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British Lend-Lease Tanks and the Battle

of Moscow, November–December 1941 —
Revisited
a
Alexander Hill
a
University of Calgary ,
Published online: 30 Nov 2009.

To cite this article: Alexander Hill (2009) British Lend-Lease Tanks and the Battle of Moscow,
November–December 1941 — Revisited, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 22:4, 574-587, DOI:
10.1080/13518040903355794

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 Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 22:574–587, 2009
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1351-8046 print/1556-3006 online
DOI: 10.1080/13518040903355794

British Lend-Lease Tanks and the Battle of

1556-3006
1351-8046
FSLV
Journal of Slavic Military Studies
Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4, October 2009: pp. 0–0

Moscow, November–December
1941 — Revisited

ALEXANDER HILL
British
A. Hill Lend-Lease Tanks and Battle of Moscow

University of Calgary
Downloaded by [University of Miami] at 23:45 30 December 2014

This short article returns to the issue of the value of British Lend-
Lease tanks for the Soviet war effort during late 1941 from a
research note in Volume 19, Number 2 of this journal.

The issue of the value of British-supplied tanks for the Soviet war effort
in late 1941 as addressed by the author in a series of articles in the aca-
demic and more popular literature in 2006–8 has aroused some debate,
and prompted at least some constructive criticism. 1 Figures provided by
the author for deliveries of British tanks to the Soviet Union by the Battle
of Moscow have not been questioned, and nor indeed the notion that
these deliveries were, in the context of Soviet losses at a critical juncture
in the fighting on the Eastern Front, of some value to the Red Army—
Stalin and the Soviet leadership did after all request the delivery of tanks

1
The articles concerned are Alexander Hill, ‘British “Lend-Lease” Tanks and the Battle for Moscow,
November-December 1941 — A Research Note’, in Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 19, 2 (June 2006),
pp. 289–294; ‘British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort, June 1941 June 1942’, in The Journal of
Military History, 71, 3 (July 2007), pp. 773–808, and ‘Did Russia Really Go It Alone?’, in World War II
Magazine (June/July 2008), pp. 62–66. For discussion of some of this material see http://www.armchair
general.com/forums/showthread.php?t=51810 and http://www.twcenter.net/forums/showthread.
php?t=126245 and http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=79&t=145031 and http://www.military-
historyonline.com/forums/ViewPost.aspx?ForumID=11&ID=15330&P=1. Thanks to Yan Mann for his
comments on a draft of this current article.
Alexander Hill is an associate professor in military history at the University of Calgary,
and author of The War Behind the Eastern Front: The Soviet Partisan Movement in North-West
Russia, 1941–1944 (2005) and The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941–1945: A
Documentary Reader (2009).
Address correspondence to Alexander Hill, Department of History, University of Calgary,
2500 University Drive NW, Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4, Canada. E-mail: hilla@ucalgary.ca

574
 British Lend-Lease Tanks and Battle of Moscow 575

and other weapons systems with some awareness of what they were
receiving.2
However, the author’s classification of the British Matilda and Valentine as
heavy and medium tanks, respectively, has been the subject of some discussion
— a categorization of some importance given the significance of this classifica-
tion for assessment of the degree to which these deliveries were valuable, where
I asserted that British deliveries constituted more than 33% of the medium and
heavy tank strength available to the Red Army in December 1941, and 25% if
counting those British vehicles actually in service by the end of the year. Perhaps
most contentiously I asserted that 30–40% of Soviet medium and heavy tanks
before Moscow in early December were of British origin.3 In addition to those
percentages already published, if figures provided in Soliankin et al. are to be
accepted, then it can be noted that the Red Army had only 1,731 tanks in field
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army units as of 1 December 1941, of which 1,214 were light tanks. This leaves
517 medium and heavy tanks, meaning that the 90 British tanks (all Matilda and
Valentine) alone that had seen action by 9 December 1941 according to the
British military mission in Moscow constituted in the region of 15% of Soviet
medium and heavy tank strength of the Soviet field army at that point.4
British-supplied tanks provided to Soviet units as of 20 November 1941
were, according to the service diary of Nikolai Biriukov, Military Commissar
of the Main Auto-Armour Board of the Red Army from 10 August 1941, 21
Valentines for both 137 and 139 Tank Battalions of 146 Tank Brigade, as
well as for 131 Tank Battalion, with 15 Matildas and 6 Valentines for 138 Tank
Battalion, 3 Matilda and 9 Valentines for 136 Tank Battalion, and 2 Matilda and
19 Valentine for 132 Tank Battalion.5 Given references made to these units by
Rotmistrov and other Soviet authors, all of those British-supplied units listed
above, with the exception of 132 Independent Tank Battalions, can be iden-
tified as having seen action with Soviet forces before Moscow by 9 December
— a total of 96 tanks as of 20 November, and appear on Map 1. Before the
end of November 138 Independent Tank Battalion, that had initially been
allocated as one of three battalions of 146 Tank Brigade, was a part of
30 Army of the Western Front involved in stemming the advance of German
units north west of Moscow, being directed to the south of Solnechnogorsk

2
On the genesis of Anglo-American aid to the Soviet Union, see Alexander Hill, ‘British Lend-Lease Aid
and the Soviet War Effort…’, op.cit., pp. 778–783. For example, in addition to any prior knowledge, a Soviet
military mission, initially of 8, arrived in the UK on 8 July 1941, and soon expanded its staff to include a
range of military and technical personnel for the assessment of and supervision of the shipment of military
equipment. N.M. Kharlamov, Trudnaia missiia (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo, 1983), Chapters 2–5.
3
See, for example, Alexander Hill, ‘British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort…’, op.cit., pp. 788, 791.
4
In all likelihood the figures for Soviet strengths include British-supplied vehicles, but it is unclear
under which categories they have been counted. A.G. Soliankin, M.V. Pavlov, I.V. Pavlov, I.G. Zheltov,
Otechestvennie bronirovannie mashini. XX vek. 1941–1945. Tom 2 (Moscow: Eksprint, 2005), p. 24 and
Secret Cipher Telegram. From: 30 Military Mission. To: The War Office. Recd 11/12/41. The UK National
Archives (TNA) WO 193/580.
5
N. Biriukov, Tanki – frontu! Zapiski sovetskogo generala (Smolensk: Rusich, 2005), p. 57.
 576 A. Hill
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FIGURE 1 Approximate dispositions of British-equipped Soviet armored units before

Moscow, late November–early December 1941.

after its fall on 23 November.6 146 Tank Brigade was in action with 16 of
Army the Western Front before the end of November to the north west of
Moscow, as well as in early December in the same region near Kriukovo.7
Which of either 138 Independent Tank Battalion or 146 Tank Brigade
was the first to see action is unclear. There is certainly more information

6
At one stage alongside 24 and 145 Tank Brigades and 126 Independent Tank Battalion. P.A.
Rotmistrov, Vremia i tanki (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1972) p. 108; Biriukov, ibid., p. 53; Moskovskaia bitva v
khronike faktov i sobitii (Moscow: Voenizdat, 2004), entry for Monday 24 November. militera.lib.ru
(accessed 30 October 2009)
7
Rotmistrov, op.cit., pp. 116–7.
 British Lend-Lease Tanks and Battle of Moscow 577

available in the secondary literature consulted on the activities of 146

Tank Brigade. Whilst the first identification of British-supplied tanks on
the Eastern Front can be noted to have been no later than 26 November
from a British intercept of German communications, further investigation
suggests on the basis of German sources that they first appeared in action
certainly no later than 25 November. A report of the Wehrmacht IX Corps
notes that 252 Infantry Division engaged and destroyed three British-
supplied tanks of unidentified type at Petrovskoe near the River Istra on
25 November.8
In an article in the Soviet Military History Journal Afanasii Beloborodov,
commander of 78 Rifle/9 Guards Rifle Division notes the participation of
146 Tank Brigade in securing the withdrawal of his division in the face of
the advance of 5 Panzer Division and other German units, including 252
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Infantry Division, up to 25 November, by which point 146 Tank Brigade

was attached to his division and participated in subsequent defensive action
on the Istra River. Elements of 146 Tank Brigade were apparently deployed
in forest to the north west of Petrovskoe before later engaging German
forces on the sector around Petrovskoe on the road and railway line to Mos-
cow, along the axis of which the German Das Reich, 10 Panzer and 252
Infantry Divisions were advancing.9
Beloborodov’s later memoirs further describe these actions against
German forces in the Istra region during this period. He clearly notes, citing
captured German materials, the presence of elements of 146 Tank Brigade
opposite the German 10 Panzer Division during 26 November.10 According
to an operational situation report of the Western Front of 5 December 1941
146 Tank Brigade was certainly still in action in the area on 5 December
alongside 18 Rifle Division.11
Further regarding the activities of British-equipped units in this area, the
memoirs of M.E. Katukov note that 1 Guards Tank Brigade saw an unidenti-
fied independent tank battalion equipped with “slow moving British Matilda
medium (Mk-II)” tanks attached to it at the beginning of December for oper-
ations in the Kriukovo area also to the north west of Moscow—commanded
by one Captain Gerasimenko.12 The diary of Horst Lange certainly notes in
the entry for 2 December 1941 that he had come across “an English model

8
See CX/MSS/470/T17, 0630/27/11/41. Eastern Europe. Miscellaneous. On 26/11 … . TNA HW 1/
267 and Generalkommando IX.A.K. Abteilung Ic. An Panzergruppe 4, Ic, K.Gef.-Stand, den 27.11.41. Ic -
Morgenmeldung 27.11.41. United States National Archives (US NA) T-314 408 121.
9
A.P. Beloborodov, “Na Istrinskom napravlenii”, in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, 2 (1962), pp. 95–100.
10
A.P. Beloborodov, Vsegda v boiu (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1978), p. 90.
11
Operativnaia svodka shtaba Zapadnogo fronta o boevikh deistviiakh voisk. No. 323. 5 dekabria
1941 g., in Russkii Arkhiv: Velikaia Otechestvennaia. T.15 (4-1). Bitva pod Moskvoi. Sbornik dokumentov
(Moscow: TERRA, 1997), p. 173.
12
M.E. Katukov, Na ostrie glavnogo udara. Izdanie tret’e (Moscow: “Visshaia shkola”, 1985), p. 104.
 578 A. Hill

tank” knocked out on the road near Podsolnechnaia (Solnechnogorsk) on

the Klin-Moscow highway.13
Of the remaining British-supplied units, the exploits of 136 Independent
Tank Battalion of 33 Army of the Western Front are more widely noted in
the literature.14 Document 1, an after action report of the Western Front of
the end of January 1942, describes the participation of the battalion in the
elimination of the Naro-Fominsk breakthrough by German forces in early
December.
Document 1: Report to the head of the operational department of the
headquarters of the Western Front from the head of the Auto-Armour Board
of the Western Front, 31 January 1942, No. 61.
… “The activity of tanks on the front of 33 Army”
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THE TANK BATTLE BELOW IUSHKOVO 2–3 DECEMBER 1941

At approaching 12 hours and 30 minutes on 2 December 1941 forward units

of the enemy passed through Iushkovo and occupied Petrovskoe and Burt-
sevo. … At about that time 136 Independent Tank Batallion [ITB], consisting
of 22 tanks, approached Alabino, the remaining tanks being left, as a result
of technical failures, at different points along the road between Moscow and
Alabino. Ten tanks from this battalion were separated off for action with the
left flank of the Army with 113 and 110 Rifle Divisions. The remaining tanks
were sent to Petrovskoe.
At 1300 hours the tank battalion was met with artillery, mortar and tank
fire from Petrovskoe, and with two tanks knocked out, pulled back. . . .
Only medium and light tanks took part in the first attempt to capture Petro-
vskoe, the super-light tanks [malie] still remained in Alabino. At 1400 hours
the commander of the battalion was given the order to immediately attack
the enemy in Petrovskoe. . . . The battalion knocked out two [enemy] tanks
straight away and two [were] burnt out, and occupied the south eastern out-
skirts of Petrovskoe. Further, meeting heavy anti-tank fire from Iushkovo
and south-west of Petrovskoe, the battalion could not move forward. Using
sub-machine gunners the enemy worked their way around the left flank of
136 ITB… . In order to counteract the enemy four super-light tanks were
sent to the northern edge of the forest (200 m south-east of Petrovskoe),
which halted the forward movement of the enemy in that direction.
The battalion was forced to spend the evening and night defending
Petrovskoe with limited infantry support. . . . The commander of 136 ITB was
ordered to position his tanks during the night, such that they covered each

13
Horst Lange, Tagebücher aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Mainz: v.Hase & Koehler Verlag, 1979), p. 100.
14
See, for example, David Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army
Stopped Hitler (Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 1995), p. 89.
 British Lend-Lease Tanks and Battle of Moscow 579

other with machine gun fire, and in addition, would not remain in one place,
but would constantly change positions. . . . Toward the morning of 3 December
units began to concentrate [in the area]. 18 Rifle Brigade and 23 and 24 Ski
Battalions arrived, with 140 Independent Tank Battalion approaching.
The commander’s decision was as follows:
The tank group consisting of 136 and 140 Tank Battalions and 23 and 24 Ski
Battalions was, with the ski battalions concentrated in the forest south-west of
Mamir’ and tank battalions from Petrovskoe, to advance concentrically on Iushk-
ovo, capture it and then, pursuing the enemy in the direction of Goloven’ka,
Tashirovo, restore the army’s position [i.e., eliminate the German penetration].
Approaching 1200 hours on 3 December 140 [Tank] Battalion had
already arrived and concentrated at start positions in the forest 200 m east of
the platform [halt] Alabino. The concentration of the infantry was delayed.
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… The possibility of enemy penetration from Burtsevo to Mamir’ was coun-

tered by the positioning of four tanks of 136 TB in ambush positions [v zas-
ade] in the forest on either side of the road 600m east of Burtsevo.
…
At the allotted time the infantry did not attack. The tank battalions
acted alone [Note—with limited infantry riding on tanks]. … At 1620 hours
136 ITB moved out to the northern edge of Iushkovo… . The enemy at
speed fled from Iushkovo to the west, leaving behind four artillery pieces,
rifles and other trophies. It was already getting dark. The battalion was in
need of fuel, food for personnel, ammunition. … 140 ITB broke through to
the western spur of Petrovskoe, destroying a number of enemy firepoints,
after which with tank-borne infantry it attacked the western spur of Petrovskoe
and the forest to the north west, ejecting the remains of the enemy from
there and destroying two anti-tank guns. …
Enemy tanks near Iushkovo, totaling 12, were active on 3 December
only against 136 ITB, after having lost four they did not enter into open
combat again, but firing stationary from the edge of the forest south-west of
Iushkovo, where they remained until 1600 hours on 3 December, after
which with the coming darkness departed to the heights 210.8 and subse-
quently behind the River Nara. Tank losses in the battle for Iushkovo and
Petrovskoe were: four tanks knocked-out (three repaired) and one got stuck
in a hole. The tanks attacked without the expectation of infantry, utilizing
the reduced morale of the enemy after two salvoes of Katiusha rockets.15
This engagement also saw the participation of 20 and 5 Tank Brigades,
the former advancing from the north and the latter on the flank of 136 Tank

15
Report to the head of the operational department of the headquarters of the Western Front from
the head of the Auto-Armour Board of the Western Front, 31 January 1942, No. 61. … . 1. The tank battle
below Iushkovo 2–3 December 1941, in Alexander Hill, The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union,
1941–1945: A Documentary Reader (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 79–80.
 580 A. Hill

Battalion. German accounts of the engagement do not specifically mention

British-supplied tanks, those British tanks participating perhaps being those
described as “medium” tanks as distinct from the T-34s and KV series
vehicles otherwise singled out. By the time the Soviet armored attack was
pressed home during the afternoon of 3 December, as of 14:15 orders had
been issued to German forces of 258 Infantry Division, and more specifically
in Iushkovo and Burtsevo 478 Infantry Regiment supported primarily by ele-
ments of Sturmgeschütz-Abteilung 191, to withdraw behind the River Nara.16
Finally, of those British-supplied units most probably in action by 9
December, 131 Independent Tank Battalion was in action with the Western
Front from early December with 50 Army to the east of Tula to the south of
Moscow, apparently as part of 112 Tank Division.17 It is unclear what role
132 Independent Tank Battalion, as of 20 November equipped with 2 Matilda
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and 19 Valentine tanks, played in the battle. As of 1 December it was

attached to the Moscow Military District, having been on 1 November, and
being on 1 January 1942, attached to the South western Front.18
On the proportion of Soviet medium and heavy tanks before Moscow
of British origin, as noted elsewhere, Rotmistrov suggests that 205 out of
670 Soviet tanks on the Moscow axis (Western, Kalinin, and South western
Fronts) were heavy and medium models at the end of November.19 That
would mean that at most the British-supplied tanks in the above units made
up 43.9% of Soviet medium and heavy tank strength on this axis at the
beginning of December if counting the full 90 as noted as having partici-
pated in combat by the British by 9 December. Reducing this percentage to
a less precise 30–40% as in previous work makes some allowance for a
significant proportion of the British vehicles not to have been in operation
at the time the 205 figure applies, even if it is not apparent how many of the
Soviet tanks concerned were actually operable. It also makes some allow-
ance for any Soviet heavy and medium tanks in 9, 17, and 24 Tank Brigades,
for which Soviet sources seem unable to provide strengths but which were
in operation on the Moscow axis, and are apparently not included in the
205 figure used by Rotmistrov.20

16
See 258. Division. Abt. Ia. Div.Gef.Stand, im Februar 1942. Gefechtsbericht der 258. J.D. über den
Angriff über die Nara bis an die Desna bei Burtzewo und anschliessenden Rückzug in die Ausgangsstel-
lung in der Zeit vom 1.12.–4.12.1941. US NA T-315 1817 404–459. Document 1 is translated from V.M.
Safir, “Oborona Moskvi. Narofominskii proriv 1–5 dekabria 1941 goda (chto bilo i chego ne bilo v
deistvitelnosti)”, in Voenno-istoricheskii arkhiv, Vipusk 1 (1997), pp. 77–104, which provides further
details of Soviet operations.
17
Rotmistrov, op.cit., pp. 118–9.
18
Voenno-nauchnoe upravlenie General’nogo shtaba. Voenno-istoricheskii otdel. Boevoi sostav
Sovetskoi armii. Chast’ I (iiun’–dekabr’ 1941 goda), (Moscow: undated), pp. 64, 79, and Chast’ II (Ianvar’–
dekabr’ 1942 goda) (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’stvo Ministervstva oboroni SSSR, 1966), p. 12.
19
Rotmistrov, op.cit., p. 113. Certainly including British-supplied Matildas.
20
“Moskovskaia bitva v tsifrakh (period kontrnastupleniia)”, in Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, 1
(1967) p. 92.
 British Lend-Lease Tanks and Battle of Moscow 581

Further comparing British deliveries of tanks to the Soviet Union by

the end of 1941 to Soviet strengths along the lines of previous articles, I
have taken into account minor errors and critiques of the methods ini-
tially used to calculate percentages for British tanks compared to overall
Soviet strength. Slightly revised figures suggest the equivalent of about
32% of the Red Army heavy and medium tank park at the end of 1941 as
having been British-supplied, with British tanks actually having been in
Red Army hands by the end of the year remaining as the equivalent of
25% of the heavy and medium tank park of the Red Army at the end of
December. If making a generous allowance for losses of British vehicles
in action, going as far as assuming that all 90 of those British tanks that
had seen action by 9 December had been lost by the end of the month,
then British heavy and medium tanks in Red Army hands can still be
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deemed to have made up nearly 20% of the Red Army heavy and medium
tank park at the end of 1941.21
While receipt of British tanks had only started in October after ship-
ment had commenced the previous month, British deliveries were being
received in a context where although T-34 production was rising, this
was from a low of 185 vehicles in October, to 253 and 327 vehicles in
November and December respectively. During October, as the first Brit-
ish tanks were delivered to the Red Army, Soviet industry was still pro-
ducing hopelessly outdated light tanks rather than halt production at a
critical time—in October the last major consignments of the T-30 series
and T-40 light amphibious tanks (115) were produced, armed only with
a standard main armament of a 7.62 and 12.7 mm machine gun, respec-
tively, with a final 20 produced in December 1941.22 British tanks arrived
in significant numbers during a period of significant disruption to Soviet
industry and also a period of transition to the wholescale production of
the latest tank types.
Of course, the presence of British tanks, even in Red Army field units,
did not mean that they all got in to combat and remained in action even if
not knocked out by the enemy—there is the question of the reliability of
British tanks and their performances in the winter conditions of the Eastern
Front, including the issue of crew training. As noted by the Russian author
Suprun, up until the end of 1942 “almost half of foreign tanks broke down
at disembarkation points or in transit due to inappropriate use and
maintenance [obsluzhivanie]. A significant proportion, getting to the point
of contact with the enemy, did not remain in combat for technical

21
Where previously 20 Tetrarch tanks had mistakenly been included as medium or heavy tanks, and
the Red Army medium and heavy tank park is taken as having been 1,400 based on figures from G.F.
Krivosheev (ed.), Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century (London: Greenhill
Books, 1997). See Alexander Hill, ‘British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort…’, p. 788.
22
A.G. Soliankin et al., op.cit., p. 24.
 582 A. Hill

reasons.”23 Issues with winter performance led Biriukov to note on 17

December 1941 that Matildas should be held back from service until March
given that they were “apparently African vehicles” [eto ved’ afrikanskaia
mashina’].24 Apart from technical issues with British-supplied tanks already
mentioned elsewhere,25 the cross country performance of the Matilda and
Valentine in deep snow were significantly inferior to the KV-1 and T-34, the
former capable, according to Soviet sources, of operating in 60–70 cm of
snow and the latter up to 70 cm, where the Matilda and Valentine were
capable of operating in 35 and 40 cm, respectively — the former on a par
with the T-60 light tank.26
Maintenance and combat performance were hampered by the limited
training provided to Soviet crews on foreign-supplied equipment with
which few had familiarity. The hands-on training of the first British-
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equipped units could not start in earnest until 28 October when the first 20
tanks arrived at the Kazan’ training centre. While it is understandable that
these first units were thrown in to action with only very limited training and
familiarization with their new equipment, even by 17 December, as Biriukov
noted, the training of 1,600 crew members for British-supplied vehicles was
to last only 15 days.27 Actually, in action, as an indicator of their overall values
the Soviet historiography of the war has tended to classify the Matilda and
Valentine as medium and light tanks, respectively—Katukov, as noted
above for example, describing the Matilda as a “slow medium tank,” where
in the “light” category, to which the Valentine apparently belonged, the
Soviet Union had a relative abundance of vehicles even during the battle of
Moscow, and particularly the T-60, of which 1,388 were produced during
the final quarter of 1941.28 I have classified the Matilda and Valentine as the
equivalent of heavy and medium tanks, respectively. By 1941 light tanks
were of increasingly limited significance on the battlefield for anything
other than reconnaissance given their extreme vulnerabilities in the face of
both contemporary tanks and anti-tank weapons. Certainly, if simple weight
is any indicator, the Valentine cannot be considered light by the standards of
late 1941 and early 1942—weighing in at 16 tons. The Valentine was
considerably better armored than the T-60, or indeed German light tanks

23
M. Suprun Lend-liz i severnie konvoi 1941–1945 (Moscow: Andreevskii flag, 1997), p. 52.
24
N. Biriukov, op.cit., p. 69.
25
Alexander Hill, ‘British Lend-Lease Aid and the Soviet War Effort…, ‘op.cit’., p. 787.
26
Soobrazheniia ABTU Zapadnogo fronta v Operativnii otdel Genshtaba KA po ABTU, sostavlennie
na osnove opita boevikh deistvii tankovikh chastei, 19 ianvaria 1942 g., in Glavnoe avtobronetankovoe
upravlenie. Liudi, sobitiia, fakti i dokumentakh—1940–1942 gg. (Moscow: GABTU, 2005), p. 168.
27
Biriukov noted on 17 December that British personnel should be included in the repair of British
vehicles—the services of whom the Soviet leadership had showed little willingness to utilize. In fact it
seems to have been on British rather than Soviet insistence that two personnel had been sent to the
Kazan’ training centre to assist in the readying of British-supplied vehicles according to a note by Biriukov
of 17 November. Biriukov, op.cit., pp. 47, 53, 69.
28
Katukov, op.cit., p. 104. As production of the T-40S and T-30 ceased. A.G. Soliankin et al., p. 24.
 British Lend-Lease Tanks and Battle of Moscow 583

operating on the Eastern Front in late 1941 and early 1942, with maximum
frontal armor of 65 mm compared to 35 mm for the T-60 or Panzer II being
indicative of overall differences.29
Even the 2-pounder gun equipping the British tanks was superior to the
armaments of the bulk of those tanks of any army deemed light in the post-
war Western literature. While not being a light tank in terms of armor, the
Valentine, as indeed the Matilda, certainly compared unfavorably in military
value to the T-34 medium tank, available to the Soviet Union in increasing but
still limited numbers at the end of 1941. As identified in the author’s previous
articles, in late 1941 the Red Army was only too aware that the armaments of
the Matilda and Valentine were far inferior to the KV-1 heavy and T-34
medium tanks. Biriukov noted in his service diary on 28 November 1941 that
while the Soviet Union could not, “as the Russian saying goes look a gift
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horse in the mouth,” British-supplied tanks were not being provided “for vis-
iting friends and relatives, but for heading in to battle” and that it would
therefore be necessary to “drag the English tanks up a little to the standard of
the T-34 as far as possible,” but with proposals for up gunning both—the
Matilda with a 76mm and Valentine 45mm gun—ending up being abortive.30
Soviet complaints about these vehicles were not limited to their arma-
ments, but also cross-country capabilities in Russian conditions and their
speeds—both the Matilda and Valentine managing a maximum of only 15
mph compared to 32 mph for the T-34/76B and even 22 mph for the cumber-
some KV-1A.31 The low speeds of the British-supplied tanks hampered their
coordination with other faster tanks—a problem the British had encountered
in the Western Desert when using the Matilda alongside cruiser tanks – and
certainly made their deployment together as below tactically sensible.32 In all
of these categories the Matilda and Valentine were far inferior to the T-34 and
KV-1. That the Matilda and Valentine were both of less military utility than the
KV-1 and T-34 is beyond dispute, but the Red Army not only did not have
either in abundance in late 1941, but continued to deploy large numbers of T-
60s (T-26s and even BT-series tanks) in the defence of Moscow and during
the subsequent counter-offensive, compared to which the Valentine and Mat-
ilda were arguably superior in most tactical situations.33

29
See Soliankin et al., op.cit., p. 137 and Eric Grove, World War II Tanks (London: Black Cat, 1978),
pp. 6, 74.
30
Biriukov, op.cit., pp. 55, 60, 71. A close-support version of the Matilda armed with a 3-inch howit-
zer was subsequently supplied to the Soviet Union in small numbers.
31
Grove, op.cit., pp. 72, 75, 111, 117. Alternative sources suggest a slightly higher speed of 55 kmh
for the T-34-76 (1941 and 1942). See Soliankin et al., op.cit., p. 204.
32
Major General I.S.O. Playfair et al., The Mediterranean and the Middle East. Volume II. ‘The Germans
Come to the Help of Their Ally’ (1941) (London: HMSO, 1956), p. 173.
33
In English, in Colossus Reborn David Glantz has collated a significant amount of data on the
strength and composition of Soviet armored units, in this instance for the period from October 1941 to
March 1942. See David Glantz, Colossus Reborn: The Red Army at War, 1941–1943 (Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 2005), pp. 268–270.
 584 A. Hill

While the T-60 is described in post-war Soviet literature as a light tank,

along with the Valentine, with the Matilda and T-34 as medium and KV-1 as
a heavy tank, in contemporary Soviet sources such classifications were
rarely used, one exception being the differentiation between US-supplied
M-3 tanks as light or medium.34 Without explicit use of the terms heavy,
medium, and light, Soviet tank brigades would ideally deploy KV, T-34 and
T-60 tanks together during the winter of 1941–2, but this ideal type had fre-
quently fallen by the wayside by the winter of 1941–2, although some bri-
gades such as 1 Guards Tank Brigade were, in this case as of 28 November,
equipped as such (11 KV, 16 T-34, 32 T-60).35 T-34s were sometimes
deployed supported by Matildas and T-60s, as in the case of 38 Tank Bri-
gade on 27 January 1942, and even Valentines and T-60s, as in the case of
36 Tank Brigade, although this combination was the exception rather than
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the rule.36
By the winter of 1941–2 tanks were increasingly being thrown into
combat in two-type battalion or brigade strength, with typical pairings being
either T-34s and T-60s and Matildas and Valentines, but including, as in the
case of 80 Tank Brigade as of 21 January 1942, the pairing of British tanks
with the T-60—in this case Valentines.37 Clearly, at this juncture, the Red
Army had not simply determined that the Valentine and Matilda were of
such little value as to be deployable only if accompanied by KV-1s or T-34s.
Despite their deficiencies compared to the T-34 and KV-1, a lack of rigidity
in the implicit classification and deployment of British vehicles is under-
standable when their armours are considered in the light of contemporary
anti-tank weapons and when the British vehicles are compared to the vehi-
cles available at the time to their German opponents.
While many of the inadequacies of the Matilda and Valentine are
obvious, particularly when compared to the latest Soviet types, they were
still being deployed with some success by the British in North Africa, even
if their deficiencies and strengths were not being appropriately amelio-
rated or fully exploited with their appropriate integration into a combined-
arms system.38

34
See, for example, Biriukov, op.cit., p. 89, referring, on 27 January 1942, to the formation of 176
Tank Battalion with 32 M3 light and a company of M3 medium tanks.
35
See, for example, Postanovlenie No. GKO-671ss ot 13 sentiabria 1941 g. … O formirovanii tanko-
vikh brigad v sentiabre mesiatse s.g. (13 September 1941) calling for the formation of tank brigades with
7 KV, 22 T-34, and 32 T-60, BT or T-26, and Postanovlenie No. GKO-1295ss ot 16 fevralia 1942 g. … O
formirovanii tankovikh brigad v fevrale, marte i aprele mesiatsiakh 1942 goda ( 16 February 1942)
requiring the formation of brigades with 10 KV, 20 T-34 and 16 T-60. www.soldat.ru/doc/gko/
gko1941.html and ...1942.html (accessed 30 October 2009), and Biriukov, op.cit., p. 60.
36
Biriukov, op.cit., p. 89.
37
Ibid., p. 84.
38
Major General I.S.O. Playfair et al., The Mediterranean and the Middle East. Volume III (September
1941–September 1942). British Fortunes Reach their Lowest Ebb (London: HMSO, 1960) pp. 70–1, and
213–4.
 British Lend-Lease Tanks and Battle of Moscow 585

German sources have tended not to be quite as deprecatory about

these British-supplied tanks as Soviet or even British sources. In German
doctrine, tanks were ideally not supposed to be engaging enemy tanks, but,
instead “soft” targets. As the British official history of the war in the desert
notes, Operation “Battleaxe” in June 1941:

…gave the British in the Middle East their first experience of German
preparedness for encounters between armoured forces, though it is
doubtful that they fully appreciated the German conception, which was
that the primary use of tanks was to deal with troops and thin-skinned
vehicles and that the task of destroying the enemy’s tanks was largely
one for the anti-tank gun.39
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In the context of German doctrine and the relative effectiveness of

German combined arms, including the effective use of the 88mm anti-aircraft
gun in an anti-tank role in coordination with tanks, in part demanded by the
Matilda’s armor,40 it is perhaps understandable why the Germans seem to
have held the Matilda in higher esteem than either the British or the Soviets,
at least if post-war accounts are indicative of wartime attitudes. Major Gen-
eral F.W. von Mellenthin notes, writing on the war in the Western Desert in
November 1941, that the Afrika Korps “thought highly” of the five captured
Matildas operating with them at the time of the Crusader offensive—noting
the strength of its armor.41 Rommel wrote at a little greater length and far
more critically, writing:

In this battle [Sollum, June 1941] the British used large numbers of
their Mark II [Matilda] tanks, which were too heavily armored to be
penetrated by most of our anti-tank weapons. However, the gun
which they carried was far too small and its range too short. It would
be interesting to know why the Mark II was called an infantry tank,
when it had no H.E. ammunition with which to engage the opposing
infantry. It was also, as I have already said, far too slow. In fact, its
only real use was in a straight punch to smash a hole in a concentra-
tion of material.42

General Bayerlein, Rommel’s Chief of Staff, goes on to note when dis-

cussing the fighting during the winter of 1941-2:

39
The Mediterranean and the Middle East. Volume II, p. 173.
40
Ibid.
41
Major General F.W. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles: A Study in the Employment of Armour in the
Second World War (Trans. H. Betler, L.F.C. Turner ed;) (London: Futura Publications, 1977), p. 63.
42
B.H. Liddell Hart (ed.), The Rommel Papers (Trans. Paul Finlay) (London: Collins, 1953), p. 147.
 586 A. Hill

The British Matilda tank was feared because its heavy armor made it dif-
ficult to kill. But it was slow and had a short, small-caliber gun. At the
end of 1941 the German Panzer III and Panzer IV were still superior to
enemy types in range and caliber of guns and, in some measure,
maneuverability.43

While increasingly seen as an outdated concept, and armed with an

inadequate main gun for the role as effective anti-tank weapon ranges
exceeded those of the Matilda’s machine guns, the Matilda had, as Rommel
notes, been developed as an infantry tank—to provide fire-support to infantry
with their machine guns, with the capability of dealing with enemy tanks
that might interfere with the 2-pounder main gun. When appropriately
deployed in an infantry-support role — for instance when used “to smash a
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hole in a concentration of material” — the Matilda proved of value in both

the Western Desert and Soviet Union, although closing the range on larger
German anti-tank guns to machine gun range left the Matilda vulnerable
where knocking out such infantry and gun teams was extremely difficult at
longer ranges with solid shot.44
When engaging enemy tanks the Matilda and Valentine were in many
ways in a better position than when they faced high-velocity 50mm and
88mm anti-tank guns. Taking for example the Panzer III — mainstay of the
German armored forces during 1942 when the Panzer II and 38(t) were
clearly inadequate — the Panzer III “special” armed with the higher-velocity
60-calibre KwK 39 gun was not available at all until that year, and the per-
formance of the short-barreled lower velocity 50 mm KwK L/42 gun was
arguably no better than the British 2-pounder despite more versatile German
ammunition types, even if the equipping of German tanks with additional
armor in the form of face-hardened armor plates during 1941 severely limited
the ability of the 2-pounder to penetrate the frontal armor. The significant
numbers of Panzer II and 38(t) in action in December 1941 were certainly
vulnerable to the Matilda and Valentine’s main guns well beyond the effec-
tive range of the 37.2mm (L/47.8) gun on the 38(t) against the Matilda or,
indeed, Valentine’s front or side armor, and against either the Matilda or
Valentine the 20 mm KwK 30 gun of the Panzer II offered little hope.45
It is therefore not unreasonable to state that in late 1941 British-supplied
Soviet Matilda and Valentine tanks were still able to take on German armor
— particularly in a defensive context where the tactical impact of their

43
Ibid., p. 185.
44
A later war (1943) illustration in English of the limitations of the two-pounder (40mm) main arma-
ment of the Matilda, at a point in the war that it was clearly inadequate, can be found in Dmitrii Loza,
Fighting for the Motherland – Recollections from the Eastern Front (Lincoln and London, NE: University
of Nebraska Press, 1998), pp. 30–1. The issue with HE ammunition was probably not, as suggested, one
of immediate supply but whether it was available at all.
45
The Mediterranean and the Middle East. Volume III, op.cit., pp. 435–8, 442–3.
 British Lend-Lease Tanks and Battle of Moscow 587

limited speeds could be ameliorated by such devices as their use in

ambush. Additionally, as Rotmistrov notes, during the Moscow counter-
offensive “the bulk of tank brigades and independent tank battalions were
supposedly tied [predpologalos’ vkluchat’] to rifle divisions for the direct
support of infantry” — the role for which the Matilda and Valentine had
been intended.46 Despite being frequently tied to supporting infantry units,
that should have reduced problems in the coordination of arms and indeed
optimized the values of British-supplied armor, Soviet instructions of the
period for the deployment of tanks stressed the extent to which they should
have been more effectively coordinated with artillery, infantry, and air-
power. For example, Order Number 57 of the Stavka VGK of 22 January
1942 on “the use of tank units and formations in battle” noted poor cooper-
ation between tanks and infantry and artillery, as well as a tendency for
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tanks to be thrown into battle piecemeal and without even elementary

reconnaissance prior to their deployment.47
Overall Soviet failures in the effective coordination between arms were
to some extent masked by the relative superiority of the KV-1 and T-34 over
German armor and indeed limited vulnerability to the bulk of available anti-
tank weapons, where substantial sloped armor in the case of the T-34 was
matched with a powerful gun for late 1941 with a HE capability. When
deployed appropriately in late 1941, however, British-supplied Matilda and
Valentine tanks did not look as inadequate either in terms of either the
Soviet or German parks as they would by mid-1942, and where even if they
were not replacements for the KV-1 or T-34, offered a far more valuable
weapon for infantry support than the T-60 and other older model Soviet
tanks otherwise employed in such roles.
British deliveries of the Matilda and Valentine tank to the Soviet Union
during the Battle of Moscow, were not, as I have previously stated, “decisive.”
However, in the context of the limited number of superior Soviet models
available at the time, and even an approximate parity with much German
armor on a tank by tank basis, such vehicles represented a meaningful,
morale-boosting British contribution to the war on the Eastern Front and
indication that, despite initial British vacillation about providing assistance
to the Soviet Union, the Allied alliance was more than simply rhetoric.

46
Rotmistrov, op.cit., p. 113.
47
See Document 62, in Hill, The Great Patriotic War...: A Documentary Reader, op.cit., p. 86.