Overview on British Relations with their French neighbours

The language barrier/ love-hate/ sweet enemies

French has had an influence on the English language. Simon Elmes, producer of Routes of
English, a BBC radio 4 documentary ‘tens of thousands of French words are imbedded in our
language’. And the French have appropriated inordinate amounts of English vocabulary. They
take breaks at LE WEEKEND and are known to bid farewells with a ‘bye bye‘
GEOPOLITICS
*the UN Security Council: there is a general consensus among historians that the period
from 1900 to 1940 was one of close relations between France and Britain as states. It was
marked near the beginning by the conclusion of the agreement of April 1904
-Historiography, the writing of history based on the critical investigation of documents/ The
choice of specific details from the reliable materials in those sources/ The synthesis of details
into a narrative. The term historiography also refers to «the theory and history of historical
writing »
For the most part, historiography is simply something to keep in the back of your mind when
you read a text or sift through your various sources as you prepare to write
The most influential historiographical approaches are: comparative history/ cultural history/
diplomatic history/ economic history/ environmental history/ ethno history/ family history/
feminist history/ history of religion and Church history/ intellectual history and history of
ideas/ labour history/ Latin American history/ local history and microhistory/ Marxist
historiography and Historical Materialism/ military history/ oral history/ political history/
public history/ Quantitative history/ social history and history from below along with the
french version the Annales School and the German Bielefeld School/ women’s history and
Gender history/ world history and universal history
The century of alliance 1904 up until the Brexit
Relations between France and Britain were that close but complicated. How ? People‘s
attitudes towards one another were ambiguous. How ?
In both countries, there were elite groups who took a close interest in affairs across the
channel. At the turn of the 19th century there were strong common sentiments amounting to
mutual admiration among these elites. Cultivated Englishmen were fascinated by French art
and literature. Many among the British upper and middle classes found the French life style so
agreeable. On top of that, both countries shared a sense of belonging to a common
civilisation.
FRICTION
Between the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth the two
powers fought six major wars with one another and this Franco-British duel profoundly
shaped European and global politics.
The Norman conquest (1066)/ Henry 2 and sons 1154-1216/ Hundred years war 1337-1453/
The American War of independence ,1775-83/ The French revolution 1789
It was in the early 1840s that the phrase Entente Cordiale was applied to Anglo -French
relations
King Louis Philippe 1844:« France asks nothing from England. England asks nothing from
France. We only desire Entente cordiale »
Entente cordiale: 150 years
Naval rivalry 1859, la gloire, the first steam/ powered ironclad battleship 860 ,HMS Warrior
Scramble for Africa: The 1880s and 1890s were the time of the so-called scramble for
Africa. Fashoda and the Boer war, coming closely one after another meant that the old century
ended and the new began on a very sour note.
Perfidious Albion: the French had been given much cause to revive that loaded phrase
Perfidious Albion
Historiography: the 2 countries were positioning themselves in terms of world power, how?
In the late 17th c, France was by far the leading power in Europe in wealth, armed strengths,
culture and reputation. During the 18th century, Britain moved forward as her wealth,
population and power grew
In the late 19th C, The balance titled very much in Britain’s favour
*While British economy thrived on free trade, France needed protection
*Britain the leading power in the world and Germany the predominant power in Europe
*France had fallen behind in both spheres
In terms of diplomacy and strategy, Britain and France had begun to eye one another with a
guarded but hopeful surmise
WHY? A rapprochement to Britain looked a better prospect

ENTENTE CORDIALE 1904 & Franco-British Relations

Treaties: Traditional diplomacy has been greatly concerned with making treaties. On 8 April
1904 a complicated package of Anglo-French agreements commonly known as Entente
Cordiale was signed. It took them 2 years of negotiations to sign the agreement.
Entente Cordiale consisted of 3 elements:
1) A Declaration relating to Newfoundland, West Africa and central Africa
2) A Declaration dealing with Egypt and Morocco
3) A Declaration concerning Siam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides
What process led from the Fashoda Crisis to the Agreement of 1904?
Morocco and the Anglo-French Rivalry! By the Navy Law of 1900, the Germans set out to
build a large fleet. Within a measurable period, France would either have to build against
them or accept that her colonies would be at the mercy of the German sea-power.
The first course would be very expensive; the second would be both dangerous and
humiliating. But there was a third possibility, an agreement with Britain which would gain
the support of the Royal Navy. The prospect of an arrangement with Britain looked
increasingly attractive for France. (Secured Morocco/ Insurance at sea/ the diplomatic
isolation of Germany)
Britain and the « splendid isolation »
Britain was facing the question of whether the old system of a free band would still suffice,
or whether an alliance was necessary. In January 1902, Joseph Chamberlain declared publicly
that the British people must count upon themselves alone: « I say alone, yes in splendid
isolation». The British were puzzled by the German policy because, in the words of a
historian, « the German challenge was at once very concrete and very abstract. »
It was concrete, in that the Germans on occasion threatened war over Samoa, an island in
the Pacific which mattered little to either country. It was abstract in that the Germans talked
in grandiose terms of Weltpolitik and Weltmacht. In 1900 it became clear that one meaning
of Weltpolitik was that Germany would build an ocean-going fleet, which touched the British
at their most sensitive spot (Their SEA POWER).
Plus the economic menace: The growth of German industry/ Coal/ Iron and steel/ Chemicals
Journey leading up to the Entente Cordiale: The negotiations which followed were highly
characteristic of that era and almost completely alien – indeed repugnant to nowadays
They involved the drawing of boundaries between British and French territories in West
Africa without any regard for their.
Paul Cambon wrote to his son : « We split hairs and debate about piles of pebbles in the
region of Lake Chad ».
On 18 January 1896, Wilhelm II declared: “from the German Reich came the world Reich”.
He announced the new doctrine of German foreign policy, Weltpolitik, world policy. For the
Kaiser, Germany had to do everything possible to extend its power throughout the world.
German Weltpolitik was an aggressive policy towards its European neighbours. William II
had to provide Germany with a large fleet: “our future is on the water”, he declared, but this
statement was opposed to that of Salisbury who used to say “we are fish”. Churchill, the
First Lord of the Admiralty, explained: “the navy is a necessity for England; for Germany it is
a luxury item. For us it means existence, for them it means expansion.”
The entente was thought to be impossible. It went against history! Yet it worked! The
agreements did not end all colonial rivalry between France and Britain but they definitely
closed several chapters in that rivalry. The Germans were shaken and dismayed by the
conclusion of the Anglo-French entente
ENTENTE CORDIALE THE Aftermath
THE FIRST MOROCCAN CRISIS (TANGIER INCIDENT)
After the signing of "the entente cordiale" between France and Great Britain in 1904, France
– in order to emphasize an immediate incorporation of the new agreement - provided the
Moroccan Sultan with a program of merely economic and police "reforms" Due to this
decision, Germany grew upset of this "entente cordiale" because its policies relied on the
antagonism between France and Great Britain : it was prince von was BULOW who
conducted the policy of "the free hand" assuring that Great Britain , France and Russia's
relationships would ALWAYS remain conflictual because of their strong disagreement in
Africa and the Far East
Observed consequences
In March, 31, 1905, Wilhelm the second landed in Tangier, and announced to the Moroccan
Sultan that he is in full support of Morocco's independence. Historical overview of the
matter: in 1880, an international convention guaranteed the independence of Morocco.
However, an agreement between France and Britain, two of Europe's most powerful nations,
is perceived as a threat to Morocco. As a result, the first Moroccan crisis emerged and
France's interests were put at risk In order to settle the matter of Tangier incident, Algeciras
conference was soon to be conducted in Spain in 1906
ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 1906
To Germany's disappointment, during the conference, ONLY Austria-Hungary sided with it,
while Italy, Russia and more significantly Great Britain and the United States supported
France. April 7, 1906, The Act of Algeciras was signed. However, the Act did draw some
limitations opposite the French's penetration in Morocco: The Act reaffirmed the
independence of the Sultan and the economic equality of the powers. It also stated that the
French and Spanish Police officers will be under command of a Swiss inspector general. Plus,
the conference guaranteed equal trade opportunities and economic freedom for every
nation It limited any colonial attempt by any nation without consulting with the rest of the
signatories. Germany's intentions to disrupt the relationship between Britain and France,
only served to further strengthen the bond between both powers. They soon started to
discuss military matters to reduce the German threat. A third country, Russia, entered the
entente in 1907 to establish the Triple Entente.
Second Moroccan crisis (July-November 1911)
Earlier on May, 1911 and at the request of the Sultan, France sent troops to Morocco in
order to restore order in the city of Fez where tribes plan to rebel. Later in July 1911,
Germany sent its gunboat, the panther, to the port of Agadir to intimidate the French,
attempt again to break their agreement with Britain and as a result, Germany remains a
strong European power. This aggravated the tensions between Britain and Germany because
Britain conceived of the panther as a German attempt to build a base in Morocco and thus
challenge Britain's naval domination of the Atlantic Ocean.
Second crises resolutions
On November, 4, 1911, another conference occurred to settle the disputes between France
and Germany. The agreement resulted in France ceding parts of the French Congo to
Germany as a way for France to resume its activities within Morocco without Germany's
intervention. While the resolved conflicts gave France full permission to proclaim Morocco a
protectorate, Germany remained unsatisfied of the portion of worthless land it got. In his
speech, Kaiser Wilhem talks about his readiness for sacrifices of "blood and treasure”
Consequences of the Crisis
Both the first and the second Moroccan crisis served as a prelude to the World War 1. The
Moroccan crisis confirmed the division in Europe through the rise, along the years, of large
blocks of power: Germany on one side backed up by Italy and Austria-Hungary and Britain,
France and Russia on the other side
Raymond Poincaré, in early 1912, observed: 'whenever we have adopted a conciliatory
approach to Germany, she has abused it; on the other hand, on each occasion we have
shown firmness, she has yielded, hence Germany's policy is bluff and it would only
understand a forceful response.
Britain's support of France during the crisis proves once more the strong ties between the
two nations and with Russia as well. The crisis increased the Anglo-German estrangement
which emphasized the deep divisions in Europe and would years later culminate in the
outbreak of the First World War Furthermore, the crisis pushed Britain and France to
conclude a secret naval agreement stating that : The Royal Navy would protect the Northern
coast of France from potential German aggressions, while France would concentrate her
fleet in the Western Mediterranean and would defend the British interests there as well

Britain and France go to War 1914-1918 (historiographical perspectives)

PROBLEMATIC: Alliances dictated by military dogma, patriotic sentiment and /or national
interest?
The corpus of literature on the First World War is immense, and of this writing much has
been addressed to events on the western front.
The bloody attrition battles of 1914-1918 and the reputation of commanders who directed
them have been the subject of thorough scrutiny.
Recent studies stressed the need to get away from the essentially national histories of the
war and develop « a new alliance » view. There is a strong reason behind analysing one
aspect of that coalition, the Anglo-French military relationship in the field . The armies of
Great Britain and France were in a unique military situation on the Western front. For over
four years they fought a joint campaign on a common front. This shared military burden
necessitated a close working relationship between the two high commands.
However the nature of the relationship was never stable because of certain important
differences between the principles of campaigns itself, the changing nature of the campaign,
the personalities of the allied commands, the relationship between the allied commands and
the changing size of fighting potential of each army.
3 allied armies, French, British and Belgian fought side by side on the west front from august
1914 to November 1918.
The first move of a coalition war had proved disastrous for the entente, inspiring doubt and
mistrust between the 3 allies. How?
Battle of frontiers, during the first battle of Marne the French accused the British of their
delay to help in the flung at Belgian frontier. They were mutually accusing each other. The
British delay in supporting the French counter offense of Marne.
French reluctance to support Kitchener’s effort to relieve ANTWERP stand out as two of the
principal instances of frictions: Lord Esher Kitchener’s personal envoy in France warned that
if the war ends in unsatisfactory peace it will be because of the muss-management and
mishandling of the alliance from the French side. The British warned that the French would
gain an upper hand in the Alliance which would enable them to dictate the peace
settlement. However, the British were convinced of one thing “we must march to the
support of the French”.
While the French and the British commanders in chief both favoured an offensive strategy to
liberate occupied France and Belgium, they had their differences over how best to carry this
out! Offensive strategy (France territorially occupied by Germans). French plan was dictated
by military dogma and patriotic sentiment
British strategy was geared to British national interests ( ‘ splendid isolation ‘)
-this meant priority was given to Britain’s maritime security in the channel and North sea
and the security of British isles
*there existed a fundamental paradox in British operational strategy on the Western front
Defensive: between Britain’s alliances obligations and her national interests (perfidious
Albion)
The British began the war with a strong sense of their own military independence .They were
allies rather than subordinates , a perception which regular dealings with the French high
command only served to heighten. This is because the French as the principle partner on the
Western front, had pretentions not only to the general control of the allied campaign but the
supreme command.
A political solution to the problems of divided commands only complicated things by
introducing a further competing authority trying to direct operations on the western front.
Churchill noticed that the lack of any real coordination has become evident of every stage.
On the western front, there is a question of unified commands: « We suffer terribly from a
lack of unity of command »
Friction is of course endemic to any military alliance, although the circumstances of the
western front which obliged clearly cooperation in all aspects of offences and defense,
offered wider scope for disagreement than normal.
The regular disputes between the allied high commands are under stable because of the
allies’ strategic differences / dissimilarities in national characteristics /the personal peccadillo
of the allied powers are taken into account.
The French sensed a British air of superiority +the British regarded their French allies as
unreliable+ language barrier+ the demarcation between the two armies was rigidly
maintained+ the French and the British soldiers did not come into contact with one another
General Robertson: « I believe the French are as good allies as any country could have. I
merely wish to emphasize the great difficulty there has been and always will be in operations
conducted by allies armies. It is only natural. »
Argument 1: Praising the French army: despite to these difficulties
Argument 2: history of enmity +ups/downs

Anglo-French Economic alliance 1914-1918

Problematic: Anglo-French /Franco -British economic alliance in the Great War revisited
through the lens of Perfidious Albion?
France faced economic problems from the very start of the war, why?
Total mobilisation of the army brought an immediate drop in industrial production/ Harvest
left to women, children and old men. Germany occupied large areas of North-eastern
France/ Coal mines industries (French coal productions stood at 40.8 million tons in 1913 -
1.1 million in 1915)/ France began to invest more on armaments production/ France became
a large scale importer of coal, raw materials, finished industrial goods and food for both man
and beast.
Britain: Problems came late/ Voluntary recruitment caused much havoc to British economy
as did conscription in France/ Britain was accustomed to vast imports , in 1914 , possessed
some 4000 merchant vessels to transport them/ May 1915, another cloud appeared on the
horizon/ The German declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare/ 1915, the pound
sterling was in a disquieting decline against the dollar/ Early Feb 1915, the British +French
agreed to create a « gold pool » to secure the common use of their gold reserves/ Britain
became for a time the banker of the alliance/ Britain began to arrange loans from the US and
transfer some of them to France
The French played their part, too: France sold some of the gold reserves to England to use as
a guarantee for loans. Britain introduced system to protect merchant vessels from German
U-boats.
August 1915, conference in Boulogne between the British Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mc
Kenna) and French finance Minister (Ribot) ; it was agreed to raise a joint French +British
loan from the US. The two governments agreed to transfer gold to the value of 200 million
dollars each year to New York to promote this loan: a large degree of financial
interdependence between the two countries. The great necessity of all necessities was to
import food: equally important for both Britain + France. Both countries agreed to combine
their efforts to purchase jointly (a humiliation to French character)
February 1916, McKenna and Clémental French minister of commerce agreed that the royal
Sugar commission should buy sugar for both countries and then supply France with 29.000
tons of sugar per month. This was unwelcomed to France’s pride and in the long run
dangerous for French interests