PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE

BURDEN OF PROOF

Section 1 of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court

defines Burden of proof as the duty of a party to present
evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his
claim or defenses by the amount of evidence required
by law. It is up for the plaintiff to establish his cause of
action or the defendant to establish his defense.
 Thus, if the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he
was damaged because of the negligent acts of the
defendant, the plaintiff has the burden of proving such
negligence.

(Taylor vs. Manila Electric Railroad supra, citing

Scaevola, Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil, vol. 6, pp. 551,
552).
PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SPOUSES ANTONIO
ESTEBAN and GLORIA ESTEBAN

G.R. No. L-57079  September 29, 1989

FACTS:
 
The Esteban’s jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into an
open trench, an excavation undertaken by PLDT for the
installation of its underground conduit system.

Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left

uncovered because of the darkness and the lack of any warning
light or signs
 
FACTS:
  The Estebans allegedly sustained injuries.
 
PLDT, denies liability on the contention that the
injuries sustained by respondent spouses were the result
of their own negligence and that the entity which should
be held responsible, Barte an independent contractor
which undertook the construction.
FACTS:
 The Lower Court ruled in favor of Estebans.
 
However, the Court of Appeals found that that the
relationship of Barte and PLDT should be viewed in the
light of the contract between them and, under the
independent contractor rule, PLDT is not liable for the
acts of an independent contractor. Still, CA affirmed LC
decision.
ISSUE:
  Whether PLDT is liable for the injuries sustained
by the Estebans?
RULING:
  The accident which befell the Estebans was due to the lack
of diligence of respondent Antonio Esteban and was not
imputable to negligent omission on the part of petitioner PLDT.

The accident was not due to the absence of warning signs, but
to the unexplained abrupt swerving of the jeep from the inside
lane. That may explain plaintiff husband's insistence that he did
not see the ACCIDENT MOUND for which reason he ran into it
 The jeep was not running at 25 kilometers an hour. At
that speed, he could have braked the vehicle the moment it
struck the ACCIDENT MOUND. The jeep would not have
climbed the ACCIDENT MOUND several feet as indicated
by the tire marks. The jeep must have been running quite
fast.

Plaintiff-husband had not exercised the diligence of a

good father of a family to avoid the accident.
 The negligence of Antonio Esteban was not only
contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to
the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one of its
determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to
recover damages.

The presence of warning signs could not have completely

prevented the accident; the only purpose of said signs was to
inform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on
the site. The private respondents already knew of the
presence of said excavations.
 It was not the lack of knowledge of these excavations
which caused the jeep of respondents to fall into the
excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the
jeep from the inside lane towards the accident mound.

Furthermore, Antonio Esteban had the last clear chance or

opportunity to avoid the accident
 A person claiming damages for the negligence of
another has the burden of proving the existence of such
fault or negligence causative thereof. The facts constitutive
of negligence must be affirmatively established by
competent evidence. Whosoever relies on negligence for
his cause of action has the burden in the first instance of
proving the existence of the same if contested, otherwise
his action must fail
FOOD TERMINAL INCORPORATED
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND BASIC FOOD CORPORATION, 

G.R. No. 108397               June 21, 2000

FACTS:

Basic Food (basic) is engaged in the business of

manufacturing food and allied products. One of which is
Red Star compressed yeast which should be refrigerated in
a space to avoid spoiling.

Food Terminal Inc. (FTI) was engaged in the storing of

goods and merchandise for compensation at its refrigerated
warehouses in Taguig.
FACTS:

Basic Foods (basic) is engaged in the business of

manufacturing food and allied products. One of which is
Red Star compressed yeast which should be refrigerated in
a space to avoid spoiling.

Food Terminal Inc. (FTI) was engaged in the storing of

goods and merchandise for compensation at its refrigerated
warehouses in Taguig.
FACTS:

During the period for June 10, 1987 to June 23,

1987, Basic Food deposited at FTI’s warehouse
1,770 cartons of the said yeast, but due to the failure
to control the temperature, a total of 383.6 cartons of
the said yeast were spoiled. The monetary value of
which amounted to at least P16,112.00.
FACTS:

FTI contends that even though it failed to

maintain the said temperature, they should not
compensate for the yeast due to stipulations of the
party in the contract that if certain situations arise
(which the failure to control the temperature is
one of them), then they are not liable for the
damage.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner was negligent in the

care and custody of respondent's goods during
storage?
RULING:

The Supreme Court said that YES. In the first

place, the issue is factual, thus, the ruling of the
Court of Appeals is binding on the parties and may
not be reviewed on appeal via certiorari.
RULING:

Petitioner practically admitted that it failed to

maintain the agreed temperature of the cold storage
area to 2-4 degrees centigrade at all times.

Since Negligence has been established, petitioners

liability from damages is inescapable.
German Marine Agencies, Inc.
vs.
NLRC

G.R. No. 142049, January 30, 2001

FACTS:
Froilan de Lara was hired by German Marine
Agencies, Inc. to work as a radio officer on board its
vessel, M/V T.A. VOYAGER.

While the vessel was docked at the port of New

Zealand, de Lara was taken ill which was brought to the
attention of the master of the vessel.
FACTS:
However, instead of disembarking him so he may
receive immediate medical attention, the master of the
vessel proceeded to Manila, a voyage of ten days.

Upon arrival in Manila, he was not immediately

disembarked but was made to wait for several hours
until a vacant slot in the Manila pier was available.
FACTS:
It was only upon the insistence of de Lara’s relatives
that petitioners were compelled to disembark him and
finally commit him to a hospital.
 
He was confined in the Manila Doctors Hospital,
where he was treated.
FACTS:
After being discharged from the hospital, he
demanded from German Marine the payment of his
disability benefits and unpaid balance of his sickness
wages, pursuant to the Standard Employment Contract
of the parties.

De Lara filed a complaint with the NLRC for

payment of disability benefits and the balance of his
sickness wages.
ISSUE:

Whether or not negligence exist on the part

German Marine, and should therefore be liable for
damages?
RULING:

YES, German Marine is guilty of negligence and

thereby liable for damages.

There is no doubt that the failure of petitioners to

provide private respondent with the necessary
medical care caused the rapid deterioration and
inevitable worsening of the latter’s condition, which
eventually resulted in his sustaining a permanent
disability.
RULING:

Negligence not only exists but was deliberately

perpetrated by petitioners by its arbitrary refusal to
commit the ailing de Lara to a hospital in New Zealand
or at any nearest port.
Such deprivation of immediate medical attention
appears deliberated by the clear manifestation from
petitioner’s own words which states that,
RULING:

“the proposition of the complainant that

respondents should have taken the complainant to
the nearest port of New Zealand is easier said than
done. The deviation from the route of the vessel will
definitely result to loss of a fortune in dollars.”
Tan vs. Northwest Airlines

G.R. No. 102358, March 3, 2000

FACTS:
On May 31, 1994, Priscilla Tan(petitioner) and
Connie Tan boarded NWA Flight 29 in Chicago USA
bound for Manila, Phils. It had a stop-over in Detroit.

They arrived at the NAIA on June 1, 1994. Petitioner

and her companion found out that their luggage was
missing.
FACTS:
They went back the next day and were informed that their
luggages were still in another plane in Tokyo. On June 3, 1994,
they recovered their baggage but discovered that some of its
contents were destroyed and soiled.

Claiming that they "suffered mental anguish, sleepless nights

and great damage" because of Northwest's failure to inform
them in advance that their baggages would not be loaded on the
same flight they boarded and because of their delayed arrival,
they demanded from Northwest Airlines compensation for the
damages they suffered.
FACTS:
On June 15 and 22, 1994, petitioner sent demand
letters to Northwest but the latter did not respond.

After due trial, on June 10, 1996, the trial court

rendered decision finding respondent Northwest Airlines,
Inc. liable
for damages.
FACTS:
Hence, petitioner filed the case against respondents.

RTC ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered respondents to

pay petitioner:
1. Actual damages – P 15k;
2. Moral damages – P100k;
3. Exemplary Damages – 30k; atty’s fees and costs.

CA affirmed but deleted the award of moral and exemplary

damages
ISSUE:
Whether Northwest Airlines was liable for moral and
exemplary damages for willful misconduct and breach
of the contract of carriage?
RULING:
NO, the petition is without merit. We agree with the
Court of Appeals that respondent was not guilty of
willful misconduct.

For willful misconduct to exist, there must be a

showing that the acts complained of were impelled
by an intention to violate the law, or were in
persistent disregard of one’s rights. It must be
evidenced by a flagrantly or shamefully wrong or
improper conduct.
RULING:
Nothing in the conduct of respondent which showed
that they were motivated by malice or bad faith.

Northwest Airlines did not deny that baggages of

petitioner were not loaded in Flight 29. The baggages
could not be carried on the same flight due to weight
and balance restrictions.
RULING:

However, the baggage were loaded in another NWA

flight.

When petitioner received her soiled luggages, NWA

offered to either:
1. Reimburse the cost or repair of the bags or 2.
Reimburse the cost for the purchase of new bags upon
submission of receipts.
RULING:

BAD FAITH – does not simply connote bad

judgment or negligence, it imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through
some motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the
nature of fraud.
Thank you for listening!