Nature and Responsibility , Presumption of Negligence Articles 1755-1756 defect?

2. Whether or not the carrier has exercised the required extraordinary

La Mallorca and Pampanga Bus Company vs. Valentin de Jesus and diligence in handling the passengers.
Manolo Tolentino and the Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-21486 May 14, 1966 RULING:
17 SCRA 23 1. Yes. A carrier is liable to its passengers caused by mechanical defects of
FACTS: the conveyance. The carrier, while it is not an insurer of the safety of the
Respondent filed a case against petitioner Mallorca because of the death of passengers, should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of its
Lolita de Jesus, a passenger of petitioner’s bus which collided head-on equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. In this connection, the
with a freight truck traveling in the opposite direction, in a barrio in manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the
Marilao Bulacan, in the morning of October 8, 1959. The immediate cause carrier’s liability is the fact that the passenger has no privity with the
of the collision was the fact that the driver of the bus lost control of the manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence, he has no remedy against
wheel when its left front tire suddenly exploded. him, while the carrier usually has.
ISSUES: 2. No. The liability of the carrier depends on its negligence, his failure to
1. Are the carriers liable for the accident caused by mechanical defect? exercise the “utmost” degree of diligence that the law requires, and by Art.
2. Are petitioners liable for moral damages? 1756, in case of a passenger’s death or injury the carrier bears the burden
RULING: of satisfying the court that he has duly discharged the duty of prudence
1. Yes. The court found that the cause of the blow-out was that the inner required. In this case, the monthly visual inspection of the steering
tube of the left front tire was pressed between the inner circle of the left knuckle by the carrier did not measure up to the required legal standard
wheel and the rim which had slipped out of the wheel. This was a of “utmost diligence of very cautious person.
mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in its equipment which was
easily discoverable if the bus had been subjected to a more thorough, or
DOCTRINE: Mechanical defects are not force majeure if the same were
rigid check-up before it took to the road that morning. Considering that
discoverable by regular and adequate inspections. The prevailing rule in
the bus was running quite fast immediately before the accident and the
this jursdiction is that the carrier is liable to its passengers for damages
tire which exploded was not new, the plea of caso fortuito could not be
caused by mechanical defects of the conveyance. For the purposes of this
upheld and therefore, petitioners were liable.
doctrine, the manufacturer is considered the agent of the carrier.
2. Yes. moral damages are recoverable by reason of the death of a
passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier, as
provided in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil Code.
Baliwag Transit, Inc. vs Court of Appeals, Spouses Antonio Garcia &
Leticia Garcia, A & J Trading and Julio Recontique
Necesito, et. al. vs. Paras, et. al. G.R. No. 116110, May 15, 1996
G.R. No. L-10605, June 30, 1958 256 SCRA 746
104 Phil 75 FACTS:
FACTS: Respondent Leticia Garcia, and her five-year old son, Allan Garcia,
Mother, Severina Garces and her son, Precillano Necesito boarded boarded Baliwag Transit Bus bound for Cabanatuan City. At about 7:30 in
passenger auto truck of the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines. On its way from the evening the bus passengers saw a cargo truck parked at the shoulder
Pangasinan to Manila, the bus entered a wooden bridge but the driver lost of the national highway. A kerosene lamp appeared at the edge of the road
control because of the broken steering knuckle. The truck fell into the to serve as a warning device. The driver and the helper of the parked truck
creek. The mother was drowned and the son was injured. owned by respondent A & J Trading were replacing a flat tire. However the
ISSUES: bus driver was driving fast and was conversing with his co-employees
1. Whether or not carrier is liable for damages caused by mechanical while driving. The passengers pleaded for its driver to slow down, but their

1
plea was ignored. The bus collided with the cargo truck causing the death 3. Yes. In a breach of contract of carriage, moral damages are recoverable
of the bus driver and the helper of the truck and injury to the passengers. if the carrier, through its agent, acted fraudulently or in bad faith. The
Respondents Leticia and Allan experienced physical suffering, mental evidence shows the gross negligence of the driver of Baliwag bus which
anguish and serious anxiety by reason of the accident. Leticia underwent amounted to bad faith.
an operation to replace her broken hip bone with a metal plate. She was
confined at the National Orthopedic Hospital for 45 days and her son was
NOTES:
also confined in the hospital for his foot injury.
Evidence – To prove actual damages, the best evidence available to the
ISSUES:
injured party must be presented. The court cannot rely on uncorroborated
1. Whether or not petitioner carrier is liable for the injury of its
testimony whose truth is suspect but must depend upon competent proof
passengers.
that damages have been actually suffered.
2. Whether or not respondent company and driver were also liable for
When the goods shipped either are lost or arrive in damaged condition, a
failing to display an early warning device.
presumption arises against the carrier of its failure to observe that
3. Whether or not the injured passengers are entitled to moral damages.
requisite diligence, and there need not be an express finding of negligence
RULING:
to hold it liable. (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 234
1. Yes. A common carrier is bound to carry its passengers safely as far as
SCRA 78 [1994])
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very
When one devotes his property to a use in which the public has an
cautious person, with due regard for all the circumstances. In a contract
interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and
of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was at fault or was
must submit to the control by the public for the common good, to the
negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless the presumption is
extent of the interest he has thus created. (Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor
rebutted, the court need not even make an express finding of fault or
Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 [1994])
negligence on the part of the common carrier. This statutory presumption
may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.
Vicente Calalas vs. Court of Appeals, Eliza Jujeurche Sunga and
However, under Article 1759, common carriers are liable for the death of
Francisco Salva
or injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the
G.R. No. 122039, May 31, 2000
former’s employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the
332 SCRA 356
scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
FACTS:
carriers. This liability of the common carriers do not cease upon proof that
Respondent, Eliza Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
petitioner Vicente Calalas. The jeepney was already filled with passengers
or supervision of their employees.
so she was given by the conductor an “extension seat,” a wooden stool at
In this case, Baliwag, as a common carrier, breached its contract of
the back of the door. As she was seated at the rear end of the vehicle,
carriage when it failed to deliver its passengers, Leticia and Allan Garcia to
Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Unfortunately, a truck driven
their destination safe and sound. Baliwag failed to prove that it exercised
by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear
extraordinary diligence. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrates its
portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.
driver’s recklessness.
Sunga then filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging
2. No. The evidence shows that the truck driver and his helper placed a
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the
kerosene lamp or torch at the edge of the road, near the rear portion of the
diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand,
truck to serve as an early warning device. This substantially complies with
filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the
Section 34 (g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
truck.

2
RTC’s decision: Absolved Calalas of liability and ruled that Salva as third-
party defendant was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of
another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and
Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same court held Salva
and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his
jeepney.
CA’s decision: reversed RTC’s ruling on the ground that Sunga’s cause of
action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the
common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil
Code. It also dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and
adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent passenger is bound by the ruling in Civil
Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the truck liable for
quasi-delict.
2. Whether or not respondent carrier is responsible for the injury caused
to its passenger when the accident was caused by another vehicle.
3. Whether or not the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by Salva
was a caso fortuito.
4. Whether or not respondent passenger is entitled to moral damages.
RULING:
1. No. The principle of res judicata does not apply where a party in a
pending case was never a party in a previous one. And besides, the issues
in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case are not the same. The issue
in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were
liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner’s jeepney. On the
other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his
contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of
the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is
premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation.
2. Yes. The liability of petitioner arises from his negligence in the
performance of his contractual obligation or breach of contract of carriage.
Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently in case of death or injuries
to passengers, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision
necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof. It is now the
duty of petitioner to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the
care of his passengers. However, in this case, petitioner failed to prove that
3
he observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers. It was
found that the jeepney was not properly parked and he took more
passengers than the allowed seating capacity.
3. No. The taking of an “extension seat” is not an implied assumption of
risk on the part of the passenger. A caso fortuito is an event which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires
that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is
independent of the obligor’s will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the obligor
to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the obligor did not take
part in causing the injury to the creditor. Petitioner should have foreseen
the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into
the highway.
4. No. Petitioner did not act in bad faith in the performance of the contract
of carriage. As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in
actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of
the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. As an exception,
such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in
the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in relation to Art.
2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty
of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.
NOTES:
In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established
because it s the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the
action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract
and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination.
Doctrine of Proximate Cause
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-
delicts, not in actions involving breach of contract.
Presumption of Negligence
Upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at
once arises, and it becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he
observed extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.
Bad faith
The common carrier’s admission in open court that his driver failed to
assist the injured passenger in going to a nearby hospital cannot be
construed as an admission of bad faith.
The rules on extraordinary responsibility of common carriers remain
basically unchanged even when the contract is breached by tort although
noncontradictory principles on quasi-delict may then be assimilated as
also forming part of the governing law. (Sabena Belgian World Airlines vs.
Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 38 [1996])
Proximate cause, which is determined by a mixed consideration of logic,
common sense, policy and precedent, is that cause which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occured. (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals, 641 SCRA
326 [2000])
While the driver of an improperly parked vehicle may be liable in case of
collision, the driver of a moving vehicle who had no opportunity to avoid
the collision due to his own making is not relieved of liability, such as
when his negligence is the immediate and proximate cause of the collision.
(Austria vs. Court of Appeals, 327 SCRA 668 [2000])
Trans-Asia Shipping Lines vs. CA
(GR 118126, 4 March 1996)
FACTS:
Respondent Atty. Renato Arroyo, a public attorney, bought a ticket from
herein petitioner for the voyage of M/V Asia Thailand vessel to Cagayan de
Oro City from Cebu City on November 12, 1991.
At around 5:30 in the evening of November 12, 1991, respondent boarded
the M/V Asia Thailand vessel during which he noticed that some repairs
were being undertaken on the engine of the vessel. The vessel departed at
around 11:00 in the evening with only one (1) engine running.
After an hour of slow voyage, the vessel stopped near Kawit Island and
dropped its anchor thereat. After half an hour of stillness, some
passengers demanded that they should be allowed to return to Cebu City
for they were no longer willing to continue their voyage to Cagayan de Oro
4
City. The captain acceded to their request and thus the vessel headed
back to Cebu City.
In Cebu City, plaintiff together with the other passengers who requested to
be brought back to Cebu City, were allowed to disembark. Thereafter, the
vessel proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner, the next day, boarded
the M/V Asia Japan for its voyage to Cagayan de Oro City, likewise a
vessel of defendant.
On account of this failure of defendant to transport him to the place of
destination on November 12, 1991, respondent Arroyo filed before the trial
court “an action for damage arising from bad faith, breach of contract and
from tort,” against petitioner. The trial court ruled only for breach of
contract. The CA reversed and set aside said decision on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner Trans-Asia was negligent?
HELD:
Yes.
Before commencing the contracted voyage, the petitioner undertook some
repairs on the cylinder head of one of the vessel’s engines. But even before
it could finish these repairs, it allowed the vessel to leave the port of origin
on only one functioning engine, instead of two. Moreover, even the lone
functioning engine was not in perfect condition as sometime after it had
run its course, it conked out. This caused the vessel to stop and remain
adrift at sea, thus in order to prevent the ship from capsizing, it had to
drop anchor. Plainly, the vessel was unseaworthy even before the voyage
began. For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must be adequately equipped for
the voyage and manned with a sufficient number of competent officers and
crew.[21] The failure of a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy
condition its vessel involved in a contract of carriage is a clear breach of is
duty prescribed in Article 1755 of the Civil Code.

Bachelor Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 85691, 31 July
1990, 188 SCRA 216
FACTS:
– On Aug 1980, a bus owned by Bachelor Express, Inc. (BEI) and driven
by Cresencio Rivera came from Davao City on its way to Cagayan de Oro
City passing Butuan City.
– While at Tabon-Tabon, Butuan City, the bus picked up a passenger and
about 15 mins later, a passenger at the rear portion suddenly stabbed a
PC soldier which caused commotion and panic among the passengers.
– When the bus stopped, passengers Ornominio Beter and Narcisa
Rautraut were found lying down the road, the former already dead as a
result of head injuries and the latter also suffering from severe injuries
which caused her death later.
– The passenger assailant alighted from the bus and ran toward the
bushes but was killed by the police. Thereafter, the heirs of Ornominio
Beter and Narcisa Rautraut, private respondents herein the parents of
Beter and Rautraut.
– RTC dismissed the complaint. Upon appeal, the decision was reversed
and set aside. CA found BEI and Rivera solidarily liable to pay the private
respondents herein.
ISSUE:
1. What was the proximate cause of the whole incident?
2. Whether or not the petitioner’ common carrier observed extraordinary
diligence to safeguard the lives of its passengers? NO
RULING:
1. Petitioner, in order to overcome the presumption of fault/negligence
under the law, states that the vehicular incident resulting in the death of
the passengers Beter and Rautraut was caused by force majeure/casa
fortuito.
5
The following essential characteristics of casa fortuito are: (1) The cause of
the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor
to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will; (2)
It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso
fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (3) The
occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
his obligation in a normal manner. and (4) the obligor (debtor) must be
free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the
creditor.
The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the
incident as it triggered off a commotion and panic among passengers
started running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling
off the passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The
sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in the bus is
within context of force majeure.
ENGRACIO FABRE, JR. and PORFIRIO CABIL vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. no. 111127, July 26, 1996
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Fabre and his wife were the owners of 1982 model Mazda
minibus. They were using the said vehicle as a school bus service for
children in Manila. They hired Cabil as their driver. On November 2,
1982, private respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship (WWCF)
arranged with petitioners for the transportation of members of young adult
ministry from Manila to La Union and back. While travelling, they met an
accident. The bus hit a fence and a coconut tree that caused passengers to
be injured including respondent Antonio.
The WWCF and Antonio then filed a criminal complaint against the driver,
the trial court decided in favor of respondents. All evidence presented
showed the negligence of the defendants ultimately resulted to the
accident. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are liable for the injuries suffered by the
respondents based on culpa contractual and/or culpa aquiliana.
RULING:
The Court ruled that damages should be awarded based on the theory that
petitioners are liable for breach of contract of carriage or culpa contractual
or on the theory of quasi delict or culpa aquiliana holding that the relation
of passenger and carrier is “contractual both in origin and nature,”
nevertheless “the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort. In both
sources of obligation, the existence of negligence of petitioners must be
determined. In this case, Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his
employer, the Fabres, who owned the bus, failed to exercise the diligence
of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their
employee is fully supported by the evidence on record. Pursuant to Arts.
2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise to the
presumption that his employers, the Fabres, were themselves negligent in
the selection and supervision of their employee. Thus, the finding of the
Court that petitioners are liable under Arts. 2176 and 2180 for quasi
delict fully justify that they are guilty of breach of contract of carriage
under Arts. 1733, 1755 and 1759 of the Civil Code.
WILLIAM TIU v. PEDRO A. ARRIESGADO, GR No. 138060, 2004-09-01
Facts:
At about 10:00 p.m. of March 15, 1987, the cargo truck marked "Condor
Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise" bearing plate number GBP-675
was loaded with firewood in Bogo, Cebu and left for Cebu City. Upon
reaching Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu, just as the truck...
passed over a bridge, one of its rear tires exploded. The driver, Sergio
Pedrano, then parked along the right side of the national highway and
removed the damaged tire to have it vulcanized at a nearby shop, about
700 meters away.[3] Pedrano left his... helper, Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep
watch over the stalled vehicle, and instructed the latter to place a spare
tire six fathoms away[4] behind the stalled truck to serve as a warning for
oncoming vehicles. The truck's tail lights were also left on. It was... about
12:00 a.m., March 16, 1987.
At about 4:45 a.m., D' Rough Riders passenger bus with plate number
PBP-724 driven by Virgilio Te Laspiñas was cruising along the national
highway of Sitio Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu. The passenger bus
was also bound for Cebu City, and had come from Maya, Daanbantayan,...
Cebu. Among its passengers were the Spouses Pedro A. Arriesgado and
6
Felisa Pepito Arriesgado, who were seated at the right side of the bus,
about three (3) or four (4) places from the front seat.
As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspiñas saw the stalled truck,
which was then about 25 meters away.[5] He applied the breaks and tried
to swerve to the left to avoid hitting the truck. But it was too late; the bus
rammed into the truck's left rear.
The impact damaged the right side of the bus and left several passengers
injured.  Pedro Arriesgado lost consciousness and suffered a fracture in
his right colles.[6] His wife, Felisa, was brought to the Danao City
Hospital.    She was... later transferred to the Southern Island Medical
Center where she died shortly thereafter.[7]
Respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado then filed a complaint for breach of
contract of carriage, damages and attorney's fees before the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 20, against the petitioners, D' Rough Riders
bus operator William Tiu and his driver, Virgilio Te Laspiñas... on May 27,
1987. The respondent alleged that the passenger bus in question was
cruising at a fast and high speed along the national road, and that
petitioner Laspiñas did not take precautionary measures to avoid the
accident.
The trial court also ruled that the absence of an early warning device near
the place where the truck was parked was not sufficient to impute
negligence on the part of respondent Pedrano, since the tail lights of the
truck were fully on, and the vicinity was well lighted by... street lamps.[16]
It also found that the testimony of petitioner Tiu, that he based the
selection of his driver Laspiñas on efficiency and in-service training, and
that the latter had been so far an efficient and good driver for the past six
years of his... employment, was insufficient to prove that he observed the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employees.
After the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said decision was
denied, the petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals
The appellate court rendered judgment affirming the trial court's decision
with the modification that the awards for moral and exemplary damages
were reduced to P25,000.
According to the appellate court, the action of respondent Arriesgado was
based not on quasi-delict but on breach of contract of carriage. As a
common carrier, it was incumbent upon petitioner Tiu to prove that
extraordinary diligence was observed in ensuring the safety of...
passengers during transportation. Since the latter failed to do so, he
should be held liable for respondent Arriesgado's claim.
Issues:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
PETITIONERS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AND HENCE, LIABLE TO
RESPONDENT PEDRO A. ARRIESGADO.
Ruling:
According to the petitioners, the appellate court erred in failing to
appreciate the absence of an early warning device and/or built-in
reflectors at the front and back of the cargo truck, in clear violation of
Section 34, par. (g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
They aver that such violation is only a proof of respondent Pedrano's
negligence, as provided under Article 2185 of the New Civil Code. They
also question the appellate court's failure to take into account that the
truck was parked in an oblique manner, its rear portion almost... at the
center of the road. As such, the proximate cause of the incident was the
gross recklessness and imprudence of respondent Pedrano, creating the
presumption of negligence on the part of respondent Condor in
supervising his employees, which presumption was not rebutted. The...
petitioners then contend that respondents Condor and Pedrano should be
held jointly and severally liable to respondent Arriesgado for the    4136,... ec. 35. Restriction as to speed. (a) Any person driving a motor
payment of the latter's claim.
The petitioners, likewise, aver that expert evidence should have been
presented to prove that petitioner Laspiñas was driving at a very fast
speed, and that the CA could not reach such conclusion by merely
considering the damages on the cargo truck. It was also pointed out that...
petitioner Tiu presented evidence that he had exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his drivers.
Petitioner Laspiñas
Was negligent in driving
The Ill-fated bus
In his testimony before the trial court, petitioner Laspiñas claimed that he
was traversing the two-lane road at Compostela, Cebu at a speed of only
forty (40) to fifty (50) kilometers per hour before the incident occurred.[23]
7
He also admitted that he... saw the truck which was parked in an "oblique
position" at about 25 meters before impact,[24] and tried to avoid hitting it
by swerving to the left. However, even in the absence of expert evidence,
the damage sustained by the truck[25] itself supports the finding of both
the trial court and the appellate court, that the D' Rough Rider bus driven
by petitioner Laspiñas was traveling at a fast pace. Since he saw the
stalled truck at a distance of 25 meters, petitioner Laspiñas had more
than... enough time to swerve to his left to avoid hitting it; that is, if the
speed of the bus was only 40 to 50 kilometers per hour as he claimed. As
found by the Court of Appeals, it is easier to believe that petitioner
Laspiñas was driving at a very fast speed, since at 4:45 a.m.,... the hour of
the accident, there were no oncoming vehicles at the opposite direction.
Petitioner Laspiñas could have swerved to the left lane with proper
clearance, and, thus, could have avoided the truck.[26] Instinct, at the
very least, would have prompted... him to apply the breaks to avert the
impending disaster which he must have foreseen when he caught sight of
the stalled truck.
Indeed, petitioner Laspiñas' negligence in driving the bus is apparent in
the records. By his own admission, he had just passed a bridge and was
traversing the highway of Compostela, Cebu at a speed of 40 to 50
kilometers per hour before the collision occurred. The maximum speed...
allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per hour.[29] And, as
correctly pointed out by the trial court, petitioner Laspiñas also violated
Section 35 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No.
vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed,
not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for
the traffic, the width of the highway,... and or any other condition then
and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a
highway at such speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any
person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to
a stop... within the assured clear distance ahead.
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is
presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any
traffic regulation.
Petitioner Tiu failed to Overcome the presumption Of negligence against
him as One engaged in the business Of common carriage.
The rules which common carriers should observe as to the safety of their
passengers are set forth in the Civil Code, Articles 1733,[32] 1755[33] and
1756.[34] In this case, respondent Arriesgado and... his deceased wife
contracted with petitioner Tiu, as owner and operator of D' Rough Riders
bus service, for transportation from Maya, Daanbantayan, Cebu, to Cebu
City for the price of P18.00.[35] It is undisputed that the respondent and
his wife were not... safely transported to the destination agreed upon. In
actions for breach of contract, only the existence of such contract, and the
fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport
his passenger safely to his destination are the matters that need to be...
proved.[36] This is because under the said contract of carriage, the
petitioners assumed the express obligation to transport the respondent
and his wife to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary
diligence with due regard for all... circumstances.[37] Any injury suffered
by the passengers in the course thereof is immediately attributable to the
negligence of the carrier.[38] Upon the happening of the accident, the
presumption of negligence at once arises, and it... becomes the duty of a
common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the
care of his passengers.[39] It must be stressed that in requiring the
highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and in creating
a presumption of... negligence against them, the law compels them to curb
the recklessness of their drivers.[40]
While evidence may be submitted to overcome such presumption of
negligence, it must be shown that the carrier observed the required
extraordinary diligence, which means that the carrier must show the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons as far as human care and
foresight... can provide, or that the accident was caused by fortuitous
event.[41] As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner Tiu failed to
conclusively rebut such presumption. The negligence of petitioner
Laspiñas as driver of the passenger bus is, thus, binding... against
petitioner Tiu, as the owner of the passenger bus engaged as a common
carrier.[42]
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the principle of last clear chance is
inapplicable in the instant case, as it only applies in a suit between the
owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a
passenger demands responsibility... from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent
driver and its owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise
guilty of negligence.
Principles:
8
In actions for breach of contract, only the existence of such contract, and
the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination are the matters that need
to be... proved.[36] This is because under the said contract of carriage, the
petitioners assumed the express obligation to transport the respondent
and his wife to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary
diligence with due regard for all... circumstances.[37] Any injury suffered
by the passengers in the course thereof is immediately attributable to the
negligence of the carrier.[38] Upon the happening of the accident, the
presumption of negligence at once arises, and it... becomes the duty of a
common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the
care of his passengers.[39] It must be stressed that in requiring the
highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and in creating
a presumption of... negligence against them, the law compels them to curb
the recklessness of their drivers.[40]
The common law notion of last clear chance... permitted courts to grant
recovery to a plaintiff who has also been negligent provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do
so.
SULPICIO LINES v. NAPOLEON SESANTE, GR No. 172682, 2016-07-27
Facts:
On September 18, 1998, at around 12:55 p.m., the M/V Princess of the
Orient, a passenger vessel owned and operated by the petitioner, sank
near Fortune Island in Batangas. Of the 388 recorded passengers, 150
were lost.[3] Napoleon Sesante, then a member of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) and a lawyer, was one of the passengers who survived the
sinking. He sued the petitioner for breach of contract and damages.[4]
Sesante alleged in his complaint that the M/V Princess of the Orient left
the Port of Manila while Metro Manila was experiencing stormy weather;
that at around 11:00 p.m., he had noticed the vessel listing starboard, so
he had gone to the uppermost deck where he witnessed the strong winds
and big waves pounding the vessel; that at the same time, he had seen
how the passengers had been panicking, crying for help and frantically
scrambling for life jackets in the absence of the vessel's officers and crew;
that sensing danger, he had called a certain Vency Ceballos through his
cellphone to request him to inform the proper authorities of the situation;
that thereafter, big waves had rocked the vessel, tossing him to the floor
where he was pinned by a long steel bar; that he had freed himself only
after another wave had hit the vessel;[5] that he had managed to stay
afloat after the vessel had sunk, and had been carried by the waves to the
coastline of Cavite and Batangas until he had been rescued; that he had
suffered tremendous hunger, thirst, pain, fear, shock, serious anxiety and
mental anguish; that he had sustained injuries,[6] and had lost money,
jewelry, important documents, police uniforms and the .45 caliber pistol
issued to him by the PNP; and that because it had committed bad faith in
allowing the vessel to sail despite the storm signal, the petitioner should
pay him actual and moral damages
In its defense, the petitioner insisted on the seaworthiness of the M/V
Princess of the Orient due to its having been cleared to sail from the Port
of Manila by the proper authorities; that the sinking had been due to force
majeure; that it had not been negligent; and that its officers and crew had
also not been negligent because they had made preparations to abandon
the vessel because they had launched life rafts and had provided the
passengers assistance in that regard.
On October 12, 2001, the RTC rendered its judgment in favor of the
respondent,... The petitioner sought reconsideration, but the RTC only
partly granted its motion by reducing the temperate damages from
P500,000.00 to P300,000.00
Dissatisfied, the petitioner appealed.[12] It was pending the appeal in the
CA when Sesante passed away. He was substituted by his heirs.
On June 27, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision. It lowered
the temperate damages to P120,000.00, which approximated the cost of
Sesante's lost personal belongings; and held that despite the
seaworthiness of the vessel, the petitioner remained civilly liable because
its officers and crew had been negligent in performing their duties
Issues:
(1) Is the complaint for breach of contract and damages a personal action
that does not survive the death of the plaintiff?; (2) Is the petitioner liable
for damages under Article 1759 of the Civil Code?; and (3) Is there
sufficient basis for awarding moral and temperate damages?
Ruling:
The appeal lacks merit.
An action for breach of contract of carriage survives the death of the
plaintiff
9
Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court lays down the proper procedure in
the event of the death of a litigant, viz.:Section 16. Death of party; duty of
counsel. - Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the
court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to
give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for
disciplinary action.The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be
substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem
for the minor heirs.
A contract of carriage generates a relation attended with public duty,
neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees and gives ground for an
action for damages.[19] Sesante's claim against the petitioner involved his
personal injury caused by the breach of the contract of carriage. Pursuant
to the aforecited rules, the complaint survived his death, and could be
continued by his heirs following the rule on substitution.
The petitioner is liable for breach of contract of carriage
The petitioner submits that an action for damages based on breach of
contract of carriage under Article 1759 of the Civil Code should be read in
conjunction with Article 2201 of the same code; that although Article 1759
only provides for a presumption of negligence, it does not envision
automatic liability; and that it was not guilty of bad faith considering that
the sinking of M/V Princess of the Orient had been due to a fortuitous
event, an exempting circumstance under Article 1174 of the Civil Code.
Article 1759 of the Civil Code does not establish a presumption of
negligence because it explicitly makes the common carrier liable in the
event of death or injury to passengers due to the negligence or fault of the
common carrier's employees. It reads:Article 1759. Common carriers are
liable for the death or injuries to passengers through the negligence or
willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of
the common carriers.This liability of the common carriers does not cease
upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of their employees.The liability of common
carriers under Article 1759 is demanded by the duty of extraordinary
diligence required of common carriers in safely carrying their passengers.[
On the other hand, Article 1756 of the Civil Code lays down the
presumption of negligence against the common carrier in the event of
death or injury of its passenger, viz.:Article 1756. In case of death of or
injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755.
Clearly, the trial court is not required to make an express finding of the
common carrier's fault or negligence.[21] Even the mere proof of injury
relieves the passengers from establishing the fault or negligence of the
carrier or its employees.[22] The presumption of negligence applies so long
as there is evidence showing that: (a) a contract exists between the
passenger and the common carrier; and (b) the injury or death took place
during the existence of such contract.[23] In such event, the burden shifts
to the common carrier to prove its observance of extraordinary diligence,
and that an unforeseen event or force majeure had caused the injury.
Sesante sustained injuries due to the buffeting by the waves and
consequent sinking of M/V Princess of the Orient where he was a
passenger. To exculpate itself from liability, the common carrier vouched
for the seaworthiness of M/V Princess of the Orient, and referred to the
BMI report to the effect that the severe weather condition - a force majeure
- had brought about the sinking of the vessel.
A common carrier may be relieved of any liability arising from a fortuitous
event pursuant to Article 1174[25] of the Civil Code. But while it may free
a common carrier from liability, the provision still requires exclusion of
human agency from the cause of injury or loss.[26] Else stated, for a
common carrier to be absolved from liability in case of force majeure, it is
not enough that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event. The
common carrier must still prove that it did not contribute to the
occurrence of the incident due to its own or its employees' negligence.
The petitioner has attributed the sinking of the vessel to the storm
notwithstanding its position on the seaworthiness of M/V Princess of the
Orient. Yet, the findings of the BMI directly contradicted the petitioner's
attribution,... The Captain's erroneous maneuvers of the M/V Princess of
the Orient minutes before she sunk [sic] had caused the accident. It
should be noted that during the first two hours when the ship left North
Harbor, she was navigating smoothly towards Limbones Point. During the
same period, the ship was only subjected to the normal weather stress
prevailing at the time. She was then inside Manila Bar. The waves were
observed to be relatively small to endanger the safety of the ship. It was
10
only when the MV Princess of the Orient had cleared Limbones Pt. while
navigating towards the direction of the Fortune Island when this agonizing
misfortune struck the ship.
Initially, a list of three degrees was observed. The listing of the ship to her
portside had continuously increased. It was at this point that the captain
had misjudged the situation. While the ship continuously listed to her
portside and was battered by big waves, strong southwesterly winds,
prudent judgement [sic] would dictate that the Captain should have
considerably reduced the ship's speed. He could have immediately ordered
the Chief Engineer to slacken down the speed. Meanwhile, the winds and
waves continuously hit the ship on her starboard side. The waves were at
least seven to eight meters in height and the wind velocity was a[t] 25
knots. The MV Princess of the Orient being a close-type ship (seven decks,
wide and high superstructure) was vulnerable and exposed to the howling
winds and ravaging seas. Because of the excessive movement, the solid
and liquid cargo below the decks must have shifted its weight to port,
which could have contributed to the tilted position of the ship.
Even assuming the seaworthiness of the MA/ Princess of the Orient, the
petitioner could not escape liability considering that, as borne out by the
aforequoted findings of the BMI, the immediate and proximate cause of the
sinking of the vessel had been the gross negligence of its captain in
maneuvering the vessel
The Court also notes that Metro Manila was experiencing Storm Signal No.
1 during the time of the sinking.[31] The BMI observed that a vessel like
the M/V Princess of the Orient, which had a volume of 13.734 gross tons,
should have been capable of withstanding a Storm Signal No. 1
considering that the responding fishing boats of less than 500 gross tons
had been able to weather through the same waves and winds to go to the
succor of the sinking vessel and had actually rescued several of the latter's
distressed passengers
We agree with the petitioner that moral damages may be recovered in an
action upon breach of contract of carriage only when: (a) death of a
passenger results, or (b) it is proved that the carrier was guilty of fraud
and bad faith, even if death does not result.[33] However, moral damages
may be awarded if the contractual breach is found to be wanton and
deliberately injurious, or if the one responsible acted fraudulently or with
malice or bad faith.
Principles:
In order to be considered a fortuitous event, however, (1) the cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to
comply with his obligation, must be independent of human will; (2) it must
be impossible to foresee the event which constitute the caso fortuito, or if
it can be foreseen it must be impossible to avoid; (3) the occurrence must
be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in
any manner; and (4) the obligor must be free from any participation in the
aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
[T]he principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that
the act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human
intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of
the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the
participation of man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or
failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and removed from
the rules applicable to the acts of God.[
JOSE SANICO and VICENTE CASTRO, Petitioners –versus- WERHERLINA
P. COLIPANO, Respondent G.R. No. 209969, September 27, 2017,
SECOND DIVISION, CAGUIOA, J.
Since the cause of action is based on a breach of a contract of carriage,
the liability of the owner is direct as the contract is between him and the
passenger. The driver cannot be made liable as he is not a party to the
contract of carriage.
FACTS:
On December 25, 1993, Christmas Day, Colipano and her daughter were
paying passengers in the jeepney operated by Sanico, which was driven by
Castro. Colipano claimed she was made to sit on an empty beer case at
the edge of the rear entrance/exit of the jeepney with her sleeping child on
her lap. And, at an uphill incline in the road to Carmen, Cebu, the jeepney
slid backwards because it did not have the power to reach the top.
Colipano pushed both her feet against the step board to prevent herself
and her child from being thrown out of the exit, but because the step
board was wet, her left foot slipped and got crushed between the step
board and a coconut tree which the jeepney bumped, causing the jeepney
to stop its backward movement. Colipano's leg was badly injured and was
eventually amputated. Sanico claimed however that the event was due to
11
engine failure, that he paid for all the hospital and medical expenses of
Colipano, and that Colipano eventually freely and voluntarily executed an
Affidavit of Desistance and Release of Claim.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sanico and Castro breached the contract of
carriage with Colipano.
RULING:
Only Sanico breached the contract of carriage. Since the cause of action is
based on a breach of a contract of carriage, the liability of Sanico is direct
as the contract is between him and Colipano. Castro, being merely the
driver of Sanico's jeepney, cannot be made liable as he is not a party to the
contract of carriage. Although he was driving the jeepney, he was a mere
employee of Sanico, who was the operator and owner of the jeepney. The
obligation to carry Colipano safely to her destination was with Sanico. In
fact, the elements of a contract of carriage existed between Colipano and
Sanico: consent, as shown when Castro, as employee of Sanico, accepted
Colipano as a passenger when he allowed Colipano to board the jeepney,
and as to Colipano, when she boarded the jeepney; cause or consideration,
when Colipano, for her part, paid her fare; and, object, the transportation
of Colipano from the place of departure to the place of destination.
Specific to a contract of carriage, the Civil Code requires common carriers
to observe extraordinary diligence in safely transporting their passengers.
Article 1733 of the Civil Code states: ART. 1733. Common carriers, from
the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the
safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case. Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance
over the goods is further expressed in Articles 1734, 1735 and 1745, Nos.
5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers is further set forth in Articles 1755 and 1756. This
extraordinary diligence, following Article 1755 of the Civil Code, means
that common carriers have the obligation to carry passengers safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. In case
of death of or injury to their passengers, Article 1756 of the Civil Code
provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or
negligent, and this presumption can be overcome only by proof of the
extraordinary diligence exercised to ensure the safety of the passengers.
Being an operator and owner of a common carrier, Sanico was required to
observe extraordinary diligence in safely transporting Colipano. When
Colipano's leg was injured while she was a passenger in Sanico's jeepney,
the presumption of fault or negligence on Sanico's part arose and he had
the burden to prove that he exercised the extraordinary diligence required
of him. He failed to do this. In Calalas v. Court of Appeals, the Court found
that allowing the respondent in that case to be seated in an extension
seat, which was a wooden stool at the rear of the jeepney, "placed [the
respondent] in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers
were exposed." The Court further ruled that the petitioner in Calalas was
not only "unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on
him for the injury sustained by [the respondent], but also, the evidence
shows he was actually negligent in transporting passengers."
Calalas squarely applies here. Sanico failed to rebut the presumption of
fault or negligence under the Civil Code. More than this, the evidence
indubitably established Sanico's negligence when Castro made Colipano
sit on an empty beer case at the edge of the rear entrance/exit of the
jeepney with her sleeping child on her lap, which put her and her child in
greater peril than the other passengers.
As the CA correctly held: For the driver, Vicente Castro, to allow a seat
extension made of an empty case of beer clearly indicates lack of
prudence. Permitting Colipano to occupy an improvised seat in the rear
portion of the jeepney, with a child on her lap to boot, exposed her and her
child in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were
exposed. The use of an improvised seat extension is undeniable, in view of
the testimony of plaintiff's witness, which is consistent with Colipano's
testimonial assertion.
Further, the defense of engine failure, instead of exonerating Sanico, only
aggravated his already precarious position. The engine failure "hinted lack
of regular check and maintenance to ensure that the engine is at its best,
12
considering that the jeepney regularly passes through a mountainous
area." This failure to ensure that the jeepney can safely transport
passengers through its route which required navigation through a
mountainous area is proof of fault on Sanico's part.
Responsibility for Acts of Employees Articles 1759 - 1760
ANTONIA MARANAN, Petitioner, -versus - PASCUAL PEREZ, ET AL.,
Respondents. G.R. No. L-22272, EN BANC, June 26, 1967, BENGZON,
J.P., J.
Unlike in the Old Civil Code, Article 1759 of the New Civil Code expressly
makes a common carrier liable for intentional assaults committed by its
employees upon its passengers. To be liable, it is enough that the assault
happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is not a defense for
the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience
of its orders. In the case at bar, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of
the very cab transporting the passenger, in whose hands the carrier had
entrusted the duty of executing the contract of carriage. The incident took
place in the course of the duty of the guilty employee. As such, Perez is
liable under Article 1759 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of the claim
against Valenzuela is correct as well. Maranan's action was DEAN’S
CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 176 predicated on breach of
contract of carriage and the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil
liability is covered in the criminal case.
FACTS: Rogelio Corachea was stabbed and killed by driver Simeon
Valenzuela while the former was riding as a passenger in a taxicab owned
and operated by Pascual Perez. Valenzuela was prosecuted for homicide
and was found guilty. While the appeal was pending, Antonia Maranan,
Corachea's mother, filed an action to recover damages from Perez and
Valenzuela for the death of her son. In response, Perez and Valenzuela
asserted that the deceased was killed in self-defense since he first
assaulted the driver by stabbing the latter from behind. Perez further
claimed that the death was a caso fortuito for which the carrier like him
was not liable. The trial court ruled against Perez and dismissed the claim
against Valenzuela.
 ISSUE: Whether Perez is liable for the crime committed by Valenzuela Article 1759 of the Civil Code. The dismissal of the claim against
while the latter is in the performance of his duty as driver of the taxicab. Valenzuela is correct as well. Maranan's action was predicated on breach
(YES) of contract of carriage and the cab driver was not a party thereto. His civil
liability is covered in the criminal case.
RULING: Unlike in the Old Civil Code, Article 1759 of the New Civil Code
expressly makes a common carrier liable for intentional assaults Responsibility for Acts of Strangers, Co-passengers Articles 1763
committed by its employees upon its passengers. It provides that:
Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers [G.R. No. 55300. March 15, 1990.]
through the negligence or willful acts of the former’s employees, although
FRANKLIN G. GACAL and CORAZON M. GACAL, the latter assisted by
such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in her husband, FRANKLIN G. GACAL, Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE AIR
violation of the orders of the common carriers. To be liable, it is enough LINES, INC., and THE HONORABLE PEDRO SAMSON C. ANIMAS, in
that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is his capacity as PRESIDING JUDGE of the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
not a defense for the carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or OF SOUTH COTABATO, BRANCH I, Respondents.
in disobedience of its orders. Such liability is absolute in the sense that it
practically secures the passengers from all assaults committed by its own Vicente A. Mirabueno, for Petitioners.
employees. It is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako for Private Respondent.
that is the principle behind this. At least three reasons underlie the above
rule. First, the special undertaking of the carrier requires that it furnish
its passenger that full measure of protection afforded by the exercise of the SYLLABUS
high degree of care prescribed by the law from violence and insults at the
hands of strangers and other passengers, but above all, from the acts of
the carrier's own servants charged with the passenger's safety. Second, 1. CIVIL LAW; COMMON CARRIER; REQUIRED TO EXERCISE
EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE IN THEIR VIGILANCE OVER GOODS AND
the result of the carrier confiding in the servant's hands the performance
FOR THE SAFETY OF PASSENGER TRANSPORTED. — Under the Civil
of his contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the Code, common carriers are required to exercise extraordinary diligence in
duty of protecting the passenger with the utmost care prescribed by law. their vigilance over the goods and for the safety of passengers transported
Third, as between the carrier and the passenger, the former must bear the by them, according so all the circumstances of each case (Article 1733).
risk of wrongful acts or negligence of its employees against the passengers The source of a common carrier’s legal liability is the contract of carriage,
since it, and not the passengers, has power to select and remove them. and by entering into said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers
Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. There is breach of
this obligation if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all the
other employees with due regard not only to their technical competence
circumstances of the case in exercise of the utmost diligence of a very
and physical ability but also to their total personality, including their cautious person (Isaac v. Ammen Transportation Co., 101 Phil. 1046
patterns of behavior, moral fibers, and social attitude [1957]; Juntilla v. Fontanar, 136 SCRA 624 [1985]).

In the case at bar, the killing was perpetrated by the driver of the very cab 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESUMED NEGLIGENT IN CASE OF DEATH OR INJURY
transporting the passenger, in whose hands the carrier had entrusted the RESULTED; DUTY TO OVERCOME THEREOF. — They are presumed at
duty of executing the contract of carriage. The incident took place in the fault or to have acted negligently whenever a passenger dies or is injured
course of the duty of the guilty employee. As such, Perez is liable under (Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 124

13
SCRA 583 [1983]) or for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods in
cases other than those enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code
(Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA
463 [1987]). It is the duty of a common carrier to overcome the
presumption of negligence (Philippine National Railways v. Court of
Appeals, 139 SCRA 87 [1985]) and it must be shown that the carrier had
observed the required extraordinary diligence of a very cautious person as
far as human care and foresight can provide or that the accident was
caused by a fortuitous event (Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 523
[1976]). Thus, as ruled by this Court, no person shall be responsible for
those "events which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen were
inevitable." (Article 1174, Civil Code). The term is synonymous with caso
fortuito (Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657 [1924]) which is of the same sense
as "force majeure" (Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 17, p.
362).
3. ID.; FORCE MAJEURE; DEFINED; ELEMENTS THAT MUST CONCUR
TO EXEMPT PARTY FROM LIABILITY. — In order to constitute a caso
fortuito or force majeure that would exempt a person from liability under
Article 1174 of the Civil Code, it is necessary that the following elements
must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be
independent of the human will (the will of the debtor or the obligor); (b) the
event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the event must be
such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in,
or aggravation of the injury to the creditor (Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil. 657
[1924]; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527 [1971]; Estrada v.
Consolacion, supra; Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553 [1985];
Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA 596 [1986]). Caso
fortuito or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not
foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, are inevitable. It is, therefore, not enough that the event
should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed,
but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to
foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same (Republic v.
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, 21 SCRA 279 [1967]).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SATISFIED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — Applying the above
guidelines to the case at bar, the failure to transport petitioners safely
from Davao to Manila was due to the skyjacking incident staged by six (6)
passengers of the same plane, all members of the Moro National Liberation
Front (MNLF), without any connection with private respondent, hence,
14
independent of the will of either the PAL or of its passengers. Under
normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the skyjacking incident
which could have been avoided had there been a more thorough frisking of
passengers and inspection of baggages as authorized by R.A No. 6235. But
the incident in question occurred during Martial Law where there was a
military take-over of airport security including the frisking of passengers
and the inspection of their luggage preparatory to boarding domestic and
international flights. In fact military take-over was specifically announced
on October 20, 1973 by General Jose L. Rancudo, Commanding General of
the Philippine Air Force in a letter to Brig. Gen. Jesus Singson, then
Director of the Civil Aeronautics Administration (Rollo, pp. 71-72) later
confirmed shortly before the hijacking incident of May 21, 1976 by Letter
of Instruction No. 399 issued on April 28, 1976. Otherwise stated, these
events rendered it impossible for PAL to perform its obligations in a
normal manner and obviously it cannot be faulted with negligence in the
performance of duty taken over by the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
the exclusion of the former. There is no dispute that the fourth element
has also been satisfied. Consequently the existence of force majeure has
been established exempting respondent PAL from the payment of damages
to its passengers who suffered death or injuries in their persons and for
loss of their baggages.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
First Instance of South Cotabato, Branch 1, * promulgated on August 26,
1980 dismissing three (3) consolidated cases for damages: Civil Case No.
1701, Civil Case No. 1773 and Civil Case No. 1797 (Rollo, p. 35).
The facts, as found by respondent court, are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Plaintiffs Franklin G. Gacal and his wife, Corazon M. Gacal, Bonifacio S.
Anislag and his wife, Mansueta L. Anislag, and the late Elma de Guzman,
were then passengers boarding defendant’s BAC 111 at Davao Airport for
a flight to Manila, not knowing that on the same flight, Macalinog, Taurac
Pendatum known as Commander Zapata, Nasser Omar, Liling Pusuan
Radia, Dimantong Dimarosing and Mike Randa, all of Marawi City and
members of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), were their co-
passengers, three (3) armed with grenades, two (2) with .45 caliber pistols,
and one with a .22 caliber pistol. Ten (10) minutes after take off at about
2:30 in the afternoon, the hijackers brandishing their respective firearms
announced the hijacking of the aircraft and directed its pilot to fly to
Libya. With the pilot explaining to them especially to its leader,
Commander Zapata, of the inherent fuel limitations of the plane and that
they are not rated for international flights, the hijackers directed the pilot
to fly to Sabah. With the same explanation, they relented and directed the
aircraft to land at Zamboanga Airport, Zamboanga City for refueling. The
aircraft landed at 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of May 21, 1976 at
Zamboanga Airport. When the plane began to taxi at the runway, it was
met by two armored cars of the military with machine guns pointed at the
plane, and it stopped there. The rebels thru its commander demanded that
a DC-aircraft take them to Libya with the President of the defendant
company as hostage and that they be given $375,000 and six (6)
armalites, otherwise they will blow up the plane if their demands will not
be met by the government and Philippine Air Lines. Meanwhile, the
passengers were not served any food nor water and it was only on May 23,
a Sunday, at about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon that they were served 1/4
slice of a sandwich and 1/10 cup of PAL water. After that, relatives of the
hijackers were allowed to board the plane but immediately after they
alighted therefrom, an armored car bumped the stairs. That commenced
the battle between the military and the hijackers which led ultimately to
the liberation of the surviving crew and the passengers, with the final
score of ten (10) passengers and three (3) hijackers dead on the spot and
three (3) hijackers captured.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
"City Fiscal Frank in G. Gacal was unhurt. Mrs. Corazon M. Gacal
suffered injuries in the course of her jumping out of the plane when it was
peppered with bullets by the army and after two (2) hand grenades
exploded inside the plane. She was hospitalized at General Santos Doctors
Hospital, General Santos City, for two (2) days, spending P245.60 for
hospital and medical expenses, Assistant City Fiscal Bonifacio S. Anislag
also escaped unhurt but Mrs. Anislag suffered a fracture at the radial
bone of her left elbow for which she was hospitalized and operated on at
the San Pedro Hospital, Davao City, and therefore, at Davao Regional
Hospital, Davao City, spending P4,500.00. Elma de Guzman died because
of that battle. Hence, the action of damages instituted by the plaintiffs
demanding the following damages, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Civil Case No. 1701 — flights, including the inspection of baggages and cargo and frisking of
15
City Fiscal Franklin G. Gacal and Mrs. Corazon M. Gacal — actual
damages: P245.60 for hospital and medical expenses of Mrs. Gacal;
P8,995.00 for their personal belongings which were lost and not recovered;
P50,000.00 each for moral damages; and P5,000.00 for attorney’s fees,
apart from the prayer for an award of exemplary damages (Record, pp. 4-6,
Civil Case No. 1701).
Civil Case No. 1773 —
x        x        x
Civil Case No. 1797 —
x       x       x"
The trial court, on August 26, 1980, dismissed the complaints finding that
all the damages sustained in the premises were attributed to force
majeure.
On September 12, 1980 the spouses Franklin G. Gacal and Corazon M.
Gacal, plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 1701, filed a notice of appeal with the
lower court on pure questions of law (Rollo, p. 55) and the petition for
review on certiorari was filed with this Court on October 20, 1980 (Rollo, p.
30).
The Court gave due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 147) and both parties
filed their respective briefs but petitioner failed to file reply brief which was
noted by the Court in the resolution dated May 3, 1982 (Rollo, p. 183).
Petitioners alleged that the main cause of the unfortunate incident is the
gross, wanton and inexcusable negligence of respondent Airline personnel
in their failure to frisk the passengers adequately in order to discover
hidden weapons in the bodies of the six (6) hijackers. They claimed that
despite the prevalence of skyjacking, PAL did not use a metal detector
which is the most effective means of discovering potential skyjackers
among the passengers (Rollo, pp. 6-7).. Respondent Airline averred that in
the performance of its obligation to safely transport passengers as far as
human care and foresight can provide, it has exercised the utmost
diligence of a very cautious person with due regard to all circumstances,
but the security checks and measures and surveillance precautions in all
passengers at the Davao Airport were performed and rendered solely by
military personnel who under appropriate authority had assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over the same in all airports in the Philippines.
Similarly, the negotiations with the hijackers were a purely government
matter and a military operation, handled by and subject to the absolute
and exclusive jurisdiction of the military authorities. Hence, it concluded
that the accident that befell RP-C1161 was caused by fortuitous event,
force majeure and other causes beyond the control of the respondent
Airline.
The determinative issue in this case is whether or not hijacking or air
piracy during martial law and under the circumstances obtaining herein,
is a caso fortuito or force majeure which would exempt an aircraft from
payment of damages to its passengers whose lives were put in jeopardy
and whose personal belongings were lost during the incident.
Under the Civil Code, common carriers are required to exercise
extraordinary diligence in their vigilance over the goods and for the safety
of passengers transported by them, according so all the circumstances of
each case (Article 1733). They are presumed at fault or to have acted
negligently whenever a passenger dies or is injured (Philippine Airlines,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 124 SCRA 583 [1983]) or for
the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods in cases other than those
enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 463
[1987]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The source of a common carrier’s legal liability is the contract of carriage,
and by entering into said contract, it binds itself to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. There is breach of
this obligation if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence according to all the
circumstances of the case in exercise of the utmost diligence of a very
cautious person (Isaac v. Ammen Transportation Co., 101 Phil. 1046
[1957]; Juntilla v. Fontanar, 136 SCRA 624 [1985]).
It is the duty of a common carrier to overcome the presumption of
negligence (Philippine National Railways v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 87
[1985]) and it must be shown that the carrier had observed the required
extraordinary diligence of a very cautious person as far as human care
and foresight can provide or that the accident was caused by a fortuitous
event (Estrada v. Consolacion, 71 SCRA 523 [1976]). Thus, as ruled by
16
this Court, no person shall be responsible for those "events which could
not be foreseen or which though foreseen were inevitable." (Article 1174,
Civil Code). The term is synonymous with caso fortuito (Lasam v. Smith,
45 Phil. 657 [1924]) which is of the same sense as "force majeure" (Words
and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 17, p. 362).
In order to constitute a caso fortuito or force majeure that would exempt a
person from liability under Article 1174 of the Civil Code, it is necessary
that the following elements must concur: (a) the cause of the breach of the
obligation must be independent of the human will (the will of the debtor or
the obligor); (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c)
the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the debtor must be free from
any participation in, or aggravation of the injury to the creditor (Lasam v.
Smith, 45 Phil. 657 [1924]; Austria v. Court of Appeals, 39 SCRA 527
[1971]; Estrada v. Consolacion, supra; Vasquez v. Court of Appeals, 138
SCRA 553 [1985]; Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, 144 SCRA
596 [1986]). Caso fortuito or force majeure, by definition, are
extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is, therefore, not
enough that the event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is
commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to avoid.
The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee
the same (Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, 21 SCRA 279
[1967]).
Applying the above guidelines to the case at bar, the failure to transport
petitioners safely from Davao to Manila was due to the skyjacking incident
staged by six (6) passengers of the same plane, all members of the Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF), without any connection with private
respondent, hence, independent of the will of either the PAL or of its
passengers.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Under normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the skyjacking
incident which could have been avoided had there been a more thorough
frisking of passengers and inspection of baggages as authorized by R.A No.
6235. But the incident in question occurred during Martial Law where
there was a military take-over of airport security including the frisking of
passengers and the inspection of their luggage preparatory to boarding
domestic and international flights. In fact military take-over was
specifically announced on October 20, 1973 by General Jose L. Rancudo,
Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force in a letter to Brig. Gen.
Jesus Singson, then Director of the Civil Aeronautics Administration
(Rollo, pp. 71-72) later confirmed shortly before the hijacking incident of
May 21, 1976 by Letter of Instruction No. 399 issued on April 28, 1976
(Rollo, p. 72).
Otherwise stated, these events rendered it impossible for PAL to perform
its obligations in a normal manner and obviously it cannot be faulted with
negligence in the performance of duty taken over by the Armed Forces of
the Philippines to the exclusion of the former.
Finally, there is no dispute that the fourth element has also been satisfied.
Consequently the existence of force majeure has been established
exempting respondent PAL from the payment of damages to its passengers
who suffered death or injuries in their persons and for loss of their
baggages.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit and the decision of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato,
Branch I is hereby AFFIRMED.chanrobles law library
SO ORDERED.
FORTUNE EXPRESS, INC., Petitioners, -versus - COURT OF APPEALS,
PAULIE U.CAORONG, and minor childrenYASSER KING CAORONG, ROSE
HEINNI and PRINCE ALEXANDER, all surnamed CAORONG, and
represented by their mother PAULIE U. CAORONG, Respondents. G.R. No.
119756
To considered as force majeure, it is necessary that (1) the cause of the
breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will; (2) the
event must be either unforeseeable or DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 184 unavoidable; (3) the occurrence must be
render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill the obligation in a normal
manner; and (4) the obligor must be free of participation in, or aggravation
of, the injury to the creditor. FACTS: A bus of Fortune Express Inc. (FEI)
figured in an accident with a jeepney resulting in the death of several
passengers of the jeepney, including two Maranaos. Sgt. Reynaldo Bastasa
of the Philippine Constabulary informed Diosdado Bravo (Bravo),
17
operations manager of FEI that certain Maranaos were planning to take
revenge by burning some of FEI’s buses. Bravo assured him that the
necessary precautions to insure the safety of lives and property would be
taken. Three armed Maranaos who pretended to be passengers, seized a
bus of FEI. The one of the Maranaos started pouring gasoline inside the
bus, as the other held the passenger at bay with a handgun. The
passengers, including Atty. Caorong, stepped out of the bus and went
behind the bushes in a field some distance from the highway. However,
Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve something from the overhead
rack. One of the passengers heard gun shots from inside the bus and saw
that Atty. Caorong was hit. Then the bus was set on fire. Some of the
passengers were able to pull Atty. Caorong out of the burning bus and
rush him to a hospital in Iligan City, but he died while undergoing
operation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of the Maranaos were considered caso
fortuito.
RULING: NO. The Court held that the seizure of the bus of FEI was
foreseeable and, therefore, was not a fortuitous event which would exempt
FEI from liability. The absence of any of the requisites mentioned above
would prevent the obligor from being excused from liability. It was held
that the common carrier was liable for its failure to take the necessary
precautions against an approaching typhoon, of which it was warned,
resulting in the loss of the lives of several passengers. The event was
forseeable, and, thus, the second requisite mentioned above was not
fulfilled. This ruling applies by analogy to the present case. Despite the
report from Sgt. Bastasa that the Maranaos were going to attack its buses,
FEI took no steps to safeguard the lives and properties of its passengers.
Had FEI and its employees been vigilant they would not have failed to see
that the malefactors had a large quantity of gasoline with them. Under the
circumstances, simple precautionary measures to protect the safety of
passengers, such as frisking passengers and inspecting their baggage,
preferably with non-intrusive gadgets such as metal detectors, before
allowing them on board could have been employed without violating the
passenger's constitutional rights. In the case, it is clear that because of
the negligence of petitioner's employees, the seizure of the bus by the
Maranaos was made possible. It is evident that FEI's employees failed to
prevent the attack on one of FEI's buses because they did not exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family. Hence, FEI should be held liable for
the death of Atty. Caorong.
Contributory Negligence committed by Passenger Articles 1761- 1762
PNR vs.Court of Appeals
(G.R. No. L-55347 October 4, 1985)
FACTS:
Winifredo Tupang, husband of respondent Rosario Tupang, boarded 'Train
No. 516 of petitioner at Libmanan, Camarines Sur, as a paying passenger
bound for Manila. Due to some mechanical defect, the train stopped at
Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for repairs, taking some two hours before the
train could resume its trip to Manila. Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam
Bridge at Lucena, Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in
his death. The train did not stop despite the alarm raised by the other
passengers that somebody fell from the train. Instead, the train conductor
Perfecto Abrazado, called the station agent at Candelaria, Quezon, and
requested for verification of the information. Police authorities of Lucena
City were dispatched to the Iyam Bridge where they found the lifeless body
of Winifredo Tupang.
Upon complaint filed by the deceased's widow, Rosario Tupang, the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal, after trial, held the petitioner PNR liable
for damages for breach of contract of carriage and ordered "to pay the
plaintiff the sum of P12,000,00 for the death of Winifredo Tupang, plus
P20,000.00 for loss of his earning capacity and the further sum of
P10,000.00 as moral damages, and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, and
costs.
On appeal, the Appellate Court sustained the holding of the trial court
that the PNR did not exercise the utmost diligence required by law of a
common carrier. It further increased the amount adjudicated by the trial
court by ordering PNR to pay the plaintiff an additional sum of P5,000.00
18
as exemplary damages.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is liable as a common carrier.
HELD:
The appellate court found, the petitioner does not deny, that the train
boarded by the deceased Winifredo Tupang was so over-crowded that he
and many other passengers had no choice but to sit on the open platforms
between the coaches of the train. It is likewise undisputed that the train
did not even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was
under repair at the time, Neither did the train stop, despite the alarm
raised by other passengers that a person had fallen off the train at lyam
Bridge.
The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their
destinations and to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so. Death or
any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption
that it was negligent in the performance of its obligation under the
contract of carriage. Thus, as correctly ruled by the respondent court, the
petitioner failed to overthrow such presumption of negligence with clear
and convincing evidence.
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required
by law, 8 it appears that the deceased was chargeable with contributory
negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the coaches
of the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on the upright
metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the
speeding train. Such contributory negligence, while not exempting the
PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the deletion of the amount
adjudicated as moral damages. By the same token, the award of
exemplary damages must be set aside. Exemplary damages may be
allowed only in cases where the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner. There being no evidence of
fraud, malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner, the grant of exemplary  Dangwa: observed and continued to observe the
damages should be discarded.
extraordinary diligence required in the operation of the co. and the
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby supervision of the employees even as they are not absolute insurers of
modified by eliminating therefrom the amounts of P10,000.00 and the public at large
P5,000.00 adjudicated as moral and exemplary damages, respectively. No  RTC: in favour of Dangwa holding Pedrito as negligent and his
costs.
negligence was the cause of his death but still ordered to pay in equity
P 10,000 to the heirs of Pedrito
Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. V. CA Et Al. (1991)  CA: reversed and ordered to pay Pedrito indemnity, moral
damages, actual and compensatory damages and cost of the suit
G.R. No. 95582  October 7, 1991

Lessons Applicable: Actionable Document (Transportation)

ISSUE: W/N Dangwa should be held liable for the negligence of its driver
Laws Applicable: Art. 1733, Art. 1755
Theodore

FACTS:
HELD: YES. CA affirmed.

 May 13, 1985: Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus

 A public utility once it stops, is in effect making a continuous offer
belonging to Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. (Dangwa)  
to bus riders (EVEN when moving as long as it is still slow in motion)
 The bus was at full stop bet. Bunkhouses 53 and 54 when
 Duty of the driver: do NOT make acts that would have the
Pedro alighted
effect of increasing peril to a passenger while he is attempting to board
 Pedro Cudiamat fell from the platform of the bus
the same
when it suddenly accelerated forward
 Premature acceleration of the bus in this case =
 Pedro was ran over by the rear right tires of
breach of duty
the vehicle
 Stepping and standing on the platform of the bus is already
 Theodore first brought his other passengers and cargo to
considered a passenger and is entitled all the rights and protection
their respective destinations before bringing Pedro to Lepanto Hospital
pertaining to such a contractual relation
where he expired
 Duty extends to boarding and alighting
 Private respondents filed a complaint for damages against Dangwa
 GR: By contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express
for the death of Pedro Cudiamat
obligation to transport the passenger to his destination safely and

19
 observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the
circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by the passenger
is right away attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier
 EX: carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Art. 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code
 Failure to immediately bring Pedrito to the hospital despite his
serious condition = patent and incontrovertible proof of their
negligence
 Hospital was in Bunk 56
 1st proceeded to Bunk 70 to allow a passenger (who later
called the family of Pedrito on his own will) to alight and deliver a
refrigerator
 In tort, actual damages is based on net earnings
PAL vs. CA & Zapatos
G.R. No. L-82619, September 15, 1993
FACTS:
Zapatos filed a complaint for damages for breach of contract of carriage
against PAL. He took a flight from Cebu-Ozamiz. 15 minutes before
landing at Ozamiz, the pilot received a radio message that the airport was
closed due to heavy rains and inclement weather and that he should
proceed to Cotabato City instead. He was not given accommodation to the
flight back to Cebu and the flight the
next day to Ozamiz. His belongings (including camera worth 2k) were still
on board when the plane flew back to Cebu and were no longer recovered.
He received under protest a free ticket to Iligan. PAL did not provide him
with transportation from the airport to the city proper nor food and
accommodation for his stay in Cotabato. The
next day, he purchased a ticket to Iligan, informing PAL he would not use
the free ticket because he was filing a case against it. RTC ordered PAL to
pay. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether PAL is liable.
RULING:
20
PAL did not rebut the evidence alleging its negligence in caring for its
stranded passengers. The contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Being
imbued with public interest, the law requires common carriers to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using
the utmost diligence of every cautious persons, with due regard for all
circumstances. Undisputably, PAL's diversion of its flight due to
inclement weather was a fortuitous event. Nonetheless, such occurrence
did not terminate PAL's contract with its passengers. Being in the
business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL is
deemed equipped to deal with situations as in the case at bar. What we
said in one case once again must be stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier
and passenger continues until the latter has been landed at the port of
destination
and has left the carrier's premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would still have
to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort,
convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached
their final destination. On this score, PAL grossly failed considering
the then ongoing battle between
government forces and Muslim rebels in Cotabato City and the fact that
the private respondent was a stranger to the place. Since part of the
failure to comply with the obligation of common carrier to deliver its
passengers safely to their destination lay in the defendant's failure to
provide comfort and convenience to its stranded passengers using
extraordinary diligence, the cause of nonfulfillment is not solely and
exclusively due to fortuitous event, but due to something which
defendant airline could have prevented,
defendant becomes liable to plaintiff. Admittedly, private respondent's
insistence on being given priority in accommodation was
unreasonable considering the fortuitous event and that there was a
sequence to be observed in the booking, i.e., in the order the passengers
checked in at their port of origin. His intransigence in fact was the main
cause for his having to stay at the airport longer than was necessary.
(moral damages is reduced)