HSE

Health & Safety

Executive

Comparative evaluation of minimum

structures and jackets

Prepared by
WS Atkins Consultants Ltd
for the Health and Safety Executive

OFFSHORE TECHNOLOGY REPORT

2001/062
 HSE
Health & Safety
Executive

Comparative evaluation of minimum

structures and jackets

WS Atkins Consultants Ltd

Woodcote Grove
Ashley Road
Epsom
Surrey KT18 5BW
United Kingdom

HSE BOOKS
© Crown copyright 2002
Applications for reproduction should be made in writing to:
Copyright Unit, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office,
St Clements House, 2-16 Colegate, Norwich NR3 1BQ

First published 2002

ISBN 0 7176 2353 X

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be

reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted
in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the prior
written permission of the copyright owner.

This report is made available by the Health and Safety

Executive as part of a series of reports of work which has
been supported by funds provided by Mobil North Sea
Limited (UK), BP Amoco (USA), Exxon Production
Research (USA), Minerals Management Service (USA),
Odebrecht Oil & Gas (UK), Saudi Aramco (SA) and the
Executive. Neither the Executive, nor the contractors
concerned assume any liability for the reports nor do they
necessarily reflect the views or policy of the Executive.

ii
 iii

Steering Committee Members from Sponsoring Organisations

Mr D. Galbraith (Chairman) Mobil North Sea Limited (UK)

Dr B. Stahl & Mr S. DeFranco BP Amoco (USA)
Mr W. Turner Exxon Production Research (USA)
Mr W. Jones Health & Safety Executive (UK)
Mr R.W. Smith Minerals Management Service (USA)
Mr B.L. Smith Odebrecht Oil & Gas (UK)
Dr A.M. Radwan Saudi Aramco (SA)

Steering Committee Members from Project Consultants

Dr N. Shetty WS Atkins Consultants Ltd (UK)

Dr A. Dier MSL Engineering (UK)
Mr J. Waegter Ramboll (DK)
Prof. R.G. Bea University of California, Berkeley (USA)

Contributors to the Report

Dr N. Shetty WS Atkins Consultants Ltd (UK)

Dr J.T. Gierlinski WS Atkins Consultants Ltd (UK)
Dr B. Rozmarynowski WS Atkins Consultants Ltd (UK)
Dr A. Dier MSL Engineering (UK)
Mr J. Waegter Ramboll (DK)
Mr S.T. Christoffersen Ramboll (DK
Prof. R.G. Bea University of California, Berkeley (USA)
Mr R.B. Lawson University of California, Berkeley (USA)
Mr B.L. Smith Odebrecht Oil & Gas (UK)
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Due to their low fabrication and installation costs, there has been a trend in recent years to use
Minimum Facility Platforms (MFPs) for the “fast track” development of marginal oil and gas fields in
water depths of up to 60 m.

Compared to traditional jackets, minimum structures are characterised by a slender layout, low
stiffness, and a low level of redundancy. There are concerns that these structures may be very
sensitive to damage and defects which may occur due to design, construction or operational errors.
There is therefore a need to understand the performance of these structures with regard to reliability,
life-cycle costs and risks, so that informed decisions can be made about their feasibility for a
particular field development.

The Joint Industry Project was set up with the overall objective of evaluating and comparing the
system reliability levels of three minimum structures against a standard four-pile jacket under extreme
storm, fatigue and ship collision conditions. The study also considered the potential for errors due to
human and organisational factors during design, construction, and operation of minimum structures,
and to quantify their effect on the reliability of these structures. The structural concepts considered
are: (i) 3-pile Monotower, (ii) Vierendeel Tower, (iii) Braced Caisson, and (iv) a conventional 4-pile
Jacket.

To enable a consistent comparison, the structures were designed using a common design criteria,
analysis and design procedures, and for operation at the same field, and to support the same
topside. The key members were designed to have utilisation ratios close to 0.8 under the 100-year
return environmental loading. Welded joints were designed to have minimum fatigue lives of 5 times
the service life (assumed = 20 years) for the three minimum structures and 3 times the service life for
the 4-pile Jacket. The in-place operational condition, vortex shedding, and on-bottom stability
requirements were considered, but stresses due to fabrication, transportation and installation
conditions were not explicitly checked. The structures were not particularly designed for ship
impact, minor reinforcements were made to joint cans and braces to ensure that the structures fully
mobilise their capacity during impact.

The reliability of the as designed structures were initially evaluated considering them to be “free”
from gross defect/damage which could arise from human error. Three loading conditions: extreme
storm, fatigue and ship collision were investigated.

The performance of the four structures under extreme storm conditions was studied by carrying out
deterministic pushover and system reliability analyses. The pushover analysis was performed by
factoring up the 100-year design values of wave and current forces until structural collapse
occurred. The sequence of member failures and the corresponding load levels were noted. In the
cases where the foundation piles were seen to fail, their failure was suppressed by artificially
increasing the yield strength of pile steel and/or increasing the pile penetration. Based on the joint
probability distributions of wave height, period and current parameters and the ultimate capacity of
the structure from the pushover analysis, and also accounting for the uncertainty in the calculated
 vi

hydrodynamic loads and capacity of the structure, system reliability index and probability of failure
were evaluated for each structure.

The results of the above analyses show that the environmental load factors on the 100-year loading
at which collapse occurs are broadly similar for all the structures, ranging from 4.0 to 5.0, with the
highest value for the Braced Caisson structure. Similarly, the system reliability indices under extreme
storm condition are broadly similar for all the structures with the annual reliability index ranging from
5.58 to 6.23. Although the 4-pile Jacket has the highest ultimate strength, it also attracts 40-50%
higher environmental loading for the same wave height compared to the minimum structures resulting
in a collapse load factor comparable to the MFPs.

The above results correspond to the case when failure of the foundation was suppressed by
artificially strengthening the piles and increasing their penetration depth. When foundation failure was
allowed, the collapse load factors reduce to between 2.5 and 3.2.

The reliability under fatigue condition was evaluated corresponding to the failure of individual joints
and sequences of two, three or four joints, assuming that initial joint failures are not detected and
repaired. The impact of fatigue failure of joints on pushover reliability was evaluated by calculating
the conditional probability of collapse due to environmental overload given the initial failure of one or
more joints by fatigue, and multiplying this with the probability of the fatigue failure sequence
occurring. A number of dominant fatigue failure sequences were identified and evaluated for each
structure.

The 3-pile Monotower and Vierendeel Tower structures show a significant influence from fatigue on
system reliability. Progressive fatigue failure of any two tubular joints in the critical braces would
significantly reduce the pushover capacity of these two structures. The 4-leg Jacket shows a
moderate reduction in reliability when fatigue is considered. The Braced Caisson shows no influence
of fatigue as its pushover capacity is largely derived from the piles and the caisson.

Time-domain, non-linear, ship/structure interaction analyses were carried out to study the
performance of the selected structures against collision from a supply vessel. Following the impact, a
post-impact pushover analysis was carried out to determine the reduction in pushover capacity as a
result of ship impact damage. For each structure analyses were carried out for a number of vessel
mass and velocity combinations in the range of 500 to 3500 tonne mass and impact velocities of up
to 2.5 m/sec which were considered as credible limits for operation in the Southern and Central
North Sea fields.

All the structures, except for the 3-pile Monotower show adequate capacities to resist collisions
from vessels over the range of mass and impact velocities considered. Although significant denting
was caused at the impact location, this did not reduce the pushover capacity of any of the structures.
The 3-pile Monotower failed during the impact event for certain combinations of vessel mass and
velocity. Although this reduced the reliability of this structure, the resulting value is still comfortably
high. Maximum limits for this structure are considered to be vessel mass of 2000 tonne with a
maximum velocity of 2.5 m/sec or 3000 tonne vessel mass with a maximum velocity of 2.0 m/sec.
 vii

A methodology for human and organisational error analysis was developed and implemented into a
software system called SYRAS. Based on a review of world-wide accident database for marine
structures and reported incidents of damage to offshore structures in the North Sea and other fields,
five potential error scenarios for minimum facility platforms were identified. These cover errors
which could occur during design, fabrication, installation, and operation phases of a structure. For
the selected error scenarios, the likely damage to the structures were determined and their
reliabilities under the damaged condition were evaluated considering fatigue, extreme storm and ship
collision conditions, as relevant.

Of the five human error scenarios considered, two scenarios which affect fatigue strength show
considerable influence on the 3-pile Monotower and the Vierendeel Tower structures. Hence these
two structures can be regarded as less robust against human and organisational errors.

The Braced Caisson, despite having far fewer members than the other three structures, shows a
remarkably high system reliability and high robustness against Human and Organisational Errors
(HOE). This is because its ultimate strength is derived primarily by the central caisson and the two
piles which are all large diameter stocky members.

Considering the overall performance of the structures under different loading conditions and error
scenarios, and also accounting for the fabrication and installation effort, the Braced Caisson may be
the best choice in the Gulf-of-Mexico where the installation costs are relatively low. The high
installation cost and the high risk associated with the significant offshore work could make this
concept unattractive in the North Sea. The 3-pile Monotower and the Vierendeel Tower structures
could be the preferred options for the North Sea, provided these are adequately designed for fatigue
and ship collision, and effective QA/QC procedures are put in place to safeguard against human and
organisational errors. Apart from a slightly higher initial cost, the conventional 4-leg jacket can still
be a very attractive concept for the North Sea.

Key features which influence the life-cycle reliability characteristics of each structure have been
identified and recommendations for design have been made to improve their performance.

This JIP has clearly demonstrated that a life-cycle system reliability assessment offers considerable
benefits by providing a better insight into the performance of minimum structures. It is therefore
recommended that a system reliability assessment is performed initially at the feasibility stage of a
project to select the best concept for the particular field and operations requirements, and
subsequently during the detailed design stage to further enhance the life-cycle reliability
characteristics of the selected concept.

In summary, minimum structures can be made as reliable as conventional jackets by better

engineering:
ü by designing for ship impact to mitigate the risk of damage to wells/risers considering the
dynamic interaction between the vessel and the structure;
ü by designing critical welds for fatigue lives >10 times the service life;
ü by using a life-cycle system reliability-based approach during design.
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CONTENTS

Page

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1
1.1 Background ..................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Objectives ....................................................................................................................... 2
1.3 Project Organisation......................................................................................................... 2
1.4 Method of Approach ....................................................................................................... 3
1.4.1 Structures Selected for Comparison.......................................................................... 3
1.4.2 Framework for Comparative Evaluation.................................................................... 9
1.4.3 Work Programme .................................................................................................. 10
1.5 Organisation of the Report.............................................................................................. 13

2. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN ............................................................................................... 15

2.1 Introduction................................................................................................................... 15
2.2 Design Premises............................................................................................................. 15
2.2.1 Design Criteria ....................................................................................................... 15
2.2.2 Design Data........................................................................................................... 16
2.3 Design and Analysis Procedures..................................................................................... 17
2.4 Key Design Features...................................................................................................... 19
2.4.1 3-Pile Monotower.................................................................................................. 19
2.4.2 Vierendeel Tower .................................................................................................. 19
2.4.3 Braced Caisson...................................................................................................... 20
2.4.4 4-Pile Jacket.......................................................................................................... 20
2.4.5 Comparison of Key Figures.................................................................................... 21

3. RELIABILITY UNDER EXTREME STORM AND FATIGUE CONDITIONS ............. 23

3.1 Structural and Load Modelling........................................................................................ 23
3.2 Deterministic Pushover Analysis...................................................................................... 23
3.3 Reliability Under Extreme Storm Conditions.................................................................... 24
3.4 Reliability Under Combined Fatigue and Extreme Storm Conditions ................................ 25
3.5 Results........................................................................................................................... 25
3.5.1 Extreme Storm Condition....................................................................................... 25
3.5.2 Combined Fatigue and Extreme Storm Condition.................................................... 28
3.5.3 Generalisation of Results to Other Wave Environments............................................ 29

4. RELIABILITY UNDER SHIP COLLISION CONDITIONS.......................................... 31

4.1 Structural and Load Modelling........................................................................................ 31
4.2 Ship Collision Analysis ................................................................................................... 32
4.3 Reliability Analysis.......................................................................................................... 33
4.4 Results........................................................................................................................... 34

5. HUMAN & ORGANISATIONAL ERROR ANALYSIS................................................ 37

5.1 Failures due to Human and Organisational Errors............................................................ 37
5.2 Factors Influencing Error Likelihood............................................................................... 38
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5.3 Quality Assurance and Control....................................................................................... 40

5.4 Sources of Information for HOE Quantification............................................................... 40
5.5 Methodology for Quantification of Error Likelihood ........................................................ 43
5.6 The SYRAS Software.................................................................................................... 45

6. EVALUATION OF ERROR SCENARIOS .................................................................... 48

6.1 Identification of Human Error Scenarios.......................................................................... 48
6.2 Design HOE Scenario: Fatigue due to Pile Driving Stresses............................................. 49
6.3 Fabrication HOE Scenario: Fit-up and Welding Flaws .................................................... 51
6.4 Installation HOE Scenario: Pile Insertion Damage............................................................ 52
6.5 Operations HOE Scenario: Ship Collision Damage.......................................................... 53
6.6 Operations HOE Scenario: Dropped Object Damage ..................................................... 54

7. COMPARISON OF SELECTED STRUCTURES .......................................................... 56

7.1 General.......................................................................................................................... 56
7.2 Fabrication and Installation Effort.................................................................................... 56
7.3 Performance Under Extreme Storm Condition................................................................ 59
7.4 Performance Under Fatigue Condition............................................................................ 60
7.5 Performance Under Ship Collision Condition.................................................................. 61
7.6 Performance Under Human and Organisational Errors..................................................... 63
7.7 Overall Comparison....................................................................................................... 65

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................... 66

8.1 Conclusions ................................................................................................................... 66
8.2 Limitations ..................................................................................................................... 69
8.3 Recommendations.......................................................................................................... 70

9. REFERENCES................................................................................................................ 72
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TABLES

Table 2.1: Environmental Parameters Used for Design................................................................. 17

Table 2.2: Comparison of Key Design Figures for the Selected Structures................................... 22
Table 3.1: Probability distributions for environmental loading variables........................................ 24
Table 3.2: Probability distributions for fatigue resistance variables............................................... 25
Table 3.3: Key results for the extreme storm condition............................................................... 27
Table 3.4: Reliability indices under combined fatigue and pushover conditions ............................. 28
Table 4.1: Probability distributions for reliability analysis under ship impact condition.................... 34
Table 4.2: Results of ship impact analysis .................................................................................... 35
Table 6.1: Results for design HOE: fatigue due to pile driving stresses......................................... 50
Table 6.2: Results for fabrication HOE: fit-up and welding flaws................................................. 51
Table 6.3: Results for installation HOE: pile insertion damage...................................................... 52
Table 7.1: Comparison of design features influencing fabrication and installation effort .................. 58
Table 7.2: Comparison of performance under extreme storm condition........................................ 59
Table 7.3: Comparison of performance under fatigue condition.................................................... 61
Table 7.4: Comparison of performance under ship collision condition......................................... 62
Table 7.5: Comparison of the performance of structures under various error scenarios................. 64
 xii

FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Organisation of the Project.......................................................................................... 3

Figure 1.2: 3-Pile Monotower ...................................................................................................... 5
Figure 1.3: Vierendeel Tower....................................................................................................... 6
Figure 1.4: Braced Caisson .......................................................................................................... 7
Figure 1.5: 4-Pile Jacket............................................................................................................... 8
Figure 1.6: Framework for reliability evaluation considering human errors ...................................... 9
Figure 1.7: Flow-chart for Stage-I of the Project......................................................................... 11
Figure 1.8: Flow-chart for Stage-II of the Project ....................................................................... 12
Figure 3.1: Pushover collapse modes for the four structures........................................................ 26
Figure 3.2: Environmental load factor vs. horizontal deck deflection............................................ 27
Figure 3.3: Pushover system reliability indices for different offshore locations................................ 30
Figure 5.1: Factors influencing human and organisational errors................................................... 38
Figure 5.2: Nominal human task performance unreliability........................................................... 43
Figure 5.3: Generic human task error rates.................................................................................. 43
Figure 5.4: Operating team HOE causes and influencing factors................................................... 44
Figure 5.5: Quality Attribute Form.............................................................................................. 46
Figure 5.6: Quality Attribute Life-cycle Phase Form.................................................................... 46
Figure 5.7: Task Structure Form................................................................................................. 47
Figure 5.8: Task Information Form............................................................................................. 47
Figure 6.1: Error rates for design HOE: Fatigue due to pile driving stresses.................................. 49
Figure 6.2: Error sources for ship collision HOE scenario ............................................................ 53
Figure 7.1: Base shear versus wave height for the four structures ................................................. 59
 1

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background

Due to their low fabrication and installation costs, Minimum Facility Platforms (MFPs) (e.g.
monotowers) have become attractive within the last decade, especially for the “fast track”
development of marginal oil and gas fields. This would allow marginal fields to start
producing typically at about half the cost and in half the time compared to those associated
with standard four-pile jackets.

Compared to traditional jackets, minimum structures are characterised by a slender layout,

low stiffness and a low level of redundancy. This could make these structures very sensitive
to damage and defects that may occur due to design, fabrication or operational errors.
There is therefore a need to understand the performance of these structures with regard to
reliability, life-cycle costs and risks, so that informed decisions can be made about their
feasibility for a particular field development.

Minimum structures have hitherto been used as unmanned platforms in water depths of
40m-60m, mainly for the development of marginal fields. However, Operators are now
considering the use of these structures in deeper water, to support higher topside loads and
for providing accommodation facilities as well. Such changes could considerably increase
the potential consequences of failure.

The Operators considering using minimum structures are faced with two key questions:

1. How do the reliability levels of minimum structures compare with those of standard four-
pile jackets?

2. How does one choose between a jacket and a minimum structure concept for a given
field considering life-cycle costs and risks?

The choice between a minimum structure and a jacket, and between alternative minimum
structure designs, is likely to be influenced by a number of factors such as: lead time,
production revenue, service life, initial costs of fabrication and installation, in-service
maintenance costs, probabilities of failure, consequences of failure, etc.

Experience has shown that human errors are the root causes of many failures of offshore
structures (e.g. Sleipner collapse). The likelihood of occurrence and effects of these errors
are influenced by organisations, procedures, hardware and equipment, and external and
internal environments. These errors can develop in design, construction and operation of a
structure. Because of their low level of redundancy, minimum structures could be very
sensitive to damage and defects arising from human errors.
 2

1.2 Objectives

The Joint Industry Project was set up with the overall objective of evaluating and comparing
the life-cycle reliability and risk characteristics of minimum structures with those of traditional
jacket structures. More specifically, the objectives include:

• To evaluate and compare system reliability levels of three minimum structures against a
standard four-pile jacket under extreme storm, fatigue and ship collision conditions.

• To develop procedures for the evaluation of potential for errors due to human and
organisational factors during design, construction, operation and maintenance of minimum
structures and to quantify their effect on the reliability of these structures.

It is not the intention of this project to “rank” the selected concepts or to recommend any
one as the best. The objective is to identify key features which influence the reliability
characteristics of each structure, and if possible, to suggest how the performance of each
structure can be improved.

The focus of the JIP is on quantifying the inherent reliability of the sub-structure (i.e. the
jacket), and for this reason, the failure of the foundation, damage to conductors/risers, wave
impingement on the deck, wave breaking, fire and blast effects have specifically been
excluded from the study.

Given the increased interest in the use of minimum structures within a “fast track” field
development programme, the results from the JIP are expected to give considerable benefits
to the industry by providing a better understanding of their behaviour and quantifying their
inherent reliability and susceptibility to gross errors. The study also aims to identify key
characteristics that might be changed to improve the life-cycle performance of minimum
structures.

1.3 Project Organisation

The JIP was executed by four consultants with the roles defined as below:

WS Atkins Project Co-ordinator

Reliability under extreme storm and fatigue conditions

Ramboll Dy. Project Manager

Conceptual design of selected structures
Inputs to identification of human error scenarios

MSL Engineering Dy. Project Manager

Reliability under ship collision conditions

Univ. of California Dy. Project Manager

Human and organisational error analysis
 3

The project was sponsored by seven organisations as listed at the beginning of the report.
WS Atkins acted as the main contractor with the sponsors while Ramboll, MSL and UCB
were sub-contractors to WS Atkins.

A Project Steering Committee (PSC) was constituted with one representative each from the
sponsoring organisations and the consultants to monitor the project. David Galbraith from
Mobil acted as the Chairman of the PSC. The organisation of the project is shown in Figure
1.1.

Steering Chairman Secretary

Committee (D Galbraith) (N Shetty)

Project Co-ordinator
(N Shetty)

Dy. P.M. Dy. P.M. Dy P.M. Dy. P.M.

(J Gierlinski) (N Nichols) (ST Christoffersen)
(R Bea)

Atkins UCB MSL Ramboll

Team Team Team Team

Figure 1.1: Organisation of the Project

1.4 Method of Approach

1.4.1 Structures Selected for Comparison

Three minimum structure concepts which have been widely used in the North Sea and Gulf-
of-Mexico were selected for comparison with a 4-pile jacket. The selected structures were:

1. 3-Pile Monotower

2. Vierendeel Tower

3. Braced Caisson

4. 4-Pile Jacket
 4

To enable a consistent comparison, the selected structures were designed within the project
to a consistent design premise assuming that the structures will be operating at the same
offshore field and will be supporting the same topside loads, see Section 2.

Schematic views of the as-designed structures are shown in Figures 1.2-1.5.

 5

Figure 1.2: 3-Pile Monotower

 6

Figure 1.3: Vierendeel Tower

 7

Figure 1.4: Braced Caisson

 8

Figure 1.5: 4-Pile Jacket

 9

1.4.2 Framework for Comparative Evaluation

The system reliability levels of the selected structures were compared considering the
following three design conditions:
1. Extreme storm
2. Fatigue
3. Ship collision

For each condition, the reliabilities were evaluated in two parts and then combined:

1. Probability of failure assuming that the structure is “error-free”. This is called “intrinsic”
or “natural” probability of failure, denoted PfI.
2. Probability of failure of the structure with one or more error scenarios which could occur
during design, construction, maintenance or operation of the structure. This is evaluated
by first identifying a number of error scenarios relevant to a structure and quantifying the
likelihood or probability of the error scenario Xi occurring, PEXi . This part is called
“human error analysis”. Next, the conditional probability of failure [PfE|Xi ] of the
structure given a defect or damaged state arising from the error scenario Xi is evaluated.
This is called “fragility analysis”. The product of the two probabilities then gives the
“extrinsic” or “human” probability of failure PfE = [P EXi ] * [P fE|Xi ]. The likelihood of
human error is influenced by “organisation”, “procedures”, “hardware” and
“environment” under which an activity is carried out.

The above framework for reliability evaluation considering the potential for human and
organisational errors is shown schematically in Figure 1.6.

System Reliability

Extreme Fatigue Ship

Storm Collision

Human Natural
PfE PfI

Design Construction Maintenance Operations

Human Error Analysis Fragility Analysis

P EX P fX |E

Figure 1.6: Framework for reliability evaluation considering human errors

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1.4.3 Work Programme

The Project Work Programme was divided into two Stages, with three Tasks within each
stage as below. The Consultant responsible for each task is indicated in braces.

Stage-I: Reliability evaluation of “error-free” structures

Task I.1: Conceptual design (Ramboll)

Task I.2: Reliability under extreme storm and fatigue (WS Atkins)

Task I.3: Reliability under ship collision condition (MSL)

Stage-II: Human and organisational error analysis

Task II.1: Methodology for human error analysis (UCB)

Task II.2: Quantification of error probabilities (UCB, Ramboll)

Task II.3: Reliability analysis for error scenarios (WS Atkins, MSL)

The flow-chart of the tasks for Stage-I is shown in Figure 1.7 and for Stage-II is shown in
Figure 1.8.
 11

START

Data Collection

Task I.1
Conceptual Design
Ramboll

3-Pile Braced Vierendeel 4-Pile

Monotower Caisson Tower Jacket

Task I.2 Task I.3

Reliability under extreme Reliability under Ship
Storm and Fatigue Collision Condition

WS Atkins MSL Engineering

Reporting

Input to
Stage -II

Figure 1.7: Flow-chart for Stage-I of the Project

 12

START

Data Collection

Task II.1
Methodology & Software
Development
UCB
Structures from
Stage - I

Task II.2
Quantification of Error
Probabilities

UCB & Ramboll

Results from
Stage - I

Task II.3
Reliability Analysis of
Error Scenarios

WS Atkins & MSL

Reporting

Figure 1.8: Flow-chart for Stage-II of the Project

 13

1.5 Organisation of the Report

This report summarises the work carried out under the various tasks within the project and
presents and discusses the key results obtained. For detailed information reference should
be made to the individual task reports listed at the end of this report.

An overview of the remaining sections of this report is given below.

Section 2: Conceptual Design

This Section summarises the work carried out by Ramboll under Task I.1. The Design
Premise which forms the basis of design of the selected structures is discussed and the key
data used in design is summarised. The design and analysis procedures used to ensure that
the structures are comparable on a consistent basis are discussed, and key design features
of the selected structures are compared.

Section 3: Reliability Under Extreme Storm and Fatigue Conditions

The work carried out by WS Atkins under Task I.2 of the Project is summarised in this
Section. The methodology used for pushover analysis and system reliability analysis under
extreme storm and fatigue conditions is outlined and the probabilistic modelling of the basic
variables is summarised. The key results obtained for the four structures are presented and
compared. Possible generalisation of the results to other geographical locations with
different wave climates is discussed.

Section 4: Reliability Under Ship Collision Conditions

The ship collision study carried out by MSL under Task I.3 is presented. The methodology
for dynamic ship/structure interaction analysis is outlined and the background work for
collecting ship collision data for the North Sea is summarised. The methodology for
reliability analysis is described and the results from the study are presented and discussed for
the four structures.

Section 5: Human and Organisational Error Analysis

The methodology for human and organisational error analysis and its implementation into the
SYRAS software developed by UCB under Task II.1 is presented. The overall framework
for the identification of dominant error scenarios during design, construction, maintenance
and operation of minimum structures is presented. The influence of organisations, hardware,
procedures and environments on the likelihood of human error is discussed and a
methodology for reducing the error rates using appropriate QA/QC measures is described.

Section 6: Evaluation of Error Scenarios

This section summarises the work carried out by UCB and Ramboll in Task II.2 and that by
WS Atkins and MSL under Task II.3. The application of the methodology for human error
analysis to the selected structures is presented. The six dominant error scenarios identified
 14

covering the different life-cycle phases and the quantification of their error probabilities are
described. The reliability analysis for the identified error scenarios considering extreme
storm, fatigue and ship collision conditions is outlined and the results from this study are
presented and discussed.

Section 7: Comparison of the Selected Structures

This section compares the life-cycle reliability characteristics of the four structures in terms
of their fabrication effort, reliability under extreme storm, fatigue, and ship collision
conditions, and performance under human and organisational error scenarios.

Section 8: Conclusions and Recommendations

Based on the results from the different tasks, a number of conclusions are made and their
implications on the design of minimum structures are discussed. Recommendations are
made for improving the life-cycle reliability characteristics of minimum characteristics.
 15

2. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN

2.1 Introduction

This section summarises the conceptual design of the three minimum structures and a 4-pile
jacket carried out by Ramboll under Task I.1 of the Project. Detailed information on the
design process and the configuration of the structures can be obtained from References 1-5.

The scope of work under Task I.1 was to carry out a conceptual design of the four
structures which will form the basis of a comparative reliability evaluation. To enable a
consistent comparison, it is important that the structures are designed to a consistent criteria
and using the same design data on topside loading, environmental conditions, material, and
soil parameters. For this purpose, the “design premises” were established at the beginning
of the project and all the structures were designed according to this.

The design premises are discussed in Section 2.2 followed by a summary of the design and
analysis procedures used in Section 2.3. The key design features of the four structures are
compared and discussed in Section 2.4.

2.2 Design Premises

2.2.1 Design Criteria

With the agreement of the Project Steering Committee (PSC), the Davy field in the Southern
North Sea was chosen as the reference site where all the structures would be located for the
purposes of design. It was also chosen to adopt standard North Sea design criteria and
design procedures for conceptual design. Where possible, generalisation of the results to
other wave environments would be made following the baseline study for North Sea
conditions.

The following conditions were considered for the design of structures:

• Extreme storm (100-year return)

• Operating storm
• Fatigue
• Vortex shedding
• On-bottom stability

During the initial phase of the project, following standard North Sea practice, ship collision
from a 2500 tonne vessel at 2 m/sec was also used as a design condition. This, however,
was seen to totally govern the section dimensions of most of the structures which made the
other loading conditions insignificant. Ship collision is currently not a design requirement in
the Gulf-of-Mexico and many other offshore fields and hence it was decided by the PSC to
drop this design requirement. However, for each structure after being designed for the
above listed conditions, its inherent capacity to resist a ship collision was determined as
explained further in Section 2.3.
 16

In view of the shallow water depth, it was assumed that fabrication, load-out, transportation
and installation conditions do not have a significant influence on design. In view of the
conceptual nature of the design, these conditions were not assessed in detail. However, it is
considered that the resulting designs are representative of real structures and can actually be
fabricated and installed, following detailed engineering.

The designs were carried out largely according to API Recommended Practice 2A-WSD,
20th Edition [Ref. 6].

In order to ensure a consistent comparison of the structures, the key members of all the
structures were designed for a “utilisation ratio” of close to 0.8. In order to achieve this
requirement, wall thickness of members were selected in increments of 1 mm. Hence it is
possible that some of the member dimensions may not follow the standard pipe section
schedules available in practice.

The focus of the JIP was to compare the reliability characteristics of the primary
substructure (i.e. the jacket) without being influenced by the chosen soil profile. It was
therefore important that the system reliability of the structures were not governed by
foundation failure. For this purpose, the pile axial utilisation ratios were kept well below
0.60. It is considered that this has no significant influence on the primary structure
dimensions and its failure behaviour.

The service life of the platforms was considered to be 20 years. The design for fatigue was
based on the UK HSE guidelines [Ref.7]. In line with the draft ISO standard for design of
fixed offshore steel structures (ISO 13819-2, Fixed Steel Offshore Structures, Draft C,
1997), a distinction was made between design fatigue life for the three minimum structures
and for the traditional jacket based on an assumed difference in robustness. Consequently,
for the 4-Legged Jacket, a Fatigue Life Safety Factor of 3.0 was applied, while for the
remaining structures a factor of 5.0 was used.

2.2.2 Design Data

All the platforms were designed to accommodate four O.D. 26 inch conductors and one
O.D. 12 inch export riser. For the 3-Pile Monotower the conductors and the riser are
assumed to be located inside the central column while for the Braced Caisson the
conductors are located inside the caisson and the riser is assumed clamped onto the caisson
on the outside. For the Vierendeel Tower, the conductors are located inside the four corner
columns while the riser is located within the perimeter of the Vierendeel tower. For the 4-
Legged Jacket both the conductors and the riser are located centrally within the jacket to
provide maximum protection against ship impact.

The topside is assumed to have a total weight of 400 tonnes. A simplified modelling of the
topside was adopted. Additional loads due to eccentricity of the C.O.G. of the topside
loading, out-of-vertical tolerance for installation, weight of anodes and other appurtenant
elements were accounted for.
 17

As mentioned previously, the Davy field in the Southern North Sea was chosen as the
reference site. Accordingly, all the environmental data and soil properties were taken from
this site. The key environmental parameters are summarised in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Environmental Parameters Used for Design

Water Depth including storm surge 36.2 m

100-year return wave height 16.4 m
Period of the 100-year wave 12.6 m
Associated current speed at the surface 0.96 m/sec
Associated wind speed (1 hour mean @ 10 m above LAT) 32.2 m/sec

2.3 Design and Analysis Procedures

The environmental loading for the extreme storm and fatigue analysis were generated
following API RP 2A-20th edition wave load recipe. Stream function theory was used for
the extreme wave loading and Stokes 5th Order wave theory for the fatigue loading. A
wave kinematics factor of 0.9 was used and current blockage and Doppler effects were
modelled according to API. The environmental criteria given in Table 2.1 was applied
omni-directionally.

A marine growth thickness of 50 mm was assumed between LAT and -12.2 m and a
thickness of 25 mm from -12.2 m down to the mud line. Values of the hydrodynamic
coefficients used were: Cd = 1.05 and Cm = 1.20 for marine growth fouled members and Cd
= 0.65 and Cm = 1.60 for members not fouled by marine growth. In addition, for large
diameter vertical members such as the caissons, the hydrodynamic coefficients were
evaluated as a function of the Keulegan-Carpenter number. The above values of the
coefficients were increased by 5% to account for the presence of anodes.

A non-linear soil/pile interaction analysis was used for the extreme wave and ship impact
analyses, while for fatigue analysis a linear boundary model was used for the foundation
support. The soil spring characteristics were calculated according to API.

The dynamic response of the structure for extreme wave and fatigue analysis was modelled
through a Dynamic Amplification Factor corresponding to the eigen period of the first
bending mode determined based on the analysis of a single degree of freedom system with
2% of the critical damping.

The wind loading on the topside was determined based on a rectangular box of L = 15 m,
W = 8 m, and H = 16 m). A wind shape factor of 1.5 was used.

The structures were designed to avoid the risk of vortex shedding induced vibrations and the
resulting loads. This was achieved by designing all elements to be outside the locking-on
 18

range for cross-flow and in-line excitations. The calculations followed the methods outlined
in DNV Classification Note No. 30.5 [Ref. 8]. The particle velocities used for calculation of
the reduced velocity parameter, vr, was the resulting 100 year return period velocities at the
relevant depth for the element in question after pertinent combination of wave and current.

Although the structures were not explicitly designed for ship collision condition, their inherent
capacity to resist a ship collision was determined in terms of the critical velocity of a 1000
tonne vessel. Both broad and stern side impacts were analysed and the worst case from the
two was used to define the capacity.

The ship impact capacity was determined based on a Plastic Limit State utilisation ratio limit
of 1.00 (as opposed to the Elastic Limit State limit of 0.80 applied in connection with the
environmental loads). During the performance of the design, it was further decided (with the
approval of the PSC) to re-size any of the joints which failed before the failure of the
corresponding member in the ship collision analysis. The intention was to achieve a higher
ship impact rating if this can be achieved at a marginally extra cost by re-sizing the joints. A
full non-linear progressive collapse analysis was considered beyond the scope of a
conceptual design (this was to be performed in any case by MSL under Task I.3 which is
presented in Section 4).

For the ship collision analysis of the three minimum structures, a time-domain dynamic
ship/structure interaction analysis was performed. The full model of the structure used in the
extreme wave analysis was simplified for dynamic analysis using a modal approach, in which
the structure is represented by the lowest bending mode shape. Based on the accelerations
and forces found in the non-linear two-degrees of freedom system, maximum d’Alembert
forces (inertial forces) and direct collision forces were established. These were then
transferred back to the full structural model for which a design check was subsequently
performed. The impact velocity resulting in a maximum Plastic Limit State member utilisation
ratio of 1.0 was determined by iterative and interpolation methods.

For the 4-pile jacket on the other hand, in view of its low dynamic sensitivity, the ship
impact analysis was performed using the traditional impact energy conservation method. The
initial kinetic energy of the drifting ship (including the effect of added mass) was assumed to
be absorbed by the following four mechanisms:

• Local plastic deformation (denting) of the impacted jacket member;

• Plastic deformation (denting) of the supply vessel;
• Development of a hinge mechanism in the impacted jacket member;
• Global elastic deformation of the jacket.

The critical impact velocity which results in a maximum Plastic Limit State member utilisation
ratio of 1.0 was determined by iterative and interpolation methods.
 19

2.4 Key Design Features

The 3-D views of the as designed structures are shown in Figures 1.2-1.5. Detailed
drawings for the structures along with all relevant results such as member and joint utilisation
ratios, fatigue lives, etc. can be obtained from References 2-5. The governing conditions for
each structure are discussed in the following and the key design features of all the four
structures are compared in a table at the end of this section.

2.4.1 3-Pile Monotower

The Monotower member dimensions are mainly governed by the in-place extreme storm
condition. The tubular joints as well as the lower and middle inclined braces are governed by
fatigue.

Some parts of the centre column and the pile sleeves have relatively small utilisation ratios as
they are governed by the maximum allowable diameter over wall thickness ratio (= 100). In
addition, the horizontal braces at the mud line have small utilisation ratios as their dimensions
are governed by vortex shedding considerations.

The penetration length of the piles and their axial tension and compression capacities are
governed by the extreme storm condition.

The critical velocity for impact from a 1000 t supply boat is found to be 1.78 m/s. The
corresponding estimated maximum collision force is 5.7 MN giving a maximum indentation
of 502 mm corresponding to an indentation-to-diameter ratio of 0.21.

2.4.2 Vierendeel Tower

Above elev. (-)5.0 the joint cans and members of the Vierendeel tower are mainly governed
by the in-place extreme storm condition. The upper inclined braces, the upper horizontal
braces and their joints (the cowhorn system) are governed by the in-place operational storm
condition. At elevation (-)23.0, the joints and horizontal braces are governed by fatigue.

The dimensions of the horizontal braces connecting the pile sleeves in elev. (-)23.0 were
chosen to avoid vortex shedding lock-in. The diameter of the horizontal braces connecting
the pile sleeves just above mud line was chosen for geometric reasons. Consequently, the
utilisation of these members in the 100-year extreme storm analysis is rather low. Similarly,
the buttress braces and the lower corner columns have low utilisation ratios as they were
designed to avoid vortex shedding lock-in.

For a few members, the minimum acceptable wall thickness was reached, and for a few
other members (e.g. the legs) the diameter-to-thickness ratio was governing.

The soil penetration length of the piles is governed by the extreme storm condition.

The critical velocity for a 1000 t supply boat was found to be 1.0 m/s. The corresponding
maximum collision force is 4.04 MN giving a maximum indentation in the corner column of
 20

256 mm. This corresponds to an indentation-to-diameter ratio of 0.31. For this load level,
the section at the impact point was found to be fully plastified. Nevertheless, the capacity of
the dented member is shown to be sufficient, since a collision force of 5.1 MN would be
required to establish a three-hinge mechanism in the member.

The analyses for the 1.0 m/s impact velocity showed utilisation ratios of 2.08 in the member
stress check of the horizontal braces at elev. (-)5.0 and 2.39/1.47 in the punching shear
check of the corner column cans at elev. (-)5.0 and (+)3.5, respectively. By increasing the
dimensions of the horizontals at elev. (-)5.0 from Ø559x20 to Ø711x43, the corner column
cans at elev. (-)5.0 from Ø854x37 to Ø960x90 and the corner column cans at elev. (+)3.5
from Ø878x49 to Ø894x57, the utilisation ratios in the member stress check and punching
shear check were reduced to max. 1.0.

2.4.3 Braced Caisson

The design of the Braced Caisson is mainly governed by the in-place extreme storm
condition in the case of members and by fatigue in the case of joints.

The upper inclined braces, the upper horizontal braces and their joints (the cowhorn system)
are governed by the in-place operational storm condition. The pile sleeves and the horizontal
braces at elevation (-)15.0 are governed by element fatigue. The joint fatigue governs for all
the joint cans of the pile sleeves and for the caisson sleeves at elevation (-)15.0 and at
elevation (+)4.0.

The penetration lengths of the caisson and piles are governed by extreme storm.

The critical velocity for a 1000 t supply boat is found to be 1.78 m/s. The corresponding
estimated maximum collision force is 5.3 MN for impact on the caisson, giving an
indentation of 369 mm corresponding to an indentation-to-diameter ratio of 0.18.

For impact on the pile sleeve and pile the estimated maximum collision force is 6.8 MN.
This gives a maximum indentation of 300 mm for the pile sleeve, corresponding to an
indentation-to-diameter ratio of 0.19.

The analysis for the 2.0 m/s impact velocity showed a utilisation ratio of 5.93 in the punching
shear check of the caisson at elev. (+)11.6. By increasing the dimensions of the caisson can
at this elevation from Ø2134x37 to Ø2134x44, the utilisation ratio in the punching shear
check was reduced to 1.13. At elev. (+)17.5 the punching shear check also showed a
utilisation ratio of 1.13. By linear interpolation a velocity of 1.78 m/s is expected to give a
utilisation ratio of approximately 1.0 for both the joints.

2.4.4 4-Pile Jacket

The design of the 4-pile Jacket is mainly governed by the in-place extreme storm condition.
The majority of the joints are governed by fatigue.
 21

The dimensions and layout of the horizontal bracing system just above the mud line were
chosen to avoid vortex shedding lock-in. Consequently, the utilisation of these members in
the 100-year extreme storm analysis is rather low. Similarly, a number of other braces have
low utilisation ratios as their diameters were chosen to avoid vortex shedding lock-in,
sometimes in combination with requirements of diameter-over-thickness ratios. For a few
braces the minimum acceptable wall thickness (fixed at 7 mm) was reached. Some parts of
the legs have relatively small utilisation ratios as they are governed by the maximum
allowable diameter-over-thickness ratio.

The penetration length of the piles is governed by the extreme storm condition.

The critical velocity for a 1000 t supply boat is found to be 1.50 m/s. For impact on a jacket
leg the impact force is found to be 3.39 MN. It is found that no hinge mechanism will
develop in the leg for this impact force. A local dent of 705 mm is, however, introduced at
the point of impact corresponding to one half the diameter of the leg.

For impact on the X-bracing the impact force is found to be 1.11 MN. It is found that a
hinge mechanism will develop in the X-bracing system for this impact force. A total
deformation of 0.877 meter at the impact point is estimated. A local dent of 46 mm is further
induced at the point of impact.

The analyses for the leg impact with 1.5 m/s impact velocity showed punching shear
utilisation ratios of 1.46 at the X-joint in the upper bay, 1.14 at the X-joint in the middle
bay, and 1.07 at the leg cans at elev. (+)17.0. Similarly, the impact on the X-bracing with
1.5 m/s impact velocity showed punching shear utilisation ratios of 5.95 at the X-joint in the
upper bay and 2.94 at the leg cans at elev. (+) 17.0. The wall thickness of the above
mentioned joint cans were increased so as to provide maximum punching shear utilisation
ratios of ≈1.0.

2.4.5 Comparison of Key Figures

For comparison, a number of key figures for the four platforms are shown in Table 2.2. The
number of nodes and braces gives an indication of the relative effort involved in fabrication
and the number of items potentially requiring offshore inspection.

The total weight (jacket + pile) (taking the pile weight of 185 t for the Monotower and
ignoring the weight of followers for the 4-pile Jacket) for the three minimum structures is at
the most 10% lower than the 4-pile Jacket. The fabrication effort, however, depends on
several factors such as the number of braces and joints, the diameter and thickness of
members, extent of nodal construction and outdoor work, etc. Similarly the installation
costs depend on the number of piles to be driven, the use of followers, the extent and
duration of offshore work, etc. A detailed comparison of the fabrication effort of the four
structures is presented in Section 7.2.
 22

Table 2.2: Comparison of Key Design Figures for the Selected Structures

4-Pile Jacket 3-Pile Vierendeel Braced

Monotower Tower Caisson
Jacket Weight:
Primary steel 260 t 215 t 260 t 260 t
Secondary steel 50 t 45 t 45 t 9t
Pile Weight 189(+47)[2] t 140(185)[1] t 170 t 190 t
Caisson/Leg Dia. 1.25 m 2.4 m 0.88 m 2.1 m
Pile Diameter 1.2 m 1.2 m 1.2 m 1.5 m
Pile Penetration 40 m 34 m 32 m 41 m
No. of Braces 60 20 56 15
Tubular Joints 120 36 108 26
Cicumf. Welds 232 100 212 82
No. of Piles 4 3 4 2
Critical Velocity 1.5 (0.7)[3] 1.8 1.0 (<0.5)[4] 1.8 (1.0)[5]
(m/s)for 1000 t vessel
Dent Depth/Dia. 0.50 0.21 0.31 0.19

1. The 140 t pile weight is based on an estimated wall thickness graduation. The 185 t pile weight is
based on the constant 40 mm thickness used in the structural analysis.
2. Pile weight 189 t, followers 47 t.
3. m/s is the capacity as determined from the final layout. Without minor can reinforcements the
capacity is approx. 0.7 m/s.
4. m/s is the capacity as determined from the final layout. Without minor can and brace reinforcements
the capacity is estimated to be below 0.5 m/s.
5. m/s is the capacity as determined from the final layout. Without minor can reinforcements the
capacity is approx. 1.0 m/s.

Since the ship impact rating has been determined on a component basis, it is somewhat
unfair to compare the structures on this basis as some structures exhibit considerable reserve
strength. The performance of the four structures in terms of their system reliability levels
under extreme storm, fatigue and ship collision conditions, with and without gross errors, will
be compared in the following sections.
 23

3. RELIABILITY UNDER EXTREME STORM AND FATIGUE CONDITIONS

This section presents the work carried out by WS Atkins under Tasks I.2 of the project
involving deterministic pushover analysis and system reliability analysis under extreme
environmental and fatigue conditions, see [Ref.9]. The methodology used is summarised
and the key results from the analyses are presented and discussed.

A consistent approach was used for the analysis of all four structures in order to allow
meaningful comparisons. All the analyses were undertaken using the RASOS software
package, [Ref.10], which is a specialised computer code for load generation, progressive
collapse analysis and structural system reliability analysis of offshore structures.

3.1 Structural and Load Modelling

Data for structural modelling, comprising of material parameters and geometrical dimensions
were taken from the Conceptual Design documents for individual structures, [Refs. 2, 3, 4
and 5].
All the structures were modelled as space frames with each member represented by an
"engineering beam/column" element. For the purpose of collapse analysis joints were
modelled as separate elements. Piles inside legs were modelled using beam elements with
equivalent properties representing combined stiffness and strength of the two components.
A simplified model of the deck was used with members having equivalent stiffness properties
to simulate the actual stiffness of the deck structure.
Soil data and geometrical dimensions of plies, used to calculate the foundation response
were taken from the Design Premises [Ref.1] document. The foundation for each structure
was modelled using pile elements supported on non-linear springs distributed along the piles.
The piles themselves were modelled as tubular beam/column elements. Non-linear stiffness
of support springs (lateral p-y and axial t-z and q-z springs) were calculated from the soil
properties and pile dimensions according to API [Ref.6].
Data for environmental conditions, in terms of water depth, wave and current characteristics,
marine growth and hydrodynamic coefficients were taken from the Design Premises [Ref.1].
For the extreme environmental loading condition the analyses were based on a static
approach. The environmental loading, represented by distributed forces, was calculated
using the API RP 2A 20th Edition recipe, [Ref.6], and the Stoke's 5th order wave theory
was used for calculating particle kinematics.
The structural response under 100-year return environmental loading calculated by the three
consultants using different software codes, namely Ramboll - ROSA, MSL - USFOS and
WS Atkins - RASOS were compared for each structure. After some adjustments of the
USFOS and RASOS computer models satisfactory agreement was obtained for all
structures.
3.2 Deterministic Pushover Analysis

The pushover analysis employed for calculation of the non-linear response of a structure
requires an incremental - iterative strategy, as outlined below.
 24

The first step in this strategy was to calculate the deterministic response under the dead load
and environmental loading for 100-year return conditions. This analysis was carried out
employing an iterative technique, in order to take into account non-linearity in the soil
response.
The global progressive collapse analysis was carried out by factoring-up the wave and
current forces from their initial 100-year values until structural collapse occurred. When a
member or joint "failed", by yielding or buckling, the surplus forces were redistributed to the
remainder of the structure. The plastic deformation and the resulting global non-linear
response of the structure was calculated using the Virtual Distortion Method (VDM)
developed by Holnicki-Szulc and Gierlinski, [Ref.11]. The algorithm used in this method
introduces virtual distortions into the failed locations to simulate plastic deformations that
satisfy the constitutive law and the global equilibrium. This results in a virtual stress-strain
state of the structure. Superimposing the virtual state on the original linear-elastic stress-
strain state gave the final non-linear stress-strain state of the structure with one or more
components failed. The key feature of the above approach is that the governing equations
are constructed for the degrees of freedom in damaged locations only. Thus, the number of
equations is considerably smaller compared to that for standard FE approach, leading to a
substantial reduction in computational effort.
3.3 Reliability Under Extreme Storm Conditions

For reliability analysis, the structure was modelled as a single component with its mean
resistance represented by the ultimate base shear capacity obtained from the deterministic
pushover analysis.

A number of loading, resistance and model uncertainty parameters were treated as random
basic variables described using appropriate probability distributions as summarised in Table
3.1.

Table 3.1: Probability distributions for environmental loading variables

Variable Distribution Mean COV

Wave Height, H [m] Gumbel 12.6 0.10
Wave Period [sec.] Lognormal 0.432*H + 5.61 0.10
Current Speed [m/sec.] Lognormal 0.028*H + 0.48 0.15
Load Model Uncertainty Normal Bias = 1.0 0.15
Ultimate Strength Uncertainty Lognormal Bias = 1.0 0.15

The random base shear due to the applied loading was evaluated as a function of the basic
variables wave height, wave period, current speed and wave load model uncertainty. First-
and Second- Order Methods (FORM/SORM) were used for calculating the probability of
failure.
 25

3.4 Reliability Under Combined Fatigue and Extreme Storm Conditions

The probabilistic model for fatigue variables is summarised in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Probability distributions for fatigue resistance variables

Variable Distribution Mean COV

Global analysis model uncertainty Lognormal 1.0 0.20
S.C.F. model uncertainty Lognormal 1.0 0.15
S-N curve random factor Lognormal 3.38 0.58
Miner’s rule model uncertainty Lognormal 1.0 0.25

Under combined fatigue and extreme storm conditions three types of failure sequences
leading to collapse of the structure need to be considered:
1. Sequence of member/joint static failures under an extreme storm condition,
2. Sequence of fatigue failures of joints at random points in time, and
3. Initial failure of one or more joints in sequence by fatigue followed by collapse of the
weakened structure during an extreme storm.
The union of all the dominant failure sequences of the above three types then gives the
overall system failure probability. In the present study, the pushover failure scenarios under
extreme environmental conditions, either from an intact state of the structure (in 1 above) or
following initial damage by fatigue (in 3), were analysed using a simplified single resistance
variable approach as discussed in Section 3.4. Sequence of fatigue failures of joints (in 2
and 3 above) were analysed using the Selective Enumeration Method, Shetty, [Ref.12].
Besides the overall system reliability levels of the candidate structures, the analysis under the
combined conditions provides useful information about the relative importance of fatigue and
extreme storm conditions for the selected structures.
3.5 Results

3.5.1 Extreme Storm Condition

Deterministic pushover analyses of the four structures were carried out by factoring-up the
wave and current forces from their initial 100-year values until collapse occurred. Only the
most critical wave direction, selected on the basis of design calculations, was considered.
Initial analyses showed that the collapse of all the structures was governed by the failure of
the foundation system. In order to focus the comparisons to the jacket part of the
structures, the foundation failure was suppressed by either strengthening the piles or by
increasing their penetration depth. The results below correspond to the revised designs. The
collapse modes and sequence of member failures for the four structures are shown in Figure
3.1.
 26

5
4
7 8
9 10
3

10 1
2
4 3
9 2
8
1

6 5 6

(a) 4-legged Jacket (b) 3-pile Monotower

5
8 4
1
9 11 2
10 4
1
37
6
5
2
13 3
12

(c) Vierendeel Tower (d) Braced Caisson

Figure 3.1: Pushover collapse modes for the four structures

 27

The load factor on the 100-year environmental loading versus the horizontal deflection at the
deck level for the structures are plotted in Figure 3.2.

6.0
Caisson
5.0
Environmental Load Factor

Jacket
4.0 Monot.

3.0

Vierend.
2.0

1.0

0.0
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Horizontal Deflection at Deck Level (m)

Figure 3.2: Environmental load factor vs. horizontal deck deflection

From the above figure two types of behaviour could be distinguished. The 3-pile
Monotower and the Braced Caisson show a much stiffer behaviour until very close to
collapse and a rapid increase in deck displacement as the collapse load is reached. In
contrast, the 4-Legged Jacket and the Vierendeel Tower, show a local maximum at around
60% to 70% of the ultimate capacity usually associated with local buckling of key
compressive braces. This results in a dynamic change of the load path with the remaining
members of the structures supporting further increases in the load.
The key results from the deterministic pushover analyses and system reliability analyses for
the extreme storm condition are summarised in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Key results for the extreme storm condition

4-Pile 3-Pile Vierendeel Braced

Result
Jacket Monotower Tower Caisson
100-year design env. base shear [kN] 7,970 3,450 4,646 3,700
Ultimate env. base shear [kN] 32,600 15,180 18,440 18,500
Env. load factor at collapse 4.09 4.40 3.97 5.00
Component reliability index (annual) 4.62 4.91 4.44 5.20
System reliability index (annual) 5.73 5.91 5.58 6.23
Most likely collapse wave [m] 26.60 27.30 25.90 > 27.00

Env. load factor to collapse for the 2.52 3.12 3.20 3.12
original foundation design
 28

Of the four structures, the lowest ultimate load factor was obtained for the Vierendeel
Tower while the highest value was achieved for the Braced Caisson. Notwithstanding these
differences, the collapse load factors for all the four structures are relatively high.
The above trend is also reflected by the system reliability indices for the four structures
which shows that the Braced Caisson has the highest system reliability (6.23) while the
Vierendeel Tower gives the lowest reliability (5.58). While the values are reasonably high
for all the structures, the difference between the highest and lowest values is equivalent to
one order of magnitude in annual failure probability.
The above results can in part be explained by the amount of environmental loading the
structures attract for a given wave height. Comparing the environmental base shear for100-
year return design conditions and ultimate base shears at collapse for the four structures, it
can be seen that for the three minimum structures the base shears for the same design wave
height are roughly of similar magnitude. In contrast, the jacket structure attracts about twice
as much load as the other structures. The ultimate capacities of the four structures also
compare similarly, and it can be seen that the wave height corresponding to collapse is
nearly equal for the four structures. This could explain why, despite the high ultimate
capacity of the jacket, its ultimate environmental load factor is not significantly different from
the minimum structures.
Comparing the three minimum structures themselves, it can be seen that the Vierendeel
Tower attracts about 20% more hydrodynamic loading than the 3-pile Monotower at the
design level. This structure also has a 10% higher ultimate capacity than the 3-pile
Monotower. However, due to differences between base shears for these two structures at
the design level, the collapse load factor for the 3-pile Monotower ends up about 10%
higher than that of the Vierendeel Tower.
For the sake of comparison, the collapse load factors for the original design of the
foundation are given in the last row of Table 3.3. In this case collapse occurred due to
failure of the foundation for all structures. It can be seen that foundation failure governs the
ultimate capacity of all the four structures.
3.5.2 Combined Fatigue and Extreme Storm Condition

Component reliability indices for fatigue failure of joints and system reliability indices under
combined fatigue and pushover conditions are given in Table 3.4 for all the four structures.
The results are for a service exposure of 20 years.

Table 3.4: Reliability indices under combined fatigue and pushover conditions

Structure First joint failure by Any joint failure by System

fatigue, β fcf fatigue, β afcf Reliability, β sys

3-pile Monotower 3.07 2.57 3.14

4-legged Jacket 2.69 1.82 5.43
Vierendeel Tower 3.23 2.70 4.10
Braced Caisson 3.21 2.85 6.23
 29

Of the four structures, the 3-pile Monotower is seen to be the most sensitive to fatigue, with
a combined fatigue and pushover reliability of 3.14 compared with 5.91 when fatigue is not
considered. The fatigue-sensitive joints of this structure all form part of the primary
members of the underwater truss structure. It was found that progressive fatigue failure of
any two tubular joints in sequence was sufficient to significantly reduce the pushover
capacity of the structure. The critical sequences all involved initial fatigue failure of any one
of the joints in the top compression braces in the three frames. Subsequent fatigue failure of
any one of the joints in the lower braces, or in the remaining top braces gives a probability of
collapse under pushover loading of greater than 0.5.

The system reliability of the Vierendeel structure is also seen to be very sensitive to fatigue,
with a combined fatigue and pushover reliability of 4.1 compared with 5.57 when fatigue is
not considered. The fatigue-critical joints for this structure are in the four pyramidal raking
braces supporting the Vierendeel frame. Fatigue failure of joints in any two out of these four
braces will lead to the platform collapsing under its self-weight. The system reliability index
is thus determined by the probability of these fatigue sequences occurring. The joints in the
eight horizontal braces close to the mudline are also fatigue-sensitive. However fatigue
failure of these joints, although reducing the pushover capacity of the structure, does not
influence the overall system reliability under combined fatigue and pushover conditions.

The 4-legged jacket is seen to be relatively less sensitive to fatigue, with the combined
fatigue and pushover reliability of 5.43 compared with 5.73 for the pure pushover condition.
The fatigue-critical joints are in the vertical diagonal braces in the bottom and middle bays.
Failure of the four bottom bay brace joints by fatigue is more critical than failure of the
middle bay brace joints. However, the platform still has considerable reserve of strength
following the fatigue failure of these brace joints owing to the bending capacity of the main
legs.

The pushover capacity of the braced caisson is seen to be insensitive to the effects of fatigue
of failure of the joints in the cross braces which connect the caisson and piles below the
mean sea level. The reliability against combined fatigue and pushover is thus the same as the
reliability under pushover condition with a reliability index of 6.23.

Note that all the fatigue reliability results are for an exposure period of 20 years (assumed
service life) and assume no inspection during service.

3.5.3 Generalisation of Results to Other Wave Environments

The results for the extreme storm condition can be generalised to other offshore
environments under the following assumptions:

1. Structures are designed to the same premises;

2. They are designed to 100-year return conditions of the offshore field considered;
 30

3. The ultimate environmental load factors are assumed to remain the same as those given in
Table 3.3 above.

Under the above assumptions, the system reliability indices under extreme storm condition
for the different offshore fields differ as a function of the different coefficient of variation
(COV) of the wave height for these locations.

The system reliability indices for different offshore locations are compared in Figure 3.3
assuming the COV of wave height as: North Sea - 0.10, Other location - 0.15, and Gulf-of-
Mexico - 0.20.

7 North Sea
Other
6 G-o-M
System Reliability Index

0
Jacket Monotower Vierendeel Caisson

Figure 3.3: Pushover system reliability indices for different offshore locations
 31

4. RELIABILITY UNDER SHIP COLLISION CONDITIONS

The ship collision study carried out by MSL under Task I.3 is presented in this Section. The
methodology for dynamic ship/structure interaction analysis and reliability analysis is outlined.
The main results from the study are presented and discussed for the four structures. Further
details can be obtained from the MSL report [Ref.13].

A consistent approach to analyses was applied to all structures so that valid comparisons
could be made between their respective behaviours.

4.1 Structural and Load Modelling

Structural and load modelling and subsequent ship impact and pushover analyses were
carried out using the USFOS computer program [Ref. 14].

The first step was to create the structural models including boat landings, appurtenances and
marine growth within USFOS. The structural details were taken from Ramboll reports
[Refs. 2-5] for individual structures. Subsequent changes to pile dimensions and material
properties provided by WS Atkins, as discussed in Section 3, were incorporated before the
final analyses were carried out. Soil springs were generated using an EXCEL spreadsheet
based on API RP 2A [Ref. 6] formulations.

The loading on the structures included gravity loads from the self weight of the structure and
topside equipment, wind loading on deck, buoyancy, and wave and current loads. The
effects of eccentricity of C.O.G. of topside loading and out-of-verticality tolerance during
installation were simulated using additional horizontal loads at the deck level.

The substructure steel density was increased by 5% to account for the weight of sacrificial
anodes. Wind loads were simulated by point loads distributed over the topsides structure.
Stream Function theory was used to calculate wave loads for the 100-year return design
storm conditions. The hydrodynamic coefficients were taken from Ramboll reports.

The mean value of yield strength of steel was taken to be 15% higher than the specified
minimum value used by Ramboll in design.

The structural and load models were checked by comparing base shears, over-turning
moments and axial loads in selected members to values obtained by Ramboll and WS
Atkins. Satisfactory agreement was obtained.

All bracing members were automatically given an initial bow and assigned certain plasticity
factors such that the buckling strength estimated by USFOS match the API RP2A strengths
(without the safety factors).

Baseline pushover analyses of all the structures in their intact condition were carried out by
factoring up only the wave and current loads from their initial 100-year return values until
structural collapse occurred. The results of collapse base shear and RSR were compared
 32

with the corresponding results from WS Atkins and satisfactory agreement was found, see
Section 3.
4.2 Ship Collision Analysis

In a separate study carried out by MSL for HSE, one of the Sponsors of the JIP, the HSE’s
collision database pertaining to UK sector of the North Sea was examined. From this
study, credible ranges of ship mass and velocity were established. Based on this, the ship
impact analyses for the four structures considered a range of ship mass between 500 and
3500 tonnes and impact velocities up to 2.5 m/sec.

A non-linear, time-domain, dynamic ship/structure interaction analysis was used for all of the
structures. Still water conditions and gravity loads were considered at the time of impact.

Two non-linear springs were inserted in series into the model at the impact location. One
spring represented the member denting process for which the P-δ non-linear stiffness
relationship was obtained from the work of Pettersen and Johnsen [Ref. 15]. The other
spring simulated the deformation characteristics of the vessel. The P-δ relationship specified
by DNV [Ref. 16] was used for this spring.

After applying gravity, buoyancy and other ‘static’ loads, a mass representing the vessel and
associated added mass was given the initial velocity and applied to the end of the (ship) non-
linear spring. Appropriate levels of damping were used during this phase of the analysis.
Normally, following a short period, the response of the structure and vessel was such that
separation occurred.

After separation, the damping levels were increased to damp out structural vibrations
quickly, in preparation for the quasi-static post-impact pushover analysis under extreme
environmental conditions. The impact damage was modelled in terms of the residual dent
and bow damage of the impacted member and any residual plastic deformations elsewhere
in the structure.

For each structure, only one impact location was selected and a broadside impact was
assumed as this proved to have the worst effect on the structure. From the knowledge of
the critical members for the pushover condition obtained from the initial baseline analyses,
the direction of the ship was chosen such that the impact will cause maximum damage
(yielding/buckling) to these critical members.

A maximum limit of 0.7 was set for the dent depth to member diameter ratio. The impact
analysis was stopped when either this limit was reached or the structure failed during the
impact itself. In reality, the well conductors and risers within the impacted member may be
severely damaged before the limiting dent depth is reached. In order to capture this effect
correctly a detailed modelling of the conductor package would be necessary. There is also
a danger that following this approach would make the results specific to the system used.
Therefore, it was agreed by the Project Steering Committee that the impact analysis would
ignore the presence of conductors/risers and aim to determine the maximum capacity of the
 33

structures to withstand ship impact. If necessary, the Operators can set a lower limit taking
into account the exact configuration of the conductor/riser system.

4.3 Reliability Analysis

For reliability analysis, the structure was modelled as a single component with its resistance
representing the ultimate strength of the structure under pushover condition. The reduction
in pushover capacity due to ship impact damage was modelled using a reduction factor f(M,
v) which is a function of the ship mass and velocity of impact.

The safety margin, Z, for collapse of the structure under extreme environmental loading
following ship impact is expressed as

Z = Xmodel . Rinit (1 – f (M, v)) – Xhydro (a . H b) – Xmwind . Fwind (4.1)

where:

Xmodel = random factor for uncertainty in ship impact and pushover capacity

Xhydro = random factor for uncertainty in base shear calculations

H = annual maximum wave height (random)

Xmwind = random factor for uncertainty in wind force calculations

Fwind = Base shear due to associated wind loading on the deck (random)

Rinit = ultimate capacity of the structure in terms of base shear at collapse

f(M,v) = function to account for degradation of system strength due to ship

impact (see below)

a, b = structure dependent parameters, fitted from analysis results, to relate

base shear to wave height.

The function f(M,v) depends on the mass (M) and velocity (v) of the ship. The results of the
analyses described in Section 4.4 next suggest that f(M,v) = 0 for all structures except the
3-pile Monotower.

The Monotower structure failed during the ship impact for certain combinations of mass and
velocity. The safety margin for failure during ship impact for this structure is expressed as

Z = [411.5 v2 - 3971 v + 9560] - M (4.2)

The term in the [ ] braces represents the capacity of the structure against ship impact and
was obtained by fitting a function to those values of mass and velocity which resulted in the
failure of the structure during impact.
 34

The vessel sizes which could visit a structure were modelled using a uniform (rectangular)
distribution between 500 and 3500 tonnes. (This does not include the added mass which
was taken into account during analyses.) For a given vessel, the uncertainty in its mass was
modelled using a normal distribution with a coefficient of variation of 0.15. The velocity of
impact was taken to be exponentially distributed with a mean of 0.3 m/s and a standard
deviation of 0.3 m/s.

The distributions for the environmental parameters and model uncertainty factors are the
same as those discussed under Section 3, and are summarised in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1: Probability distributions for reliability analysis under ship impact condition

Variable Distribution Statistics

Xmodel Normal Mean = 1.0

(Modelling uncertainty) COV = 0.15
Xhydro Normal Mean = 1.0
(Base shear uncertainty) COV = 0.15
H Gumbel Mean = 12.55m
(Annual max. wave height) COV = 0.097
Xmwind Lognormal Mean = 1.0
(Wind force model uncertainty) COV = 0.15
Xwind Lognormal Mean = varies
(Wind force) COV = 0.20
M Rectangular 500 to 3500 t
(Ship mass)
Xmship Normal Mean = 1.0
(Ship mass uncertainty) COV = 0.15
v Exponential Mean = 0.3 m/s
(Ship velocity) Std. dev. = 0.3 m/s

4.4 Results

A series of dynamic ship impact and post-impact pushover analyses were conducted to
establish the degradation of system strength, if any, due to the impact. The results are
presented in Table 4.2. For the range of vessel mass and velocities considered (500 to
3500 tonnes and up to 2.5 m/s) it can be seen that only the 3-pile Monotower’s system
strength was affected.
 35

Although the dent must have a weakening effect on the impacted member, the member did
not participate in the collapse mechanism under pushover conditions. Therefore, provided
the structure survived the ship impact itself, the reserve strength under subsequent pushover
conditions remained unaffected.

Table 4.2: Results of ship impact analysis

Ship Ship
Structure and ship Energy Post Impact Pushover Strength
Mass Velocity Dent (m) d/D
impact location (MJ) λ
(Tonnes) (m/s)
3P Monopod 1000 1.78 2.275 0.200 0.083 3.71
Caisson φ=2.400m 1000 2.00 2.870 0.270 0.113 ''
+4.0m 1000 2.50 4.488 0.370 0.150 ''
1000 3.25 7.585 0.600 0.250 3.65
1000 3.30 7.821 - - Failed during impact
2500 1.78 5.687 0.420 0.180 3.71
2500 2.00 7.180 0.550 0.230 ''
2500 2.35 9.915 0.600 0.250 3.445
2500 2.50 11.219 - - Failed during impact
3500 1.50 5.654 0.440 0.180 3.71
3500 1.78 7.962 0.580 0.240 ''
3500 1.90 9.074 0.600 0.250 3.65
3500 2.00 10.052 - - Failed during impact
4 Legged Jacket 1000 1.50 1.800 0.580 0.410 3.05
Leg φ=1.422m 1000 2.00 3.200 0.870 0.610 ''
-2.0m 1000 2.50 5.000 1.000 0.700 ''
2500 1.25 3.125 0.870 0.610 ''
2500 1.50 4.500 1.000 0.700 ''
3500 1.10 3.388 0.870 0.610 ''
3500 1.25 4.375 1.000 0.700 ''
3500 2.50 17.500 1.000 0.700 ''
Vierendeel 1000 1.00 0.800 0.070 0.083 2.76
Column φ=0.840m 1000 2.00 3.200 0.375 0.446 ''
-2.0m 3500 2.00 11.200 0.588 0.700 ''
3500 2.50 17.500 0.588 0.700 "
Braced Caisson 1000 1.00 0.719 0.058 0.030 3.76
Column φ=2.134m 1000 2.00 2.876 0.315 0.150 "
+2.0m 3500 2.00 7.876 0.800 0.370 "
3500 2.50 12.306 1.000 0.470 "

Notes: 1) For each structure limit of denting is d/D=0.700

2) For 4 legged jacket removal of X-bracing for sternside. X bracing impact had no effect on reducing pushover strength.

For certain impact cases, very high dent depths (up to 0.7 of the member diameter) were
obtained without global collapse and without a significant influence on the pushover capacity.
In reality, the well conductors and risers within the impacted member may be severely
damaged before these dent depths are reached.

For the 4-pile Jacket, Vierendeel Tower and the Braced Caisson, the system reliability is
therefore governed by the pushover condition and the results will be the same as those given
in Section 3 for the intact structure without any damage due to ship impact.
 36

The 3-pile Monotower structure failed during the ship impact for certain combinations of
mass and velocity. In the other cases, the pushover capacity was only marginally affected
for values of mass and velocity very close to those which caused failure under ship impact
itself. Therefore the reliability of this structure for failure during ship impact was evaluated
using the safety margin given in Eq. (4.2).

The probability of failure during impact, using the First Order Reliability Method (FORM),
was calculated as 6.36E-04. In Task II.2, the probability of impact was established as
9.0E-03 per annum based on historic collision data for North Sea structures. Combining
these two probabilities gives an overall probability of failure due to ship impact of 5.72E-06
equivalent to a reliability index of 4.39. This is lower than the reliability index of 5.13 under
pushover condition obtained using the safety margin Eq. (4.1) with f (M, v) set to zero.

In summary, all structures except perhaps the 3-pile Monotower have proven to be robust
against impacts from vessels up to 3500 tonnes and velocities up to 2.5 m/sec. Even for the
3-pile Monotower, the reliability index remains at a comfortably high level. These results,
however, ignore any damage to conductors and riser within the impacted member
(caisson/leg) which in practice will limit the size of the vessel and impact velocities to much
lower values.

For the 3-pile Monotower, Vierendeel tower and the Braced Caisson, the values given in
Table 4.2 should therefore be considered as upper bounds to the impact capacities of these
structures, while those given in Table 2.2, which are based on component failure, should be
taken as lower bound values. For the 4-pile jacket, in which the conductors and the riser
are located centrally within the jacket, the ship impact capacity will correspond to the values
given in Table 4.2.
 37

5. HUMAN & ORGANISATIONAL ERROR ANALYSIS

This section describes the work carried out by University of California, Berkeley under Task
II.1 of the project. A general framework for the identification of human errors and
quantification of their likelihood was developed, [Ref.17]. The methodology was
implemented into the SYRAS software to facilitate the error evaluation, [Ref.18].

5.1 Failures due to Human and Organisational Errors

Experience has shown human errors to be the basic cause of failures of many engineered
systems. In almost all cases, the initiating event can be traced back to a catastrophic
compounding of human and organisational errors, [Ref.17]. A careful examination and
evaluation of past incidents of major failures in different industrial sectors has provided a
better insight into the causes of human errors.

Failure can be defined as any undesirable or unanticipated state or poor performance which
makes a structure unfit for its intended purpose. Failure could occur, for example, due to
loss of safety, serviceability, durability, or other performance requirements such as budget,
project schedule, aesthetics, etc.

Failures could occur due to:

(i) “intrinsic” (natural, inherent) causes - those that could have been or were anticipated, i.e.
predictable causes, and
(ii) “extrinsic” (human error related) causes - those that could not have been or were not
anticipated, i.e. unpredictable causes.

The causes of failure due to human and organisational errors (HOE) can be organised into
three categories:
1. the initiating actions which are the direct cause of failures,
2. the contributory factors that underlie the above actions, and
3. the compounding or propagating actions.

A detailed study of the case histories of failure of marine structures indicates that while the
direct causes of failure can be attributed to the acts of individuals, the dominant contributing
and compounding causes are fundamentally "organisational" - erroneous actions by groups
of individuals that influence the direct cause of failure and exacerbate or escalate its
development through compounded errors. Of the individual errors, the majority of errors
are errors of commission (80%), i.e. what was performed was erroneous and purposefully
executed. Errors of omission or what was performed was not intentional account for a
minority of the causes (20%). Often, the direct initiating actions are identified and the more
important underlying and compounding actions are ignored. This has been an important
deficiency in most accident databases.

Human and organisational errors can occur during the design, construction, and operation
phases of the life-cycle of a structure.
 38

5.2 Factors Influencing Error Likelihood

Any activity that involves human intervention is subject to the results of human influences that
have both positive and negative impacts of varying degrees. These influences can be
categorised into six groups as depicted in Figure 5.1.

Operating
Teams Organizational
Factors Factors

Structural Interfaces Hardware

Factors Factors Factors

Environmental Procedural
Factors Factors

Figure 5.1: Factors influencing human and organisational errors

Operators. The Operator or Individual malfunctions might best be described as actions and
in-actions that result in lower than acceptable performance. Operator malfunctions can be
categorized by types of error mechanisms (Reason, 1990). These include slips or lapses,
mistakes, and circumvention. Slips and lapses cause low quality actions when the outcome
of the action is or was not the intended outcome. Frequently, the significance of this type of
malfunction is small because these actions are not easily recognized by the person involved
and in most cases are easily corrected. Mistakes can develop when the action is intended,
but the intention is wrong. Mistakes are perhaps the most significant because the
perpetrator has limited clues to indicate a problem. Circumvention (violations, intentional
short cuts) develop when a person decides to break a rule for what seems to be a good (or
benign) reason in order to simplify or avoid a task. Often, it takes an outsider to the
situation to identify this.

Organisations. An organisational malfunction is defined as a departure from acceptable or

desirable practice on the part of a group of individuals that produces unacceptable or
undesirable results.

Analysis of the history of failures of offshore platforms and other marine systems provides
many examples in which organisational malfunctions have been primarily responsible for
failures. The goals promulgated by an organisation may induce operators to conduct their
work in a manner that management would approve. Excessive risk-taking problems are very
common in marine systems. Frequently, the organisation develops high rewards for
maintaining and increasing production while hoping for safety. The formal and informal
rewards and incentives provided by an organisation have a major influence on the
performance of operators.

One of the most pervasive problems resulting in failures of offshore platforms involves
organisational communications. In the case of the Piper Alpha platform, the break down in
 39

organisation was found in the failure of the permit to work system, the loss of command
control, and the organisation’s ignoring early warning signals issued by the field operating
personnel [Ref.19]. Due to incentives provided by the organisation, there were tendencies to
filter information, making things seem better than they were.

Experience indicates that one of the major factors in organisational malfunctions is the culture
of the organisation. Organisational culture is reflected in the following: views on action,
change, and innovation; the degree of external focus contrasted with internal focus;
incentives provided for risk taking; other rewards and incentives; the degree of lateral and
vertical integration of the organisation; the effectiveness and honesty of communications;
autonomy, responsibility, authority and decision making; rewards and; and the orientation
toward the quality of performance contrasted with the quantity of production. The culture of
an organisation is embedded in its history.

Procedures. These malfunctions can be embedded in engineering design guidelines and

computer programs, construction specifications, and operations manuals. They can be
embedded in how people are taught to do things. With the advent of computers and their
integration into many aspects of the design, construction, and operation of marine structures,
software errors are of particular concern because computers can only function within the
limitations of their designers.

Software errors in which incorrect and inaccurate algorithms were coded into computer
programs have been at the root cause of several major failures of marine structures.
Guidelines have been developed to address the quality of computer software for the
performance of finite element analyses. Extensive software testing is required to assure that
the software performs as it should and that the documentation is sufficient. Of particular
importance is the provision of independent checking procedures that can be used to validate
the results from analyses. High quality procedures need to be verifiable based on first
principles, results from testing, and field experience.

Given the rapid pace at which significant industrial and technical developments have been
taking place, there has been a tendency to make design guidelines, construction
specifications, and operating manuals more and more complex. In many cases, poor
organisation and documentation of software and procedures has exacerbated the tendencies
for humans to make errors. Simplicity, clarity, completeness, accuracy, and organisation are
desirable attributes in procedures developed for the design, construction, and operation of
marine structures.

Hardware. Human malfunctions can be initiated by or exacerbated by poorly engineered

systems and procedures that invite. Such systems (hardware and/or structure) are difficult to
construct, operate, and maintain.

New technologies compound the problems of latent system flaws. Complex design, close
coupling (failure of one component leads to failure of other components) and severe
performance demands on systems increase the difficulty in controlling the impact of human
malfunctions even in well operated systems.
 40

The issues of system robustness (defect or damage tolerance), design for constructibility,
and design for IMR (Inspection, Maintenance, Repair) are critical aspects of engineering
offshore platforms that will be able to deliver acceptable performance.

Environment. Environmental influences can have important effects on the performance

characteristics of individuals, organisations, hardware, and software. Environmental
influences include external (e.g. wind, temperature, rain, fog, time of day), internal (lighting,
ventilation, noise, motions) and sociological factors (e.g. values, beliefs, etc.).

5.3 Quality Assurance and Control

Quality Assurance (QA) is composed of those practices and procedures designed to help
assure that an acceptable degree of quality or performance is obtained. QA is focused on
preventing of malfunctions. Quality Control (QC) is associated with the implementation and
verification of the QA practices and procedures. Quality control is intended to assure that
the desired level of quality is actually achieved. Quality control is focused on reaction,
identification of malfunctions, rectification, and correction.

Achieving quality goals is primarily dependent on people. QA / QC efforts are directed

fundamentally at assuring that human and system performance is developed and maintained
at acceptable levels. Strategies for implementing QA /QC measures include those put in
place before the activity (prevention), during the activity (checking), after the activity
(inspection), after the manufacture or construction (testing), and after the structure has been
put in service (detection). The earlier QA / QC measures are able to detect the lack of
acceptable quality, then the more effective the remediation.

It is desirable that QA / QC are very stringent for the error intolerant elements that comprise
a structure system. Also, it is desirable to configure or design the element or component so
that it can be “error tolerant” for the highly likely types of design, construction, and / or
operations malfunctions. The design of damage or defect tolerant (robust) structures is very
important. The sensitivities of various parts of a particular structure and various parts of a
particular design process can be studied beforehand through “fragility analysis” to determine
the most error intolerant parts. Re-design and QA / QC efforts can thus be directed at
those elements and aspects with the highest criticality. Constant attention needs to be given
to these elements during construction, operation, and maintenance. Inspections can help
confirm the quality and condition of the elements most important to the integrity of the
platform and most intolerant of low quality factors.

5.4 Sources of Information for HOE Quantification

A study of the present databases on marine and offshore systems in which there has been
unacceptable levels of quality indicates that they are deficient in their ability to accurately
define the key initiating, contributing, and compounding factors that lead to compromises of
operating quality. There has not been any common classification or definition of causes of
marine accidents. There has been a dearth of well trained investigators. Investigations
generally have focused on the immediate causes of quality problems, not the underlying
 41

factors that lead to these causes. Investigations have frequently been focused on placing
blame rather than on determining the underlying, direct, and contributing factors.
Organisational factors have largely been ignored. Due to legal action concerns, there is not
a single generally available database that addresses violations or intentional circumvention
related causes of low quality in marine systems.

In all parts of the quality improvement process, data on HOE causes and effects is sadly
lacking. There has not been a common vocabulary to describe direct, contributing, and
compounding causes. There is little definitive information on the rates and effects of human
errors and their interactions with organisations, environments, hardware, and software.
There is even less definitive information on how contributing factors influence the rates of
human errors.

Given the requirement to improve the quality of marine structures and a need to implement
alternative QA / QC strategies in design, construction, and operation of marine structures,
there is a pressing need to begin gathering, archiving and analysing high quality data on HOE
incidence, causes, and effects. Some organisations have begun such developments. These
efforts need to be encouraged and extended.

Given the dearth of reliable quantitative information that is presently available on HOE in
design and construction of marine systems, the analysts are left with four primary sources of
information to perform evaluations:
• judgment,
• simulations,
• field, laboratory, and office experiments, and
• process reviews, accident and near-miss investigations.

All of these sources represent viable means of providing quantitative evaluations. It is rare to
find a structured and consistent use of these four approaches in HOE assessments. Given
the lack of definitive quantitative information on which to base objective quantitative
evaluations, one must rely, at least in the near future, primarily on judgement. As adequately
structured databases are developed and implemented for HOE evaluations, then in the
future, more reliance can be placed on objective data and evaluations based on a
combination of data and judgement. Adequately qualified and unbiased judgement will be
essential to produce meaningful results.

A number of researchers have published useful summaries that provide quantified

information on human errors, see [Ref.17] for sources. This information has been
developed primarily for evaluation of HOE effects in the operations of nuclear power plants.
The information was developed primarily from experiments and simulations concerning
general categories of human task reliability, and are shown in figures below.

Generic human error rates are assigned to general types of tasks performed under general
types of influences and impediments. The range of error probabilities are intended to be
associated with the potential ranges in the influences and impediments. If the influences and
 42

impediments are intense, then the error probabilities will be toward the upper portion of the
range and vice versa.

It is important to note that the severity of the error is not captured in any of the available
quantitative information. Errors are either major and significant or minor or not significant. It
is noted that minor or not significant errors are generally caught by the individual or
individuals and corrected; hence their lack of importance in the assessment of human
reliability.
1
unfamilar task
performed with change system state
speed without procedures
without checking
1 E-1
simple task
performd with routine task
speed performed with
speed or diverted
1 E-2 attention

change system
with procedures
with checking
1 E-3

routine tasks
trained, motivated

1 E-4

1 E-5 respond to system commands

with supervisory system

1 E-6

Figure 5.2: Nominal human task performance unreliability

(o Mean; • - 1 Standard Deviation)

1
new or rarely performed task
extreme stress, very little time
severe distractions & imparements
MEAN PROBABILITY OF HUMAN ERROR

10-1
highly complex task
considerable stress, little time
OR FAILURE PER TASK

moderate distractions & imparements

10-2
complex or unfamililar task
moderate stress, moderate time
little distractions & imparements
10-3
difficult but famillar task
little stress, sufficient time
very little distractions or imparements
10-4
simple, frequently, skilled task
no stress, no time limits
no distractions or imparements
10-5

Figure 5.3: Generic human task error rates

 43

Information also has been developed on human error performance shaping factors. These
performance shaping factors are influences that can result in an increase in the mean rates of
human errors. Simulations, experiments, and information gathered on plant operations have
provided this information.

These “performance shaping factors” are extremely useful in helping develop quantification
of the potential effects of changes in organisation, hardware, procedures, and environments
on the base rates of human errors. In [Ref.17] the performance shaping factors are
presented in the form of “influence scales” that give the multipliers on the base rate or
.

5.5 Methodology for Quantification of Error Likelihood

The methodology used in the JIP for the quantification of the likelihood of HOE scenarios is
summarised below. The methodology attempts to account for all the major human and
organisational factors which influence errors as discussed in the previous sections.

A number of potential human and organisational error scenarios are first identified based on
judgement combined with information from historical incident databases. The scenarios
should cover the design, fabrication, installation, operation and maintenance phases of a
structure’s life-cycle. The likelihood of error is evaluated separately for each scenario which
is then multiplied with the conditional probability of structural failure given the error. The
probabilities due to different error scenarios and for different failure modes are then
combined to evaluate the overall system failure probability as shown in Figure 1.6. Specific
HOE scenarios considered in this project and the results of their evaluation are presented in
Section 6.

Each error scenario is broken down into the primary functions or “tasks” involved in the
activity. If desirable, a task can be decomposed into sub-tasks. As discussed in Section
5.2, in each task, errors due to the Operating teams can develop due to eight different
causes (or sources) as given in Figure 5.4. The error rates for these eight sources can be
estimated from the generic error rates given in Figure 5.3 combined with judgement.

Performance shaping factors or influence scales given in [Ref.17] are used to modify the
base operator error rates to recognise the influences of Organisations, Procedures,
Hardware and Environments (external, internal, social) as discussed in Section 5.2.
 44

.
PE =
OPERATIN G TEA M

Co m m u n ic a t io n s

Se le ct io n &
T ra in in g

Pla nn ing & ORGA N IZA TION S

P re p a r a t io n s

influences
Lim it a t io n s & P RO CED URES
I m p a i rm e n t s

HA RD W A RE
V i o la t io n s

EN V IRON MEN TS
S l ip s

Ig n o r a n c e

Mi s t a k e s

Figure 5.4: Operating team HOE causes and influencing factors

In determining the overall probability of error, the correlation between the above eight
sources should be considered. High positive correlation in the sources could be developed
by human factors such as a consistent set of high quality individuals (human), organisation,
hardware, and procedures that are allowed to permeate the entire design process.
Organisation culture is one of the most important of the correlating processes. For
simplicity, full correlation can be assumed to obtain a lower-bound to the error probability,
while zero correlation will give an upper-bound.

The influence of different QA / QC alternatives on the error probability can then be

determined with a view to select the most effective option. The attention here is focused on
the major malfunctions which can be detected and corrected by the QA / QC system. The
probability of error detection, P(D), and error correction, P(C), play an important role in
reducing the likelihood of human error. The P(D) and P(C) depend on the effectiveness and
intensity of the QA / QC measure used. The probability due to each error source is then
multiplied by [1- P(D) • P(C)] which represents the probability that the error is not detected
and not corrected.
 45

5.6 The SYRAS Software

The SYRAS software was developed within the project to facilitate the evaluation human
and organisational errors implementing the methodology described above. The error
evaluation is achieved by progressing through a number of forms or windows, each window
performing a specific task.

After entering relevant information about platform name, location, water depth, etc. the user
is presented with the Quality Attribute Form shown in Figure 5.5. The overall system
reliability can be evaluated in terms of four quality attributes: Serviceability, Safety,
Durability, and Compatibility (i.e. ability to meet budget and schedule requirements). The
results can be obtained with and without accounting for the influence of QA / QC measures.

After selecting a quality attribute, the Life-cycle Phase Form is presented as shown in Figure
5.6. The results for each life-cycle phase and for each quality attribute are presented both
with and without QA / QC. The total life-cycle probability combining all the phases is also
presented.

By selecting one of the life-cycle phases, the user is presented with a Task Structure Form,
Figure 5.7. This allows the user to input the sequences, correlation, and organisational
relationships between tasks. The open format is composed of a six by six grid of individual
task openings to depict different series and parallel relationships. Task information is entered
into the structure by double clicking on the task location (represented by an empty box).
Double clicking the task box allows the user to either: (a) Designate the task as a
supervisory task (whose Pf will be calculated using the Pf’s of sub-tasks), or (b) Designate
the tasks as a sub-task. Task relationships are defined using the horizontal and vertical
check boxes. Horizontal boxes designate correlation, and vertical boxes designate results of
fragility analyses.

Information for sub-tasks is input using the Task Information Form, Figure 5.8. After double
clicking on the desired task location for a sub-task, the user is prompted for information on
base error rate, description, and mean for the task. The user then identifies the impacts of
the six influence factors: the Operator, the Organisation, the Procedures, the Hardware, the
Environment, and the resulting Interfaces. Using the multipliers inherent to the influences, the
new task error rate is calculated and displayed. When the user exits the form, the data is
stored. The life-cycle phase Pf is updated upon returning to the task structure form.

After exiting the task structure form, the user is taken back to the life-cycle form to select
the next life-cycle phase. After completing all the life-cycle phases for a quality attribute, the
control returns to the quality attribute form to select the next quality attribute. The evaluation
is completed after finishing all the quality attributes and exiting from the quality attribute form.

The data and results from SYRAS can be exported into an Excel spreadsheet for
presentation in a tabular format.
 46

Figure 5.5: Quality Attribute Form

Figure 5.6: Quality Attribute Life-cycle Phase Form

 47

Figure 5.7: Task Structure Form

Figure 5.8: Task Information Form

 48

6. EVALUATION OF ERROR SCENARIOS

This section presents the work carried out by UCB and Ramboll in Task II.2 and that by
WS Atkins and MSL under Task II.3. The application of the methodology for human error
analysis to the selected structures is presented. Six dominant error scenarios identified
covering the different life-cycle phases and the quantification of their error probabilities are
described. The reliability analysis for the identified error scenarios considering extreme
storm, fatigue and ship collision conditions is outlined and the results from this study are
presented and discussed. Further details can be obtained from [Refs. 17, 9, 13].

6.1 Identification of Human Error Scenarios

High consequence accidents resulting from HOE can be differentiated into those that occur
in design, construction and operation phases of a marine system's life cycle. Experience has
shown that the majority of the errors occur or manifest during the operating phase, however,
many of these may have root causes founded in design and / or construction errors.

Based on the information available from the World Offshore Accident Databank (WOAD)
[Ref.19], the principal cause of accidents to fixed offshore platforms are seen as blowouts,
collisions, fires and explosions. Of all the causes of accidents, only 6% to 9% are attributed
to structurally related causes.

Examination of the major causes for damage and repair of offshore structures in the North
Sea, [Ref.20], indicates that the leading causes are fatigue (frequency of 10-3 per annum)
and collision (9×10-3 p.a.). The other sources of damage included dropped objects,
fabrication and installation faults, corrosion, design and operating errors and the probability
of damage to the platforms from these sources ranges from 3 E-3 pa to 5 E-3 pa. Current
experience also indicates that the majority of damage that is associated with accidents
(collisions, dropped objects) is discovered after the incident occurs, [Ref.20]. About 60%
of fatigue and corrosion damage is detected during routine inspections. However, the
balance of 40% is discovered accidentally or during non-routine inspections.

Some experience has also been available specific to minimum structures in the Gulf-of-
Mexico. This suggests that the likelihood of error for these structures are typically much
higher than the conventional jacket structures which have reached a level of ‘maturity’ in the
design and construction.

Based on the wider experience available from the above sources combined with the specific
experience of the JIP participants, the following five HOE scenarios were identified as the
most significant for the type of structures considered in this study:
1. Design: Fatigue due to pile driving stresses (Durability)
2. Fabrication: Welding & fit-up flaws (Durability)
3. Installation: Pile insertion damage (Safety)
4. Operations: Dropped production processing package (Safety)
5. Operations: Supply / work boat collision (Safety)
 49

The evaluation of each of the above scenarios is discussed in the following sub-sections. The
SYRAS software was used for the evaluation of the error likelihood [Ref.17], while the
conditional probabilities of structural collapse given damage due to each HOE scenario were
evaluated by repeating the analyses presented in Sections 3 and 4 considering extreme
storm, fatigue and ship collision conditions, [Refs. 9 and 13].

6.2 Design HOE Scenario: Fatigue due to Pile Driving Stresses

This HOE scenario relates to a design error which involves “failure to design the structure
for pile driving stresses and not making provisions to allow more precise alignment of the
piles during driving”. This error could result in significant stresses transmitted to the pile
sleeves and into the rest of the structure due to pile misalignment during driving. This results
in significant fatigue cracking in all the joints of the braces connecting the pile sleeves/guides
to the primary structure. This scenario is not likely to influence the 4-pile Jacket structure as
the piles are driven through the legs from above the water level thus allowing a better
alignment of the piles.

The methodology and the SYSRAS software described in Section 5 was used for the
quantification of likelihood of this error scenario. The base rates due to the eight primary
causes of error were obtained as shown in Figure 6.1.

These probabilities should reflect the PE= 8.9 E-3

OPERATING TEAM
influence of the Organisations,
.

Procedures, Hardware, and

Environments. These influences can be Communications
modified by the influence scales to Pe = 5 E-4

reflect the practices within a specific Selection &

organisation. Training
Pe = 2 E-3

Combining the error rates from the eight Planning &

Preparations
causes, the overall probability of this Pe = 5 E-4 ORGANIZATIONS
HOE is obtained as 8.9E-3. The Limitations &
dominant sources of this HOE are Imparements
Pe = 6 E-4 PROCEDURES
ignorance (56%) and selection and
influences

training of the designers (22%). The Violations

Pe = 1 E-4
ignorance cause is primarily attributed to HARDWARE

the lack of organisational communication Slips

and defined design procedures to Pe = 1 E-4 ENVIRONMENTS
address this problem.
Ignorance
Pe = 5 E-3
There can be ‘correlations’ between the
eight sources of errors due to Mistakes
organisational influences that impart a Pe = 1 E-3

specific culture within an organisation

resulting in ‘group think’ biases. Such Figure 6.1: Error rates for design HOE: Fatigue
correlations could be modelled through due to pile driving stresses
 50

SYRAS, and assuming perfect positive correlation in this case would reduce the error
probability from 8.9E-3 to 5.0E-3.

The error likelihood can be significantly reduced by effective QA/QC procedures. With the
conventional checking procedures during design the error PE can only be reduced slightly to
a range 4.6E-3 ~ 8.2E-3. On the other hand using an independent ‘third party’ verification
by an experienced engineer could reduce the PE to 1.4E-3 ~ 2.5E-3.

In order to determine the effect of this HOE scenario on the reliability of the considered
structures, the fatigue damage due to pile driving stresses was considered to be such that it
reduces the original (error-free) calculated fatigue lives by a factor of 1/10 for all the joints in
braces connecting the pile sleeves/guides to the primary structure. System reliability analysis
under combined fatigue and pushover conditions was carried out with the reduced fatigue
lives for the three minimum structures.

The results of error likelihood, conditional probability of structural collapse under combined
fatigue and pushover loading and the overall probability of failure considering human errors
are summarised in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1: Results for design HOE: fatigue due to pile driving stresses

Error Prob. Conditional Prob. Total Prob. Error-free

Structure (no QA/QC) of Failure of Failure Prob.
PE Pf|E PE×Pf|E Pf
4-leg Jacket - - - 3.0E-8
3-Pile Monotower 5.0E-3 ~ 8.9E-3 0.37 1.8E-3 ~ 3.3E-3 8.0E-4
Vierendeel Tower 5.0E-3 ~ 8.9E-3 0.097 4.8E-4 ~ 8.6E-4 2.0E-5
Braced Caisson 5.0E-3 ~ 8.9E-3 2.5E-10 < 1.0E-11 2.5E-10

It can be seen that this error scenario has a significant influence on the 3-pile Monotower
and Vierendeel Tower structures and practically no influence on the Braced Caisson. Given
the damage caused by human error, probabilities of fatigue failure of affected joints and
sequence of fatigue failures increase quite considerably but the pushover reliability following
fatigue failures is unaffected. As a result, the overall system probability of failure given an
error scenario is increased considerably from the error-free case for the 3-pile Monotower
and Vierendeel Tower structures. This shows that these two structures are less robust
against the human error scenarios considered.
 51

6.3 Fabrication HOE Scenario: Fit-up and Welding Flaws

One of the potential HOE scenario that could occur during fabrication relates to “lack of
adequate fit-up resulting in the misalignment of the surfaces to be welded”. This increases
the local stresses at the joints significantly. Misalignment also makes welding difficult
resulting in defects such as incomplete root penetration, inadequate profiling of welds, etc.
The combined effect of increased local stresses and welding flaws is to reduce the fatigue
lives of joints considerably. This HOE scenario is particularly crucial for minimum structures
since very small tolerances are involved and much of the work must be done above the
ground.

Based on a careful analysis of the tasks involved during fabrication, the base rates for the
eight error sources were determined. These probabilities reflect the influence of
organisations (low bid, fast-track contracting) and procedures (difficult to achieve
tolerances). Hardware and environments do not have a significant influence. The dominant
causes of the HOE are selection and training of the fabrication team (less experienced
welders selected for speed of welding and low hourly rate) (33 %), and limitations and
impairments associated with the difficulty to fit-up and align the joints (24 %). The violation
source error was influenced primarily by lack of organisational incentives to “report bad
news” (difficult alignment and fit-up that will delay the schedule) and procedures to rectify
the problem.

The overall probability of this HOE scenario is determined as 2.1E-3 (for no correlation)
and 0.7E-3 (for full correlation). This probability can be reduced to 1.0E-4 ~ 2.8E-4 using
appropriate QA/QC measures that involve proper training and qualification of welders,
encouraging staff to report to the management any potential problems.

The effect of the HOE scenario was modelled by reducing the original (error-free) fatigue
lives by a factor of 1/10 for all the joints in braces connecting the pile sleeves/guides to the
primary structure. System reliability analysis under combined fatigue and pushover
conditions was carried out with the reduced fatigue lives for the all four structures. The
results are summarised in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2: Results for fabrication HOE: fit-up and welding flaws

Error Prob. Conditional Prob. Total Prob. Error-free

Structure (no QA/QC) of Failure of Failure Prob.
PE Pf|E PE×Pf|E Pf
4-leg Jacket 0.7E-3 ~ 2.1E-3 1.7E-4 1.2E-7 ~ 3.6E-7 3.0E-8
3-Pile Monotower 0.7E-3 ~ 2.1E-3 0.37 2.6E-4 ~ 7.8E-4 8.0E-4
Vierendeel Tower 0.7E-3 ~ 2.1E-3 0.097 6.8E-5 ~ 2.0E-4 2.0E-5
Braced Caisson 0.7E-3 ~ 2.1E-3 2.5E-10 Negligible 2.5E-10

It can be seen that this error scenario has a significant influence on the 3-pile Monotower
and Vierendeel Tower structures and practically no influence on the Braced Caisson. For
 52

the 4-leg Jacket, although there is a significant reduction in reliability due to the error
damage, the resulting system reliability is still considered to be acceptable.

6.4 Installation HOE Scenario: Pile Insertion Damage

A potential HOE scenario during the installation phase relates to “a pile swinging away from
its guides during stabbing and damaging a brace member”. Rough weather conditions and
poor visibility makes stabbing into the underwater pile guides difficult for the minimum
structures. This could result in a damage to one of the braces in 3-pile Monotower and
Vierendeel Tower structures, while in the case of the Braced Caisson this could result in a
damage to one of the piles while the second one is being inserted. This scenario is not likely
for the 4-leg Jacket as the piles are driven through the legs from above the water level which
enables a greater control of the pile during stabbing.

Combining the probabilities for each of the eight error causes, the overall probability of the
error scenario was obtained as 3.7E-3. The dominant sources are limitations and
impairments (pile stabbing in difficult operating weather conditions, limited visibility of the
pile guides) (54 %), and slips associated with the difficulties to align the piles and
manoeuvering them into the pile guides (27 %). These probabilities reflect influences from
the organisations (low bid, fast-track contracting), procedures (difficult underwater pile
stabbing operations), hardware (no significant influences), and environments (significant
weather influences). The base rates of errors can be further modified by the influence scales
provided in [Ref.17].

Considering correlation due to organisational influences a lower-bound of 2.0E-3 (for full

correlation) and an upper-bound of 3.7E-3 (for no correlation) can be obtained for the error
probability. Adequate QA/QC would have suggested installing an additional above water
guide which would reduce the error probability to 2.0E-4 to 3.7E-4.

The damage to the structures due to this HOE scenario was modelled by selecting one of
the critical braces in each structure and reducing its axial capacity by 25% to account for the
dent/bow effects. Pushover reliability analysis (excluding fatigue deterioration) was carried
out for all the structures and the results are summarised in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3: Results for installation HOE: pile insertion damage

Error Prob. Conditional Prob. Total Prob. Error-free

Structure (no QA/QC) of Failure of Failure Prob.
PE Pf|E PE×Pf|E Pf
4-leg Jacket - 2.0E-8 - 5.0E-9
3-Pile Monotower 2.0E-3 ~ 3.7E-3 3.0E-9 negligible 2.0E-9
Vierendeel Tower 2.0E-3 ~ 3.7E-3 2.0E-8 negligible 1.0E-8
Braced Caisson 2.0E-3 ~ 3.7E-3 3.0E-9 negligible 2.5E-10

It can be seen that the probability of failure increases only marginally as a result of the pile
insertion damage compared to the “error-free” failure probability. Taking the probability of
 53

the error scenario into account would reduce the overall probabilities of failure as a result of
this HOE to negligible levels for all structures.

6.5 Operations HOE Scenario: Ship Collision Damage

Ship collision on offshore structures is a major cause of damage and repair in the North Sea
which has prompted the introduction of detailed risk analysis and explicit design to protect
the structures against collision. Most collisions are caused by supply boats manoeuvering
near the platform in severe seas. For the 3-pile Monotower a collision could severely dent
the central column while for the Vierendeel Tower one of the legs of the tower could be
damaged. Collision could damage the central caisson in a Braced Caisson structure, while
in a 4-leg Jacket the impact could be critical on a leg, a brace member or an intersecting
node of the X-braces.

The factors that influence the operator error include training (inexperienced boat operator),
and limitations (fatigue). The organisational factors included culture, and monitoring /
controlling. The hardware factors include less than desired power in the supply vessel and
insufficient fendering on the platform. The procedure factors include incomplete and
inaccurate instructions to the master in conducting supply operations in severe sea
conditions. The environmental factors are the severe sea conditions, and unfavourable wind
and current directions. There are no significant interface breakdown factors. Lack of
checks to allow detection of the hazardous situation and correction before the accident
occurred also influence the likelihood of this HOE.

P E = 8 .7 E- 3
The probabilities of each of the eight
O PE R A T IN G TEA M
potential causes of this are summarised in
Figure 6.2.
C o m m u n ic a t io n s

Pe = 1 E- 4
The overall probability of this HOE scenario S e le c t io n &

was obtained as 8.7E-3. The dominant T r a i n in g

P e = 3 E-3
.

sources are selection and training of the P la n n in g & O R G A N IZ A T IO N S

operating team (captain and crew) (35 %), P r e p a r a t io n s

P e = 1 E -3

and limitations and impairments (due to L im i t a t io n s & P R O C E D U RE S

Im p a ir m e n t s
crew and captain fatigue) (35 %). Lack of P e = 3 E-3

proper planning and preparations (trying to V io la t io n s

HA RD W A RE
in

u
n
e
c
e
s
fl

come along side in severe seas) and slips Pe = 1 E-5

(using the throttles to manoeuver in stern S l ip s

EN V IR O N M EN T S

seas) each account for 12 % of the HOE P e = 1 E-3

likelihood. Ig n o r a n c e

Pe = 1 E- 4

Considering the correlation in the error M is t a k e s

Pe = 5 E -4
sources, a lower-bound of 3.0E-3 (for full
correlation) and an upper-bound of 8.7E-3
Figure 6.2: Error sources for ship collision
(for no correlation) can be obtained. HOE scenario
QA/QC procedures involving hiring
experienced boat crew and captain and
 54

training them in severe sea conditions could reduce the error probability to 0.6E-3 to 1.7E-
3. A second alternative of change in the regulations and procedures requiring sufficient rest
by boat masters and crews could reduce the error probability to 0.9E-3 to 2.6E-3.

The results of ship impact analyses for the four structures have been presented in Section 4,
see Table 4.2. From this it can be seen that, within the range of ship mass and velocities
considered credible in the North Sea, the ship impact damage has a significant influence on
only the 3-pile Monotower which failed during the impact event for certain combinations of
ship mass and velocity. The other three structures survived the ship collision incident without
collapse and the resulting damage did not reduce their pushover capacity appreciably.

Reliability analysis of the 3-pile Monotower for the ship collision condition gave a probability
of system collapse of 6.36E-4. Multiplying this with the probability of impact gives an overall
probability of failure due to ship impact of 1.9E-6 to 5.7E-06.

6.6 Operations HOE Scenario: Dropped Object Damage

Dropped object damage is a common cause of repair to North Sea platforms. This HOE
scenario models “dropping of a production package during transfer from a barge to the top
deck”. The package drops through the water and strikes one of the critical vertical diagonal
braces of the structure.

The dropped object HOE could result from a series of errors committed by the rigging
crew, the work crew supervisor, the derrick operator, and the barge superintendent. Lack
of experienced rigging crew (low bid, down-sized operating crew), under-sized shackles
used to attach the slings to the production package, inability of the supervisors to detect and
correct the evolving problem, and when the package started to break loose from the slings
(it had been lifted clear of the transportation barge) the barge operator could slip and put an
impact loading on to the package. The package could then drop from the elevation of the
upper deck and into the sea.

The base error rates for each of the above contributors to the scenario were determined and
the overall error probability of 4.1E-3 was obtained. This takes into account the
organisational (low bid, fast-track contracting) and procedural influences, while the
hardware and environmental influences are considered to be less significant. The primary
sources of the HOE are selection and training of the operating team (less experienced rigging
team) (24 %), lack of proper planning preparations (sling shackles not laid out and checked
for use by rigging team) (24 %), and the slip by the barge crane operator (24 %).
Ignorance and mistakes (on the part of the rigging crew) and communications breakdowns
(crew supervisor and barge superintendent) were responsible for the majority of the
remaining causes.

Accounting for correlation in the different error sources due to organisational influences gives
a lower-bound of 3.1E-3 (for full correlation) and an upper-bound of 4.1E-3 (for no
correlation) can be obtained for the error probability. Adequate QA/QC measures
 55

involving the use of experienced rigging crew, close communication and supervision by the
barge operations managers could reduce the error probability to 1.4E-4 to 5.7E-4.

The dent and bow damage which could be caused by a dropped object in the selected
critical braces of each structure was evaluated considering two impact energies of 0.5MJ
and 1.0MJ. To put a perspective on these energy levels, 0.5 MJ corresponds to an object
of 10 tonnes travelling at 10 m/s or 65 tonnes (eg. pile) at 4 m/s, [Ref.13].

The denting process was modelled by a non-linear P-δ d characteristic obtained from the
work of Pettersen and Johnsen [Ref.15]. Non-linear analyses were conducted with a point
load of increasing magnitude applied at the end of the dent spring. This allows the non-linear
bowing response of member to be accurately established. The maximum and residual values
of dent and bow were obtained by post-processing the USFOS results.

The dent and bow levels obtained were compared with the range of values recorded in
practice for North Sea structures from a database prepared by MSL for HSE and a good
correlation was found. The residual bow and dent values pertaining to E = 0.5MJ were
used to set the damage levels for subsequent analyses.

With the pre-existing damage due to the dropped object, the structures were subjected to
dynamic ship impact analyses and subsequent pushover analyses. The ship impact and
pushover analyses were conducted in a similar manner to that used for intact structures
described in Section 4. The results showed that only the 3-pile Monotower is significantly
affected by the dent/bow damage. Relatively minor damage from the dropped object was
sustained by the Vierendeel and Braced Caisson structures and hence their ship impact and
pushover capacities remained unaffected. The jacket member, on the other hand, suffered
quite severe damage both in bow and dent but this was not seen to affect the ultimate
strength of the jacket structure.

The 3-pile Monotower failed during the impact event for certain combinations of ship mass
and velocity. Reliability analysis for the ship collision condition gave probability of failure
due to impact of 3.7E-3. Multiplying this with the ship impact probability of 3E-3 ~ 9E-3
and dropped object error probability of 3.1E-3 ~ 4.1E-3 gives a overall probability of
failure due to ship collision following a dropped object damage of 3.4E-8 to 0.13E-8.

Although the effect of dropped object damage on pushover reliability was not investigated,
the results of conditional probabilities of failure given in Table 6.3 can be taken as
reasonable upper-bound values. This would make the overall probability of pushover failure
as a result of this HOE scenario would be negligible for all structures.
 56

7. COMPARISON OF SELECTED STRUCTURES

7.1 General

This section compares the life-cycle reliability characteristics of the four structures using a
number of performance indicators. The key results from all the tasks which are presented in
the previous sections are synthesised and discussed. The objective of this comparison is to
identify key features which influence the reliability characteristics of each structure, and if
possible to suggest how the performance of each structure can be improved. It is not the
intention of this JIP to rank the selected concepts or to recommend any one concept as the
best.

The comparison is presented initially in terms of the following:

• Fabrication and installation effort
• Performance under extreme storm condition
• Performance under fatigue condition
• Performance under ship collision condition
• Robustness against human and organisational errors

Following this, an overall comparison is made considering all the above factors.

7.2 Fabrication and Installation Effort

The effort required in the fabrication and installation of a structure directly influences the
initial costs and the lead time from design to commissioning of the platform. Although the
fabrication and installation costs were not evaluated within the project, a good indication of
this can be obtained from the comparison of the key design features presented in Table 7.1
for the four structures.

Fabrication effort/cost is influenced by factors such as:

• The total weight of jacket and pile steel
• Thickness and type of material used
• No. of tubular joints to be welded
• No. of circumferential and longitudinal butt welds in large diameter tubulars
• Split of work between covered and uncovered assembly areas
• Quantity of work carried out at height and ease of access to the work place
• Quantity of inspection required
• Size and ease of handling fabricated components

Other considerations are that fabrication in northern European yards will be more influenced
by weather considerations than those in the Gulf-of-Mexico (GoM), and that different yards
will have plant and experience more suited to certain types of construction than others. It is
therefore not possible to give definitive guidance on which of the substructure options it may
be cheapest to construct. After all it must be remembered that many of the MFP solutions
 57

on the market were developed around the specific capabilities of the companies promoting
them.

The 3-pile Monotower uses a very large diameter column and relatively stocky tubulars for
most of the braces. These would have to be made from rolled cans of 3 to 4 m long
sections requiring a number of circumferential welds. The Braced Caisson also uses large
diameter rolled cans for the caisson and the piles. The 4-pile Jacket and the Vierendeel
Tower, on the other hand, except for the legs use small diameter members which can be
made from seamless tubes which reduces the no. of circumferencial joints and expedites the
fabrication process.

Both the 4-pile Jacket and the Vierendeel Tower structures require a larger number of
tubular joints to be welded but because of small diameter tubes point-to-point construction
can be used throughout. The 3-pile Monotower and Braced Caisson need nodal
construction and PWHT although they have far fewer nodes to be fabricated. The main
disadvantage of the 3-pile Monotower is the need to work in confined space within the
central column to attach the various guides for the conductors and risers. The Braced
Caisson has far fewer braces and joints to make but a significant amount of the construction
is carried out at the offshore site.

Installation cost depends on the type of offshore equipment used and the duration of it’s use.
The GoM has a greater range and supply of installation vessels than are to be found in
European waters. This in turn leads to far more competitive hire rates existing in the GoM
than in Europe, where, therefore, installation cost represents a much greater proportion of
the overall project cost than in the GoM. Typically, for a Minimum Facility Platform installed
by Heavy Lift Vessel in the southern North Sea the installation cost will represent about
30% of the total facility cost (topsides plus substructure). This proportion will be between
15 - 20% for the GoM. It is therefore more cost effective to minimise offshore work and its
duration in the North Sea than it is in GoM. If it is assumed that all the structures are to be
installed by heavy lift crane vessel then the probable offshore work-scope for each
substructure can be used as a measure of comparing the relative installation costs.

The 4-pile Jacket would be installed by driving the piles using followers. The need to insert,
remove and change follower at each pile will increase the installation time compared with
that for a single one piece pile installation. For the 3-pile Monotower and the Vierendeel
Tower the piles can be driven in a single operation thus significantly reducing the installation
time. The Braced Caisson requires a significant amount of offshore construction in
connecting the two sections of the caisson and completing the field weld at the top
connecting the caisson with the piles. The inclination of the piles may necessitate the use of
multiple sections during driving.
 58

Table 7.1: Comparison of design features influencing fabrication and installation effort

Item 4-Pile Jacket 3-Pile Monotower Vierendeel Tower Braced Caisson

Jacket weight: 310 t 260 t 305 t 269 t
Pile weight 189 t 185 t 170 t 190 t
Caisson/Leg diameter 1.25 m 2.4 m 0.88 m 2.1 m
No. of braces 64 20 60 15
No. of seamless tube members 48 4 32 8
No. of circumferential welds 232 100 212 82
No. of tubular joints 120 36 108 26
Amount of nodal construction None Considerable None Considerable
Work at height Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal
Work in confined space None Considerable Minimal Considerable
Work in the open Maximum Minimal Minimal Significant
Craneage required Light Heavy Heavy Heavy
Piles/caisson to be driven 4 3 4 2+1
Inclination of piles 9.3° Vertical Vertical 1-Vertical; 2 @ 14°
Pile Diameter 1.2 m 1.2 m 1.2 m 1.5 m
Pile Penetration 40 m 34 m 32 m Caisson: 36m; Piles: 41m
Offshore fabrication/assembly None None None Considerable
Hammer position Above water Under water Under water Above water
Pile driving method Multiple sections using Single section Single section May need multiple sections
followers
1. Tubular sections < 610 mm diameter are assumed to be seamless tubes, the rest are rolled members
2. Circumferential welds are assumed at thickness transitions and @ every 4m lengths of rolled members
3. All structures are assumed to be installed using a heavy lift crane vessel
 59

7.3 Performance Under Extreme Storm Condition

The performance of the four structures under extreme storm conditions was studied by
carrying out deterministic pushover and system reliability analyses as discussed in Section 3.
The results from these analyses are summarised in Table 7.2.

Table 7.2: Comparison of performance under extreme storm condition

4-Pile 3-Pile Vierendeel Braced

Item
Jacket Monotower Tower Caisson
100-yr Wave + Current Base Shear 7.97 MN 3.40 MN 4.64 MN 3.7 MN
Load Factor for Collapse 4.09 4.40 3.97 5.00
Base Shear at Collapse 32.59 MN 15.18 MN 18.4 MN 18.5 MN
Component Reliability Index 4.62 4.91 4.44 5.2
System Reliability Index 5.73 5.91 5.58 6.23
System Failure Probability 5.0E-9 2.0E-9 1.0E-8 2.5E-10
(Note: The Load Factor above is a factor on the 100-year wave + current loading)

From the above table it can be seen that the ultimate capacities of the minimum structures,
measured in terms of the wave + current base shear at collapse, are about half of that for the
4-pile Jacket. However, it is interesting to note that, in terms of the Load Factor to
collapse, which measures the system reserve against environmental loading, the differences
are not that large. This is because the Jacket structure attracts relatively high environmental
loading compared to the other structures since it has many of its structural members within
the wave zone close to the mean sea level.

25

4-Pile Jacket
20 3-Pile Monotower
Vierendeel Tower
Base Shear (MN)

Braced Caisson
15

10

0
10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
Wave Height (m)

Figure 7.1: Base shear versus wave height for the four structures
 60

This is evident from the base shear versus wave height relationships for the four structures
shown in Figure 7.1. For the Jacket structure, the base shear increases much more rapidly
with wave height compared to the other structures.

For the 4-pile Jacket, 3-pile Monotower and Vierendeel Tower structures, the pushover
capacity is governed by the two vertical framing levels close to the sea bed which are in line
with the wave approach. For the Braced Caisson, the ultimate capacity is derived largely by
the axial capacity of one pile and bending capacities of the caisson and the second pile,
again failure occurring close to the sea bed.

The high capacity of the jacket structure comes from the X-bracing system. The triangular
base of the 3-pile Monotower with its Z-bracing also provides an efficient load sharing
arrangement resulting in high capacity. The Vierendeel Tower appears to suffer from the K-
bracing system with its pushover capacity being governed by the two compressive and two
tensile braces in the vertical frames in line with the wave.

The system reliability of a structure under extreme storm condition is closely related to the
Load Factor on environmental loading and not the absolute capacity of the structure. As a
result, the system reliability indices for the structures are surprisingly close to each other,
with all the four structures showing comfortably high reliability levels. The system failure
probability for the Vierendeel Structure is about one order of magnitude higher than that of
the 4-pile Jacket.

The results given in Table 7.2 correspond to the failure of the primary sub-structure with the
foundation failure being suppressed by artificially strengthening the piles. When foundation
failure was allowed, it is seen that the collapse load factors are in the range of 2.5 to 3.2
with failure occurring in the foundation for all the structures. Therefore, it should be noted
that the high reliability values given in Table 7.2 will not be achieved in practice for these
structures.

7.4 Performance Under Fatigue Condition

The degradation in pushover reliability as a result of fatigue deterioration was studied by

carrying out system reliability analyses under combined fatigue and extreme storm
conditions. For each structure, various combinations of one, two, three or four tubular joints
failing in sequence due to fatigue was studied. A service life of 20 years was used and the
structures were assumed not to undergo any inspection and maintenance over the 20 year
period. The probability of each fatigue failure sequence and the conditional probability of
system collapse due to environmental overload given the initial damage due to fatigue were
evaluated as described in Section 3. The results are summarised in Table 7.3 for all the four
structures. For comparison the results for pure extreme storm condition are given in the last
column of the table.
 61

Table 7.3: Comparison of performance under fatigue condition

Structure Any single joint System reliability System

failure by under combined reliability under
fatigue, β afcf loading pushover
loading
4-legged Jacket 1.82 5.43 5.73
3-pile Monotower 2.57 3.14 5.91
Vierendeel Tower 2.70 4.10 5.58
Braced Caisson 2.85 6.23 6.23

From the above table, it can be seen that the 3-pile Monotower and the Vierendeel Tower
structures show a significant influence of fatigue. The 4-leg Jacket shows a moderate
reduction in reliability when fatigue deterioration is considered. The Braced Caisson shows
no influence of fatigue as its pushover capacity is largely derived from the piles and the
caisson.

The fatigue-sensitive joints of the 3-pile Monotower all form part of the primary members of
the underwater truss structure. It was found that progressive fatigue failure of any two
tubular joints in sequence was sufficient to significantly reduce the pushover capacity of the
structure.

The fatigue-critical joints in the Vierendeel Tower are in the four pyramidal raking braces
supporting the Vierendeel frame. Fatigue failure of joints in any two out of these four braces
will lead to the platform collapsing under its self-weight. The system reliability index is thus
determined by the probability of these fatigue sequences occurring.

7.5 Performance Under Ship Collision Condition

Time-domain, non-linear, ship/structure interaction analyses were carried out to study the
performance of the selected structures against collision from a supply vessel. The analyses
aimed to determine the maximum impact capacities of the structures ignoring the presence, if
any, of conductors/risers within the impacted members (leg/caisson). A limiting dent depth
of 0.7 of the impacted member diameter was chosen, and the analysis was stopped when
this dent depth was reached or the structure failed during the impact itself. Following the
impact, a post-impact pushover analysis was carried out to determine the reduction in
pushover capacity as a result of ship impact damage.

Based on a review of HSE’s collision database and considering the typical vessel sizes
operating in the Southern and Central North Sea fields, credible limits on supply vessel sizes
were set as 500 to 3500 tonne mass and impact velocity of up to 2.5 m/sec. For each
structure ship impact analyses were carried out for a number of vessel mass and velocity
combinations to determine the ship impact capacities of the structures as detailed in Section
4. The key results are summarised in Table 7.4.
 62

Table 7.4: Comparison of performance under ship collision condition

4-Pile 3-Pile Vierendeel Braced

Item
Jacket Monotower Tower Caisson

Impact location Leg Caisson Column Caisson

at -2 m at + 4m at -2m at + 2 m
Impacted member diameter, D (m) 1.42 2.40 0.84 2.13
Dent depth due to impact, d (m) 1.00 0.55 0.59 1.00
Relative dent depth (d/D) 0.70 0.23 0.70 0.47
Max. vessel mass (tonnes) 3500 2500 3500 3500
Limiting velocity (m/sec) 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.5
Post-impact pushover Load Factor 3.05 3.71 2.76 3.76
Load Factor with no impact damage 3.05 3.71 2.76 3.76

From these results it can be seen that, except for the 3-pile Monotower, all the other
structures showed adequate capacities to resist collision from vessels up to the maximum
credible values of 3500 tonne mass and 2.5 m/sec impact velocity. For the 3-pile
Monotower, collapse occurred during the impact itself at velocities higher than that shown in
the table. Furthermore, although significant denting occurred at the impact location, it did
not reduce the pushover capacity of any of the structures as the impacted members did not
participate in the collapse mechanism under pushover condition.

The 3-pile Monotower structure failed during the ship impact for certain combinations of
mass and velocity. Using these values, a reliability analysis was carried out for failure during
ship impact. Taking also into account the probability of a ship colliding with the structure, a
system reliability index of 4.39 was obtained which is lower than the reliability index of 5.13
under pushover condition without ship impact damage.

It should be noted that the above results ignore any damage to conductors and riser within
the impacted member (caisson/leg) which in practice will limit the size of the vessel and
impact velocities to much lower values. For the 3-pile Monotower, Vierendeel Tower and
the Braced Caisson, the values given in Table 7.4 should therefore be considered as upper
bounds to the impact capacities of these structures, while those given in Table 2.2, which are
based on component failure, should be taken as lower bound values. For the 4-pile jacket,
in which the conductors and the riser are located centrally within the jacket, the ship impact
capacity can well correspond to the values given in Table 7.4.
 63

7.6 Performance Under Human and Organisational Errors

Five human and organisational error (HOE) scenarios, covering design, fabrication,
installation, and operation phases, were identified based on judgement and historical data on
incidents of human error. For each of these scenarios, the probability of error occurring was
evaluated using information on generic error rates for the basic tasks involved as explained in
Section 6. These error rates take account of the influences of organisations, procedures,
hardware, and environments. The error probabilities were modified to take account of
correlation in the different error sources and also the effect of QA/QC procedures in
reducing the likelihood of error.

The likely levels of defects/damage suffered by the structures as a result of human error
were evaluated or simply estimated in some cases. The system reliability of the structures
with these defects/damage were carried out considering either pure pushover loading or
combined fatigue and pushover loading depending on whichever is the governing criterion
for the considered HOE scenario.

The key results from the above analyses are presented in Table 7.5. The “intrinsic” or
“error-free” probabilities of system failure, PfI, under pure pushover and combined fatigue
and pushover loading are given in the first row of the table. The probabilities of system
failure as a result of “extrinsic” or “human error” causes, PfE, are given for each HOE
scenario, and these were obtained by multiplying the human error probability (given in
column 2) with the conditional probability of system failure given the HOE. The total
probability of system failure is then obtained as PfT = PfI + PfE.

From the results in Table 7.5 it can be seen that, the first two HOE scenarios: (1) Omission
of pile driving stresses during design and not making adequate provisions for alignment of
piles during driving, and (2) Fit-up and welding flaws introduced during fabrication, both of
which affect fatigue strength, have the most significant influence in degrading the system
reliability of 3-pile Monotower and Vierendeel Tower structures. These two structures are
therefore less robust under these HOE scenarios. The 4-pile Jacket shows only a marginal
influence due to HOE scenario (2), while the Braced Caisson shows practically no influence
from these HOE scenarios.

Under HOE scenario (4), only the 3-pile Monotower structure shows a significant reduction
in pushover reliability as a result of ship impact damage, while the other three structures
show high level of robustness.

The HOE scenarios (3) and (5) involving damage to one of the braces do not show a
significant impact on the system reliability of any of the four structures.
 64

Table 7.5: Comparison of the performance of structures under various error scenarios

Error Prob. 4-Pile 3-Pile Vierendeel Braced

Scenario Description
(No QA/QC) Jacket Monotower Tower Caisson

Pushover: 5.0E-9 Pushover: 2.0E-9 Pushover: 1.0E-8 Pushover: 2.5E-10

“Error-free” Pf I -
Fatigue : 3.0E-8 Fatigue : 8.0E-4 Fatigue : 2.0E-5 Fatigue : 2.5E-10

1. Design: Omission of pile PfE = not credible PfE = 2.5E-3 PfE = 6.7E-4 PfE = negligible
7.0E-03
driving stresses → Fatigue
PfT = 3.0E-8 PfT = 3.3E-3 PfT = 6.9E-4 PfT = 2.5E-10
2. Fabrication: Welding and fit- PfE = 2.4E-7 PfE = 5.2E-4 PfE = 1.3E-4 PfE = negligible
1.4E-03
up flaws → Fatigue
PfT = 2.7E-7 PfT = 1.3E-3 PfT = 1.5E-4 PfT = 2.5E-10
3. Installation: Pile insertion PfE = not credible PfE = negligible PfE = negligible PfE = negligible
2.8E-03
damage → Pushover Strength
PfT = 5.0E-9 PfT = 2.0E-9 PfT = 1.0E-8 PfT = 2.5E-10
4. Production: Ship impact → PfE = negligible PfE = 3.8E-6 PfE = negligible PfE = negligible
6.0E-03
Pushover Strength
PfT = 5.0E-9 PfT = 8.0E-4 PfT = 2.0E-5 PfT = 2.5E-10
5. Production: Dropped object PfE = negligible PfE = negligible PfE = negligible PfE = negligible
3.5E-03
damage → Pushover Strength
PfT = 5.0E-9 PfT = 8.0E-4 PfT = 2.0E-5 PfT = 2.5E-10
Notes: PfI = Intrinsic probability of failure of “error-free” structure

PfE = Extrinsic probability of failure of a structure damaged by human error

PfT = Total probability of system failure (PfI + PfE)

 65

7.7 Overall Comparison

All the four structures show comfortably high levels of system reliability under extreme storm
condition when foundation failure is suppressed. In practice, the pushover reliability of all
the four structures will be limited by foundation capacity.

Considering fatigue deterioration over the service life of 20 years and not accounting for any
inspection and repair, the system reliability of the 3-pile Monotower and the Vierendeel
Tower structures are reduced considerably. The reliability of the 4-leg Jacket reduces
marginally while the Braced Caisson shows no influence of fatigue.

All the structures, except for the 3-pile Monotower show adequate capacities to resist
collisions from vessels over the range of mass and impact velocities considered. Although
significant denting was caused at the impact location, this did not reduce the pushover
capacity of any of the structures. The 3-pile Monotower failed during the impact event for
certain combinations of vessel mass and velocity. Although this reduced the reliability of this
structure, the resulting value is still comfortably high.

Of the five human error scenarios considered, two scenarios which affect fatigue strength
show considerable influence on the 3-pile Monotower and the Vierendeel Tower structures.
Hence these two structures can be regarded as less robust against human and organisational
errors.

The Braced Caisson, despite having far fewer members than the other three structures,
shows a remarkably high system reliability and high robustness against HOE. This is
because its ultimate strength is derived primarily by the central caisson and the two piles
which are all large diameter stocky members.

Considering also the fabrication and installation effort, the Braced Caisson may be the first
choice in the Gulf-of-Mexico where the installation costs are relatively low, while the high
installation cost and the high risk associated with the significant offshore work could make
this concept unattractive in the North Sea. The 3-pile Monotower and the Vierendeel
Tower structures could be the preferred options for the North Sea, provided these are
adequately designed for fatigue and ship collision, and effective QA/QC procedures are put
in place to safeguard against human and organisational errors. Apart from a slightly higher
initial cost, the conventional 4-leg jacket can still be a very attractive concept for the North
Sea.
 66

8. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

8.1 Conclusions

The life-cycle reliability characteristics of the four structures have been compared in terms of
the following factors:

• Fabrication and installation effort

• Performance under extreme storm condition
• Performance under fatigue condition
• Performance under ship collision condition
• Robustness against human and organisational errors

Considering each of the above factors in turn, the following observations and conclusions
can be made based on the results obtained within the JIP.

Fabrication and Installation Effort

• The total weight of steel (jacket + pile) for all the four structures is very similar with the
weights for the three minimum structures being at the most 10% lower than the 4-pile
Jacket.

• All of the structural concepts have certain strengths and weaknesses with regard to the
ease of fabrication which are influenced by design features. The 4-pile Jacket and
Vierendeel Tower benefit from the use of relatively small size tubulars allowing point-to-
point construction without the need for expensive PWHT but need many braces and a
large number of joints to make. The 3-pile Monotower and the Braced Caisson, on the
other hand, have much fewer braces and joints but they use large diameter rolled
members needing nodal construction and expensive PWHT.

• For installation, the piles for the Vierendeel Tower and the Monotower can be driven in
single sections thus reducing the installation time. The Jacket and the Braced Caisson
may need multiple sections, however, the piling is done above the water level which may
be an advantage in places where underwater hammers are not readily available or
expensive.

Because of the above, the total fabrication and installation costs in the North Sea for the
three minimum structures are not likely to be considerably lower than the 4-pile Jacket. The
Braced Caisson may not be preferred in the North Sea because of the considerable
fabrication/assembly work required offshore which would increase the installation risks and
push up the costs. In the Gulf-of-Mexico, due to the generally calm weather conditions and
the availability of a greater range of installation vessels, the Braced Caisson may be the
cheapest option in terms of initial costs. Provided the chosen yard has the necessary plant
and experience, the 3-pile Monotower and Vierendeel Tower concepts may be cheaper to
fabricate and install in the North Sea.
 67

Performance under Extreme Storm Condition

• The ultimate capacities of the three minimum structures, measured in terms of the
wave + current base shear at collapse, are about half of that for the 4-pile Jacket.
However, the 4-pile jacket attracts 40% to 50% higher hydrodynamic loading than
the minimum structures for the same wave height.
• Despite the high ultimate capacity of the 4-leg Jacket, the environmental load factors
on the 100-year loading at which collapse occurs are relatively similar for all the
structures, ranging from 4.0 to 5.0, with the highest value for the Braced Caisson
structure.
• Similarly, the system reliability indices under extreme storm condition are broadly
similar for all the structures with the β index ranging from 5.58 to 6.23. Again the
highest value is associated with the Braced Caisson.
• The above results correspond to the case when failure of the foundation was
suppressed by artificially strengthening the piles and increasing their penetration depth.
When foundation failure was allowed, the collapse load factors reduce to between 2.5
and 3.2.

Performance under Fatigue Condition

• The 3-pile Monotower and Vierendeel Tower structures show a significant influence of
fatigue on system reliability. The 4-leg Jacket shows a moderate reduction in reliability
when fatigue deterioration is considered. The Braced Caisson shows no influence of
fatigue as its pushover capacity is largely derived from the piles and the caisson.

• The fatigue-sensitive joints of the 3-pile Monotower all form part of the primary members
of the underwater truss structure. It was found that progressive fatigue failure of any two
tubular joints in sequence was sufficient to significantly reduce the pushover capacity of
the structure.

• The fatigue-critical joints in the Vierendeel Tower are in the four pyramidal raking braces
supporting the Vierendeel frame. Fatigue failure of joints in any two out of these four
braces will lead to the platform collapsing under its self-weight. The system reliability
index is thus determined by the probability of these fatigue sequences occurring.

Performance under Ship Collision Condition

• For the range of ship mass (500-3500 tonnes) and velocities (up to 2.5m/s) considered,
only the 3-pile Monotower structure failed during the ship impact event (for certain M
and v combinations). This has the effect of reducing the baseline pushover reliability
index for this structure from 5.1 to 4.4.

• The ship impact generally introduced very deep dent at the impact location, in certain
cases the dent depths of up to 0.7 of the member diameter were obtained without global
 68

collapse. In practice, conductors/riser inside the impacted member (caisson/leg) may be

severely damaged before this dent depth is reached. This was ignored in the analyses
with a view to quantify the maximum capacities of the structures.

• Although the dent must have a weakening effect on the impacted member, the member
did not participate in the collapse mechanism under pushover conditions. Therefore,
provided the structure survived the ship impact itself, the reserve strength under
subsequent pushover conditions remained unaffected for all the four structures.

• Since damage to well/riser inside the impacted member has been ignored, the results
from ship impact analyses should be treated as upper bound values for the three minimum
structures. The 4-pile jacket can withstand the full range of impact scenarios considered
as there is no risk of damaging the wells. The impact capacities calculated during
conceptual design, which give critical velocities in the range 1.0 - 1.8 m/sec for a 1000
tonne vessel should be taken as lower bound values for the three minimum structures as
they are based on component checks.

Performance under Human and Organisational Error (HOE) Scenarios

• Five potential human error scenarios covering the design, fabrication, installation, and
operation phases of a structure were identified. The likelihood of error for these
scenarios range from 1.0E-03 to 9.0E-03 which can be reduced by about one order of
magnitude using effective QA/QC measures.

• Two HOE scenarios (omission of pile driving stresses, and fit-up and welding flaws)
which affect fatigue strength, have the most significant influence in degrading the system
reliability of 3-pile Monotower and Vierendeel Tower structures. These two structures
are therefore less robust under these HOE scenarios. The 4-pile Jacket shows only a
marginal influence while the Braced Caisson shows practically no influence from these
HOE scenarios.

• The dropped object damage to one of the critical braces did not have a significant effect
on the ship collision capacity of the structures and had only a marginal effect on pushover
capacity. The relative dent depths caused by the dropped object (0.5 MJ energy) were
< 0.05 for the Vierendeel Tower and the Braced Caisson, while for the Monotower and
the Jacket structures, they were around 0.2.

• The pile insertion damage during installation to one of the critical braces had no significant
effect on pushover reliability.

In summary, provided the 3-pile Monotower and the Vierendeel Tower structures
are adequately designed for fatigue and ship collision, and effective QA/QC
measures are put in place to safeguard against human and organisational errors, all
the four structures can achieve comfortably high reliability levels.
 69

8.2 Limitations

The focus of the JIP has been to compare the inherent reliability of the sub-structure (i.e. the
jacket), and for this reason, the following considerations were specifically excluded from the
study:

• failure of the foundation,

• damage to conductors/risers,
• wave impingement on the deck,
• wave breaking,
• fire and blast effects.

The above factors are very important, and in practice may actually govern the system
reliability of the concepts studied. For this reason, the results and conclusions from this
study should be used with caution.

Initial studies showed that the reliability under extreme storm condition will be limited by
foundation failure for all structures, particularly severely for the 3-pile Monotower and the
Braced Caisson. Except for the 4-pile Jacket, the reliability under ship impact will be
governed by the need to limit dent depths in order to prevent damage to conductors/riser
inside the impacted leg/caisson member.

The various analyses carried out in the project have been based on the North Sea
environmental and geotechnical conditions, and standard North Sea design, fabrication,
installation, and operation procedures have been assumed. Although, some effort has been
made to generalise the reliability results to other environmental conditions, care should be
exercised in extrapolating the results to other geographical locations with wholly different
environmental and geotechnical conditions, and design, fabrication, installation, operation
and maintenance practices.
 70

8.3 Recommendations

All the four structures, despite being designed using the conventional deterministic
component-based design approach, have shown high levels of system reliability. Based on
the results from this study, the following generic recommendations are made for improving
the life-cycle reliability characteristics of the selected concepts.

• Under extreme storm condition, the reliability of all the four structures, as designed, is
seen to be governed by foundation failure. For the 3-pile Monotower and the Braced
Caisson the failure is initiated in the foundation before the failure of any members in the
jacket. For the Vierendeel Tower and the 4-pile Jacket, axial pile failures occur after
initial failures in the jacket but would limit the final capacity and the reliability level. A
proper design of the foundation is necessary to fully mobilise jacket capacity and to
achieve the high levels of reliability reported here.

• For the 4-pile Jacket, the final failure under extreme storm condition occurred due to the
failure of the four legs in the lowermost bay close to the seabed. The jacket ultimate
capacity could be further increased by extending the pile element inside the legs up to the
second horizontal framing level. This feature has considerably enhanced the capacity of
the 3-pile Monotower and the Vierendeel Tower structures.

• In order to achieve acceptable reliability levels under fatigue as observed in this study, the
joints should be designed to nominal lives of at least 5 times the service life of the
platform. For the select few joints of members which are critical to the integrity of the
structure under the extreme storm condition, designing to even longer fatigue lives would
be beneficial for the 3-pile Monotower and the Vierendeel Tower.

• Except for the 4-pile Jacket, in which the conductors and the riser are located centrally,
the ship impact resistance of all the other structures will be governed by considerations
for preventing damage to conductors/risers. Careful attention should therefore be given
to the packaging of wells/risers within the caisson/leg and the guides should be
adequately strengthened. Where possible higher gap should be provided between the
well/riser and the caisson.

• For the 3-pile Monotower, the caisson failed during impact at less than the maximum
specified vessel sizes and impact velocities. This could be prevented by increasing the
bending capacity of the central column by using cans of high strength steel at the two
nodes where it is connected to the base structure.

• In view of their greater sensitivity to ship impact, minimum structures should be explicitly
designed for ship collision based on a dynamic ship/structure interaction analysis. The
cost/benefits of designing to a higher impact capacity initially to reduce the risk of
expensive offshore repair and shut-down costs later during service should be
investigated.

• The 3-pile Monotower and the Vierendeel Tower structures are seen to be particularly
vulnerable to potential human errors which affect the fatigue strength of critical welds.
 71

Effective QA/QC measures should be put in place to safeguard these structures against
these HOE scenarios. In addition, designing the critical welds to longer fatigue lives and
thorough inspection of welds at the fabrication yard and after installation are
recommended to minimise the risk of gross errors.

This JIP has clearly demonstrated that a life-cycle system reliability assessment offers
considerable benefits by providing a better insight into the performance of minimum
structures. It is therefore recommended that a system reliability assessment is performed
initially at the feasibility stage of a project to select the best concept for the particular field
and operations requirements, and subsequently during the detailed design stage to further
enhance the life-cycle reliability characteristics of the selected concept.

In summary, minimum structures can be made as reliable as conventional jackets by better

engineering:
ü by designing for ship impact to mitigate the risk of damage to wells/risers considering
the dynamic interaction between the vessel and the structure;
ü by designing critical welds for fatigue lives >10 times the service life;
ü by using a life-cycle system reliability-based approach during design.
 72

9. REFERENCES

1. RAMBØLL, “Conceptual Design - Summary Report”, Job No. 978503, doc. No.
340_005, rev. 1, 1999-01-05, JIP on Comparative Evaluation of Minimum Structures
and Jackets.

2. RAMBØLL, “Design Report, Conceptual Design, 3-Pile Monotower”, Job No.

978503, doc. No. 340_001, rev. 1, 1998-05-11, JIP on Comparative Evaluation of
Minimum Structures and Jackets.

3. RAMBØLL, “Design Report, Conceptual Design, 4-Legged Jacket”, Job No. 978503,
doc. No. 340_002, rev. 1, 1998-09-17, JIP on Comparative Evaluation of Minimum
Structures and Jackets.

4. RAMBØLL, “Conceptual Design Report, Vierendeel Tower Jacket”, Job No. 978503,
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