1 9 1 8.
7. Ibid., entries of February 24 and March 28, 1 9 1 8 ; Ziv. 362.
8. Ziv. 1 3 , "Podaci Radovanovica-Koce." About that time Princess
Naryshkin, who knew the Prince well, told French military attache, Four­
nier, that Zivkovic was having sexual relations with Alexander-Ziv. 632.
9. Ziv. 40, Zivkovic. See above pp. 000.
10. Ziv. 40 and 620. Appended to 620 is Radovanovic's written de­
fense: "My speech . . . on Peter Zivkovic's pederasty," May 5 / 1 8, 1 9 1 8.
Koca left a copy with Belgrade lawyer, Kosta Timotijevic, and later asked
the lawyer to give it to Pilac who was "tirelessly collecting data for com­
plete proof of his innocence . . . . " Milovanovic learned that Radovano­
vic's defense attorney, Milan Djordjevic, had asserted Zivkovic was respon­
sible for the conviction at Salonika. Calling Apis a martyr, Djordjevic pre­
dicted Prince Alexander would be mounting a bloodsoaked throne-Ziv.
10, entry of June 10, 1 9 1 8.
11. Ziv., 632.
12. Ziv. 620.
13. Pravda (Belgrade), January 28, 1 9 20, "Solunski rezim-X l l l ."
14. Ibid., January 24, "Solunski rezim-X."
15. A new Yugoslav party formed in 1 9 1 9 from remnants of the In­
dependent Radicals, Progressives and Liberals. In the early postwar period
it comprised the chief opposition to Radical rule in Serbia.
16. Samouprava. December 25, 1 9 1 9, "Kampanija o Crnoj Ruci." See
also ibid., January 1-22, 1920, "Ujedinjenje ili smrt," parts 1-X.
1 7. Pravda. January 28, I 920.
362 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
18. Balkan, March 23, 1922, "Kako umiru revolucionari." For a fuller
version of Apis' plea to Alexander see above, pp. 000.
19. Ibid., March 28, Milovanovic to editor; Ziv. 4157.
20. Ziv. 263, "lnterpelacija" of Ribarac, November 2 1 , 1919.
2 1 . Ziv. 2 1 8, "Narodnoj Skupstina SRS," June 1922. Among the
numerous signatories were M. G. Milovanovic, Ceda Popovic, Radoje Lazic,
Velimir Vemic, and Aca Blagojevic. Another similar appeal by Milovanovic
et al. of February 1924 is in Ziv. 186. Italics in text.
22. Ziv. 209, "Your Royal Highness," by V. Gojkovic to Prince Paul,
citing his letter to Zivkovic of November 29, 1934.
23. Ziv. 269, Radoje Jankovic to "Mon cher Colonel." Lured back to
Yugoslavia in 1923 by assurances of forgiveness, Jankovic was thrown into
Pozarevac prison. Soon pardoned and released, he served Yugoslavia in
various diplomatic posts abroad.
24. Plans to rehabilitate Apis and the "Black Hand" were confirmed
by a letter of Lieutenant Colonel Zivan L. Knezevic to BoSko N. Kostic of
September 10, 1946 from Washington, D.C. Wrote Knezevic: "When my
brother, Radoje, became Minister of Court, in agreement with Generals
Simovic and [Bogoljub] Ilic [the new War Minister] it was decided to
.
bring the late Apis with Ljuba [Vulovic] and Malobabic back to the coun-
try with full honors, promote Apis to anny general . . . and for the young
King [Peter Karadjordjevic 11] personally to give a speech at his reburial.
Then to promote all living coworkers of Apis, the so-called "Black Hand­
ers," to ranks held by their classmates, decorate them and retire them im­
mediately We wanted to reconcile the [Karadjordjevic] Dynasty with the
most honorable Serbian national families so that the young King could
liquidate the unhappy past and correct an injustice." Mr. Bosko N. Kostic,
a nephew of Apis, kindly sent the author a copy of this letter.
25 . Ziv. 3814; "Petar Zivkovic," in Enciklopedija Jugoslavije (Zagreb,
1960). For Zivkovic's role in the exile government in London see S. Pav­
lovic, Razgovori sa Slobodanom Jovanovicem (Windsor, Canada, 1969).
26. Ziv. 547, "Interpellation to Premier of Yugoslavia, 1945."
27. M. Zivanovic, "Dvadesetsesti juni 1917 g. u Solunu," Republika,
December 18, 1945. June 26th was the new style date of Apis' execution.
28. Ibid., "Solunski process hiljadu devetsto sedamnaeste," Belgrade
University, 1953. The published version was retitled: Pukovnik Apis Sol­
unski process 1917 (Belgrade, 1955). On the defense and awarding of Ziv­
anovic's doctoral degree see Politika, June 3 , 1953, p. 4.
Notes to Chapter XXIV 363
29. Ziv. 2062, Dragoslav llic to Narodna Skupstina, 1947.
30. Jovanovic , Moji savremenici, pp. 446 ff. Jovanovic questioned (p.
447) the Serbian Supreme Court's impartiality after the spectacular 1946
trial of Cetnik leader, Dra:Z.a Mihajlovic, who was condemned to death on
circumstantial evidence.
3 1 . Politika, May 7, 1953, "Podnesen predlog . . . "; Protic Memoirs,
ll, p. 72.
32. Oslobodjenje, May 17, "Krvavi obracun Karadjordjevica."
33. Vjesnik, May 27, ''Solunski aveti," p. 5. Another reason for the
Radical regime to destroy the Apis group, alleged Vjesnik, was that it
favored a republic and federal structure for a future Yugoslavia, a claim
disputed by V. Dedijer and B. Pavicevic.
34. Oslobodjenje, June 3, "Rasvjetljavanja sudskog zlocina Alek-
sandra Karadjordjevica," p. 3.
35. Polirika, June 3, "Posle 36 godina."
36. Ibid., June 4.
37. Ibid., June 5, "Juce je nastavljeno citanje . . . .
"
38. Ibid., June 6, "Zavrseno je citanje dokumenata."
39. Ibid., June 7, "U svojim iskazima svedoci potvrdjuju daje atentat
na Aleksandra bio izmiSljen."
40. Ibid., June 10, "Sta je pokazao pretres."
4 1 . Ibid., June 13, p. 5, "Javni tuzilac i odbrana dokazali da su svi
optuzeni nevino osudjeni . . . . "
42. M. Zivanovic, Pukvovnik Apis, pp. 619 ff.
Notes to Chapter XXV
1. Ziv. 4354, "About Dragutin Dirnitrijevic," by Milan Zivanovic,
and quoting R. W. Seton-Watson, "Serbia Must Choose," The New Europe,
October 2 1 , 1922.
2. .Ziv. 1941, z. Zivanovid , "Iz zivota."
3. Ziv. 1985, Pankovic, "Secanje na Dirnitrijevica-Apisa."
4. Polit ika, July 5, 1953, P. Vasiljevic, "Organizacija 'Ujedinjenje ili
smrt! "'; August 29, "lspravka Prvoslava Vasiljevica."
5. Nova Misao, July 1953, V. Dedijer and B. Pavicevic, "Organizacija
'Ujedinjenje ili smrt!" ; Politika, Dedijer, "J os jedan odgovor Politici."
'
364 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator

6. Ziv. 2024, Borba, July 1953, "Crna Ruka i nacionaJno pitanje";

Zagrebacka Borba, August 25, and August 26, citing H. Hinkovic, "lz po­
zadine Solunskog procesa," Knjitevna republika, No. 2, 1924.
7. Author' s interviews with Colonel Dr. Peter Opacic, June 1 6 , 1986
and December 1 1 , 1987.
8. S. Jovanovic,Moji savremenici, pp. 44143.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

l AR CHIVES

A. AUSTRIA: Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchlv (HHSA)-

1 . Politisches Archlv, Serbien XIX: 62 ( 1 9 1 1); 63 ( 1 9 1 2) ; 64 ( 1 9 1 3);
66 ( 1 9 1 4 ; 74 Liasse X: Ermordung des Serbkonigpaares, 1903).
2. P. A. XL, Interna 58: Tagesbuch des Ministers des Aussern, 1 9 1 7 .
3. P. A. 1/10, Krieg 1914- 1 9 1 8 : Karton 8 10, 8 1 1 , 8 1 2-19 14; K.
8 1 3- 1 9 1 6 ; K. 8 1 4 ( 1 9 1 7-18).
4. Sonderbestande:
a. M. Boghitschewitsch (Milos Bogicevic).
b. Morsey-Samelkarton 3.
c. Obersberger-Samelkarton 6.

B. FRANCE: Les archives de l'armee de terre, Vincennes-(ADT)

1 . 7N 339, 340, 383-385 (Armee serbe , 19 15-18), 332.
2. 7N 7 1 6 (Balcan), 724, 725, 726, 729 (Armee serbe), dossiers 1-6.
C. GREAT BRITAIN: Public Record Office, Kew Gardens. (PRO)
1 . Foreign Office (FO): 733, 734-Servia 1909; 982 ( 1 9 1 0); 1 2 1 9
(19 1 1 ) ; 1472 ( 1 9 1 2) ; 1748 ( 1 9 1 3) ; 2098 ( 1 9 1 4); 2460 ( 1 9 1 5) ;
2756 ( 1 9 1 6); 2870 ( 1 9 1 7).
2. War Office (WO) 106/1335, 1400, 1402, 1403, 1404, 1407 .
•

3. Cabinet (CAB) 1 7 / 1 1 3 , 1 3 1 .
D. YUGOSLAVIA: Belgrade
1. Arhlv Jugoslavije (AJ): fond Jovana Jovanovica-Pizona-Karton
1 , 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9' 10, 1 1 , 12, 24, 42.

365
366 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Bibliography 367

2. Drzavni Arhiv Srbije (DAS)- 3: "lskazi i odbrana Pukovnika Dirnitrijevica-Apisa" (Apis' testi-

a. Dvorski arhiv, K. 1 . mony at the Salonika Trial, April-May 1 9 1 7)-152 pages.

b. Licni fond Nikolaja Arandjelovica. 4 : "Beleznik Andre Djordjevica . . . , " 1897-1 900."

c. Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Dela, Krf 1916, K. 6. 5: "Dnevnik Generala Milosa Bozanovica" (excerpts for 1 9 1 1).

d . Poklon i otkupa (PiO) 69/56,57: Dnevnik Vukasina Petrovica. 6: "Diary of Cavalry Colonel Velimir Vemic" -39 pages.

e. Solunski proces: Karton 1 - 1 9 . 7 : "Excerpt from notes of Colonel Vladimir Tucovic, 1903 - 1 9 1 7."

3. Vojno-istorijski arhiv (VIA): 8: "From the papers of Colonel Cedomir Popovic"- 1 8 pages.

a. Pop. 3: Supreme Command-K. 1-4, 6, 106-09, 1 1 1 -13 , · 1 22, 9: "Excerpts from the war diary of Colonel N. V. Zavacila."

1 24-26, 1 3 1 , 1 3 5 , 1 3 9 , 140, 142, 149, 1 5 1 , 156-58, 1 79-82, 10: "Excerpts from the diary of Colonel M. G. Milovanovic-1917-

187-90, 1 9 5 , 196, 430-3 1 , 466, 473-75 (Salonika Trial). 1919."

b . Pop. 5 : War Ministry , Adjutant division-K. 1 6 (Salonika Trial­ 1 1 : "Excerpt from the Belgrade diary of Colonel Milovanovic

hearings), 56 (Salonika Trial : investigations), 92, 135, 478- ( 1 9 1 9)."

90 (Salonika Trial materials received from Austria). 1 3 : "Data from Lieutenant Colonel Milorad Radovanovic-Koca,

c. Pop. 14: Standing and active army: General Staff. 1921."

d . Pop. 16: Archive of Milan Radojevic-K. 1 , 5 , 7, 8, 28A, 3 1 , 14 : "Excerpts from the letters ofGeneral Damjan Popovic ( 1 9 1 6)."

32, 40, 43 , 44, 46, 47, 5 1 . 1 5 : Atanasije T. Sredojevic, "Information about witnesses in the

4. Srpska Akademija Nauke i Umetnosti (SANU): Salonika Affair ( 1916)."

a. Avakumovic, Jovan Dj : Memoari IV-VI-9287. 1 6 : M. .Z. Zivanovic, "Neuspeli pregovori oko obrazovanja koali-

b . Blagojevic, Aca, "Gradja za biografiju Generala Petra Zivko- cione vlade na Krfu ( 19 1 8)."

vica-13609. 34: "Artillery Major Lj ubomir Vulovic."

c. Draskic, Panta: Memoari, 145 1 1 . 3 5 : "About Rade Malobabic."

d. "Gradja o nasem parlamentamom zivotu na Krfu": 13253. 36: "Testimony about Muhamed Mehmedbasic."

e. "Opozicioni blok Regentu Aleksandru na Krfu, 1 9 1 8"-13429. 3 7 : "Testimony about Bogdan Radenkovic."

f. "Zaostavstina Nikole Pasica:" Pisma 1903 g.- 1 1 623. 38: "Guerrilla chieftain Major Vojislav Tankosic."

g. Pecanac, Kosta, "Moja ispoved" (1933): 14520. 40: "Peter Zivkovic: biography and role in the Salonika Trial" ;

h. Zaostavstina Mihaila Radivojevica: Zapisnik Glavnog Odbora Radovanovic-Koca's "Moja rec pred vojnim sudom . . . . "

Samostalne Radikalne Stranke- 13252. 43. Pavle Pankovic, "Reminiscences about Dragutin Dimitrijevic­

i . "Srpska vojska u XIX i pocetku XX v."- 1 36 1 1 . Apis."

j. Stojanovic, Ljubomir-Prepiska: 12394, 12576, 12579, 1 2 9 1 8 . 186: Colonel M. G. Milovanovic et al. to Narodna Skupstina of

k. Trbic, Vasilije: "Uspomene," III-14148. Yugoslavia (February 1924).

l. Zivanovic, Milan Z : Zaostavstina-14434: 199: "Gospodu sudije," by Lieutenant Colonel Milan Radojevic (His
0

defense of Apis at the Salonika Trial).

Papers of Milan Z. Zivanovic: These were acquired by the Serbian
202: "Excerpt from the minutes of a cabinet meeting on Corfu . . . "
Academy of Sciences and Arts in June 1978 and include over
203: "One historical document: why were Colonel D. Dirnitrijevic
4,000 separate items listed in four huge catalogues. This collec­
and his friends shot?"
tion reflects the work of many years by Apis' nephew who refer­
207: "One characteristic episode from the time of the preparation
red to it as the Archive of the Salonika Trial (Arhiv Solunskog
of the Salonika affair"-Belgrade, September 1945.
Procesa). The most important items utilized in this biography are
as follows:
368 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Bibliography 369
•

209-2 10: General Vojislav Gojkovic, "Your Royal Highness" ( 1 934, 184 7-1868: Photographs of Colonel Dimitrijevic-Apis.
1935). 1931 : N ikolaj Arandjelovic, "Colonel D. T. Dimitrijevic, man and
215-216: "Query of Opposition on Corfu 1 9 1 8 about the Salonika officer."
affair." 193 7 : Borivoje Neskovic, "D. Dimitrijevic-Apis."
2 1 8 : Colonel M . G . Milovanovic et al. "To Narodna Skupstina of 1940: J elena Zivanovic: "Dragutin T. Dimitrijevic-A pis."
Yugoslavia," June 1922. 1941: Zivan Zivanovic: "From the life of Colonel D. Dimitrijevic-
246: "Final speech of Colonel M. G . Milovanovic at the Salonika Apis."
Trial." 1963: Ueutenant Josif G . Protic: "The Last Hour of those Con-
296: Stojan Ribarac, "Notes for a final speech about 'The secret demned to Death," June 13, 1 9 1 7.
conspiratorial organization.'" 1985-1986: Pavle N. Pankovic: "The May Coup, 1903" and "Sal­
30 1 : "Topical memorandum" by M . Radovanovic-Koca, 1 9 1 7. onika Trial, 1 9 1 7."
369: Letter of Major Radoslav J ankovic, June 1 9 1 9 . 2062: Dragoslav Ilic: "Speech prepared for Narodna Skupstina in
397: Memorandum from four Serbian officers in Petrograd , June favor of those convicted in the Salonika Trial" ( 1 947).
10, 1 9 1 7. 2067: Milan Z. Zivanovic: "Critique of Apis' work."
401, 403, 406, 407: Russian Foreign Minister M. I . Tereshchenko 207 1 : Milan Z. Zivanovic: "The Death of Colonel Apis."
protests the Salonika verdict, 1 9 1 7. 2075: "The Death of Colonel A pis and the Sarajevo Assassination."
420: Vojislav Gojkovic, "Kasacionom sudu" (protesting Salonika 209 1 : Milan Z. Zivanovic: "Apis-Personal."
verdict). 3205: "Excerpts from the Diary of Captain Milan Stojkovic"
489: On "Tajna prevratna organizacija" and "Dodatak" (supple- ( 1 9 1 7) ( 1 1 3 pages).
ment). 4 1 20: "Data about witnesses in the Salonika Affair from a very
495: Report of Captain Stojkovic on the death of Apis. knowledgeable person."
536: "About Rade Malobabic . . . ," by Mita Pavlovic ( 1 932). 4170: Vojislav Gojkovic: "Kasacionom sudu," April 1924 ("To
576: "The affair of Colonel Peter Zivkovic" (on his pederasty). the court of appeals' ').
586: "The Salonika affair: violation oflaw . . . . " 4215: M. z. Zivanovic: "The Gate at Salonika" ("Kapija kod
590: "The surprise at the session of March 27, 1 9 1 7." Soluna").
598: "The Austrian offer of separate peace in the World War." 4354: "About Dimitrijevic-Apis" (by Milan Zivanovic?).
6 1 2: "Black memory."
617-618: "Ujedinjenje ili smrt!" by Bozin Simic. 11. NEWSPAPERS
620: "Peter Zivkovic" (by Bozin Simic?).
692: "Data obtained from M . Radovanovic-Koca" (May 1921). A. Yugoslav-
7 1 6 : "Solunska afera" ("The Salonika Affair"). Balkan (Belgrade) . Pravda (Belgrade)
7 1 7-718: "Apis and the Salonika Affair." Beogradska nedelja ( Belgrade) Radikal (Belgrade)
719: "The Conflict of the year, 1914." Beogradske novine (Belgrade) Radnicke novine (Belgrade)
753: Aca Blagojevic: "My Quarrel with Stojan Protic in May 191 4," Beogradski dnevn ik (Belgrade) Radnik (Belgrade)
-May 1946. Borba (Belgrade) Republika ( Belgrade)
I 084- J 085: "Reminiscences of Milan z . Zivanovic ( 1 9 1 5-16)." Demokratija (Belgrade) Samouprava (Belgrade)
1818-1846: Apis' correspondence, chiefly with family members. Dnevnik (Belgrade) Srpska zastava
370 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Bibliography 371

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N arodni list (Belgrade) Srpski glasni.k (Corfu) Istorijski g/asnik (Belgrade) (IG)
Novi pokret (Belgrade) Stampa (Belgrade) Izdanje Cupiceve zaduibine (Belgrade) (ICZ)
Novi Zivot Tribuna (Belgrade) Journal of Modern History, The (Chicago) (JMH)
Novo vreme Vecernje novosti (Zagreb) Jugoslovenska revija za medjunarodno pravo (Belgrade) (JRMP)
Novosti Vjesni.k (Zagreb) Jugoslovenski narod pred prvi svetski rat (JNPPSR)
Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo) Vreme (Belgrade) Knjiievna republika (Zagreb) (KR)
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---

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Ziv.
----

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0
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Addenda:
Hrabak, Bogomil. "Delatnost clanova udruzenja 'Ujedinjenja i srmt! ' u
Rusiji, 1 9 1 5- 1 8 godine," lstorija XX veka. Zbornik radova, Vll ( 1 965),
pp. 195-271.

I
 Index
389

Bojovic, General Peter (Serbian chief Cherniaev, General M . G . tRussian

of staff) : 1 1 0-13, 1 1 5-16, 1 8 7 , general): 23
196, 224, 236 Chlumecky, Leopold (Austrian
Bojovic, Colonel Radomir (War scholar): 1 27-28
Minister): 148, 1 5 7 Cicvaric, Krsta (Serbian journalist):
Boljetinac, Isa (Albanian chieftain): 1 , 258, 300
87, 90, 9 1 Ciganovic, Milan (Sarajevo assassin):
INDEX
Borba (Belgrade newspaper) : 3 1 3 1 88-89, 225, 226, 249, 274
87-89, 97, 98, 1 0 1 -04, 106, 120; Bosnia and Hercegovina: 2, 1 0 , 64- Cincar-Markovic, Dimitrije: 38, 42
Acimovic , Stevan (lawyer): 1 8 1
Sarajevo assassination and, 1 24- 65, 123, 1 28-37, 139, 1 4 3 , 1 5 1 - Cinn, Dr. (professor of bacterio­
Albania and Albanians: 2, 153;
•

39; ultimatum to Serbia ( 1 9 1 4), 52, 154 logy): 94, 97

Serbian retreat through, 1 60ff. ;
1 3 9 ; Austro-Serbian War, 1 9 1 4 - Bosnian volunteers (World War I): Cirkovic, Jovan (political comrnis­
175, 185
1 5 , 138-52; 176, 209, 221 ' 242, 1 5 1 -52, 165-66, 188, 223, 225, sar) : 208, 2 1 1 , 306
Albertini, Luigi (historian): 1 25-26
258, 266, 293-95, 3 1 3 , 3 14, 3 1 6 237, 274 Colovic, D . (Salonika witness): 188
Alexander Karadjordj evic: see Kara-
d'Avari, Marquis de: 202, 255-56 Bourbon-Parma, Prince Sixte de: "Committee of Ten for the Liquid­
dj ordjevic, Alexander
Avakumovic, Jovan: 36, 5 5 22 1 , 242 ation of Colonel Apis": 207-08,
Allies: see Triple Entente
Bozanovic, Milos (Serbian War 2 1 1 , 2 1 5 - 1 6 , 220-2 1 , 239, 305
America (USA): 270
Bakic, Dobrivoje: 173, 174 Minister, 1 9 1 3- 1 4 ) : 37, 38, 72,
Anastas. Father Peter: 2 1 7 Congress of Berlin ( 1 878): 24, 26
Balkan (Belgrade newspaper): 301 80, 85, 86, 107
Annexation Crisis (1 908-09): 98; , Conrad von Hotzendorff (Austrian
Balkan League ( 1 9 1 2) : 87-89 Bozovic, Branko Gournalist): 73,
see also Bosnia and Hercegovina chief of staff) : 1 2 7 , 138, 145
Balkan Wars: 60, 87, 96 189, 274
"AN o" File: 2 1 2 Constantine (King of Greece): 3 ,
Barbusse, Henri: 167 Brehm, Bruno (writer): 1 7 , 1 9 , 3 1 8
Antic, Antonije (May conspirator): 156, 189, 223
Barclay, Charles: 73 Budisavljevic, Dr. Srdjan: 1 0 1 , 1 4 1
32-36, 47, 53, SS, 77, 84, 1 8 7 Corfu (island and town): 18, 149,
Bardolff, Colonel von: 1 2 7 Bulgaria and Bulgars: 1 8 , 24, 60,
Apis (Dragutin T . Dimitrijevic) : see 167, 1 75-77, 183, 208- 1 2 , 2 1 4 ,
Barjaktarovic, Colonel: 83, 85, 86 62, 66, 70, 87-9 1 , 95, 97, 98,
throughout 2 1 6 , 2 1 8, 221 , 223, 248, 286,
Beogradski dnevnik (Belgrade news- 105, 106, 151, 153, 156-58,
Arandjelovic, General N icholas: 3 14
paper): 258, 300 160, 163, 176, 1 80-8 1 , 1 94-96,
165, 175 Croatia and Croatians: 73, 1 00,
Berchtold, Count Leopold (Austro­ 203 , 2 1 0
Arandjelovic, Sotir: 1 6 1 0 1 , 103, 124, 126, 1 3 3 , 1 4 5 ,
Hungarian premier): 145
Arezina, Bosko (Bosnian volunteer): 3 1 2- 1 4
Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobold von: Cabrinovic, Nedeljko: 135
188, 2 1 8 , 226, 240 Cvetkovic, Vitornir (Salonika de­
99 Cavalry Division (Serbian): 89, 92,
Artamonov, Victor A. (Russian fendant): 1 1 6 , 1 1 8 , 228
Bismarck, Otto von: 2, 1 26 93, 164
military attache in Serbia): 129-
"Black Hand": see "Unification or
Central Executive Committee (of Dabic, Colonel Ljubomir: 16-20,
1 32, 258
Death!"
•

"Black Hand"): see "Unifica- 300, 320

Atanackovic , Jovan (Serbian politi­
Blagojevic, Alexander(Aca): 78, 84, tion or Death!"
cian): 36 Danube Divisions: 108, 1 4 1 , 2 1 0
1 08, 1 26, 1 3 2-3 3, 134 Cerska (Battle of, 1914); 145-46 Davidovic , Ljubomir (Independent
Austria-Hungary (and Austria and
Bogieevic, Milos (Serb minister in Cetinjska Street (Belgrade): 22 Radical leader): 1 1 4- 1 5 , 148-49,
Austrians): 2, 3, 10, 18, 23, 24,
Berlin): 49, 97-98, 134, 3 1 1 , 3 4 1 Chantilly Conference ( 1 9 1 6): 193, 186, 243 ; seeks clemency for
26, 28, 3 1 , 34, 35, 4 1 , 48, 50,
Bogicevic, Dr. Vojislav (archivist) : 221 Apis, 29 1 -92
5 1 , 56, 58, 64-66, 73, 77, 79,
1 3 1-32, 134 Charles of Habsburg (Karl) (Aus­ "Davison" (correspondent for Pied­
trian emperor): 220-2 1 , 242 mont): 98
388
390 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Index 391

Dedijer, Dr. Vladimir (Yugoslav Filipovic, Colonel Miha (Salonika l GliSic, Lieutenant Colonel Alex­ Hohenberg, Dr. Max: 125
writer): 4, 98-99, 327 judge): 245, 247 ander (A pis' relative ) : 94, 1 1 7- Holy Sava Street (Belgrade): 25,
Delcasse, Theophile (French states­ Filipovic, R. R. (Pa8i6's secretary): 1 19 ; letter to Apis of, 1 9 1 , 173, 26, 35 •

man): 195 238 2 1 5 , 227 Hrvatski dnevi'lik: 127

Democrats (of Serbia): 300 Fournier, Colonel (French attache Glisic, Colonel Dusan: 1 16
Dimitrijevic, Dragutin T. (Apis): in Serbia):
1 5 1 , 164-65, 344 Glisic, Nenusvka (Alexander Glisic's Illic, Danilo (Bosnian teacher): 13 5 ,
see throughout and Table of France and French: 95, 145, 1 5 1 , daughter): 173, 174, 2 1 5 , 260, 137
Contents 155-56, 1 59-6 1 , 167, 193-95, 315 Ilic, Dragoslav (lawyer): 304-05,
Dimitrijevic, Jelena: see Zivanovic. 205, 210, 242 Glisic, Stanislava (Apis' relative): 3 10, 330
Jelena Franc;:ois, Colonel (French military 1 73-74, 1 8 1 llic, Milic (Apis' orderly): 226-27
Dimitrijevic, Jovanka (Apis' attache ) : 164-65 Gojkovic, General Vojislav (May Ilic, Vlada:
177-78
mother): 12, 22, 26, 1 73 Franz Ferdinand of Este (Austrian conspirator): 34, 65, 1 3 1 , 160, l'lndependant (French newspaper):
Dimitrijevic, Milica (Apis' sister): 3 , 5 , 6, 123ff., 139,
archduke ) : 165' 176, 188, 226, 242, 287- 285
24 209, 258-59 88, 302,327, 329 Independent Radicals (of Serbia):
Dimitrijevic, Todor (Apis' father): Franz Josef I (Austrian emperor): Goltz, General von der: 98 47, 48, 57, 62, 167, 186, 188,
24 125, 127, 128, 221 Golubic, Mustafa: 226, 236 2 1 6 , 219, 243, 248, 291-92,
"Diplomatic Strike" ( 1903): 56-57 Freemasonry: 69, 270-71 Grabez, Trifko (Sarajevo assassin): 323
Dra8kic, Major Panta (Prince Alex­ 135, 137 Italy and Italians: 62, 87, 1 5 1 , 153-
ander's duty officer): 72, 79-8 1, Gacinovic , Vladimir (Bosnian na­ Great Britain (and England, British): 54, 1 6 7 , 241
145, 150, 163, 202 , 2 1 1 - 12, 221 tionalist): 135 153-56 158-59, 163' 194-9 5, Ivkovic, Captain Dragisa: 191
'
Dra8kovic, Milorad (Independent Garasanin, llija (Serbian statesmen): 276,289 lvkovic, Colonel Milojko: 109-92
Radical leader):
1 14-15, 149, 55 Greater Serbia: 2, 9, 14, 16, 20, 74,
186, 221, 243, 291-92,337 Garibaldi, Giuseppe (Italian nation­ 128, 166, 1 8 1 , 200, 213, 267, Jaksic, Svetolik Gournalist and
Dreyfus Case: compared with Sal­ alist): 74 284, 309, 3 12-14 , 3 1 7 politician) : 1 8 5 , 1 8 7, 208
onika Trial, 307 Gatalovic , Branko (Salonika judge): Greece: 72, 88, 153, 1 5 5-56, 193, Janjic, Pop (Salonika witness) :
249
Drina Division (of Serbia); 62, 65, 37, 290 223 , 24 1 Jankovic, General Boza: 134, 166
203 "Gate of sabres": 221 Grey, Lord Edward (British For­ Jankovic, Colonel Milutin: 207
Dual Monarchy : see Austria-Hun­ Gavrilovic , Colonel Milan: 7 1 , 207, eign Secretary): 155-56, 158 Jankovic, Major Radoje (Apis' col-
gary 214 league): 43, 190, 192-93, 197,
Dumba, Konstantin (Austrian min­ Gavrilovic , Dr. Nikolaj : 117 Habsburg Empire and Habsburgs: 242, 287-90, 303, 362
ister to Serbia): 56 Gencic, Djordje (Interior Minister see Austria-Hungary Jankovic , Velizar: 148
Dunjic, Colonel Milan (Salonika and May conspirator): 29, 36, Hadji-Toma, Nikola: 36 Jelenic, Djurdje (Prince Alexander's
military commandant) : 10, 12, 45, 55 , 325 Harrison, Colonel Arthur (British
'
secretary): 145, 150, 208, 239,
14, 16-19, 229; arrests Apis General Staff, Serbian: 57, 60, 83, military attache): 276 240, 299
( 1 9 1 6), 226-27; 228-29, 232, 90, 97, 1 0 1 , 103-04, 1 24, 130, Hartvig, Nicholas (Russian minister Jeremic, Colonel Dragoljub: 207
250, 281-82, 284, 286 139-40, 142-44, 146, 190, 205-
I
to Serbia): 91, 1 2 1 , 132, 275 Joffre, Fieldmarshal (of France):
06, 232, 258, 3 1 6 High Command, Serbian: see Su­ 193, 195
Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg (King of Germany: 2, 4, 5 7 ; A pis and, 98- preme Command Jovanovic, Aleksa: 29
Bulgaria): 3 , 73, 133, 155-56, 99, 134, 293-94 Hinkovic, Hinko (Croatian leader): Jovanovic, Cedo (director of Of­
189, 223 Giesl, Baron von (Austrian minister 286 , 3 13 ficers' Club): 1 1 0, 1 4 1 , 242
to Serbia): 1 1 1 , 139
 39 2 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Index 393

Jovanovic, Jovan (auditor of Salon­ Karadjordjevic dynasty: 9, 3 1 , 33, , "Kolarac" (Belgrade restaurant): Mackensen, Fieldmarshal August
ika court): 245, 247 48, 60, 106, 137, 223-25, 242, 34, 58, I 1 2 von: 156-57, 160
J ovanovic , Mihajlo (Third Army 275, 290,295, 305-06, 320,362 Konstantinovic, Djordje (Salonika Ma.karije, Father:. 8
chief of staff): 25, 194, 205 Karadjordjevic, Prince Alexander I witne�): 1 6 , 255, 274,306, 309 Ma.ksimovic; Major Vojin: 165
Jovanovic, Milutin (Foreign Min­ (King Peter's father): 35 Kosovo, Battle of ( 1 389); 1 25, 1 3 9 Malobabic, Rade (Apis' chief agent
istry official): 2 1 8 Karadjordjevic, Alexander 1 1 (Prince Kosovo, Field of: 19, 90, 94, 139, and close friend): 2, 3 , 8-10, 14,
Jovanovic, Slobodan (historian and Regent, 19 14-22, King of Yugo­ 159 1 5 , 1 7 , 1 9 , 20, 97, 1 00-04; Sara­
politician): 55, 82, 89, 99, 100, slavia, 1922-34): 2-8, 10, 1 2, 1 3 , Kostic, Bosko N. (Apis' nephew): jevo assassination and, 1 23 , 129-
1 1 9, 138, 147-50, 153, 162, 1 7, 28, 53, 62, 72, 74, 76-86, 362 3 7 ; arrest of ( 1 9 1 5), 140-44;
1 64, 183-86, 2 1 7 , 236, 2 7 1 , 95, 106, 1 1 1 - 1 2, 1 1 7, 1 20-2 1 , t Kostic, General Josif (foe of Apis): 152, 157-58, 166; on Corfu ,
280, 294-95, 305-06, 3 1 5 133, 140-4 1, 145-47; quarrel of 33, 72, 79, 80, 84-86, 207-08, 190; Apis' concealment of, 197-
Jovanovic, Colonel Vlada: 290 with Apis ( 1 9 1 5 ) ; 149-50, 163- 2 1 6, 239-40, 280, 290, 304 201 , 2 10, 2 1 5 - 1 6 , 2 1 9 , 235, 254-
Jovanovic-Cupa, Ljubomir (pro­ 64; 1 6 6 , 168, 1 7 2 , 1 74, 183-89, Kostic, Lj ubomir: 5, 43 59, 263-66, 268-69, 272-74,278,
Yugoslav nationalist): 66-70, 73, 192-93; command of Salonika Kostic, Naum (Apis' uncle): 173- 280-8 1 , 294, 3 1 5
74, 98, 224-25, 270-7 1 , 3 14 Front and, 1 95 ; "attempt" on 74, 180-81 Maltese fever: Apis and, 93-94
Jovanovic-Pata.k, Ljubomir (Radical life of ( 1 9 1 6) : 201-02, 204, Kumanovo, Battle of ( 1 9 1 2): 94-95 March Demonstration ( 1903): 38-39
leader and Interior Minister): 6, 208- 17, 2 1 9-22, 224, 232-33, Maric, Colonel: 196-97
I
10, 1 3 , 1 6 , 67, 124, 133, 144, 235; date of "attempt" on, Lansdowne , Lord (British states­ Maric, Tihornir (Salonika witness):
1 5 2 , 182, 208, 2 1 0- 1 1 , 2 1 6, 2 1 9 ; 237-38, 240-5 1 , 254-5 6 ; Apis' man): 5 1 , 56 188
I

"Prezidijal" of(December 19 16), letter to ( 1 9 1 7), 259-62; 263- Lazarevic, Colonel Milutin: 39, 1 1 2- Marinkovic, Dusan: 1 5 2
222-23, 237-38, 248, 266, 287, 65, 268, 274-76, 279-80; 285- 13, 1 1 6, 1 1 8, 187, 227, 267, Marinkovic, Pavle (Serbian Educa­
298, 300-01 308 88; Salonika death penal ties and, 338 tion Minister): 30, 243
'
Jovanovic-Piion, Jovan (Serbian 291-92, 294-96, 297-300, 307- Lazarevic, Svetolik : 309 Masin, Colonel Alexander (Queen
diplomat): 185, 1 8 7 , 204-05 09, 3 1 2-16, 332 Lazarevic, Vaso : 1 42-43 Draga's brother-in-law): 37, 42,
Jurisic, Colonel Pantelije: 202 Karadjordjevic, Prince Djordje : 34, Lazic, Major Radoje: 20 1 , 253, 269, 45, 54-56
Jurisic, Pavle-Sturm (general): 84, 53, 54, 62, 76-79, 8 1 , 82 , 84, 85, 280, 296, 306-08 Masin, Draga (Queen of Serbia): 1 ,
'
146, 150, 202, 207, 2 1 1 - 14, 95 League of German Youth (Jung 29, 35, 37�8, 42, 46, 252, 325
2 1 8, 222, 255-57, 299 Karadjordjevic, Prince Paul: 302-03 Deulschland Bund): 98 Ma5in, Svetozar: 29
JuriSic, Peter: 84, 213-14, 257 Karadjordjevic, Peter 1 (King of May conspirators (see also May
•

Lebedev, Vladirnir (Russian min­

Serbia, 1903-22): 2, 18, 24, 33- ister); 275 Coup): 2, 4, 74, 85-86, 107,
Kaclerovic, T risa (socialist leader): 35, 48, 50, 5 1 , 54, 56, 57, 62, Liberal Party : 188 1 1 0, 1 2 1 , 185-86, 209- 1 0 , 241,
87 149-50 74, 78-80, 83-86, 1 1 0-12, 1 1 7, Lju bibratic, Dragoslav (scholar): 275
'
"Kaisermanover": 57 1 2 1 , 140, 149, 163-67, 1 83-84, 1 26, 1 30, 135-36 May Coup ( 1 903): 2, 5 , 9, 1 5 , 38,
Kajma.kcalan Mountain and Battle 2 1 6 , 233, 255, 3 1 5 London , Treaty of ( 1 9 1 5 ): 1 5 3-54 40-49, 5 1 , 52, 55, 58-62, 69, 8 1 ,
of ( 1 9 1 6) : 194-96 , 203 Katanic, Captain Bozidar (Salonika Lunjevica, Nikodije : 32 85, 96, 246, 273, 301-02, 3 1 1 -
Kalemegdan Fortress: 38, 39, 99, clerk of court): 245-46 •
Lunj evica, Panta: 29 1 2 , 3 27-28
132 Knezevic (shot at King Milan): 28 Mazzini, Giovanni (Italian nation­
Karadjordje Petrovic: 23, 24, 300 Knezevic, Colonel Zivan: 362 Macedonia: 3, 24, 60-62, 65-69, alist): 74
Karadjordje, Star of (Serbian dec­ Kala.kovic (Prince Djordje's servant): 71, 88-90, 94, 108- 1 1 , 1 1 3, Mehmedbasic, Muhamed (Bosnian
oration): 1 3 , 95, 2 1 3 , 232, 3 1 9 77-78, 332 1 1 6-17, 1 5 1 , 155, 196, 227, 232, volunteer and Salonika defend­
3 14 ant): 20 1 , 226, 254, 258-59,
266, 278, 306

•
 394 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Index 395

"Memorandum" of Apis' associates 42, 43, 54, 56, 57, 68, 70, 7 1 , Novakovic, Milan (leader of coun­ Paris Soir-Dimanche (French news­
I
in Russia ( 1 9 1 7): 288 1 1 1 , 1 4 1 , 142, 144, 187, 189, terconspiracy): 54-55, 85 paper): 125

Mihl, Rudolf("Schwabe"): "swims" 200-01 , 219, 2404 1 , 24546, Pasic, Niko1a (Radical Party chief,

189-90; 290 Obrenovic, King Alexander: 1 , 22, premier):· 6·,

with Apis,
Mijatovic, Cedomilj: 42
Milanovic , Stevan: 37
Miletic, Krsta (Salonika witness):
249
Miletic, Stevan (Salonika judge):
290
Military Academy (Belgrade) : 1 , 25,
27, 28, 33, 60, 80, 8 1 , 89, 235
Milosavljevic, Jovan (police agent) :
224-25
9, 10, 26-28, 54-58,
25 1 , 254-58, 265, 267-70, 279,
24, 26-38, 4 1 42, 46, 4849, 60, 62, 65, 73, 79, 106- 1 1 , 1 17, 1 2 1 ,
300, 308,326
1 85-86, 252, 322-23, 325 22, 124, 1 27-28, 1 4 1 , 147, 1 5 1 ,
Misic, Vojvoda Zivojin: 120, 145,
Obrenovic, Mihailo (Prince of Ser­ 1 54-56, 158, 162-64, 166-68,
185-86
bia): 39 183-86, 204-05 , 208, 214, 216,
Mitrovic, Major Grgur: 177
Obrenovic , Milan (Prince, later king 2 19-22, 224, 236-38, 241-43,
Ooacanin, Dr. (Prince Alexander's
of Serbia): 22-24, 26-29, 32, 44, 245, 248-50, 252, 258, 275-77,
physician): 77 , 216
60, 3 1 3 280, 287, 289; Salonika death
Mondesir, Piaron (French general):
Obrenovic, Milos (prince of Ser­ penalties and, 291-94, 300-0 1,
167
bia): 23 305, 208-09, 3 1 2 , 359
Montenegro: 4, 23, 33, 88, 9 1 ,
153-54, 162, 167 Obrenovic dynasty: 2, 5, 9-10, 23, Paunovic , Father Zdravko (confes­

Milosavljevic, General Mirko (chair­ "Moskva" Hotel (Belgrade): 73, 84

27, 32, 34, 59, 60, 85 sor of Apis): 7-10, 1 2, 14, 15,
man of Salonika High Court): Odjek (Belgrade newspaper): 33 17, 19, 20, 3 1 9-20
2 1 5 , 236, 24 1 , 280, 290 Officers' Club (in Belgrade): 1 10, Pavlovic, Colonel Dimitrije: 100-03,
Nalic, Nezir Hadzi (Bosnian volun­
•
Milovanovic, Captain Blagoje: 190- 226, 240 242, 252 129
teer):
92 Okanovic, Colonel Dragu tin: 85, Pavlovic , Colonel Gojko (head of
Narodna Odbrana (National De­
Milovanovic, Milan G . : see Milo­ 207' 2 1 0-1 1 , 300 legal division of Supreme Com­
fense) : 65-67, 74, 100, 103-04,
vanovic-Pilac, M. G . Opacic, Colonel Peter (historian): mand): 216, 220, 224-25, 232,
134, 1 5 2
Milovanovic, Milovan (Serbian for­ Natalija (Queen of Serbia): 26, 29
127, 130, 3 1 3 239, 246 , 281
Oslobodjenje (Sarajevo newspaper): Pavlovic, Todor: 40, 62
2, 65-66, 69-70,
eign minister): Naumovic, Captain Mihailo: 42, 44
307 Pavlovic, Colonel Zivko: 146, 160-
74, 85, 87, 88, 89, 146, 270, Negotin (Serbian town): 37, 80, 86
330, 334 Ostojic, Colonel Djordje (marshal 6 1 , 164
Nice (French city): 86, 176, 179
Milovanovic, Colonel Stevan: 202
of Alexander's court): 150, 163, Pecanac, Kosta (guerrilla leader):
Nicholas 11 (Emperor of Russia): 3 1
Milovanovic-Pilac, Colonel M. G. Nikola Petrovic (Prince, later king
21 1 1 66-67
(close colleague of Apis): 37, 40, 33, 73, 78, 286 Ostrovo (village ; "incident at"):18, Pesic, Peter: 79
of Montenegro) :
,
83, 90, 1 1 1 , 1 18, 1 2 1 , 1404 1 , Nikolai Nikolaevich, Grand Prince
1 97-99, 202; "incident" at, 2 1 5 - Petrovic, Lazar: 4 1 , 44-46
162, 166, 1 87, 196,201-02, 2 1 2, 16, 226, 240, 255, 257, 260, 265 Piedmont (Pijemont) (Belgrade
(Russian commander-in -chief) :
Ottoman Empire: see Turkey newspaper): 2, 3 1 , 35, 74, 83,
214-15, 221, 226-28, 23 1 , 234- 151
35 ' 24344, 250-51 ' 253 ' 259 ' 86, 88-89, 98-99, 106-09, 1 1 5,
Nikolajevic, Dobrivoje: 160
Pacu, Lazar (Radical finance min­ 1 2 1 , 138-39, 189,224,261, 270,
268; final statement of at Sal­ Nikolic, Andra (Assembly chair­
ister): 55 3 1 3-14
onika Trial, 274-75, 278, 28 1 - man): 258, 292
Paget, Lady: 295 Plazina, Colonel Milovan : 1 13, l 16,
82, 29 1 , 298,301 , 35 1 Nikolic, Major Milan: 269
f Paget, Sir Ralph (British minister 1 1 8, 227
Mirko (Prince of Montenegro): 33 Nikolic, Colonel Radga: 177-78,
to Serbia): 158 Politika (Belgrade newspaper) : 308-
Mirkovic, Dragic (Serbian prosecu­ 207, 239
Pankovic, Captain Pavle (May con­ 09
tor):306-09 Nincic, Momcilo (Radical minister):
MiSic, Lazar: 225 294 spirator): 32-34, 36-37, 92-93, Popovic, Colonel Cedomir ("fron­
312 tier officer," colleague of Apis):
MiSic, Colonel Peter (chairman of (1914): 149
N is Declaration
Salonika Lower Court): 37, 40, Novakovic, Aca: 36, 38, 45
 396
37, 40, 65, 76, 97, 100, 102-03,
136-37, 146, 228, 23 1 , 250-54,
(testimony of at Salonika Trial);
280, 298, 331
Popovic , General Damjan (comman­
der in Skoplje, Salonika defend­
ant): 37, 54, 109-12, 120, 214,
228, 246, 263, 276, 296
Popovic, Mileva: 214, 264
Popovic, Major Vojin Vuk: 146,
223
Potiorek, General Oskar (governor
of Bosnia): 139, 145, 1 53
Pravda (Belgrade newspaper): 300
Pribicevic, Dr. Svetozar: 124, 133
Princip, Gavrilo (Sarajevo assassin):
5 , 128, 135-37
Priority Decree and Dispute: 105,
108-22, 124, 140, 184, 186, 243,
246, 268, 274, 3 1 5
Protic, Lieutenant Josif G . (assist­
ant warden at Salonika Prison):
13-16, 19-20, 230; arrives at the
Prison, 232, 233-237, 239, 250-
53, 267, 270-7 1, 278-84, 286-
87, 306
Protic, Stojan (Radical leader, In­
terior Minister): 3 , 9, 10, 32, 48,
55, 73; "Priority Decree" of,
107- 1 12, 1 1 6 ; 141, 144, 148,
186, 214, 216, 221, 258, 286,
294-95 , 298, 300, 305
Provisional Government (of Russia,
1 9 1 7): 288-89
Prvalovic, Commissar: 142
Putnik, Vojvoda Radomir (Serbian
chief of staff): 57, 60, 62, 74,
85, 89, 90, 9 1 , 95, 107, 1 1 0- 1 5 ,
1 20-2 1 , 124, 129, 140-4 1 , 145-
47, 149, 154-55, 158, 160, 163-
64, 218 , 268, 313, 343
APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Radakovic, Lieutenant Colonel
Radak: 207, 210
Radenkovic , Bogdan (Serbian na­
tionalist, "Black Hand" leader):
6 1 , 62, 66-69, 90, 9 1 , 228, 23 1 ,
250, 254, 266, 278, 280, 305,
3 1 4 , 330
Radical Party (of Serbia): 3 , 4, 6,
9, 26-29, 32, 34, 38, 39, 48, 54-
58, 62, 65, 70, 73, 83, 85, 108-
1 1 1 , 1 1 6, 120-2 1 , 140, 184, 210,
220, 224, 236,246-47,258, 276,
291-92 298, 300, 305-07 ' 3 14,
•.
323
Radivojevic, liija: 46, 47, 68, 72
Radojevic, Lieutenant Colonel
Milan (Apis' defender at Salon­
ika): 273-74
Radojlovic, Colonel Radoje: 1 5 ,
320
Radovanovic, Colonel Milorad­
Koca ("White Hand" leader):
178, 207, 214-15, 222,239, 248,
299, 305, 308
Rankovic, Alexander (Yugoslav In­
terior Minister): 306
Rankovic, Mihailo: 210, 224-26,
240, 272
Rasic, Mihajlo: 85
Rasic, General: 204
Ratni dnevnik (Salonika military
newspaper): 23 1
"Remove uniforms, they or we!":
54
Retrial of 1953 (Belgrade): 5 ; op­
posed by Major Jankovic, 303;
post-1945 agitation for, 304-06,
307-09 , 3 1 2-14
Reuss, Dr. Rudolph A. (also Reis
and Reiss): 147
Index
Ribarac, Stojan (Liberal leader):
1 14, 301
Risimic, Milun: 37, 52-53,328
Ristic, Jovan (Serbian premier and
regent): 24, 26
Ristic, Mihailo: 46-47
Ristic, Vaso: 140
Royal Guards: 38, 79, 8 1 , 299
Rujanac-Bacet, Aksenij e: 36
Rumania: 1 5 5 , 220
Russia: 23, 24, 26-28, 3 1 , 32, 50,
5 1 , 56, 62, 65, 87, 89, 129; Apis
and, 130-31, 132, 140, 145-46,
1 5 1 , 154-55, 192-93; Apis' as­
sociates in, 287-88; Provisional
Government and Salonika ver­
dict, 288-89
Russo-Japanese War ( 1 904-05): 60
St. John's Day (Ivandan) attempt
against King Milan: 28, 3 2
St. Vitus Day (Vidovdan): 19, 139
Salonika: 12, 15, 18, 125, 154, 165,
1 67-68, 178, 193-95, 208, 2 1 1 ,
214, 227
Salonika Front: 155-56, 159, 163,
188, 193, 194ff., 209, 2 1 9 ; ef­
fect on Apis' arrest on, 227, 24 1 -
42, 246, 268, 274, 28 1, 298
Salonika Military Courts ( 1 9 1 7) : 8,
9, 240-41, 245-47, 280-8 1 , 290-
9 1 , 305-06
Salonika Officers' Prison: 102, 186,
227, 228ff., 247, 282-83, 3 1 5
"Salonika Regime" (1916-17): 208,
210-1 1 , 240, 247, 298, 300-01 ,
305 , 35 1
Salonika Trial ( 1 9 1 7) : 4-7, 10, 12,
37' 60, 67 ' 68, 70, 89, 98, 1 14,
1 16-20, 1 24, 1 29-30, 134, 141,
397
144, 170, 200-01 ;preparation of,
21 1-12, 2 1 5 , 217, 219,221, 236;
ZivkoviC's role Jn preparing, 238-
40; 240-4 1, 24344, 245ff.; Apis'
report to, 258-59, 295 ; Apis'
testimony at, 268-72; foreign re­
actions to, 275-77; verdicts in,
278-8 1 ; protests against verdicts,
287-90; High Court reviews ver­
dicts, 290-91 ; clemency issue
and, 291-95, 297-99, 301-05,
307-09 , 3 14-15
Samouprava (Radical Party news­
paper): 56, 300
Sapinac, Colonel Stevan: 179, 1 8 1 ,
347
Sarac, Djuro (Bosnian nationalist):
135-36, 188, 225, 226
Sarajevo assassination ( 1 9 14): 3, 4,
1 5 , 102-03, 123-38; Apis and,
1 28-30, 133, 213, 248, 252,
257-59, 271, 293-95, 3 15, 3 16,
338
Sarrail, General Maurice (Allied
commander-in-c.;hief of Salonika
Front): 195, 202-04, 241
Sazonov, Sergei D. (Russian foreign
minister): 1 5 1
Serbia: see throughout
Serbian Volunteer Corps in Russia:
187, 242, 287
Serbo-Bulgarian Alliance ( 1912):
87-89
Serbo-Bulgarian War ( 1913): 95
Serbo-Turkish War (1912): 95
Serge, Victor: 1 3 1
Seton-Watson, Dr. R. W. (British
scholar): 277, 298, 3 1 1 , 34 1
Seventh Infantry Regiment: 28, 39,
42
 39 8
Simic, Bozin (colleague of Apis):
37, 39, 60,66, 89, 90, 1 1 6, 1 1 8,
1 3 1 , 152, 226, 242, 287-88 , 329
Simovic, General Dusan: 304
Sixth Infantry Regiment: 37, 39,
40, 42, 43 , 45
Skadar (Albanian port): 102, 163-
64, 166-67
Skoplje (Macedonian capital): 66,
94; and "Priority Dispute," 109-
10, 1 1 3-14, 1 16-18, 120, 268
Skoplje Committee: 60-62
"Slavija" (square in Belgrade): 43,
45, 78
Slivnica, Battle of (1885): 24-25
S/ovenski Jug (Serbian student
newspaper): 225
Smiljanic, Colonel Krsta (General
Staff officer): 120, 144
Social Democrats: 78, 1 14
Spalajkovic, Dr. Miroslav (Serbian
minister to Russia): 1 5 1 , 344
Srb, Colonel Alexander: 242, 278-
88
Srpska Zastava (newspaper): 33
Srpske Novine (official newspaper
of Serbia): 78
Sredojevic, Atanasije (police offic-
ial): 144, 45, 21 7-28, 352
Stajic, General J ordan: 163
Stajic, Dr. Milan: 175
Stanojevic, Dr. Stanoje: 133-34
Stefanovic, Colonel Dusan (War
Minister, 1914): 108-10, 1 1 3-15,
120, 141, 148
Stepanovic, General Stepa: 79, 83,
84, 9 1 , 95 , 120
Stojadinovic, Dragisa: 208, 266
Stojanovic, Bratislav (postal censor):
198
APIS: The Congenial Conspirator
Stojanovic, DragiSa: 306
Stojanovic, Dragomir Sr.: 226
Stojic, Milenko (lawyer): 239
Stojkovic, Captain Milan ( com-
mandant of Salonika Officers'
Prison): 7 , 8 , 10, 13-16, 20,228-
32, 234-35, 239, 243-44, 248-49,
250, 252, 254-5 5 , 257,259, 262-
64, 266, 270-72, 281-82, 285-
86, 290-9 1 , 296, 298, 3 1 8-19
Stojsic, Colonel Alexander: 199-200
Sumadija Division: 1 1 3 , 1 1 6
Supreme Command (of Serbia):
144-45, 147, 150, 152, 154-56,
159-6 1 ; directive of on retreat of
1 9 1 5 , 163; replaced, 164, 168,
176, 183, 195-96, 200, 202, 208,
2 1 6 - 1 8 , 224, 227-28, 236-37,
266
Supreme Court of Serbia: 306-09
"Surprise of March 27, 1917":
254-55
Switzerland : 33, 62, 179, 210, 221
Tankosic, Major Vojislav (guerrilla
leader): 38, 45, 6 1 , 65, 66, 74,
88, 1 1 2; Sarajevo assassination
and, 131-36, 140, 146, 152,
252, 274, 331 , 341
Tartaglia, Oskar (Croatian journal­
ist): 73, 74
Tausanovic, Kosta: 28
Tereshchenko, M. I. (Russian for­
eign minister, 1917): 289
Terzic, Colonel Bozidar (Serbian
war minister, 1916-17): 1 1 2-13,
182, 208-09, 212, 2 1 6 , 223-24,
226,242,287
Thesiger (British consul): 56, 329
Third Army (Serbian): 177, 179,
Index
180, 189, 194, 197-98, 205-06,
210, 218, 226, 239
Times, The (London newspaper): 5 1
Timok Army: 153, 157, 1 60-6 1,
163-65, 169, 175; dissolution of,
176, 188, 1 9 1
Tirnok Revolt ( 1 883): 26
Tirnotijevic, Kosta (cabinet min·
ister): 259
Tito, Josip Broz (Yugoslav leader):
304, 306
Todorovic, Kosta: 100
Todorovic, Major Sretan: 208, 2 1 1
Tomic, Milutin (Salonika witness):
146
Tribuna (Belgrade newspaper): 72,
86, 1 1 4
Trifunovic, Ranko: 2 1 1 , 218, 306
Trifunovic, Stefan: 159-60
Triple Entente ( 1 907-18) (also the
Allies): 99, 146, 154-55, 158-59,
1 60-6 1 , 167, 220-2 1 , 241-42,
289
Trivunac, Major Zivojin: 208, 2 1 1 ,
212
Trydar-Burzynski: 1 3 1
Tucakovic, Kosta (Drina region
chief) : 144-45, 200, 208, 217,
218, 306
Tucakovic, Colonel Milan: 1 14
Tucakovic, Panta (lawyer): 1 15
Tucovic, Colonel Vladimir (close
Apis colleague, Salonika defen­
dant): 16, 43, 49, 50, 59, 72,
77 83-85, 184, 187 ' 192, 208-
' Veljkovic, Vojislav (Liberal leader):
09, 210, 2 1 2-13, 218, 227-28,
235-36, 239, 256, 259,267, 269,
2 7 1 , 280, 285
Turkey (and Ottoman Empire): 23,
6 1 , 66, 72, 87-92, 94, 3 12, 3 1 4
399
Ugron, von (Austrian diplomat): 73
"Unification or Death" ("Ujedin­
jenje ili smrt! ") (called the
"Black Hand"): 2-5, 9, 10, 58,
60, 6 1 , 64, 66-75, 80, 83-9 1 , 96,
97, 1 00, 106, 108, 1 1 0-17, 1 1 9-
22; Sarajevo association and,
124, 129, 130, 1 35-37, 146, 148,
150, 152, 163, 166, 182, 1 86-87,
190-9 1 , 201 , 206,210, 212, 215,
218, 221-25, 227, 23 1 , 236-37,
240, 242; at Salonika Trial,
248ff., 263; Apis' testimony
about at Salonika Trial, 268,
27 1 , 273-77, 280, 287-89, 297-
305, 308-09, 3 12-15, 331
Uiice Army (renamed Timok Army
in 1 9 1 5): 149-52
Vadar Division: 1 13, 202
Vasic, Milan: 74, 100, 103
Vasic, General Milos (War Min·
ister, Third Army commander):
29, 30, 85, 197-99, 201-02;
negative assessment of Apis by
( 1 9 1 6), 205-06, 217, 269, 272,
349
Vasiljevic, Prvoslav (Apis' defender
at Retrial): 221-22, 309, 3 12- 13,
327-28
Velickovic, Dr. Zivojin: 1 5 8
Veljanovic, Temeljko (Salonika wit·
ness): 16, 255-56, 272,274, 306,
309
1 14
Vemic, Major Velirnir (a founder of
"Black Hand"): 13, 15, 37, 39,
66-68, 73, 77, 90, 98, 108, 146,
) 5 1 , 226, 23 1 244, 253, 257,
400
259, 266, 269, 275, 278; escape
of, 28 1 -84, 287, 330-3 1, 336
Venizelos, Alexander (Greek states­
man): 155, 156, 158
Verk.hovskii, Alexander (Russian
war minister, 1 9 1 7) : 1 3 1
Vidovdan: see St. Vitus Day
Vivian, Herbert (British officer):
322, 324
Vlajic, Velimir (Salonika witness):
249
Vohoska, Cedomir: 244
Vojvoda Putnik: see Putnik, Voj­
voda Radomir
Vuk, Vojvoda (guerrilla leader):
166
Vukasin, Corporal (at Salonika Of­
ficers' Prison): 28 1 , 283
Vulovic , Major Lj ubomir (intimate
friend of Apis, national activist):
3 , 8, 9 , 14-20, 6 1 , 97, 104, 129,
1 3 1 -32, 134, 144, 152, 1 5 7, 200,
216-19, 22 1 , 225-27, 232-34,
253,256,258,264, 266-68, 270,
278, 28 1 , 283-84, 286,292, 294,
296,303, 306
"White Hand" (officers group fonn­
ed 1 9 1 1): 3 , S, 58, 76, 85, 86,
1 1 2, 1 20, 150, 164, 1 84-85, 208-
09, 2 1 1 , 214-17, 227, 236, 239,
24 1 , 260, 290, 297-300, 314,
3 16
Wick.ham-Steed, Henry (British
journalist): SO-S 1
William I I (Gennan emperor): 133,
189, 223
"Young Bosnia" ("Mlada Bosna")
(nationalist student group): 5 ,
123, 135, 137, 237, 3 1 5
Young Turks: 66, 88
APIS: The Congenial Conspirator Index 401
Yugoslav Committee ( 1 9 1 5 - 1 8): Yugoslavia of, 299-300, 302-04;
286, 294 Retrial and, 308-09, 3 1 6, 332,
Yugoslavia and Yugoslavs: 2-4, 9, 333
10, 20, 3 1 , 35, 66-67, 74, 137, "Zvezdana" (horse) : 93
203, 2 1 3 , 294, 297, 299-301, Zvono (newspaper) : 78
303-04, 309-1 1
Zagreb Treason Trial: 100, 142, 286
Zavacil, Milan: 90
Zecevic, Veljko: 165, 226
Zerajic, Bogdan: 133
Zivanovic family: 93, 94, 169, 1 76-
77
Zivanovic, Alexander (Sasha): 93,
179
Zivanovic, Jelena, nee Dimitrijevic
(Apis' sister) : 22-25 , 47, 169, 322
Zivanovic , Milan Z . (Apis' nephew):
3 , 4, 7, 10-12, 126, 128-29, 137,
144, 169-7 1 , 174; reminiscences
of ( 1 9 16), 1 75 ; correspondence
of with Apis, 1 77-82, 198, 226,
234-35, 304, 3 1 1 , 3 1 5, 3 1 9
Zivanovic, Zivan (Apis' brother-in­
law): 25, 36, 39, 44, 46, 47, SO,
52, 53, 169; about Apis, 17 1-72,
1 76, 1 78-79, 1 80-8 1 , 3 1 1-12,
319
Zivkovic, Lju bomir: 4 7, 48, 77, 323
Zivkovic, General Mihailo (com­
mander of Volunteer Corps in
Russia): 242
Zivkovic, General Peter ("Pera")
(Guards officer, "Yugoslav Ras­
putin"): 3, S, 6, 38, 42, 43, 53,
54, 62, 76-86, 95-96, 149, 150,
164, 1 77-78, 207-08; prepares
Salonika Trial, 2 1 1-16, 219, 230-
3 1 , 234-35, 238-39, 246-49,
259-60, 270-7 1 , 287, 297-98;
accused of homosexuality
( 1 9 1 8), 299; influence in royal