Biological Bases of Prejudice

Author(s): Heiner Flohr

Source: International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique
, Apr., 1987, Vol. 8, No. 2, Main Currents in Biopolitics (Apr., 1987), pp. 183-192
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1600692

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International Political Science Review (1987), Vol. 8, No. 2, 183-192

Biological Bases of Prejudice

HEINER FLOHR

ABSTRACT. Our knowledge of the causes of social prejudice is insufficient;

conventional sociological and psychological approaches should be com-
plemented by a search for biological causes. Evolutionary theory can
explain why there is a need for prejudices. The formation of prejudices is
supported by some characteristics of our cognitive apparatus. Apart from
that, behavioural tendencies such as group orientation and xenophobia, as
well as the biologically rooted rejection of outsiders, contribute to the
formation of prejudices. Prejudices are hard to fight because of their
biological basis, but insight into this element may indicate effective
countermeasures.

In this paper prejudice is broadly defined as a construct based on insufficient

empirical evidence. It includes patterns of perception, interpretation, evaluation and
action which are relatively immune to criticism and change. A prejudice (in this
sense) has a cognitive, an affective, and, under certain conditions, a conative aspect.
Behavioural scientists disagree on the causes of prejudice. Psychologists generally
look for causes located inside the individual, and sociologists focus on social factors. I
prefer to start with the biological factors which might be involved. The known
sociological and psychological approaches will not be replaced by biological
explanations, but they should be complemented by a comprehensive biocultural
understanding (Flohr, 1986).

The Need for Prejudices

All living beings must solve their problems of survival-that is the task to which they
are adapted biologically. This task shapes the entire organism, including
morphology, physiology, perceptual abilities, instincts, and-depending on the level
of development-emotions and intelligence. It is the function of this equipment to
enable the individual or the species to behave in its environment in a biologically
successful way. To cope with their "problems," animals receive guidance from:

(a) genetic programming;

(b) innate maturation programmes in combination with environmental stimuli (e.g.
imprinting);
(c) imitation of their conspecifics; and,
(d) their own primary experience.

This system of behavioural guidance is a balanced combination of elements fixed by

0192-5121/87/02 0183-10 $03.00 ( 1987 International Political Science Association

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184 Biological Bases of Prejudice

genetic programming and elements that vary according to learning experiences.

Human beings have the same instruments of behavioural guidance at their
disposal. However, the roles of genetic programming and maturation (acquired
learning programmes plus external stimuli) are greatly reduced in comparison with
socialization by conspecifics and relatively open personal learning. This considerable
change in the relative weights of different behavioural components leads to
behavioural elasticity unrivalled in the animal kingdom.
Socialization by conspecifics and personal learning assume dominant positions as a
consequence of the evolution of consciousness, of the ability to communicate
symbolically, and, finally, of a highly developed ability to think, which results from
the combination of the first two factors. While the behavioural guidance systems of
animals are sufficient to solve the problems encountered in animal life (with the
possibilities of individual and collective failure always present), human beings must
cope with the vast array of problems resulting from the productivity of our own
consciousness. We do so by using a guidance system which relies substantially on
help from conspecifics and on our own intelligence, and only to a small degree on
genetically coded instructions. Problems range from physical survival, in a narrow
sense, to appropriate behaviour in interactions with conspecifics, and to social,
political, ideological, and religious issues.
Presumably, individuals should solve these problems on the basis of their own
experience. But our experience is extremely limited in relation to many of the
problems requiring solution. Such problems as religious issues cannot be solved for
reasons of principle, while others cannot be solved for quantitative reasons since the
opportunities for gaining experience are spatially and temporally limited.
This gap between personal experience and the problems to be solved also occurs in
other animals. That is why all animals have to rely, to some degree, on extrapolations
based on their experiences, i.e. they have to make inferential judgements whenever
they cannot rely on genetically controlled behavioural instructions. Using inferential
judgements, an animal will develop behaviours which may occasionally turn out to be
wrong, but which may compensate for this disadvantage by increased security and
efficiency.
Prejudgements play an enormous role in the behaviour of all living systems (Riedl,
1980). For cognitive processes in living beings, the requirement of prejudgements is
more or less trivial. A perfect net of prejudgements is the result of everything that is
biologically learned. Of course, all those conclusions are extrapolations and therefore
not conclusive. But nature does not bother about the logical objections to induction.
The algorithm of living systems is not founded on the apparent contradictions of our
inductive logic, but on probability. To be able to perceive and evaluate, we have
innate prejudgements at our disposal, a whole system of phylogenetically acquired
orientations, which Egon Brunswik (1955) has called "ratiomorphic apparatus."
This apparatus induces us to make judgements which are usually correct with regard
to practical problems. In some ways, however, this apparatus is uncritical and
misleads us by suggesting wrong conclusions. We must assume that the mistakes
produced by this system are too unimportant to prevent the evolution of a more
sophisticated system which would avoid at least some of these mistakes without a
decrease in the overall level of reliability and "robustness." Prejudgements are a
precondition for existence. As long as they are more likely to lead to correct
judgements than a random search they protect the conditions of survival and are
functional (Riedl, 1980: 70).

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 HEINER FLOHR 185

There is every indication that this generalization also applies to human beings. As
long as our primary experience is insufficient, we have to rely on prejudgements,
including prejudgements about other people. That being so, one might have
predicted that social prejudices would be as widespread as, in fact, they are.

Properties of Our Cognitive Apparatus Favouring Prejudices

As the cognitive aspect of prejudices consists of opinions based on insufficient
empirical evidence, the formation of prejudices is favoured by all those tendencies
which lead to insufficiently informed judgements. Evolutionary theory suggests that
such tendencies exist but one can go beyond speculation and cite concrete examples.
The more complex the organism, the more information it can and must process and
still behave in a biologically meaningful way. This requirement is most fully present
in human beings. From a biological perspective, one would expect that man has
evolved mechanisms to reduce uncertainty. Since the human cognitive apparatus has
great impact as a behavioural guidance system, it seems reasonable to expect
mechanisms to reduce cognitive uncertainty.
Turning to cognitive psychology we find that this expectation is fully supported by
empirical evidence. Cognitive psychology tells us how information processing works
to effect an adequate reduction of uncertainty. The importance of this task is
demonstrated most impressively in cases in which reduction is unsuccessful.
Insufficient reduction of uncertainty leads in humans and in animals to what M. E. P.
Seligman (1975) has called "learned helplessness." Seligman's research points to the
great importance of information that reduces uncertainty. If such information is not
available, humans employ strategies to create it and the illusion of control (Kalma,
1983). This reaction helps explain the strong desire to defend self-pleasing opinions
against contradictory information. This is particularly true with regard to opinions
that are part of an integrated belief system, when opinions count not only for
themselves, but simultaneously support other elements of the belief system; for
example, beliefs concerning the nature and the quality of the social structure of a
society.
Prejudices are particularly resistant to change when they are integral parts of a
"culture pattern." Within such a culture pattern, social prejudices can perform
important functions related to the collective self-image of the group by indicating who
(individuals or groups) belongs to a particular culture and who does not, thus
reinforcing integration and selection processes. How much and, if necessary, how
ingeniously we protect ourselves against any disruption of important opinions has
been demonstrated by the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1968).
Psychology shows and biology explains how strong our desire is for reduction of
uncertainty through information (if necessary, false) as opposed to the values of
factual accuracy and scientific objectivity, even though these may be accepted as
abstract goals.
Approaches other than the theory of cognitive dissonance show how we deal with
information to achieve a reduction of uncertainty which may be objectively incorrect
but subjectively satisfying. The psychology of perception shows that our emotional
wishes and cognitive commitments have a considerable impact on the selection of
information. The processing of the perceived information is not an objective,
"interest-free" registration. It is influenced at each important juncture by existing
emotional and cognitive commitments.

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186 Biological Bases of Prejudice

Additional illustrations are seen in some findings of cognitive psychology which

demonstrate how people strive for a reduction of uncertainty in a subjectively
satisfying way. For instance, we tend to extrapolate linearly when we estimate future
trends (Wagenaar and Sagaria, 1975). Although our present problems in connection
with resource scarcity, population growth, and the deterioration of the environment
show that many trends develop exponentially, we find this characteristic hard to
grasp.
We tend to overestimate the relative weight of familiar or immediate information
(availability heuristics) and to think mono-causally in terms of linear cause-effect
relationships instead of causal systems involving feedback relationships (Ddrner et
al., 1983); we frequently overestimate situations when accounting for our own
behaviour, and personal properties in observations of other people. Our way of
thinking has evolved as a response to practical problems of living, not as an optimal
technique for finding the truth. Therefore, we tend to think more in terms of
categories or classes than in terms of individuals. Using these generalizations we form
schemata which are extremely useful, but at the same time lead to stereotypes. As J.
R. Anderson (1980) has remarked, stereotyping reflects the dark side of schema
abstraction.
This process culminates in a tendency to dichotomize phenomena. We classify
objects within the nervous system-often beginning with our sensory perception-
according to some kind of either-or rule, distinguishing, for example, between known
and unknown, interesting and uninteresting; then between positively interesting and
negatively interesting. In the negatively interesting class, we may distinguish between
agonal behaviours, attack or flight, etc. Cultural anthropologists and ethnologists
have collected hundreds of examples related to this tendency, clearly seen in
mythologies in which dichotomies play an important role (good-evil, male-female,
etc.). In politics this tendency leads to thinking in radically opposite terms, like
friend-versus-foe ("whoever is not for us, is against us") if strong political
engagement is not balanced by an equally strong readiness to differentiate fairly.
Konrad Lorenz (1973) regards the formation of opposite terms, the juxtaposition of
alpha and non-alpha, as innate; Levi-Strauss (1962) assumes that the human mind
has a natural tendency to make such distinctions.
Thinking in binary terms leads to an overaccentuation of properties and thus to
distinctions between individuals and between groups. Prejudices thrive on
polarization, on the maximization of differences between categories. This shows up in
the widespread tendency to classify individuals, political parties and whole political
systems according to a left-right schema, or a progressive-conservative schema, or a
democratic-undemocratic (totalitarian) schema.
These biases are products of attempts to subjectively satisfy the need for a
reduction of uncertainty; we seek it, even at the price of losing objective information
and opinion. Cognitive heuristics have a considerable impact on the development and
persistence of prejudices. Availability heuristics contribute to the formation of
stereotypes, and representative heuristics lead to rash extrapolations from properties
of single individuals to characteristics of whole groups. Confirmation bias encourages
those stereotypes to persist.
I have mentioned some of the cognitive processes employed in the formation of
attitudes. Mechanisms of perception, representation and memory, among others, are
also relevant, and one could demonstrate that all of them contribute in specific ways
to the development of prejudices.

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 HEINER FLOHR 187

Group Orientation

Individuals can acquire stereotypes in two ways which are closely connected and
mutually supportive: (a) they can form their own opinions with the help of those
biasing mechanisms described above; and, (b) they can uncritically adopt opinions
common within their social environment. This section examines the second
possibility.
Individuals are known to uncritically adopt opinions common within their social
environment. They are prompted to do so by their group orientation, their desire to
be respected by the group (or several groups) to which they belong. Such respect is
won by adopting beliefs that prevail within the group. The strong group orientation of
humans as a social species has biological roots.
Since time immemorial, humans have been obliged to rely on support from the
group, on being accepted by the group. As a matter of survival, we had to adapt to the
group and adopt its modes of behaviour and its value orientations. Today we still
tend to define our personal identity by our membership of groups and by their value
orientations. Membership gives us a pleasant and secure feeling and makes it easier to
fend off both criticism and self-criticism. High respect for one's own group fosters a
sense of superiority to other groups. We attribute better characteristics to our own
group than it really deserves, while other groups get lower grades than they deserve.
Unfortunately, it seems to be true that a sense of superiority serves our own sense of
well-being. This observation favours the assumption that we form many strong
negative prejudices against other groups and, from experience, we know this
assumption is correct. A tendency to form prejudices can thus be derived from our
striving for group identity, the experience of which is pleasurable, the content of
which continues to be culturally defined, but the basis of which is biological. It is
indeed essential to our survival that we belong to a group that accepts us, takes care of
us and protects us.
Group orientation influences behaviour, affect, and cognition, i.e. all three
dimensions in which prejudices can be found. Group processes that strengthen
contacts between group members lead to prejudices and are, in themselves, supported
by prejudices. Because prejudices contribute to supporting exchange, they fulfil an
adaptive function. We love our prejudices, because they provide us with both
cognitive and social stability (Bergler, 1976). Once acquired, prejudices are stabilized
not only by selective perception, but because the behaviour of those who are
discriminated against is changed by discrimination in a way that seems to justify our
stereotypes and feelings.

Xenophobia and the Rejection of Strangers

Group orientation provides several other indicators pointing to a biological basis of
prejudices. One of them is the universal existence of xenophobia. Particular
manifestations and frequency of xenophobia are well known (Holloway, 1974). It is
also well known that, in conjunction with pseudo-speciation (Erikson, 1985),
xenophobia leads to high aggressiveness and may lead to war due to the weakening of
mechanisms for appeasement and inhibitions against killing.
A biological basis for xenophobia seems plausible in light of the apparently innate
fear of strangers that can be observed in little children (Sroufe, 1977). Infants turn
away from strangers, avoid eye contact with them and start to cry when they are

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 188 Biological Bases of Prejudice

touched by them. This rejection of strangers genera

eight months and decreases gradually after that. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1984), who has
observed the rejection of strangers in many different cultures and also in children who
were born deaf and blind, regards it as innate behaviour.
If there is (as the sociobiologists claim) less aggressiveness within a group than
between groups because of the relatively close genetic relationship between the
members of the group, then the rejection of individuals not belonging to the group can
be understood as an exclusion from the benefits of social cooperation available within
it. In highly social animals, social cooperation is a particularly scarce good, and it is
therefore understandable that aggressive competition for membership in groups is
combined with discrimination against strangers. Since humans are highly social
beings, we can assume that a disposition to behave aggressively towards strangers is
part of the basic inventory of evolutionarily selected propensities in man. This
disposition can be activated and amplified by the appropriate environmental
experience-"education" (Markl, 1982). Furthermore, the definition of group
membership can be manipulated culturally, because the biological basis concerns the
tendency towards prejudices to a much larger extent than the specific content of
prejudices.
The in-group-out-group distinction seems to fulfil adaptive functions. The
propensity to distinguish between in-groups and out-groups, and to reject the
out-group, is an evolutionary remnant that man has in common with other primates,
one that might be traced back to more primitive territoriality. This propensity is an
overarching frame of reference into which the more specific learned elements of
stereotypes can be built.

Discrimination against Nonconformists

The propensity to discriminate against nonconformists should be distinguished from
the disposition towards xenophobia. The former is not directed against strangers, but
against members of one's own group, those who deviate markedly in appearance and
behaviour from the group "norm." Not all social species practise rejection of
nonconformists, and some non-human primates even tolerate, under certain
conditions, behaviour that is markedly deviant. But many animal species show a
behaviour that is analogous to prejudice (Neumann, 1981).
Ethnology provides a wealth of examples of rejection of individuals with physical
and psychological abnormalities. On the other hand there are many cultures that are
characterized by tolerance and even helpfulness towards nonconformists. This can be
regarded as an expression of morality, but perhaps these cultural norms are
supported by the fact that the biological disposition towards aggression against
nonconformists is weaker in primates, as some studies seem to indicate (Berkson,
1977; Fedigan and Fedigan, 1977). However that may be, even if Homo sapiens
should have an innate disposition towards tolerance or even helpfulness with regard
to some nonconformists (namely those who are helpless and therefore harmless), this
would not rule out an innate disposition to reject nonconformists under different
circumstances.
The strong discrimination of humans against many kinds of nonconformists, which
seems to be universal, need not necessarily be the product of an innate behavioural
tendency, despite its similarity with the behaviour of many animals. But plausible
"cultural" explanations are lacking.

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 HEINER FLOHR 189

The biological tendency to reject nonconformists is sometimes extended by cultural

means; in this way prejudices contribute to the formation of cultural identity. To
reject something that is different simply because it is not normal spares one the
trouble of dealing with the substance of alternative positions and thus serves as a
mechanism that reduces complexity. Stereotypes make it easier to reject someone
effectively, by providing a reason for one's behaviour, however wrong this reason may
be from an objective point of view.
One could also hypothesize, following Lopreato (1984), that the rejection of
nonconformists is founded on a biologically based need for conformity. According to
Lopreato, this tendency serves to support the social structure by maintaining
reciprocal behaviour filtered through the working of the dominance hierarchy; and,
further, the evolution of this tendency is likely to be correlated with the evolution of
reciprocity and the disposition towards dominance and submissiveness which are
both fundamental elements of group living.
It may be, as Pierre van den Berghe put it in a personal communication (October
1984), that this tendency and those I 'mentioned earlier are biologically useful
dispositions to trust the familiar and to distrust the unfamiliar.

Prejudices and Stereotypes

We next need to look at the relationship between prejudices and stereotypes as the
cognitive aspect of prejudices. Stereotypes exaggerate the differences between groups
("dichotomization") and underestimate the differences within groups ("generaliza-
tion"). They can result from erroneous attribution or from simplified judgement.
Perceptions are involved in the discriminatory behaviour found in animals but,
compared to humans, cognitions are not involved in the same way. Even if humans
have an innate tendency to reject nonconformists, it involves the affective and the
conative aspects, i.e. people develop feelings of rejection and behave correspondingly.
It is not logically essential for cognitions to be involved. Stereotypes do not
necessarily lead to "corresponding" affects and discriminations and, vice versa,
discriminatory behaviour need not be based on a corresponding stereotype. In fact,
the rejection of nonconformists often involves a bad conscience indicating that no
acceptable justification is available. But equally often, probably more often, a
justification is attached to affective rejection and discrimination-particularly in
cases of intensive discrimination-and the reasons invoked consist of stereotypes. In
a way, these justifications are provided post hoc; they illustrate how a successful
attempt to discredit a stereotype frequently leads to the formation of new ones, which
then serve to justify affects and discrimination. Stereotypes seem intended to support
dispositions to act effectively and discriminatorily with regard to nonconformists, but
the ease with which even absurd stereotypes are formed points towards an innate
tendency to think in stereotypes. As far as this is true, human prejudices can be
accounted for by three different, but complementary tendencies: the cognitive, the
affective, and the conative.

Prejudices and Behaviour

The interest of sociologists and political scientists in prejudices focuses on

discrimination, i.e. on the behavioural aspect of prejudices. For my purposes,
discrimination is of interest only insofar as it is related to attitudes. It is well known

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190 Biological Bases of Prejudice

that other factors, such as the physical environment and characteristics of the society
in question, influence overt behaviour. Biological factors are probably also involved
in the way aspects of the social and natural environment influence behaviour, but that
is a separate issue.
This article has not presented a detailed account of the relations between the
cognitive and the affective dimension on the one hand, and the behavioural
dimension on the other; therefore, I restrict myself to a few comments.
Social behaviour results from a combination of mental, social, and situational
factors. Genetic factors have, among others, an impact on stereotypes through innate
information processing (with all its biases) discussed earlier. As far as stereotypes
foster affects and discrimination, genetic factors also have an indirect influence on
these dimensions of prejudiced behaviour. It seems likely, too, that there is a direct
influence on affect and discrimination initially independent of stereotypes.
Conscience and the social need to justify behaviour induce a reliance on stereotypes.
This works in two directions: tendencies towards specific affects and discrimination
influence the formation and the content of "appropriate" (in the sense of searching for
justification) stereotypes; and, the content of stereotypes has a constraining impact on
both affects and discrimination (and, by the way, on perception).
Those who do not like other persons or groups and who seek to avoid contacts with
them need not link their own behaviour to any cognitions of these people. This is
typical for the first of two possibilities, i.e. that affects and possibly discrimination are
not related to stereotypes. But the more a human group or society tries to stabilize its
collective identity by discourse or communication on how its members ought to
behave, the more its members feel the need to justify their thinking, feeling, and
behaviour, including affects and discrimination, to themselves and others. Obliged to
justify our behaviour, we need arguments to support our affective rejection and
discrimination. These arguments must be socially acceptable, i.e. they must
correspond to the prevailing expectations of the group. Since one's interest in having
an opinion is the result of this socially imposed need for justification rather than a
desire to critically form an opinion of one's own, it seems even more likely that the
opinions offered by the group will be adopted.
What a group collectively thinks about another group, however, emerges with the
object of maximum differentiation, so that the opinions held by a group are, in
general, stereotypes. By adopting these stereotypes we meet the expectations of the
group (with the related benefit of being accepted) and avoid the costs of trying to form
our own beliefs based on empirical evidence. Even if opinions about social groups are
not adopted but formed by the individual, they are likely to be biased because of the
peculiarities of our information processing, and thus they are very often stereotyped.
The tendency to form stereotypes may not be created by our desire to follow group
opinions, but it is reinforced considerably by that desire.

How Can This Perspective Be Extended?

What cognitive psychology can only describe, psychophysiology may explain.

Whoever intends to understand physiological structures and processes must take
their phylogenetic development into account and seek explanations derived from
evolutionary theory.
The problem of prejudice can be studied in several contexts. Political science can
try to find the extent and consequences of political prejudice; sociologists can do the

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 HEINER FLOHR 191

same for social prejudice. Psychology can demonstrate the different ways in which
stereotypes are formed, the influence of emotions on stereotypes, and the feedback
between the two. It is the task of psychobiology to explain these relationships in
physiological terms, and of evolutionary theory to throw light on the ultimate causes
of those structures and processes.
Researchers specialize of necessity and, therefore, deal with specific contexts. But a
political scientist trying to reach a deeper understanding of prejudice-a
phenomenon that is politically of great importance-should become acquainted with
the connections between concrete prejudices and the other, structural levels of this
problem discussed above.
My reflections on this topic are explicitly one-sided because I concentrate on
biological factors and try to complement the conventional view held by social
scientists. A full understanding of human prejudice requires a comprehensive theory
which would treat prejudice as an integral part of an interdependent system of
orientation and behaviour whose individual elements are complicated mixtures of
cultural and biological factors.

Disposition towards Prejudices and Political Responsibility

Social scientists often express reservations about biosocial analyses and argue that
reference to biological factors aims at reducing the burden of responsibility for
individual behaviour. But the examination of biological factors that shape human
behaviour is not an attempt to deny responsibility for political behaviour. One has to
distinguish between "is" (biologically given) and "ought" (morally appropriate);
consequently it is not permissible to use biology as an apology for misbehaviour or an
exoneration for committed crimes. To do so would be scientifically untenable and
morally unacceptable (Flohr and T6nnesmann, 1983).
Specific prejudices or particularly evil behaviour cannot be fully explained
biologically. However, biological factors are involved, and it is necessary to know
these factors to fight dangerous prejudices as efficiently as possible. If we want to
teach humanity and tolerance successfully, we need full knowledge of the difficulties
that might impede this teaching. Without becoming fatalistic, we should realize how
difficult it is to reduce social prejudice. Insight into its biological basis can lead to
greater realism, and should thus help us to avoid inappropriate attempts to reduce
prejudice and to look for better ways to diminish and eliminate it.

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Biographical Note

HEINER FLOHR is Professor of Political Science at the University of Dusseldorf

(Institute for the Social Sciences), West Germany. His main fields of research are
political philosophy, comparative government and behavioural anthropology.
ADDRESS: Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut, Politikwissenschaft, Universitdt Diissel-
dorf, Universitaitsstrasse 1, D-4000 Dusseldorf, Federal Republic of Germany.

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