Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The Insurance Code of 1978 was amended by Republic Act No. 10607 which
embodies the new Insurance Code. It took effect fifteen days after it was
published on August 15, 2013.
Q. What are the new concepts introduced by the New Insurance Code to
enhance the business of Insurance?
(1) Microinsurance;
(2) Bancassurance
(3) Trust for charitable uses.
(4) Trust business of insurance companies.
Q. What is microinsurance?
"(b) The maximum sum of guaranteed benefits is not more than one thousand
(1,000) times of the current daily minimum wage rate for nonagricultural
workers in Metro Manila."
Q. What is BANCASSURANCE?
A. The term bancassurance shall mean the presentation and sale to bank
customers by an insurance company of its insurance products within the
premises of the head office of such bank duly licensed by the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas or any of its branches under such rules and regulations whiçh the
Commişsioner and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas may promulgate.
A. Industrial life insurance means that form of life insurance under which the
premiums are payable monthly or oftener, if the face amount of insurance
provided in any policy is not more than five hundred times that of the current
statutory daily wage of the City of Manila, and if the words industrial policy are
printed upon the policy as part of the descriptive matter.
Such kind of policy shall not lapse for non- payment of premium if such non-
payment was due to the failure of the insurer to send its representative or
agent, to the insured at the residence of the insured or someplace indicated by
him for the purpose of collecting such premium. However, this does not apply
when the premium on the policy remains unpaid for a period of three months or
twelve weeks after the grace period has expired.
The maximum amount of Industrial Life Insurance is 500 times that of the
current statutory daily wage in the City of Manila while Micro insurance’s
maximum is 4000 times of the current daily minimum wage in. Metro Manila.
Thus, while Micro insurance is for the "risk protection of the poor", Industrial Life
Insurance is for the protection of the poorer people.
Industrial Life Insurance shall not lapse for non-payment of premium. if such
non-payment was due to the failure of the insurer to send its representative or
agent to the insured at the residence of the insured or someplace indicated by
him for the purpose of collecting such premium," while failure to collect the-
premium of Micro insurance is not an excuse for non-payment of premium and
the policy will lapse if the premium is not paid;"
In Industrial Life Insurance, the insured has a grace period of thirty days within
which to pay the succeeding premium while no such privilege is provided in
Micro insurance."
A. The Civil Code should be applied and under Article 1319 thereof, an
acceptance made by letter shall not bind the person making the offer except
from the time it came to his knowledge. There was no valid contract as H died
without knowing the acceptance of his application."
(3) Pascuala the legal wife cannot recover because she is not a beneficiary.
The proceeds of the policy should go to the estate of Buenaventura."
Q. Asia Life Insurance Co, insured the life of Arcadio Constantino for a
term of 20 years. The first premium covered the period up to September
26, 1942. After the first payment, no further premium was paid. The
insurer being an American corporation had to close its branch office in
Manila by reason of Japanese occupation i.e., from January 2, 1942, until
the year 1945. The insurer refused to pay the proceeds of the policy and
asserted the policy had lapsed for non-payment of premiums. Onthe other
hand, the beneficiary maintained that inasmuch as the non-payment of
premiums was the consequence of war, it should be excused and should
not cause forfeiture of the policy. Issue: Was the policy effective despite
non-payment of succeeding premiums?
A. Since the year 1917, the Philippine law on Insurance was found in Act no.
2427, as amended, and the Civil Code. Act No. 2427 was largely copied from
the Civil Code of California. And therefore, our insurance law should be
supplemented by the general principles prevailing on the subject in the United
States. In determining the effect of non-pavment of premiums occasioned by
war, the American cases may be divided into three groups, the so called
Connecticut Rule, the New York Rule, or the United States Rule.
The United States Rule declares that the contract is not merely suspended, but
is abrogated by reason of non-payment of premiums, since the time of payment
is peculiarly of the essence of the contract. In keeping with such legislative
policy, the court felt no hesitation to adopt the United States Rule." Hence,
since this rule is adopted in the Philippines, the policy was abrogated.
Q. How may a contract of insurance be perfected?
A. The contract was not perfected. It is only when the insurer accepts the
application and communicates the same to the applicant and the latter pays the
premium while he is in good health that the contract of insurance is perfected.
The insurer's acceptance is manifested when it issues a corresponding policy to
the applicant. Perez died before his application was brought to the head office
of BF Lineman in Manila. There was absolutely no way the acceptance of the
application could have been communicated to the applicant inasmuch as the
applicant was already dead at that time. There can be no contract pf insurance
unless the minds of the parties have met in agreement."
A. "If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of
the contracting parties, the literal meaning of the stipulations shall control." This
provision is akin to the "plain meaning rule" applied by Pennsylvania courts,
which assumes that the intent of the parties to an instrument is embodied in the
writing itself and when the words are clear and unambiguous the intent is to be
discovered only from the express language of the agreement.
A. The insurer was not liable since the insured violated the "Other Insurance
Clause". The terms of the contract were clear and unambiguous. The insured
was specifically required to disclose to the insurer any other insurance and its
particulars which he may have effected on the same subject matter. The
knowledge of such insurance by the insurer's agents, even assuming the
acquisition thereof by the former, was not the "notice" that would estop the
insurer from denying the claim. The parties must abide by the terms of the
contract because such terms constitute the meaning of the insurer's liability and
compliance therewith was a condition precedent to the insured's right to
recovery from the insurer."
Q. Producers Bank obtained an insurance against theft and robbery from
Fortune Insurance. The policy excluded "any loss caused by any
dishonest, fraudulent or criminal act of the insured or any officer,
employee partner, director trustee or authorized representative of the
insured whether acting alone or in conjunction with others". While in the
process of transferring cash in the sum of P725,000 from the Pasay
branch of the insured to its head office in Makati, its amored car carrying
the money was robbed. At the time, the armored car was driven by
Magalong and escorted by Security Guard Atiga. Magalong was assigned
by PRC Management Systems to the insured while Artiga was assigned
by Unicorn Security Services to the insured. After investigation, Magalong
and Artiga, together with three other persons were charged with the
violation of the Anti-Robbery Law. When the insured demanded payment
from the insurer, the latter refused to pay on the ground that the loss was
excluded from the coverage of the policy. Question: Was the loss
excluded by the policy? Yes
A. The loss was excluded by the policy. While the contracts of the insured from
PRC Management and Unicom Security Services provided "labor only",
Magalong and Artiga were, in respect of the transfer of Producer's money from
its Pasay branch to its head office in Makati, its "authorized representatives"
who served as such. Fortune Insurance under the general exception clause of
the policy was not liable for the loss caused by the "authorized representative"
of the insured. While limitations of liability should be regarded with extreme
jealousy and must be construed in such a way as to preclude the insurer from
non- compliance with the obligation, however if the terms of the contracts are
clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction and such terms
cannot be enlarged or diminished by judicial construction.
Q. Felipe obtained a life insurance policy from Insular Life. On June 23,
1999, the policy lapsed due to non-payment of premiums. Felipe applied
for reinstatement of the policy which Insular Life approved with the
following changes on the policy: (1) Extra premium and (2) Waiver of the
accidental death benefit and premium disability. Felipe agreed to the
added conditions. Insula Life issued an endorsement stating "This
certifies that as agreed by the Insured, the reinstatement of this policy has
been approved by the Company on the understanding that the following
changes are made on the policy effective June 22, 1999." Felipe paid the
adjusted premium on Dec. 27, 1999. Felipe died on Sept. 22, 2001. The
beneficiaries filed a claim with the insurer which the latter denied on the
ground of concealment and misrepresentation. The insurer claimed that
the two-year period of incontestability should be counted from Dec. 27,
1999 when the additional premium was paid and from such date to the
death of the insured on Sept. 22, 2001, less than 2 years had elapsed.
A. In the first sentence of the Endorsement, it is not entirely clear whether the
phrase, "effective June 22, 1999" refers to the subject of the sentence, namely,
"the reinstatement of this policy" or to the subsequent phrase, "changes are
made on the policy." Given the obscurity of the language, the construction
favorable to the insured will be adopted by the courts. Accordingly, the subject
policy is deemed reinstated as of June 22, 1999.
A. No. The clause containing the prohibition was ambiguous and must be
construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured. In
ordinary parlance, "oils" means "lubricants" and not gasoline or kerosene.
There was no reason why the prohibition against keeping gasoline in the
premises could not be expressed clearly and in the language and terms that
the general public can readily understand. 37
Q. The Social Security System (SSS) was issued by the insurer with a
group mortgage redemption policy on the lives of its housing loan
mortgagors. Under the scheme, a grantee of housing loan of SSS is
required to mortgage to SSS the house constructed out of the loan and
the lot on which it stands. SSS takes a life insurance policy on the
mortgagor and if the mortgagor dies, the proceeds of his life insurance
will be used to pay his mortgage indebtedness and the deceased's heirs
will be relieved of the burden of paying the loan to SSS. Mortgage
redemption insurance is made compulsory by SSS for all qualified (not
more than 65 years old at the time of the loan and not more than 75 years
old at maturity of the loan) borrowers. A housing loan of P37,000 was
granted to Serrano by SSS. After obtaining a partial release of P35,400
from SSS, Serrano died. The widow tried to avail of the benefits of the
group mortgage redemption insurance but it was denied on the ground
that Serrano was not yet covered by the policy at the time his death.
A. The insurer is not liable. The terms of the policies are clear, express and
specific that only amputation of the hand should be considered as a loss
thereof. An interpretation that would include a mere fracture or other temporary
disability not covered by the policies would be unwarranted.
A. In the case of Ty Vs. National Surety & Assurance Co., Inc., the Supreme
Court ruled that since the policy expressly stipulated that disability means loss
of either hand by amputation, the insured whose left hand was injured but not
amputated was not entitled to the benefits of the policy. In distinguishing the
said case with the case of Ranaton vs. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., the Court
of Appeals pointed out that the injuries sustained by Ty caused only temporary
total disability of his left hand. On the other hand, the injury suffered by
Panaton produced a total paralysis of both legs, resulting in the complete loss
of the use of both legs for life. It seems, therefore, that even if the policy
expressly requires amputation of both legs as a prerequisite for recovery in an
accident insurance, a total permanent paralysis of the legs would be sufficient
to entitle the insured to the proceeds of the policy. After all, where the insured
suffers from permanent total paralysis of both legs, he would be bedridden for
life and the amputation of his legs would not alter the result.
Q. Are insurance contracts entered into by the insured and the insurer on
equal footing?
Q. Philamlife and Eternal Gardens entered into a Group Life Policy under
which the clients of Eternal who purchased burial lots from it on
installment would be insured by Philamlife. Eternal was required under
the policy to submit a list of new lot purchasers, together with a copy of
the application of each purchasers and the amounts of the respective
unpaid balances of all insured lot purchasers. Eternal sent a letter dated
December 29, 1982, containing a list of insurable balances of its lot
buyers. One of those included in the list was John Chuang. Philamlife did
not reply to the said letter. On August 2, 1984 Chuang died. Eternal
demanded payment from Philamlife of the insurance claim for Chuang's
death. Philamlife denied the claim on the ground that no application for
Group Insurance was submitted to Philamlife prior to Chuang's death. The
contact between Philamlife and Eternal stated that the "insurance of any
eligible Lot Purchaser shall be effective on the date he contracts a loan
with the Assured" (Eternal). It was further stated that "there shall be no
insurance if the application of the Lot Purchaser is not approved by the
Company (Philamlife). Question: there valid contract of insurance
covering Chuang's life considering the conflicting provisions of the
policy?
Q. What is suretyship?
A. Such contract was not a contract of insurance, since acting as surety did not
appear to be the vocation of Francisco and it was merely an isolated transaction
incidental to the legitimate activity of Francisco. However, if it wasFrancisco's
vocation to act as surety and therefore, the suretyship contract was part of the
general scheme to distribute losses among a large group of persons bearing
somewhat similar risks, then such contract shall be deemed to be a contract of
insurance.
The "fact that no profit is derived from the making of insurance contract or that
no separate or direct consideration is received therefore shall not be conclusive
to show that the making thereof does not constitute the doing or transacting of
an insurance business.
Q. White Gold Marine Services, Inc. procured protection and indemnity for
its vessels from The Steamship Mutual Underwriting Association which
issued to White Certificate of Entry and Acceptance. Steamship Mutual
was a Protection and Indemnity (P & I) Club, an association composed of
ship owners who band together to provide mutual protection against
liabilities incidental to ship owning that members may incur in favor of
third parties. Steamship Mutual has license to do insurance business in
the Philippines as it claims that it is not doing insurance business. Issue:
Is Steamship Mutual engaged in the insurance business?
A. contract of Insurance other than that of life and accident where the result is
death, is a contract of indemnity by which is meant that the party insured is
entitled to compensation for such loss as has been occasioned by the perils
insured against, the right to recover being commensurate with the loss
sustained. Thus, the measure of insurable interest in property is the extent to
which the insured might be damnified by loss or injury thereof, as the purpose
of insurance is merely to reimburse the insured for his actual loss not exceeding
the amount agreed in the policy.
A. No, the refusal of the insurer to pay was not correct. The insurer was liable
for P5,000,000 since life insurance is not a contract of indemnity as no value
can be placed on human life.
A. C cannot recover from the insurer anymore because the payment of the debt
removed the basis of recovery. C did not suffer any damage since the debt of D
had already been paid Insurance taken by a creditor on the life of the debtor is
a contract of indemnity, provided that the creditor paid the premiums.
Q. A insured his house against fire with X Co. Later, A sold his house to
B. After the sale, the house was totally burned. Question: May B, the new
owner, recover from X Co.?
A. No, since the policy taken by A applied to his interest alone and the sale of
the house did not automatically transfer the policy to B but instead, the policy
was suspended.
Q. A insured his house with X Ins. Co. on January 15. Later, on March 9, A
sold his house to B. On May 9, the house insured was burned. Can A
recover from the insurer? Can B recover from the Insurer? What
characteristics of insurance may be used to prevent A and/or B from
recovering?
A. Insurance is conditional in the sense that the insurer is not obligated to pay
unless the loss arises from the specified perils." However, while a contract of
insurance is a conditional one, there is a distinction between property insurance
and life insurance. In property insurance, the loss may or may not occur, and,
when it occurs, it may be total or partial, while in life insurance, death will
definitely occur so that the time of the happening.
is the only contingent element.
CHAPTER I THE CONTRACT OF INSURANCE.
TITLE 1.
WHAT MAY BE INSURED.
A. The risks that may be insured may either be: (a). one that may cause
damage to the insurer, or (b). one that may create liability against him. Said
risks may be insured against events which are contingent or unknown, whether
past or future.
Q. When is the insurer liable for a past event or loss that occurred before
the policy was issued?
A. An insurer cannot exempt himself from liability by claiming that the cause of
the loss or damage to the thing insured is a fortuitous event where such event is
among the risks included in the policy, for the nature of the obligation of the
insurer requires the assumption of risk, and, accordingly, the insurer is still
responsible even if the event could not be foreseen, or though foreseen, is
inevitable.
Q. Does the insurance taken by one spouse on his or her own life or that
of their children require the consent of the other?
A. "The consent of the spouse is not necessary for married person on his or her
life or that of his or the validity of an insurance policy taken out by her children.
A. "All rights, title and interest in the policy of insurance taken out by an original
owner on the health of the person insured shall automatically vest in the latter
upon the death of the original owner, unless otherwise provided for in the policy.
In case the original owner of a policy taken on the life of another should
predecease the latter, all rights, title and interest in the policy shall automatically
vest in the insured, unless otherwise provided for in the policy. Thus, even if the
original owner of the policy designated himself as beneficiary in a policy
insuring the life of another, the death of the original policy owner. shall
automatically vest title on the policy to the insured. Suppose, however, the
husband took the policy on the life of his son and designated his wife as
beneficiary. In case the husband dies, would his wife be deprived of interest in
the policy so that the insured son could acquire the rights, title and interest
therein? It is submitted, that the interest on the policy should not pass to the
insured person upon the death of the original owner of the policy where another
person was designated as beneficiary. Such a situation should be considered
as an exception because the designation of a third person as beneficiary is
tantamount to a provision in the policy that the rights, title and interest in the
policy should not vest in the insured person when the original owner
predeceases the insured. And it must be borne in mind that by express
provision of Section 3, where the policy provides otherwise, the death of the
original policy owner shall not transfer the rights, title and interest on the policy
to the person whose life was insured.
Q. Juan insured the life of his son, Juan, Jr. and designated himself
(Juan) as beneficiary. Later, Juan died on January 16, 2018. Juan, Jr. died
on April 1, 2018. (1) Since Juan died ahead of Juan Jr., to whom should
the proceeds of the policy go? (2) Suppose the beneficiary is Marian, the
wife of Juan, who should get the proceeds of the policy?
A. (1) The proceeds of the policy should go to the estate of Juan, Jr. because in
case the original owner of a policy taken on the life of another should
predecease the latter, all rights, title and interest in the policy shall automatically
vest in the insured or his estate.
(2) The interest on the policy should not pass to Juan, Jr., the insured upon the
death of the original owner of the policy where another person was designated
as beneficiary. Such a situation should be considered as an exception because
the designation of a third person as beneficiary is tantamount to a provision in
the policy that the rights, title and interest in the policy should not vest in the
insured person. The proceeds should go to Marian, the beneficiary since by
express provision of Section 3, where the policy provides otherwise, the death
of the original policy owner shall not transfer the rights, title and interest on the
policy to the person whose life was insured.
A. "The preceding section does not authorize an insurance for or against the
drawing of any lottery, or for or against any chance or ticket in a lottery drawing
a prize."
A. Gambling may possibly result in a profit, which is not true in insurance, and,
therefore, gambling of any sort may not be insured. Thus, gambling courts
fortune; the insured seeks to avoid misfortune. Gambling tends to increase the
inequality of fortune, while the contract of insurance tends to equalize fortune.
TITLE 2.
PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT.
A. public enemy may not be insured because the purpose of war is to cripple
the power and exhaust the resources of the enemy, and it is inconsistent that
one country should destroy its enemy and repay in insurance the value of what
has been so destroyed, or that it should in such manner increase the resources
of the enemy or render it aid.
A. YES! Abu Nani's policy can continue because he is not a public enemy
within the purview of the Insurance Code. A public enemy is a citizen or subject
of a nation at war with the Philippines. The Philippines is not at war with any
nation and now we have no public enemy. Aside therefrom, a Filipino cannot be
a public enemy in the Philippines because a public enemy must be a citizen of
another country.
A. No the insurer was not liable. The insured became an enemy corporation
because of the outbreak of the war between the United States and the policy
ceased to be allowable as soon as the insured became a public enemy.
However, the premium paid for the period after the insured became a public
enemy should be returned.
A. When a property is mortgaged, the mortgagor and the mortgagee may take
out separate policies with the same or different insurance companies. The
mortgagor may insure the property mortgaged to the full value of such property
while the mortgagee can insure the same only to the extent of the amount of his
credit.
A. A, the owner may insure the house for P500,000 while B, the mortgagee,
may likewise insure the said house for P300,000.
A. Where the mortgagor insures the property mortgaged without making the
loss payable to the mortgagee, upon occurrence of the loss, only the mortgagor
may recover from insurer since the policy taken by the mortgagor shall be
applied exclusively to his interest. However, the mortgage constituted shall
extend to the proceeds of the indemnity paid by the insurer of the mortgaged
property upon occurrence of the loss and, therefore, the mortgagee has a lien
on the proceeds of the policy.
A. Where the mortgagor insures the property mortgaged in his own name
providing that the loss shall be payable to the mortgagee, or assigns the policy
to the mortgagee, the effects thereof are as follows:
1. The insurance is still deemed to be upon the interest of the mortgagor, who
does not cease to be a party to the original contract." It is an insurance on the
property of the mortgagor as owner and not on the interest of the mortgagee,
and accordingly, the contract is one between the insurer and the mortgagor who
is the insured and not one between the insurer and the mortgagee.
Illustration:
A, the mortgagor insured his mortgaged building against fire and made
the loss payable to the mortgagee. Later on, the insurer cancelled the
policy pursuant to a stipulation thereon allowing either party to terminate
the contract by giving notice thereof to the other. The insurer gave notice
of cancellation to the mortgagee and not to the mortgagor. The building
was thereafter burned. Question: Was the insurer liable?
Answer: Yes, the insurer was liable. The cancellation of the policy was not
binding upon the mortgagor since the insurer failed to Comply with its duty to
notify the insured mortgagor of such cancellation of the policy so as to give the
latter ample opportunity to negotiate for another insurance. The notice should
be personal to the insured.
2. Any act of the mortgagor, prior to the loss, which would otherwise avoid the
insurance, will have the same effect although the property is in the hands of the
mortgagee.
Illustrations:
Answer: No, because the act of the mortgagor in violation of the policy avoided
the contract although the loss was made payable to the mortgagee.
Answer: No, Pacific Banking's contention was not correct. Where the insured
who was primarily entitled to receive the proceeds of the policy had by his fraud
and/or misrepresentation, forfeited said right, with more reason, Pacific Banking
which was merely claiming as indorsee of said insured, cannot be entitled to
such proceeds.
Illustration:
Question: Upon occurrence of the loss, who may recover from the
insurer?
5. Upon recovery by the mortgagee to the extent of his credit from the insurer,
the mortgagor is released from his indebtedness.
A. In case the mortgagor insures the mortgaged property and assigns the policy
to the mortgagee, such assignment is merely to afford the mortgagee a greater
security for the settlement of the mortgagor's obligation and should not be
construed as payment in just the same way that delivery of negotiable
instruments does not constitute payment until the proceeds are realized or
collected. By such assignment, therefore, the mortgage indebtedness is not
extinguished until such time as the mortgagee has collected the proceeds of the
policy from the insurer after the occurrence of the loss.
Where the mortgagor pays the insurance premium under the mortgage
redemption life insurance policy, making the loss payable to the mortgagee, the
insurance is still on the mortgagor's interest, and the mortgagor continues to be
a party to the contract, while the mortgagee is simply a beneficiary of the
insurance to the extent of the unpaid indebtedness and does not make the
mortgagee a party to the contract.
A. The action will prosper. Since DBP has already foreclosed the mortgage, the
insurance proceeds shall inure to the benefit of the heirs of Leuterio. Where the
mortgagor pays the insurance premium under a group life insurance policy,
making the loss payable to the mortgagee, the insurance is still on the interest
of the mortgagor who continues to be a party to the contract. Such kind of policy
of insurance upon life or he alth may pass by transfer, will or succession to any
person, whether he has an insurable interest or not, and such person may
recover whatever the insured might have recovered and therefore, the widow of
Leuterno may recover from Grepalife.
A. Where the mortgagee insures his interest in the property without reference to
the right of the mortgagor, the effects of such policy taken are as follows:
1. The mortgagee may collect from the insurer upon the occurrence of the loss
to the extent of his credit.
2. Unless otherwise stated in the policy, the mortgagor has no right to collect
the balance of the proceeds of the policy after payment of the interest of the
mortgagee.
5. The mortgagor is not released from his debt by the insurer' s payment to the
mortgagee-insured.
A. (a) C, the mortgagee, may collect from the insurer only P 2 Million since the
mortgagee's insurable interest on the mortgaged property is limited to the
amount of his credit.
(b) D, the mortgagor has no right to recover the balance of P1 Million since the
policy covered the interest of the mortgagee alone without reference to the
interest of D.
(c) After paying C P2 Million, the insurer is automatically subrogated to the right
of C against D and, therefore, the insurer may collect the amount paid to C from
D, the mortgagor.
(d) C the mortgagee, after collecting the full amount of his credit from the
insurer, can no longer hold D, the mortgagor, liable, since the right of C Over
his credit is transferred to the insurer upon the latter's payment to C, by virtue of
subrogation. However, if C was able to collect only P1.5 Million from the insurer
due to the latter's insolvency, C may collect the balance of P500,000 from D.
(e) Payment by the insurer to the mortgagee will not extinguish the mortgagor's
debt since the insurer is subrogated to the mortgagee's right over the credit.
A. Ordinarily, where the mortgagor insures the property mortgaged and makes
the loss payable to the mortgagee, the mortgagor does not cease to be a party
to the insurance contract and, therefore, any act of his which would otherwise
avoid the policy shall have the same effect. In insurance parlance, such
stipulation is referred to as "open mortgage clause. " But where the policy
contains a "union mortgage clause," instead of an "open mortgage clause," the
mortgagee shall not be affected or prejudiced by any act or neglect of the
mortgagor" since the purpose of the "union mortgage clause" is to provide an
independent contract between the mortgagee and the insurer so that the
mortgagee will be responsible only for his own acts.
TITLE 3
INSURABLE INTEREST
Different persons may have separate insurable interest in the same property.
Thus, in the same property mortgaged, the mortgagor has insurable interest
therein as owner while the mortgagee likewise has insurable interest in such
property to the extent of his lien.
A. An insurable interest on the part of the person taking out the policy is
essential to the validity and enforce ability of the contract of insurance, and if
such interest is lacking, the policy is void.
Q. A made a last will and testament and provided B, his talented student a
legacy of P1 million to be taken out of his estate upon his death.
Question: Does B have insurable interest on the life of A?
A. B does not have insurable interest on the life of A since he will not obtain any
benefit during the lifetime of A. He will be benefited only when A dies. Since B's
interest on the life of A is not the continuance of the life of the latter but on its
loss or destruction, B has no insurable interest on his life.
Q. Pangilinan executed his last will and testament and provided therein a
legacy of P10 million in favor of his closest friend, Espinosa. Does
Espinosa have insurable interest in the life of Pangilinan?
A. Espinosà does not have insurable interest on the not obtain any life of
Pangilinan since he will benefit during the lifetime of Pangilinan. He will be
benefited only when Pangilinan, dies. Since Espinosa's interest on the life of
Pangilinan is not the continuance of the life of the latter but on its loss or
destruction, Espinosa has no insurable interest on his life. Insurable interest in
life must be one in favor of the continuance of life and not an interest in its loss
or destruction.
Q. Upon whose life and health does a person have insurance interest?
"(c) Of any person under a legal obligation to him for the payment of money, or
respecting property or services, of which death or illness might delay or prevent
the performance; and
"(d) Of any person upon whose life any estate or interest vested in him
depends."
Q. Pangilinan executed his last will and testament and provided therein a
legacy of P10 million in favor of his closest friend, Espinosa. Does Espinosa
have insurable interest in the life of Pangilinan?
A. Espinosà does not have insurable interest on the not obtain any life of
Pangilinan since he will benefit during the lifetime of Pangilinan. He will be
benefited only when Pangilinan, dies. Since Espinosa's interest on the life of
Pangilinan is not the continuance of the life of the latter but on its loss or
destruction, Espinosa has no insurable interest on his life. Insurable interest in
life must be one in favor of the continuance of life and not an interest in its loss
or destruction.
Q. Upon whose life and health does a person have insurance interest?
"(c) Of any person under a legal obligation to him for the payment of money, or
respecting property or services, of which death or illness might delay or prevent
the performance; and
"(d) Of any person upon whose life any estate or interest vested in him
depends."
Q. A person has insurable interest in the life and health of any person on
whom he depends wholly or in part for education or support. Who are
obliged to support each other?
1. The spouse;
2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
3. Parents and acknowledged natural children and the legitimate or the
illegitimate descendants of the latter;
4. Parents and natural children by legal fiction and the legitimate and illegitimate
descendants of the latter;
5. Parents and illegitimate children, who are not natural; and
6. Brothers and sisters.
Q. Does the creditor have insurable interest in the life of the debtor?
A. A creditor has an insurable interest in the life of his debtor, at least to the
extent of the indebtedness. Thus, a person has insurable interest on the life of
another "under a legal obligation to him for the payment of money, or respecting
property o services, of which death or illness might delay or prevent the
performance. “
However, insurance on the life of the debtor to be valid must for an
amount which is not grossly disproportionate to the amount of the obligation,
otherwise the policy is not valid for being a wagering contract. Thus, the test of
a creditor's insurable interest is whether the amount of the debt is reasonably
proportionate to the amount of the insurance which he contracts. If the debt is
so small as to be out of proportion to the amount of insurance, the creditor lacks
insurable interest and the contract of insurance is nothing more than a wagering
scheme. For instance, C granted a loan to D amounting to P700. C then insured
the life of D for P30, 000. Such policy was a mere wagering contract and
therefore not valid.
A. Insurable interest in life must exist at the time of the effectivity of the policy
and need not exist at time of the death of the insured, as life insurance is not a
contract of indemnity. Hence, where a life insurance policy is valid at its
inception by reason of the existence of insurable interest at the time, the
subsequent diminution or cessation of that interest does not invalidate the
policy." However insurable interest of a creditor on the life of a debtor must exist
not only at the time the policy takes effect, but also at the time of the debtor's
death, for such kind of life insurance is still a contract of indemnity.
Where the wife insures the life of the husband, a subsequent divorce
does not terminate the policy since in life insurance, the fact that insurable
interest ceases before the death of the insured is immaterial.
Q. Christine and Renmarc got married on May 9, 2015. Christine insured
the life of Renmarc on June 20, 2015 with Christine as beneficiary. After a
violent quarrel, their marriage was annulled on September 27, 2017. The
annulment was too much for Renmarc to bear and so on March 9, 2018,
Renmarc died of heart failure. Christine filed a claim with the insurance
company for payment of the proceeds of the insurance on Renmarc's life.
The insurance company refused to pay on the ground that after the
annulment of their marriage, Christine lost her insurable interest on the
life of Renmarc. Decide with reason.
A. Christine may recover the proceeds of the policy even if her marriage with
Renmarc was already annulled at the time of the death of the latter because
insurable interest in life need exist only at the time of the effectivity of the policy
and need not exist at time of the death of the insured, as life insurance is not a
contract of indemnity.
Q. Must the beneficiary have insurable interest on the life of the insured?
A. A person procuring insurance on his own life may name anyone he chooses
as beneficiary thereof, even though he is stranger and has no insurable interest
in the life insured. However, a person who cannot receive donation from the
insured under Article 739 of the Civil Code cannot be designated as beneficiary.
The rule is different in property insurance where the law requires that the
beneficiary must have an insurable interest in the property insured.
A. While the general principle is that a person may lawfully take out a policy of
insurance on his own life and make the benefit payable to whomsoever pleases
regardless of whether the beneficiary has an insurable interest or not, however,
it is necessary that such designation be made in good faith without fraud or
intent to enter into a wagering contract. Thus, it was held that the policy was not
valid where it was procured by the insured, on the inducement of the
beneficiary, for the purpose of enabling the latter in which he had no insurable
interest and thereby evade the law against speculative and wagering insurance.
A. The life insurance policies were void and without force and effect for reasons
of public policy and not being based on the existence of insurable interest on
the part of Luis Parco on the life of Misterioso San Juan. The insurance policies
in question belonged to the wagering or speculative classes designed to
perpetrate a massive fraud against the insurance companies.
A. In the case of Social Security System, et al. vs. Gloria de los Santos & the
Supreme Court ruled that a wife who left her husband and lived with another
man is no longer entitled to receive Social Security benefits upon the death of
the husband because she was no longer dependent upon him for her support.
Q. Less than a year after the marriage of Antonio de los Santos and Gloria
de los Santos, the latter left Antonio and contracted another marriage with
Domingo Talens in 1965. In 1969, Gloria went back to Antonio and lived
with him until 1983 when she again left Antonio and went to the United
States where she obtained a divorce from Antonio. In the meantime,
Antonio married Cirila de los Santos and amended his SSS records by
changing his beneficiary from Gloria to Cirila. Antonio died and Gloria
claimed the SSS insurance benefits. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
marriage between Antonio and Gloria still subsisted and the subsequent
marriages contracted by them were void. Thus, the Court of Appeals ruled
that Gloria was still the legal wife of Antonio hence entitled to the SSS
benefits. Question Should Gloria be entitled to the SSS benefits?
A. The divorce obtained by Gloria against Antonio was not binding in this
jurisdiction. Under Philippine law, only aliens may obtain divorce abroad
provided they are valid according to their national law. The divorce was
obtained by Gloria while she was still a Filipino citizen, hence it did not sever
her marriage with Antonio. However, although Gloria was the legal spouse, she
is still disqualified to be his primary beneficiary under the SSS law. A wife who
left her family until her husband died and lived with other men was not
dependent upon her husband for support, financial or otherwise, during the
same period.
Gloria left the conjugal abode and lived with two different men. These facts
remove her from qualifying as a primary beneficiary of her deceased husband.
A. "The insured shall have the right to change the beneficiary he designated in
the policy, unless he has expressly waived this right in said policy.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the insured does not change the
beneficiary during his lifetime, the designation shall be deemed irrevocable.
A. When a beneficiary has been designated and the right to change him has
been expressly waived in the policy, he could not be deprived of his vested
interest by the insured by putting an end to the policy. Should the insured
discontinue paying premiums, the beneficiary may continue paying it and be
entitled to automatic extended term or paid-up insurance options.
A. The petition should be denied. It is only with the consent of all the
beneficiaries that any change or amendment to the policy concerning the
irrevocable beneficiaries may be legally and validly effected. There is no other
exception thus; abrogating the contention of Dimayuga that said designation
can be amended if the court finds a just, reasonable ground to do so. The
consent given by the minors was not effective since they cannot validly give
their consent to the change of beneficiaries.
However, where the insurance was taken on the life of a minor, the death of the
original owner of the policy shall automatically vest in the minor all rights, title
and interest in the policy.
Q. Elvis procured a life insurance policy and designated his son, Elvis, Jr.
as beneficiary. While Elvis and Elvis, Jr. were riding a car, they met an
accident. Elvis, Jr. died 1 day ahead of Elvis. To whom should the
proceeds of the policy go?
On the other hand, where the beneficiary is revocable and therefore, does not
have vested interest in the policy at the time of his death, his estate or legal
representatives derives no interest from or through him, but the right to the
proceeds passes to the estate of the insured.
The proceeds of the policy shall likewise pass to the estate of the insured where
the proceeds of the policy were payable to the beneficiary "if surviving" and he
died before the insured's death.
The designation of the beneficiary is revocable unless the right to change the
beneficiary has been waived and hence, in this case the proceeds should go to
the estate of the insured, Elvis.
A. In the event the insured does not change the beneficiary during his lifetime,
the designation shall be deemed irrevocable. The revocation of the beneficiary
therefore, should be done during the lifetime of the insured. Hence, the
revocation of the beneficiary cannot be done in the last will and testament of the
insured because it takes effect upon the death of the insured.
Q. In case the beneficiary did not submit an insurance claim against the
insurer because he did not know of the existence of the insurance, is he
bound by the prescriptive period stated in the contract?
A. No. It was incumbent upon the agent to give proper notice of the existence of
the insurance coverage and the stipulation in the insurance contract for filing a
claim to the beneficiary upon the death of the insured. The agent and not the
beneficiary shall bear the loss. It is unfair to deny the claim of the beneficiary
where he was unable to file the claim within the period provided in the policy in
case he did not even know the policy existed.
A. The Platinum 2-in-1 Savings and Insurance account was BPI's commercial
product, offering the insurance coverage for free for every deposit account
opened. Rheozel directly communicated with BPI, the agent of FGU. BPI, as
agent of FGU had the primary responsibility to ensure that the 2-in-1 account be
reasonably carried out with full disclosure to the parties concerned, particularly
the beneficiaries. Thus, it was incumbent upon BPI to give proper notice of the
existence of the insurance coverage and the stipulation in the insurance
contract for filing a claim to Laingo, as Rhoezel's beneficiary, upon the latter's
death. Since BPI is the agent of FGU then notice of death of Rhoezel to BPI is
considered as notice to FGU. Both BPI and FGU shall bear the loss and must
compensate Laingo for actual damages and FGU must pay the proceeds of the
policy.
Although the law specifically mentioned only the act of "willfully'" killing the
insured, it has been ruled that such act must not only be willful or intentional but
must likewise be felonious. And where the killing was unintentional or not
felonious, the beneficiary will not be denied recovery by reason of his causing
the death of the insured.
Q. Under Section 89, "an insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the
willful act or through the connivance of the insured." Suppose X who had
insurable interest in the life of Y insured the latter and had himself (X)
designated as beneficiary. Thereafter, X willfully killed Y. Is the insurer
exempted from liability as apparently provided for in Section 89 or, would
the insurer be liable to (a) the other beneficiaries who are not disqualified,
or (b) in accordance with the policy contract, or (c) to the estate of the
insured as provided for in Section12?
Q. Marco insured his life with X Co., and designated Ganda as beneficiary.
Ganda killed Marco. (1) May Ganda recover from the insurer? (2) If Ganda
cannot recover from the insurer,
who may recover?
A. (1) Ganda cannot recover from the insurer even if she is the beneficiary
because she killed the insured, and hence, her interest as beneficiary in the
policy has been forfeited.
(2) The share forfeited shall pass on to the other beneficiaries, unless otherwise
disqualified. In the absence of other beneficiaries, the proceeds shall be paid in
accordance with the policy contract. If the policy contract is silent, the proceeds
shall be paid to the estate of the insured.
A. The test of insurable interest in property is whether the insured has such a
right, title, or interest therein, or relation thereto that he will be benefited by its
preservation and continued existence, or suffer a direct pecuniary loss from its
destruction or injury by the peril insured against.
Examples:
(a)A son has no insurable interest in the property of his father," as his
interest in such property is a mere expectancy not founded on an actual
right or valid contact for it.
(b)The owner of a parcel of land has insurable interest on expected crops
even before they are sown.
(c) The owner of ship has insurable interest on expected freightage.
A. Yes, because the destruction of the textiles will mean pecuniary loss to him
as he will be deprived of the compensation he would be entitled to for dyeing
the same, not to mention his pecuniary liability for labor and expenses.
2. In property insurance, the interest must exist at the time the policy takes
effect and at the time of the loss ; while in the life insurance, interest need exist
only at the time the insurance takes effect except in life insurance taken by the
creditor on the life of debtor wherein interest must also exist at the time of the
loss.
3. Insurable interest in property is limited to the actual value of the damage the
insured may suffer, while in life, there is no limit on the amount of insurable
interest unless it is based on creditor-debtor relationship.
Q. Spouses Nilo and Stella Cha entered into a contract of lease with CKS
which provided that the lessees "shall not insure against fire the chattels,
merchandise, textiles, goods and effects placed at any stall or store or
space in the leased premises without first obtaining the written consent
and approval of the LESSOR. If the LESSEE obtain(s) the insurance
without the consent of the LESSOR then the policy is deemed assigned
and transferred to the LESSOR for its own benefit." Notwithstanding the
said stipulation, the Cha spouses insured against fire the merchandise
inside the leased premises for P500,000 with United Insurance without the
written consent of CKS. On the day the lease was to expire, fire broke out
inside the leased premises and burned the insured merchandise. When
CKS learned of the insurance earlier procured by the Cha spouses, it
wrote the insurer a demand letter asking that the proceeds of the
insurance be paid directly to CKS, based on its lease contract with the
Cha spouses. Question: Can CKS recover from the insurer the proceeds
of the insurance procured by Cha spouses?
A. CKS cannot recover. A non-life insurance policy Such as the fire insurance
policy taken by the Cha spouses over their merchandise is a contract of
indemnity. Insurable interest in the property insured must exist at the time the
insurance takes effect and at the time the loss occurs. The basis of such
requirement of insurable interest in property insured is based on sound public
policy: to prevent a person from taking out an insurance olicy on property upon
which he has no insurable interest and collecting the proceeds of said property
in case of loss. In such a case, the contract of insurance is a mere wager which
is void. It cannot be denied that CKS has no insurable interest in the goods and
merchandise inside the leased premises. Therefore, CKS cannot be a
beneficiary of the fire insurance policy taken by Cha spouses. The automatic
assignment of the policy to CKS under the provision of the lease contract is void
for being contrary to law and/or public policy. The proceeds of the fire insurance
policy thus rightfully belong to the spouses Cha.
The insurer cannot be compelled to pay the proceeds of the fire insurance
policy to a person (CKS) who has no insurable interest in the property insured.
A. The beneficiary in life insurance need not have insurable interest in the life
insured while the beneficiary in property insurance must have insurable interest
in the property insured.
A. In property insurance, an insurable interest must exist both at the time of the
effectivity of the contract and at the time of the loss, while in life insurance, it is
ordinarily sufficient if an insurable interest exists at the inception of the contract
except when the life insurance is procured by a creditor on the life of a debtor.
This distinction is based on the fact that property insurance is a contract of
indemnity, while life insurance is not.
A. Neither A nor B may collect from the insurance company. A may not collect
because although he had insurable interest at the time the insurance took
effect, he did not have insurable interest at the time of the loss, as he already
sold the house. B may not also collect because he did not have insurable
interest at the time the policy took effect although he had insurable interest at
the time of the loss. Since the transfer of the house to B did not include the
transfer of the policy, said policy is suspended.
Q. Mr. Simeon Garcia bought a house and lot from Mr. Sixto Gatchalian.
Receiving the agreed price, Mr. Gatchalian delivered to Mr. Garcia the
deed of sale, certificate of title, fire insurance policy for the building, and
other documents. The deed of sale was registered and a new title was
issued in the name of Mr. Simeon Garcia, but no request was made for the
transfer of the fire insurance policy. After one month, the building was
destroyed by fire of accidental origin which razed the whole block where
the building was located. Question: Under the facts enumerated above,
who had the right to collect the value of the policy?
A. No one may collect from the insurer because when Gatchalian sold the
house insured to Garcia without effecting the transfer of the policy, the contract
was thereby suspended and since the loss occurred while the policy was
suspended, the insurer was not liable. Furthermore, an insurable interest must
exist when the insurance take effect and when the loss occurs and neither
Garcia nor Gatchalian had insurable interest both at the effectivity of the policy
and at the time the loss.
Q. What is the meaning of change of "interest that will suspend the policy
unless accompanied by change of interest in the policy? Give
illustrations/examples.
Illustrations:
(a)The property insured against fire was mortgaged without the consent
of the insurer.
Question: Was there an alienation of the property insured which would
suspend the insurance?
Answer: No, the policy was not suspended since the interest in the
property insured did not pass by mere execution of a mortgage.
(c) A judgment debtor whose property has been sold on execution retains
insurable interest therein until the right to redeem or have the sale set
aside has been lost.
(d)A mortgagor whose property has been foreclosed still has insurable
interest on such property for he retains the equity or right of
redemption. Such interest is terminated only by a failure to redeem
within the specified time.
(e)A vendor who has not absolutely parted with all his rights respecting
the property, still has insurable interest on the property sold to the
extent of the interest retained. Thus, the vendor who has a lien on the
property sold until the purchase price is paid or the conditions of the
sale are performed retains insurable interest in such property.
In the foregoing examples, the policy will not be suspended since
the insured is not divested of his entire interest in the property insured.
The policy subsists to the extent of the interest retained by the insured.
A. The following are the exceptions to the rule that policy is suspended by the
transfer of interest is the thing insured without corresponding transfer of the
insurance:
1. When there is a prohibition against alienation or change of interest without
the consent of the insurer in which case the policy is not merely suspended but
avoided.
7. When the policy is so framed that it will inure to the benefit of whomsoever,
during the continuance of the risk, may become the owner of the interest
insured.
A. Johann cannot recover the loss of Unit 27 because the policy was
suspended insofar as Unit 27 was concerned because Johann sold it. He may
recover the loss of Unit 29 because change of interest in one or more of several
distinct things, separately insured by one policy, does not avoid the insurance
as to others. The Sale of Unit 27 did not affect the insurance as to Unit 29.
Q. Example: A fire insurance policy provided that the loss was: "Payable to the
San Miguel Brewery, mortgagee, as its interest may appear, the remainder to
whosoever, during the continuance of the risk, may become the owner of the
interest insured." The property insured was sold without transferring the policy
to the buyer. Question: Is the buyer entitled to recover?
A. Answer: Yes, because the transfer of the thing insured need not be
accompanied by the transfer of the policy, as it was so framed that it will inure
to the benefit of whomsoever during the continuance of the risk may become
the owner of the interest insured.
2. A change of interest, by will or succession, on the death of the insured
passes the interest in the insurance to the person taking his interest in the thing
insured.
Q. Example: А insured his house against fire. Thereafter, A died leaving as his
only heir, B who inherited the house. The house was burned. Question: May B
recover from the insurer?
A. Answer: B may recover from the insurer because the transfer of the house
to B by succession upon death of A carried with it the transfer of the policy.
3. Transfer of interest by one of several partners, joint owners, or owners in
common who are jointly insured, to the others.
Q. When is the policy not suspended despite the transfer of interest in the
subject matter of insurance without transfer of interest in the policy?
A. The following are the exceptions to the rule that the policy is suspended by
the transfer of interest in the subject-matter insured without corresponding
transfer of the insurance:
1. When there is a prohibition against alienation or change of interest without
the consent of the insurer in which case the policy is not merely suspended but
avoided.
2. In case of life, accident, and health insurance.
3. A change of interest in a thing insured, after the occurrence of an injury which
results in a loss.
4. A change of interest in one or more of several distinct things, separately
insured by one policy, does not avoid the insurance as to others.
5. A change of interest, by will or succession, on the death of the insured
passes the interest in the insurance to the person taking the interest in the
things insured.
6. A transfer of interest by one of several partners, joint owners or owners, in
common, who are jointly insured, to the others.
7. When the policy is so framed that it will inure to the benefit of whomsoever,
during the continuance of the risk, may become the owner of the interest
insured.
A. The reason why a change of interest will not affect an insurance upon life,
health or accident is that such kind of policies are not regarded as contracts of
indemnity and, therefore, insurable interest need exist only at the time the
insurance takes effect. And accordingly, the loss of insurable interest at the time
of the happening of the event insured against will not affect the right of recovery
from the insurer.
Q. Why is the insurance not suspended when the transfer of the thing
insured occurred after the loss?
A. After the loss occurs, the right of the insured under the policy becomes fixed
and a subsequent conveyance by the insured cannot affect the insurer's
liability.
Example: A insured his house against fire. One month later, one-half of the
house was burned. After filing a claim for the partial loss, A sold what remained
of the house to B. Such transfer will not affect the right of A to recover from the
insurer.
A. "Every stipulation in a policy of insurance for the payment of loss whether the
person insured has or has not any interest in the property insured, or that the
policy shall be received as proof of such interest, and every policy executed by
way of gaming or wagering, is void. Thus, every stipulation in an insurance
contract:
(a) for the payment of loss whether the person insured has or has no insurable
interest in the subject matter of insurance, or
(b) that the policy shall be received as proof of such interest, and
(c) every policy executed by way of gaming or wagering is void.
TITLE 4 CONCEALMENT
Q. What is concealment?
Q. Must the insured reveal information about his health which he acquired
after the effectivity of the policy?
A. Where an information was acquired after the effectivity of the policy, a failure
to communicate the same to the other will not entitle the latter to rescind the
contract on the ground of concealment of material fact. The reason is that after
the policy has taken effect, information subsequently acquired could no longer
be material as it will not influence a party anymore to enter into such contract.
Thus, whether or not the nondisclosure of a fact constitutes concealment is
determined as of the time the contract of insurance takes effect, and does not
depend upon or is affected by subsequent events or facts after the contract is
completed.
Q. Erwin applied for life insurance on January 16, 2018 with X Ins. Co. At
that time Erwin did not know of any ailment that he has. On January 21,
2018, he had himself physically examined and he found out that he had
heart ailment and kidney disease. On January 28, 2018 the life insurance
policy of Erwin was issued and he did not inform the insurer about his
ailment, believing that he need not reveal the same to the insurer because
he acquired knowledge thereof after he applied for life insurance. Was
Erwin guilty of concealment?
A. Erwin was quilty of concealment because he failed to inform the insurer of
the ailment he acquired knowledge of before the effectivity of the policy. There
is a continuing duty on the part of an applicant to disclose newly discovered
matters arising between the application for, and the confirmation and effectivity
of the contract, where they come to the applicant's knowledge and render his
former answers no longer true.
A. While the general rule is that a party is bound to disclose a material change
occurring after the application and before the effectivity of the contract,
however, such rule does not apply:
a) where the policy provides that if the application is approved and the
policy is issued, it shall be in force from the date of the application, and
b) where the change occurs after the consummation of the insurance
orally although the formal policy has not been issued yet.
Q. What is the right of the injured party where the other is guilty of
concealment? Must concealment be intentional?
Q. What is the effect of concealment and what is the basis of such rule?
A. The insurer was not liable because concealment entitled the other to rescind
the contract.
A. The facts that a party is bound to communicate are those of which he makes
no warranty. it is not necessary to communicate or disclose matters concerning
which the insured makes a warranty, express or implied. Thus, where no inquiry
is made, the assured need not disclose matters affecting the seaworthiness of
the vessel, since seaworthiness is a warranty implied in marine insurance.
The reason is that where a fact is covered by a warranty, express or
implied, it is superfluous to require disclosure. However, when a fact proves or
tends to prove the falsity of a warranty, it must be revealed to the other. Thus,
the insured's concealment of facts or information that falsifies a warranty is in all
cases to be deemed a fraud that vitiates the policy, such as the concealment of
an incident which proves or tends to prove the falsity of the implied warranty of
seaworthiness of the vessel insured.
Α. A party is under no duty to disclose to the other what the latter already
knows or ought to know. Such rule is not limited to facts known personally to a
party but extends to matters known to his agent. Thus, any information material
to the transaction either possessed by the agent at the time of transaction or
acquired by him before its completion, is deemed to be knowledge of the
principal at least so far as the transaction is concerned even though in fact
knowledge is not communicated to the principal at all. Knowledge, therefore, of
the insurer's agent is knowledge of the insurer 345 345 However, where the
agent of the insurer fraudulently conspired with the insured, knowledge of the
agent will not bind the insurer.
Q. Sibya, Jr. applied for life Insurance with Sun Life. In his application for
insurance, he indicated that he had sought advice for kidney problems.
He indicated in his application: "Last 1987, had undergone lithoripsy due
to kidney stone under Dr. Jesus Benjamin Mendoza at National Kidney
Institute, discharged after 3 days, no recurrence as claimed." On February
5, 2001, Sun Life approved Sibya's application and issued the life
insurance policy. On May 11, 2001, Sibya died of gunshot wound. Sun Life
sought to rescind the policy on the ground of concealment. Sun Life
claimed that Sibya did not disclose his previous medical treatment at the
NKI in May and August 1994. The beneficiaries claimed that the insured
did not commit concealment or misrepresentation and he even authorized
Sun Life to inquire further into his medical history for verification
purposes. Issue: Was the insured guilty of concealment or
misrepresentation?
Q. What are the matters each party ought to know and need not be
communicated to the other? Give examples of each.
Q. In the application for life insurance, the insured was asked if he had
ever submitted himself to any infirmary, sanitarium or hospital for
consultation and treatment. He answered that he was confined for 5 days
at the Quezon Memorial Hospital for influenza in 1947. It turned out that he
had been twice confined at the Alzona Clinic in Lucena City, the first was
on July 19-23, 1959, and the second was from January 29, 1960 which
were not mentioned by the insured. Question: Was there a waiver of
information as to the confinement at Alzona Clinic?
A. NO. There was no waiver of information. The answer of the insured to the
question propounded by the insurer was complete and the latter had the right to
rely on the correctness thereof. The insurer, having been informed that the
insured had been confined at the Quezon Memorial Hospital in 1947, without
mentioning his confinement at the Alzona Clinic, had the right to rely that the
insured had not been confined in any other hospital or clinic. There would have
been a waiver of further information if., on its face, the answer appeared to be
incomplete or ambiguous; if the insured had merely answered "Yes", to the
question "Have you ever been to any infirmary, sanitarium or hospital for
consultation and treatment? and the insurer did not make any further inquiry.
A. NO! There was no concealment since the insurer impliedly waived the
information. The information communicated by Kwang Nam was imperfect and
sufficient to have induced the insurer to make further l inquiries about the
ailment and operation of the insured. The failure of the insurer to make further
inquiries constituted a waiver of imperfection of the answer and rendered the
omission to answer more fully immaterial. Kwang Nam had informed the
insurer's medical examiner that the tumor for which he was operated on was
"associated with ulcer of stomach". In the absence of evidence that the insured
had sufficient knowledge as to enable him to distinguish between "peptic ulcer"
"tumor", his statement that said tumor was associated with ulcer of stomach"
should be construed as an expression made in good faith of his belief as to the
nature of his ailment and operation.
A. Waiver of medical examination of the applicant for life insurance should not
be construed as a waiver of material information, since the waiver of medical
examination is made where the insured represents himself to be of good health.
It is reasonable to assume that had the insured revealed material information
concerning his health, the insurer would not have waived the medical
examination.
A. The contention was without merit. The information required of the insured
concerning her previous condition of health constituted an important factor,
which the insurer took into consideration in deciding whether to issue the policy
or not. It was because the insured had given herself a clean bill of health that
the insurer had no longer considered an actual medical check-up necessary.
A. Yes. Since the waiver of a medical examination renders even more material
the information required of the applicant concerning previous condition of health
and diseases suffered because such information constitutes an important factor
which the insurer takes into consideration whether to issue the policy or not.
The fact concealed must be material to entitle the other to rescind the
policy. A fact is immaterial where the knowledge or ignorance of it will naturally
influence the judgment of the Insurer in deciding Whether he will enter into the
contract, or in estimating the degree and character of the risk., or in fixing the
rate of premium. It operates as an inducement to the usurer to enter into the
contract, where, except for such inducement, it would not have done so, or
would have charged a higher premium.
Example:
In an application for life insurance, the insured was asked, "Have you ever
been to any infirmary, sanitarium or hospital for consultation and treatment? "
Question: Was the information sought by the insurer material?
Answer: YES. The information sought was material. The insurer had
asked specific question not a general one. Matters subject of special inquiries
are deemed conclusively material.
A. The test of materiality is whether knowledge of the true facts would have
influenced a prudent insurer in determining whether to accept the risk or in
fixing the amount of premiums. That is, if answers to questions propounded by
the insurer are such as may influence it in determining whether to accept risk
and what premium to charge, such answers are material and must be truthful.
Thus, every fact is material which increases the risk or which, if disclosed, might
have led the company to decline the risk, or to accept the risk only for higher
premium.
Examples:
(a) Material illness:
1. Operation for removal of infected cyst from abdomen, attacks of "acute
cholicystitis" or serious infection of the gall from bladder.
2 Cerebral congestion and Bell's palsy, cancer and disease of the
kidneys.
(b) Immaterial illness:
1. A mere cold or slight attack of influenza.
2. Attack of diarrhea about two years previously.
Q. Is causal connection between the fact concealed and the cause of the
loss or death necessary?
A. The insurer was (not) liable since the fact concealed was material although
the insured did not die of the fact concealed.
Q. Bacani applied for a non-medical life insurance. Despite the fact that
he was asked if he consulted health practitioner any doctor or within the
past 5 years, the insured did not inform the insurer that two weeks prior to
his application for insurance, he was examined and confined at the Lung
Center of the Philippines, where he was diagnosed for renal failure. The
insured died in a plane crash. The beneficiaries contended that since the
fact concealed had no bearing with the cause of death of the insured, the
insurer was liable Question: Was such contention correct?
A. NO! The contention of the beneficiaries was not correct. The insured need
not die of the disease he failed to disclose to the insurer, It is sufficient that his
non-disclosure misled the insurer in forming his estimates of the risk of the
proposed insurance policy or in making inquiries. The insurer was not liable.
A. NO! "Information of the nature or amount of the interest of one insured need
not be communicated unless in answer to an inquiry, except as prescribed by
Section 51."
The insured need not communicate the nature or amount of his interest
except: (a) when the insurer makes an inquiry thereon, and (b) where the
insured is not the absolute owner of the property insured.
TITLE 5
REPRESENTATION
A. "A representation may be made at the time of, or before, issuance of the
policy. Since representation is an inducement to a contract of insurance, it
must, ordinarily, be made at the time of issuing the policy, or before it. It is
submitted, however, that representation may likewise be made after the
issuance of the policy when the purpose thereof is to induce the insurer to
modify an existing insurance contract since the provisions on representation are
applicable not only to the original formation of an insurance but also to its
modification.
Q. A insured his building against fire. After the policy was issued, A
realized that the premiums charged were higher because a part of the
building was occupied by a bakery. A asked the insurer to reduce the
premium for the unexpired portion of the policy on the pretext that the
bakery was no longer in the building when, it truth, it was still there. The
insurer reduced the premium. Question: Did the insured make a
misrepresentation?
Q. H bought a car for P2,800. H then gave the car as a gift to his wife. The
wife in applying for insurance on the said car represented that the "price
paid by the proposer" was P3,500 and the present value was P3,000.
Question: Considering that the wife who insured the car did not pay the
price as it was merely given to her as a gift, was she guilty of
misrepresentation?
Q. The insured represented that he did not drink beer or other intoxicants.
The truth, however was that he drank beer occasionally. Question: Was
there a misrepresentation that entitled the insurer to rescind the policy?
A. No, because the representation need not be literally true. Occasional drinking
by the insured was not a material circumstance that entitled the insurer to rescind
the policy.
Q. A purchased a car for P2,800. A gave the said car to his wife and
informed her that the value of the car was P3,000. The wife insured the car
and represented to the insurer's agent that according to her husband the
value the car was P3,000. Question: Was the insured guilty of
misrepresentation?
A. No, because the insured did not state of her own knowledge that the
automobile originally costP3,000, or that its value at the time of the insurance
was P3,000. She merely repeated the information given by her husband, and at
the Same time disclosed to defendant's agent the source of her information.
A. Although the general rule is that information received from others and of
which the insured has no personal knowledge need not be communicated to the
insurer, however, in the following cases, the insured must disclose information
received from another person:
1. When the information material to the transaction was acquired by the agent
of the insured, since knowledge of the agent is also knowledge of the principal.
In such case, the insured must not only reveal the information acquired from his
agent but is likewise responsible for its truth provided that it is the duty of the
agent to give the information.
2. In marine insurance, the information as to the belief or expectation of a third
person, in reference to a material fact, is material and must, therefore, be
communicated to the insurer.
Q. When is representation deemed to be false?
A. The policy may be avoided. There can be no Recovery from the insurer
where the answers given by the insured were substantially false on a material
point.
Q. The insured was required to answer questions in the application for life
insurance as to what physicians had been consulted by, or had treated
the applicant. The applicant answered in the negative knowing that he had
been confined in a hospital and treated on a number of occasions for
various ailments, including incipient pulmonary tuberculosis. Question:
Upon death of the insured, may the beneficiary recover from the insurer?
A. There can be no recovery from the insurer since the answers given by the
insured were substantially false.
Q. What is the consequence if the applicant for insurance made truthful
statements to the agent of the insurer but the agent misrepresented the
facts?
Q. The applicant tor life insurance and members of his family disclosed to
the insurance agent to whom the application was made, that the applicant
had a lung trouble and had been confined in a sanitarium. Said applicant
merely signed the application form in blank and the agent filled in the
answers negativing ill health. Question: In an action on the policy, may
the insurer raise the defense of misrepresentation?
A. Where the age of the insured was falsely stated or misstated, the policy will
not be avoided but instead, the value of the insurance will be adjusted in such a
way that the “amount payable or benefit accruing under the policy shall be such
as the premium paid would have purchased at the correct age." Such principle,
however, is applicable only when there was a valid and binding contract, not
procured by fraud and where there was only an innocent misstatement of age
and does not apply where the difference between the true age and the age
given was so great that there was no doubt that it was knowingly and purposely
exaggerated by the insured.
Q. What is the effect of acceptance of premium payment after the insured
has violated the policy of insurance?
A. Where the insurer was aware of a violation of the policy at the time of the
acceptance of premium the insurer is barred from raising such violation as a
defense. However, where the insurer was not aware of a violation of the policy
at the time of the acceptance of premium, the insurer is not barred from raising
such violation as a defense.
A. The refusal of the insurer to pay was not correct because it was barred by
estoppel from claiming forfeiture of the policy. Lapuz indicated in her application
that she was 65 years of age by stating her date of birth and yet the insurer
accepted payment of premium and issued the policy.
A. Yes, rescission was made within the period provided by law because the
insurance company more than a month previous to the commencement of the
present action, wrote the beneficiary and informed him that the company
was offering to refund the premium which the insured paid, upon the return of
the policy for cancellation. Such offer operated to rescind the contract
A. The insurer cannot invoke the violation of the policy as a defense. If, with the
knowledge of the existence of other insurances in violation of the policy, the
insurer preferred to continue the policy, its action amounted to a waiver of the
rescission of the contract.
Q. The insurer had knowledge that the premises insured against fire did
not have the number of fire hydrants required in the policy. Question: May
the insurer later on refuse payment of the loss?
A. The denial of the claim was not correct. Lapuz did not conceal her age
having stated in her application her date of birth which showed that she was
almost 65 years of age. The issuance of the policy by the insurer and its
subsequent failure to cancel the policy before the accident happened despite
the departure from the exclusionary condition contained in the said policy
constituted a waiver of such condition.
A. No, Pacifc Banking's contention Was, Not correct. Where the insured who
was primarily entitled to receive the proceeds of the policy had by fraud and or
misrepresentation, forfeited said right with more reason, Pacific Banking which
was claiming as indorsee of said insured cannot be entitled.
A. "After a policy of life insurance made payable on the death of the insured
shall have been in force during the lifetime of the insured for a period of two (2)
years from the date of its issue or of its last reinstatement, the insurer cannot
prove that the policy is void ab initio or is rescindable by reason of the
fraudulent concealment Or misrepresentation of the insured or his agent."
Q. What is the meaning of the incontestable clause and what are the
requisites thereof?
A. The insurer was liable because the policy became incontestable after the
lapse of two years and therefore the insurer cannot rescind or annul the policy
on the ground of concealment misrepresentation of the insured.
A. Prior to the cases of Manila Bankers Lite Insurance Corp. v. Aban,7 and Sun
Life Canada (Phils.), Inc. vs. Sibya, et al. the "incontestability clause" which
precluded the insurer from raising the defenses of false representations or
concealment of material facts applied if the insurance had been in force for at
least two years from the time the policy was issued or reinstated.
The phrase "during the lifetime of the insured" found in Section 48 simply meant
that the policy was no longer considered in force after the insured died. The key
phrase in the second paragraph of Section 48 is "for a period of two years". The
insurer has two years from the date of issuance of the life insurance contract or
its last reinstatement within which to contest the policy,whether or not the
insured still lives within such period. After two years, the defenses of
concealment or misrepresentation, no matter how patent or well founded, no
longer lie. Congress felt this was a sufficient answer to the various tactics
employed by insurance companies to avoid liability. The case of Tan vs. Court
Appeals, SCRA 403 supports the view that the insurer hastwo years from the
issuance of the policy within which to contest the life insurance policy.
Illustration:
Phil-Am Life issued a life insurance policy amounting to P80,000 in favor
of Tan Lee Siong effective from Nov. 6, 1973. On April 26, 1975, the
insured died of hepatoma. The beneficiaries demanded payment but the
insurer denied the claim on September 11, 1975 and rescinded the policy
by reason of misrepresentation and concealment of material facts made
by the insured in his application for insurance. The beneficiaries
maintained that the insurer can no longer rescind the poly after the death
of the insured. They also claimed that recission must be done during the
lifetime of the insured within two years and to and prior to the
commencement of the action: Question: Are the contentions of the
beneficiaries, correct?
A. The contentions are without merit. The insure, has two years from the date of
issuance of the insurance contract or of its last reinstatement within which to
contest the policy, whether or not the insured still lives within such period.* from
November 6, 1973 when the policy was issued in April 26, 1975 when the
insured died, less than two years had elapsed and hence the policy was not yet
incontestable.
Q. Were there subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court that altered the
effect of the ruling in the a forecited case of Tan?
A. Yes. The decisions in the in the cases of Manila Bankers Life Insurance
Corp. v. Aban, and Sun Life of Canada (Phils.), Inc. vs. Sibya, et al,° changed
the effect of the ruling in the case of Tan vs. Court Appeals, by declaring that
the "insurer is given two years - from the effectivity of a life insurance contract
and while the insurer is alive to discover or prove that the contract is void ab
initio or rescindable" by reason of concealment or misrepresentation and
therefore if the insured is already dead the insurer cannot contest the life
insurance policy even if less than two years from the issuance of the policy had
elapsed.
Q. On July 3, 1993 Sotero took out a life insurance policy from Manila
Bankers Life Insurance with Aban as beneficiary. On April 10, 1996 when
the insurance policy had been in force for more than two years and seven
months, Sotero died. The beneficiary filed a claim with the insurer. The
insurer alleged that Sotero fraudulently obtained the policy and filed an
action to rescind the policy. May the policy be rescinded?
A. The insurer cannot rescind the contract of insurance. "An insurer is given two
years – from the effectivity of a life insurance contract and while the insurer is
alive to discover or prove that the policy is void ab initio or is rescindable by
reason of the fraudulent concealment or misrepresentation of the insured or his
agent. After the two-year period lapses, or when the insured dies within the
period, the insurer must make good on the policy, even though the policy was
obtained by fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation. This is not to say that
insurance fraud must be rewarded, but that insurers who recklessly and
indiscriminately solicit and obtain business must be penalized, for such
recklessness and lack of discrimination ultimately work for the detriment of bona
fide takers of insurance and the public in general.
A. In the subsequent Sibya case it was likewise ruled that "An insurer is given
two years - from the effectivity of a life insurance contract and while the insurer
is alive to discover or prove that that policy is void ab initio or is rescindable by
reasons of the fraudulent concealment misrepresentation of the insured or his
agent: After the two-year period lapses, or when the insured dies within the
period, the insurer must make good on the policy, even though the policy was
obtained by fraud, concealment, Or misrepresentation. This is not to say that
insurance fraud must be rewarded, but that insurers who recklessly and
indiscriminately solicit and obtain business must be penalized, for such
recklessness and lack of discrimination ultimately work to the detriment of bona
fide takers of insurance and the public in general."
It will be observed that in the Sibya case, the insured died barely three months
from the time the policy was issued and yet it was considered incontestable
because the insured was already dead. Hence, the insurer must rescind the life
insurance contract on the ground concealment or misrepresentation within two
years from the time the policy was issued provided the insured is still alive at
that time. If the insured is already dead, the life insurance policy is already
incontestable even if less than two years had elapsed at that time. In effect the
Sibya case overruled the ruling in the Tan case wherein the insured died 1 year
and five months from the time the policy was issued but the insurer was allowed
to rescind the contract less than two years had elapsed since the policy was
issued.
A. Notwithstanding the incontestability of the policy, insurer may still raise the
following defenses,
1. The insurer may raise the defense that the premiums were not paid
2. The insurer may raise the defense that the insured violated the condition in
the policy relating to military or naval service in time of war
3. The insurer may raise the defense that the insured has no insurable interest
in the subject-matter of the insurance. $90
4. The insurer may raise the defense that the cause of death was excepted or
not covered by the terms of the policy.
5. The insurer may raise the defense that the fraud committed was of a
particulary vicious type such as: (a) where the policy was taken in furtherance
of a scheme to murder the insured; (b) where the insured substituted another
person for the medical examination; and (c) where the beneficiary feloniously
killed the insured.
6. The insurer may raise the defense that the necessary notice or proof of
insured's death was not given
TITLE 6
THE POLICY
Q. What is a policy?
Q. In what form should a policy be? What is the effect of failure to comply
with such form?
The failure to obtain approval of the Insurance Commissioner does not affect
the validity of the terms of the contract and therefore, the policy may still be
enforced. The insurer cannot set up its own failure to comply with the
requirements of the law defense to in action against, it on the policy However,
the insurer which failed to obtain the approval be the Insurance Commissioner
will be liable to prosecution for having used an unapproved form. When the
terms of the policy, however, are contrary to law such provisions shall of
course, be void.
A. There was no valid contract as H died without knowing the acceptance of his
application. An acceptance made by letter shall not bind the person making the
offer except from the time it came to his knowledge
Q. In case the language of the policy is one which the insured cannot read
or understand, who has the obligation to show that the term of the
contract had been fully explained to insured?
A. In case the language of the policy is one which the insured cannot read or
understand, the obligation to show that the terms of the contract had been fully
explained to the insured devolves on the party seeking to enforce the contract.
Thus, if the insured seeks to enforce the contract, the insurer is under no
obligation to prove that the terms of the insurance contract were fully explained
to the insured. Such obligation pertains to the party seeking the performance of
the contract.
Q. Lee See Guat, a 61-year old illiterate who spoke only Chinese, applied
for life insurance. The application which became a part of the contract
was in English and since her answers indicated that she was healthy, the
insurer issued the policy. Lee Se Guat died for lung cancer about seven
months after the policy was issued. It turned out that the insured
deliberately concealed material facts about her physical condition and
history. The beneficiary claimed that since Lee See Guat was illiterate and
spoke only Chinese, she could not be held guilty of concealment of her
health history because the application for insurance was in English and
the insurer failed to prove that the terms thereof had been fully explained
to her. Question: Was the insurer bound to explain the terms of the
contract to an illiterate insured?
A. The insurer was under no obligation to prove that the terms of the contract
were fully explained to the other party. The obligation to show that the terms of
the contract had been fully explained to the party who is unable to read or
understand the language of the contract, when fraud or mistake is alleged,
devolves on the party seeking to enforce it. Here the insurer was not seeking to
enforce the contract, on the contrary, it was seeking to avoid performance.
Since the insured was guilty of concealment, the insurer was not liable.
A rider pasted or attached to the insurance policy is part of the contract, to the
same extent and with the same effect as if actually embodied therein, provided,
however, that the descriptive title or name of the rider is written on the blank
spaces provided in the policy, otherwise, said rider shall not bind the insured.
A. In case the rider, clause, endorsement or warranty was issued after the
original policy took effect, the said rider must be countersigned by the insured
or owner unless applied for by the latter. On the other hand, where the rider
was pasted or attached to the original policy at the time it was issued, the
signature of the insured is not necessary but the descriptive title or name of the
rider must be written on the blank spaces provided in the policy.
Q. What is a cover note and when does it bind the insurer? Give
examples.
Examples :
A. Joyce stated the general rules concerning the issuance by the insurance
agent of a receipt pending approval or issuance of the policy, as follows:
1. If the act of acceptance of the risk by the agent and the giving by him of a
receipt, are within the scope of the agent’s authority, and nothing remains but to
issue a policy, then the receipt will bind the company.
2. Where an agreement is made between the applicant and the agent whether
by signing an application containing such condition, or otherwise, that no liability
shall attach until the principal approves the risk and a receipt is given by the
agent, such acceptance is merely conditional and in subordinated to the act of
the company in approving or rejecting.
3. Where the acceptance by the agent is within the scope of his authority a
receipt containing a contract for insurance for a specified time which is not
absolute but conditional, upon acceptance or rejection by the principal, covers
the specified period unless the risk is declined within that are period.
Q. Ngo Hing applied with the Cebu City Branch of Pacific Life for a twenty-
year endowment policy on the life of his one-year old daughter, Helen.
Ngo Hing paid the annual premium and Mondragon, Branch Manager of
Pacific Life in Cebu City, issued him a binding deposit receipt. The
following were some of the conditions printed at the back of the binding
deposit receipt: (a) If the company or its agent received the premium
deposit and insurance application, the insurance shall be in force
provided the Company is satisfied that on said date, the applicant was
insurable under its rule; and (b) If the Company does not accept the
application or offers to issue a policy for a different plan, the insurance
shall not be in force. Pacific Life disapproved the application because the
twenty-year endowment plan was not available to minors below seven
years old under its rules. The denial of the application was allegedly not
communicated to Ngo Hing. Later, Helen died. Question: Is the insurer
liable?
A. In life insurance, a "binding slip" or "binding receipt" does not insure by itself.
Since the receipt stated that it was subject to the approval of the insurer and
Pacific Life disapproved the application, the binding deposit receipt never
became effective. The insurer is not liable.
Q. On March 19, 1963 Pacific Timber obtained a cover note insuring logs
to be exported. On April 2, 1963 the regular marine policies were issued
and the premiums thereon were paid. No separate premium was paid on
the cover note. After the issuance of the cover note but before the
issuance of the regular policies, a number of logs were lost. The insurer
refused to pay the loss on the ground that no premium was paid on the
cover note. Question: Was premium needed to make the cover note
binding?
A. The cover note was binding even if premium was not paid thereon because
no premium could be fixed on the cover note until all the particulars of the
shipment are known. a logical consequence, no separate premium is required
to be paid on the cover note. Furthermore, if the cover note is to be treated as a
separate policy which would require separate premium instead of integrating it
to the regular policies subsequently issued, the purpose and function of the
cover note would be set at naught or rendered meaningless. Liability on the
cover note should arise even before payment of premium. This is how the cover
note as a "binder" should legally operate; otherwise, it will serve no practical
purpose in the realm of commerce.
A. Reyes, Inc. had the right to recover from the insurer since the policy made
the loss payable to such company. Bonifacio Brothers Inc. and Ayala Auto Parts
Co. had no right to the proceeds because "a policy of insurance is a distinct and
independent contract between the insured and the insurer, and third persons
have no right either in a court of equity, or in a court of law, to the proceeds.
Q. When may third persons who are neither insured nor beneficiary hold
the insurer liable?
A. The general rule is that the insurer shall be liable only to the insured or the
beneficiary named in a contract of insurance because the "insurance proceeds
shall be applied exclusively to the proper interest of the person in whose name
or for whose benefit it is made unless otherwise specified in the policy. Hence,
in general only parties to an insurance contract may bring an action on the
policy against the insurer.
However, if the insurance contract was intended to benefit third persons,
the latter may directly claim from the insurer and hold the latter liable. Thus
a. If the insurance contract should contain some stipulation in favor of a
third person, the latter although not a party to the contract may enforce
the stipulation in his favor before it is revoked by the contracting parties,
or
b. Where the insurance contract provides for indemnity against liability to
third persons, then third persons, to whom the insured is liable, can sue
the insurer.
Q. Fieldmen's Ins. Co., Inc., issued in favor of Manila Yellow Taxicab Co.,
Inc., a common carrier accident insurance policy wherein it was stipulated
that the insurer "will indemnify any authorized driver who is driving the
motor vehicle" of the insured and in the event of death of said driver, the
insurer shall "indemnify his personal representatives." A taxicab of the
insured, driven by Carlito Coquia, met a vehicular accident, as a
consequence of which Carlito died. Question: May the heirs of Coquia
hold the insurer liable?
A. The heirs of Coquia may hold the insurer liable. The policy under
consideration is typical of contracts pour autrui and therefore, the enforcement
thereof may be demanded by a third party for whose benefit it is made,
although not a party to the contract.
A. The insurance taken was one for indemnity for liability to third person and,
therefore, such third person is entitled to sue the insurer.
Q. What is the test to determine if a third person may hold the insurer
liable?
A. The right of the person injured to sue the insurer of the party at fault
(insured) depends on whether the contract of insurance is intended to benefit
third persons also or only the insured. And the test applied has been this: where
the contract provides for indemnity against liability to third persons, then
third persons, to whom the insured is liable, can sue the insurer. Where the
contract is for the indemnity against actual loss or payment, then third
persons cannot proceed against the insurer, the contract being solely to
reimburse the insured for liability actually discharged by him through payment to
third persons, said third persons' recourse being thus limited to the insured
alone.
Q. Is the insurer solidarily liable with the insured carrier where the
insurance contract provides for indemnity against liability to third
persons?
A. While it is true that where the insurance contract provides for indemnity
against liability to third persons, such third persons can directly sue the insurer,
the direct liability of the insurer under indemnity contracts to third persons does
not mean that the insurer can be held liable in solidum with the insured and/or
the other persons found at fault. The reason is that the liability of the insurer is
based on contract while that of the insured carrier or vehicle owner is based on
tort.
A. GSIS cannot be made solidarily liable with NFA. While it is true that where
the insurance contract provides for indemnity against liability to third persons,
the latter can directly sue the insurer however, the insurer cannot be held liable
in solidum with the insured and/or the other parties found at fault. The liability of
the insurer is based on contract; that of the insured carrier or vehicle owner is
based on tort. The liability of GSIS based on the insurance contract is direct, but
not solidary with that of the NFA. The latter's liability is based separately on
Article 2180 (quasi-delict) of the Civil Code. Furthermore, although the victims
may proceed directly against GSIS as insurer for indemnity, the third party
liability is only up to the extent of the amount covered by the insurance policy.
Q. Where the policy is effected by one partner or part owner, how should
it be made applicable to the interest of his co-partners or other part
owners?
Q. (1) What are the kinds of policy? (2) Define each one.
1. In open policy, the value of the thing insured is not agreed upon in the
policy, while in valued policy, the parties have stipulated in the policy that the
thing insured is valued at a specified sum;
2. In open policy, upon occurrence of the loss, the insured must prove the
value of the thing insured, while in valued policy proof of value of the thing
insured after the loss is no longer necessary.
Q. A policy provides that: "No suit or action on this policy for the recovery
of any claim, shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless the
insured shall have fully complied with all the terms and conditions of this
policy, nor unless commenced within twelve (12) months next after the
happening of the loss xxx".
A. The stipulation is void for if it will be given effect, the period allowed the
insured for bringing the action would be reduced to less than one year from the
time the cause of action accrues. This is so because the said clause makes the
prescriptive period begin from the happening of the loss and at the same time
requires the filing of a claim after the loss against the carrier, and that a copy of
the reply of the carrier should be sent to the insurer. Compliance with this
condition will necessarily consume time and thus shorten the period for bringing
suit to less than one year if the period will be computed from the happening of
the loss.
A. The action has prescribed. The condition contained in the insurance policy
that claims must be presented within one year after rejection is not merely a
procedural requirement. The condition is an important matter, essential to a
prompt settlement of claims against insurance companies, as it demands that
insurance suits be brought by the insured while the evidence as to the origin
and cause of destruction have not yet disappeared. It is in the nature of a
condition precedent to the liability of the insurer, the purpose of which is to
terminate all liabilities in case the action is not filed by insured within the
period stipulated.
Q. From what time should the prescriptive period agreed upon by the
parties be computed?
A. When no period for bringing the action has been agreed upon in the policy,
or when such agreement is void, the insured may bring the action within the
prescriptive period provided for in the Civil Code, that is within ten years in case
the contract is written and within six years in case of an oral contract from the
time the cause of action accrues.
A. In case the claim was denied by the insurer but the insured filed a petition for
reconsideration, the prescriptive period should be counted from the date the
claim was denied at the first instance and not from the denial of the petition for
reconsideration. To rule otherwise would give insured persons a scheme or
devise to waste time until any evidence which may be considered
against them is destroyed.
Q. The policy provides that "if a claim is made and rejected and no action
or suit is commenced within twelve months after such rejection" "all
benefits under this policy shall be forfeited". After the claim of the insured
was denied, he asked for reconsideration of the denial of the claim. Later
the request for reconsideration was also denied. From what time should
the period of twelve months from final rejection be computed?
A. Final rejection means denial by the insurer of the claims of the insured and
not the rejection or denial by the insurer of the insured's motion or request for
reconsideration. The rejection referred to should be construed as the rejection
in the first instance"
Q. The insured obtained a Contractors' All Risks (CAR) Policy from GSIS.
The policy provides that "all benefits thereunder shall be forfeited if no
action is instituted within twelve (12) months after the rejection of the
claim for loss, damage or liability." Because of typhoons "Biring"
"Huaníng" and "Saling", the insured typhoons property was damaged and
the insured made several claims for indemnity on June 30, 1988, August
25, 1988 and October 18, 1988 from GSIS. In a letter dated April 26, 1990,
GSIS rejected the claims for indemnity for damages wrought by typhoons
"Biring" and "Huaning". In a letter dated June 21, 1990, GSIS also denied
the claim for damages caused by typhoon "Saling". In a letter dated April
18, 1991, the insured impugned the rejection of the claims and reiterated
its demand for settlement of the claims. On September 27, 1991, the
insured filed a complaint against GSIS. The insured claims that the GSIS
letters dated April 26, 1990 and June 21, 1990 did not amount to a "final
rejection" of the claim. Has the action prescribed?
A. YES. The insured's causes of action accrued from its receipt of the letters
dated April 26, 1990 and June 21, 1990, or the date the GSIS rejected its
claims in the first instance. Since the insured allowed more than twelve (12)
months to lapse before filing the necessary action on September 27, 1991, its
causes of action had already prescribed.
A. Section 384 of the Insurance Code of 1978 used to provide that an action for
recovery of damages under the compulsory motor vehicle insurance must be
brought "within one year from the date of the accident, otherwise, the claimant's
right of action shall prescribe." Such provision gave rise to confusion as to
whether the prescriptive period should be counted from the date of the accident
as the law expressly provided or from the denial of the claim. In some cases,
the court ignored section 384 probably because of the absurdity of said
provision.
A. The insurer should count the one-year period within which an action on the
policy should be filed from the date of rejection as this is the time when the
cause of action accrues. Thus, Sec.384 made it clear that the action for
recovery of loss or injury under the policy should be filed within one year from
denial of the claim. Assemblyman H. Perez who was the sponsor of the Bill
(Parliamentary Bill No. 1340) that embodied the proposed amendment of
changing the period of prescription to run not from the date of the accident but
from the date of the denial of claim, explained that the latter is the date of
accrual of the cause of action. The insurer did not reject the Claim and instead
promised to pay the same and therefore, the period of prescription had not
begun. The motion to dismiss should be denied
Q. Is the right of the insured to file an action against the insurer affected
by Sec. 3 (6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act that provides that the
carrier and the ship shall be discharged from all liability for loss or
damage to the goods if no suit is filed within one year after delivery of the
goods or date when they should be delivered?
A. Section 3 (6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act states that the carrier and
the ship shall be discharged from all liability for loss or damage to the goods if
no suit is filed within one year after delivery of the goods or date when they
should be delivered. It will be observed that the prescriptive period in such case
begins to run from the date of delivery of the goods or date when they should
have been delivered and not from the denial of the claim.
Q. From August to October, 1983, Mayer Steel shipped pipes and fittings
to Hongkong Company. Mayer insured the cargo with South Sea Surety
for Us212,772.09 and with Charter Insurance for US$149,470. When the
goods reached Hongkong, it was discovered that a substantial portion
thereof was damaged. Charter paid Hongkong Co., HK $64,904.75. Mayer
and Hongkong Co. demanded payment of the balance of HK $299,345.30
from the insurers. An action was filed against the insurers on April 17,
1986, more than two years from the time the goods were unloaded from
the vessel. The insurers claimed prescription under the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act because more than one year had elapsed since the cargo was
unloaded. Question: Has the action prescribed as provided for in the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act?
A. YES. Under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the insurer, like the shipper,
may no longer file a claim against the carrier beyond the one-year period
provided by law. But it does not mean that the upper may no longer file a claim
against the insurer because the basis of the insurer s liability is the insurance
contract. The action has not yet prescribed as the insured has ten years from
denial of the claim within which to file an action against the insurer
A. Under Section 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the suit against the
carrier must be filed within one year After delivery of the goods or the date
when goods should have been delivered otherwise the action shall prescribe
principle applies not only to an action against the carrier by the shipper or
consignee but also to an action filed by an insurer against the carrier.
A. The insurer was already barred from filing a claim against the carrier
because under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the suit against the carrier
must be filed within One year after delivery of the goods or the date when the
goods should have been delivered. The said Act includes the insurer of the
goods in its action against the carrier.
Q. Distinguish the Mayer Steel case from the Filipino Merchants case.
A. The Filipino Merchants case is different from the Mayer Steel case. In
Filipino Merchants, it was the insurer which filed a claim against the carier for
reimbursement of the amount it paid or might pay to the shipper. In the Mayer
Steel case, it was the shipper which filed a claim against the insurer. The bases
of the shipper's claims in the Mayer Steel case are the insurance policies
issued.
The ruling in Filipino Merchants should apply only to suits against the
carrier filed either by the shipper, the consignee or the insurer. Under the
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, the insurer, like the shipper, may no longer file
a claim against the carrier beyond the one-year period provided in the law. But
it does not mean that the shipper may no longer file a claim against the insurer
because the basis of the insurer's liability is the insurance contract and not the
contract of carriage of goods.
Q. When may an insurance policy other than life be cancelled and upon
what grounds?
A. "No policy of insurance other than life shall be cancelled by the insurer
except upon prior notice thereof to the insured, and no notice of cancellation
shall be effective unless it in based on the occurrence, after the effective date of
the policy, of one or more of the following
"(b) Conviction of a crime arising out of acts increasing the hazard insured
against;
"(e) Physical changes in the property insured which result in the property
becoming uninsurable;
"(f) Discovery of other insurance coverage that makes the total insurance in
excess of the value of the property insured; or
The provision abrogated the ruling in the case of Abolafia vs Liverpool &
London & Globe Ins, Co. Ltd., wherein it was held that notice of cancellation
need not be in writing but may be oral It is now required that the notice of
cancellation be in writing and must state the grounds relied upon and, at the
written request of the insured, the facts on which the cancellation is based must
be furnished.
A. After canceling the policy pursuant to Section 64 allowing the same, notice of
cancellation must be sent to the insured himself or his authorized broker so as
to enable the insured to procure another insurance, otherwise, the cancellation
is not valid.
Q. A insured his mortgaged building against fire and made the loss
payable to the mortgagee. Later on, the insurer cancelled the policy
pursuant to the stipulation thereon allowing either party to terminate the
contract upon notice thereof to the other, the insurer gave the notice of
cancellation to the mortgagee. The loss insured against occurred.
Question: Was the cancellation valid?
A. The cancellation of the policy was not binding upon A, the insured, since the
insurer failed to comply with its primary duty to notify the insured so as to give
the latter an ample opportunity negotiate for another insurance. The notice
should be personal to the insured and not to and/or through any unauthorized
person
Q. Does the insured in non-life insurance have the right to have his policy
renewed?
A. In case of insurance other than life, unless the insurer at least forty-five (45)
days in advance of the end of the policy period mails or delivers to the named
insured at the address shown in the policy notice of its intention not to renew
the policy or to condition its renewal upon reduction of limits or elimination of
coverages, the named insured shall be entitled to renew the policy upon
payment of the premium due on the effective date of the renewal. Any policy
written for a term of less than one (1) year shall be considered as if written for a
term of one (1) year. Any policy written for a term longer than one (1) year or
any policy with no fixed expiration date shall be considered as if written for
successive policy periods or terms of one (1) year."
This provision gives the insured the option to renew property insurance
by the payment of the premium due on the effective date of renewal unless at
least forty-five days prior to the end of the policy, the insurer gives notice of its
intention not to renew the policy.
TITLE 7
WARRANTIES
Q. What is a warranty?
Q. What are the kinds of warranties and in what form should warranties
be?
A. "A warranty is either express or implied.” A warranty may relate to the past,
the present, the future, or to any or all of these." "No particular form of words is
necessary to create a warranty."
The following are kinds of warranties:
1. Affirmative warranty is one which relates to matters which exist at or before
the issuance of the insurance of the policy.
2. Promissory warranty is one in which the insured undertakes that something
shall be done or omitted after the policy takes effect and during its continuance.
3. Express warranty is a statement in a policy, of a matter relating to the person
or thing insured, or to the risk, as a fact.
4. Implied warranty is an agreement or stipulation not expressed in the policy
but the existence of which is admitted or presumed from the fact that the
contract of insurance has been executed.
A. The respondent insurance company is not liable. Just like any other contract,
insurance requires a cause or consideration. The consideration is the premium,
which must be paid at the time and in the way and manner specified in the
policy. If not so paid, the policy will lapse and be forfeited by its own terms. The
policy in this case does not fall under one of the exceptions where the
insurance policy takes effect even if the premium is not paid. It does not fail
either under the exceptions laid down in Makati Tuscany Condominium Corp.
and UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. cases. Both contemplate situations
where the insurer consistently granted credit extension or term for the payment
of the premium Here, however, petitioner failed to establish the fact of a grant
by respondent of a credit term in his favor, or that the grant has been
consistent. To rule otherwise would render nugatory the requirement in Section
77 that "notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, no policy or contract of
insurance issued by an insurance company is valid and binding unless and
premium thereof has been paid.
Q. The insured was thUNPe owner of a house insured yearly since 1961.
On November 27, 1965, the insurer sent to the insured, renewal certificate
covering said house for the period from December 5, 1965 to December 5
1966. The insurer asked for the payment of the corresponding premium.
The insured promised to pay the premium on January 4, 1966 but failed to
pay it. On January 8, 1966, the house was totally destroyed by fire.
Question: Is the The insurer liable?
A. The insurer is not liable because time is of the essence in the payment of
premium so that if it is not paid the insurance does not take effect.
Q. Acme Shoe had been insuring its properties yearly with Domestic
Insurance since 1946. On May 14, 1963 Acme renewed its insurance for
the period from May 15, 1963 to May 15, 1964 Acme did not pay the
premiums right away and instead paid the same only on January 8, 1964
which Domestic Insurance accepted. Later, Acme was issued a renewal
fire insurance policy by Domestic Insurance to cover the period from May
15, 1964 to May 15, 1965. The policy included a Credit Agreement which
provided "The premium corresponding to the first ninety days of the term
of this policy or any renewal thereof is hereby considered paid for the
purpose only of making this policy valid and binding during said portion
of the term." Acme's properties were completely destroyed by fire on
October 13, 1964 at which time the premiums on the renewed policy had
not been paid. Acme claimed that when the insurer accepted payment of
premiums in January, 1964 for the insurance covering from May 1963 to
May 1964, there was a clear intention to grant a credit extension beyond
90 days. Question: Is the contention valid?
A. It is clear from the Credit Agreement that the credit extension granted was
only for 90 days. Practices before RA 3540 which took effect on October 1,
1963 cannot change the express provision of the Act which provides that no
policy could be valid and binding unless and until the premiums thereof have
been paid.
Q. What are the statutory exceptions to the rule that the insurer is entitled
to the payment of premium is soon as the thing insured 1 exposed to the
peril insured against?
A. The payment of premium is a condition precedent to, and essential for, the
efficacy of the contract of insurance. Unless the premium is paid, the policy
shall not be valid and binding notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary.
The statutory exceptions are:
(1) In case the insurance coverage relates to life or industrial life (health)
insurance when grace period applies:
(2) Whenever a ninety-day credit extension is given for the premium due
(3) When the insurer makes a written acknowledgement of receipt of premium,
this acknowledgement being conclusive evidence of payment of (4.) Where the
obligee has accepted the bond in which case the bond becomes valid
enforceable irrespective of whether or TV the premium has been paid by the
obligor to the surety.
(5) and In case of industrial life insurance, the policy shall not lapse for non-
payment of premium if such non-payment was due to the failure of the insurer
to send its representative or agent to the insured at the residence of the insured
or some place indicated by him for the purpose of collecting such premium.
However, this does not apply when the premium on the policy remains unpaid
for a period of three months or twelve weeks after the grade period has expired.
Of course, as hereinafter discussed, judicial interpretations have provided
additional exceptions to the general principle that the premium must be paid
before an insurance policy becomes effective. Aside therefrom, payment of the
premium to the agent of the insurer is sufficient to make the policy binding.
Q. Juan insured his own life and paid the corresponding premium for the
first year. The premium for the second year was due on March 1, 2018 but
Juan was unable to pay it. On March 20, 2018, Juan died at which time, the
premium was still unpaid. Is the insurer liable?
A. The insurer is liable even if the premium has not been paid at the time of the
death of the insured because in life insurance, after the payment of the first
premium the insured is entitled to a grace period of thirty days or one month
within which to pay the succeeding premiums. In case the insured dies during
the period of grace and before the payment of the premium due, the insurer is
liable as the policy continues in force during the grace period but the premium
due and the interest thereon may be deducted from the amount payable to the
beneficiary.
Q. Will credit extension for the premium due sufficient to make the policy
binding?
A. Under the former rule, whenever the insured was granted credit extension of
the premium due or given a period of time to pay the premium on the policy
issued, such policy was binding although premiums had not been paid.*** This
rule was changed by Section 77 of the Insurance Code of 1978 when the said
provision eliminated the portion concerning credit agreement, and added the
phrase "notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary" which precludes the
parties from stipulating that the policy is valid even if premiums are not paid.
even However, under the present law, a 90-day credit extension is allowed to
make the policy binding even if the premium has not been paid. It reverted to
the former rule embodied the Insurance Act which allowed a credit extension for
the premium due except that such credit extension is now limited to ninety days
Hence, under the present law, the policy is valid and binding even if the
premium has not been paid if there is a ninety-day credit extension given
Even before this section amended Section 77 of the insurance Code of
1978, the Supreme Court noted that there is nothing in the said section which
prohibits the parties in an Insurance contract to provide a credit term within
which to pay the premiums. "The agreement is not against the law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy. The agreement binds the parties.
Hence, it would be unjust and inequitable not to allow recovery on the policy on
the ground of non-payment of premiums because the insurer is barred by
estoppel from taking refuge under Section 77.
A. The defense was untenable because Gregroco, the obligee had already
accepted the bonds and thus, the said bonds became valid and enforceable
irrespective of whether or not the premiums had been paid by Sagum, the
obligor to Philippine Pryce, the surety.
A. In case of industrial life insurance, the policy shall not lapse for non-payment
of premium if such non payment was due to the failure of the insurer to send its
representative or agent to the insured at the residence of the insured or
someplace such premium. However, this does not apply when the premium on
the policy remains for a period of three months or twelve weeks after he grace
period has expired.
Q. What are the instances when the Supreme Court declared that the
policy is valid and binding notwithstanding the non-payment of premium?
A. Aside from the statutory exceptions, the following are the instances when the
Supreme Court ruled that the policy is valid and binding notwithstanding the
non-payment of premiums:
1. In case of cover notes which are binding even if premiums are not paid
thereon because no premium could be fixed on the cover note until all the
particulars of the insurance are known. Cover notes should be integrated
to the regular policies so that the premiums on the regular policies include
the consideration for the cover notes
2. When the parties agreed to have the premiums paid by installments or
payment by installments is an established practice by the parties,
acceptance of the payment of premium by installments would suffice to
make the policy binding.
Q. On March 19, 1963 Pacific Timber obtained a cover note insuring logs
to be exported. On April 2, 1963 the regular marine policies were issued
and the premiums thereon were paid. No separate premium was paid on
the cover note. After the issuance of the cover note but before the
issuance of the regular policies, a number of logs were lost. The insurer
refused to pay the loss on the ground that no premium was paid on the
cover note. Question: Was premium needed to make the cover note
binding?
A. The cover note was binding even if premium was not paid thereon because
no premium could be fixed on the cover note until all the particulars of the
shipment are known. As a logical consequence, no separate premium is
required to be paid on the cover note. Furthermore, if the cover note is to be
treated as a separate policy which would require separate premium instead of
integrating it to the regular policies subsequently issued, the purpose and
function of the cover note would be set at naught or rendered meaningless.
Liability on the cover note should arise even before payment of premium. This
is how the"binder" should legally operate; otherwise, it will serve no practical
purpose in the realm of commerce.
A. If the parties have not agreed to have the premiums paid by installments or
payment by installments is not an established practice by the parties, the
obligation to pay premium when due is considered as an invisible obligation.
Hence, a forfeiture of the policy is not prevented by part payment thereof. This
means that a part payment will not keep the policy in force for even such a
proportionate part of the new period as the sum paid bears to the whole
premium due.
However, in case the parties agreed to have the premiums paid by
installments or payment by installments is established practice by the parties,
acceptance of the payment of premiums by installments would suffice to make
the policy binding because it reveals an intention on the part of the insurer to
honor the policy. Basic principles of equity and fairness would not allow the
insurer to continue collecting and accepting the premiums paid on installments,
ground that the premiums were not paid in full.
A. The policy was binding and effective notwithstanding the staggered payment
of premiums. The initial insurance contract entered into in 1982 was renewed in
1983, then in 1984. In those (3) three years, the insurer accepted all the
installment payments speaks loudly of the insurer's intention to honor the
policies it issued Section 77 of the Insurance Code, the parties may to the
insured. While it may be true that under not agree to make the insurance
contract valid and binding without payment of premiums, there is nothing in said
section which suggests that the parties may not agree to allow payment of the
premiums in installments, or to consider the contract as valid and binding upon
payment of the first premium. Otherwise, we would allow the insurer to renege
on its liability under the contract had a loss occurred before completion of
payment of the entire premium, despite its voluntary acceptance of partial
payments, eschewed by basic considerations of fairness and equity.
Furthermore, where the risk is entire and the contract is indivisible, the insured
is not entitled to a refund of the premiums paid if the insurer was exposed to the
risk insured for any period, however brief or momentary. The insured was liable
to pay the balance of the premium.
Q. The offices of the insurer were ordered closed by the Japanese Military
authorities, but the company opened an office clandestinely for the
purpose of receiving premiums from the policy holders. The insurer,
however, failed to advise the insured of its new address. Question: What
was the effect of failure to advise the insured of the change of insurer's
address on the right to have premiums paid promptly?
A. Such failure did not work as forfeiture or waiver of the insurer's right to have
premiums paid promptly.
A. The effect of payment of overdue premiums after the loss will depend on
whether the insurer was aware of the loss or not at the time of the acceptance
of payment. The acceptance and retention by the insurer of the overdue
premium with knowledge of the fact, evidences a waiver of the right to forfeit the
policy and, therefore, insurer is bound under the policy.
However, where the insurer at the time payment of premium did not know
of the loss and subsequent returned the premium to the insured, the insurer
may still raise the defense of non payment of premium.
Q. The insured tendered payment of premium for the succeeding year but
the insurer refused to accept it because the office was closing for the day
on account of threat of bombing by Japanese planes. Question: May the
insurer later on claim forfeiture of the policy for nonpayment of
premiums?
A. No, the insurer may not assert non-payment of premiums because the
refusal to accept payment estopped the insurer from claiming a forfeiture of the
policy for non-payment.
A. To prevent the insured from losing the entire amount already paid to the
insurer in life insurance by reason of the insured's inability to pay the
succeeding premiums, the following devices are employed: (a) Period of grace;
(b) Payment of the cash surrender value; (c) Giving options to the insured after
payment of the three full annual premiums such as extended insurance and
paid-up insurance; (d) Automatic loan clause and (e) Reinstatement of lapsed
policies.
A. In life insurance, after the payment of the first premium, the insured is
entitled to a grace period of thirty days or one month within which to pay the
succeeding premiums.682 In case the insured dies during the period of grace
and before the payment of the premium due, the insurer is liable as the policy
continues in force during the grace period but the premium due and the interest
thereon may be deducted from the amount payable to the beneficiary.
Cash surrender value "arises from the fact that the fixed annual
premiums is much in excess of the annual risk during the earlier years of the
policy, an excess made necessary in order to balance the deficiency the same
premium will meet for the annual risk during the later days of the policy."
Q. What are the usual options granted to the insured after payment of
three full annual premiums?
A. The law requires the insurer to provide in the policy the options to which the
insured is entitled in the event of default in a premium payment after three full
annual premiums shall have been paid.The usual options provided are the
payment of cash surrender value, the conversion of the policy to an extended
insurance, or the conversion of the policy to a paid-up insurance.
A. Paid-up insurance means that no more payments are required, and consists
of insurance for life in such an amount as the sum available therefore,
considered as single and final premium will purchase. It results to a reduction of
the original amount of insurance, but for the same period originally stipulated.
Like an extended insurance, the policy usually designates the cash
surrender value as the fund applicable for the payment of the paid-up
insurance.
A. Automatic loan clause is a stipulation in the policy providing that upon default
in the payment of premium, the same "shall be paid from the loan value of the
policy until that value is consumed. In and effectively as though the premiums
had been such case, the policy is continued in force as full and effectively as
though the premiums had been paid by the insured from funds derived from
other sources.
A. Every life insurance policy must contain a provision that the holder of the
policy shall be
Entitled to reinstatement of the contracts at any time within three years from the
date of default in the payment of the premium, unless the cash surrender value
has been duly paid or the extension period expired, upon production of
evidence of insurability satisfactory to the company and the payment of all
overdue premiums and any indebtedness to the company upon said policy.
A. The insurer was not liable as the policy was not reinstated. The failure to pay
the balance of the overdue premiums prevented reinstatement and recovery of
the face value of the policy.
1. When no part of the interest in the thing insured is exposed to any of the
perils insured against.
2. Where the insurance is made for a definite period of time and the insured
surrenders his policy before the expiration of that period.
3. When the contract is voidable and subsequently annulled the provisions of
the Civil Code on account of the fraud or misrepresentation of the insurer, or his
agent.
5. When by any default of the insured than actual fraud, the insurer never
incurred any liability under the policy.
7. In case of over-insurance.
A. "Premium and risk are the very essence of a contract of insurance and each
is dependent upon and inseparable from the other. It follows that if the risk has
not attached, or if no part of the interest is exposed to the peril insured against,
in the absence of any fault or fraud on the part of the insured, the insurer has no
claim to the premium and that, if paid, it must be returned. Thus, it is
fundamental that if no policy is ever issued or delivered as contracted for, the
applicant for insurance having acted in good faith, may recover any premium
that he has paid"' Likewise, when no valid contract was effected due to the
absence of any one of the essential requisites of a contract, i.e., consent and
subject matter, the whole premium paid may be recovered.
Examples:
(a) When an application for insurance was rejected by the insurer, the applicant
is entitled to a return of the whole premium paid,
(b) When the voyage insured never commences, the insured is entitled to return
of the premium paid."
(c) When the applicant for insurance withdraws his application before it is
accepted, he is entitled to a return of premium.
A. "Where the insurance is made for a definite period of time and the insured
surrenders his policy, to such portion of the premium as Corresponds with the
unexpired time, at a pro rata rate, unless a short period rate has been agreed
upon and appears on the face of the policy, after deducting from the whole
premium any claim for loss or damage under the policy which has previously
accrued: Provided, That no holder of a life insurance policy may avail himself of
the privileges of this paragraph without sufficient cause as otherwise provided
by law."
Thus, when the insurance is for a definite the period and insured surrenders the
policy before the expiration of the period, he is entitled corresponding to the to a
return of premium unexpired portion of the period.
Illustration:
Q. What is "short period rate" and its effect on the amount of the premium
to be returned in case of surrender of the policy before the expiration of
the period of insurance?
A. A short period rate is a stipulation in the policy stating the amount or rate of
premium for Specified short times, or premiums at short-time rate. Such
stipulation is reflected in a table usually appearing at the last page of an
insurance policy. Whenever a short period rate has been agreed upon, the
amount recoverable upon surrender or the policy will no longer be the whole
premium corresponding to the unexpired portion of the policy, but only the
balance after deducting the percentage to be retained by the insurer as stated
in the short period rate table. The short period rate however, applies only if the
insured surrenders the policy and not when the insurer cancels the policy.
Illustration:
In the event that the insured suffered a partial loss during the existence of
the policy and before the surrender thereof, the amount of the loss paid by the
insurer shall be deducted from the whole premium and only the balance shall
be the basis of the return of the premium.
Illustration:
In the example given above, in case the insured suffers a loss amounting
to P1,200 before the policy is surrendered, said amount shall be deducted from
P2,400, the whole premium paid. The difference of P1,200 shall be the basis of
the computation of the premium to be returned. Since the period unexpired is
Six months or one-half of the whole period, the insured is entitled to a return of
% of P1,200 or P600.00, and should the short period scale mentioned above be
stipulated, the insured may obtain the return of 30% of P1,200 or P360.
The present provision the made qualification that when the contract is voidable,
it must be subsequently annulled under the provisions of the Civil Code. It is not
clear what the intention of the lawmakers was in inserting this provision other
than to favor the insurer because the insured cannot obtain a return of the
premium until actual rescission of the contract pursuant to the Civil Code.
Hence, the insurer can withhold the return of the premium until the contract is
annulled in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code.
A. "A person insured is entitled to a return of the premium when the contract is
voidable, and subsequently annulled under the provisions of the Civil Code xxx
on account of facts, or the existence of which the insured was ignorant of
without his fault; or when by any default of the insured other than actual fraud,
the insurer never incurred any liability under the policy."
When, by any default of the insured other than actual fraud, the insurer
never incurred any liability under the policy, the insured is entitled to a return of
premium. Thus, where an insurance was procured on the life of another without
the Consent of the latter, the person procuring the policy who paid the premium
believing it to be valid is entitled to a return of the premium, since the insured's
default in obtaining the consent of the person whose life was insured prevented
the insurer from incurring any liability under the policy.
Illustration:
A wife who takes out insurance on her husband's life without the consent of the
latter and pays premiums thereon under the belief that the policy is valid, is
entitled to recover the premiums so paid."
Since the value of the house was only taken policies total the while P1,500,000
amounted to P3,000,000, there was an over insurance by P1,500,000, A may
obtain a return of the premiums paid on the excess of P1,500,000 as follows:
P5,000 from X Co. and P10,000 from Y Co.
Illustrations:
(a) Under a lease contract requiring the tenant to protect the premises with
adequate insurance at his expense, there is no privity of contract between the
insurer and the landlord as far as premiums are concerned, therefore, the
landlord has no right to recover the premium paid.
(b) When an application for insurance was refused by the company, the
premium is recoverable by the applicant and not by a third party who has
advanced the money under a special agreement with the applicant providing for
reimbursement."
A. In the following cases, the insured cannot recover the premium paid:
1. If the peril insured against has existed, and the insurer has been liable for
any period the peril being entire and indivisible.
2. In life insurance.
Q. Why is premium not recoverable when the peril insured against has
existed and the risk is entire and indivisible?
A. When the risk is entire and the contract is indivisible, the insured is not
entitled to a return of the premium it the insurer was exposed to liability for any
period however short. "This rule is based upon just and equitable principles, for
the insurer has, by taking upon himself the peril become entitled to the
premium, and although the rule may result in profit to the insurer, it is but a just
Compensation for the dangers or peril assumed; besides, the danger incurred
may be peril greater in any one moment than during the entire remaining period
of insurance, and it would be extremely difficult fairly to apportion the premium,"
Illustration:
A insured his cargo from Manila to San Francisco, California. After the
vessel upon which said cargo was loaded left the port of Manila and while it was
still five days away from San Francisco, A surrendered the policy. Question:
Was A entitled to a return of premium?
Answer: No, because the risk was entire and indivisible and the insurer had
been exposed to liability already.
A. In life insurance, the insured is not entitled to a return of the premium dpon
surrender of the policy.' The reason for such rule is that life insurance is
indivisible. Thus, the contract of life insurance i s not an assurance for a single
year, with a privilege of renewal from year to year by paying the annual
premium, but that it is an entire contract of assurance for life" and premiums
paid "are clearly not intended as the consideration for the respective years in
which they are paid; for, after they are all paid, the policy stands good for the
balance of the life insured, without further payment. Each installment is, in fact,
the consideration of the entire insurance for life."