MANILA HOTEL CORP. VS.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LEGAL AFFAIRS OF THE

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL, G.R. NO. 241034, AUGUST 3, 2022

FACTS:

*On March 19, 2013, petitioner applied for registration of its trademark "CHAMPAGNE ROOM" with the IPO.

*On November 7, 2013, petitioner received a Notice of Opposition from respondent CIVC, a public service body
established by the French Parliament engaged in the protection and development of the champagne market in general.

*On December 22, 2017, IPO Adjudication Officer Atty. Adoracion U. Zare (Adjudication Officer) rendered a
Decision16 dismissing the opposition of respondent CIVC. The Adjudication Officer held that petitioner's adoption of the
mark "CHAMPAGNE ROOM" does not suggest a connection to respondent CIVC or its appellation of origin. Neither does
it mislead the buying public or consumers as to the geographical origin or the trade name of respondent CIVC.

Respondent CIVC received a copy of the Decision on February 2, 2018 and filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Appeal20 to the IPO-BLA Director praying for an extension of 10 days from February 12, 2018 or until February 22, 2018
within which to file an appeal.

Petitioner filed an Opposition23 to respondent CIVC's Motion asserting that the Revised Inter Partes Rules do not provide
for an extension of the period within which to appeal the decision of the IPO Adjudication Officer to the IPO-BLA Director.

In an Order dated February 13, 2018, the IPO-BLA Director granted the motion of respondent CIVC.

Not satisfied, petitioner filed before the CA a Petition29 for certiorari and prohibition with an urgent application for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which assailed
the Orders of the IPO-BLA Director.

Petitioner maintained that the IPO-BLA Director committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in granting an extension of time to file an appeal and giving due course to respondent CIVC's appeal.

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the aforementioned Order, but the CA denied the motion in a Resolution34 dated July
23, 2018.

ISSUE:

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether the CA erred in affirming the Orders of the IPO-BLA Director granting
respondent CIVC's Motion for Extension to File Appeal from the Decision of the Adjudication Officer.

RULING:

The Court denies the Petition and sustains the assailed Resolutions issued by the CA.

It is true that the right to appeal, being merely a statutory privilege, should be exercised in the manner prescribed by
law. But "it is equally true that in proceedings before administrative bodies the general rule has always been liberality."
Administrative rules of procedure should be construed liberally in order to promote their object to assist the parties in
obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses."

An assiduous reading of Section 2(a) of Rule 9 would readily show that while the rules expressly state that the 10-day
period for filing a comment to the appeal is non-extendible, there is no similar express prohibition on moving for an
extension of time for filing an appeal.
SPS. FERNANDO CRUZ AND AMELIA M. CRUZ AND MILLIANS SHOE, INC. VS. ONSHORE STRATEGIC ASSETS,
INC.; ET AL. G.R. NO. 212862, JUNE 17, 2019S

FACTS:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the July 25, 2013 Decision1 and
June 9, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 99062 which dismissed the appeal of
petitioners.

On March 17, 2011, petitioners filed a Complaint for Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale, Loan Documents,
Accounting and Damages against respondents Onshore Strategic Assets (SPV-AMC), Inc. (OSAI), United Overseas Bank
Philippines, as well as the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, RTC of Marikina City and the Register of
Deed of Marikina City.

Instead of filing its Answer, OSAI moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds: (a) failure of the
lawyer for the petitioners to comply with Bar Matter No. 1922, particularly the requirement for the counsel to indicate in
every pleading that will be filed in court, the counsel's Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance
Number for the immediately preceding compliance period;

(b) violation of the prohibition against forum shopping as there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause;

(c) lack of legal capacity to sue on the part of petitioner Millians Shoe, Inc. by reason of the revocation of its Articles of
Incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

In their Opposition, petitioners alleged that Atty. Michelle D. Martinez (Atty. Martinez), their counsel, had no intention to
derogate the rules. They admitted that their counsel had only complied with the MCLE requirement for the second
compliance period, and that she has a two-hour deficiency for the third compliance period brought about by her occupied
time in attending to client calls in various domestic destinations and trips to Australia to attend to important filial
obligations.

On September 21, 2011, the RTC issued an order granting the motion to dismiss.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but the same was still denied by the RTC in an Order dated March 19, 2012.

Not accepting defeat, petitioners appealed the matter before the CA.

In a Decision dated July 25, 2013, the CA found the appeal to be without merit and dismissed the same.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied it in a Resolution13 dated June 9, 2014.

Undaunted, petitioners are now before this Court in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari

ISSUES:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTON FOR RECONSIDERATION AND
DISMISSING THE PETITION NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT WAS CLEARLY SHOWN THAT THE
PETITIONERS HAVE BEEN ABSOLUTELY DENIED THE CONSTITUTIONALLY GUARANTEED RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS AND WHETHER OR NOT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 263, OF MARIKINA CITY ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE NEGLIGENCE AND MISTAKE OF COUNSEL BIND THE CLIENT.

RULING:

Non-compliance with Bar Matter No. 1922 of petitioners' counsel correctly resulted to the dismissal of the
complaint filed in court.

Bar Matter No. 1922 requires lawyers to indicate in all the pleadings and motions they file before the courts, the number
and date of their MCLE Certificate of Completion or Exemption.

There is no dispute that when the subject complaint was filed before the RTC, petitioners' counsel failed to indicate the
date and number of her MCLE Compliance Certificate for the immediately preceding period, which is the third compliance
period in this case, as required by Bar Matter No. 1922.
The obligation to disclose the information required under Bar Matter No. 1922 is not a useless formality. The inclusion of
information regarding compliance with (or exemption from) MCLE seeks to ensure that legal practice is reserved only for
those who have complied with the recognized mechanism for "keeping abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintaining
the ethics of the profession, and enhancing the standards of the practice of law."

Thus, the dismissal of petitioners' complaint for non-compliance therewith was proper.

In a plethora of cases, this Court has consistently held that rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice; their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

Petitioners' right to due process had not been violated by the dismissal of the complaint

It must be stressed that the dismissal was brought about by their counsel's non-observance of Bar Matter No. 1922. Be
that as it may, such dismissal did not prejudice petitioners' cause or rights because the same complaint may be re-filed
with complete compliance of the rules as it had not been adjudicated on the merits. Moreover, such dismissal could not be
considered a violation of due process as rights were never deprived or taken away from the petitioners.

The doctrinal rule is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Otherwise, there would be no end to a suit so long as
a new counsel could be employed who would allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent,
experienced, or learned. "However, this rule admits certain exceptions, such as: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of
counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client's
liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so requires."

Appeal to the appellate court from the RTC's Orders of dismissal was not proper.

As aptly observed by the CA, petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they appealed the Orders of the RTC which
dismissed their complaint without prejudice. This is explicitly provided in Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure.
MARYLOU CABRERA VS. FELIX NG, G.R. NO. 201601, MARCH 12, 2014

FACTS:

On February 14, 2004, Felix Ng (respondent) filed a complaint for sum of money with the RTC against the petitioner and
her husband Marionilo Cabrera, alleging that the latter issued to him checks that when presented for payment, the said
checks were all dishonored as the accounts from which they had been drawn were already closed.

On August 7, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision, which ordered the spouses Cabrera to pay the respondent the
following:

(1) Two Million Five Hundred Sixty-Nine Thousand Seventy-Four Pesos (₱2,569,074.00) plus legal interest from inception
of the obligation until fully paid;

(2) moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00);

(3) attorney’s fees of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00); and

(4) litigation expenses in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00).

On August 14, 2007, the spouses Cabrera filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration, which they set for hearing on
August 17, 2007. On even date, the spouses Cabrera sent a copy of their motion for reconsideration to the respondent
thru registered mail; it was actually received by the respondent on August 21, 2007.

The said motion for reconsideration, however, was not heard on August 17, 2007 as the new acting presiding judge of the
said court had just assumed office. On August 28, 2007, the RTC issued a notice, which set the said motion for
reconsideration for hearing on September 25, 2007.

On September 20, 2007, the respondent filed an opposition to the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses
Cabrera.

On October 26, 2007, the RTC issued an Order, which directed the parties to file their additional pleadings, after which the
motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera would be deemed submitted for resolution.

On December 19, 2007, the RTC issued an Order which denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses
Cabrera.

After a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, the court opines that the motion was filed beyond the reglementary
three 3-day period.

The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying
her motion for reconsideration.

On October 21, 2009, the CA, by way of the assailed Decision, denied the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner.

The petitioner sought a reconsideration of the Decision dated October 21, 2009 but it was denied by the CA.

ISSUE:

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC Order dated December 19, 2007,
which denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera.

RULING:

The petition is meritorious.

Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provide that:

Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. – Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse
party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

The general rule is that the three-day notice requirement in motions under Sections 4 and 5 of the Rules of Court is
mandatory. It is an integral component of procedural due process.

"A motion that does not comply with the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is a worthless
piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority to act upon."

The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the
literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its
authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

Notwithstanding that the respondent received a copy of the said motion for reconsideration four days after the date set by
the spouses Cabrera for the hearing thereof, his right to due process was not impinged as he was afforded the chance to
argue his position. Thus, the R TC erred in denying the spouses Cabrera's motion for reconsideration based merely on
their failure to comply with the three-day notice requirement.
ELIZA ZUNIGA – SANTOS VS. MARIA DIVINA GRACIA SANTOS G.R. NO. 197380, 10/8/2014

On January 9, 2006, petitioner Eliza Zuñiga-Santos (petitioner), through her authorized representative, Nympha Z.
Sales,5 filed a Complaint6 for annulment of sale and revocation of title against respondents Maria Divina Gracia Santos-
Gran (Gran) and the Register of Deeds of Marikina City before the RTC. The said complaint was later amended7 on
March 10, 2006.

Petitioner prayed, inter alia, that Gran surrender to her the subject properties and pay damages, including costs of suit.

For her part, Gran filed a Motion to Dismiss

In an Order16 dated July 6, 2006, the RTC granted Gran’s motion and dismissed the Amended Complaint for its failure to
state a cause of action.

Dissatisfied, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA.

In a Decision19 dated January 10, 2011, the CA sustained the dismissal of petitioner’s Amended Complaint but on the
ground of insufficiency of factual basis.

Aggrieved, petitioner moved for reconsideration.

In a Resolution25 dated June 22, 2011, the CA denied petitioner’s motion.

ISSUE:

The primordial issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the dismissal of petitioner’s Amended Complaint should
be sustained.

RULING:

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct grounds to dismiss a particular action. The former
refers to the insufficiency of the allegations in the pleading, while the latter to the insufficiency of the factual basis for the
action. Dismissal for failure to state a cause of action may be raised at the earliest stages of the proceedings through a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, while dismissal for lack of cause of action may be raised any time
after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented by the
plaintiff.

In the case at bar, both the RTC and the CA were one in dismissing petitioner’s Amended Complaint, but varied on the
grounds thereof – that is, the RTC held that there was failure to state a cause of action while the CA ruled that there was
insufficiency of factual basis.

It is clear that “insufficiency of factual basis” is not a ground for a motion to dismiss. Rather, it is a ground which becomes
available only after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence
presented by the plaintiff.

At the preliminary stages of the proceedings, without any presentation of evidence even conducted, it is perceptibly
impossible to assess the insufficiency of the factual basis on which the plaintiff asserts his cause of action, as in this case.
Therefore, that ground could not be the basis for the dismissal of the action.

However, the Amended Complaint is still dismissible but on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, as correctly
held by the RTC.

It is well to point out that the plaintiff’s cause of action should not merely be “stated” but, importantly, the statement thereof
should be “sufficient.” This is why the elementary test in a motion to dismiss on such ground is whether or not the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 10, 2011 and the Resolution dated June 22, 2011 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87849 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the Amended
Complaint be dismissed on the grounds of (a) failure to state a cause of action, and (b) prescription as herein discussed.
LETICIA NAGUIAT AQUINO VS. CESAR QUIAZON, G.R. NO. 201248, MARCH 11, 2015

FACTS:

On December 16, 2005, a complaint3 for Annulment and Quieting of Title was filed before the RTC-Branch59 by the
petitioners, alleging that they were the heirs of the late Epifanio Makam and Severina Bautista, who acquired a house and
lot situated in Magalang, Pampanga.

In June 2005, they received various demand letters from the respondents claiming ownership over the subject property
and demanding that they vacate the same.

Upon inquiry with the Register of Deeds of San Fernando, Pampanga, they confirmed that the property had been titled in
the name of respondents under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 213777-R; that the said title was invalid, ineffective,
voidable or unenforceable; and that they were the true owners of the property.

Hence, they prayed that the title be cancelled and a new title be issued in their favor.

In their Answer,4 respondents asserted that they were the absolute owners of the subject land as per TCT No. 213777-R;
that they had inherited the same from their predecessor-in-interest, Fausta Baluyut, one of the registered owners. They
denied the allegations in the complaint and proffered affirmative defenses with counterclaims.

The respondents argued 3 main points:

 The petitioners "have no valid, legal and sufficient cause of action" against them
 They also raised the settled rule that a title registered under the Torrens system could not be defeated by
adverse, open and notorious possession, or by prescription.
 The action was also barred by res judicata and violated the prohibition against forum shopping, considering that
petitioners had earlier filed a similar case for quieting of title against respondents

On July 14, 2008, the RTC-Br. 59 issued the Order dismissing petitioners’ complaint. It found that based on the decision,
dated June 28, 1919, in Cadastral Case No. 5, the Baluyut siblings, respondents’ predecessors-in-interest, were declared
the absolute owners of the subject property, over the claim of Jose Makam, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioners, who
was one of the oppositors in the said case.

On December 22, 2008, the RTC-Br. 59 denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration. It stated that the court may
consider evidence presented in hearings related to the case, which was an exception to the general rule that only the
complaint should be taken into consideration.

In the assailed Decision, dated March 13, 2012, the CA dismissed petitioners’ appeal. It explained that under Section 6,
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, a court is allowed to conduct a preliminary hearing, motu proprio, on the defendant’s
affirmative defenses, including the ground of "lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of action."

But as shown in the foregoing rule, the holding of a preliminary hearing on any of the grounds for a motion to dismiss
which is pleaded as an affirmative defense is within the full discretion of the trial court. The rule speaks of affirmative
defenses that are grounds for a motion to dismiss. Indubitably, lack of cause of action or failure to state a cause of action,
being one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss, is included thereby.

The CA gave credence to the evidence presented by respondents and noted that, except for petitioners’ bare allegation
that respondents’ title was invalid, there was nothing more to support the same. It further noted that the deed of sale was
written in a local dialect without the translation and with no ascertainable reference to the area of the property being
conveyed

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action or failure
to state a cause of action.

RULING:
The Court notes that respondents raised the affirmative defense in their Answer that petitioners "have no valid, legal and
sufficient cause of action," raising factual matters,14 which is effectively the ground of "lack of cause of action."
Respondents’ arguments made no assertion that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. The ground of "lack of
cause of action" has been frequently confused with the ground of "failure to state a cause of action," and this is the
situation prevailing in the present case. The terms were, in fact, used interchangeably by both the respondents and the
lower courts.

The distinction between the grounds of "failure to state a cause of action" and "lack of cause of action" was aptly
discussed in Dabuco vs. Court of Appeals, to wit:

As a preliminary matter, we wish to stress the distinction between the two grounds for dismissal of an action: failure to
state a cause of action, on the one hand, and lack of cause of action, on the other hand. The former refers to the
insufficiency of allegation in the pleading, the latter to the insufficiency of factual basis for the action. Failure to state a
cause may be raised in a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 16, while lack of cause may be raised any time. Dismissal for
failure to state a cause can be made at the earliest stages of an action. Dismissal for lack of cause is usually made after
questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or evidence presented.

In determining the existence of a cause of action, only the statements in the complaint may properly be considered. It is
error for the court to take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to determine their existence. If the
allegation in a complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint may be maintained, the same should not be
dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (supra).

Thus, in determining the existence of a cause of action, only the allegations in the complaint may properly be considered.
For the court to do otherwise would be a procedural error and a denial of the plaintiff’s right to due process.

Although neither the RTC or the CA ruled on the affirmative defenses of prescription and res judicata, it appears that this
case could not have been dismissed on these grounds. First, an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in
possession of the property, which is the situation prevailing in the present case. Second, there appears to be no res
judicata nor a violation of the prohibition against forum shopping considering that Civil Case No. 5487 had been
dismissed, without prejudice, years before petitioners initiated their complaint for quieting of title.

In sum, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. Evidence
should have been received not during a preliminary hearing under Section 6 of Rule 16, but should have been presented
during the course of the trial. The case should, thus, be remanded to the RTC-Br. 59 for trial on the merits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The March 13, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No.
92887 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is ordered REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits
of the case.

SO ORDERED.
CONSULAR AREA RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION VS. CASANOVA, G.R. NO. 202618, APRIL 12, 2016

FACTS:

In 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion and Development Act
of 1992. For this purpose, the BCDA was authorized to own, hold, and administer portions of the Metro Manila military
camps that may be transferred to it by the President. In this relation, Executive Order (EO) No. 40, Series of 1992 was
issued, identifying Fort Bonifacio as one of the military camps earmarked for development and disposition to raise funds
for BCDA projects.

Located in Fort Bonifacio are the JUSMAG and Diplomatic and Consular Areas subject of this case. The JUSMAG Area is
a 34.5-hectare area located along Lawton Avenue where military officers, both in the active and retired services, and their
respective families, had occupied housing units and facilities originally constructed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP).

On July 18, 2012, the Local Housing Board of Taguig City issued a Certificate of Compliance on Demolition13 declaring
that the BCDA had complied with the requirement of "Just and Humane Demolition and Eviction," prescribed under
Section 28 of RA 7279,14 otherwise known as the "Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992," for the demolition of
structures within the JUSMAG Area.

Respondent Casanova, as President and Chief Executive Officer of the BCDA, sent a Letter, informing petitioner and its
members that they should, within a seven (7)-day, coordinate with BCDA officials should they choose to either accept the
relocation package being offered to them, or voluntarily dismantle their structures and peacefully vacate the property.

Petitioner filed the case to enjoin the demolition of their structures which they claimed are within the Diplomatic and
Consular Area, and not the JUSMAG Area. Furthermore, petitioner posited that Casanova had no authority to act for and
in behalf of the BCDA considering his "highly anomalous and irregular" appointment as President thereof.

ISSUE:

The main issue in this case is whether or not the demolition should be enjoined.

RULING:

Supreme Court held that the petition lacks merit.

While the instant petition is denominated as one for prohibition, a careful perasal of the same reveals that it is actually a
petition for injunction as it ultimately seeks that a writ of injunction be issued to pennanently stop respondents, or any
other person acting under their orders or authority, from carrying out, or causing to carry out, the demolition of petitioner's
properties.

Case law dictates that "for a party to be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it
must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising functions, judicial [, quasi-judicial or
ministerial;

(b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion and

(c) there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."

In his opinion in the case of Nuclear Free Philippine Coalition v. National Power Corporation,29 former Chief Justice
Ramon Aquino discussed the basic distinction between an action for prohibition and one for injunction:

Prohibition is not the same as injunction. Lawyers often make the mistake of confusing prohibition with injunction.
Basically, prohibition is a remedy to stop a tribunal from exercising a power beyond its jurisdiction, x x x.

Prohibition is an extraordinary prerogative writ of a preventive nature, its proper function being to prevent courts or other
tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction with which they are not vested.

For another, petitioner argues against the legality of the intended demolition, insisting that there should be a court order
authorizing the demolition, However, contrary to petitioner's argument, the Court has already settled, in the case
of Kalipunan ng Damay ang Mahihirap, Inc. v. Robredo, that demolitions and evictions may be validly carried out even
without a judicial order when, among others, government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be
implemented pursuant to Section 28 (b) of RA 7279.

As a final note, attention should be drawn to the manifestation of respondents that the demolition and eviction activities in
the JUSMAG Area, on which petitioner's claimed structures belong, had already been performed and completed on
September 21, 2012. Thus, since prayers for injunctive reliefs do not lie to restrain an act that is already fait
accompli, there is no other proper course of action but to dismiss the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
ZENAIDA D. ROA VS. SPS. ROBINSON K AND MARIE VALERIE SY ET AL, G.R. NO. 221586, SEPTEMBER 14, 2021

FACTS:

On March 19, 2013, petitioner (Zenaida D. Roa) filed the complaint against respondents.

Petitioner averred that, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 133936, she and her sister Amelia Roa
(Amelia) are the legitimate owners of a property located at 73 Amorsolo Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati City. She
learned from a relative that their title had been cancelled by the RD Makati, and by virtue of a deed of sale.

It was impossible for her to have signed the deed of sale since she was in Washington D.C. On the other hand, her sister
Amelia could not have signed the same on her own volition since she had been suffering from Alzheimer's disease

Francisco subsequently sold the property to Spouses Sy. Francisco was able to secure a title in her name only on July 16,
2012, while the sale of the same property to Spouses Sy was supposedly done on July 20, 2012

Instead of filing an answer, Spouses Sy filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.
Spouses Sy further claimed that they acted in good faith when they relied on Francisco's title.

The trial court denied Spouses Sy's motion to dismiss for lack of merit. It noted that the complaint stated that petitioners
were the registered owners of the property.

Spouses Sy's motion for reconsideration was denied. Thereafter, they filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars.

The trial court granted the motion and ordered petitioner to submit her bill of particulars. Petitioner promptly complied.

While the proceedings below were ongoing, Spouses Sy also pursued a petition for certiorari assailing the earlier denial of
their motion to dismiss.

In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals reversed. It ruled that petitioner failed to particularly allege when Spouses
Sy started to negotiate with Francisco for the purchase of the property.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:

Did the Court of Appeals commit reversible error when it dismissed the complaint against Spouses Sy on the ground that
petitioner has no cause of action against them, albeit what the latter actually pleaded was another ground, that is, failure
to state a cause of action?

RULING:

The Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action.

To begin with, Spouses Sy sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action against
them. Hence, it is a reversible error for the Court of Appeals to have motu proprio taken cognizance of an entirely different
ground, i.e., lack of cause of action, to justify the dismissal of the complaint.

In any event, it has been repeatedly held that failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are distinct and
separate grounds to dismiss a particular action.

If the Complaint fails to state a cause of action, a motion to dismiss must be made before a responsive pleading is filed;
and the issue can be resolved only on the basis of the allegations in the initiatory pleading. On the other hand, if the
Complaint lacks a cause of action, the motion to dismiss must be filed after the plaintiff has rested its case.

In the first situation, the veracity of the allegations is immaterial; however, in the second situation, the judge must
determine the veracity of the allegations based on the evidence presented.

In fine, petitioner essentially claims that: (a) she and Amelia are the legitimate owners of the subject property; (b)
Francisco acquired title to the property through fraud by forging a deed of sale making it appear that she and Amelia sold
the property to her; (c) Francisco's title was issued only on July 16, 2012, and the sale in favor of Spouses Sy was dated
July 20, 2012, just days apart; (d) Spouses Sy were aware that at the time they negotiated with Francisco for the sale of
the property, the latter was not yet the registered owner of the property as evidenced by the mere handwritten annotation
in the title; and (e) Spouses Sy are buyers in bad faith because despite the apparent irregularity in the manner by which
Francisco obtained title to the property, they turned a blind eye and did not further investigate on the legality of the seller
Francisco's title and her authority to sell the property.

Here, assuming the foregoing allegations to be true, petitioner and her sister Amelia, as registered owners of the property,
have the right to the relief prayed for, i.e., to declare as void the Deed of Sale of the property in favor of Spouses Sy who
are buyers in bad faith.
ASIA BREWERY INC. VS. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, G.R. NO. 190432, APRIL 25, 2017
FACTS:
Within the period of September 1996 to July 1998, 10 checks and 16 demand drafts (collectively, "instruments")
were issued in the name of Charlie Go.

In their Complaint, petitioners narrate:

10. None of the above checks and demand drafts set out under the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Causes of Action reached payee, co-plaintiff Charlie S. Go.

11. All of the above checks and demand drafts fell into the hands of a certain Raymond U. Keh, then a Sales
Accounting Manager of plaintiff Asia Brewery, Inc., who falsely, willfully, and maliciously pretending to be the payee,
co-plaintiff Charlie S. Go, succeeded in opening accounts with defendant Equitable PCI Bank in the name of Charlie
Go and thereafter deposited the said checks and demand drafts in said accounts and withdrew the proceeds thereof
to the damage and prejudice of plaintiff Asia Brewery, Inc.