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U.S. Army War College The Senior Leader Development and Resiliency program
SLDR
supports the United States Army War College’s lines of
effort to educate strategic leaders and provide well-being
Senior Leader Development and Resiliency education and support by developing self-awareness
through leader feedback and leader resiliency.
The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War
College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related
to national security and military strategy with emphasis on
geostrategic analysis.
September 2013
The views expressed in this report are those of the author and
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ISBN 1-58487-585-2
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INTRODUCTION
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27. Ibid., p. 8.
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39. James Igoe Walsh and John Szmer, “They Must All Be
Militants: Targeted Killings, Drone Strikes, and Insurgent Vio-
lence in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” paper presented at the an-
nual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego,
CA, April 2012.
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47. Mark Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma, Ann Arbor, MI: Uni-
versity of Michigan Press, 1995, p. 18.
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55. The data for drone strikes and civilian and militant deaths
are those collected by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism. This
data source is preferable for two reasons. First, the Bureau ap-
pears to rely on a wider range of media and nonmedia sources
for its data, and has on occasion sent investigators to the region of
Pakistan where drone strikes occur to conduct interviews to iden-
tify the number and status of victims. Second, the Bureau’s data
produce higher estimates of civilian casualties from drones than
do those of the New America Foundation. If such deaths do incite
more terrorist activity, as some critics of the drone campaign sug-
gest, this should be more clearly visible using the Bureau’s data.
57. David A. Jaeger and Zahra Siddique, Are Drone Strikes Ef-
fective in Afghanistan and Pakistan? On the Dynamics of Violence Be-
tween the United States and the Taliban, Bonn, Germany: IZA, 2011.
60. Megan Smith and James Igoe Walsh, “Do Drone Strikes
Degrade al Qaeda? Evidence from Propaganda Output,” Terror-
ism and Political Violence, forthcoming.
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Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Director of Research
Dr. Steven K. Metz
Author
Professor James Igoe Walsh
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
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Composition
Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil