uterus.
The D&C procedure having been conducted in
Sps Lasam v Ramolete
On July 28, 1994, respondent, three months
pregnant Editha Ramolete (Editha) was
brought to the Lorma Medical Center (LMC)
in San Fernando, La Union due to vaginal
bleeding. Upon advice of the petitioner relayed
via telephone, Editha was admitted to the LMC
on the same day. A pelvic sonogram was then
conducted on Editha revealing the fetus' weak
cardiac pulsation. The following day, Editha's
repeat pelvic sonogram showed that aside from
the fetus' weak cardiac pulsation, no fetal
movement was also appreciated. Due to
persistent and profuse vaginal bleeding,
petitioner advised Editha to undergo a
Dilatation and Curettage Procedure (D&C) or
"raspa".
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence
was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his
negligence was only contributory, the immediate
and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate
the damages to be awarded.
Ruling:
The immediate cause of the accident resulting in
Editha's injury was her own omission when she
did not return for a follow-up check up, in
defiance of petitioner's orders. The immediate
cause of Editha's injury was her own act; thus,
she cannot recover damages from the injury.|||
It is undisputed that Editha did not return for a
follow-up evaluation, in defiance of the petitioner's
advise. Editha omitted the diligence required by the
circumstances which could have avoided the injury.
The omission in not returning for a follow-up
evaluation played a substantial part in bringing about
Editha's own injury. Had Editha returned, petitioner
could have conducted the proper medical tests and
procedure necessary to determine Editha's health
condition and applied the corresponding treatment
which could have prevented the rupture of Editha's
accordance with the standard medical practice, it is
clear that Editha's omission was the proximate cause
of her own injury and not merely a contributory
negligence on her part.
PNR v Vizcara GR No. 190022
Facts:
● On May 14, 2004, a passenger jeepney
driven by Reynaldo Vizcara was
crossing a railroad track in Tiaong,
Quezon. The jeepney was suddenly hit
by a Philippine National Railways (PNR)
train. The collision resulted in the death
of Reynaldo and three other
passengers, as well as serious injuries
to two other passengers. At the time of
the accident, there was no level
crossing installed at the railroad
crossing and the "Stop, Look and Listen"
signage was poorly maintained. On May
14, 2004, a passenger jeepney driven
by Reynaldo Vizcara was crossing a
railroad track in Tiaong, Quezon when it
was hit by a Philippine National
Railways (PNR) train operated by
Japhet Estranas. The collision resulted
in the death of Reynaldo Vizcara,
Cresencio Vizcara, Crispin Natividad,
and Samuel Natividad. Dominador
Antonio and Joel Vizcara sustained
serious injuries. The survivors and heirs
of the deceased victims filed an action
for damages against PNR, Estranas,
and Ben Saga (alternate driver of the
train) before the RTC of Palayan City.
The respondents alleged that the
petitioners' negligence in not providing
adequate safety measures at the
railroad crossing was the proximate
cause of the accident. The petitioners
claimed that they exercised due
diligence in operating the train and that
the negligence of the jeepney driver was
the proximate cause of the collision.
Issue:
1. Whether the petitioners were negligent
in failing to provide adequate safety
measures at the railroad crossing.
 2. Whether there was contributory
negligence on the part of the victims.
3. Whether the doctrine of last clear
chance applies.
Ruling:
The court ruled in favor of the
respondents and held the petitioners
liable for damages.
Ratio:
● The court found that the petitioners
were negligent in failing to install
sufficient safety devices at the
railroad crossing, such as level
crossing bars, lighting equipment,
and warning signs.
● The absence of these safety measures
was the proximate cause of the
accident.
● The court emphasized that it is the
responsibility of the railroad company to
ensure the safety of the public by
installing and maintaining adequate
warning devices at railroad crossings.
● The court also ruled that there was no
contributory negligence on the part
of the victims.
● The victims were not aware of the
impending danger and had no reason to
anticipate the collision.
● Their actions did not fall below the
standard of care required for their own
protection.
● Lastly, the court held that the doctrine of
last clear chance does not apply in this
case.
● The petitioners' negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident, and
there was no preceding negligence on
the part of the victims.
● Therefore, the petitioners cannot be
absolved of liability based on the
doctrine of last clear chance.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
● The RTC found that the petitioners'
failure to install adequate safety devices
at the railroad crossing was the
proximate cause of the accident.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA affirmed the RTC's finding of negligence
on the part of the petitioners but modified the
amount of damages awarded to the
respondents. The CA reduced the amount of
damages awarded for moral and exemplary
damages and deleted the award for
re-embalming expenses, wake/interment
expenses, attorney's fees, and reimbursement
for the value of the jeepney.
The Supreme Court's Ruling
● The Supreme Court held that the
petition lacked merit.
● The Court affirmed the finding of
negligence on the part of the petitioners,
as ruled by the RTC and the CA.
● The Court emphasized that the
petitioners' failure to install adequate
safety devices at the railroad crossing
was the proximate cause of the
accident.
● The Court also ruled that there was no
contributory negligence on the part of
the respondents, as they were not
aware of the impending danger and did
not exhibit any disregard for their own
safety.
● The Court further stated that the
doctrine of last clear chance was not
applicable in this case, as the
petitioners' negligence was the
proximate cause of the collision.
● The Court upheld the CA's modification
of the damages awarded to the
respondents.
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v IAC
DOCTRINE:
(1) The principle of "the last clear" chance is
applicable in a suit between the owners and
drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not
arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it would be
inequitable to exempt the negligent driver
and its owners on the ground that the other
driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
(2)In culpa contractual, the moment a passenger
dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently,
and this disputable presumption may only be
overcome by evidence that he had observed
extra-ordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles
1733, 1755 and 1756 of the New Civil Code or
that the death or injury of the passenger was
due to a fortuitous event.
(3) The driver cannot be held jointly and
severally liable with the carrier in case of breach
of the contract of carriage. Firstly, the contract of
carriage is between the carrier and the
passenger, and in the event of contractual
liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible to
the passenger, even if such breach be due to
the negligence of his driver. In other words, the
carrier can neither shift his liability on the
contract to his driver nor share it with him, for his
driver's negligence is his. Secondly, that would
make the carrier's liability personal instead of
merely vicarious and consequently, entitled to
recover only the share which corresponds to the
driver, contradictory to the explicit provision of
Article 2181 of the New Civil Code.
FACTS: At 11am on December 24, 1966,
Catalina Pascua, Caridad Pascua, Adelaida
Estomo, Erlinda Meriales, Mercedes Lorenzo,
Alejandro Morales and Zenaida Parejas
boarded the jeepney owned by spouses
Isidro Mangune and Guillerma Carreon and
driven by Tranquilino Manalo at Dau,
Mabalacat, Pampanga bound for Carmen,
Rosales, Pangasinan to spend Christmas with
their families for P 24.00. Upon reaching barrio
Sinayoan, San Manuel, Tarlac, the right rear
wheel of the jeepney detached causing it to
run in an unbalanced position. Driver Manalo
stepped on the brake, causing the jeepney to
make a U-turn, invading and eventually
stopping on the opposite lane of the road
(the jeepney's front faced the south (from where
it came) and its rear faced the north (towards
where it was going)). The jeepney occupied and
blocked the greater portion of the western lane,
which is the right of way of vehicles coming from
the north. Petitioner Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines
claims that almost immediately after the sudden
U-turn the bus bumped the right rear portion of
the jeep.
Defendant’s claim:
● that the bus stopped a few minutes
before hitting the jeepney. Either way, as
a result of the collision, three
passengers of the jeepney (Catalina
Pascua, Erlinda Meriales and Adelaida
Estomo) died while the other jeepney
passengers sustained physical injuries.
A criminal complaint was filed against the two
drivers for Multiple Homicide. The case against
delos Reyes (driver of Phil. Rabbit) was
dismissed for insufficieny of evidence.
Manalo (jeepney driver), however, was
convicted and sentenced to suffer
imprisonment. complaints for recovery of
damages were then filed before the CFI of
Pangasinan. (1) Spouses Casiano Pascua and
Juana Valdez sued as heirs of Catalina Pascua
while Caridad Pascua sued in her behalf Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan. (2) Spouses
Manuel Millares and Fidencia Arcica sued as
heirs of Erlinda Meriales. And (3) spouses
Mariano Estomo and Dionisia Sarmiento sued
as heirs of Adelaida Estomo. All three cases
impleaded spouses Mangune and Carreon,
Manalo (jeepney owners), Rabbit and delos
Reyes as defendants. Plaintiffs anchored their
suits against spouses Mangune and Carreon
and Manalo on their contractual liability. As
against Rabbit and delos Reyes, plaintiffs based
their suits on their culpability for a quasi-delict.
Filriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation, Inc.
was also impleaded as additional defendant in
the first case only.
The trial court ruled in favour of then plaintiffs,
finding defendants negligent and having
breached the contract of carriage with their
passengers and ordering them, jointly and
severally to pay the plaintiffs damages. The IAC
reversed the ruling of the trial court, applying
primarily (1) the doctrine of last clear chance, (2)
the presumption that drivers who bump the rear
of another vehicle guilty and the cause of the
accident unless contradicted by other evidence,
and (3) the substantial factor test (which
concluded that bus driver delos Reyes, NOT
jeepney driver Manalo, was negligent).
Issue: Who are liable for the death and injuries
of the passenger.
RATIO:
(1) The principle of "the last clear" chance is
applicable in a suit between the owners and
drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not
arise where a passenger demands responsibility
from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. For it would be inequitable to
exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and
its owners on the ground that the other driver
was likewise guilty of negligence.
(2) The IAC erred in applying the presumption
that the driver who bumps the rear of another
vehicle is guilty and the cause of the accident,
unless contradicted by other evidence. This
presumption is based on the responsibility given
to a rear vehicle of avoiding a collision with the
front vehicle for it is the rear vehicle who has full
control of the situation as it is in a position to
observe the vehicle in front of it. Such
presumption is rebutted by the evidence that
shows that the jeepney, which was then
traveling on the eastern shoulder, making a
straight, skid mark of approximately 35
meters, crossed the eastern lane at a sharp
angle, making a skid mark of approximately
15 meters from the eastern shoulder to the
point of impact. (Basically, the U-turn was
sudden and delos Reyes could not have
reasonably anticipated it even though he was
the rear vehicle)
(3) Likewise, the bus cannot be made liable
under the substantial factor test (that if the
actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about harm to another, the fact that the actor
neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the
extent of the harm or the manner in which it
occurred does not prevent him from being
liable). Contrary to the findings of the
appellate court, the bus was travelling within
the speed limit allowed in highways. He also
had only a few seconds to react to the
situation. To require delos Reyes to avoid the
collision is to ask too much from him. Aside
from the time element involved, there were no
options available to him to have avoided the
collision.
RULING:
The proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of jeepney driver Manalo and
spouses Mangune and Carreon. They all
failed to exercise the precautions that are
needed precisely pro hac vice. In culpa
contractual, the moment a passenger dies or is
injured, the carrier is presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, and this
disputable presumption may only be overcome
by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733, 1755
and 1756 of the New Civil Code or that the
death or injury of the passenger was due to a
fortuitous event. The negligence of Manalo was
proven during the trial by the unrebutted
testimonies of Caridad Pascua, the police who
arrived on the scene, his (Manalo's) conviction
and the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur supra. Spouses Mangune and Carreon
alleged that their mechanic regularly maintains
the jeepney and on the day before the collision,
the mechanic actually checked the vehicle and
even tightened the bolts, thus the incident was
caused by a caso fortuito. The SC upheld the
trial court’s findings that "in an action for
damages against the carrier for his failure to
safely carry his passenger to his destination, an
accident caused either by defects in the
automobile or through the negligence of its
driver, is not a caso fortuito which would avoid
the carriers’ liability. The SC modified the
decision holding spouses Mangune and Carreon
jointly and severally liable with Manalo. The
driver cannot be held jointly and severally liable
with the carrier in case of breach of the contract
of carriage. Firstly, the contract of carriage is
between the carrier and the passenger, and
in the event of contractual liability, the carrier
is exclusively responsible to the passenger,
even if such breach be due to the negligence
of his driver. In other words, the carrier can
neither shift his liability on the contract to his
driver nor share it with him, for his driver's
negligence is his. Secondly, that would make the
carrier's liability personal instead of merely
vicarious and consequently, entitled to recover
only the share which corresponds to the driver,
contradictory to the explicit provision of Article
2181 of the New Civil Code.
Greenstar Express v Universal Robina
Corporation
GR No. 205090
2.) The doctrine of last clear chance provides
that where both parties are negligent but the
negligent act of one is appreciably later in point
of time than that of the other, or where it is
impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence brought about the occurrence of the
incident, the one who had the last clear
opportunity to avoid the impending harm but
failed to do so, is chargeable with the
consequences arising therefrom. Stated
differently, the rule is that the antecedent
negligence of a person does not preclude
recovery of damages caused by the supervening
negligence of the latter, who had the last fair
chance to prevent the impending harm by the
exercise of due diligence.
FACTS:
Petitioner Greenstar Express, Inc. (Greenstar) is
a domestic corporation engaged in the business
of public transportation, while petitioner Fruto L.
Sayson, Jr. (Sayson) is one of its bus drivers.
Respondents Universal Robina Corporation
(URC) and Nissin Universal Robina Corporation
(NURC) are domestic corporations engaged in
the food business. NURC is a subsidiary of
URC. URC is the registered owner of a
Mitsubishi L- 300 van.
At about 6:50 a.m. on February 25, 2003, which
was then a declared national holiday,
petitioner's bus, which was then being driven
toward the direction of Manila by Sayson,
collided head-on with the URC van, which
was then being driven Quezon
province-bound by NURC's Operations
Manager, Renante Bicomong (Bicomong).
The incident occurred along Km. 76, Maharlika
Highway, Brgy. San Agustin, Alaminos, Laguna.
Bicomong died on the spot, while the colliding
vehicles sustained considerable damage.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack
of cause of action as Bicomong was not
performing his assigned tasks at the time of the
incident and the court of appeals affirmed this
decision. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUE:
WON respondents are liable to petitioners for
the damages they sustained considering that the
accident was attributed to the negligence of
Renante Bicomong.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
In the present case, it has been established that
on the day of the collision — or on February 25,
2003 — URC was the registered owner of the
URC van, although it appears that it was
designated for use by NURC, as it was officially
assigned to the latter's Logistics Manager,
Florante Soro-Soro (Soro-Soro); that Bicomong
was the Operations Manager of NURC and
assigned to the First Cavite Industrial Estate;
that there was no work as the day was declared
a national holiday; that Bicomong was on his
way home to his family in Quezon province; that
the URC van was not assigned to Bicomong as
well, but solely for Soro-Soro's official use; that
the company service vehicle officially assigned
to Bicomong was a Toyota Corolla, which he left
at the Cavite plant and instead, he used the
URC van; and that other than the Cavite plant,
there is no other NURC plant in the provinces of
Quezon, Laguna or Bicol.
Respondents succeeded in overcoming the
presumption of negligence, having shown
that when the collision took place, Bicomong
was not in the performance of his work; that
he was in possession of a service vehicle
that did not belong to his employer NURC,
but to URC, and which vehicle was not
officially assigned to him, but to another
employee; that his use of the URC van was
unauthorized — even if he had used the
same
vehicle in furtherance of a personal
undertaking in the past, this does not amount
to implied permission; that the accident occurred
on a holiday and while Bicomong was on his
way home to his family in Quezon province; and
that Bicomong had no official business
whatsoever in his hometown in Quezon, or in
Laguna where the collision occurred, his area of
operations being limited to the Cavite area.
On the other hand, the evidence suggests that
the collision could have been avoided if
Sayson exercised care and prudence, given
the circumstances and information that he
had immediately prior to the accident.
Despite having seen Bicomong drive the URC
van in a precarious manner while the same was
still a good 250 meters away from his bus,
Sayson did not take the necessary precautions,
as by reducing speed and adopting a defensive
stance to avert any untoward incident that may
occur from Bicomong's manner of driving. This is
precisely his testimony during trial. When the
van began to swerve toward his bus, he did not
reduce speed nor swerve his bus to avoid
collision. Instead, he maintained his current
speed and course, and for this reason, the
inevitable took place. An experienced driver who
is presented with the same facts would have
adopted an attitude consistent with a desire to
preserve life and property; for common carriers,
the diligence demanded is of the highest degree
Afialda v Hisole
GR No. L-2075
Caretaker na nainjure ng kalabaw
Loreto Afialda was a caretaker of the carabaos
owned by Basilio Hisole. In March 1947, without
any fault from Afialda or any force majeure, one
of the carabaos gored him thereby causing his
death. Afialda’s sister, Margarita Afialda, sued
Hisole arguing that under the Civil Code, “The
possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the
same, is liable for any damages it may cause,
even if such animal should escape from him or
stray away. This liability shall cease only in case,
the damage should arise from force majeure or
from the fault of the person who may have
suffered it.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Hisole is liable in the
case at bar as owner of the carabao which killed
Afialda.
RULING: No. The law uses the term “possessor
and user of the animal”. Afialda was the
caretaker of the animal and he was tasked and
paid to tend the carabaos. He, at the time of the
goring, is the possessor and the user of the
carabao and therefore he is the one who had
custody and control of the animal and was in a
position to prevent the animal from causing
damage. It would have been different had
Afialda been a stranger. Obviously, it was the
caretaker’s business to try to prevent the animal
from causing injury or damage to anyone,
including himself. And being injured by the
animal under those circumstances was one of
the risks of the occupation which he had
voluntarily assumed and for which he must take
the consequences.
Under article 1905 of the Civil Code, the owner
of an animal is not liable for injury caused by it to
its caretaker. For the statute names the
possessor or user of the animal as the person
liable for "any damages it may cause," and this
for the obvious reason that the possessor or
user has the custody and control of the animal
and is therefore the one in a position to prevent
it from causing damage.
In the present case, the animal was in the
custody and under the control of the caretaker,
who was paid for his work as such. Obviously, it
was the caretaker's business to try to prevent
the animal from causing injury or damage to
anyone, including himself. And being injured by
the animal under those circumstances, was one
of the risks of the occupation which he had
voluntarily assumed and for which he must take
the consequences. This action could have been
more appropriately raised in court under the
provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act
as the risk involved was one of occupational
hazards.
Capuno v Pepsi-Cola GR No. L-19331
Truck and private car collision
The case started from a vehicular collision in
Pampanga, which involved the truck driven by
Elordi, and private car driven by Capuno. Elordi
was charged with triple homicide through
reckless imprudence. When the accused was
acquitted of the charges against him, the
plaintiffs commenced a civil action for damages.
However, the lower courts dismissed the case
on the ground that the action had already been
prescribed. The SC affirmed the decision of the
lower courts, stating that the civil action had
already been prescribed.
The incident in question was a vehicular collision
that resulted in the death of Cipriano Capuno
and his passengers, the spouses Florencio
Buan and Rizalina Paras. The collision occurred
on January 3, 1953, and Elordi was charged
with triple homicide through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga. The criminal case was later
amended to include claims for damages by the
heirs of the victims.
HENSON v UCPB GR No. 223134
Facts:
 ● UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc.
(UCPB Gen) filed a complaint for
damages against Vicente G. Henson, Jr.
and others before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati City.
● The complaint stemmed from a water
leak incident and subsequent
reimbursement claim.
● The RTC ruled in favor of UCPB Gen,
stating that its cause of action has not
yet prescribed and allowing the inclusion
of Henson as a party-defendant.
● The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
RTC ruling.
Issue:
● Whether or not UCPB Gen's claim has
yet to prescribe.
Ruling:
● UCPB Gen's claim has already
prescribed.
Ratio:
● The prescriptive period for UCPB Gen's
cause of action is four years based on
quasi-delict, not ten years based on an
obligation created by law.
● UCPB Gen's right of subrogation does
not create a new obligation between
Henson and UCPB Gen, but only allows
UCPB Gen to enforce the rights of the
insured.
● Therefore, the prescriptive period for
UCPB Gen's claim is the same as the
prescriptive period for the insured's
claim, which is four years from the time
the tort was committed against the
insured.
● The ruling in Vector Shipping
Corporation v. American Home
Assurance Company, which held that
the prescriptive period for an insurer's
claim is ten years from the time of
indemnification, should be prospective
in application.
● The new ruling on prescription should
only apply to cases filed after the finality
of this decision.
● For cases that were filed before the
finality of this decision, the prescriptive
period should be determined based on
the rules prevailing at the time the action
was filed.
Yap Kim Chuan v Tiaoqui GR No. 10006
Nangungupahan umulan nabasa ang tinda
DOCTRINE:The lessor cannot be held
responsible for damages caused by a fortuitous
event such as a torrential rainfall.
Facts:
● Parties involved: Yap Kim Chuan
(plaintiff) and Alfonso M. Tiaoqui
(defendant)
● Date and place: Not mentioned
● Brief account of events: Yap Kim Chuan
leased a building owned by Alfonso
M. Tiaoqui. During a heavy rainstorm,
the roof of the building leaked,
causing damage to the plaintiff's
merchandise stored in the building.
● Brief account of the case in the lower
court: The plaintiff filed a complaint
seeking compensation for the damages.
Issue:
WON the lessor can be held responsible for the
damages caused by the rainfall.
Ruling:
● The Supreme Court absolved the
defendant from liability.
Ratio:
 ● The court held that the rainfall was a
fortuitous event or force majeure,
which could not have been foreseen or
prevented by either party.
● The lessor cannot be held responsible
for damages caused by unforeseen and
inevitable occurrences, unless expressly
stated in the law or the contract.
● There was no provision in the lease
agreement that made the lessor liable
for damages caused by leaks in the
roof.
● The lessor's obligation to warrant the
thing leased, including any defects, is
separate from his liability for damages.
● The lessor can only be held responsible
for damages if he knew about the
defects and failed to reveal them to the
lessee.
● There was no evidence that the lessor
had knowledge of any defects in the
roof.
● The court rejected the plaintiff's claim
that the lessor had promised to
compensate for the damages due to
lack of sufficient evidence.
● The lessor cannot be held responsible
for damages caused by a fortuitous
event such as a torrential rainfall.
PHILIPPINE SATELLITE v GLOBE GR No.
147324
Facts:
● The case involves a dispute between
Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (Philcomsat) and Globe
Telecom, Inc. over the termination of an
agreement for communication facilities.
● The agreement was entered into in
1991, with Philcomsat obligated to
establish and operate an earth station
for the exclusive use of the US Defense
Communications Agency (USDCA).
● Globe was responsible for paying
monthly rentals for the leased circuit
involved.
● Due to the termination of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement and the
withdrawal of US military forces from
Subic Naval Base, Globe notified
Philcomsat of its intention to discontinue
the use of the earth station.
● Globe argued that this termination was
justified under the force majeure clause
in the agreement.
● Philcomsat demanded payment of
outstanding obligations, leading to a
legal dispute.
Issue:
1. Whether the termination of the RP-US
Military Bases Agreement and the
withdrawal of US military forces
constitute force majeure, exempting
Globe from paying rentals under the
agreement.
2. Whether Globe is liable to pay rentals
for the month of December 1992.
3. Whether Philcomsat is entitled to
attorney's fees and exemplary damages.
Ruling:
● The Supreme Court ruled in favor of
Globe Telecom, Inc.
● The Court held that the termination of
the RP-US Military Bases Agreement
and the withdrawal of US military forces
constituted force majeure events,
exempting Globe from paying rentals for
the remainder of the agreement.
● The Court also ruled that Globe is liable
to pay rentals for the month of
December 1992, as the US military
forces and personnel completely
withdrew from Cubi Point only on that
date.
● The Court further held that Philcomsat is
not entitled to attorney's fees and
exemplary damages, as both parties
had legitimate claims against each other
and no party actually prevailed.
Ratio:
● The Court based its decision on the
force majeure clause in the agreement,
which listed events beyond the control
of the parties as constituting force
majeure.
● The Court found that the termination of
the RP-US Military Bases Agreement
and the withdrawal of US military forces
fell within the scope of force majeure.
● The Court also considered the inequity
of requiring Globe to continue paying
rentals for a service that could not be
rendered due to circumstances beyond
its control.
● Therefore, the Court affirmed the lower
court's decision, dismissing Philcomsat's
claims for rentals and damages.