You are on page 1of 12

Lesson

Meaning of Intersubjectivity
1
Lesson I: Defining Intersubjectivity: Gabriel Marcel

We all live in the world surrounded by different people with different


background and personality. Relating with others and settling our differences is not
always an easy task but it’s a task that we have to embrace since we all desire to live
peacefully in a world that we shared with them no matter how different they are to us.
Since we, also, benefit from living with others, like security and companionship, we
tried to establish harmonious relationship with them. Some could say that
relationship is a blessing but, perhaps, this is not true for others who find it more
of a curse. Some relationship last longer and touches more lives, while other
relationships ended even before the relation takes root. Trust or suspicion, authentic
communication or lies and dishonesty, unconditional love or self-interest are just some
of the possible causes of strengthening or breaking human relationship. How could we
achieve and maintain good and fulfilling relationship with others who are different
from us? This will be the thrust of this chapter.
In its most general sense of that which occurs between or exists among
conscious human actors, INTERSUBJECTIVITY is a little more than synonyms for THE
SOCIAL. It denotes a set of relations, meanings, structures, practices, experiences, or
phenomena evident in human life.
In another sense, INTERSUBJECTIVITY is the sharing of experiential content
(feelings, perceptions, thoughts, and linguistic meanings) among a plurality of subjects.
INTERSUBJECTIVITY, refers to the condition of man, a subject, among other
men, who are also a subjects. We cannot speak of man without implying and drawing
from his situatedness within the world, and this situatedness always involves other
subjects such as himself is.

Man is a being with others.

Intersubjectivity, a term originally coined by the philosopher Edmund Husserl


(1859–1938), is most simply stated as the interchange of thoughts and feelings, both
conscious and unconscious, between two persons or “subjects,” as facilitated by
empathy. To understand intersubjectivity, it is necessary first to define the term
subjectivity – i.e., the perception or experience of reality from within one’s own
perspective (both conscious and unconscious) and necessarily limited by the
boundary or horizon of one’s own worldview. The term intersubjectivity
has several usages in the social sciences (such as cognitive agreement between
individuals or groups or, on the contrary, relating simultaneously to others out of
two diverging subjective perspectives, as in the acts of lying or presenting oneself
somewhat differently in different social situations); however, its deepest and most
complex usage is related to the postmodern philosophical concept of constructivism.
Intersubjectivity is “the realm of existence to which the preposition with properly
applies” (Marcel, 1950: 180). There are instances in which we use the preposition with –
it doesn’t simply mean being together through aggregation like the way passengers in
a jeepney are together, let’s say, on a rainy day, where they all cramp together, each
one scrambling for space to sit on. Their bodies may be touching, bumping, impinging on
one another’s flesh, yet we do not say that the passengers are with each other. They may
be facing each other, in the same way that family members on a dinner are faced
toward each other, but the presence of one passenger with another passenger is not a
co-presence.
To be with the other is to open myself to being of the other, which is a mystery.
As we have shown in our discussion of embodied spirit, we have distinguished the
treatment of a human person as “problem” from that of a “mystery”. Being a mystery,
the human being is removed from the category of things, or of “having”. Something “I
have” is an instrument that one can possess, use, and discard after use. That is why any
treatment of the person as a mere tool can be manipulated, any treatment of a
person as a beast, leads to a cry for justice; for it does violence to the dignity and
essence of a human person. To mutually respect each other as subjects, that is
intersubjectivity.
The word “living” is a general term that covers plant, animal and human life.
The medical sciences have a specific definition of life – “the state of existence characterized
by such functions as metabolism, growth, reproduction, adaptation, and response to
stimuli” (Medilexicon, 2016). If we closely look at this definition, we would note that
it refers not only to human life but to animal life in general.

Marcel, however, argues that there is more to human life other than the vital
signs we share with animals in general. This is evident in some people who
experience the loss for the drive to live. For Marcel, there is a seeming contradiction
here because we use two different senses of the word “living”. One refers to a scientific
definition, another points to a more specific form of living which Marcels singles out
as “human living.” “Human living” is “living of something other than itself” (Marcel:
171). The center of human life is outside of itself. This is captures in one of the
teachings of Jesus Christ, said “Whoever finds his life will lose it, and whoever loses
his life for my sake will find it” (Matthew 10:39)
This is Marcels’ intuition about human life. He tests this by imagining the
life of slaves who get enraged by their situation. When slaves are reduced into
mere objects or instruments and are not given due respect as person, there is a voice
deep down that nags them, “There must be more to my life than bearing this yoke
imposed unjustly upon me.” The cruel master might say in reply, “What is there to
complain about? I give you enough money to feed yourself. For that you are alive.
Why not be contented?” What the cruel master fails to see is that human life is not just
about catering to one’s biological sustenance. Human life has to have meaning.
For Marcel, we find that meaning outside of ourselves – in the other. The French
word for meaning, sens, literally means direction. Hence, the argument here is that
life is human as it is propelled or directed towards something other than itself. A life
that is only concerned about its biological sustenance is focused only on oneself.
People who live in fear that their properties might be taken away from them isolate
themselves by putting up high walls both literally and figuratively. When the focus is
on one’s survival and the preservation of the means for that survival, human life
becomes stale like a puddle of water that only receives and never flows onto other
channels. This makes us no different than the prey whose only concern is to survive
from his predator’s attack. It makes us no different from animals.
By contrast, people who live for others, ironically, are those who feel more fulfilled.
We learn about saints, martyrs and heroes who gave their lives for others, and we
wonder where they draw their strength and superabundant love. For Marcel, these are
the people who embraced the reality of human living. They live for others because it
is who they are; it is what human living is. To be, to exist in human way, is to be
with. Intersubjectivity is thus a state in which one recognizes one’s being as a being-
with-others. It is not human life if it is centered on itself. It becomes human, that is, it
is humanized, as soon as one de-centers oneself from himself, which is when the center
of one’s life is on the care for the welfare of another.

Instersubjectivity is a relationship that is supported by genuine communication


founded on mutual respect for each other as subjects, and on co- presence – the openness
of one’s presence to the presence of the other.

To be, to exist in a human way, is to be with. Intersubjectivity is thus a state


in which I recognize my being as a being-with-others. My life is not human if it is
centered on itself. Life becomes human, that is, it is humanized, as soon as I de-center
myself from myself, when the center of my life is on the welfare of another. “Human
living” is “living of something other than itself”.
Lesson An Intersubjectivity Relationship
2 Across Differences

We are all unique individuals. Most of the time, we look at our differences and
may have labels towards one another. Though we are part of our society, we are still
different individuals living in this society. Each of us will have different appearances
or points of view.

The Phenomenology of Intersubjective Relationship

Jurgen Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action

Mutual understanding is an important telos of any conversation be it a simple


dialogue or an argumentation. Thoughts are refined, relationship is deepened, trust in
others and confidence in oneself are built through communication. When people
converse bridges are constructed, strangers become friends, and individuals turn into
a society of people. Life-experiences, however, proves that this is not always the case.
In fact, it is common to see individuals with different backgrounds such as way of
thinking, believing, and behaving could easily come into conflict when they
communicate. To avoid arriving at that point, Jurgen Habermas introduce a path
leading to mutual understanding through his theory of communication.

Jü rgen Habermas, a known German sociologist and philosopher in the tradition


of critical theory of the second half of the 20th century, is perhaps best recognized for his
theory on communicative rationality. In “What is Universal Pragmatics?” found in his book
Communication and the Evolution of Society, he identifies and reconstruct “universal
conditions of possible understanding [Verstä ndigung]”(Habermas, 1979, p. 1). He, first,
introduces various forms of action that human beings use like conflict, competition,
strategic action that facilitate understanding but he singled out “speech actions” for he
believes that speech acts (dialogue) were predominant means by which understanding
is achieved. He formulated four tests, or validity claims on
comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness, and rightness that must occur in conversation
to achieve mutual understanding. Anyone, according to him, who engaged themselves in a
speech act/dialogue has to fulfill the following: first, both speaker and hearer must use
comprehensible expressions in which they both understand; second, the speaker should use
a true proposition so that the hearer can share in the speaker’s knowledge; third, the
speaker must be truthful in his intention in order to elicit trust from the hearer; and,
fourth, both speaker and hearer must agree on the right utterance with respect to
a recognized normative background (Ibid., pp. 2-3). The first universal validity
claim of Habermas
on comprehensibility pertains to the use of ordinary language. If the meaning of a word
or statement is defined by the ordinary language in which both speaker and hearer are
familiar with then, for sure, understanding will be achieved, especially, if the ordinary
language is the native language of both speaker and hearer. This means to say, that
for Habermas, the use of common language in which two individuals in a dialogue are
familiar with is an important instrument towards understanding. The second universal
validity claim of Habermas on truth refers to how true the uttered statement in reference
to objective facts. If customer asks a waiter for a glass of water, the request will surely
be understood and it will be granted. But if a customer asks for a “Kryptonite Salad”
in which the restaurant doesn’t actually serve and the waiter is not familiar with, the
request will surely be rejected for confusion and misunderstanding between the customer
and waiter will surely take over. The third validity claim of Habermas on truthfulness
pertains to the genuine intention of the speaker which is essential for the hearer’s
gaining trust. Sincerity in relationship is an important aspect in achieving mutual
understanding and it is assessed by considering the congruence of the expressed meaning
and the speaker’s agenda. Whenever other’s give advice, we appreciate them when
they clearly showed their care through consistency in their words and actions; while, we
are repulsed by those whose actions contradict their words. Hence, it is also important
that we have a genuine intention while conversing with others in order that we gain
their trust. For trust breaks down barriers of suspicions but nurtures and deepens
relationship. Sometimes, familiarity with each other is helpful in determining the
truthfulness of intention. And so when the request for “Kryptonite Salad” is made and
the waiter is familiar with the customer, as their regular visitor, then the request
could be received as a joke and in which case, usually, gives smile to the waiter or
opens for a casual conversation between the two. If the customer is a stranger and,
worst, the request is given with a serious face, the waiter, for sure, feels discomfort,
confusion, and, perhaps, even threaten by the customer’s behavior. These feelings
become now a hindrance for understanding and the beginning of rejection. And lastly,
the validity of claim of Habermas on rightness pertains to the acceptable tone and pitch of
voice and expressions. Filipinos, generally, are intimidated, irritated, and even threaten
when someone talk with a high pitch or a loud voice as in a shouting manner. While
low and gentle voice make us calm and relax and, in certain situation, make us
recognize the sincere words of the others. Perhaps, this is something we acquire in
our family that whenever we make mistake our parents, sometimes, have a loud, “angry
voice” which frightened us but when they are calm we find their words assuring and
comforting. Hence, the manner of utterance or way of speaking use in conversation could
either be a hindrance or means for genuine understanding.

Comprehensibility, truth, truthfulness, and rightness, for Habermas, are


significant factors for authentic dialogue to occur leading to better relationship.
Habermas believes that when actors do not violate any of the validity claims in their
speech acts, it would result in intersubjective “reciprocal understanding, shared
knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another” (Ibid., p. 3). The byproduct of
such communication is thus a transformation in the relationship of the two
individuals engaged in a dialogue. Hence, for Habermas it is never the goal of
communicative action to force or influence the other’s decision but to reach a mutually
satisfying agreement or understanding through the use of dialogue and
communication skills (Baynes 1998, 195; Rasmussen, 1990, p. 27).

Habermas theory of communication reminds us on the importance of authentic


communication in the cessation of conflicts, avoidance of misunderstanding, and
establishment of intersubjective relationship. Living with others having different
characters, conviction, and thinking, it’s common for conflicts to arise at any moment
and hinders good relationship with others. Yet, this could be avoided when individuals
are aware of how the use of language, the manner of speaking, the truthfulness of the
words, and the sincerity of the intention are all affecting their understanding of the
others and vice versa. It’s not enough that one is aware, he/she must also do
something about it in order to build relationship. It’s never, for Habermas, the aim of
dialogue to build fences through uninformed judgement but rather mutual
understanding and respect for others who are different from us. It would be hard for
us to understand the others or to recognize those people with disabilities, the
underprivileged, and the LGBT group unless we sit down and talk to them with an
open ears and compassionate heart. It is through sincere dialogue that we grow
together with others as an authentic person in such a way that a long-standing
stereotyping image is dissolved; “fences” of mistrust and suspicion is overcome;
mutual understanding is achieved; people who are previously at odds with one
another become friends or allies; and new perspectives/insights are gained resulting
to a stronger bond of relationship. In our current time when most individuals and
groups tried to separate themselves from the others through their profession, status,
race, ethnicity, and even political affiliation by developing their own vocabularies,
values, and convictions, there is more reason for Habermas’ validity claim to occur.
Sincere dialogue builds bridges by encouraging individuals’ collaborations in the
creation of a common shared world where everyone could live in harmony and unity
while maintaining their diversity.

However, though Habermas is indeed correct in saying that communication is important


in building intersubjective relationship, it’s still not enough unless we also realize how
indispensable the presence of “other” in our life. Martin Buber’s I- Thou Relationship, in
the next section, will elucidate us on how intersubjective relationship is a necessary
condition for authentic living.

Martin Buber’s I-Thou Relationship


The onset of industrialization and the growth of large urban cities, for Martin Buber,
has dehumanized the modern man by converting him from subjects into objects
through the instrumentality of the machine as “machines which were invented in
order to serve men in their work were no longer, like tools, an extension of man’s arm
but man became that extension doing the bidding of the machines”(See Curtis &
Boultwood, 1975). The way man treats the machine as an object becomes also his way of
treating the other human person. To radically break from these prevailing attitudes in
order to establish an ethical principle on human relationship anchored on the dignity of
the human person, Buber introduces his I- Thou philosophical theory.

Martin Buber (1878–1965), a Jewish philosopher, became famous through his 1923
philosophical writings entitled I and Thou (Ich und Du). The major theme of the book
is that authentic human existence manifests in genuine dialogue with each other, with
the world, and even with God. The book explored the psychology of individual man in
two distinct relationships, namely, the ‘I-It’ and the ‘I- Thou’ (Buber, 1958, p. 3).

The first mode, which Buber calls “experience” (the mode of ‘I–it’), is the mode that
modern man almost exclusively uses. Through experience, man collects data of the
world, analyses, classifies, and theorizes about them. This means that, in terms of
experiencing, no real relationship occurs for the “I” is acting more as an observer while
its object, the “it” is more of a receiver of the I’s interpretation. The “it” is
viewed as a thing to be utilized, a thing to be known, or put for some purpose. Thus,
there is a distance between the experiencing “I” and the experienced “it” for the
former acts as the subject and the latter as a passive object, a mere recipient of the act
(Buber, 1958:4). Since there is no relationship that occurs in experience, the “I” lacks
authentic existence for it’s not socially growing or developing perhaps only gaining
knowledge about the object. So, for Buber, unless the “I” meets an other “I”, that is,
an other subject of experience, relationship is never established. Only when there is
an I-I encounter can there be an experience (Buber, 1958, pp. 5-7).

In the other mode of existence, which Buber calls “encounter” (the mode of I–Thou),
both the “I” and the ‘other’ enter into a genuine relationship as active participants. In
this relationship, human beings do not perceive each other as consisting of specific,
isolated qualities, but engage in a dialogue involving each other’s whole being and, in
which, the ‘other’ is transformed into a “Thou” or “You” (Buber, 1958, p. 8). This
treating the other as a “You” and not an “it” is, for Buber, made possible by “Love”
because in love, subjects do not perceive each other as objects but subjects (Buber,
1958, pp. 15-16). Love, for Buber, should not be understood as merely a mental or
psychological state of the lovers but as a genuine relation between the loving beings
(Buber, 1958, p. 66). Hence, for Buber, love is an I-Thou relation in which both subjects
share a sense of caring, respect, commitment, and responsibility. In this relationship,
therefore, all living beings meet each other as having a unity of being and engage in a
dialogue involving each other’s whole being. It is a direct interpersonal relation which
is not mediated by any intervening system of ideas, that is, no object of thoughts
intervenes between “I” and “Thou”(Buber, 1958, p. 26). Thus, the “Thou” is not a
means to some object or goal and the “I”, through its relation with the “Thou”, receives
a more complete authentic existence. The more that I-and-Thou share their reality, the
more complete is their reality.

Buber, looking at the main problem of human society in his time, claims that the
problem of human life in the modern age lies on the mode of the I–It relation. Modern
human relationship is mostly grounded on others viewing another human person as
an “it” rather than as a “Thou” and treats everyone as a means to their selfish ends
(Buber, 1958, pp. 37-38, 47). The human person, thus, becomes alienated in this It-
world (Buber, 1958, p. 68). Most modern human beings, according to him, feel at some
point in their life an existential anguish, worries of meaninglessness, and the sense of
impending doom as a result of an strict reliance on ‘experience’ to the exclusion of an
‘encounter’ or on the attitude of relating with things (I-It) rather than relating with
persons (I-Thou) (Buber, 1958, p. 70). With this situation, Buber gives his solution to
modern man’s woes by emphasizing on the value of encounter based on relation to
“Thou” rather than experience of “it”.

Buber further argues that there is something more lasting and more fulfilling when
human persons encounter each other through an I-Thou mode of relationship. The
I-Thou could also bring an absolute relation, an encounter with an Absolute Thou, God
(Buber, 1958, p. 78). In the I-Thou relation between the individual and God, there is a
unity of being in which the individual can always find God. In this relation, there is no
barrier of other relations which separate the individual from God and, thus, the
individual can speak directly to God. However, he contends that the Eternal Thou is not
“an object of experience or an object of thought”, or something which can be
investigated or examined (Buber, 1958, p. 112). One must employ faith to encounter
him for only through faith that the eternal Thou can be known as the “Absolute
Person” who gives unity to all beings. We cannot also seek our encounter with God
but can only ready ourselves for that encounter (Buber,
1958, p. 80). When that encounter with the Eternal Thou occurs then we come to see
every other being as a Thou (Buber, 1958, p. 82). By doing this, one can then
understand the universe in its relation to God for this is the only way to fully
comprehend the world. Buber also contends that the I-Thou relation between the
individual and God is a universal relation which is the foundation for all other relations
for God is the “Thou” who sustains the I-Thou relation among beings. If the individual
has a real I-Thou relation with God, the individual have a real I- Thou relation with
the world for his I-Thou relation with God is the basis for his I- Thou relation with the
world (Buber, 1958, pp. 106-107). Filled with loving responsibility, given the ability to
say Thou to the world, man is no longer alienated, and does not worry about the
meaninglessness of life (Buber, 1958, p. 118) but find himself fulfilled and complete in
that relation.

Buber’s I-Thou mode of relationship has shown us a clearer path to genuine living through
authentic relation to others. By valuing the others we also encourage or give them
reason to value us. Authenticity, therefore, lies in reciprocal intersubjective relations
wherein despite our differences we recognize each other as humans. The others are not
means, tools, or instruments for the fulfilment of my whims but, rather, they are a
companion in life, a friend to rely on, a person worthy to live with. Life is best lived
when others are there to encourage me when I feel giving up; to challenge me so I can
bring out the best in me; to remind me when I forget to act morally; or even just to sit
beside me while listening to me in my loneliest moment. But my life will be more
authentic when I manifest those things (I mentioned) to others. In this era of
technology, when people are more engrossed in their gadgets, more superficial in
dealing with each other, more individualistic in doing things solely by themselves, an
authentic I-Thou mode of human relationship is significantly essential more than ever.
People used to spend more time touching their gadgets than talk with the person in
front of them. There is no substitute to the value of real encounter with real people for a
sense of care, respect, and commitment is only built through I-Thou relationship.

In addition, Buber’s I-Thou did not only deepen our respect and the value we give for
each other as human, it also made us connect to God, whom we always set aside in
our life. Buber is clear in his statement that I-Thou relationship is not just a plain
human encounter but also a divine encounter with God. As a Jew, Buber saw and
understood love more than simply a human emotion but as a gift given by God whose
movement is always towards establishing rapport with others. It is not what I need or
what other’s need but what we both need in order to live life to the full. In living life
to the full, one does not only encounter another human person but God himself. And
in so doing, one cannot live his/her life with authenticity without God. This, perhaps,
is also what is lacking in Husserl’s theory. Buber’s I- Thou is not geared towards
individuality but on complementarity of each other establish through I-Thou relationship.
This is a challenge to today’s values which geared towards “love for oneself”. Facebook or
any social networking website has given us free access on how people look in their
“selfies”, what food they have eaten, what place they have visited, who are their
friends, what do they think about an issue. These are all expressions of self-love
looking for recognition. This desire for other’s recognition will soon result to
psychological dependency on what others say. Buber is clear that the focus should be
on mutual relation and not necessarily on individual’s needs for social recognition. In I-
Thou relation, individuals give recognition spontaneously as a result of love and it is
not because someone demands for it.
While Buber’s gives more emphasis on reciprocal intersubjective relations where the
“I” and the “Thou” achieved a more complete authentic existence, Emmanuel Levinas, on
the other hand, in the next lesson, focuses more on the “Other” as the basis of
relationship. This is another important point in intersubjective relationship in which
the “Other” is given more importance than the self.

I- THOU

Buber’s philosophy is about human person as a subject, who is being different


from things or objects. The human persons as subjects have direct and mutual sharing
of selves. This signifies a person-to-person, subject-to-subject relation or acceptance,
sincerity, concern, respect, dialog, and care. The human person is not just being-in-the-
world but being-with-others, or being-in-relation.

I-I t relationship
In contrast, to realm of meeting and dialog, Buber cites I-It relationship. I-It
relationship is a person to thing, subject to object that is merely experiencing and
using; lacking directedness and mutuality (feeling, knowing, and acting)

Emmanuel Levinas’ Face of the Other


The moral philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas differs from traditional ethical theories like
that of deontology which focuses on duty, or utilitarianism which advocates happiness for
the greater number of people, or the virtue-ethics which emphasizes on the role of
individual’s character and virtue as the basis for moral act. Levinasian ethics does not
legislate nor propose any moral laws or rules as advocated by the traditional theories
but emphasizes on endless responsibility to “Others”. While Buber is immersed in
relationship, Levinas is concerned more on our infinite and unconditional duty to
“others”.

Though Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995) is commonly known as a French philosopher,


he was actually born in Russia, in Kovno (now Kaunas), Lithuania in 1906 to a Jewish
family rich in Jewish cultural traditions. At the event of World War I, the Levinas’s
family immigrated to France where Levinas became a citizen. Being a French citizen, he
joined the French army when World War II began. During the war, his French
uniform saved him from deportation to the gas chambers when he was captured by
the Germans, while all his family were murdered by the Nazis. Levinas’ exposure to the
barbarity of the Nazi was instrumental to the creation of his 1961 book entitled
Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority where he strives to bring people to the
meaning of life through heteronomous relation to the ‘Other’.

Levinas grounds his ethics in a criticism of Western philosophical tradition which


subordinates the personal relation with concrete person who is an existent to an
impersonal relation with an abstract “Being” (Levinas, 1961/1979, p. 36). For instance,
whenever we deal with someone, we use the values and beliefs that we inherited from
our society and used them as our basis in relating with “others”. Certain times, we use
them also as standard in which we judge “other’s” actions and character as good or
bad. For Levinas, these social values and beliefs are abstract “concept” that blurred
our sight and hinder us in seeing, accepting, and
relating humanely with “others” for we give more importance to those concepts than
to “concrete person” who deserves more our attention. In relating with others, we also
apply our own “analytical or judgmental categories” focusing more on what “I think” is
good behaviour, right living, correct thinking that the “other” must elicit for him/her to
be accepted (Levinas, 1961/1979, p. 46). This, however, for Levinas, is turning the
other’s otherness into a “same” or like everyone else. This attitude also brings back the
other to oneself in a way that when one means to speak of the other, one is actually only
“speaks of oneself”, that is, of his own image (Levinas, 1991, pp110-111). It is in this
case, that the other’s “otherness” is radically negated. To this kind of ontological
approach, Levinas wishes to substitute a non- allergic relation with alterity, that is, one
that caters for the “other’s infinite otherness” (Levinas, 1961/1979, p. 38). What Levinas
suggests is for us to adopt a genuine face-to-face encounter with the “Other”. He believes
that it is only in responding to the command of the face of the ‘Other’ that an authentic
ethics could be made. He even claimed that the meaning of ethics is in responding to
the needs of the “Other”, to be subjected to the “Other”, and to be responsible to the
“Other” without expecting anything in return (Levinas, 1982, pp. 98-99). Levinas
declares that it is through a face-to-face encounter with the “Other” that an imperious
moral urgency is raised: “My humanity is grounded in my subjectivity and this one is
in turn grounded in my face-to-face with the other…. As a human being, the face that
is in front of me summons me, asks for me and begs me” (Levinas, 1961/1979, p. 96).
Thus, the encounter with the “Other” is not simply an encounter that one experience as
one encounters other worldly objects. Rather, the encounter with the “Other” calls on the
self to respond to his/her need or summon and not to leave him/her alone for the appeal
is made in his/her weakness and vulnerability (Levinas, 1991, pp. 9-10). This
responsibility for the other is immediate and not only a matter of perception. As soon as
someone looks at me, I am responsible for him/her. This responsibility is mine and I can
neither ignore nor refuse it (Levinas, 1961/1979, p. 100). This “Other” that Levinas
refers to are the stranger, the widow, the destitute, and the orphan to whom the self is
obligated (Levinas, 1961/1979, p. 215).This reveals that Levinas’ concept of
responsibility to the “Other” has preference for those who are poor, weak, and
marginalized by the society. Thus, for Levinas, doing something for the “Other” and
fulfilling one’s responsibility even to the point of sacrificing one’s life for the sake of
the “Other” is the identification mark of one’s humanity and spirituality. Levinas even
says that “the ‘Other’s’ right to exist has primacy over my own” (Levinas & Kearney,
1986, p. 24). Even if one tries to deny his responsibility to the “Other” by justifying his
right to freedom, one cannot escape the demand of the “Other” because the demand is
done even “before the self can claim its own freedom” (Levinas & Kearney, 1986, p. 27).
Levinas also emphasizes that one’s relationship and responsibility to the “Other” is
“asymmetrical” or non-reciprocal in a sense that one does not respond to the “Other”
and expect or demand that the “Other” be also responsible in return (Levinas, 1982, p.
95). Levinas’ ethics keeps redefining the terms of an unlimited personal responsibility
that would start and end beyond ontology, beyond the “being” of the “Other”, and
beyond the existence of the “Other’s” radical otherness. It is in this sense that ethics
is, for Levinas, first philosophy because of the primacy of human relationship and
intersubjectivity which reveals the fact that in the beginning was the human relation.
Lesson Genuine Communication and
3 Intersubjectivity

In this lesson, you will learn that the best way to have a more holistic perspective is
to learn from others who see things differently from us. In short, we must learn to
silence our minds that tend to totalize things and persons, and wait for others to teach
us something new. The people who need this most are those in society whom we have
already trapped within our prejudices.

For example, we readily assume that persons with special needs have such a
pitiable and difficult life. Young points out a survey conducted in one city in which
people were asked how would they perceived their lives if they were in the shoes of a
person with special need. Majority of the respondents said that they would find their
lives worthless and that they would lose the drive to live. Statistics in the city,
however, showed that actual PWDs “usually think that their lives are quite worth
living, and strongly wish to have discriminatory implements removed so they can live
those lives as well as possible” (Young, 1997:344-345). In other words, it is totally
unfair and insulting for us to imagine that PWDs think that their lives are not worth
living. They are, as studies show, generally happy and would rather not feel being
pitied for their situation. Many of us cannot seem understand this because we project
our own definition of a happy life on them; but they are different, and it is important
for us to recognize and respect that. It does not mean however, that we should treat
them as lesser human beings. They deserve respect just as much as any other human
subject does. To recognize this is ti appreciate the meaning of intersubjectivity. The
other subject is different from me, but deserves respect as much as I do.

Genuine understanding begins with the silence that is essential to listening. We


cannot really hear what the other is saying unless we hold our tongue and tame our
tendency to speak for them. Such a silence entails moral humility. This humility is
exercised through the admission that we do not know the other person fully. With this
admission we open ourselves to the possibility that we will learn something different
from them. Therefore, understanding those who are different from us cannot happen
by simply imagining ourselves in their situation. We must listen to what they have to
say.
To many of us, the act of listening seems to be an easy matter. Genuine
listening, however, entails great effort. Here are some of the things we should avoid saying
if we want people to truly open up to us (Faber and Mazlish, 1980).
1. Do not say that their feelings are invalid. There are no right or wrong feelings.
Let them express how they feel. They should not be judged for emotions that they
cannot help.
2. Do not give advice if they are not asking for any. What they need is a friend who
can be with them, not some expert who can look at them in a detached way.
3. Do not philosophize about their situation as if you are above them and you
truly know what has happened.
4. Do not say “I know how you feel.” Sometimes this can really be offensive to the
other person because no one can really know how she feels unless you become
her.
5. Do not say, “If I were you…,” unless she asks you what you would do if you
were in her shoes. Without her consent, saying “If I were you…,” would turn
the conversation into something about you, and not the person who needed
listening too.

Group 1 Lesson 1 Meaning of Intersubjectivity

Group 2- Group 4 Lesson 2 An Intersubjectivity Relationship Across Differences

Group 2 Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action

Group 3 Martin Buber’s I-Thou Relationship

Group 4 Emmanuel Levinas’ Face of the Other

Group 5 Lesson 3 Genuine Communication and Intersubjectivity

You might also like