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62 ‘TORTS AND DAMAGES the company was concerned. Almost a year later, the driver was convicted and the decretal portion, of the judgment on the civil liability of the driver resulting from his criminal conviction state that “the civil liability of the accused has already been determined and assessed” in the prior civil case, When the judgment in the civil case became final, the Paduas sought execution thereof, but this proved futile. Hence, they instituted an action in the same court against the owner of the taxicab ‘company to enforce the latter's subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. On. ‘motion of the owner, the court a quo dismissed the suit on the ground that the complaint stated no ‘cause of action, see Se ot ty eres oes ree Saat aes eee i Sareea sac Pie Rae canes a ee sateen ate Sara Panty se Sica 4 oa a a seer Tt tras is meetin Se Sencegisaa ty omnes tas as ed st een aoa CHAPTER THREE NEGLIGENCE Definition Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that Aegree of care, precatution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person sullers injury. Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it consists of the “omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place.* Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those Considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct fof human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. ‘The whole theory of nesligence presuppose some Uniform standard of behavior which must be an external ‘and objective ene, rather than, the individual judgment good or 3c particular tortfeasor. It must be, as far as possible, the same for all persons and at the same time make proper allowance for the risk apparent to the tortfeasor for his capacity to mect it, and for the circumstances under which he must act. The question as to what ‘oge ,Gonon Boling Company, OR. No. 164749 (2017) 6a 64 ‘TORTS AND DAMAGES would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in each situation must of course be always determined in the light of human experience and of the acts involved in the particular case.7° ‘The Civil Code provides that if the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance of an obligation, that which is expected of a good father of the family shall only be required, Accordingly, a defendant is only bound to exercise the degree of care that would be exercised by an ordinarily careful and prudent man in the same position and circumstances and not that of the cautious man of more than average prudence. ‘Test of Negligence or nhe 8 By which to determine the existence ‘negligence in a particular case may be stated a8 follows: * Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent fact use that reasonable care and caution which an. ontinarily prudent person would have used in the ‘same situation? I not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be ‘supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence, in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what (CHAPTER THREE 6s would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and, determines liability based on outcome. ‘Test of negligence was first determined by the Supreme Court in Pleart vs. Smith” Amado Picart was riding on his pony over a bridge. Before he hhad gotten halfway across, Frank Smith Jr. approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about 10 or 12 miles per hour, As Smith neared the bridge, he saw a horseman on itand blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge, he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. Picart saw the automobile coming. and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing, Smith assumed that the horseman would move to the other side. The pony had not yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, Smith, instead of veering to the right, while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly towards the horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to 66 ‘TORTS AND DAMAGES the other side, Smith quickly turned his car ‘suliciently to the right to escape hitting the horse alongside of the railing where it was then standing, bbut in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened ‘and tumed its body across the bridge with its head toward the railing. In so doing, it was struck on the hock ofthe left hind leg by the flange of the car ‘and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its der was thrown off with some violence. As a result Of ts injures, the horse died, Pcart received contusions ‘which caused temporary unconsciousness and required ‘medical attention for several days, The Supreme Court laid the answer to the auestion as to what would constitute the conduct of @ prudent man in each situation must of course be ‘always determined in the light of human ‘experience and in view of the facts involved in the articular case. Abstract speculation cannot here bbe of much value but this much can be profitably said: “Reasonable men govern their conduct by the Grcumstances which are before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the future.” Hence, they can be CxPected to take care only when there is something efore them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresce harm, as a result of the course actually pursued? Io, it was the duty ofthe actor to tale recautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to (CHAPTER THREE or NEGLIGENCE ‘exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence, in & riven case is this: “Conduct is said to be negligent When a prudent man in the position of the torteasor would have foreseen that an effect, harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences."72 Degrees of Diligence a) Banks It is well-settled that the diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family, Banks are required to exercise the highest degree of diligence in its banking transactions, ‘considering the fiduciary relationship between the depositor and the bank.” The Supreme Court Clarified the matter in the case of Cagungun ws. Planters Development Bank," in which the failure of the bank to prevent seven unauthorized withdrawals, from the deposits of petitioners and its non- compliance with petitioners’ instructions regarding the loan payments constitute gross neelizence which justifies the award of moral damages. As employer, respondent is liable for the negligence or misdeed of its employees which caused petitioners to have Sleepless nights thinking about the threatened foreclosure of their house and lot. In addition, the ‘way responclent gave petitioners a hard time in securing ‘acc ofthe Piipine Inland ve. Spoues Quint, OR NO a Ro 1585782005. cy ‘TORTS AND DAMAGES copies of their withdrawal sips and ledgers of their ‘deposits is an indication of bad faith. Respondent could have easily cooperated with petitioners. by ‘immediately furnishing the latter with documents they wanted, Writen communications from petitioners’ lawyers and from the Central Bank Govemor were not sulcient in order that respondent will provide petitioners with the documents they needed. It was only after two agents of the Philippine Constabulary went to the bank that respondent was obliged to five petitioners what they were asking for.” ‘Supreme Court ratiocinate, that said fiduciary relationship means that the bank’s obligation to observe “highest standards of integrity and performance” is deemed written into every deposit ‘agreement between a bank and its depositor. The Aduciary nature of wuires banks to ‘assume a degree of diligence higher than that of 8 ‘good father of a family. Article 1172 of the New Civil Code states that the degree of diligence required of an obligor is that prescribed by law or contract, and absent such stipulation then the diligence of a good father of a family. In every case, the depositor expects the bank to treat his account with utmost fidelity, whether such accounts, consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions of pesos. Settled is the rule that gross negligence of a bank in handling of its cients deposit amounts to bad faith that calls for an award of moral damages. Moral damages are meant to compensate the claimant for any physical suffering, mental (CHAPTER THREE 6 ‘anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injuries unjustly caused.76 ) Common Carriers Specific to a contract of carriage, the Civil Code requires common carriers to observe extraordinary diligence in safely transporting their passengers and/or their goods. Thus, the applicable provisions under the Civil Code states:”” Asticle 1733, Common carers, from the nature of ther business and for reasons of public policy, fare bound to observe extraordinary diligence in te glance over the goods and forthe safety of the passengers transported by them, according to al the ceumstances ofeach case. ‘Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is furcher expressed in Articles 1734, 1735 and 1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for'the safety of the ‘passengers (3 further set forth in Articles 1755 ‘and 1736. This extraordinary, diligence, following Article 41755 of the Cull Code, means that common carriers ‘have the obligation to carry passengers safely as Jar as human care and foresight can provide, lusing the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard forall the circumstances, {In case of death of or injury fo their passengers, ‘Antcie 1756. of the Cul Code provides. that ‘common cariers are presumed fo have been at “Secmen, va Bank oft ipl nde, Ma 80887 (2009, s saic a Capane Gio, 209959 201, 70 ‘TORTS AND DAMAGES {fault or negligent, and this presumption can be overcome only by proof of the extraordinary Uigence exercised fo ensure the safety of the ‘passengers. ‘Article 1785. A common carier is bound to ‘cary the passengers safely as far as human ‘care and foresight ean prove, using the utmost dligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for al the circumstances. Article 1756. in case of death of or injuries to ‘passengers, common callers are presumed (0 have been at fault orto have acted negligently, lnless they prove that they observed extraordinary * Dr. Batiquin, performed a simple Caesarean Section. fon Mrs. Villegas at the Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital. After leaving the hospital, Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of being feverish, The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring despite the medications administered bby Dr. Batiquin. When the pains became unbearable, she consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at the Holy Child Hospital in Dumaguete City. Blood test shows that Mrs. Villegas had an infection inside her abdominal cavity. Thereafter, Dr. Kho suggested to Mrs. Villegas to submit to another surgery, which the latter agreed. When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs. Villegas, she found a “foreign body" looked like = piece of a “rubber glove," which could have been tom section of a surmeon's gloves or could have come from other sources. This foreign body was the cause of the infection of the ovaries and consequently of all the discomfort sulfered by Mrs. Villegas after her delivery. ‘The Supreme Court stated that the principle of res ipsa loquitur is applicable herein. Inthe instant ‘case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine fare present. First, the entire proceedings of the caesarean section were under the exclusive contro! of Dr. Batiquin. In this light, the private respondents were bereft of direct evidence as to the actual Culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private respondent Villega body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless through the intersection of negligence. Second, since aside from the caesarean section, private 28 ‘TORTS AND DAMAGES. (CHAPTER THREE 89 NEGLIGENCE, respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which could have caused the offending piece of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason, that such could only have been a by-product of the caesarean section performed by Dr. Batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Batiquin is therefore liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villezas's ‘abdomen and for all the adverse effects thereof. ) Respondeat Superior One type of vicarious liability is respondeat ‘superior, which means ‘let the master answer.” When respondeat superior applies, an employer will be liable for an employee's negligent actions or omissions that occur during the course and scope of the employee's employment. This means that the employee must be performing duties for the employer at the time of the negligence for the ‘employer to be held liable under respondeat superior. In Castites ve. Vasques,> on August 28, 1988, around 1:30 #9 2-00 in the mornings Romeo Vasgice, was driving « Honda motorcyele around Fuente Osmena Rowsnda: He was traveling counter clockwise, (the normal flow of tate in a rotunda) brut without any protective helmet o goa, He vias also only carving a students permit to drive tthe time. Upon the ether had, Benjamin Abad, ‘manager of peitoner Castile Industral Corporation, the registered owner of a Toyota HitLax Pick-up, On the same date and sme, Abed Grove the sald Oe 132366 9) company car out of a parking lot, but instead of going around the Osmefa rotunda he made a short cut against the flow of the trafic. In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick- up of Abad collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died, As regards the liability of Castillex as an employer, the Supreme Court intimated in determining who had the burden of proving that, the act was within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks. On this issue, this Court said that the burden of proving the existence of an employer employee relationship and that the employee was acting within the scope of his or her assigned tasks rests with the plaintiff under the Latin ‘maxim "ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat for "he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove.” ‘Therefore, it is not incumbent on the employer to rove that the employee was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks. Once the plaintiff establishes the requisite facts, the presumption. that the employer was negligent in the selection ‘and supervision of the employee arises, disputable ‘with evidence that the employer has observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. Though vicarious, the liability of employers under Article 2180 is personal and direct. Generally, this principle applies if there is an employer- employee relationship, Respondeat superior is the doctrine that states that an employer is responsible for an employee. More precisely, it states that a master is liable for torts of its servants committed in the course of their service. Moreover, under standard 90 ‘TORTS AND DAMAGES: agency law, the master usually is entitled to indemnification from the servant for any damages the master suffers from the servant’s tort, if the master pays damages under respondeat superior, itis entitled to sue the servant for repayment. Respondeat superior relieves the tort claimant of the need to prove that the master was directly negligent and it suffices to prove that the servant ‘was negligent. Thus, if an employer reasonably creates @ Work situation in which employees can negligently injure people, respondeat superior means that the employer is lable without proof of employer negligence. Respondeat superior means that the ‘employee's negligence will be deemed the employer's Respondeat superior can be thought of in two ways that usually, but not always, reach parallel conelusions, Ostensible Agency/ Apparent Authority Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding out” theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel has TS yt om te we waar Seg Sth on in siiea tate Sem eens arate Siete See eae eee Se as Soi eee cps Sey cent (CHAPTER THREE, a NEGLIGENCE its origin from the law of agency. It imposes ability, not as the result of the reality of @ contractual relationship, but rather because of the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into believing that the relationship or the authority exists. The concept is essentially one of estoppel. Under this principle, the principal is bound by the acts of his agent with the apparent authority which he knowingly permits the agent to assume, for which he holds the agent out to the public as possessing. The question in every case is whether the principal has by his voluntary act placed the agent in such a situation that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with business usages and the nature of the particular business, is justified in presuming that such agent has authority to perform the particular act in question. ‘The applicability of apparent authority in the field of hospital liability was upheld long time ago in Irving vs. Doctor Hospital of Lake Worth, Inc.” There, it was explicitly stated that “there {does not appear to be any rational basis for excluding, the concept of apparent authority from the field of hospital liability." Thus, in cases where it can be shown that a hospital, by its actions, has held out f particular physician as its agent and/or employee ‘and that a patient has accepted treatment from that ‘ea Sopa enely upon eoppa” Agarenteuaciyrcfers 0 “e Pe” ec he ea elas ana son by unc wh {RIE Sle pear ay eee er, wg fom wd isa. 2455. Di. App 1962 2 ‘TORTS AND DAMAGES (CHAPTER THREE 93 NEGLIGENCE: physician in the reasonable belief that it is being rendered on behalf of the hospital, then the hospital will be lable for the physician's negligence, ‘Our jurisdiction recognizes the concept of an agency by implication or estoppel. Article 1869 of the Civil Code reads: Asticle 1869, agency may be express or implied from the acts of the prinipa, from his silence or Tack of action, oF his fature to repudiate the agency, Knowing that anather person © acting on his behalf without authority, In Professional Services Ine. (PSI) vs. ‘Agana.* PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the names and specializations of the physicians associated or accredited by it, including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. We Concur with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that itis now estopped from passing all the blame to the physicians whose names it proudly paraded in, the public directory leading the public to believe that it vouched for their skill and competence.” Indeed, PSI's act is tantamount to holding out to the public that Medical City Hospital, through its ‘accredited physicians, offers quality health care Services. By accrediting Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes, and publicly advertising their qualifications, the hospital created the impression that they were its agents, authorized to perform medical or surgical ‘services for its patients, As expected, these patients, Natividad being one of them, accepted the Services, fon the reasonable belief that such were being rendered by the hospital or its employees, agents, or servants. Ostensible agency or Apparent Authority is usually applied in hospital lability claims. In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician, There i however, an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the ‘ostensible’ ‘agent of the hospital. This exception is also known as the "doctrine of apparent authority." Under the “doctrine of apparent authority,” a hospital can be held vicariously liable for. the negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether the physician is an independent contractor, unless the patient knows, for should have known, that the physician is an independent contractor. The elements of the action have been set out as follows: (2) the hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was flleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital; where the acts of the agent create the appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them; and a 94 ‘TORTS AND DAMAGES () the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and prudence."!0 ‘The elements of “holding out” on the past of the hospital does not require an express representation by the hospital that the person alleged to be negligent is an employee. Rather, the element is satisfied ifthe hospital holds itself out as a provider of emergency room care without informing. the patient that the care is provided by independent eontractors. 1 ©) Trallic Violations ‘The pertinent provisions under the Civil Code are as follows: Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the ouner i$ solidarly lable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use ofthe due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It '8 disputably presumed that @ driver was negligent, he had been found guilty or reckless driving or Yolating traffic egulations atleast twice within the next preceding two months. I the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the Provisions of article 2180 are applicable. Article 2188. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving @ ‘motor vehicle has boon negligent ifat the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. CHAPTER THREE 95 ‘Thus, in the case of Sanitary Steam Laundry Inc., vs. Court of Appeals,\0? on August 31, 1980, a truck registered under petitioner Sanitary Steam Laundry collided with Cimarron, which caused the death of three persons and the injuries of several others. The pastengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of the Project Management Consultants, Ine. (PMCI). The Cimarron was owned by Salvador Salenaa, father of one ofthe employees of PMCI. Driving the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez ‘The driver of the truck claimed that a jeepney in front of him suddenly stopped. He avers that he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney, that caused his vehiele to swerve to the left and ‘encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. AS a result, the truck collided with the Cimarron on the north-bound lane. ‘As stated by the Supreme Court: First, it has not been shown how the alleged nesligence of the Cimarron. driver contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land ‘Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate cr legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it ‘a contributing cause of the injury. Petitioner says that "driving an overloaded vehicle with only fone functioning headlight during nighttime certainly Increases the risk of accident,” that because the 96 ‘TORTS AND DAMAGES. Cimarron had only one headlight, there was "decreased visibility,” and that the tact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat overcrowded “decreased |its| maneuverability,” However, mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the contributing cause of the injury.'® Likewise controlling is the ruling of the ‘Supreme Court in Atonuevo vs. Court of Appeats,'° ‘where the Court reiterated that negligence per se, arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in establishing liability for damages. In said case, Aonuevo, who was driving. fa car, did not attempt "to establish a causal connection between the safety violations imputed to the injured cyclist, and the accident itself. Instead, he relied on a putative presumption that these ‘lations in themacves suliciently established negligence appreciable against the cyclist. Since the onus on ‘Afonuevo is to conclusively prove the link between the violations and the accident, we can deem him. as having failed to discharge his necessary burden. of proving the eyclist’s own liability." for volation of traffic rules and regulations: 1), Republic Act No. 4136, also known as the “Land Transportation and Traffic Code.” The Code provides proper regulation and penalties on the following road policies: SE ne. 13003 2000, (CHAPTER THREE °7 + Overtaking and passing a vehicle; + right of way and signaling; + turning at intersections; + reckless driving; + right of way for police and other emergency vehicles; + tampering with vehicles; + hitching to a vehicle; ‘+ driving or parking on sidewalk; + obstruction of traffic. 2) Republic Act No. 10913 or_ the “Anti- Distracted Driving Act,” prohibits drivers from using electronic and communication devices while the car is in motion or stopped at a red light. But to make it clear, R-A. 10913 defines an electronic device as “any handheld electronic device capable of digital information processing, recording, capturing, for displaying and computing operations such as, but not limited to, laptops, computers, tablets, video game consoles and calculators.” Meanwhile, communication devices are defined as “electronic communications equipment such as, but not limited to, cellular phones, wireless telephones, two-way radio transceivers, pagers and other similar devices capable of transmitting, receiving, oF both, of encrypted data and/or signals through wireless electronic or any other similar means.” 98 ‘TORTS AND DAMAGES. 3), Republic Act No. 10586 or the “Anti-Drunk sand. Drugged Driving Act” is one of the most serious driving laws in the Philippines. It penalizes driving while intoxicated, Police officers can refer to the following indications and manifestations of being intoxicated while on the road: + Over-speeding + Weaving + Lane straddling + Sudden stops + Swerving + Poor coordination, + Evident smell of alcohol in a person's breath + Signs of use of dangerous drugs 4) Republic Act No, 8750 or the "Seat Belts Use Act.” R.A. 8750 makes the use of seat belts andatory for drivers, front seat, and back seat Passengers of public and private vehicles. This law also prohibits infants, ‘toddlers, and children under six years old from sitting in front. This law Fequires car manufacturers to ensure that all their vehicles are equipped with the proper seat belt provisions. ‘The seat belts should also meet the standards of the Bureau of Product Standards of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) in consultation with the Land Transportation Office. 5)_Republic Act No. 10666 or the “Children’s Safety on Motoreycies Act.” The law prohibits children from boarding two-wheeled vehicles running faster CHAPTER THREE 90 than 60 kph on public roads. There are exceptions to this law: + The child can comfortably reach his/her feet on the standard foot peg of the motorcycle. + The child's arms can reach around and grasp the waist of the motorcycle rider. + The child is wearing a standard protective helmet. 6) Republic Act No, 10054 or "The Motorcycle Helmet Act,” that requires motorbike drivers and riders to wear standard protective motorcycle helmets prescribed by the Department of Trade and Industry. A helmet should bear the Philippine ‘Standard (PS) mark or Import Commodity Clearance (ICC) of the Bureau of Product Standards (BPS). 4) Carrying or Possession of Dangerous Weapons or Substances ARTICLE 2188, There i prima facie presumption of negligence on the ‘part of the defendant if the death or injury results from is [possession of dangerous weapons or substances, Such as firearms ‘and poison, except when the [possession or use thereof is indispensable in his ‘ceupation or business. For possession of dangerous substances, it creates a presumption of negligence if it results to undue risk of harm to another. In Smith Bell vs. ‘Borja, 0 petitioner's vessel was carrying chemical ‘cargo - alleyl benzene and methyl methacrylate 100 ‘TORTS AND DAMAGES ‘monomer. While knowing that their vessel was carrying dangerous inflammable chemicals, its officers and crew failed to take all the necessary precautions to prevent an accident, Petitioner was, therefore, negligent. ‘The three elements of quasi delictare: (a) damages sullered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, and (c) the connection of cause and. cfect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages inflicted on the plaintiff. All these clements were established in thie case. Knowing fully well that it was carrying dangerous chemicals, Petitioner was negligent in not taking all the ‘ecessary precautions in transporting the cargo. ‘Asa result ofthe fre and the explosion during the unloading of the chemicals from petitioners vessel, respondent Borja suffered the’ following damage ‘and injuries: (1) chemical burns of the face and. arms; (2) inhalation of fumes. from Durning chemicals; (3) exposure to the clements [white Hoating in sea water for about three (3) hours; (s) homonymous hemianopsia or blurring of the right eye [which was of] possible toxic origin; and (6) cerebral infact with’ neo-vasctlarization, left occipital region with right sided headache and the blurring of ison of ight eye. Hence, the owner of the person in possession and control of vessel and the vessel ace liable for all natural and proximate damage caused to persons land property by reason of negligent management or navigation 0° Twa Ra 1008 0) (CHAPTER THREE 101 ©) Common Carriers ‘The law exacts from common carriers (.e., those persons, corporations, firms, or associations ‘engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public) the highest degree of diligence (.e., extraordinary diligence) in ensuring the safety ofits passengers. Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code stat Article 1733, Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of, the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case Article 1755, A common cartier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances. In this relation, Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that "ijn case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to hhave been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." This disputable presumption may also be overcome by a showing that the accident was ‘caused by a fortuitous event. While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of 102 ‘TORTS AND DAMAGES. negligence against them, it does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety ofits passengers. Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance, and precaution in the carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such as human care and foresight can provide. What constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged with due regard to all the circumstances. ices oon pie a heTihs Sacees oet Sat aaa ms Sie mania ng Sear cia etn SO Place of evidence. Being a mere presumption, Sr fier rehece oan Sa aoe ere eee Se cote ake ae ae obligation, or a a injury See atte! ce ye 2 oe = 1) Banks and Similar Institution ‘The business of banking is one imbued with Dublic interest. As such, banking institutions are obliged to exercise the highest degree of diligence as well as high standards of integrity and performance in all its transactions. The law ‘expressly imposes upon the banks a fiduciary duty towards its clients and to treat in this regard the accounts ofits depositors with meticulous care, "SG Ra Panevan of tng, Ro. 208802 2018) (CHAPTER THREE, 103 EGLIGENCE In light of these, banking institutions may be hheld liable for damages, even based on presumption for failure to exercise the diligence required of it resulting to contractual breach or where the act or omission complained of constitutes an actionable tot. In BPI vs Quiaoitic it was established that fon 15 April 1999, Fernando informed BPI to prepare US$20,000 that he would withdraw from his ‘account. The withdrawal, through encashment of BPI Greenhills Check No, 003434, was done five days later, or on 20 April 1999, BPI had ample opportunity to prepare the dollar bills. Since the dollar bills were handed to Lambayong inside an envelope and in bundles, Lambayong did not check them. However, as pointed out by the Court fof Appeals, BPI could have listed down the serial numbers of the dollar bills and erased any doubt fas to whether the counterfeit bills came from it, While BPI Greenhills marked the dollar bills with, “chapa’ to identify that they came from that branch, Lambayong was not informed of the markings and hence, she could not have checked i all the bills were marked. BPI insists that there is no law requiring it to list down the serial numbers of the dollar bills, However, itis well-settled that the diligence required of banks is more than that of a good ather of a family. Banks are required to exercise the highest degree of diligence in its banking transactions. In releasing the dollar bills without listing down their serial numbers, BPI failed to exercise the highest degree of care and diligence ‘ean wo. tone, a1) 108 ‘TORTS AND DAMAGES required of it. BPI exposed not only its client but also itself to the situation that led to this case. Had BPI listed down the serial numbers, BPI's Presentation of a copy of such listed serial humbers would establish whether the returned dollar bills came from BPI or not. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the action of BPI is the proximate cause of the loss suffered by the spouses Quiaoit. Proximate cause is defined as the catise which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury and without ‘which the result would not have occurred. Granting that Lambayong counted the two bundles of the USS100 bills she received from the bank, there ‘was no way for her, or for the spouses Quiaoit, to determine whether the dollar bills were genuine or counterfeit. They did not have the expertise t0 verify the genuineness of the bills, and they were not informed about the "chapa” on the bills 80 that, ‘they could have checked the same. BPI cannot Pass the burden on the spouses Quiaoit to verify the genuineness of the bills, even if they did not check or count the dollar bills in their possession while they were abroad CHAPTER FOUR DEFENSES AVAILABLE AGAINST QUASI-DELICT 8) Plaintiff's Own Negligence Under Article 2179 (Civil Code). When the plaintiffs oun negligence was the immediate and Proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. xxx Where the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff's own act, which contributed to the principal occurrence one of its determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury. Reiterating, the case of Lasam vs. Spouses Ramolete,''© based on the evidence presented in the present case under review, in which no negligence can be attributed to the petitioner, the immediate cause of the accident resulting in Editha’s injury was her own omission when she did not return for a follow-up check-up, in defiance of her doctor's orders. The immediate cause of Editha’s injury was her own act, thus, sshe cannot recover damages from the injury.1? ) Contributory or Comparative Negligence Under Artiete 2179 (oi Code) x x But if is negligence was only contributory, the ine ‘and prostmate cause of the injury borg the defendar’s 105

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