Professional Documents
Culture Documents
There has always been a strong relationship between education and philosophy –
especially political philosophy. Renewed concern about the importance and effi-
cacy of political education has revived key questions about the connections
between the power to govern and the power to educate. Although these themes
are not always prominent in commentaries, political writings have often been
very deeply concerned with both educational theory and practice. This invalua-
ble book will introduce the reader to key concepts and disputes surrounding
educational themes in the history of political thought.
The book draws together a fascinating range of educational pioneers and think-
ers from the canon of philosophers and philosophical schools, from Plato and
Aristotle to Edward Carpenter and John Dewey, with attention along the way
paid both to individual authors, such as Thomas Hobbes and Mary Wollstonecraft,
as well as to intellectual movements, such as the Scottish Enlightenment and the
Utopian Socialists. Each thinker or group is positioned in their historical context,
and each chapter addresses the structure of the theory and argument, consider-
ing both contemporaneous and current controversies. A number of themes run
through the volume:
Typeset in Galliard
by Cenveo Publisher Services
Contents
Index 285
Contributors
McPherran, M. L. (2010) Socrates, Plato, erôs and liberal education, Oxford Review of
Education, 36, 527–541.
Curren, R. (2010) Aristotle’s educational politics and the Aristotelian renaissance in
philosophy of education, Oxford Review of Education, 36, 543–559.
Reydams-Schils, G. (2010) Philosophy and education in Stoicism of the Roman imperial
era, Oxford Review of Education, 36, 561–574.
FitzGerald, B. D. (2010) Medieval theories of education: Hugh of St Victor and John of
Salisbury, Oxford Review of Education, 36, 575–588.
Parrish, J. M. (2010) Education, Erasmian humanism and More’s Utopia, Oxford Review
of Education, 36, 589–605.
Bejan, T. M. (2010) Teaching the Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on education, Oxford
Review of Education, 36, 607–626.
Tuckness, A. (2010) Locke on education and the rights of parents, Oxford Review of
Education, 36, 627–638.
Riley, P. (2011) Rousseau’s philosophy of transformative, ‘denaturing’ education, Oxford
Review of Education, 37, 573–586.
Hanley, R. P. (2011) Educational theory and the social vision of the Scottish
Enlightenment, Oxford Review of Education, 37, 587–602.
Frazer, E. (2011) Mary Wollstonecraft and Catharine Macaulay on education, Oxford
Review of Education, 37, 603–617.
Leopold, D. (2011) Education and utopia: Robert Owen and Charles Fourier, Oxford
Review of Education, 37, 619–635.
Watts, R. (2011) Harriet Martineau and the Unitarian tradition in education, Oxford
Review of Education, 37, 637–651.
Ryan, A. (2011) J. S. Mill on education, Oxford Review of Education, 37, 653–667.
Schwartz, L. (2011) Feminist thinking on education in Victorian England, Oxford Review
of Education, 37, 669–682.
Quinn, J. C. & Brooke, C. (2011) ‘Affection in education’: Edward Carpenter, John
Addington Symonds and the politics of Greek love, Oxford Review of Education, 37,
683–698.
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Introduction
Education and political theory
Christopher Brooke and
Elizabeth Frazer
This book collects together specially commissioned chapters which cover a series
of political philosophical theories of education: Plato and Socrates, Aristotle, the
Roman Stoics, the Scholastics Hugh of St Victor and John of Salisbury, Erasmus
and More, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, the Scottish Enlightenment, Macaulay and
Wollstonecraft, Fichte and Schleiermacher, the Utopian Socialists, Owen and
Fourier, Martineau and the Unitarians, J. S. Mill, nineteenth-century British
feminists, the Idealists, Symonds and Carpenter, and Dewey. The initial
intellectual impetus for our project was the observation that political and social
theories and philosophies inevitably are imbricated with some theory of or, more
modestly, ideas about, education. So we asked contributors to place accounts of
pedagogy, curriculum, socialisation, schooling, university and scholarship into
the context of political and social philosophy and theory, considering the
relationships between education and the concerns about public and private life,
political and personal power, as they had been understood by prominent thinkers
and groups of intellectuals.
The close relationship between educational and political theory may, of
course, come as news to some scholars and theorists in both disciplines.
Disciplinary specialisation and departmentalisation mean that the academic study
of education and of political theory or philosophy can proceed in mutual
disregard or even ignorance of one another. In any case, the place of the one in
relation to the concerns of the other varies tremendously, and certainly cannot
be determined in advance of close textual and theoretical study. Further, there
will invariably be interpretive dispute about the structure and coherence of any
thinker’s work, and therefore about how the themes of education and political
power relate therein.
Let us take as an example a thinker whose work is not covered by any of the
contributors to the present volume, because he is outside our timeframe. John
Rawls in his 1971 book A theory of justice says rather little about the education
of young people, although he does not say nothing.1 The paucity of his direct
engagement with the theme, though, is of course consistent with the interpreta-
tion that actually education must be a critical contributor to a Rawlsian just
society. Exactly what its contribution is, however, is a matter of interpretation
and dispute between critics and philosophers.
2 Christopher Brooke and Elizabeth Frazer
Like those of other systematic political thinkers, Rawls’s model relies on a
balance between four factors. First is the rational or philosophical justification of
certain patterns and standards of conduct. The idea is that participants in the
society and state will be rationally motivated to behave in desirable ways, simply
because of the truth or validity of proposals that they should behave in those
ways. Second are the institutional and structural incentives that constrain
and urge citizens and rulers to conduct themselves in particular desirable ways.
The idea here is that people behave appropriately not so much because they are
convinced of the independent rightness of appropriate behaviour, but because
the institutions of reward, taxation, and punishment of the society make such
behaviour instrumentally rational. Third is the cultivation of a culture of values
and standards which governs individuals and groups, as it were, informally. The
norms of conduct to strangers, friends, and kin, the values that are celebrated in
cultural forms like music, food, and sociability, are a necessary element of a social
system that is stable and just. Fourth and finally, there is the overt socialisation
of individuals with a specific emphasis on socially oriented and state-endorsed
education, in particular of young people. Just and stable societies educate
individuals to be the kinds of characters who participate appropriately in the just
society.
Exactly how the balance between rational motivation, structural incentives,
culture and education, is, can be, and should be, struck and maintained is a
problem that looms large in the now legendarily voluminous literature on
Rawlsian political theory.2 Commentators argue about what Rawls himself actu-
ally thought about this question, and critics wonder whether Rawls’s solution, or
any solution that is consistent with Rawls’s theory, is really valid or feasible. A
Rawlsian worry about education, especially of young people, is that socialising,
disciplining, incentivising, and acculturating individuals to be ‘the right kind of
individual’ for the society can seem to be an unjustifiable, or, worse, sinister,
imposition of society’s values on what ought to be autonomous individuals.
Others worry that it is an unwarranted intrusion on what should be the prerog-
ative of parents, or cultural community. For others, the idea that a just society
can be established and maintained simply by incentivising adults, engaging in
philosophical argument about right and wrong, and promoting a public culture
is evidently inadequate: education, of children and adults, must be a necessary
condition of any project of social and political stability.
Many theorists and thinkers from the ‘political thought’ canon, of course, say
a good deal more about education, as such, than did Rawls. For many, a treatise
on education is a prominent part of the work – for instance, Erasmus, Locke,
Rousseau, Wollstonecraft, Fichte, and Dewey. For others – for example, More,
Hobbes, or Carpenter – ideas about education are much more interwoven with
the general social or political philosophy. In some cases, essays explicitly address-
ing educational policy and philosophy can be put into the context of more
general social and political theory, as in the cases of Mill and Fichte. In other
cases, an intellectual and political position has its origins in struggles over
education; this is true for the Unitarians, for example, and, arguably, a good deal
Introduction 3
of feminist thought and action. Either way, problems of interpretation regarding
the exact place of education in the theory arise. How, exactly, we should read and
understand works or remarks on education in relation to those on epistemology,
political power and governmental legitimacy, ethics and metaphysics is invariably
contentious.
The ‘philosophy of education’ raises the same kind of conundrums and
disputes as have been rehearsed with reference to other branches of philosophy.
For some, philosophy consists of an enquiry into metaphysics and epistemology,
or into the nature of being, what there is, and our understanding or knowledge
of it. Some philosophers accordingly treat works that are ostensibly about ‘ethics’
or ‘politics’, or about ‘education’ or ‘science’, as ‘really’ about knowledge and
existence, and hence about the human condition. The question whether we treat
philosophical analysis of education and politics (and ethics, science, etc.) as
autonomous fields of study with their own concepts, methods (and nowadays of
course departments, conferences and journals), or as derivative of some more
fundamental philosophical enquiry, is one with which our project engages.
Our discussion of Rawls’s political philosophy earlier treats ‘education’ as one
element in a theory of state and social stability and justice – one that is analyti-
cally distinct from truth, economic rationality, and culture. That it is analytically
distinct from these others does not in itself settle the question of its necessity, nor
its sufficiency, as a critical element of a theory. Nor does analytic distinctiveness
imply that education is wholly autonomous from economy or culture. But denial
that it is wholly autonomous does not licence the view that it is simply derivative,
an epiphenomenon, or some kind of reflex. And analogous considerations apply
to the question of the philosophies of education, politics and epistemology and
metaphysics. Commentators and critics ask whether we should treat Rousseau’s
Emile separately or together with The social contract and the Discourse on
inequality; or whether we should read Locke’s Essay on human understanding,
his Two treatises of government, and Some thoughts concerning education
separately, in the context of distinct philosophical enterprises, or together as part
of ‘the same’ problem.3
These questions then – how philosophy of education relates to other kinds of
philosophical enquiry, and the place of education in particular in relation to
other elements in philosophy and theory of state and social, public and private,
political and personal power – are at the basis of our project. From the Stoic
philosophers, to utopian experimenters, we meet, in the chapters that follow, a
range of philosophical analyses of the relationship between education and the
self, and the society, the polity, values, and knowledge.
The term education itself, of course, covers a wide range of processes and
concerns. The chapters here show how focus shifts over time and from thinker
to thinker. Analyses variously focus on the purposes and methods of scholarship;
the nature of a ‘university’ or a ‘school’; the rearing and socialisation of children;
and the learning and politicisation aspects of religious observance. For some of
the philosophers and thinkers considered here, education is connected above all
to questions of equality and autonomy. Some focus on the relationships internal
4 Christopher Brooke and Elizabeth Frazer
to education itself – between students, between teacher and pupil; others
consider education, and the institutions within which it proceeds, in terms of
their effects on polity and society.
We have decided to present the chapters in the traditional chronological order,
although in the course of the project we considered some alternative schemes.
The historical order naturally conduces to a reading of changes over time, and
across intellectual and political contexts, in how education is conceptualised.
This way of putting it signals dissent from some recent methodological positions
in the history of ideas. It has been argued that an idea in its local context, formed
as it is in response to very specific questions and problems, can hardly be treated
as the ‘same idea’ as that which is denoted by the same word in a context many
centuries distant.4 Notwithstanding the undoubted value of interpretive caution,
about stability of meaning, about the nature of intellectual influence, and about
the ‘development’ of ideas over time, we work on the basis that the past, distant
though it may be, is never completely left behind by those who come after. It
might be that the situations of educators like Socrates, Aristotle, or the Stoics,
mean that their view of education as a public concern is dramatically different
from the view that education, including the education of girls, must be a matter
of public interest as that is articulated by Catharine Macaulay and Mary
Wollstonecraft in the eighteenth century. But the contrasts can be over-
emphasised, for eighteenth-century thinkers were well aware of the concepts,
analyses, and arguments of the classics, and used them as resources in their own
thinking. Macaulay, for example, defended ‘stoicism’ at length, and modelled
herself (in portraits and sculpture) as a Roman woman. Rousseau’s Emile can be
read as a complex dialogue with both Plato and Seneca. Similarly, a particular
understanding of the nature of medieval scholarship and education in the
universities – critically constructed as ‘scholasticism’ – was an important counter
in the fashioning of a new idea of the relationship between state sovereignty and
education in the work of Hobbes, and after him Locke and Rousseau.
These ‘conversations’ across time are an important aspect of our project. We
don’t think of the transformation of ideas across time as teleological – develop-
mentally directed to a greater understanding. But nor do we think of ideas as
occurring purely locally, in specific historical contexts. History is not just one
great philosopher, with her or his ideas of education and politics, in relation to
their own time and place, after another. The transformation of ideas across
contexts and across time is a matter of contestation, rejection, inspirational
refashioning, and reinvention.
From the point of view of some philosophers of education and historians of
educational thought, this collection of essays might look incomplete. Important
eighteenth-century educationalists such as Johann Pestalozzi, or nineteenth-
century figures like Maria Montessori, should surely figure in a collection of
essays entitled ‘Ideas of Education’. We have to say that our intentions from the
outset in this project have been to explore the relationship between thought
about public and private power, politics and government and about education,
and that our approach has been unabashedly based on a traditional canon.
Introduction 5
So Rousseau is here, but Pestalozzi not; Mill is in, but not Montessori, simply
because Rousseau and Mill are among the standard list of significant political
thinkers, and our question about the place of education in their schemes is
clearly posed. This is not to say that we here offer a complete canonical guide. A
larger reader or encyclopaedia would encompass a much longer list of thinkers
than ours.
The chapters published here are not encyclopaedic, either, in their approach
or format. We asked contributors to consider the nature of educational ideas as
well as their place in the broader context of the theory and philosophy of the
individual or group in question, and to consider, where appropriate, the educa-
tional legacy or continuing salience of the work. But we also asked for independ-
ent views of the theme and treatments of the subject. The results are gratifyingly
non-standard, although we have tried to achieve a certain uniformity in the
provision of dates, references, allusions to critical disputes, and to changes in the
reception of the theories in question, in order to help interested readers who
wish to pursue their study further.
Notes
1 Rawls, 1999: two sentences in §17, one in §39, and a paragraph on instruction in moral
autonomy in §78.
2 Some notable contributions in this framework are Gutmann, 1987; Callan, 1997;
Brighouse, 1998; Levinson, 1999; Macedo, 2000.
3 On Rousseau, see Bloom’s introduction to Emile in which he warns against treating; it
as a book ‘for teacher training schools’: Rousseau, 1979, p. 4. On the question of the
relationship between Locke’s Treatises and the epistemology, see Waldron, 2002, pp. 50ff.
4 Skinner, 2002, p. 86.
References
Brighouse, H. (1998) ‘Civic education and liberal legitimacy’, Ethics, 108, 719–745.
Callan, E. (1997) Creating citizens: political education and liberal democracy (Oxford,
Clarendon Press).
Gutmann, A. (1987) Democratic education (Princeton, Princeton University Press).
Levinson, M. (1999) The demands of liberal education (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
Macedo, S. (2000) Diversity and distrust: civic education in a multicultural society
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press).
Rawls, J. [1971] (1999) A theory of justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
Rousseau, J.-J. [1762] (1979) Emile, or on education (ed. A. Bloom) (Harmondsworth,
Penguin).
Skinner, Q. [1969] (2002) Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas, in: Visions
of politics vol. 2 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
Waldron, J. (2002) God, Locke, and equality: Christian Foundations in Locke’s Political
Thought (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
1 Socrates, Plato, erôs, and
liberal education
Mark L. McPherran
Introduction
Although modern educators and educational theorists often credit Socrates and
Plato for their ground-breaking contributions to educational methods, theory,
and reform, they often misunderstand them. They also commonly relegate them
to the history of education, rather than seeing them as still relevant to the theory
and practice of teaching at secondary and post-secondary levels. This is
understandable, especially if one has some understanding of the current state of
secondary and post-secondary teacher education.1
There are several useful outlines of the nature and uses of Socrates’ (469–399
BCE) notorious ‘Socratic Method’ – and many contemporary discussions of the
logical side of its several puzzling aspects.2 There are also several good outlines
of Plato’s (428/427–348/347 BCE) educational theory – especially as it is
deployed in his portrait of the perfect city in his Republic.3 In this paper, I want
to focus on a more neglected topic, namely, the non-logical, psychologically-
astute pedagogical methods of Socrates, mentioning briefly what Plato did with
that inheritance.
It has been said that the first axiom of Socratic teaching is ‘Start where the
students are’ (Swardson, 2005, p. 178). Given where some students really are
these days, however, this will strike some of us as a very challenging invitation.
For although Aristotle (384–322 BCE) may have been right in his own time and
place that ‘It is easy to get starting points with men of good upbringing’
(Nicomachean Ethics, Bk I, 1095b7-8), such points are now harder to find in the
post-everything era of the present – even among the very best of the breed. For
although undergraduates may not actually believe that four-sided triangles exist,
some very bright ones are nevertheless willing to assert that very possibility until
one can per impossibile prove otherwise. Others seem not to have any committed
beliefs on philosophical topics to appeal to in discussion. So even though the
Socratic method – the elenchos – is frequently presented as a relatively theory-free
teaching device, suitable for use in all disciplines from art to law to engineering
as a way of testing student knowledge claims, it needs always to be recognised
that its subjects must at least possess a commitment to the law of non-
contradiction for the game to even get going. Moreover, the effective use of the
Socrates, Plato, erôs, and liberal education 7
elenchos requires a full consideration of the psychological, cultural, and ethical
factors surrounding the relationship between the elenchos-wielder and his or her
interlocutor.
The philosophising mentioned in item (7) most closely associated with Plato’s
Socrates is the elenchos. The general pattern of an elenchos is roughly this:
A real lover of learning strives by nature for what is … He does not linger
over each of the many things that are believed to be, but keeps on going,
18 Mark L. McPherran
without dulling his erotic passion or desisting from it, until he grasps what
the nature is of each thing itself with the part of his soul that is fitted to grasp
a thing of that sort because of its kinship with it. Once he is drawn near to
it, has intercourse with what really is, and has begotten understanding and
truth, he knows, truly lives, is nourished, and – at that point, but not
before – is relieved from his labor pains. (490a9-b7).
This is precisely why it is more important than ever to have high school and
college students confront texts such as the Symposium: for such texts give them
the language and the theories that will allow them to confront and integrate the
great forces that those years unleash, and whose long-term consequences can
be more than devastating.
I should here make some brief relevant points about Plato’s larger, positive
educational theory. As Plato sees it, education is not something that can be
simply instilled in a manner analogous to ‘putting sight into blind eyes’ (Plato,
Republic, 518b-c). On the contrary, the educator grants that sight is there,
though not turned in the right way or looking where it should look, and
contrives to redirect it appropriately (518d). Education, then, is the craft
concerned with ‘this very turning around … with how this instrument [by which
we learn] can be most easily and effectively turned around, not of putting sight
into it’ (518d). The instrument in question, here, is our rational element (580d).
That element, together with appetite (439) and spirit (thumos; 439e, 581a-b)
constitutes the entire embodied human soul. As a result, education cannot
accomplish its task of reorienting reason without reorienting the whole soul, any
more than an eye can be turned around except by turning the whole body
(518c). So although Platonic educational practice is primarily targeted on
reason, it must also concern itself with appetite and spirit. And, as I have here
argued, we can now see that it must concern itself also with love.
The lesson of Plato’s dialogues is that we must somehow lead students to
desire to come to visit us (and each other), as Socrates does with Theodotê. This
must be instead of us chasing after them and their often transitory, job-oriented
goals. We can try to grasp just what it is they think they desire, and then connect
it as best we can in our teaching styles with a desire for the subject matter at
hand, the argumentative skills that subject involves, and even, perhaps, the
psychic harmony that must be a component of their actual, genuine, inchoate
Desire.
Acknowledgements
Previous versions of this chapter have been presented at the Socrates or Rousseau?
Ancient and Modern Perspectives on Liberal Education conference, The Daniel
Webster Program, Dartmouth College, November; Vancouver Island University,
September 2009; and the University of San Francisco, March 2010. My thanks
to my audiences for their comments. I am also grateful to my colleague at USF,
Marjolein Oele, for her comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
Socrates, Plato, erôs, and liberal education 19
Notes
1 A recent (tough-minded) article on the current state of the liberal arts in the United
States is Slouka (2009).
2 See, e.g., Scott (2002).
3 See, e.g., Reeve (2010).
4 Erôs is most commonly observed at work in those who are sexually infatuated with
a beloved, whereas friendly affection (philia) can be had for friends and family. On
Socrates’ use of irony, Vlastos (1991), ch. 1; for his use of shame, Brickhouse & Smith
(2010), pp. 53–62, and Sanderman (2004).
5 Slouka (2009) argues that ‘upsetting people is arguably the very purpose of the arts and
perhaps the humanities in general’.
6 My argument in these paragraphs is engaged in particular with Vlastos (1991).
References
Aristotle (1933/5) The Metaphysics. 2 vols, Loeb Classical Library (London, Heinemann).
Aristotle (1934) Nicomachean Ethics (trans. H. Rackham) (London, Heinemann).
Benson, H. (2000) Socratic wisdom (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
Brickhouse, T. & Smith, N. (2002) The Socratic Elenchos? In: G. Scott (ed.) Does Socrates
have a method? Rethinking the Elenchus in Plato’s dialogues and beyond (University Park,
PA, Pennsylvania State University Press), 145–157.
Brickhouse, T. & Smith, N. (2010) Socratic moral psychology (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press).
Cicero (1927) Tusculan disputations (trans J.E. King) Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge,
MA, Harvard University Press).
Entralgo, L. (1970) The therapy of the word in classical antiquity (eds and trans. L.J. Rather
& J.M. Sharp) (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press).
McPherran, M.L. (1996) The religion of Socrates (University Park, Pennsylvania State
University Press).
McPherran, M.L. (2007) Socratic epagôgê and Socratic induction, Journal of the History of
Philosophy, 45(3), 347–364.
Plato (1953 fp 1871) Gorgias (trans. B. Jowett) in Vol. II of Dialogues of Plato (Oxford,
Clarendon Press).
Plato (1953 fp 1871) Charmides (trans. B. Jowett) in Vol. I of Dialogues of Plato
(Oxford, Clarendon Press).
Plato (1953 fp 1871) Euthyphro (trans. B. Jowett) in Vol. I of Dialogues of Plato (Oxford,
Clarendon Press).
Plato (1953 fp 1871) Euthydemus (trans. B. Jowett) in Vol. I of Dialogues of Plato
(Oxford, Clarendon Press).
Plato (1930–1935) Republic (trans. P. Shorey) 2 vols, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge,
MA, Harvard University Press).
Plato (1953 fp 1871) Sophist (trans. B. Jowett) in Vol. III of Dialogues of Plato (Oxford,
Clarendon Press).
Plato (1953 fp 1871) Phaedrus (trans. B. Jowett) in Vol. III of Dialogues of Plato
(Oxford, Clarendon Press).
Plato (1953 fp 1871) Symposium (trans. B. Jowett) in Vol. I of Dialogues of Plato
(Oxford, Clarendon Press).
Reeve, C.D.C. (1989) Socrates in the Apology (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing
Company).
20 Mark L. McPherran
Reeve, C.D.C. (2010) Blindness and reorientation: education and the acquisition of
knowledge in the Republic. In: M. McPherran (ed.) Plato’s Republic: a critical guide
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
Sanderman, D. (2004) Why Socrates mocks his interlocutors, Skepsis, 15, 431–441.
Scott, G. (ed.) (2002) Does Socrates have a method? Rethinking the Elenchos in Plato’s
Dialogues and beyond (University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press).
Slouka, M. (2009, September) Dehumanized: when math and science rule the school,
Harper’s Magazine, 32–40 (Available online at: http://www.harpers.org/archive/
2009/09/0082640).
Swardson, H.R. (2005) Socratic teaching under postmodern conditions, The Philosophical
Forum, 36(2), 161–182.
Vlastos, G. (1989) Socratic piety. In: J. Cleary (ed.) Proceedings of the Boston area
colloquium in ancient philosophy, v(5), 213–238.
Vlastos, G. (1991) Socrates: ironist and moral philosopher (Ithaca, Cornell University
Press).
Vlastos, G. (1994) Socratic Studies (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
Woolf, R. (2000) Callicles and Socrates: psychic (dis)harmony in the Gorgias, Oxford
Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 18 (Summer), 1–40.
Xenophon (1923) Memorabilia (trans. E.C. Marchant) in Vol. IV of Xenophon in 7 vols.
Loeb Classical Library (London, Heinnemann).
2 Aristotle’s educational
politics and the Aristotelian
renaissance in philosophy
of education
Randall Curren
Introduction
The only extended discussion of education in the Aristotelian corpus is in Book
VIII of the Politics, where Aristotle advocates that schooling be publicly provided
and ‘one and the same for all’ (VIII.1 1337a23). Isolated remarks about
education appear in earlier books of the Politics, and a few can be found in the
Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere. With enough effort, these scattered passages
can be understood in relation to one another and in light of the overall plan of
the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) and Politics (Pol.).1 The former concerns ethics,
obviously enough, and the latter concerns ‘legislative science’ (nomothetikê), but
they are closely related to each other as parts of the larger enterprise Aristotle
calls ‘political science’ (hê politikê epistêmê or hê politikê; NE I.2, X.9; Adkins,
1991). As Aristotle conceives it, the general aim of political science is to
determine the truth about human happiness (eudaimonia) – ‘the highest of all
goods achievable by action’ (NE I.4 1095a15-20) – and to guide societies (Pol.
IV.1 1288b21-89a7, III.8 1279b12-25; NE VII.11 1152b1-2) and households
(NE X.9 1180a25 ff.) toward happiness.2 A central claim about happiness in the
Nicomachean Ethics is that it requires the possession and exercise of intellectual
and moral virtues, and a central related feature of the Politics is its identification
of education that cultivates these virtues as the primary tool of statesmanship
(Pol. VIII.1). Education is as important to Aristotle’s conception of a political
community as it is to Plato’s, though Aristotle would seem to have had less
patience with spelling out the details.
A revival of interest in Aristotle’s ethics was well underway in the 1970s (see
Cooper, 1975; Barnes et al., 1977; Rorty, 1980), and a revival of his politics
followed (see Keyt & Miller, 1991; Yack, 1993; Miller, 1995), yielding more
integrated readings of the texts and topics that span them (see, e.g., Cooper,
1999; Curren, 2000; Kraut, 2002; Roberts, 1989, 2009).
An Aristotelian renaissance in philosophy of education has meanwhile devel-
oped largely as an offshoot of the virtue ethics movement associated with the
revival of Aristotle’s ethics. This has arguably done much to advance our under-
standing of moral development and education (see Pincoffs, 1986; Carr, 1991;
Carr & Steutel, 1999; Curren, 2002a; Kristjánsson, 2007), and to reestablish
22 Randall Curren
human flourishing as a theorised aim of education (White & White, 1986;
Kupperman, 1987; Hirst, 1998; Strike, 2003; Brighouse, 2006; Nussbaum,
2006; Curren, 2009a). Apart from and substantially prior to the virtue ethics
movement, interest in Aristotle’s account of practical reason yielded a significant
literature on teacher competence and curriculum (Schwab, 1969; Green, 1976;
Fenstermacher & Richardson, 1993). The limitation of an Aristotelian renais-
sance largely independent of scholarship in ancient Greek philosophy is not
inconsequential, however. Opportunities have been missed and mistakes have
attracted a substantial following.
My aim in this paper is to survey Aristotle’s educational thought, noting some
interpretive controversies, commenting on related developments and missed
opportunities in contemporary educational thought, and questioning the
Aristotelian credentials of a major body of recently influential work in philosophy
of education. The work I will question concerns the nature of teaching and
denies that phronêsis (practical wisdom, good judgment) has for Aristotle the
‘universal’ element, or element of systematic knowledge of principles, he says it
has (Dunne, 1997; McLaughlin, 1999; Smith, 1999; Maclntyre & Dunne,
2002; Dunne & Pendelbury, 2003; Hogan & Smith, 2003; Carr, 2005). It
deploys this understanding of phronêsis, together with some related claims about
crafts and practices, to defend the professional autonomy of educators against
managerial encroachment. I shall challenge the Aristotelian credentials of this
work, but also suggest how a more accurate understanding of Aristotle’s philos-
ophy of education can be harnessed to much the same end. The universal
element in phronêsis was obscured by some of the interpretations of the 1980s,
sometimes in constructing particularist forms of virtue ethics, but to say that
phronêsis ‘ is concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which
become familiar from experience’ (NE VI.8 1142a13-15; cf. 1141b14-16) is to
assert unequivocally that it is concerned with universals.3
Political science
The Nicomachean Ethics and Politics are records of lectures intended to equip
Aristotle’s students with the universal element of phronêsis, or a systematic
understanding of the human good and how to promote it.4 Students must have
been ‘well brought up in good habits’ (NE I.4 1095b6) and be experienced ‘in
the actions that occur in life’ (I.4 1095a3) in order to grasp ‘the facts’ that are
the ‘starting-points’ of ethical and legislative inquiry. A good upbringing and
experience of life provide a student with true moral beliefs (‘facts’), but these are
just the starting points. True virtue (arête; see Curren, 1996a) and the systematic
knowledge required to promote virtue and happiness require more, and Aristotle
aspires to provide what is required. His course in ethics is presented as an
opportunity to progress dialectically from the possession of ordinary, unsystematic,
true or mostly true ethical beliefs to a systematic, reasoned body of ethical
knowledge (epistêmê) resting in an account of human nature and well-being
(see Reeve, 2000, pp. 21–27, on dialectic and the first principles of sciences).
Aristotle’s educational politics 23
The student’s antecedent beliefs are to be worked into a coherent, intercon-
nected, and grounded whole – the ethical knowledge required for phronêsis. There
is, thus, in the very framing of Aristotle’s project and its audience, an announce-
ment of his practical philosophy as both a science intended to guide practice and
a curriculum for all who would aspire to happiness in their own lives or the lives
of others – the curricular prerequisites of phronêsis. He follows Plato in frequently
invoking the role of medical science (epistêmê) in medical practice as a guiding
analogy for the role of political science in human affairs (NE I.13 1102a7-25;
II.2 1104a5-9; III.3 1112b12-15; X.9 1180b13-29; Pol. I.9 1257b25-32; II.8
1268b33-39; see also Jaeger, 1957; Lloyd, 1968). The reference to medicine at
the end of the Nicomachean Ethics (X.9) is especially telling:
The virtues
In the final book of the Nicomachean Ethics (X.9), Aristotle observes that
reasoned arguments alone are not enough to make people good. Many people
are not moved by arguments based on what is admirable or appropriate (kalon),
because they lack even a conception of what is kalon, having never been exposed
to it (1179b4-15). He goes on to say that ‘nature’ (i.e., traits one is born with),
habituation (training in doing the right things) and teaching must all be favour-
able in order for a person to become good, so there is little chance of becoming
good if one does not grow up under good laws. We learn in Books VII and VIII
of the Politics that those laws should, among other things, provide schooling that
is public and ‘the same for all’ (VIII.1 1337a23-24). Book VIII opens with the
remarkable suggestion that ‘No one will doubt that the legislator should direct
his attention above all to the education of youth’ (1337a10-11) – remarkable
because public or state-sponsored education was unknown in his world apart
from some military training. It reflects a conviction that societies have a funda-
mental, collective duty – a duty falling on governments – to enable the young to
develop into good and flourishing adults. The laws should regulate birth and
early training in order to ensure the healthy development of the body and the
desiring part of the psyche, all with an eye to the development of ‘reason and
mind’ (VII.15 1334b15-17). Aristotle says this sequence of development is
‘natural’, but he regards the fulfillment of a person’s intellectual potential as
something rare and difficult to achieve.
Aristotle’s educational politics 25
Aristotle defines moral virtues as dispositions to feel and be moved by our
desires or emotions neither too weakly nor too strongly, but in a way that moves
us to act as reason would dictate, and to take pleasure in doing so (NE II.2-6).
Intellectual virtues are defined as capacities or powers of understanding,
judgment and reasoning that enable us to attain truth (NE VI.2 1139b11-13).
Treating the moral virtues as states of the irrational part of the psyche, he regards
them as laying a necessary foundation for the development of intellectual virtues.
Having distinguished the moral and intellectual virtues in this way, Aristotle
says the former mainly arise as a result of habit and the latter mainly arise as a
result of teaching (NE II.1). The understanding of his conception of moral
development often goes no farther than the associated idea that we become brave
by repeatedly doing the right thing in the face of danger and become cowardly
by repeatedly fleeing or cowering in the face of danger. Yet, there are two very
important further aspects to Aristotle’s conception of moral virtue and its devel-
opment. The first is that ‘habit’ cannot mean thoughtless, unguided repetition
(Sherman, 1989). The conduct in question must be shaped in all its details
towards what is desirable. This requires supervision to ensure that the learner
does the right thing, and coaching that leads her through progressive mastery of
various nuances of what she is doing, calling her attention to aspects of it she will
not have perceived nor had any language to describe. Supervision and coaching
enable learners to progress and become self-directed in their practice and habits.
The second overlooked aspect of Aristotle’s conception of moral development
is that the moral virtues are both a necessary step towards, and only completed
by, the acquisition of the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom or good
judgment (VI.12 1144a29-37; VI.13 1144b7-20 and 30-32; Curren, 2000,
pp. 202–204). Aristotle asserts a unity of virtue thesis, which holds there are
interdependencies between the possession of good judgment and the possession
of moral virtues. No moral virtue is a true virtue unless it is guided by good
judgment, and no one can develop good judgment without first possessing
natural or habituated forms of the moral virtues. Moral virtues are dispositions
of desire, emotion and perception that lead us to choose and do what it is reason-
able for us to choose and do, all the while perceiving our choices and actions to
be reasonable. Moral virtues thereby establish the ends we aim at, while good
judgment enables us to achieve those ends. Virtue that is merely habitual might
suffice in familiar circumstances, but it will not reliably guide us to the right or
best act. A true virtue is supposed to be good without qualification, so it must
be guided by good judgment which prevents its possessor from going astray in
challenging circumstances.
The unity of virtue thesis also holds that in order to have good judgment one
must possess all the moral virtues. The possession of good judgment is only
possible if one perceives the world accurately in all its moral particularity, and
according to Aristotle our perceptions are largely shaped by what we have
experienced as normal. The ways we have habitually acted and the ends we have
habitually pursued will seem to us acceptable and good. An aspect of the
formation of (habitual) moral virtues or vices is thus the habituation of
26 Randall Curren
corresponding perceptions, accurate or inaccurate. Since good judgment
requires accurate perceptions, it also requires the possession of the moral virtues
pertaining to different spheres and aspects of conduct.
By Aristotle’s lights, good practical judgment (phronêsis) subsumes particular
cases, well perceived, under universal principles acquired through teaching.
Perceiving the particulars well requires virtue, as we have seen, but also
experience and discussion that enables one to benefit from the perceptions of
others. Learning the universal principles begins, as we have seen, with the
acquisition of true ethical beliefs in the course of a sound moral upbringing, and
it proceeds through a study of political science that refines and shapes those
beliefs into a systematic, interconnected whole – a ‘scientific’ understanding of
human affairs.
Human flourishing
Aristotle employs a whole battery of arguments in Books I and X of the
Nicomachean Ethics and Book VII of the Politics to show that the highest good
and happiest life for human beings is a life devoted to intellectual inquiry or
‘contemplation’ as its highest aim.6 The most intuitive of his reasons is that what
is most satisfying is putting our greatest gifts, our intellectual capacities, to good
use. As he says in NE I.7, the highest good for human beings is activity that
exhibits virtue of the ‘best and most complete’ kind, or in other words sophia, the
wisdom that pertains to intellectual inquiry or ‘contemplation’ (1098a16-18).
Another argument compares the two strongest candidates for being the highest
good: the life that takes contemplation as its highest end and the life that takes
statesmanship or political leadership as its highest end. The contemplative life
qualifies as the highest good for human beings, because it is not only desirable for
itself (being intrinsically satisfying), but aims at nothing beyond itself (NE X.7.
1177a16-18; Pol. VII.3 1325b14-32). The political life cannot qualify as a high-
est good, because the activity of statesmanship aims at something beyond itself –
ideally, the well-being of the statesman’s society. In aiming at something beyond
itself it is not ‘complete’ in itself, and the virtue it exhibits is not ‘complete’. The
political life may be a happy life for some, if it genuinely exhibits the virtue of
practical wisdom – the second best and most complete human virtue – but it
cannot constitute the best kind of life or highest good for a human being.
Once one recognises that Aristotle identifies only two kinds of lives as genu-
inely happy, the contemplative life being the happiest and the political life being
happy ‘in a secondary degree’ (NE X.8 1178a9), it is easy to understand his
deepest argument for believing that only someone who possesses moral virtue
can be happy. It is intrinsic to both of these kinds of lives that they involve the
exercise of intellectual virtues which, according to the unity of virtue thesis,
cannot be possessed by someone who lacks the moral virtues (Kraut, 1989). The
accurate perceptions associated with the moral virtues are required for both
phronêsis and sophia, since both are concerned with truth, including truths about
human affairs.7 Understanding this sheds light on Aristotle’s idea in Politics
Aristotle’s educational politics 27
VII that the training of the irrational psyche should aim at ‘reason and mind’. It
should prepare the way for the acquisition of the intellectual virtues, whose
exercise is central to a happy life, by ensuring that a person’s perceptions of what
is good and appropriate are not corrupted by growing accustomed to doing bad
or inappropriate things.
Political communities
Aristotle’s Politics begins with an account of the origin and growth of polises
(politically autonomous cities), and his famous claim that human beings are
‘political animals’ (politikon zôon). What this means is not that human beings
naturally engage in political activities, but that they are gregarious, need to live
together in cities in order to live the best kind of life, and are equipped by
language to live as a community consciously organised in pursuit of the best kind
of life (I.2 1252a8-53a30; Miller, 1995, pp. 30–45). As Aristotle conceives it, a
political society should be a mutually beneficial partnership to which everyone
freely consents (Pol. I.13 1259b37-60a2; III.3 1276a8-16, III.4 1277b8-30,
III.6 1297b17-22, VII.2 1324a24-25, etc.). As a partnership in pursuit of the
best kind of life, a political community must be socially unified, collectively
governed, of one mind in its conception of the best kind of life, and egalitarian.
A true political community is unified by friendship, and friendship requires at
least a semblance of equality (VII.8 1328a35-36; II.4 1262b7-10, etc.).
Yet, existing societies are not unified, Aristotle says. His concern, like Plato’s,
was how societies might become more peaceful, stable and secure against the
factional conflict that ensured most governments in their world were short-lived.
In the Republic, Plato imagined a scheme for common rearing of children in
which parents would not even know whose child was whose. He imagined that,
in this way, rivalries between families might be restrained and a stronger sense of
civic community might emerge. In Book II of the Politics, Aristotle rejects this
scheme. He agrees that a society must be unified by friendship to be secure
against factional conflict, but he thinks a more promising way to accomplish this
is through civic institutions that nurture friendships bridging all social groups.
The most important of these civic institutions is common schools – public day
schools – in which a city’s diverse children ‘grow up together’ at least a few hours
a day (V.9 1310a12-25). It is through education that societies can be unified and
made into a community, Aristotle advises (Pol. II.5 1263b37-38; see Curren,
2000, p. 131 ff, 2002c).
Aristotle goes on (in Pol. III) to elaborate an account of constitutions and the
proper forms of political rule, distinguishing the true, just or legitimate forms of
constitution from those that are corrupt, unjust or illegitimate. As one would
expect, the former aim at the common good and operate on the basis of consent,
while the latter aim only at the good of the rulers and rely on force (III.6
1279a17-22). The former promote partnership in living well, hence mutual trust
and goodwill, while the latter may seek to divide and enfeeble the populace in
order to prevent unified and effective resistance to its rule. Just regimes are based
28 Randall Curren
upon a rule of law, which no one is above, and their laws are worthy of respect.
Unjust regimes are by contrast ‘lawless’ or ‘unconstitutional’, and the unjust
requirements they announce as laws have no claim to being obeyed.
Of the just forms of constitution, polity is the best that can be attained by most
societies, and it is for that reason the goal towards which the reform of actual
societies should aim. It is both a ‘mixed’ constitution, which provides forms of
direct participation for citizens of all social classes, and a ‘middle’ constitution,
dominated by a large middle class. This is just because it respects the right of all
citizens to participate (Pol. III.9 1280a9-b7; NE V.3 1131a24-28), and it is
beneficial because moderation of wealth is conducive to living well and a large
middle class serves as a bulwark against destructive political polarisation.
Kingship is Aristotle’s theoretically ideal system, but he dismisses it as ‘unat-
tainable’, leaving an ideal form of aristocracy as the best constitution that might
be possible in highly favourable circumstances. Aristotle regards an ordinary
aristocracy, or rule in the common interest over willing citizens by a few who are
genuinely the best (aristoi), as a legitimate form of constitution.8 In Book VII of
the Politics, he imagines a constitution in which all of the citizens rule and possess
the true virtue required to live the best kind of life. This would be an ideal aristoc-
racy in which all of the citizens are voluntary partners in living the best kind of
life. Since the citizens would be partners in this, they must have leisure from
productive activities so they can acquire the highest virtue and make activity in
accordance with it the dominating concern of their lives. Those who engage in
productive activity, namely artisans, traders and farmers, would be necessary to
the political society but not members of it. They might be resident aliens at best,
maybe slaves but not citizens, though dealings with them should still be based on
mutual benefit. (It goes without saying that Aristotle has no plausible account of
how slavery could benefit the slave.) Citizens would share in ruling and being
ruled, and land holdings would be divided among the citizens, assuring the
moderation of wealth conducive to equal citizenship and a life of virtue. Three
institutions are mentioned as conducive to virtue and the social unity necessary
to a true community: common meals or dining clubs, common religious obser-
vances and common schools. In the closing chapters of Book VII, we come to
matters of childbirth, childcare and the training of habits and schooling, where
(as we have seen) everything should aim at the proper development of the rational
element of the psyche – the ‘best part’ in human nature, the flourishing of which
is intrinsic to living the best kind of life. Since this ‘ideal aristocracy’ is to be a
society of virtuous equals living in partnership in pursuit of the best kind of life,
every citizen must receive an education in virtue, and should receive it in the
context of common schools in which all citizen children are educated together.
Education
Two ideas dominate the opening of Book VIII of the Politics. One is that educa-
tion is a prerequisite for the practice of virtue, and is thus a matter of public
concern (1337a20-21). The foregoing makes this easy enough to understand: the
Aristotle’s educational politics 29
proper aim of politics is to enable citizens to live the best kind of life. In order to
live such a life, a person must be virtuous. The development of virtue depends on
a variety of things beyond a person’s control. To educate someone is to train and
teach him so he acquires the moral and intellectual virtues, develops the good
judgment needed for prudent self-governance and participation in political rule,
and learns to take pleasure in the excellent activities with which a good life is occu-
pied. It makes perfect sense that Aristotle says in VIII.5 that the main concern of
education is to ‘cultivate … the power of forming right judgments, and of taking
delight in good dispositions and admirable actions’ (1340a15-19). He says else-
where that to be educated is to be able to form a sound judgment of an investiga-
tion or exposition, a person of ‘universal education’ being one who is able to do
this in all or nearly all domains of knowledge (Departibus animalium 639a1-5).
Note well that education is a preparation for leisure ‘spent in intellectual
activity’, according to Aristotle (VIII.3 1338a10-11). It is not a preparation for
work, as is so often now assumed. Greek education in gymnastikê (athletics) and
musikê (music, poetry and narratives – the ‘Arts of the Muses’) was from the
beginning a preparation for leisure (see Curren, 1996b). The knightly warriors
of Athens who originally received it spent their daytime leisure in athletic
contests and their night-time leisure at drinking parties where they entertained
each other with music and recitations. The subsequent democratisation of
Athens and invention of group lessons altered this ‘old education’, in part by
introducing the commercially useful arts of reading, writing and arithmetic.
Leisure was, in any case, not equated with mere amusement. It was contrasted
with productive labour in such a way that public service – even military service –
was generally considered a use of leisure, or time not spent in satisfying material
needs. For Aristotle, leisure provided the opportunity to flourish as a human
being or to pursue what is intrinsically, not just instrumentally, good.
Education should include ‘necessary’ practical arts, according to Aristotle
(VIII.1 1337b3-9), but it should focus on what is ‘liberal’ or conducive to
spending one’s leisure in activities that express the best in human nature or best
and most complete virtue. Aristotle’s lengthy discussion of music emphasises its
capacity to shape character and judgment (VIII.5-7). Yet, he notes that even
music becomes illiberal or ‘mechanical’, if it is pursued in order to entertain
others (making it an activity that is not complete in itself) and is pursued in such
a way that it interferes with the development and exercise of virtue (VIII.6
1341a4-b19). He is not specific about what counts as ‘necessary’ practical arts,
but he probably has in mind what is necessary to meeting one’s material needs
and exercising virtues that involve the use of external goods. His model is
probably a landowner of moderate means who needs to read, write, draw and use
arithmetic to prudently manage his farm.
The second dominating idea at the opening of Politics VIII is that citizens
should be moulded ‘to suit the form of government’ or constitution
(1337a11-19). The character of citizens matters to preserving constitutions and
also to their quality. The better the character of the citizens, the better the
constitution, Aristotle says. This is somewhat puzzling, since everything I have
30 Randall Curren
attributed to Aristotle suggests that constitutions should be made to suit the
needs of the citizen, not the other way around. Moreover, Aristotle says that it
is only in the best constitution that the virtues expected of a citizen fully coincide
with the virtues of a human being as such (Pol. III.4 1277a1-4). Only the best
kind of society fully enables the development of independent good judgment
and encourages the universal expression of that judgment in public and private
life. Since the proper aim of any political society is to enable citizens to develop
and exercise the best and most complete human virtue, it is not clear how it
could be legitimate for any government to educate citizens to have any virtues
that deviate from these. What are we to make of this?
First it is important to realise that Aristotle says a great deal in the middle
books of the Politics about the measures that actual regimes should take to
preserve themselves. He identifies injustice as the most important general cause
of political instability, and his advice to governments has the effect of encourag-
ing reforms that will make them both more just and longer lasting (V.1 1301a36-
b4; Curren, 2000, p. 100 ff.). To the extent that defective regimes adopt his
proposed reforms, they will come to approximate polities and have the best form
of constitution most societies could hope to have. Public education is introduced
in this context as the most valuable of the reforms that can be adopted. Like
other reforms, it will not leave a deficient system as it is, but will instead both
stabilise and improve it. Indeed, Aristotle says quite explicitly in Politics V.9 that
the education that ‘suits’ a constitution is not the kind of education preferred by
the rulers of an unjust system (1310a12-25). It is education compatible with a
more balanced and moderate system that better serves the interests of all citizens.
A critic might object at this point that education should not support anything
less than an ideal system. Aristotle’s implicit answer is that the best course in
human affairs is to proceed through incremental reform transacted through
public consultation and shared governance. Education that prepares everyone to
employ independent good judgment in shared governance is progress.
Second, it must be recognised that in order for constitutions to ‘suit the needs
of the citizen’, citizens must have certain desirable qualities. A constitution
(politeia) is not, as Aristotle understood it, simply a blueprint for a form of
government, but a functioning political system whose actual patterns are heavily
determined by the characteristics of the people involved. Moulding the constitu-
tion in such a way as to enable citizens to live the best kind of life requires
measures to ensure that citizens are prepared to treat each other with mutual
respect and friendly regard for each other’s well-being. It requires that citizens
have fellow citizens who will in a variety of ways allow them the satisfaction of
fulfilling their human potential.
education is a distinctive practice with an integrity of its own, and that this
entitles that practice to a decisive measure of autonomy in carrying out its
work. (Hogan & Smith, 2003, p. 166, italics added; cf. Blake et al., 2003,
p. 7; Dunne, 1997, p. 364 ff.)
I have not found in the paper this is quoted from, or in any related works, an actual
argument for the claim that the integrity of educational practice entitles educators
to professional autonomy. Supposing the activity of teaching were a practice
engaged in for itself and nothing beyond itself, what is quite unclear is why anyone
would be entitled to engage in that activity with other people’s children, at other
people’s expense, free of external constraint, guidance and expectations.
As much as I find PPP both un-Aristotelian and philosophically irreparable, I
do sympathise with the desire to shield teaching and learning from the unrelent-
ingly instrumentalist and controlling pressures of the age. I also sympathise with
the intuition that Aristotelian resources can be put to good use in this endeavour.
The argument I have made in my own work on academic leadership (writing
here not of schools, but of universities) is that:
Acknowledgements
I owe thanks to the Spencer Foundation for facilitating my work on the larger
project of which this essay is a part, and to Deborah Modrak and an anonymous
referee for their comments on an earlier draft.
Notes
1 This was indeed my purpose in Aristotle on the necessity of public education (Curren,
2000). The present article relies fundamentally on interpretive arguments developed
in detail in that work. For some points of clarification and philosophical expansion, see
Curren 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, 2006 and 2009b. The translations quoted in this paper
are from the Revised Oxford Translations in Barnes, 1984.
2 For an account of Aristotle’s audience, see Bodéüs, 1993.
3 See Sherman, 1989, for a particularist reading, and compare Reeve, 1992 and 2000,
which take Aristotle at his word.
4 For what is known about Aristotle’s school, the Lyceum, see Lynch, 1972.
5 ‘Art’ is a more idiomatic translation of technê in some contexts, and ‘craft’ is more
idiomatic in others. Contemporary usage commends medical ‘arts’ but Socrates’ under-
stood virtue as a ‘craft’, a form of knowledge resting in definitions of the virtues; politics
as soul ‘craft,’ but the ‘art’ of governing.
6 For a comprehensive defence of this reading and consideration of the leading alterna-
tives, see Kraut, 1989. Kraut argues that it is the unity of the virtues that makes moral
virtue internally (psychically) essential to a happy life.
7 An alternative, ‘inclusive ends’ interpretation of eudaimonia and its dependence on
moral virtue attributes to Aristotle the view that a happy human life – unlike a god’s life –
essentially involves virtuous participation in a human community. The texts typically
cited include NE 1097b11, 1140b7-11, 1177b27-28, 1178b5-8 and 1179a22-32 (see
Depew, 1991; Miller, 1995, pp. 346–357; Roberts, 2009, pp. 9–10), but they are hardly
decisive. What seems true is that: (1) virtue is essential to enjoying intimate good friend-
ship, which Aristotle identifies as the greatest ‘external’ good; (2) widespread virtue with
respect to others is essential to a city capable of enabling one to live well.
8 ‘Ordinary’ aristocracy is, of course, itself an ideal. Most so-called aristocracies are actually
oligarchies ruled by persons of wealth posing as ‘the best’ or most virtuous.
9 It is important to recognise that one can dismiss the idea that development occurs in
stages, with the emergence of reasoning trailing behind the formation of desire, yet
still hold that the development of reasonableness is incremental, dependent on factors
and efforts beyond the learner’s control, and may remain incomplete (as it is in much
of our prison populations; see Curren, 2002a). Stables, 2008 is not the first work to
argue in one way or another that Aristotle is wrong because children are already ra-
tional and do not require the formative care we imagine. These arguments focus on
circumscribed forms of rationality and fail to acknowledge the incremental nature and
gradual, socially mediated development of good judgment and capacities of self-man-
agement. See Purdy, 1992, for a powerful, virtue-centred refutation of such arguments.
Aristotle’s educational politics 35
10 A great deal of Curren, 2000 is devoted to establishing this.
11 There is of course substantial overlap between my critique and Kristjánsson’s, as well as
points of divergence. In the interest of brevity I must leave it to interested readers to
consult his splendid book for themselves. It corrects other abuses of Aristotle’s ideas in
the moral education literature, which I won’t address.
12 Dunne writes, in a characteristic passage, that ‘the great significance of Aristotle lies in
the fact that he ... set limits to the sway of techne and, through his novel conception of
phronesis, provided a rich analysis of the kind of knowledge that guides … characteristi-
cally human – and therefore inescapably ethical – activity (praxis)’ (Dunne & Pendle-
bury, 2003, p. 200). He asserts a few lines later that phronêsis is irreducible ‘to general
propositions’ (p. 201). It being a virtue, this can scarcely be denied, but it does not at
all follow that the universal principles that inform good practical judgment will never,
in the circumstances discerned, point clearly to a course of action. Dunne’s rejection
of ‘technique’ rests on a form of contextualism about judgment that Aristotle did
not hold.
13 On intrinsic rewards in learning, the damaging consequences for students of admin-
istrative pressures on teachers, and the value of theory in guiding good practice, see
Pelletier & Sharp, 2009; Ryan & Niemiec, 2009a, b. The empirically grounded theory
in question incorporates a form of eudaimonism broadly inspired by Aristotle’s account
of well-being. Aristotle’s philosophy being a naturalistic one with aspirations to sci-
ence, it is entirely within the spirit of his project to wed contemporary applications of
it with empirical research (see Curren, 2006, pp. 465–468).
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36 Randall Curren
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359–380.
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3 Philosophy and education
in Stoicism of the Roman
imperial era
G. Reydams-Schils
Introduction
In the first two centuries of the Roman imperial era, the study of philosophy
constituted the crowning educational experience, in the sense of being both a
privilege and a capstone. Only an elite among the elite studied philosophy, and
only then after mastering a curriculum consisting of grammar (reading, writing
and literature) and rhetoric. The ongoing cultural rivalry between rhetoricians
and philosophers could be intense, even though a Stoic such as Seneca
(c. 4 BCE–65 CE) clearly turned his rhetorical training to his advantage in order
to convey his views more forcefully, especially in his letters and consolations. This
tension was acknowledged in Seneca’s comments about his father’s misgivings
about philosophy (Ep. 108.22), in the exchanges between Marcus Aurelius
(121–180 CE, Med. 1.7) and his rhetoric teacher Fronto (c. 100–170 CE,
De eloquentia (Haines/van den Hout), Ad M. Caes. 3.15 (1.100 Haines, p. 48
van den Hout)), and in the concerns of Epictetus (c. 55–135 CE, Diss. 3.23.33-
38), who, like Seneca (Ep. 40), warned that rhetorical flourishes should not
cloud a philosopher’s expression.1
For Romans, Latin was the linguistic medium for rhetoric (even though
rhetoric could also draw from Greek models). Philosophy, on the other hand,
was most often expressed in Greek, even in the reflections that the emperor
Marcus Aurelius addressed to himself. Seneca consciously departed from this
model by not merely rendering Greek idiom, as had Cicero (106–43 BCE) and
Lucretius (early to mid-first century BCE) before him, but also developing his
philosophical views in Latin terms (Inwood, 2005, pp. 7–22).
As the following discussion of the views of Seneca, Cornutus (fl c. 60 CE),
Musonius Rufus (fl c. 30–100 CE), Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius will demon-
strate, these later Stoics could look back on a considerable legacy established by
the founders of the school in the Hellenistic period: Zeno (334–262 BCE),
Cleanthes (331–232 BCE), and especially the prolific Chrysippus (c. 280–206
BCE). The earlier Stoics had often framed their views in a conscious rivalry with
Plato and his successors, and also claimed Socrates for their own purposes.
During the Roman Republic, Stoics such as Panaetius (c. 185–110 BCE), who
spent part of his life in Rome and belonged to the entourage of Scipio Africanus
Philosophy and education in Stoicism of the Roman imperial era 39
the Younger, and Posidonius (135–51 BCE), who went on an ambassadorship to
Rome, directly infused Roman culture with their ideas; and Cicero, though not
a Stoic himself, demonstrated a familiarity with many Stoic views.
Not all the Stoics of the Roman imperial era taught philosophy or directed a
philosophical school. (For a good overview of Stoicism in the imperial era, see
Gill, 2000, 2003.) There is evidence of teaching activity on the part of Cornutus
and Musonius Rufus, but not much information about its structure. Cornutus
appears to have also taught topics pertaining to grammar as well as philosophy.
Epictetus directed a school in Epirus. Other Stoics were engaged in a wide range
of practices. Seneca progressively devoted more time to philosophy as he grew
older, addressed others who had interests and concerns similar to his, and also
wrote tragedies; Marcus Aurelius’ writings were addressed to himself, and it is
not clear whether he intended his reflections for a wider audience; and Manilius’
work (first century CE) belongs within the tradition of didactic poetry.
Cleomedes’ astronomical treatise on the heavens is a rare example of a Stoic
technical treatise from this period (c. 200 CE),2 as is the Elements of ethics by a
certain Hierocles (fl. 100 CE), to which we will return below.
Although the works of Seneca, Cornutus, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and
Marcus Aurelius engage the topic of education at the relatively advanced level of
philosophy, they also provide some insights into pre-philosophical education.
The writings of Seneca and especially Marcus Aurelius give us clues about how
they themselves were educated. The entire first book of Marcus Aurelius’
Meditations, for instance, consists of an overview of the people who shaped him,
including his teachers. Stoic philosophy itself, in turn, had its own curriculum,
often conveniently divided into the three areas of logic, the study of nature
(or physics, as the ancients called it), and ethics, though in the work of the
authors examined here, ethics is the dominant strand of inquiry. Yet in the final
analysis, in the view of these later Stoics, philosophy cannot be reduced to a
curriculum or even a purely intellectual activity, but rather is meant to inform all
human actions and to transform so-called ‘ordinary’ life from within existing
social structures and responsibilities. The following discussion will examine these
thinkers’ views regarding pre-philosophical education, the three branches of
philosophy, and the ultimate goal of philosophical education.
The builder does not come and say: Listen to me lecturing on building. He
gets his contract for a house, builds it, and shows that he has the craft. You
should act in the same sort of way: Eat like a human being, drink like a
human being, and so too, dress, and marry, and father children, and play
your roles as citizen; put up with abuse, and an inconsiderate brother, father,
son, neighbor, fellow-traveler. Show all this to us, so that we can see what
you have really learnt from the philosophers. (Diss. 3.21.1-6; trans. Long)
Notes
1 During the later period known as the Second Sophistic, the rivalry becomes all the more
pronounced, with Dion of Prusa (also known as Chrysostom), Apuleius and Maximus
of Tyre clearly straddling the divide.
2 Even though the dates suggested for Cleomedes range from the first century BCE to the
fourth century CE, a dating of ‘some time around 200 CE’ has been proposed as likely by
Alan C. Bowen and Robert B. Todd, 2004, pp. xi–xii, 2–4.
3 Cf. Boys-Stones, 2007, who emphasises a strong strand of ethical pedagogy in his work,
which also reflects on the political and civic aspects of human communities.
4 On the point that texts such as Epictetus’ Encheiridion and Marcus Aurelius’ Medita-
tions are as ‘philosophical’ as Chrysippus’ treatises, see Sellars, 2009, esp. pp. 126–128,
165–166, 167–175. Pace Brennan, 2005, who uses a stereotypical distinction between
Chrysippus as ‘one of the greatest thinkers of all time’ and Epictetus as ‘one of the great-
est talkers’ (p. 10).
5 Here my approach differs from P. Hadot, 1998, p. 216, repeated by Sellars, 2007 and
2009, esp. p. 145 (summary statement), who stipulate that there is a practical side to
physics and logic as well. While I do not take issue with this claim as such and the impli-
cation that there are appropriate exercises in logic and physics, I would also emphasise
that physics and logic are practical precisely to the extent that they serve a human being’s
correct understanding of the good and its implementation in life, that is, ethics in action.
6 P. Hadot, 1995, is still the seminal work on this topic, but my focus here is on what
is distinctive in the later Stoic tradition; cf. also Hijmans, 1959; Sellars, 2009, esp.
pp. 107–166. Xenophon does not hesitate to attribute this notion to Socrates (Mem.
1.2.19).
7 On this aspect of Epictetus, who prefers to see himself as a ‘trainer of the young’, see
Diss. 2.19.29-34, cf. Long, 2002, pp. 121–125. Thus when Musonius Rufus speaks as
one man in exile to another, he presents his arguments as addressed to himself as well as
to his addressee (9 Hense/Lutz), and when he counsels a youth who has a conflict with
his father over the study of philosophy, he does not insert himself between the son and
the father to bring about a transfer of authority (16 Hense/Lutz). On this topic, cf. also
Bénatouïl, 2009, especially pp. 134–155, and G. Reydams-Schils, ‘Authority and agency
in Roman Stoicism’, forthcoming.
50 G. Reydams-Schils
8 Even though Epictetus explicitly distances himself from the practice of doctors adver-
tising for patients, Diss. 3.23.27. See Musonius Rufus 17 Hense/Lutz; Epictetus Diss.
1.11, addressed to a Roman official merely passing through, and 2.19.29-34.
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4 Medieval theories of education
Hugh of St Victor and
John of Salisbury
Brian D. FitzGerald
Introduction
The medieval roots of our contemporary universities are well known. Rather less
familiar is what thinkers of the time actually considered education to be. The two
theorists examined here – Hugh of St Victor (c.1096–1141) and John of
Salisbury (c.1120–1180) – represent only the twelfth century, but there are good
reasons for turning to this period in particular for an assessment of medieval
education. Intellectually, the twelfth century saw heightened activity, especially
in Paris, where Hugh taught and John studied. The old cathedral schools were
proving incapable of absorbing the influx of new texts and ideas (including, for
instance, techniques of textual analysis and the translations of Aristotelian logical
writings) or of satisfying the growing desire for instruction in these by students
who were driven both by enthusiasm and by a recognition of the career advance-
ments that education could bring within the Church.
In this period, before groups of masters and teachers became formalised
entities recognisable today as universities, before the methods and aims of
scholasticism spread, both Hugh and John understood the need for systematic
statements about what learning should be and how it should be done. Hugh’s
Didascalicon (written in the late 1120s) and John’s Metalogicon (in 1159),
besides reflecting the twelfth-century fashion of Greek-sounding titles, are their
major pedagogical statements. Medieval scholars had, of course, long been aware
of earlier visions of education: the writings, for instance, of Cicero and Quintilian,
though incompletely known in the Middle Ages, encouraged reflection on the
liberal arts – what was the relationship between wisdom and eloquence? Did
studying these arts improve people’s lives? For Christian thinkers, whose search
for wisdom revolved around the figure of Christ, whom they believed was
Wisdom incarnate, there was often uncertainty about their relationship to the
old pagan arts and forms of schooling. What place did a liberal arts education
have for a Christian when all that was necessary for salvation could be found in
the Bible? Twelfth-century scholars could find authority either for an ascetic
rejection of worldly wisdom, as in Athanasius’ Life of St Anthony, or for a more
positive monastic appraisal of secular letters, as in the writings of Cassiodorus
(c. 490–585) or Alcuin (c. 735–804). One of the reflections on these questions
Medieval theories of education 53
most influential for medieval education was Augustine of Hippo’s De doctrina
christiana, written at the beginning of the fifth century. In this paper, I hope to
show how Hugh and John, drawing on, and responding to, both classical and
Augustinian ideas, offered re-statements of pedagogical purpose and method
which were significant in their own day and important for any consideration of
the history of educational theory.
It is easy for an artisan to talk about his art, but it is much more difficult to
put the art into practice. What physician does not often discourse at length
on elements, humours, complexions, maladies, and other things pertaining
to medicine? But the patient who recovers as a result of hearing this jargon
might just as well have been sickened by it. (II.9, p. 94)
The same is true of moral philosophers who cannot embody ethics in their own
lives.10
One of John’s overriding concerns regards eloquence’s relationship to wisdom
and, like Hugh, he has an Augustinian precedent in De doctrina christiana.
While Hugh drew primarily upon the themes of the first three books of that
work, John’s interest in the concrete uses of the verbal arts is the focus of Book
IV. Augustine recognises rhetoric has a purpose in promoting the truth when
used well, but he worries about its misuses (1995, p. 119). Book IV, where he
discusses how to present Scripture’s meanings to others, reveals that underlying
ambiguity. Augustine, like John, focuses on specific uses of eloquence rather than
mastery of its rules (p. 201), but he is wary of the study or use of any rhetoric
detached from a Scriptural context. This, for him, is eloquence without wisdom,
and he refers to Cicero’s own warning ‘that wisdom without eloquence was of
little value to society but that eloquence without wisdom was generally speaking
a great nuisance, and never beneficial’ (p. 203). For Augustine, wisdom comes
from reading Scripture, and his concern is the eloquence required for preaching
to unfold Scripture’s message to others and to move them to follow it
(pp. 227–233).
John’s own discussion of this relationship is not focused on preaching but, as
befits a diplomat, on the interactions that occur in civil life. Eloquence without
wisdom – the mistake made by addicts of dialectic – is a mere ‘hodgepodge of
verbiage’ (sartago loquendi), words that are useless or harmful in their emptiness
(1962, I.3, p. 16). But wisdom without eloquence – the mistake of the
Cornificians – is equally problematic: any knowledge we have is futile unless it
can be assessed with dialectic, expressed with grammar, and used via rhetoric to
influence others (I.7, pp. 26–27). Only with eloquence can one pursue the goal
of building up human happiness.
This goal reveals a reworking of Book IV of De doctrina christiana in the
same manner that Hugh reworked the first three books. Like Hugh, John rejects
a pessimistic notion that man’s post-lapsarian nature limits his capacities and
knowledge (Nederman, 1988, pp. 11–12). John intends a more immediate
remedying of human weakness than Augustine, though he urges the develop-
ment of happiness within a context more secular than both Hugh and Augustine.
In positing the trivium’s powers, John retains an Augustinian awareness of
human weakness and disorder, and yet he believes that it is natural and beneficial
for humans to live within social bonds. John follows what Nederman calls the
Medieval theories of education 59
Ciceronian tradition (placing it between Augustinian pessimism and Aristotelian
optimism about natural sociability) – society may be natural, but people need to
be awakened to this nature through reason and persuasion (1988, pp. 4–6).11
Unlike Hugh, for whom the maxim ‘Know thyself ’ is the basis for spiritual
regeneration ultimately aimed at the contemplative’s encounter with the cosmic
source of Wisdom, John’s emphasis is on renewal of the human community. For
John, too, then, the way one studies is a mirror of moral development. Human
nature neither limits one’s abilities to learn nor one’s abilities to build up the
bonds of human society – people need to be drawn out through practice in both
learning well and living virtuously. Studies do not make people good, John
notes, but they do help them both ‘to receive and to impart knowledge’, which
precedes virtue (1962, I.21, p. 61). There is room for grace, but it must build
upon a developed nature.
John’s pedagogical ethics contain one further element. He combines his
optimism about the powers of education with a moderate scepticism (rare in his
time) regarding man’s ultimate capacities for certain knowledge.12 People are, he
says, ‘imprisoned within the petty dimensions of our human capacity’ and there-
fore must be moderate in their claims of truth (II.20, p. 127). In the end, with
sensation as its foundation, knowledge consists mainly of ‘probabilities’ (III.10,
p. 201) such that human perfection means ‘having a good concept of many
things’ (III.3, p. 157). John’s sense of the probabilistic is a major reason why he
spends so much of the Metalogicon discussing the proper uses of dialectic and
promoting in particular its Aristotelian forms: rational powers are useless without
the verbal arts to bring them to life, and Aristotelian logic seems to him a
particularly suitable technique for assessing probable truths in a world which is
otherwise reliant on sense data (Keats-Rohan, 1987, pp. 4–5). This technique’s
moderate methods are a good way of using both reason and persuasion in the
attempt to improve human society.
having attained years of discretion, they would allow serious affairs of state
to take precedence of their own diversions. The state would then feel a surge
of strength course through its entire frame and the appearance of perfect
harmony would impart charm and it would attain the perfection of an
exquisite beauty … if there be no confusion in its various functions. (1938,
I.4, p. 26)
Conclusion
Both Hugh and John, therefore, propose systems where the humble search for
wisdom and truth underlies all learning, and where the process of education is a
model for how one lives. Augustine, too, understood this to be education’s func-
tion, and Hugh and John are clearly indebted to him. Nonetheless, they are not
as willing as Augustine (or indeed as predecessors like Cassiodorus or Alcuin) to
subordinate everything so firmly to Scripture. For Hugh, a comprehensive vision
of the divine presence within the natural world leads him to seek a legitimate and
proper place for all forms of knowledge, balancing the new and the old, the
sacred and the secular. All these forms contribute to his systematised search for
wisdom, marked by the concerns of contemplation: to gain greater awareness of
the divine image within. John, on the other hand, places the arts at the service
neither of Scripture nor of contemplation but of society, for it is in the realm of
utility and action that he primarily envisions the operation of wisdom. Knowledge
in pursuit of virtue must be grounded in the practical and the probable. In peda-
gogy, this means defending the traditional trivium to keep each art in its proper
place, while encouraging the latest developments in logic because of their epis-
temological benefits. In politics, it means articulating the distinct responsibilities
of each member for the other to prevent the distortions that weaken communal
harmony, while promoting a liberty that requires humble toleration. Jerome
Taylor notes that a particular concern of twelfth-century thinkers was ‘the rela-
tionship of the entire order of nature to the divine’ (1961, p. 12). For Hugh and
for John, education develops man’s natural capacities, making him more aware
of who he is and what he is called to be, as image of God or as social creature.
Both the contemplative and the politician see education at the heart of human-
ity’s spiritual renewal.
In the following century, as the Paris schools were incorporated as a university,
the concerns of Hugh and John did not lose their significance. Indeed they
became more acute: the translation of Greek and Arabic texts continued apace,
requiring absorption by intellectuals; university curricula became both more
organised and more narrowly specialised; and dialectic assumed a greater role in
theological and philosophical discourse. Thirteenth-century scholastic philoso-
phers and theologians were certainly concerned with the role of education in
spiritual and social renewal, but, by the fourteenth century, the condemnation of
scholastic pedagogy and specialised training by Italian humanists such as Petrarch
indicated the perception of a lost balance and purpose. Schooling, with its
Medieval theories of education 63
distinctions and disputations, seemed dominated by arid subtilitas, its ethical and
civic relevance more and more distant. In the Didascalicon and Metalogicon,
though, it is clear that one does not need to wait for the Renaissance to see the
answers that would address humanist interests: the need to integrate the classical
and Christian traditions, the significance of the verbal arts, and the role of
education in transforming not only the intellect but the soul. Augustine had
already shown how important solutions to these issues were for medieval
Christians, and Hugh and John continued his work while transforming it. Their
twelfth-century statements offer insight into the earlier pedagogical traditions
while pointing forward to the questions and debates of the centuries to come.
Notes
1 See also Zinn (1995) for the presence and absence of De doctrina christiana in the
Didascalicon.
2 See Markus (1996) for an excellent discussion of this aspect of Augustine’s thought.
3 See Sweeney (1995) for a more detailed comparison of the two works.
4 For a discussion of 12th-century divisions of the arts, see Taylor (1961), pp. 7–17.
5 Cf. Hugh (1961) I.8, p. 55.
6 Zinn (1995) describes Hugh’s later development of a more refined distinction between
sacred and secular.
7 Sweeney (1995, pp. 63–65) offers more detailed comparisons.
8 Cf. Hugh’s critique of this attitude (1961, V.7, p. 130), as well as Augustine’s rejection
of curiositas, e.g. in Confessions X.35.
9 Harkins (2009, pp. 275–276) discusses the significance of this idea for Hugh’s works
after Didascalicon.
10 Two influential precedents for a discussion of this relationship – between a per-
son’s moral statements and moral actions – with regard to preachers are De doctrina
christiana Book IV and Gregory the Great’s Regula pastoralis.
11 For a discussion of the classical and early medieval sources for this concept, see
Kempshall (2008).
12 Augustine treats this sort of scepticism in De magistro and Contra Academicos.
13 There is no complete English translation of this work. In this paper, I quote the partial
versions by Pike (the 1938 edition) and Nederman (the 1990 edition).
14 Nederman (2005, p. 60) notes that, in his discussion of tyranny, John spends nearly as
much time on ecclesiastical tyrants as secular ones, for members of the clergy could just
as easily attempt to upset the balance of power between body and soul.
15 Wilks (1984) gives a more detailed explanation of this relationship.
16 For more on the debates about John’s attitude towards tyranny, see Nederman (2005),
pp. 60–62.
Further reading
For the Didascalicon, the best current translation is (1961) The Didascalicon of
Hugh of St Victor: a medieval guide to the arts (trans. J. Taylor) (London,
Columbia University). Taylor’s introduction is an excellent discussion of the text
in its historical context. The critical edition is (1939) Hugonis de Sancto Victore
Didascalicon de studio legendi (ed. C. H. Buttimer) (Washington, DC, Catholic
University). The latest comprehensive discussion of Hugh’s thought is by Paul
64 Brian D. FitzGerald
Rorem (2009) Hugh of St Victor (Oxford, Oxford University Press), and a good
overview can also be found in Patrice Sicard (1991) Hugues de Saint-Victor et son
école (Turnhout, Brepols). For a contemporary thinker’s meditation on the
significance of the Didascalicon, see Ivan Illich (1993) In the vineyard of the text:
a commentary to Hugh’s Didascalicon (Chicago, University of Chicago).
The English translation of the Metalogicon is (1962) The Metalogicon of John
of Salisbury: a twelfth-century defense of the verbal and logical arts of the trivium
(trans. D. McGarry) (Berkeley, University of California). The critical Latin
edition is (1991) Ioannis Saresberiensis Metalogicon (eds J. B. Hall & K. S. B.
Keats-Rohan) (Turnhout, Brepols). Keats-Rohan has also done a critical edition
(1993) of Books I–IV of the Policraticus (Turnhout, Brepols). The remainder
can be found in C. Webb’s 1909 edition. A recent overview of John’s life and
works, with a helpful bibliography of scholarship since 1984, can be found in
Cary Nederman (2005) John of Salisbury (Tempe, Arizona Center for Medieval
& Renaissance Studies). David Luscombe provides a summary of scholarship
before 1984 in (1984) The world of John of Salisbury (ed. M. Wilks) (Oxford,
Blackwell).
Among the numerous considerations of 12th-century thought and education,
several important ones, with references to Hugh and John, are R. W. Southern
(1982) The Schools of Paris and the School of Chartres, in: R. Benson &
G. Constable (eds) Renaissance and renewal in the twelfth century, 113–137, and
(1970) Medieval humanism (Oxford, Blackwell); C. S. Jaeger (1994) The envy of
angels: cathedral schools and social ideals in medieval Europe, 950–1200
(Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania); S. Ferruolo (1985) The origins of the
university: the schools of Paris and their critics, 1100–1215 (Stanford, Stanford
University); and M.-D. Chenu (1997) Nature, man and society in the twelfth
century (trans. J. Taylor & L. Little) (Toronto, University of Toronto).
For Augustine’s De doctrina christiana, the critical edition is R.P.H. Green
(1995) Augustine: De doctrina christiana (Oxford, Oxford Early Christian
Texts). A collection of scholarly essays about the text can be found in D. W. H.
Arnold & P. Bright (eds) (1995) De doctrina christiana: a classic of western
culture (Notre Dame, IN, University of Notre Dame). The influence of the work
is assessed in E. D. English (ed.) (1995) Reading and wisdom: the De doctrina
christiana of Augustine in the Middle Ages (London, University of Notre Dame).
References
Augustine (1992 [397]) Confessions (trans. H. Chadwick) (Oxford, Oxford University
Press).
Augustine (1995 [c. 426–7]) On christian teaching (ed. & trans. R. P. H. Green) (Oxford,
Clarendon).
Forhan, K. L. (1992) The not-so-divided self: reading Augustine in the twelfth century,
Augustiniana, 42, 95–110.
Harkins, F. (2009) Reading and the work of restoration: history and scripture in the theology
of Hugh of St Victor (Toronto, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies).
Medieval theories of education 65
Hugh of St Victor (1939 [c.1127]) Hugonis de Sancto Victore Didascalicon de studio
legendi (ed. C. H. Buttimer) (Washington, DC, Catholic University).
Hugh of St Victor (1961 [c.1127]) The Didascalicon of Hugh of St Victor: a medieval guide
to the arts (trans. J. Taylor) (New York, Columbia University).
Jerome (1996 [Epistle 70 composed 397]) Sancti Eusebii Hieronymi epistulae
(ed. I. Hilberg) (Vienna, Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften).
John of Salisbury (1938 [1159]) Frivolities of courtiers and footprints of philosophers, being
a translation of the first, second, and third books and selections from the seventh and eighth
books of the Policraticus of John of Salisbury (trans. J. Pike) (Minneapolis, University of
Minnesota).
John of Salisbury (1962 [1159]) The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury: a twelfth-century
defense of the verbal and logical arts of the trivium (trans. D. McGarry) (Berkeley,
University of California).
John of Salisbury (1990 [1159]) Policraticus (trans. C. Nederman) (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press).
John of Salisbury (1991 [1159]) Ioannis Saresberiensis Metalogicon (eds J. B. Hall &
K. S. B. Keats-Rohan) (Turnhout, Brepols).
Keats-Rohan, K. S. B. (1987) John of Salisbury and education in twelfth century Paris
from the account of his Metalogicon, History of Universities, 6, 1–46.
Kempshall, M. S. (2008) The virtues of rhetoric: Alcuin’s Disputatio de rhetorica et de
virtutibus, Anglo-Saxon England, 37, 7–30.
Markus, R. A. (1996) Signs and meanings: world and text in ancient Christianity
(Liverpool, Liverpool University).
Nederman, C. (1988) Nature, sin and the origins of society: the Ciceronian tradition in
medieval political thought, Journal of the History of Ideas, 49, 3–26.
Nederman, C. (1989) Knowledge, virtue and the path to wisdom: the unexamined
Aristotelianism of John of Salisbury’s Metalogicon, Mediaeval Studies, 51, 268–286.
Nederman, C. (1996) The meaning of ‘Aristotelianism’ in medieval moral and political
thought, Journal of the History of Ideas, 57, 563–586.
Nederman, C. (2002) Mechanics and citizens: the reception of the Aristotelian idea of
citizenship in late medieval Europe, Vivarium, 40, 75–102.
Nederman, C. (2005) John of Salisbury (Tempe, Arizona Center for Medieval and
Renaissance Studies).
Rorem, P. (2009) Hugh of St Victor (Oxford, Oxford University Press).
Sweeney, E. (1995) Hugh of St Victor: the Augustinian tradition of sacred and secular
reading revised, in: E. D. English (ed.) Reading and wisdom: the De doctrina christiana
of Augustine in the middle ages (London, University of Notre Dame), 61–83.
Taylor, J. (1961) Introduction, in: (trans. J. Taylor) The Didascalicon of Hugh of St Victor:
a medieval guide to the arts (New York, Columbia University), 3–39.
Wilks, M. (1984) John of Salisbury and the tyranny of nonsense, in: M. Wilks (ed.) The
world of John of Salisbury (Oxford, Blackwell), 263–286.
Zinn, G. (1995) The influence of Augustine’s De doctrina christiana upon the writings of
Hugh of St Victor, in: E. D. English (ed.) Reading and wisdom: the De doctrina chris-
tiana of Augustine in the middle ages (London, University of Notre Dame), pp. 48–60.
5 Education, Erasmian
humanism, and More’s Utopia
John M. Parrish
Introduction
Of the various classical theories of education surveyed in this volume, the contribu-
tion of the humanists of the Northern Renaissance – of what came to be known
as ‘Erasmian humanism’ – may well be the least familiar to modern students of
education. There is some irony in this. The name of Desiderius Erasmus (1466–
1536), though scarcely remembered today beyond the university, was in his own
day synonymous with learning and the pursuit of knowledge. The most famous
of his associates, Thomas More (1478–1535), is better remembered, but mainly
for his martyrdom, and perhaps secondarily for coining the term ‘Utopia’ – but
not as a leading exemplar and promoter of the Erasmian humanist approach to
learning and knowledge. Other leading Erasmian humanist figures, such as
Guillaume Budé or Juan Luis Vives, are now remembered almost exclusively by
historians. Yet the contribution made by Erasmus and his circle to the theory and
practice of education was as influential as perhaps any of the approaches surveyed
in this collection.
In the first section of this paper, I will outline the main features of the
Erasmian strain of Renaissance humanism, pointing out the main components of
that tradition which carried implications for the philosophy of education. In the
second section, I will explore in greater detail two specific works of Erasmus – his
treatises on The education of a Christian prince (1515) and his later work On the
education of children (1529). In the last section I will show how Thomas More’s
Utopia (1516), perhaps the most enduring literary achievement of Erasmian
humanism, displays the educational philosophy of the movement in such a way
as to bring out its larger implications for moral and political theory and practice.
Finally, in the paper’s conclusion, I will briefly consider the contemporary legacy
of this tradition for educational theory and reform.
Erasmus on education
Turning now to Erasmus’s own main texts on education, I want to focus my
attention on three issues, each of which is both central to Erasmus’s own
educational theory and has been deeply influential on subsequent educational
practice. These are: first, his persistent emphasis on the importance of early
childhood education; second, his argument that methods of education which
amuse and delight students are more effective than those which emphasise
coercion and fear; and third, his insistence that the moral dimension of
education – an explicit concern with directly cultivating the pupil’s development
of virtue and good character through the educative process itself – is not only a
legitimate but indeed an indispensable element of the teacher’s task.
If there is a single theme most frequently emphasised in Erasmus’s educational
writings, it is the importance of early childhood education. It is never too early
to begin the process, Erasmus argues, for ‘we can never begin too soon with
something that can never be finished’ (De pueris instituendis (hereafter DPI);
Collected works (hereafter CWE) v. 26, p. 343). Early education is necessary
because of the centrality of learning for human life, for what it means to be
human. Repeatedly Erasmus emphasises that someone who lacks education or
the desire for wisdom ‘is less than human’ or ‘has no humanity at all’ (Colloquies,
‘The abbot and the learned lady’, CWE v. 39, p. 502; DPI, p. 298; see also DPI
p. 301; De recta pronuntiatione (hereafter DRP), CWE v. 26, p. 369). This belief
commits Erasmus to promote public responsibility for providing universal educa-
tion to citizens, for ‘children of commoners are human beings just as much as
those of royal family’ (DPI, p. 334). Just as the public takes responsibility to train
its soldiers or its church choir members, so too should appropriate training ‘be
70 John M. Parrish
provided by the authorities for those who are to give the young people of the
nation a sound education based on humane ideals’ (DPI, p. 333).
Parents should therefore begin thinking about providing their children’s
education from the moment of conception, for the child’s earliest experiences
will have immense consequences for later life (DPI, pp. 309, 319, 323). Several
factors make children especially well suited to early learning, in contradistinction
to (sixteenth-century) conventional wisdom. First, very young children are
exceptionally impressionable, giving them a good memory and a natural aptitude
for learning (DPI, p. 297, p. 320). Erasmus stresses this from the first sentence
of the De pueris:
If you follow my advice … you will see to it that your infant son makes his
first acquaintance with a liberal education immediately, while his mind is still
uncorrupted and free from distractions, while he is in his most formative and
impressionable years, and while his spirit is still open to each and every
influence and at the same time highly retentive of what it has grasped; for
we remember nothing in old age as well as what we absorbed during our
unformed years. (DPI, p. 297)
Repeatedly, Erasmus invokes the metaphors of wax, clay and dye wool to
illustrate the impressionability of young children (Parallels, CWE v. 26, p. 163;
DPI, pp. 305–306, 318–319).
In particular, Erasmus points out, very young children are well suited to the
acquisition of language, in part because of their natural urge (shared with
monkeys) to imitate (DRP, p. 369; DPI, pp. 319–321, 336). So remarkable is
this capacity in young children, Erasmus claims, that ‘a German boy could learn
French in a few months quite unconsciously while absorbed in other activities’
(DPI, p. 320). Adults avoid learning Latin and especially Greek because of its
difficulty; early education is the remedy. And given the centrality of the rhetorical
arts to the humanist programme, it is not surprising to find Erasmus claiming
that language acquisition is the gateway to ‘intellectual judgment and a mastery
of all the branches of knowledge’ (DPI, pp. 320–321).
Not every method is suitable to early childhood education, so the instructor
must be discriminating. Human flourishing in general depends on three factors,
according to Erasmus: nature (i.e., natural character); method (i.e., education);
and practice. These form ‘three strands [which] must be intertwined to make a
complete cord: nature must be developed by method and method must find its
completion in practice’. Thus our natural character is not all-determining; and
likewise practical experiences by themselves are not sufficient to supplement it;
education or ‘method’ plays the crucial intermediary role. Diverse methods work
best with diverse students, just as various methods work best at varying stages of
children’s development (DPI, pp. 316, 335–338; Erasmus, Education of a
Christian prince (hereafter ECP), p. 12).
What links these methods together, distinguishing which method is appropri-
ate at each stage, is the importance of alluring the student to the enjoyment of
Education, Erasmian humanism, and More’s Utopia 71
study. This partly involves an accommodation to the frailties of human nature.
‘As physicians do not always prescribe the most efficacious remedies for patients
but make some allowance for their cravings’, Erasmus explains, ‘so likewise I
thought it well to allure the young – who respond more readily to pleasing than
to strict or harsh treatment – with this kind of bait’ (Colloquies, ‘The usefulness
of the Colloquies’, CWE vol. 40, p. 1097). It cannot all be fun and games, of
course – at some stage, all students must discipline and master themselves so as
‘to find delight in things productive of utility rather than pleasure’ (Colloquies,
‘The art of learning’, CWE v. 40, p. 394). Yet at the same time Erasmus insists
that ‘there is nothing which prevents usefulness from going hand in hand with
pleasure, and integrity with enjoyment’ (DPI, p. 338). Indeed, this is how we
should expect to achieve the most effective results in education. It is easier to go
downhill than uphill, easier to sail a ship with the wind and tide than against
them – and likewise ‘it is also easier to be taught in a discipline that agrees with
our personal inclinations’ (DPI, pp. 316–317, 336). Each individual has their
own unique nature, including natural aptitudes for certain subjects – mathematics,
theology, language – and ‘we take in most easily the work for which nature
designed us’ (DPI, p. 316). In such situations, the educator must accommodate
what he is in any event powerless to overcome, and help each individual talent
‘to follow its own spontaneous inclinations’ (DPI, p. 336).
The process of alluring begins with the teacher himself. According to Erasmus,
it is an absolute ‘prerequisite’ for the learning process to work effectively ‘that
the teacher must be liked’, and this is because ‘we learn best when we have the
desire to learn; and it is from those whom we like and respect that we learn most
eagerly’ (DPI, p. 324). Consequently, the teacher selected should be someone
‘who is able to encourage [the student] by a kind and charming manner, and not
someone who will alienate him by a hard demeanor’ (DPI, p. 298; see also
pp. 325, 334, 338).1 The same principle further applies to the instructor’s meth-
ods of encouragement and correction. The instructor should seek to encourage
students where he can, though always ‘with sincerity and on valid grounds’
(ECP, p. 13). To encourage students, he should also design his lessons specifi-
cally so as to avoid any unnecessary difficulties for students to encounter, and
when a difficulty is unavoidable he should ‘smooth and soften it with an agree-
able style of speech’ (ECP, p. 13; DPI, p. 341). When correction is necessary, as
it will sometimes be, he should correct the student privately and with ‘a touch of
pleasantness in manner’ (ECP, p. 13; DPI, p. 332). Above all, Erasmus returns
repeatedly to condemn the harsh and widespread use of corporal punishment in
education. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Erasmus insists, coercive practices
such as the use of fear and especially beatings in education are unhelpful, unprof-
itable and unnecessary (Colloquies, ‘Off to school’, CWE, v. 39, p. 114; DPI,
pp. 325, 327–328, 331, 333–334). Such tactics are opposed to the free spirit of
education, and will drive students either to rebellion or to despair; ‘and once this
hatred has been implanted in young minds, the disgust with education will
remain through the years of adulthood’ (DPI, p. 325; cf. pp. 326, 331; CWE,
v. 26, pp. 327, 331).
72 John M. Parrish
Instead, Erasmus warmly recommends the employment of games and amuse-
ments in the educative process. Practically nothing ‘is learned better than what
is learned as a game’, Erasmus asserts, and consequently the teacher’s task is ‘to
give the course of study the appearance of a game’ (Colloquies, ‘Usefulness’,
p. 1098; DPI, p. 341). Children will always be open to anything that can be
presented as a game, because ‘play and childhood go naturally together;’ and so
if children can be persuaded to ‘think of their activity as play rather than
exertion’, the battle is largely won (DPI, p. 341). In addition, educators can
employ students’ competitive instincts to motivate them to excel: the desire for
praise and fear of shame will drive them to greater achievements, and the teacher,
Erasmus somewhat coldly states, ‘should exploit these motives to advance their
education’ (DPI, pp. 332, 339–340).
Early childhood education matters to Erasmus not only because of the unique
capacity of young students for certain kinds of learning, but equally if not more
importantly because of its moral dimension.2 Children must be ‘fashioned and
instructed from earliest infancy … for true virtue’, Erasmus argues (‘Panegyric
for Archduke Philip of Austria’, ECP, p. 143; cf. ECP, p. 54). Failing to take
advantage of the blank slate provided by the raw impressionability of youth will
invariably result in the child’s eventual moral degeneration (DPI, p. 306).
Without this moral dimension of education, other aspects of learning are of
limited value (DPI, p. 319). Here, Erasmus again employs his redefinition of
‘philosophy’ to include the ‘philosophy of Christ’: for since a philosopher is
‘someone who rejects illusory appearance and undauntedly seeks out and follows
what is true and good’, it follows that ‘being a philosopher is in practice the same
as being a Christian; only the terminology is different’ (ECP, p. 15).
This also helps to situate in proper context the famous openness of Erasmus’s
circle to at least a limited degree of education for women. Though no member
of the Erasmian movement went so far as to encourage universal education for
women equal to that received by men, it was nevertheless the case that a few
women judged exceptionally able were encouraged to attain learning in the
humanist style and were praised when they succeeded. Perhaps the most conspic-
uous instance was the case of Thomas More’s daughter Margaret, who attained
literacy not only in English but also in Latin and even Greek and who served as
the model for the female character in Erasmus’s colloquy, ‘The abbot and the
learned lady’. This openness to education for women is somewhat surprising in
Erasmus’s case, since in other respects he was hardly inclined to view women as
equal to men in their capacity for learning: for example, he consistently uses the
male pronoun only in referring to teachers, and he has some quite unkind things
to say about females assigned to serve as teachers (as at DPI, p. 325).
Nevertheless, the belief that some women are suitable pupils for a humanist
education is clearly sincere and important to Erasmus.
This commitment to women’s education is best understood, however, in the
context of the movement’s larger commitment to the idea that knowledge is the
path to moral virtue. We can see this illustrated in Erasmus’s discussion of
Thomas More’s home ‘school’ for his three daughters and son. Describing
Education, Erasmian humanism, and More’s Utopia 73
More’s school, Erasmus observes approvingly that More’s experiment has
changed his mind to favour providing women with a full humanist education
(Erasmus, Letter 1233 to Guillaume Budé, CWE, v. 8, p. 296). Yet the rationale
for this experiment is not based on a gender-free view of human equality; it is
grounded rather in a deeply gendered perception of women’s appropriate roles
in society – and the utility of humanist learning specifically for their good perfor-
mance of these roles (Erasmus, Letter 1233, p. 296). ‘For two things in particu-
lar are perilous to a girl’s virtue, idleness and improper amusements’, Erasmus
states, ‘and against both of these the love of literature is a protection’ (Erasmus,
Letter 1233, p. 297).3 Thus the education of women is desirable because it is
education in moral principles, according to Erasmus’s understanding of the
morality of gender roles.
Central to Erasmus’s idea of moral education is the need to inoculate the
student against the contagion of popular opinion. In ‘The abbot and the learned
lady’ Erasmus’s spokesperson (the lady) states that the public is ‘the worst
possible authority’ on moral conduct, and that popular custom is ‘the mistress of
every vice’ (Colloquies, ‘Abbot’, p. 503). This is perhaps the principal reason why
early education is so important: those who delay a child’s education are postpon-
ing his learning ‘to an age when his mind will already be less receptive and more
subject to grave temptations (which by that time, in fact, may have entangled
him completely in their brambles)’ (DPI, p. 299; cf. ECP, pp. 10–11);4 for to
inculcate good habits we must first unteach bad ones – and this is far more
difficult than teaching virtue in the first place (DPI, pp. 312–313).
Instead, the learned lady advises, we should ‘accustom’ ourselves to what is
truly virtuous: ‘then the unusual will become habitual, the unpleasant enjoyable,
the apparently unseemly, seemly’ (Colloquies, ‘Abbot’, p. 503). The most impor-
tant element in moral education is therefore habituation, for ‘small acts of good-
ness, habitually repeated, amount to great virtue’ (DPI, p. 318). Once again,
early childhood education is the key to bringing this to fruition. ‘It is the young
who most easily acquire the good’, Erasmus argues, ‘since they possess that
natural flexibility which enables them to bend in any direction, are not as yet
enslaved by bad habits, and are readily inclined to imitate whatever is suggested
to them’ (DPI, p. 318). Throughout, Erasmus assumes the correctness of the
Socratic notion that virtue is in principle teachable. Since human beings are
animals designed for a specific purpose, the virtuous life, it follows that ‘every
human being can be taught virtue without any great hardship;’ all that is
required to tap into this natural inclination, ‘bursting with life’, is ‘the effort of
a dedicated teacher’ (DPI, p. 310).
This view leads Erasmus very close to the brink of denying the existence of
original sin and postulating that wrongdoing has its roots in society rather than
human nature. He does ultimately pull up short of this denial, acknowledging
that human beings, even children, are ‘indisputably’ subject to original sin (DPI,
p. 321). Indeed, he even uses this acknowledgement to provide another
argument for early childhood education; a child’s early years, he tells us, require
special care in moral education, since ‘at this stage their behaviour is guided by
74 John M. Parrish
instinct more than by reason, so that they are inclined equally to good and evil –
more to the latter, perhaps – and it is always easier to forget good habits than to
unlearn bad ones’ (DPI, p. 321; see also ECP, pp. 8–9). But the force of
Erasmus’s argument points strongly in the other direction, toward identifying
corrupt and irrational social institutions and practices as the key exacerbating
conditions of whatever sinfulness may naturally be within the human heart. ‘It is
a serious mistake’, Erasmus warns, ‘to think that the character we are born with
is all-determining’ (DPI, p. 311). Instead, he argues, ‘the greater portion of this
evil stems from corrupting relationships and a misguided education, especially as
they affect our early and most impressionable years’ (DPI, p. 321). And since this
is so, what is caused by a failure of moral education can be corrected by a proper
application of the teacher’s art. The conventional wisdom ‘that children are
inclined by nature to evil’ is unfair, Erasmus states; instead, ‘the evil is largely due
to ourselves; for it is we who corrupt young minds with evil before we expose
them to the good’ (DPI, pp. 312–313). So we should not be surprised that
children ‘who have already been schooled in the ways of evil should exhibit so
little promise for being trained in the ways of the good’, since ‘the unteaching
of bad habits’ is far more difficult than teaching good ones (DPI, pp. 312–313).
Thus, in the end Erasmus holds that much if not most of human sin is
resistible by means of moral education, for while some part of the development
of character and virtue does lie outside our influence, it is also ‘to some extent
within our power to prevent degeneration in one who was born good and to
improve by training someone born none too good’ (ECP, p. 6). As we will see
in the next section, this identification of social evil with a failure of education is
central not only to Erasmus’s own educational theory, but also to the most
systematic (if also the most elusive) articulation of Erasmian humanism’s poten-
tial political applications: Thomas More’s Utopia.
This is the defect of European educational practice. By not teaching these lessons
early, as the Utopians do, Europeans systematically reinforce the sinful and
irrational tendencies inherent in the culture. It is on these grounds that
Hythloday in Book I criticises European practices of capital punishment for theft
as educational failures, reminiscent of ‘bad schoolmasters, who would rather
whip their pupils than teach them’ (pp. 15–16).
Instead, Hythloday asserts, the source of Europe’s theft problem is its system-
atic education of people to be thieves. For, Hythloday asks, ‘if you allow young
folk to be abominably brought up and their characters corrupted, little by little,
from childhood; and if then you punish them as grown-ups for committing the
crimes to which their training has consistently inclined them, what else is this, I
ask, but first making them thieves and then punishing them for it?’ (p. 20). This
is why the Utopians punish lawbreakers raised in Utopia more severely than
foreigners, ‘feeling that they are worse and deserve stricter punishment because
they had an excellent education and the best of moral training, yet still couldn’t
be restrained from wrongdoing’ (p. 78). This is also why the Utopians have no
lawyers and very few laws, ‘for their training is such that very few suffice’ (p. 82).
Thus ‘More’ the narrator tells us that many of the Utopian practices should
instead be seen as sources from which European nations ‘might take lessons in
order to correct their errors’ (p. 12).
That this combination of humanist learning with moral education expresses
More’s own intention can be further seen in his contemporaneous letter
to his children’s tutor, William Gonnell, in which he specifically describes his
aims for the moral dimension of their educational programme. Throughout
his letter, More stresses the close relationship between learning and virtue. Of
the two goods, virtue is certainly the most important, More acknowledges;
learning indeed is worthless in the absence of true virtue (Letter 20, pp. 103,
106). Fortunately, however, there is no conflict between them. On the contrary,
More asserts that the virtues will always prove to be ‘the real and genuine
fruits of learning’, and that those who pursue learning with the intent of
improving their virtue will find success (Letter 20, p. 105). Furthermore, as
More details his account of the moral dimension of the education he desires
for his children, we find that it corresponds closely to the design of the
78 John M. Parrish
key institutions of Utopia. The tutor, More says, should continually warn
his pupils:
Near the close of the letter, More repeats this theme in words that mirror almost
exactly those of Hythloday’s peroration at the end of the discourse of Book II,
in which Hythloday asserted that Pride was the only obstacle preventing both
rational interest and Christian duty from leading to the creation of Utopian insti-
tutions elsewhere (p. 106). This Augustinian sentiment captures not only the
central evil in More’s moral system – pride – but also the central intuition behind
the Utopian plan to fight that evil – namely, the employment of moral education
as the single indispensable point toward which all the other elements aim.15 This
same policy is precisely what we find More counselling his own children’s tutor
to pursue in carrying out the Erasmian humanist educational programme in the
very house Erasmus himself had found to be exemplary of its ideals.
But, dear Gonnell, the more do I see the difficulty of getting rid of this pest
of pride, the more do I see the necessity of getting to work at it from
childhood. For I find no other reason why this inescapable evil so clings to
our hearts, than that almost as soon as we are born, it is sown in the tender
minds of children by their nurses, it is cultivated by their teachers, it is
nourished and brought to maturity by their parents; while no one teaches
anything, even the good, without bidding them always to expect praise as
the recompense and prize of virtue. Thus long accustomed to magnify
praise, they strive to please the greater number (that is, the worse) and end
by being ashamed to be good (p. 106).
For More in reality, no less than for Hythloday in Utopia, the key to proper
education lay in employing an early and comprehensively moral education to
liberate the learner from vicious custom and open her horizons to the delights
of true virtue.
Acknowledgements
I am indebted to Christopher Brooke and Thomas I. White for helpful comments
on an earlier draft of this paper; and to Kenneth Chatlos, not only for his
thoughts regarding this paper, but also for first introducing me to Erasmus,
More’s Utopia, and the study of the history of ideas.
Notes
1 Erasmus favours the sixteenth-century equivalent of ‘merit pay’ rather than equal com-
pensation for teachers (see DRP, p. 376).
2 The centrality of moral education to Erasmus’s educational programme is presumably
why he counted such morally-charged fictions as The praise of folly and The complaint
of peace among his ‘educational works’. See Rummel, 2004, p. 14.
3 More also argues a similar point in Selected Letters, Letter 20 (to William Gonnell),
p. 104.
4 On the importance of having a ‘blank slate’ to work with in moral education, see also
ECP, p. 5, pp. 11–12.
5 Throughout this section I rely on the premise that More’s views in Utopia are rep-
resentative of the general commitments of Erasmian humanism. For a careful argu-
ment of this point and a response to important counterarguments, see Hexter, 1973,
pp. 57–82.
6 It is impossible to present a brief discussion of Utopia that does full justice to the
complexity of its argumentative ambiguities and interpretive puzzles. Here I assume as
a point of departure that generally (though not without complication) More intends
Utopian institutions to be taken as at least a semi-serious model for the reform of
European institutions. I offer an argument for what I merely assume here in Parrish,
2007, ch. 3. On the political ideals of the Erasmian humanists, see Tracy, 1978.
7 Throughout this section I am indebted to the detailed discussion of these themes in
Surtz, 1957.
8 It is not accidental that the section on the Utopians’ moral philosophy is followed di-
rectly by Hythloday’s observation that ‘in intellectual pursuits they are tireless’, and by
his account of their eager acquisition and immediate application of the ancient Greek
literature Hythloday happens to carry with him (pp. 75–76).
9 On the significance of the Utopians’ religious practices for interpreting More’s inten-
tions, see Fox, 1982.
10 Their good education also strengthens their effectiveness in battle, since, having ‘been
trained from infancy in sound principles of conduct (which their education and the
good institutions of their society both reinforce)’, they are more likely to exhibit true
courage and sound judgment in battle (p. 90).
11 These ‘philosopher-kings’ are philosophers more in the ‘philosophy of Christ’ sense
than in the more familiar medieval or scholastic sense, according to Hythloday; the
Education, Erasmian humanism, and More’s Utopia 81
Utopians apparently share the Erasmian humanists’ distaste for the logical quibbles of
scholasticism (p. 64).
12 On the Utopians’ moral philosophy, see further Logan, 1983.
13 It is also in part because the priests are consistently among the best educated people in
the society, as noted above.
14 They do also acknowledge that natural reason can be misled and thus can be overrid-
den by the truths of divine revelation, though conspicuously there is no such direct
revelation visible in Utopia (p. 74).
15 Erasmus reports that More gave public lectures on the political aspects of Augustine’s
City of God, in Letter 1233.
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6 Teaching the Leviathan
Thomas Hobbes on education
Teresa M. Bejan
I
Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) is not primarily regarded as a philosopher of
education; however, the only firm policy recommendation he made in his
Leviathan (1651) was for the immediate reform of university teaching by the
sovereign power.1 After initially coyly skirting the issue of who, in his view, might
be competent to teach the universities – ‘any man that sees what I am doing may
easily perceive what I think’ – he subsequently declared his hope that, at ‘one
time or other this writing of mine may fall into the hands of a sovereign’ who
will ensure ‘the public teaching of it’ (30:14, p. 226; 31:41, pp. 243–244). The
sovereign monarch or assembly should also see to it that other doctrine be
censored and their teaching suppressed, so that none but true – that is,
Hobbesian – doctrines might be put before the people (18:9, p. 113). Once
taken, Hobbes thought these steps might enable him to surpass even Plato by
successfully ‘convert[ing] this truth of speculation into the utility of practice’
(31:41, p. 244).
At least one of Hobbes’s contemporaries approved of his proposed curricular
reform. In Academiarum examen, John Webster cited Hobbes favourably in his
own case for reform and echoed the suggestion that the works of Aristotle (espe-
cially the Politics) might profitably be replaced, as ‘our own Countreyman master
Hobbs hath pieces of more exquisiteness, and profundity in that subject, than ever
the Graecian was able to reach unto’ (1654, p. 88). (Webster was a radical
supporter of Cromwell, and an advocate of ‘natural magic’, so Hobbes would
have agreed with him on little else (Jesseph, 1999, pp. 63–68).) Others,
however, alternated between horror and incredulity. John Wallis (Savilian
Professor of Geometry), Seth Ward (Savilian Professor of Astronomy) and John
Wilkins (Warden of Wadham College, Oxford) took obvious pleasure in mocking
Hobbes publicly for what they saw as his supreme arrogance. ‘He doth not spare
to professe, upon all occasions’, sneered Wallis, ‘how incomparably he thinks
Himself to have surpassed All, Ancient, Modern, Schools, Academies, Persons,
[and] Societies … and What Hopes he hath, That, by the soveraign command of
some Absolute Prince … his new Dictates should be peremptorily imposed, to be alone
taught’ (Wallis, 1662, p. 3). Of the so-called ‘Hobbe-goblin’, Ward and Wilkins
84 Teresa M. Bejan
declared it ‘manifest, that the only thing which paines him is the desire that
Aristotelity may be changed into Hobbeity, insteed of the Stagyrite, the world
may adore the great Malmesburian Phylosopher’ (Ward & Wilkins, 1654,
pp. 54, 58). (For background, Jesseph, 1999; Malcolm, 2002, pp. 317–335;
Skinner, 2002, pp. 328–331.)
Hobbes did not quail in the face of such criticisms. In his response to the
‘egregious professors’, he argued that his proposed reforms followed necessarily
from an analysis of England’s late civil wars. In particular, ‘the cause of my writ-
ing [Leviathan]’, he explained, ‘was the consideration of what the ministers …
by their preaching and writing did contribute thereunto’ – namely, the dissemi-
nation by them and other gentlemen of false and seditious doctrines, received
first from their studies in the universities and spread thereafter to the whole
English people. Convinced, as he was, that such teaching had caused the war
and, furthermore, that he had at last demonstrated true civil doctrine in
Leviathan, how could he fail to recommend it? Thus, ‘to me … that never did
write anything in philosophy to show my wit, but, as I thought at least, to
benefit some part or other of mankind, it was very necessary to commend my
doctrine to such men as should have the power and right to regulate the
Universities’ (Six lessons, 335).
Though the ensuing controversy focused on Leviathan, Hobbes had been
arguing along similar lines since the very earliest version of his political philoso-
phy, The elements of law, circulated privately in 1640. There, he confidently
declared that ‘if the true doctrine … were perspicuously set down, and taught in
the Universities’, young men ‘would more easily receive the same, and afterward
teach it to the people, both in books and otherwise, than now they do the
contrary’ (29:8, pp. 176–177). Two years later, in De cive, he again insisted that
‘it is a duty of sovereigns to have … the true Elements of civil doctrine written
and to order that it be taught in all the Universities in the commonwealth’ (13:9,
p. 147). Neither regicide nor Restoration changed his mind; in Behemoth,
finished in 1668, he described how ‘the people were corrupted generally’ by
erroneous opinions spread by the preachers and ‘democratical gentlemen’
educated in the universities – notwithstanding the fact that the ‘rules of just and
unjust sufficiently demonstrated, and from principles evident to the meanest
capacity, [had] not been wanting’ (pp. 2, 26, 39–40). Consequently, the
common people were ignorant of their true civic duty, which consisted simply in
obedience to their rightful sovereign, and were thereafter easily manipulated by
their teachers into rebellion against him (p. 39). The universities, in educating
the educators of the people, had thus been ‘to this nation, as the wooden horse
was to the Trojans’ (p. 40).
Throughout, Hobbes maintained that although the educational situation was
dire, the means to its amelioration remained straightforward. The disease itself
suggested the cure:
For seeing the Universities are the fountains of civil and moral doctrine,
from whence the preachers and the gentry, drawing such water as they find,
Teaching the Leviathan 85
use to sprinkle the same … upon the people, there ought certainly to be
great care taken to have it pure … and by that means, the most men,
knowing their duties, will be the less subject to serve the ambition of a few
discontented persons … . (Leviathan, ‘Review & conclusion’, p. 496)
The universities’ very success in sowing rebellion offered hope for a peaceful
future. Just as they had facilitated and exploited the people’s ignorance, he
argued, they could be made to serve the opposite end.
University reform for Hobbes did not concern higher education alone but
rather the civic education of the entire commonwealth, and hence it was a matter
of supreme political importance. As the recent civil wars had demonstrated,
‘where the people are not well instructed in their duty’, the peace of the
commonwealth will be perpetually disturbed (Leviathan, 19:9, p. 122). In order
to maintain peace, force was not enough; subjects must also be taught (Behemoth,
p. 59). Sovereigns who failed to exercise their rights in overseeing the people’s
education were not only shortsighted, they were guilty of neglecting the very
end for which sovereignty was instituted. ‘The actions of men proceed from their
opinions’, Hobbes explained, and ‘in the well-governing of opinions consisteth
the well-governing of men’s actions, in order to their peace and concord’
(Leviathan, 18:9, p. 113). Hence education of the people in true civic doctrine
was, he insisted, an essential duty of the sovereign power (30:6, p. 222).
The conclusion that popular education was of paramount political importance
derived for Hobbes from his conviction that the sovereign’s authority rested
ultimately on the public opinion of his power and hence was ‘grounded on the
consent of the people and their promise to obey him’ (Leviathan, 40:6, p. 319).
Far from being merely a curious digression or megalomaniacal outburst,
Hobbes’s proposed reform of the universities in Leviathan was instead a central
and urgent conclusion of his civil science, and despite the prominence of the
universities in his discussion, his educational aspirations extended well beyond
hopes for a trickle-down enlightenment. His writings reveal instead a programme
for truly universal civic education, effected through a variety of channels. This
comprehensive instruction of the commonwealth would require Hobbes’s
civil doctrine to be taught to people at all levels of society and at every stage of
life. Not only the universities, but also the pulpit and the family must be
made to serve the educational aims of the commonwealth, and these must
furthermore be supplemented with sovereign assiduity in suppressing
dissent. Hobbes hoped that the sovereign might thereby educate a true ‘public’,
characterised not only by consensus, but by ‘a real unity of them all’ (Leviathan,
17:13, p. 109).
II
Hobbes owed his own prominence to his education. Born into obscurity in
Westport (near Malmesbury in Wiltshire) in 1588, his proficiency with classical
languages saw him through to Oxford at the age of fourteen. He learned his
86 Teresa M. Bejan
languages under the tutelage of Robert Latimer, a graduate of Oxford who ran
a small school in Westport. After graduation, Hobbes went to work as a tutor to
the Cavendish family. Such service in noble households was a common path for
young men of talent and education but little means. Over the next thirty years,
Hobbes was a tutor three times over, while also serving as a companion and
personal secretary. In light of his aspirations in Leviathan to be a teacher of
sovereigns in true civil doctrine, it is notable that he served as a tutor (if only in
geometry) to the Prince of Wales and other members of the nobility in exile
while in France during the 1640s (Skinner, 1996, pp. 19–26, 217–221).
At the time of the first civil war, England had reached the zenith of a remark-
able educational expansion at all levels, from the ubiquitous petty schools
responsible for teaching basic literacy, through the grammar schools, to the
universities (Stone, 1964, pp. 42–44). It is likely that over half of the male popu-
lation of London was literate, and in the 1630s enrollment at Oxford and
Cambridge was at an historic high (Stone, 1964, pp. 68–69, 78). By 1642 the
leaders in Parliament were an especially well-educated group, a fact that was not
lost on Hobbes and undoubtedly contributed to his assessment of the universi-
ties as the very ‘core of rebellion’. After all, ‘it is a hard matter for men, who do
all think highly of their own wits, when they have acquired the learning of the
university, to be persuaded that they want any ability requisite for the government
of a commonwealth’ (Behemoth, p. 23).
Hobbes was not alone in blaming England’s system of education for the prob-
lems of the day, and cries for educational reform were to be heard from many
quarters. In 1644, John Milton called ‘the reforming of Education … one of the
greatest and noblest designs that can be thought on, and for the want whereof
this nation perishes’ (1953, p. 363). Yet reform entailed very different things for
different people. Milton favoured an elite education in (overtly republican) civic
virtue (1953, pp. 413–414). For others, such as James Howell, the high level of
education seemed itself to be the problem, leading to the conclusion that ‘so
many Free-Schools do rather hurt than good’. Bacon himself had written in
1611: ‘Concerning the advancement of learning … for grammar schools there
are already too many, and therefore no providence to add where there is
excess … there being more scholars bred than the state can prefer and employ …
which fills the realm full of indigent, idle and wanton people which are but
materia rerum novarum’ (both quoted in Cressy, 1975, pp. 24–25, 27). Still
others agreed with Hobbes that the problem was not an educated populace per
se, but rather that their miseducation had left the people lacking in virtue; what
was needed, then, was closer attention by the government to the further expan-
sion of education and its scrupulous regulation. Samuel Hartlib described the
magistrate’s ‘Duty towards the Young ones’ to ‘Order the Meanes of their
Education aright, to which effect he should see Schools opened, provided with
teachers, endued with Maintenance, regulated with Constitutions, and hee
should have Inspectors and Overseers to looke to the observance of good Orders
in this businesse’ (Considerations tending towards England’s Reformation, 1647).
Hartlib and his associates, including John Dury and Jan Comenius, argued for
Teaching the Leviathan 87
public provision of education with the intention of improving the people in
(mostly Christian) virtue (Turnbull, 1947; Webster, 1970).
Nor was Hobbes alone in turning special attention to the universities. Figures
as different politically as he and the republican Milton could agree with a radical
Leveller like Gerrard Winstanley that the universities were, by and large, ‘stand-
ing ponds of stinking water’ (quoted in Solt, 1956, p. 310). In the Grand
Remonstrance of 1641, the Long Parliament itself (in language echoed by
Hobbes) declared the need ‘to reform and purge the fountains of learning, the
two Universities, that the streams flowing from thence may be clear and pure,
and an honour and comfort to the whole land’ (Gardiner, 1906, p. 230). Despite
these good intentions, the state of education suffered because of the war, with
many schools closing and university enrollment falling sharply. Yet even as the
situation worsened and Parliament was forced to turn its attention elsewhere,
educational reform movements in England flourished (Stone, 1964, p. 51;
Cressy, 1975, pp. 10–11).
Although he had graduated from Oxford more than forty years before the publi-
cation of Leviathan, Hobbes claimed to be well qualified to criticise the university
curriculum. Ward and Wilkins complained that his criticisms could hardly claim
to be current given his advanced age, and despite its mean-spiritedness there was
something to this assessment (pp. 58–59). It seems clear that at the time Aristotle
and scholasticism were hardly the monolithic presences Hobbes described in
Leviathan – Wilkins himself had openly attacked the authority of Aristotle from
within the university in the 1630s (Curtis, 1959, pp. 241; Malcolm, 2002,
pp. 4–5). Still, Hobbes was joined by many of his younger contemporaries in
deriding what they perceived as the lasting influence of scholasticism on university
teaching. The virulent dislike of anything hinting of Roman ‘Anti-Christianity’
amounted to a kind of ecumenical anti-Catholicism, leading to a remarkable
convergence between figures as different in politics and religion as Hobbes,
Milton, Webster, and the Comenians on this issue. Throughout Leviathan,
Hobbes criticised the ‘Schools’ and the ‘Schoolmen’ and accused them of traf-
ficking in ‘vain philosophy’ characterised by absurdities and ‘insignificant speech’
(‘Review & conclusion’, pp. 457–458; 1:5, p. 7). Instead of devoting themselves
to preaching sound morals and civil obedience, the university-trained divines
bewildered the people with concepts like ‘freedom of will, incorporeal substance,
everlasting nows, ubiquities, [and] hypostases’, all of which were unable to raise
clear, corresponding concepts in the mind and so were, strictly speaking, nonsen-
sical (Behemoth, p. 58). Hobbes suggested that this ‘philosophy’ was a kind of
learned madness and likened its purveyors to ‘beggars, when they say their pater-
noster, putting together such words and in such a manner, as in their education
they have learned from their nurses … [yet] having no images or conceptions in
their mind’ (Elements, 10:9-10, p. 63; 5:14, p. 39). Such rote learning could not
constitute knowledge for the same reason a parrot could not be considered to
know the truth, though it recite true sentences perfectly (6:3, p. 41).
Such an education, Hobbes insisted, served only to stupefy and dull the wits
of students. It was little wonder, then, that philosophy no longer resembled the
88 Teresa M. Bejan
scientific pursuit of truth but rather the parroting of certain authoritative
authors. Chief among these, of course, was Aristotle – so much so that philoso-
phy in the universities was, according to Hobbes, no more than ‘Aristotelity’
(Leviathan, 46:13, p. 458). Hobbes held the Stagyrite to be doubly guilty for
England’s educational woes: he blamed Aristotle not only for inspiring much
scholastic absurdity, but also for the current vogue for Greek and Roman
thought more generally, on account of which young men now subjugated their
understandings to ‘Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and others of like authority’,
accepting their definitions of ‘right and wrong, [and] good and bad’ unquestion-
ingly (Elements of law, 27:13, pp. 170–171). Ward and Wilkins took these
criticisms to mean that Hobbes thought the universities too hostile to free
inquiry and expression, and so responded that those familiar with the universities
‘do know that there is not to be wished a more generall liberty in point of
judgment and debate, then what is here allowed’ (1654, p. 2). Hobbes’s objec-
tion, however, was not that the universities allowed insufficient freedom of
expression. On the contrary, when it came to the expression of beliefs he thought
that students were simply subjecting their understandings to the wrong
authorities – i.e. not the sovereign.
For Hobbes, the uncritical embrace of anti-monarchical and ‘democratical’
notions by English republicans had plainly contributed to the recent revolution.
‘In these western parts of the world’, he complained, ‘we are made to receive our
opinions concerning the institution and rights of commonwealth from … Greeks
and Romans’, whose own judgments in favour of democracies or republics came
from the security and honours that they had happened to enjoy within them.
Those living under other regimes, however, mistook this preference for superior-
ity in principle, and ‘by [the] reading of these Greek and Latin authors … from
their childhood have gotten a habit (under a false show of liberty) of favoring
tumults and licentious controlling of the actions of their sovereigns’ (Leviathan,
21:9, pp. 140–141). Such political notions gratified the ambitions of certain
men, who ‘out of their readings of Tully, Seneca, or other anti-monarchics’ came
to ‘think themselves sufficient politics, and show their discontent when they are
not called to the management of the state’ (Behemoth, pp. 155–156). For
Hobbes, the self-interested embrace by ‘democratical gentlemen’ of republican
ideals in politics and religion (such, he thought, was the appeal of Presbyterian
church-government) directly caused ‘the effusion of so much blood as I think I
may truly say: there was never anything so dearly bought, as these western parts
have bought the learning of the Greek and Latin tongues’ (Leviathan, 21:9,
p. 141).
England’s late misfortunes thus stemmed from the dual influences of scholas-
ticism and the ancients on the universities – and unfortunately their negative
effects had not been limited to those there educated. Dazzled by the ‘subtile
doctrines’ preached by the university-educated clergy, the common people were
led to turn against their lawful sovereign (Behemoth, p. 43). Hobbes argued that
a number of specific seditious doctrines could be traced directly to scholastic or
classical sources, including: (1) that sovereignty could be divided or limited;
Teaching the Leviathan 89
(2) that every private man could rightly judge good and evil for himself; (3) that
to act against one’s conscience is a sin; (4) that private men have an absolute
right in their property; and (5) that citizens in a democracy or republic enjoy
liberty, while subjects in a monarchy are slaves (Leviathan, 29:6-14,
pp. 212–215). The people called for reform on the basis of these and other
errors and so, ‘like the foolish daughters of Peleus (in the fable) which, desiring
to renew the youth of their decrepit father, did by the counsel of Medea cut him
in pieces’, they brought about the commonwealth’s destruction (30:7, p. 222).
Hobbes was not alone in believing the teaching of classical authors to have
vicious effects upon the populace. Comenius, for example, held that ‘such a
reformation of Schooles as is according to the rules of true Christianity’ required
such ‘profane and heathen Authors … [be] quite rejected’ (quoted in Milton,
1953, p. 192). Hobbes was more moderate and argued that the sovereign must
not allow ‘such books to be publicly read without present applying such correc-
tives of discreet masters as are fit to take away their venom’ (Leviathan, 29:14,
p. 215).2 Nor were his proposed reforms unusually extreme. Milton (one of the
‘democratical’ gentlemen in question) advocated that the universities be
abolished altogether, a measure proposed in earnest in the Barebones Parliament
of 1653 (Milton, 1953, p. 364; Malcolm, 2002, p. 326). Hobbes’s argument
was by contrast relatively mild. Despite their shortcomings the universities were
‘not to be cast away, but to be better disciplined: that is to say, that the politics
there taught be made to be (as true politics should be) such as are fit to make
men know, that it is their duty to obey’ (Behemoth, p. 58).3 These ‘true politics’
were, of course, to be found in his Leviathan, and so Hobbes seemed to
suggest that by tweaking the curriculum, the universities might easily be made
to undo the harm they had done and be turned instead to the maintenance of
peace and order.
III
In his response to the ‘egregious professors’, Hobbes explained that his recom-
mendation that Leviathan be taught in the universities did not mean necessarily
the book itself, but rather its ‘doctrine’ – ‘for wiser men may so digest the same
as to fit it better for public teaching’ (pp. 335–336). This doctrine was no more
than the existence of a ‘mutual relation between protection and obedience’,
which required an ‘inviolable observation’ (Leviathan, ‘Review & conclusion’,
p. 497). Hobbes claimed that his conclusions were truly universal. The require-
ments for peace in all commonwealths, regardless of regime, were first, the
absolute right of sovereigns to command, and second, the absolute duty of the
people to obey. The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to
last as long and no longer ‘than the power lasteth by which he is able to protect
them … the end of obedience is protection’ (Leviathan, 21:21, p. 144). Hobbes
is clear that a subject can never alienate his right to resistance should the sover-
eign directly threaten his life. A sovereign, of course, could treat his subjects so
terribly that they had no choice but to rebel. However, until the point where he
90 Teresa M. Bejan
was no longer ensuring their protection, such action by subjects could be neither
righteous nor just. Civic virtue, then, consisted simply of obedience to the
commands of the sovereign and the civil laws. This proposed unity of virtue was
a firm rejection of the idea that civic virtue was relative to regime – and that the
most virtuous citizens belonged to the best (republican) commonwealths. For
Hobbes, the best regime was always the present one, that is, the one currently
ensuring the security of citizens.4
Hobbes drew these conclusions from the (as he thought it) universally accept-
able premise ‘that peace is good’ (De cive, 3:31, p. 55). According to his civil
science – and confirmed, as he thought, by experience – mankind is naturally
inclined to disagreement and discord because individuals left to their private
judgment will judge according to their different personal perspectives and inter-
ests. Under such conditions it is no wonder that men can scarcely agree as to the
meanings of words, let alone in their evaluations of right or wrong or just and
unjust. In the absence of laws and of a sovereign power to enforce them, this
diversity of opinion would lead necessarily to a war of all against all, wherein
individuals would live in a state of ‘continual fear and danger of violent death’
and in which ‘the life of man, [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short’
(Leviathan, 13:9, p. 76). Peace requires consensus and concord; thus, individu-
als must agree to foreswear their ‘private reason’ and submit to the unitary
‘public reason’ of the commonwealth – that is, the judgment of the sovereign
alone (37:13, p. 300). Hobbes did not think that a perfect consensus (in the
sense of genuine agreement) on controversial matters was possible, but rather
that by submitting to the sovereign’s judgment in matters of the expression of
disagreement, the outward appearance of consensus might be achieved. ‘There
is virtually no dogma either in religion or the human sciences, from which
disagreements may not arise and from them conflicts … one cannot prevent such
disagreements from occurring. However, by the use of sovereign power they can
be kept from interfering with the public peace’ (De cive, 6.11n, p. 81). This
outward consensus, maintained through energetic regulation of education and
public expression by the sovereign, would be sufficient for peace, though
thought itself would necessarily remain free.5
Once this natural diversity in judgment is reduced to the unity of the sover-
eign’s public reason, the civil laws will become the rule of all men’s actions and
the final authority in controversial matters, such as ‘whether they be right or
wrong, profitable or unprofitable, virtuous or vicious’ or (especially) just or
unjust. This sovereign right of authoritative determination, Hobbes insisted,
would extend even unto the definitions of words, insofar as they tended to
controversy. The definition of the term ‘human being’, for instance, cannot be
decided ultimately by private men or philosophers, but only by the laws
(Elements, 29:8, pp. 180–181).6 The subjection of individuals’ judgment to the
sovereign’s was especially necessary in matters of religion. Individual claims of
conscience were merely attempts by subjects to make themselves judges in
matters that were properly the province of the sovereign. ‘The law is the public
conscience’, he argued, ‘by which [the citizen] hath already undertaken to be
Teaching the Leviathan 91
guided’ (Leviathan, 29:7, p. 212). Not only is the sovereign the supreme definer
of words and judge in temporal matters, he must also be acknowledged as the
sole interpreter of Scripture and of God’s will on earth. Although Hobbes
conceded that the sovereign could err and sin against the law of nature (which
dictates peace), individuals could never claim the right to judge the matter for
themselves.7
The doctrine of Leviathan emphasised above all the tenuousness of the peace
secured by the commonwealth and the great risks attendant on any act of
disobedience. Throughout his writings, Hobbes cast education in true civil
doctrine as a necessary supplement to the ‘coercive power to compel men to the
performance of their covenants’ exercised by the sovereign (Leviathan, 15:3,
p. 89). In order to govern men’s opinions, one must first recognise that ‘opin-
ions are sown in men’s minds not by commanding but by teaching, not by threat
of penalties but by perspicuity of reasons’ (De cive, 13:9, p. 146).8 This is in
keeping with Hobbes’s assertion in Leviathan that the sovereign has a duty to
teach the people ‘the grounds and reasons’ of the rights of sovereignty ‘diligently
and truly … because they cannot be maintained by any civil law or terror of legal
punishment’ (30: 4, p. 220). Some contemporary readers have cited these state-
ments alongside his appeals to ‘public reason’ as evidence against the traditional
view that Hobbes relied entirely on self-interest and the fear of violent death in
ordering social life, in favour of a more liberal (even Rawlsian) interpretation.
Such statements, they argue, reveal Hobbes’s concern with justifying rule to the
ruled and providing political stability for the ‘right reasons’, rather than on
the sole basis of ‘coercion and fear’ (Button, 2008, p. 38; also Waldron, 1998,
pp. 141–142; Lloyd, 1992, p. 2).
This view, however, mistakes the kind of ‘reasons’ Hobbes’s civil doctrine can
be understood to offer. The problem with punishments is not that they encour-
age obedience for the ‘wrong’ reasons, but rather that they cannot be relied
upon consistently to provide the kind of constant, overwhelming inducement to
obedience (namely fear) requisite to peace. Sovereigns are neither omniscient
nor omnipotent, and self-interested subjects will seek out opportunities to break
the law ‘whensoever the hope of impunity appears’ if they can hope to profit
thereby (Leviathan, 27:18, p. 195). Teaching acts as a supplement to the ‘terror’
of punishments for Hobbes by constantly keeping men in mind of the terrible
consequences (namely, the state of nature) that must result from the neglect of
their duty of obedience (6:57, p. 34).9 The recognition, therefore, that punish-
ments alone may not always suffice as incentives to obedience should not be
taken as a revision of his basic contention that a person’s ‘will to do or not to do
depends on the opinion [he] has formed of the good or evil, reward or penalty
to follow’ (De cive, 6:11, p. 80). Science for Hobbes is precisely ‘the knowledge
of consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another’ which can help men,
who often struggle to reckon the consequences of their actions correctly, to
foresee them and plan accordingly (Leviathan, 5:17, p. 25; 6:57, p. 34). Indeed,
the civil wars alone would have ‘instructed’ men sufficiently as to the nature of
their civic rights and duties, except for the fact that human memories are short
92 Teresa M. Bejan
and ‘miseries’ quickly forgotten (18:16, p. 116). It is precisely because every
man’s actions are governed by his opinion of the likely consequences to follow
that his instruction in ‘true’ civic doctrine is so crucial.
The true civil science of just and unjust having been deduced, it was necessary
still to bring it to the universities to be taught. Once this was done, however,
‘there is no doubt … that young men, who come thither void of prejudice, and
whose minds are yet as white paper, capable of any instruction, would … receive
the same, and afterward teach it to the people’ (Elements, 29:8, pp. 176–177).
‘Teaching’ here meant ‘begetting in another the same conceptions that we have
in ourselves’, which might be done by leading the learner step-by-step through
the same demonstration by which the teacher had reached his own conclusions
(13:2, p. 73). If Hobbes had (as he thought) reasoned correctly, with conclu-
sions confirmed by experience, then his proof should be easily taught and readily
accepted by others, the sure sign of which would be consensus (13:2-2,
pp. 73–74).
Yet if – as the contemporary reception of Leviathan soon revealed – the
expected consensus was not forthcoming, how might Hobbes account for it?
Namely, by the fact that men’s minds were not ‘as white paper’, but rather hope-
lessly ‘scribbled over’ with prejudice, bad habits of reasoning, and false opinions.
Hobbes referred to this problem as indocibility, or ‘difficulty of being taught’.
Once ‘men have … acquiesced in untrue opinions, and registered them as
authentical records in their minds; it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly …
than to write legibly upon a paper already scribbled over’ (Elements, 10:8,
pp. 62–63). Such indocibility might be compounded further by a student’s
outright rejection of the definitions proffered by his master, which amounted to
a simple refusal to be taught. In such cases, any subsequent demonstration (no
matter how sound) would be entirely beside the point (De corpore, 6:15, p. 84).
Although Hobbes was under no delusions as to the seriousness of the problem
of indocibility, he seemed to have considered it no great impediment to the ready
teaching of his doctrine in the universities.10 In order to understand why this is
so, it is important to remember a particular feature of sovereignty on his
account – namely, the right of the sovereign to define all words subject to
controversy. For Hobbes, the ultimate master in the universities should be the
sovereign, who would exercise total discretion in what is to be taught, who may
teach it, and what doctrines must be suppressed. What distinguishes the sover-
eign from other schoolmasters is his right to punish those teachers and pupils
who refuse to accept his definitions as the basis of their lessons, as well as those
who insist on publicising unacceptable conclusions.11 Although he thought that
the sovereign’s commands and punishments would be inadequate to give rise
directly to genuine belief in any dissident intellect, by being able to mandate
conformity in all external speech and action Hobbes bypassed entirely the prob-
lem of internal dissent in public teaching.12 Regardless of what teachers and
students in the university might actually think, they could teach others only in
accordance with the doctrines and definitions approved by the sovereign-
teacher.13 If the sovereign were assiduous in the regulation of doctrine, the
Teaching the Leviathan 93
punishment of (scandalous) heterodoxy, and the licensing of teachers so that
‘solid reason backed with authority’ reigned, Hobbes was certain that indocibil-
ity would present no insuperable obstacle to the teaching of true civil doctrine
in the universities (Behemoth, p. 56). Hobbes thought heterodoxy would be a
problem only for geniuses (like himself), who would be clever enough to think
and express themselves safely within the confines of whatever limits the sovereign
put in place. He was, however, a poor judge of such matters in practice, and was
forced to flee from England to France and back again to avoid the threat of
persecution for his views. He proved altogether too clever by half when he
became the target of proposed anti-heresy legislation in 1666. Leviathan was
burned publicly in the Bodleian quadrangle long before it was ‘publicly taught’
in the universities (Ryan, 1983, p. 205).
IV
Given the considerable attention Hobbes devoted to university teaching in
Leviathan and elsewhere, it is little wonder that scholars have taken that discus-
sion to be representative of his views on education more generally. Yet he was
careful throughout his writings to distinguish between the different forms of
teaching appropriate to different sections of the population. These differences
extended sometimes even to the content of the lessons to be learned (Hoekstra,
2006, p. 59). The vast majority of citizens would not attend university, but like
many of his contemporaries Hobbes thought the safety and well-being of the
commonwealth required universal civic education. Merely teaching elites aright
and expecting their knowledge to trickle down would not be sufficient.
Once he considered the instruction of the ‘vulgar’, Hobbes abandoned his
technical definition of teaching as evident demonstration productive of
knowledge – and, thus, distinguished from persuasion, which produced only
‘bare opinion’ (Elements, 13:2, p. 73). Rather, teaching appeared in Leviathan
most often in conjunction with ‘preaching’ and was directed explicitly towards
cultivating opinion as such (e.g. Leviathan, 18:9, p. 113; 27:36, p. 201; 30:6,
p. 221). After all, ‘the power of the mighty has no foundation but in the opinion
and belief of the people’ (Behemoth, 16). Although the Leviathan itself might be
suitable for teaching in the universities, it would hardly be suitable for popular
instruction.14 Hobbes acknowledged that the majority of men lacked the time,
interest, or even sometimes the capacity to comprehend the whole; pithy
summaries were therefore required. His favourite summary – that of all natural
and moral laws into a negative version of the Golden Rule – was hardly the only
one to be found in his writings (Leviathan, 15:35, p. 99). Indeed, the most
suggestive précis of his civil doctrine appeared in his discussion of what, precisely,
sovereigns were to have their subjects taught, wherein he presented the central
political conclusions of Leviathan as analogues to the Ten Commandments
(30:7-13, pp. 222–225).
Bishop Bramhall accused Hobbes of writing in Leviathan a ‘Rebells catechism’
(1658, p. 515), and although Hobbes strongly rejected that characterisation of
94 Teresa M. Bejan
its conclusions, a civil catechism is exactly what Leviathan demanded for the
instruction of the people. (Fittingly, Hobbes’s father, a disgraced clergyman, had
been censured among other things for failing to catechise the young (Malcolm,
2002, p. 3).) The venue in which the bulk of popular instruction was to take
place was the pulpit, and this civic education was modelled more or less explicitly
on religious instruction. In order that the people be taught their duty and
remember it, ‘it is necessary that some such times be determined wherein they
may assemble together … hear those their duties told them … and be put in
mind of the authority that maketh’ the civil laws (Leviathan, 30:10, p. 223). In
this way, Hobbes hoped that the regular observance of the Sabbath might be
turned to the end of peace and become a kind of civic Sunday school.
Thus, the form of popular instruction proposed by Hobbes depended not on
his method for achieving scientific knowledge, which ‘proceeds by cutting a
proposition into small pieces, then chews it over and digests it slowly’ by way of
definitions and evident demonstration, but rather on that which he describes as
the way to religious belief (De cive, 18:5, pp. 238–239). ‘For it is with the
mysteries of our religion as with wholesome pills for the sick, which, swallowed
whole, have the virtue to cure, but chewed, are for the most part cast up again
without effect’ (Leviathan, 32:3, p. 246). The discussion of popular education is
further illuminated by Hobbes’s comment in a letter in 1636 that he ‘long[ed]
infinitely to see those Bookes of the Sabbaoth; & am of your Mind, they will put
such thoughts into the Heads of vulgar People, as will conferre little to their
good Life. For, when they see one of the Ten Commandments to be jus
humanum merely (as it must be, if the Church can alter it) they will hope also
that the other nine may be so too. For every man hitherto did believe that the
ten Commandments were the Morall, that is, Eternal law’ (Hobbes to Glen of
6/16 April 1636 in Correspondence, p. 30). The Ten Commandments were to
serve as a mnemonic device to aid the vulgar in remembering their duty.
Likewise, the memorable metaphoric images of the ‘Mortal God’, Leviathan, and
the secular hell of the state of nature, sure to figure prominently in sermons
based on Leviathan’s civil doctrine, would capture the popular imagination.
Hobbes often analogised education to a process of ‘imprinting’. This metaphor
recurs throughout his work, often in the context of the impressions made by
religion and the arts upon the mind. He suggests that Numa, like other found-
ers, took care to ‘imprint in [the people’s] minds a belief that those precepts
which they gave concerning religion might not be thought to proceed from their
own device’ (e.g. Leviathan, 12:20, p. 69; also 8:25, p. 43). In remarking upon
an epic poem written by a friend, Hobbes claimed that the virtues represented
therein were thus ‘so deeply imprinted, as to stay for ever [in my fancy], and
govern all the rest of my thoughts and affections’ (The answer of Mr. Hobbes to
Sir William D’Avenant’s preface before Gondibert, pp. 457–458).15
Hobbes treated the education of the people as a kind of sacrament of remem-
brance. The fountain metaphor used to describe the universities in Leviathan
deliberately recalled a Baptismal font from whence ‘the preachers and the gentry,
drawing such water as they find, use to sprinkle … upon the people’ (‘Review &
Teaching the Leviathan 95
conclusion’, p. 496). The end result of this kind of popular education would not
be – as it was in the universities – simply the consequentialist embrace of civil
society as always the lesser of two evils, but also a positive ‘love of obedience’
(Behemoth, p. 59). A well-educated populace, according to Hobbes, would think
of themselves as ‘monks and friars, that are bound by vow to … simple obedi-
ence’ (Leviathan, 46:32, p. 464). This praise of unreflective obedience weighs
against those who find in Hobbesian education primarily a ‘respect for individu-
als as reasoning beings … determine[d] to analyze politics and get to the bottom
of human affairs’ (Waldron, 1998, p. 143). Such a reading becomes still more
implausible when one considers the final site of education to which the sovereign
must attend – namely, the family.
Hobbes raised no children of his own, but he was well aware of the impor-
tance of the ‘first instruction of children’ by their parents for their later develop-
ment, and hence for the commonwealth as a whole (Leviathan, 30:11, p. 223).16
An individual’s opinions and beliefs were not, for the most part, the result of
considered reflection or evident teaching, but of this early instruction. This was
most evident, again, in the case of religious belief, wherein ‘the ordinary cause of
believing … [is] the hearing of those that … teach us, as our parents in their
houses, and our pastors in the churches’ (43:8, p. 401). Parents, moreover, were
responsible for the work of discipline through which children might first be
habituated to obedience. Indeed, ‘it is by the rod that boys’ dispositions toward
all things are shaped as parents and teachers wish’ (De homine, 16:4, p. 65). In
De cive, Hobbes claimed that ‘all men (since all men are born infants) are born
unfit for society and very many (perhaps the majority) remain so throughout
their lives, because of mental illness or lack of discipline’. ‘Man is made fit for
Society not by nature, but by discipline [disciplina]’, and this correction of
children by their parents through the application of educative punishments was
thus the cause of their sociability and a necessary precondition for the peaceful
reproduction of society over generations (1:2n.1, pp. 24–25).17
As for what, specifically, Hobbes would have the sovereign teach young
children, he suggested that they ‘be taught that originally the father of every man
was also his sovereign lord, with power over him of life and death, and that the
fathers of families, when … instituting a commonwealth … resigned that abso-
lute power’ (Leviathan, 30:11, pp. 223–224). By calling on children to analogise
their fathers to the civil sovereign in this way (and vice versa), Hobbes made the
family the first school of the commonwealth, wherein the relationship of rule
between father and child served to model the later relationship of simple obedi-
ence to the sovereign. While he habituates his children to obedience, the father
acts as a placeholder for the sovereign until their majority, whereupon their
obedience is transferred to its primary object. The family is ‘Leviathan writ small’
(Chapman, 1975). Hobbes even went so far as to argue that parental power over
children, as an example of sovereignty by acquisition, is derived not naturally by
‘generation’, ‘but from the child’s consent, either express or by other sufficient
arguments declared’ (Leviathan, 20:4, p. 126). Because every individual ‘ought
to obey him by whom [he] is preserved; because preservation of life [is] the end,
96 Teresa M. Bejan
for which one man becomes subject to another’, the child can be presumed to
have exchanged his obedience for his protection, like any adult citizen of the
commonwealth (20:5, p. 130). In this way, the family represents the Hobbesian
commonwealth to children and thereby schools them implicitly in (rational)
subjection from infancy. Although the child, like the adult, never consented
explicitly to being ruled, both will be taught to understand themselves as having
done so. (For Hobbes’s analogies between adults and children: De cive, 1:2n.1,
p. 25; Leviathan, 11.2,1 p. 61.)
On Hobbes’s account, parents serve – just like the state-licensed teachers and
pastors – as representatives of the sovereign power, and hence as public ministers
in the home, ‘allowed and appointed to teach’ by the sovereign (Leviathan,
43:8, p. 401). Although the sovereign will generally leave subjects at liberty
otherwise to ‘institute their children as they themselves think fit’, they do so only
at his discretion (21:6, p. 138). In Hobbes’s commonwealth, parents hold their
children in trust until such time as the sovereign reclaims his right. This work of
first instruction in the family prepares children for Hobbesian ‘citizenship’ and is
meant to attach securely those ‘artificial chains, called the civil laws’, that run
from the sovereign’s lips to the people’s ears (21:5, p. 138).
Far from neglecting early education, Hobbes’s commonwealth stands or falls
by it. In Leviathan, Hobbes suggests that ‘the common people’s minds, unless
they be tainted by dependence on the potent, or scribbled over with the opinions
of their doctors, are fit to receive whatsoever by public authority shall be
imprinted in them’ (30:6, p. 221). Hobbesian education requires that the minds
of all citizens, the vulgar as well as the wise, be prepared for such imprinting by
their primary instruction in the family and the pulpit. But keeping the paper of
the people’s minds clean and white requires not only that they be kept free from
dependence on the powerful, but also that ‘the dependence of subjects on the
sovereign power of their country’ be emphasised and reinforced at every turn
(46:18, p. 460).18 Thus, indocibility should be no impediment to Hobbesian
‘imprinting’ for the sovereign sufficiently attentive to the junior members of the
commonwealth.
V
Hobbesian education is an education in civic virtue. By reformulating the
doctrine of Leviathan for presentation to each of the different parts of the
commonwealth it aims to produce obedient citizens capable of the kind of stable
consensus requisite to peace. In his response to his Oxford critics, Hobbes
claimed that Leviathan in its original form, even in the absence of ‘digestion’ by
wiser men to better suit it for public teaching, ‘hath framed the minds of a thou-
sand gentlemen to a conscientious obedience to present government’ (Six lessons,
pp. 335–336). How much more might it accomplish if aptly summarised and
systematically taught?
As we have seen, Hobbes’s contention that public education was a duty of
sovereignty was not unique at the time – nor, for that matter, was government
Teaching the Leviathan 97
regulation of education. Nevertheless, the educational programme developed in
Leviathan has struck Hobbes’s readers, from his contemporaries down to the
present day, as something unusual. Its distinctiveness is summed up nicely in the
image of ‘imprinting’. Hobbesian education – whether conducted in the univer-
sity, from the pulpit, or in the family – aims always at uniformity; the virtuous
citizen it produces is the same across all nations and regimes, which are
themselves uniform with respect to their common end, peace. Such an education
does not seek to cultivate the student’s individual capacities, for judgment or for
anything else.19 Imprinting is not the cultivation of personality, but rather
conformity to true civil doctrine, designed and systematically imposed from
without by the sovereign power upon the ‘clean paper’ of men’s minds. Students
come thereby to understand themselves as equal and atomistic, each tethered
individually and so unified through their mutual relationship to the sovereign.
The end result of this education would, Hobbes hoped, be a secure consensus
and, at last, peace. The scope and character of the necessary consensus was, like
most things, to be left to the sovereign’s discretion. (Hobbes thought that a
good sovereign would leave his subjects at liberty in many things, interfering
with them only in those matters he deemed essential to peace.)
Modern students of Hobbes’s educational thought have tended to focus on
this argument – that is, that the comprehensive education of society (whether as
‘popular enlightenment’ or indoctrination) constitutes a necessary precondition
to peace because it alone can fashion citizens capable of this kind of consensus.
Whereas an earlier generation – much like those troublesome Oxford professors –
recoiled from Hobbes’s educational project, emphasising what they saw as its
totalitarian aspirations, scholars in recent years have taken a decidedly more
favourable view. For these authors, his educational thought reveals instead a
more ‘liberal’ Hobbes, one who believed that political stability could be secured
only by respecting individuals as reasoning beings.20 I have sought to show that
neither view is wholly sustainable.21 What is clear, however, is that Hobbes
believed the only architect and agent capable of fashioning a consensus adequate
to the preservation of peace would be an absolute sovereign – and this would
require, in turn, a state that might be relatively minimal in practice, but must be
utterly authoritarian in principle. Thus, the conscientious sovereign would
vigilantly oversee the intellectual life of his subjects from the cradle to the univer-
sities, and from there to the grave.
Acknowledgements
I have incurred many debts in writing this article. Meredith Edwards, Shawn
Fraistat, Bryan Garsten, Samuel James, Quentin Skinner, and Megan Wachspress
read earlier drafts, and I thank them for their comments and criticisms. Jonathan
Bruno, Alin Fumurescu, Calvert Jones, and Steven Smith were generous with
their insights in various contexts during its development. I would also like to
thank the anonymous reviewer for the Oxford Review of Education and the
tireless and endlessly helpful guest editors. I am especially grateful to Quentin
98 Teresa M. Bejan
Skinner and Mark Goldie for their wonderful supervision of my earliest work
on Milton and early modern education reform in the context of the English
Civil War.
Notes
1 Hobbes’s life in print began with his English translation of Thucydides’ Peloponnesian
War (1629) and ended with translations of the Iliad and the Odyssey in 1676; Behemoth,
finished in 1668, was published posthumously. Over this long period, Hobbes’s inter-
ests, methods and conclusions underwent significant changes, most notably with his
storied ‘discovery’ of Euclidean Geometry in 1629. However, I find his treatment of ed-
ucational matters to be reasonably consistent across his political philosophical writings,
beginning with The elements of law (1640). For the purposes of this discussion I draw
from a wide selection of works.
2 Lloyd cites this as evidence that Hobbes would not stifle all dissent (1997, p. 48);
Nelson in his introduction to Hobbes’s translations of Homer somewhat undercuts such
optimism (pp. xxxiii–xl); see also Hoekstra, 2006, p. 45.
3 In Six lessons, Hobbes spoke favourably of the idea of a lay-university (pp. 345–346); this
comment was intended as a provocation to Ward, not as a serious proposal, although
Tuck (1998) argues that it should be taken as evidence of Hobbes’s support for free
inquiry in the universities; see also Garsten, 2006, p. 39.
4 This claim allowed Hobbes’s critics to cast Leviathan as a work written expressly in
defence of Cromwell’s title. See Skinner’s ‘Hobbes and the engagement controversy’
(2002, p. 307) for emphasis on the similarities between Hobbes and other de facto theo-
ries of the period.
5 On possible similarities to the ‘Rawlsian’ notion of public reason, see Garsten (2006,
pp. 27, 116), Gauthier (1995), Lloyd (1992 and 1997), Button (2008).
6 This question of influence over meanings is a point of controversy in scholarly assess-
ment of Hobbesian eduction; see Pettit, 2008, pp. 115–132; Hoekstra, 2006, esp.
pp. 34–35.
7 Hobbes insisted that although the sovereign could be guilty of iniquity he could not, by
definition, commit injustice (Leviathan, 18:6, p. 113). Whether Hobbes meant his claim
that the sovereign could sin against the law of nature as a serious appeal to a power higher
than the sovereign’s self-interest is controversial. Supporters of the ‘Taylor-Warrender’
thesis argue that a belief in God is necessary to ground Hobbesian moral obligation
(e.g. Warrender, 1957; Hood, 1964), while others argue that Hobbes’s political theory
is secular in form and secularising in purpose. Johnston (1986) and Strauss (1953), for
example, have argued that Hobbes wanted to ‘disenchant the world’ through education.
Lloyd (1992) and Vaughan (2002) emphasise the importance to Hobbesian education
of shaping – but not necessarily eradicating – religious belief.
8 I substitute ‘perspicuity of reasons’ (from ‘Philosophical rudiments concerning
government and society’ (Hobbes, 1991), the 1651 English translation of De cive) for
Silverthorne’s ‘clarity of arguments’. Although the former was long thought to have
been authorised and approved by Hobbes, this has since been disproved. See Tuck’s
introduction to De cive (Hobbes, 1998, pp. xxxiv–xxxvii). Malcolm (2002) argues that
the translator was Charles Cotton. The Latin version runs: ‘Quoniam autem opiniones
non imperando, sed docendo; non terrore poenarum, sed perspicuitate rationum’.
9 Heaven and hell obviously complicate the picture; it is therefore especially important for
the sovereign to regulate closely doctrines pertaining thereunto. Whereas in Elements and
De cive, Hobbes seemed content to maintain more or less traditional versions of heaven
and hell – so long as eternal punishments could be shown to be annexed (like all tem-
poral ones) to violations of the civil law alone – in Leviathan he revised them so as to be
consistent with his materialism and therefore denied the immortal soul (pp. 418–431).
Teaching the Leviathan 99
Johnston argues against those who read Hobbes as a sincere Christian that a belief
in hell – or in the Christian God, for that matter – could not possibly withstand a
Hobbesian education (Johnston, 1986, pp. 142–150). While Hobbes clearly intends
to undermine hell for those taught the doctrine of Leviathan in the universities, it is
less clear that he thought it desirable for this part of his doctrine to be publicized to
the population as a whole via public preaching, although the full arguments would
certainly be available to those who should inquire.
10 For brief treatments of this puzzle, see Tarcov (1999, pp. 48–49) and Chapman
(1975, pp. 87–88). See also the growing literature on the role of rhetoric in Hobbes’s
thought, which considers directly the limits of reason to persuade (e.g. Kahn, 1985;
Johnston, 1986; Skinner, 1996; Vaughan, 2002; Garsten, 2006).
11 Failure to appreciate this distinction between the rights of the sovereign as teacher
versus those of the Church has led some scholars to draw a sharp distinction between
teaching and coercion, thus neglecting the expansive role for educative punishments
in Hobbes’s thought (see Lloyd, 1997, pp. 51–52 and 1992, p. 140; and Waldron,
1998, p. 142). Button (2008) acknowledges that this distinction is overdrawn (p. 64),
yet continues to employ it elsewhere in his discussion (pp. 38, 62–69). Hobbes is very
clear that the distinction does not apply in the case of sovereign-teachers, or those
who act as ministers of the sovereign power; the discussion of teaching as ‘fishing’ as
opposed to ‘hunting’ is meant to delimit ecclesiastical power only, not civil (Leviathan,
42:8, p. 337).
12 An earlier generation of scholars treated Hobbes as straightforwardly advocating a
programme of indoctrination and mind control; more recently scholars have made
the case for ‘a more tolerant’ Hobbes – see Ryan (1983 and 1988), Tuck (1990 and
1998); Burgess (1996). Tuck goes so far as to suggest that Hobbes desired the uni-
versities to be places of protected free inquiry (1998, p. 155) – an interpretation I find
implausible. I favour Murphy’s characterisation (1997) of Hobbes’s position as ‘toler-
ant anti-toleration’.
13 Hobbes says as much in his discussion of Galileo (Leviathan, 46:42, p. 468). There, he
argues that ‘disobedience may lawfully be punished in them that against the laws teach
even true philosophy’. This passage, along with his claim that truth is by definition
consistent with peace and the sovereign’s judgment of the same (18:9, pp. 113–114),
has been a source of much scholarly contention. Arendt cited it as evidence that the
sovereign can teach his subjects falsehoods in order to preserve the commonwealth
(pp. 297–298); Waldron and Lloyd find it far less sinister (Waldron, 1998, pp. 142,
146 n.12; Lloyd, 1997, pp. 43–45).
14 I dissent from Johnston’s suggestion that Leviathan was meant to be read by the public
at large and attempted ‘to shape public opinion directly’ (1986, p. 89).
15 See also Malcolm’s discussion of the role of such images in education in the context of
the frontispiece of Leviathan (2002, p. 228).
16 Some of Hobbes’s early critics accused him of fathering an illegitimate daughter and
this claim has been accepted by some scholars, most recently Martinich (2005, p. 8).
17 Again, I depart from the Silverthorne translation which has ‘training’ in place of
‘discipline’. Because the original English version translated disciplina here as ‘educa-
tion’, many have assumed that this was Hobbes’s preferred translation. The original
translation appeals especially to those authors who want to maintain a hard distinction
between education and coercion in Hobbes’s thought; however, given that Hobbes
refers to ‘discipline’ frequently in his writings, while also taking care at points to
distinguish it from ‘education’ (e.g. Leviathan, 29:8, p. 213, ‘Review & conclusion’,
p. 489), I believe this is to misrepresent his meaning in this passage.
18 Malcolm, following Johnston, describes Hobbesian education as the ‘liberation’ of the
people’s minds from both superstitious falsehoods and ‘the power of those groups,
elites and confederacies that manipulate falsehood for their own ends’ (2002, p. 544).
However, in this passage Hobbes states explicitly that he aims to combat such doctrines
100 Teresa M. Bejan
and factions because they serve to lessen the dependence of individuals on the sovereign
power. This is, at best, a peculiar sort of liberation.
19 Garsten (2006) argues that Hobbes’s attempt to devalue judgment and seriously
restrict its role in politics was a deliberate departure from classical political thought,
and from his neo-republican contemporaries.
20 Although their specific arguments differ, Johnston (1986), Lloyd (1992 and 1997),
Waldron (1998), Tuck (1998), Malcolm (2002) and Button (2008) can be seen alike
as representatives of this trend, and all endorse Hobbes’s educational project to a
greater or lesser extent. These accounts depart significantly from that of Voegelin, who
claimed in 1938 that Hobbes’s system would be the envy of ‘a modern minister of
propaganda’ (p. 55; see also Arendt, p. 290-1n.3). Ryan, while making the case for a
more tolerant Hobbes, suggests that although ‘Hobbes’s sovereign cannot condition
children as the Director in Brave New World can … there is no evident reason of prin-
ciple to stop him applying the techniques when they are discovered’ (1983, p. 217).
Vaughan (2002) and Hoekstra (2006) are notable exceptions to the recent trend.
21 Both groups treat Hobbesian education as though it were concerned with what people
would be like; however, it is clear that Hobbes did not entertain high hopes that
human nature could be changed (it was evidently quite stubborn) and so did not much
care what people were like on the inside, so long as they were simply obedient in exter-
nals. Furthermore, when it comes to Hobbes the dichotomy between enlightenment
and indoctrination is altogether inadequate. After all, the doctrine to be imprinted is,
strictly speaking, ‘true’ – though what this means for Hobbes is (fittingly) subject to
controversy. For a recent discussion, see Hoekstra (2006).
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7 Locke on education and
the rights of parents
Alex Tuckness
Introduction
John Locke (1632–1704) is often taken as a canonical defender of the rights of
parents in education, even as someone who carries the rights of parents too far
in that sphere (Gutmann, 1987; Carrig, 2001). This is somewhat ironic given
the fact that in his own day he was famous for limiting the rights of fathers as
part of his rejection of the divine right of kings. In response to those who
thought that Adam, by virtue of fatherhood, was monarch of the world and that
his paternal sovereignty was passed on to his oldest heir, Locke argued that
paternal power exists for a different purpose than political power and the power
of parents over children is limited to the purpose of families, the proper care and
raising of offspring (TT, 1.50-72, 2.52-76).1 Nonetheless, it is true that Locke
argued in favour of education at home by parents or tutors selected by parents,
and it is also true that Locke talked about the education of children primarily as
a right and duty of parents rather than of the state. This is a topic of no small
importance now given the substantial number of children educated at home
by parents and the frequent conflicts between parents and schools over policies
and curricula. This chapter challenges the traditional reading of Locke’s view of
education.
Locke’s reasons for believing parents should play the leading role in educating
children can be divided into pedagogical reasons and political reasons. Each
type of reason requires a different type of argument. Pedagogical reasons
simply explain why one type of educational arrangement is likely to work better
than another in terms of the goals of education itself. While Locke did
favour education by parents rather than schools, when his reasons for doing so
are set in terms of his larger theory of education it follows that many of his
objections to schools apply with less force today than they would have in
Locke’s day.
Political reasons, for Locke, are a qualitatively different kind of reason. Locke
believed that people had rights, including the right to make foolish choices while
raising children (L, p. 34). The question is how far such rights extend. This
article will first explain Locke’s pedagogical reasons for preferring education by
parents and then focus on Locke’s distinctly political reasons that seem to imply
104 Alex Tuckness
a right of parents to control their children’s education even in cases where their
choices do not seem to be in the educational interest of the child. Previous stud-
ies of Locke’s views on the rights of parents have failed to notice the implications
of his larger theory of toleration for his views on the rights of parents. In Locke’s
theory, different entities (a government, a family, a church, a business) exist for
different reasons and may have exclusive rights to act in pursuit of the goals of
that sphere. Locke also realised that two different entities pursuing two different
goals may legitimately make claims to regulate the same activity. In such cases,
Locke allowed the government to enforce its views in the face of opposition so
long as it does so in pursuit of a legitimate governmental goal. This implies a
sphere of legitimate state control over education.
As the Strength of the Body lies chiefly in being able to endure Hardships,
so also does that of the Mind. And the great Principle and Foundation of all
Virtue and Worth, is placed in this, That a Man is able to deny himself his
own Desires, cross his own Inclinations, and purely follow what Reason
directs as best, though the appetite lean the other way. (STCE, 33)
Education, for Locke, thus consists in helping people to overcome the tempta-
tions of shortsighted behaviour.
This idea summarises much of the overall message of Locke’s book on
education and connects it with his hedonistic theory of motivation. Locke
argued in the Essay that pain and pleasure were the only motivators of human
behaviour. He wrote that ‘Pleasure and Pain, and that which causes them, Good
and Evil, are the hinges on which our Passions turn’ (E, 2.20.3). Human beings
therefore naturally act in pursuit of their own pleasure. Locke proceeded to
explain why it is that human beings so often act in ways that are not likely to
bring them pleasure if human beings are always motivated to pursue the greatest
106 Alex Tuckness
pleasure. He thought that pleasure or pain will move us to act only if there is
some ‘uneasiness’. He wrote:
Locke thought that human beings neither automatically perceive the pleasures
and pains that will flow from particular actions nor automatically desire pleasures
that are not immediately present. He then explained that ‘by a due consideration
and examining any good proposed, it is in our power, to raise our desires, in due
proportion to the value of that good’ (E, 2.21.46). While we do not have the
power to act for something that we do not perceive to be for our good, we do
have the power to suspend judgment so that we can think through the ramifica-
tions of our actions and choose the action that is truly in our best interests
(E, 2.21.47).
Locke used these ideas to explain how virtue is acquired in Some thoughts
concerning education. He repeated the hedonistic assumptions of the Essay when
he stated that ‘Good and Evil, Reward and Punishment, are the only Motives to
a rational Creature; these are the Spur and Reins, whereby all Mankind are set
on work, and guided, and therefore they are to be made use of to Children too’
(STCE, 54). The task of education is therefore to help children both perceive the
consequences of actions and, even more importantly, to become ‘uneasy’ about
the possibility of missing out on important pleasures in the future. Since a
present pain may seem to overwhelm a future good, much of the task of educa-
tion is helping children to acquire the habit of learning to endure a present pain
for the sake of a greater future pleasure and to forgo present pleasure to avoid a
greater future pain (STCE, 45).
Locke employed several different educational strategies to achieve this goal.
Parents should not give children things that they do not need or are not good
for them simply because the children demand them (STCE, 35). The father
should be more stern with the child when the child is young to establish an
appropriate ‘Awe and Respect’ (STCE, 44) but this can be relaxed as the
child grows older (STCE, 41). Interestingly, a child should not be offered
material rewards for behaving well since this will only increase his tendency to
govern his behaviour by the pursuit of immediate rewards. ‘To make a good, a
wise, and a virtuous Man, ‘tis fit he should learn to cross his Appetite, and
deny his Inclination to riches, finery or pleasing his Palate, etc. whenever his
Reason advises the contrary, and his Duty requires it’. And thus parents
who motivate a child by promising a treat or new clothes to get a child to do
something ‘by misapplied Rewards and Punishments sacrifice their Virtue, invert
Locke on education and the rights of parents 107
the Order of their Education, and teach them Luxury, Pride, or Covetousness,
etc.’ (STCE, 52).
Locke’s alternative was to cultivate a different kind of motive which is more
indirect, the desire for esteem and the desire to avoid disgrace which Locke says
are ‘the most powerful incentives to the Mind, when once it is brought to relish
them’ (STCE, 56). These words are essential to understanding Locke’s approach.
He had argued in the Essay that to a great extent popular conceptions of virtue
and vice ‘in a great measure everywhere correspond with the unchangeable Rule
of Right and Wrong, which the Law of God hath established; there being
nothing, that so directly, and visibly secures, and advances the general Good of
Mankind in this World, as Obedience to the Laws he has set them’ (E, 2.28.11).
He also stated that the fear of being punished by a loss of esteem from other
people is a more powerful motivator for most people than the fear of divine or
governmental punishment (E, 2.282.12). In his book on education he stated
that although reputation is not ‘the true Principle and Measure of Virtue’ (which
stems from knowledge of God’s rewards and punishments) it is nonetheless
‘that, which comes nearest to it’ (STCE, 61).
Locke’s remark that esteem and disgrace are the mind’s most powerful
motives ‘once it is brought to relish them’ is also extremely important. The
pleasure of being esteemed, like any other pleasure, will move a person only once
he or she is uneasy about losing it. Parents, therefore, must nurture this desire
to be well thought of by praising the child’s good actions and letting him or her
know their disappointment when he or she behaves wrongly. Children should
also be taught that those who are esteemed for doing well ‘will necessarily be
beloved and cherished by everybody, and have all other good Things as a
Consequence of it’ (STCE, 58). Reputation thus becomes a way to habituate
children to seek pleasures that are more likely to correspond with the actual
principles of right and wrong.
Parents who do this will be able to minimise the use of corporal punishment.
‘Frequent Beating or Chiding is therefore carefully to be avoided’ (STCE, 60).
Children should be praised in front of others, but reprimanded in private (STCE,
62). Locke was particularly critical of parents who give children complicated
rules to follow and then punish them when they fail to follow them. Instead,
parents should keep things simple and teach children by getting them to practise
the action in question until it becomes a habit (STCE, 64). The one instance
where Locke thinks corporal punishment should be used is when children are
insubordinate (STCE, 78), since this is necessary to establish the parent’s
authority.
It is against this background that we can understand Locke’s criticisms of the
schools of his day and his reasons for recommending education under the super-
vision of parents. Schools, in Locke’s opinion, lacked the ability to provide
adequate supervision for the children outside the periods of formal instruction.
Moreover, teachers were not able to tailor education to the specific needs of each
child. Locke thought it highly likely that the child would learn rudeness, dishon-
esty, and a host of other vices from the other children at the school. Locke asks
108 Alex Tuckness
whether a father will ‘hazard your Son’s Innocence and Virtue, for a little Greek
and Latin’ (STCE, 70). Moreover, the schools tended to practise exactly the kind
of pedagogy that Locke criticised (beating children for making mistakes in Latin,
for example). Locke was convinced that children would learn far more if learning
was part of play and was not forced upon them (STCE, 72–74). As much as
possible, children should learn additional languages (French, then Latin) in the
same way they learned English to the extent possible, ideally finding a tutor who
would speak to the child only in that language (STCE, 165).
In the home, by contrast to the school, the father can find a tutor who will
instruct and model virtue and manners for his child. Locke’s list of praiseworthy
virtues presents a helpful picture of the sort of adults he sought to produce. A
child should be taught civility, humanity (abstaining from cruelty), generosity,
gracefulness, honour, humility, industry, kindness, love of God, love of study,
modesty, politeness, prudence, reverence, self control, self-denial, and self-
restraint (Yolton & Yolton, 1989, pp. 22–23). Locke’s discussion of generosity
is instructive because Locke explained that a child’s rational faculties are not
advanced enough for the child to understand property, and therefore
justice. Instead, since humans incline naturally to selfishness, parents are to
contrive things so that self-sacrifice actually ends up being beneficial for the
child, so that the child will develop a habit of generosity and will more
generally desire the esteem that goes along with being thought generous
(STCE, 110).
Locke favoured education by a tutor because, given his views on education, it
seemed at the time the better option. Locke believed each child was different and
that individualised education was therefore important. Locke thought esteem
the most important motivator and was eager to capture the natural desire to be
esteemed by parents that children have and harness it for the purposes of educa-
tion. He was also writing in a historical context where the crucial choice would
be whether to have the child educated at home or whether to send the child off
to a school wherein his contact with the family would be limited to a few weeks
each year. Because, as indicated above, Locke’s view of education was signifi-
cantly intertwined with developing virtuous character, allowing children to be
without adequate supervision so many hours per day was too risky. Ruderman
and Godwin (2000, pp. 508–509), for example, assume that since Locke was
critical of schools he would have obviously opposed a system of public schools.
Tarcov (1984, p. 210) on the other hand points out that Locke admitted that
both home and school education had inconveniences and that some of Locke’s
opposition to schools may have stemmed from the fact that they were boarding
schools. A public school system where children can conveniently attend school
and still live at home under the supervision of their parents is a very different
system from the one Locke criticised. Tarcov is right to see that we must be
cautious in making claims about how Locke would apply his ideas in a radically
different historical context. Locke’s statements were a judgment based on his
assessments of the positives and negatives of the two forms of education in his
day; they were not a statement of a timeless principle.
Locke on education and the rights of parents 109
the pravity of Mankind … obliges Men to enter into Society with one
another; that by mutual Assistance, and joint Force, they may secure unto
each other their Properties in the things that contribute to the Comfort and
Happiness of this Life; … But forasmuch as Men thus entering into
Societies, … may nevertheless be deprived of them [goods], either by the
Rapine and Fraud of their Fellow-Citizens, or by the Hostile Violence of
Foreigners; the remedy of this Evil consists in Arms, Riches, and Multitude
of Citizens; the Remedy of the other in Laws …. (L, 47–48)
What is important to notice here is that Locke believed that protecting civil
interest required the government positively to pursue ‘Arms, Riches, and
Locke on education and the rights of parents 111
Multitude of Citizens’ so that the state could defend itself from foreign attack.
This is central to Locke’s argument for religious toleration and has important
implications for his views on education as well because in both cases different
societies pursuing different ends may try to assert authority over the same
actions. In the toleration case, governments do not exist to pursue religious ends
and act illegitimately if they use their power for those ends, but they do act
legitimately when pursuing the civil interests of citizens. Although one can argue
about how broadly Locke would define civil interests, a point to which we will
return, at a minimum it includes things like an economy that can support a well
funded and highly educated military to guard from attack. Governments must
pursue positive goals to have the resources to protect ‘negative’ rights to
non-interference with life or property (Tuckness, 2008).
The complication for Locke is that a given act, killing an animal for example,
might be commanded by a church as part of a religious purpose and forbidden
by a government trying to protect the national economy. Locke gave the
example of a case where many animals have died from disease and the govern-
ment bans the slaughtering of animals for a time so that the numbers can be
replenished. Such a law would restrict the freedom of religious groups who want
to practice animal sacrifice. Locke argued that such a law is legitimate, even
though it restricts religious liberty, because the government is still acting for
civic, not spiritual ends (L, 42). The implication is that in the case of parents and
education, even if we grant that nurturing children is the purpose of parents, and
promoting civil interests the purpose of government, the commonwealth might
legitimately restrict parental rights in education so long as it can claim that it is
doing so for the sake of legitimate civil purposes such as improving the strength
of the nation to resist enemy attack. Requiring parents to teach children to
read or to learn science might be important for having a viable military and
economic system.
Suppose that the government, in pursuing what it takes to be the civic interests
of the nation, requires children to learn things to which the parents object. Again,
Locke gives us a parallel case with his writings on toleration. If a person thinks
that the government, pursuing civic interests in good faith, has nonetheless issued
an order that would violate the person’s religious beliefs to obey, he has the
option of disobeying the law and accepting the appropriate punishment. On the
other hand, if he thinks the policy is one that in fact has ends other than the civil
interests of the people (the policy was enacted to try to change people’s religious
beliefs or practices), he can regard the government actions as illegitimate uses of
government force and regard the government as illegitimate and resist it (L, 49).
Let us now take this as a model for how Locke would handle conflicts between
parents and the state regarding education issues. Since Locke gives parents, not
governments, the primary duty and power of educating children, the presump-
tion is generally in favour of parental control. Nonetheless, a system of public
education and some restrictions on parental rights are permissible if they have,
so to speak, a non-educational justification related to improving the safety and
security of the state. This would imply that public education should not restrict
112 Alex Tuckness
parental rights on the grounds that it will make the child a better or more knowl-
edgeable person alone. A political reason, the public good, is needed.
Perhaps the strongest objection against this interpretation is that it actually
underestimates the extent to which political society can aim at virtue simply for
its own sake. In Locke’s earliest defence of toleration he claimed that govern-
ments had no power to enforce morality if the vice did not affect the preservation
of human life (PE, p. 144). In his later writings, he states that magistrates should
‘impartially set themselves against vice, in whomsoever it is found, and leave men
to their own consciences; in their articles of faith, and ways of worship’
(W, 6:65). Marshall argues that Locke expanded the range of moral concerns
open to the magistrate so that it would include moral reformation in general
even if this did not directly improve the public good (1994, pp. 379–383). These
texts would need to be weighed against others where Locke rules out laws of this
sort. The best harmonisation of the various texts is likely that Locke later realised
that the virtues he was concerned about (recall the list earlier in the paper) are
all virtues that do affect the civil interests of the society and that it only confused
matters to imply that the government had no legitimate interest in regulating
such matters.
What we are left with is an account of Locke’s views on the rights of parents
that gives the state more authority to intervene in the realm of education than
previous interpretations have suggested. While Locke was adamant that different
societies exist for different ends, he recognised that certain actions affect more
than one end and that there will therefore be conflicts over whose will should
prevail. Locke believed that government would be unworkable if the state had to
suspend the pursuit of its basic goals every time it came into conflict with a claim
from another sphere and so he permitted the state to act in ways that restrict the
rights of religious believers, and by extension the rights of parents, so long as the
policy could be justified as one necessary to keep the lives, liberties, and proper-
ties of the citizens safe.
Conclusion
An overlooked contribution of Locke to modern educational theory rests in his
theory of toleration and its account of societies. The state, and the public school
systems it supports (and in some cases requires students to attend), is not a family,
and states and families do not exist for the same purposes. There is a sense in which
states can be improperly paternal, acting as if the reasons that might motivate
parents to educate children in a certain way must also be reason enough for the
state to do it. Yet Locke also realises that the state’s interest in promoting the civil
interests of citizens, even if interpreted narrowly as the defence of rights, gives the
state an interest in producing citizens who will be able to safeguard those rights in
the future. Setting up a public school system and regulating home schooling to
insure that both provide an education compatible with citizens who will protect
rights is thus a perfectly legitimate goal for governments to pursue. But it is also
one that may legitimately conflict with a parent’s sense of how best to raise a child.
Locke on education and the rights of parents 113
The parent, in seeking the best interest of the child, is also aiming at an end
legitimate for familial society. Locke would say that each is justified in acting on its
best judgment, and thus the state could be justified in pursuing a policy against
the wishes of parents if it believed there was a legitimate civil interest at stake.
Notes
1 References to Locke’s primary works will be given as follows: E = Essay concerning
human understanding (Locke, 1979) by book, chapter and section number; C = Of the
conduct of the understanding (Locke, 1996) by section number; L = Letter concerning
toleration (Locke, 1983) by page number; PE = Political essays (Locke, 1997) by page
number; STCE = Some thoughts concerning education (Locke, 1989) by section num-
ber; TT = Two treatises of government (Locke, 1988) by treatise and section number;
W = Works (Locke, 1963) by volume and page number. The original formatting, spacing
and punctuation are retained in quotations unless otherwise noted, but spellings have
been modernised.
2 While Passmore has tried to argue that Locke’s Some thoughts was ‘the great turning
point’ (2000, p. 242) in the transition to an optimistic view of human nature that saw no
limits to human perfectibility, Spellman points out that Locke’s rejection of the Calvinist
understanding of original sin did not necessarily imply a utopian view of human nature
and human possibilities (1988). Locke, for example, believed that children had a natural
inclination towards power and dominion (STCE, 103).
3 This strategy has been criticised from various angles. Gutmann (1987) argues that
Locke’s position fails to recognise the legitimate claims that the state has in producing
citizens with the requisite skills and knowledge for democratic self-governance. Carrig
(2001) goes even farther in claiming that Locke’s liberalism is really despotism by
parents. If we are nine-tenths of what we are by education and if parents control educa-
tion, their rule over children is far more extreme than that of a political tyrant. Similarly,
Sumser (1994) sees in Locke’s substitution of internalised controls (like the need for
esteem) for external force (corporal punishment) a system that leaves people no more
free than they were before. Neill (1989) and Leites (1979) both claim that if autonomy
is correctly understood it is compatible with parents raising children in the way Locke
suggested. These suggestions do not, however, respond to Gutmann’s contention that
the state should have more say in the shaping of its future citizens. This paper does not
challenge Gutmann’s conclusion about the interest of the state in its future citizens, it
instead challenges her reading of Locke.
References
Axtell, J. L. (1968) The educational writings of John Locke (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press).
Carrig, J. (2001) Liberal impediments to liberal education: the assent to Locke, The
Review of Politics, 63, 41–76.
Gutmann, A. (1987) Democratic education (Princeton, Princeton University Press).
Leites, E. (1979) Locke’s liberal theory of parenthood, in: O. O’Neill & W. Ruddick (eds)
Having children: philosophical and legal reflections on parenthood (Oxford, Oxford
University Press), 306–318.
Locke, J. (1963) [1823] Works. 10 Volumes (Germany, Scienta Verlag Aalen).
Locke, J. (1979) [1690] An essay concerning human understanding (ed. P. Nidditch)
(Oxford, Clarendon Press).
114 Alex Tuckness
Locke, J. (1983) [1689] A letter concerning toleration (ed. J. Tully) (Indianapolis, Hackett
Publishing Company).
Locke, J. (1988) [1689] Two treatises of government (ed. P. Laslett) (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press).
Locke, J. (1989) [1693] Some thoughts concerning education (ed. J. W. Yolton &
J. S. Yolton) (Oxford, Clarendon Press).
Locke, J. (1996) Some thoughts concerning education and Of the conduct of the understand-
ing (eds R. W. Grant & N. Tarcov) (Indianapolis, Hackett).
Locke, J. (1997) Political essays (ed. M. Goldie) (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press).
Marshall, J. (1994) John Locke: resistance, religion and responsibility (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press).
Neill, A. (1989) Locke on habituation, autonomy, and education, Journal of the History of
Philosophy, 27, 225–245.
Passmore, J. (2000) The perfectibility of man (3rd edn) (New York, Liberty Fund).
Ruderman, R. S. & Godwin, R. K. (2000) Liberalism and parental control of education,
The Review of Politics, 62, 503–529.
Spellman, J. (1988) John Locke and the problem of human depravity (Oxford, Oxford
University Press).
Sumser, R. (1994) John Locke and the unbearable lightness of modern education,
Educational Philosophy and Theory, 26, 1–15.
Tarcov, N. (1984) Locke’s education for liberty (Chicago, University of Chicago Press).
Wood, G. S. (1983, 3 February) This land is our land, The New York Review of Books,
16–21.
Tuckness, A. (2008) Punishment, property and the limits of altruism, American Political
Science Review, 102, 467–479.
Woolhouse, R. (2007) John Locke: a biography (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
Yolton, J. W. & Yolton, J. S. (1989) Introduction, in: J. Locke Some thoughts concerning
education (Oxford, Clarendon Press).
8 Rousseau’s philosophy
of transformative,
‘denaturing’ education
Patrick Riley
Introduction
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) is widely, and correctly, viewed as the
greatest political philosopher of the French Enlightenment. He is also widely,
and correctly, viewed as the most important philosopher of education in the
eighteenth century. For Rousseau, politics and education are strongly connected:
he gives education the task of transforming naturally self-loving egoists animated
only by their own ‘private wills’ into polis-loving citizens with a civic ‘general
will’ (CW 4.140-1/OC 3.363).1 In Book 2, Chapter 7 of the Social contract,
Rousseau introduces the figure of the ‘Great Legislator’ who must, over time, be
‘capable of changing human nature, so to speak’, by turning self-lovers into
lovers of the general good (CW 4.155/OC 3.381). This paper argues that we
should see the ‘legislator’ as a ‘civic educator’.2
Rousseau gives absolute primacy to radically transformative education which
makes people ‘what they ought to be’. Only Plato among earlier philosophers
emphasised such transformation. But Rousseau also insists that education,
however transformative, however ‘denaturing’, must finally produce autono-
mous adults who can say to their teachers (with Emile), ‘What course have I
chosen! To remain what you have made me’ (CW 13.665/OC 4.855). How far
Rousseau succeeds in finding a stable equilibrium between denaturing education,
stability in a political society of citizens, and final adult autonomy is the central
difficulty of his social thought, as the following pages will try to show.
In this chapter Rousseau’s theory of the general will is compared with ‘Kantian’
universal morality. At times something like a conversation between Rousseau and
Kant is broached. Of course, Rousseau’s relevant work was produced in the 1750s
and 60s; Kant’s philosophical works appeared in the 1780s. But there is a signifi-
cant sense in which Rousseau can intelligibly be read as doubting (in advance of
Kant) that a Kantian kind of morality and moral subject was possible, although in
many other ways he can be read as a precursor of Kantian ideas. Rousseau’s
account of general morality involves an understanding of education which takes
place in the biological and human time that frames individual subjects, and which
takes place also in the ‘civic’ or ‘political’ time in which the institutions and prac-
tices of societies and states bring about changes in the public political culture, and
116 Patrick Riley
in the mentality and morality, of citizens and subjects. For Kant, by contrast, one
is not made free or moral in time: one simply knows the moral imperatives, and
takes oneself to be free and able to comply with their commands. Where Kant
offers rational universal cosmopolitan morality valid for persons, Rousseau offers
educator-shaped, general, legislated, political civility for citizens. However, there
are also passages in Rousseau which suggest that Rousseau also has an idea of ‘the
end of time’ – a point at which freedom is perfected and authority perfectly
accepted. At such points Rousseau’s theory seems to be ‘out of time’.
The next, extensive, section of this paper analyses how Rousseau understands
the relationships between generalised (as opposed to individual, particular) will,
individual autonomy, and educational authority and power. In setting out his
philosophical understanding of these matters, Rousseau’s relationship to the
intellectual currents of his time, and, in particular, his consideration of the rival
‘kantian’ (in advance of Kant) position is explored.
Diderot
Rousseau’s radical doubts about the real existence of any universal, reason-
ordained morality come out most plainly and brilliantly in the (unpublished)
First version of the Social contract, the so-called Geneva manuscript, where he
refutes Diderot’s article for the Encyclopedia on ‘Natural Right’. Diderot had
argued that ‘if we take from the individual the right to decide the nature of the
just and the unjust’ we must then ‘bring this great question … before the human
race’, for the ‘good of all’ is the ‘only passion’ that this most-inclusive group has.
Paralleling Rousseau (initially), Diderot goes on to say that ‘individual wills are
suspect’, for they can be indifferently good or wicked, but that ‘the general will
is always good’, since ‘it has never been mistaken’ and never will be. It is to this
always-good, never-deceiving general will that ‘the individual should address
himself’, Diderot insists, ‘in order to find out to what extent he should be man,
citizen, subject, father, child, and when it is suitable for him to live and to die’
(Diderot, reprinted in Rousseau CW 3.137).
So far, no great gap has opened up between Diderot and Rousseau. But when
Diderot begins to indicate where the general will is deposited, he moves in the
direction of a proto-Kantian universalism which is (usually) foreign to the citizen
of Geneva. One can ‘consult’ the general will, he urges, ‘[i]n the written princi-
ples of Right of all civilized nations, in the social actions of savage and barbarian
peoples, in the tacit conventions of the enemies of the human race amongst
themselves; and even in indignation and resentment, the two passions that nature
seems to have even given to animals to make up for the absence of social laws
and public vengeance’ (CW 3.138). Diderot’s nominal generality is, in fact, a
universal morality (to use his own term). It relates to all humans, and seems to
extend even to honour among thieves. Rousseau’s general will – of Rome, of
Sparta, of Geneva – is a great deal more particular. Indeed in the Considerations
on the government of Poland Rousseau insists on the importance of national
peculiarities and particularities that should not be submerged in a cosmopolitan
universalism. For Diderot, then, the general will is to be found almost every-
where, whereas Rousseau doubts that it has ever been fully realised anywhere.
In the next section of ‘Natural Right’, Diderot goes on to urge that ‘the
general will is in each individual a pure act of the understanding which reasons
in the silence of the passions on what a man can demand of his fellow and on
what his fellow has the right to require of him’ (CW 3.138). At this point,
Diderot begins to be separated from Rousseau. Rousseau would have stressed
precisely ‘citizenship’ and ‘Geneva’, and would never have urged that general
will is immediately dictated by understanding or reason (as distinguished from
will-generalising civic education). Had Rousseau thought that, the passions being
‘silent’ (a phrase Diderot borrows from Malebranche), understanding and reason
could alone dictate what is right, he would never have made his famous claim in
120 Patrick Riley
The social contract that the ‘general will is always right, but the judgment that
guides it is not always enlightened’ (CW 5.154/OC 3.380). If reason alone
dictated right (as in Kant it furnishes ‘ought’), Rousseauean men would have no
need of a Legislator, nor of an Educator, to help effect ‘a union of understanding
and will’.
Book 1, chapter 2 of the Geneva manuscript is a refutation of Diderot’s ration-
alism and universalism; but it also provides more than a hint of what Rousseau
would have said about Kant’s distinctive way of combining ‘ought’ and freedom.
At one time, to be sure, Rousseau had himself stressed a roughly comparable
universal morality; in an early, unpublished fragment from around 1737 called
the Universal chronology he had appealed to Fénelon’s notion of a universal
Christian republic:
Later, and most clearly of all in the Geneva manuscript, Rousseau would abandon
the universal in favour of the general, and would exchange the ‘Christian repub-
lic’ for the more modest Sparta, Rome and Geneva. That Rousseau is not going
to argue for a reason-ordained universal morality valid for the entire human race
is evident in the opening sentence of the Geneva manuscript: ‘Let us begin by
inquiring why the necessity for political institutions arises’ (CW 4.76/OC
3.281). If a passion-silencing reason spoke to and governed all men, no mere
particular political institutions would arise at all (as Locke had already shown in
section 128 of the Second treatise, saying that only a ‘corrupt’ rejection of reason
keeps a unitary, unified mankind from being perfectly governed by natural law).
Rousseau is struck by the beauty of Diderot’s universal morality: ‘Indeed, no one
will deny that the general will in each individual is a pure act of the understand-
ing, which reasons in the silence of the passions about what man can demand of
his fellow man and what his fellow man has the right to demand of him’ (CW
4.80/OC 3.286). But, Rousseau immediately and characteristically asks, ‘where
is the man who can be so objective about himself; and if concern for his self-
preservation is nature’s first precept, can he be forced to look in this manner at
the species in general in order to impose on himself duties whose connection
with his particular constitution is not evident to him’ (CW 4.80/OC 3.286)? If
reason is not directly morally efficacious (as it cannot be, if great legislators are
to have the important formative function that is assigned to them in the Social
contract), and if ‘natural law’ is scarcely natural (as the Second discourse tries to
prove), then the natural man who fails to find his particular good in the general
Rousseau’s philosophy of transformative, ‘denaturing’ education 121
good will instead become the enemy of the human race, allying himself with the
strong and the unjust to despoil the weak. ‘It is false’, Rousseau insists, ‘that in
the state of independence, reason leads us to cooperate for the common good
out of a perception of our own interest’ (CW 4.79/OC 3.284).
So strongly does this current of thought sweep Rousseau along that he
mounts a brief assault on generality that would be fatal not just to Diderot, but
to his own political aims as well:
If the general society [of the human race] did exist somewhere other than
in the systems of Philosophers, it would be, as I have said, a moral Being
with qualities separate and distinct from those of particular Beings constitut-
ing it, somewhat like chemical compounds which have properties that do
not belong to any of the elements composing them. There would be a
universal language which nature would teach all men and which would be
their first means of mutual communication. There would be a kind of central
nervous system which would connect all the parts. The public good or ill
would not be merely the sum of private goods and ills as in a simple aggre-
gation, but would lie in the liaison uniting them. It would be greater than
this sum, and public felicity, far from being based on the happiness of private
individuals [des particuliers], would itself be the source of this happiness.
(CW 4.78-9/OC 3.284)
Plainly this argument goes too far, since Rousseau himself wants to argue for
a general good that is more than a mere sum or aggregation of private goods and
ills; it is no wonder that he suppressed the Geneva manuscript. Nevertheless the
dilemma remains that a general society cannot be produced by passion-silencing
‘reason’ alone. The only way out of the dilemma, according to Rousseau, is
through denatured, non-natural ‘new associations’ (Sparta, Rome, Geneva) that
take the place of well-meant but imaginary reason-governed general societies,
and which, through rigorous civic education, draw natural beings out of their
(equally natural) ego-centrism, bringing them to think of themselves (finally) as
‘parts of a greater whole’ – a whole less extensive, but more realisable, than a
‘Christian republic’ or a kingdom of ends. The particular social remedies
designed to overcome particularity and self-preference at the end of the second
chapter of the Geneva manuscript are rather abstractly, even vaguely character-
ised (‘new associations’, ‘new insights’, ‘perfected art’) (CW 4.82/OC 3.288);
but one knows from other works such as the Discourse on political economy and
the Considerations on the government of Poland how Rousseau proposes to
produce, through an educative shaping which finally yields ‘enlightened’ free
choice, a civic general will which is certainly no cosmopolitan ‘universal spirit’.
[Providence] has made him free in order that by choice he do not evil but
good… What more could divine power itself do for us? Could it make our
nature contradictory and give the reward for having done well to him who
did not have the power to do evil? What! To prevent man from being
wicked, was it necessary to limit him to instinct and make him a beast?
(CW 13.442-3/OC 4.587)
There is then in the depths of all souls an innate principle of justice and
moral truth anterior to all national prejudices, to all maxims of education.
This principle is the involuntary rule [la règle involontaire] based on which
we judge our actions and those of others as good or bad in spite of our own
maxims, and it is to this principle that I give the name of conscience.
(CW 12.195/OC 4.1108)
Conclusion
In the end, for Rousseau, no universal morality – not a Christian one based on
universal charity, nor a Diderotian one grounded in passion-silencing reason, nor
a Kantian one resting on reason-ordained ‘objective ends’ – can help in the
transformation of natural men into denatured citizens. The générale must be
(somewhat) particulière. This explains the weight which Rousseau gives to
education. For him, men do not naturally think of themselves as parts of a greater
whole – a genre humain or a Reich der Zwecke – and must therefore be brought
to a non-natural civic belief. But at the end of civic time – if volonté is to be equal
to généralité – they must finally see the force of Emile’s decision ‘to remain what
you have made me’.
Rousseau not only wanted to ‘secularise’ the general will – to turn it (mainly)
away from theology (and God’s will to save ‘all men’); he wanted to endow
Rousseau’s philosophy of transformative, ‘denaturing’ education 127
human beings with a will, a really efficacious ‘power’ of choosing, which can then
be subjected to the generalising influence of civic education – a republican
education which Montesquieu eloquently described but took to have vanished
from the modern (monarchical) world. First real will, then general will: that is
what Rousseau would say to his great French predecessors. And if that will can
be generalised by a non-authoritarian educative authority, the final product will
be the realisation of Rousseau’s highest civic ideal: the volonté générale one has
‘as a citizen’.
Notes
1 For all references to Rousseau’s texts in this paper, CW refers to the University Press of
New England’s Collected Writings of Rousseau edition and OC to the Bibliothèque de la
Pléiade’s Oeuvres complètes, followed by the relevant volume and page numbers.
2 This paper is a revised and edited version of ‘Rousseau’s general will: freedom of a
particular kind’, Political Studies, XXXIX, pp. 55–74, 1991; by permission of John Wiley
and Sons.
References
Augustine (1993) On free choice of the will (trans. T. Williams) (Indianapolis, Hackett).
Bayle, P. (1704) Pensées diverses, Ecrites à un docteur de Sorbonne [Diverse thoughts, writ-
ings of a doctor of Sorbonne] (4th edn.) (Rotterdam, Reinier Leers).
Charvet, J. (1974) The social problem in the philosophy of Rousseau (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press).
Hegel, G. (1942) Philosophy of right (trans. T. M. Knox) (Oxford, Clarendon Press).
Hegel, G. (1967) Phenomenology of mind (ed. & trans. J. B. Baillie) (New York, Harper
& Row).
Kant, I. (1922) Rechtslehre [The doctrine of right], in: E. Cassirer (ed.) Immanuel Kants
Werke (Volume 7) (Berlin, Bruno Cassirer Verlag), 3–180.
Kant, I. (1996a) Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals, in: M. J. Gregor (ed.) (trans.
A. W. Wood) Practical philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 37–108.
Kant, I. (1996b) Critique of practical reason, in: M. J. Gregor (ed.) (trans. A. W. Wood)
Practical philosophy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 133–271.
Kant, I. (1998) Critique of pure reason (ed. & trans. P. Guyer & A. W. Wood) (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press).
Kelly, G. A. (1978) Hegel’s retreat from Eleusis (Princeton, Princeton University Press).
Malebranche, N. (1958) Traité de la nature et de la grace [Treatise on Nature and Grace],
in: A. Robinet (ed.) Oeuvres complètes (Paris, Vrin), vol. 1.
Montesquieu. (1949) Mes pensées [My thoughts], in: R. Caillois (ed.) Oeuvres completès
(Paris, Pléiade), vol. 1, 1134–1144.
Oakeshott, M. (1975) On human conduct (Oxford, Clarendon Press).
Plato (1961) Plato: the collected dialogues (eds E. Hamilton & H. Cairns) (New York,
Bollingen).
Riley, P. (1982) Will and political legitimacy: a critical exposition of social contract theory
in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University
Press).
Riley, P. (1983) Kant’s political philosophy (Totowa, NJ, Rowman & Littlefield).
128 Patrick Riley
Riley, P. (1986) The general will before Rousseau (Princeton, Princeton University Press).
Rousseau, J.-J. (1990–2010) Collected writings of Rousseau (eds R. D. Masters & C. Kelly)
(Hanover, NH, University Press of New England), 13 vols.
Rousseau, J.-J. (1959–1995) Oeuvres complètes (eds B. Gagnebin & M. Raymond) (Paris,
Gallimard), 5 vols.
Shklar, J. (1969) Men and citizens: a study of Rousseau’s social theory (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press).
9 Educational theory and the
social vision of the Scottish
Enlightenment
Ryan Patrick Hanley
Introduction
The Scottish Enlightenment is celebrated for its many contributions to the
natural sciences, the social sciences, and the moral sciences; a wide range of
modern academic disciplines – including economics, history, and sociology – can
even trace their origins to it. But for all this attention, one aspect of the Scottish
Enlightenment has been almost entirely neglected by popular commentators and
specialists alike: its educational theory.
In what follows, I aim to illuminate the relationship between the educational
theory of the Scottish Enlightenment and the moral psychology and political
theory of commerce, corruption, and the civilising process that have long been
recognised as distinguishing features of Scottish thought in the eighteenth
century. In so doing I aim to complement the many existing studies of eighteenth-
century Scottish educational institutions – from the parish and burgh schools to
the universities – that have emphasised the relationship between such institutions
and the improving spirit associated with the Scottish Enlightenment.1 This spirit
was particularly evident in the universities of Glasgow and Aberdeen and
Edinburgh, which have long been recognised as major centres of pedagogical
innovation as well as theological liberalisation as they struggled to emerge from
the domination of Calvinism in the first half of the eighteenth century,2 and
become dynamic institutions of education in both public virtue and practical
morality and the natural sciences and mathematics.3 All of this has been carefully
and well studied. Yet what has not been a focus of study is the close relationship
of eighteenth-century Scottish educational theory to the social vision of the
Scottish Enlightenment.
To begin: what exactly was this ‘social vision’? Scholars have uncovered a
remarkable number of diverse concerns under this general aegis, but it seems fair
to say that at its heart lay a certain understanding of human flourishing and the
social institutions and individual virtues that best promote its realisation. This
conception of human flourishing was particularly rooted in an effort to reconcile
the pursuit and achievement of material opulence on a collective level with the
pursuit and achievement of moral excellence on an individual level – that is, to
combine ‘wealth and virtue’ (Hont & Ignatieff, 1983). In this sense, Scottish
130 Ryan Patrick Hanley
concern with progress was hardly limited to material progress, but extended to
a concern to promoting the moral development of both the individual and
society. Of course, to some degree such concerns were common to the European
Enlightenment taken as a whole, yet in Scotland the question of the challenges
and benefits of commercial society had a decidedly central place. In particular,
the effort to reconcile wealth and virtue contributed to the development of
several of the Scottish Enlightenment’s most distinctive contributions to the
social sciences, including the effort to define a ‘science of man’ dedicated to the
empirical study of human phenomena, the development of historical narratives
capable of explaining the progress of society from savagery to civilisation or
‘rudeness to refinement’, the emergence of a distinctive approach to political
economy, and the articulation of an ethical system suited to a commercial age.4
The educational theory of the Scottish Enlightenment was conceived in this
context and sought to contribute to this social vision. Among its principal aims
was to explain how modern citizens might be best equipped to meet the new
challenges of commercial modernity. This project compelled a creative rethink-
ing of the aims of a liberal education (Rhyn, 1999, pp. 5, 12), and particularly a
shift to the view that ‘the liberal arts were not to be indulged as ornamental
accomplishments, but as a vital forming-process for the character of citizens in a
modern Scottish res publica’ (Jones, 1983, p. 90). At the same time, the Scots
were hardly civic republicans in any simple sense; as Roger Emerson has recently
and convincingly argued, ‘the Scottish Enlightenment was not principally about
politeness or civic humanism but something more basic, the remaking of a
society so that it could produce men able to compete in every way in a rapidly
changing world’ (Emerson, 2009, p. 19). This ambition particularly compelled
a reorientation of liberal education towards ameliorating the specific challenges
posed by commercial civilisation in a manner that complemented the reform of
educational institutions happening simultaneously on practical level in response
to this stimulus (Withrington, 1970, esp. pp. 169–170, 177–181). For all their
ostensible contributions to ‘the invention of the modern world’ (Herman,
2001), the Scots knew that their invention came at a potential cost of its own –
and nowhere is this so clear as in their writings on education, which, as I argue
below, play a central role in the larger Scottish inquiry into how to maximise the
benefits of commercial society while also controlling its costs.
Taken as a whole, the educational theory of the Scottish Enlightenment
focused on two main questions. First, what particular virtues are necessary in a
commercial society and how can education properly conceived contribute to
their cultivation? Second, what particular vices are endemic to a commercial
society and how can education properly conceived contribute to their mitiga-
tion? These questions govern the brief remarks on education to be found in the
works of the most prominent thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, including
David Hume, Adam Smith, and Adam Ferguson, as well as the extensive reflec-
tions found in the Scottish Enlightenment’s three main treatises on education:
George Turnbull’s Observations upon liberal education (1742), David Fordyce’s
Dialogues on education (1745–1748), and Henry Home, Lord Kames’ Loose
Educational theory and the social vision of the Scottish Enlightenment 131
hints on education (1781). These works attest to the fact that eighteenth-century
Scotland’s contributions to innovation in education go well beyond its justly
celebrated institutions and extend to a reconsideration of the proper aims of a
liberal education in commercial modernity – an understanding deserving the
attention of intellectual historians and educational theorists alike.
In the age we live in, every thing conspires to insinuate early into young
minds the desire of riches, as that which makes the chief joy and honour of
life; and a dread and contempt of poverty, as that alone which makes
miserable, or brings disgrace and shame. Avarice is now the universal
passion: ambition is no more. But ’till the mind is fortified against this fatal
error, none of the great virtues can grow up in it. (Prefatory discourse x; see
also Observations 123)
Conclusion
The three thinkers profiled above offer the most significant and extended educa-
tional theories of the Scottish Enlightenment. How then do their studies
comport with the thoughts on education offered by the more prominent think-
ers of the Scottish Enlightenment? In fact the connection between commercial
corruption and education that lies at the heart of the educational theories of
Turnbull, Fordyce, and Kames forms the core of the briefer thoughts on educa-
tion set forth by Ferguson and Smith. Of these two, Ferguson tends to be
more readily associated with the critique of commercial corruption. Among his
Educational theory and the social vision of the Scottish Enlightenment 139
principal worries was that the corruption endemic to commercialisation vitiates
human excellence; ‘recommending employments in proportion as they are lucra-
tive, and certain in their gains’ merely ‘drives ingenuity, and ambition itself, to
the counter and the workshop’. In order to preserve within commercial society
the natural human concern for perfection, a renewed emphasis on education is
required. But not any sort of education; too often modern education itself, on
his view, further encourages this mediocrity. In this vein the growth of libraries
and university education, often viewed as a great advance, is in fact detrimental
insofar as it leads us to ‘become students and admirers, instead of rivals; and
substitute the knowledge of books, instead of the inquisitive or animated spirit
in which they were written’ (Essay 206).
Adam Smith would in time come to extend both Ferguson’s lament of the
conditions of contemporary education, as well as his insistence that the best
remedy for the challenges posed by commercial corruption was an education of
a quite different sort. Indeed the tie that binds all of Smith’s reflections on
education is this theme of corruption. Smith introduces this theme in his
comments on the state of contemporary educational institutions. Too often, he
laments, no real instruction is given there – a fact he famously blames on the
absence of incentive structures for faculty pay (Wealth of Nations 5.1.f.3–6). But
this is only the tip of the iceberg, for in truth the modern European university
system itself represents little more, on Smith’s view, than a set of ‘sanctuaries in
which exploded systems and obsolete prejudices found shelter and protection’
(Wealth of Nations 5.1.f.34). Founded originally for the training of clergymen,
curricula failed to adapt to meet the needs of a new class of students, and far from
teaching their students ‘the real business of the world’, colleges chose to focus
on the ‘austerities and abasement of a monk’ rather than ‘the liberal, generous,
and spirited conduct of a man’ (Wealth of Nations 5.1.f.30–35). Smith’s empha-
sis on the uselessness of contemporary education to provide men of the new
commercial age with what they need to know (Wealth of Nations 5.1.f.46)
parallels several criticisms set forth in the educational treatises examined
above, as well as the justifications for several more practical attempts to reform
eighteenth-century Scottish university curricula in a manner that would render
them more fit for a commercial people (see Gerard, 1755; Thom, 1762; see also
Stewart-Robertson, 1981, p. 510; Jones, 1983, pp. 113–114).
But Smith hardly stops here. For all the corruptions of the contemporary
institutions of education, Smith still insists that it is to education that we need to
turn to discover a remedy for the most acute forms of commercial corruption
itself. Here we find perhaps the clearest parallels between Smith and the Scottish
educational theorists profiled above. Smith’s account of commercial corruption
is in fact one of the most developed in the Scottish Enlightenment. He particu-
larly notes that for all the benefits of the division of labour, its gains are often
bought at a high human cost, as specialisation of labour often leads to repetition
that leads a labourer to become ‘as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a
human creature to become’ (Wealth of Nations 5.1.f.50). Smith’s worry was
that in this state of ‘drowsy stupidity’ or ‘mental mutilation, deformity, and
140 Ryan Patrick Hanley
wretchedness’ that ‘all the nobler parts of the human character may be, in a great
measure, obliterated and extinguished in the great body of the people’ (Wealth
of Nations 5.1.f.51, 60). Much of Smith’s later moral philosophy can be under-
stood as an attempt to provide a normative solution to this problem (Hanley,
2009). But more immediately, Smith turned to educational institutions as a
remedy for this particular form of corruption (e.g. West, 1996, p. 100; for
further references, see Hanley, 2009, p. 60 n.12). It is Smith’s conviction that
where the great majority of citizens are placed in circumstances disadvantageous
to both their own and the civic wellbeing, ‘some attention of government is
necessary, in order to prevent the almost entire corruption and degeneracy of the
great body of the people’ (Wealth of Nations 5.1.f.49). His particular recom-
mendation is that government should especially fund science education – and for
specifically political reasons, as such a citizenry would be susceptible to ‘the
delusions of enthusiasm and superstition, which, among ignorant nations,
frequently occasion the most dreadful disorders’ (Wealth of Nations 5.i.f.61). On
the grounds that ‘science is the great antidote to the poison of enthusiasm and
superstition’, Smith’s hope was that a people trained in scientific analysis might
be rendered more discriminating, if not impervious to manipulation by interested
factions (Wealth of Nations 5.1.g.14).
Thus Smith and Ferguson, like their contemporaries, insisted that the chief
aim of proper education was to fit the citizens of a commercial society to respond
to the challenges – at once intellectual, moral, and political – posed by commer-
cialisation itself. In so doing, they testify to the broader consensus within the
Scottish Enlightenment that the true aim of education is not merely the produc-
tion or dissemination of knowledge but the preservation and perpetuation of the
virtues required for life in liberal, commercial society. Perhaps nowhere does this
conviction find such eloquent testimony as in the brief reflections on education
set forth by two of the greatest luminaries of the Scottish Enlightenment, Francis
Hutcheson and David Hume.12 Hutcheson is more typically understood as a
defender of the view that virtue is education’s proper aim (Short introduction
1.3.4; Meditations 6.16). But it is Hume who particularly drives this point home.
Hume is not typically regarded today as a theorist of character education.13 Yet
even Hume claims that virtue never flourishes except in a state ‘where a good
education becomes general’. In so saying he largely reaffirms the claims of his
Scottish contemporaries, insisting that ‘general virtue and good morals in a state,
which are so requisite to happiness, can never arise from the most refined
precepts of philosophy, or even the severest injunctions of religion; but must
proceed entirely from the virtuous education of youth’ (History of England
1:179; Essays 55).
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to Colin Heydt and Ingrid Gregg, as well as to the
editors and reviewers for the Oxford Review of Education, for their many helpful
suggestions.
Educational theory and the social vision of the Scottish Enlightenment 141
Notes
1 See e.g. Cant, 1967 and 1982; Camic, 1983, pp. 64–71; Valdés Mirayes, 2005,
pp. 102–103; cf. Anderson, 1995, pp. 1–23.
2 See e.g. Sloan, 1971, pp. 9–32; Berry, 1997, pp. 12–16; Emerson, 2003, pp. 18–20.
This evolution itself paralleled contemporaneous struggles of evangelicals and moder-
ates in the Kirk; see e.g. Cameron, 1982; Sher, 1985, esp. pp. 324–328.
3 For the former, see esp. Sher, 1990; for the latter, see esp. Wood, 2003.
4 For comprehensive treatments of these themes, see esp. Phillipson, 1981; Skinner,
1990; Berry, 1997.
5 See e.g. Benjamin Franklin’s prominent reliance on Turnbull’s work in his Proposals
relating to the education of youth in Pennsylvania (1749).
6 The work is nowadays mainly read as an attempt to domesticate moral philosophy
within the broader context of epistemology, and is often read in contrast to Hume’s
more famous execution of the same project; see e.g. Broadie, 2003b, pp. xiv–xv. For
further important comparisons, see esp. Norton, 1975, p. 705; Mackinnon, 1987,
p. 109; Broadie, 1994, p. 39; Ahnert, 2007, p. 89.
7 For studies emphasising this ‘Shaftesburianism’, and the harmonisation of morality,
religion and the moral and physical sciences, see esp. Wasserman, 1953, pp. 45–52;
Norton, 1975, pp. 704–706, 712; Mackinnon, 1987, p. 105; Stewart, 1987, p. 99;
Wood, 1993, pp. 46–55; Rivers, 2000, pp. 179–184.
8 Thus Ahnert’s helpful description of Turnbull’s recognition that ‘the natural, provi-
dential rewards for industry’ also ‘to some extent contained the seeds of its corruption’
(2007, p. 101).
9 Turnbull’s employment of this self-conscious ‘philosophical style’ (Observations 74)
may have been the effect of his engagement with Hume’s treatment of association-
ism in the just-published Treatise; or, perhaps more likely, the influence of Locke and
Hutcheson (see e.g. Broadie, 1994, pp. 35–43; Moore, 2003, pp. xii–xiii).
10 In this respect Fordyce is indeed representative of what has been called ‘the preference
for the Socratic over the Lockean position in Scottish educational thinking’ (Stewart-
Robertson, 1981, p. 522).
11 In lamenting the corruption of their age, Fordyce’s speakers (2.13, 2.18) echo
Turnbull and also anticipate better-known arguments of Ferguson and Smith from
several decades later.
12 Hutcheson and Hume are today often regarded as on different sides of this particular
issue in light of their notorious epistolary interchange on the normative duties of the
moral philosopher. Yet that debate focused on the more specialised question of the na-
ture and aims of moral philosophy itself. With regard to education understood broadly,
however, one finds greater agreement.
13 Thus Paul Russell has noted that Hume has ‘little or nothing to say in his major writ-
ings about how the virtues are actually acquired, developed and sustained’ (2006,
p. 162; cf. Hanley, 2011, on Hume’s emphasis on the claim that the natural moral
sentiment of humanity is a sufficient foundation for modern virtue).
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10 Mary Wollstonecraft
and Catharine Macaulay
on education
Elizabeth Frazer
Introduction
In 1790 Mary Wollstonecraft was 31, a published author, editor and translator,
with experience running a school, working as a ladies’ companion, and as a
governess in an aristocratic household. She moved in dissenting circles, and
in the radical circles of her publisher Joseph Johnson in central London.1 At
the end of November 1790 Wollstonecraft published her Vindication of
the rights of men, a riposte to Edmund Burke’s hostile attack on the French
Revolution (Reflections on the revolution in France) which had been published on
November 1, 1790.2
Catharine Macaulay was 59; and a famous woman in the sense that chinaware
figurines of the ‘Female Patriot’ were manufactured by the Crown Derby porce-
lain factory in the 1770s.3 Her History of England (Macaulay, 1763–1783)
rivalled and for a time outsold David Hume’s work of the same name (Hume,
1883/1754–1762). Macaulay was remarkably involved in daily political contro-
versy as a partisan of the ‘old’, ‘true’, or ‘real’ Whig cause (Hume was associated
with the ‘Tory’ position). She was the author of a number of pamphlets on
philosophical and political matters including one on Thomas Hobbes (Macaulay,
1767) and one contesting Burke’s moderate Whig analysis of problems of parlia-
ment and administration (Macaulay, 1770; cf also Macaulay, 1775). She was
celebrated in revolutionary north America, and in Paris, and was accordingly a
figure of suspicion for the Hanoverian state. By the 1780s her reputation had
suffered from the pitfalls of celebrity culture. As aspects of her family life were
lampooned, her reputation and power as a Whig propogandist receded and the
later volumes of her History were not the best sellers that the earlier ones were.
Her intellectual efforts turned to religion and morality and in 1783 she published
her Treatise on the immutability of moral truth. This then developed into her
Letters on education published in 1790 (Part III of the Letters is more or less a
reproduction of the Treatise).
The December 1790 issue of the Analytical Review included warm reviews of
both Wollstonecraft’s Vindication and Catharine Macaulay’s Observations on the
Reflections of ... Edmund Burke on the revolution in France which was published
in December 1790 (Anon, 1790a, 1790b; Hill, 1995 p. 182). The reviewer
146 Elizabeth Frazer
judged Wollstonecraft’s and Macaulay’s works very favourably as compared with
Burke’s. In November 1790 the Analytical Review had published an admiring
review by Wollstonecraft of Macaulay’s Letters on education (published November
1790). Wollstonecraft and Macaulay were in private communication at this time,
although to Wollstonecraft’s lasting regret they were never to meet (Hill, 1995).
Macaulay died in 1791, before Wollstonecraft turned to writing her Vindication
of the rights of woman, in which she spent more words on Macaulay’s praise
(Wollstonecraft, 1994/1792, p. 180).
There is then a personal and an intellectual link between Macaulay and
Wollstonecraft, and reason to attach weight to the similarities in their views on
education. Macaulay and Wollstonecraft both participated in controversy (which
continues to our own time) about whether ‘virtue’ can be taught, as opposed to
being a natural capacity that everyone is simply given. In the eighteenth century,
the whole question was bound up with theological matters, and also political
ones. Given agreement that virtue can be taught, there is the question whether
this involves teaching knowledge of propositions and principles, or whether,
rather, ethical education is more like teaching skill. There are many diverse and
subtly distinct positions within this schematic framework. Above all, Macaulay
and Wollstonecraft both dissent from any model of education as manipulation,
or the use of concealment or subterfuge. For both, the matter of truth that is at
the heart of virtue, and hence should be at the heart of political and social life,
must be enacted also in the process, as well as the outcome, of education
(Wollstonecraft, 1974/1787, pp. 7–9; Macaulay, 1996/1790, pp. 85, 185).
There are also politically significant contrasts between the two. In particular
we can emphasise a difference in their respective theories of rights, which bears
on the questions of feminism and of education. Macaulay attacks Hobbes’s
abstract theory of rights; and she also resists Burke’s theory which makes rights
a matter of tradition (Macaulay, 1767, pp. 8–10; 1790, pp. 13–14, 31). For her
rights are historical, but they are also natural. She is concerned to establish the
correct philosophical foundation for rights, and her historical and political
writing emphasises a continuing struggle to recover lost and continually threat-
ened rights (e.g. Macaulay, 1770, p. 31; Hill, 1992, pp. 31, 229; Pocock, 1998,
pp. 248f). Wollstonecraft follows this theory of rights as natural (Wollstonecraft,
1994/1790, p. 12). She insists that they are properties of women as well as men
(Zagarri, 2005, pp. 667–670). The most important thing is to secure them
culturally and legally (Wollstonecraft, 1994/1792, intro. pp. 66–67, ch. 1, p. 79;
Taylor, 2003, pp. 213–214). She is suspicious of inherited rights (1994/1790,
p.10) and aware of the novelty of the rights she proposes – women’s enfranchise-
ment, their right to paid occupation, transformed rights within marriage and the
family. So history, whether near or distant, has a different significance for her
than it has for Macaulay.
In this paper I aim to put these respective theories of rights and education into
the complicated context of eighteenth-century factional and intellectual debates
and inheritances. I want to emphasise the striking accord between Wollstonecraft
and Macaulay in matters of religion and morality in relation to education.
Mary Wollstonecraft and Catharine Macaulay on education 147
Here in particular it seems that Macaulay’s work has some direct influence on
Wollstonecraft, although the ideas that infuse their thinking are very much part
of the general heritage of progressive, oppositional eighteenth-century intellec-
tual culture.4
I shall return to this theme of the central relevance of religion and morality to
Wollstonecraft’s educational and political theory.
First, though, we must turn to an important source for both Macaulay and
Wollstonecraft – the inheritance of the conflicting views of John Locke and Jean-
Jacques Rousseau on education (Rousseau, 1979/1762, esp. Bk III pp. 89–90;
Locke, 1989/1693).6 Lockean themes pervade both Macaulay’s and
Wollstonecraft’s views of education: experience as the only efficiacious instructor,
the superiority of reason over instinct, as well as detailed views about diet, dress,
play, sleep, techniques and topics of instruction, and so forth. (Wollstonecraft,
1787, p. 11, 1994/1792, ch. IV p. 123, ch. XI p. 237; Macaulay, 1996/1790,
Mary Wollstonecraft and Catharine Macaulay on education 149
Pt.1 e.g. III p. 23, IV pp. 40–45). In particular, of course, they both endorse
Locke’s views about educational equality between girls and boys (Locke,
1989/1693 passim; Wollstonecraft, 1994/1792, intro. p. 71; Macaulay,
1996/1790, Pt.1, IV pp. 46–50). Rousseau’s Emile, by contrast, with its roman-
tic conceit of keeping a child from society and the world, sheltering him from
understanding of truth and falsity in order to preserve innocence and guard
against corruption, is rejected by both Macaulay and Wollstonecraft in favour of
a sterner, more rationalist project of moral education and the learning of hard
lessons backed up by precept and principle (Wollstonecraft, 1787, p. 11;
1994/1792, ch.1 p.79; Macaulay, 1996/1790, e.g. Pt1.VI p. 60, VII p. 66, IX
p. 85, XIII p. 119). However, versions of the Emile project are ubiquitous in the
educational works that Macaulay and Wollstonecraft are writing to and from, and
they both produce versions of the uncorrupted educated individual as the prod-
uct of a pedagogic social process. I shall go on to discuss how Wollstonecraft’s
Original stories, in particular, explicitly echo a Rousseauian educational project.
But by far the most significant aspect of the inheritance of Locke and Rousseau
on education is Macaulay’s attack, echoed and theoretically elaborated by
Wollstonecraft, on Rousseau’s depiction of the education of a girl, and his model
of ideal womanhood in the person of Sophie (Rousseau, 1979/1762, bk. V).
Macaulay’s and Wollstonecraft’s lines of attack on Rousseau are paralleled by
some of the lines of their attack on Burke. By the 1760s Macaulay was divided
from Burke by Whig factionalism (Macaulay, 1770; Hill, 1992, pp. 74–6, 122).
The antagonisms between them widened as her History became more famous
and hence more criticised, with Burke referring in correspondence to ‘the patri-
otick scolding of our republican Virago’ and calling her an ‘Amazon’ (Hill,
1992, p. 173). Of course in 1790 Burke’s attack on the French revolution inten-
sified the bitterness of the controversy between him and the defenders of repub-
licanism, equality, and rights. Both Macaulay and Wollstonecraft attack Burke for
his treatment of sex. They also attack his written style as over-rhetorical and
over-emotional. Wollstonecraft’s version of this line, while sharing a good deal
with Macaulay’s, is theoretically and politically elaborated in a distinctive way.7
Wollstonecraft on education
Three of Wollstonecraft’s works are particularly salient for analysis of her theory
of education – her first published work: Thoughts on the education of daughters
(1787); her book about and for the education of children: Original stories from
real life (1788); and the Vindication of the rights of woman (1792). Perhaps the
most striking thing about these works is the pervasiveness of the themes of
virtue, analysis of the corruption and possible improvement of society, and the
relationship of these to religion. In the two Vindications the themes of state and
law are added, so that the critique of society is supplemented by an explicit
theory of public policy.
Thoughts on the education of daughters was written in the midst of
Wollstonecraft’s career in education – after shutting down the school she ran
with her sisters in Newington Green, prior to embarking on a new job as a
governess. In the preface she makes reference to several popular books on this
topic that were extant, and the inheritance of Rousseau’s Emile and Locke’s
Thoughts is also prominent (Wollstonecraft, 1974/1787, p. 11). Education
152 Elizabeth Frazer
includes care and socialisation from the earliest days of infancy. She is concerned
to repudiate harshness, and to affirm values such as respect and affection, and
early in the book she adverts to the theme of truth: ‘Children are taught revenge
and lies in their very cradles’ (Wollstonecraft, 1974/1787, p. 10). This emphasis
on truth and truthfulness is underpinned by an account of truth similar to the
one that is so central to Macaulay’s Letters on education and to her Treatise. This
is that ‘principles of truth are innate’ – our assent to many truths is without
‘reasoning’ (Wollstonecraft, 1974/1787, p. 13). Our understanding and
apprehension of truth is not based on inference (from our senses, or from
evidence). It is rather that ‘we feel their force’ (1787, p. 13). In turn, like
Macaulay, Wollstonecraft links this philosophy of truth and reason to her opposi-
tion to ‘deism’. For both Macaulay and Wollstonecraft our belief in God is based
on revealed truth. Reason and rationality are certainly to be brought to bear in
human affairs. But the prospects for educating virtuous persons are threatened if
the truth of moral principles is in doubt.
In Original stories Wollstonecraft crafts a book out of the pedagogical
technique of story-telling. The book itself is a story, about two young girls whose
misfortune it is to have been deprived of adequate education and socialisation
and accordingly are ignorant and badly behaved. These girls come under the
tutelage of Mrs Mason who
We can only read this as a rejoinder to Emile. Emile’s tutor is able to educate him
from a very early age, bringing him up to embody the ideal of natural, uncor-
rupted understanding and virtue. Wollstonecraft’s teacher has to be more in the
remedial line. Mrs Mason’s method of education is largely based on story-telling,
often with the stories illustrated by the real life of the neighbourhood and
countryside in which the girls live.
The Original stories are of interest for present purposes mainly for the substan-
tive set of virtues that Wollstonecraft’s teacher is concerned to instil in her pupils:
kindness and the repudiation of cruelty; honour, integrity, truthfulness; generos-
ity and charity; industriousness; fortitude and courage. In the Vindication of the
rights of woman the theme of virtue is central. Virtues are potentially realisable
characteristics of the human condition in civilisation. Virtuous conduct is
predictable and stable. The courageous or benevolent person is reliable, not just
in the sense that they can be relied upon to be benevolent or courageous, but in
the double sense that we know what benevolence and courage are, how they
manifest themselves (Wollstonecraft, 1994/1792, ch I pp. 76–77, ch III
pp. 113–115). By contrast, vice is all over the place – the vicious parent can be
randomly kind to her children, which only shows up not only the lack, but the
very corruption of, benevolence (ch. X pp. 232–234). It is this random,
Mary Wollstonecraft and Catharine Macaulay on education 153
unpredictable, out of control quality of the vices – extravagance, intemperance,
cruelty, mendacity – that make them so significant and so evil. Critically
Wollstonecraft ties virtues and vices to the political circumstances of the society.
Laws, public institutions, and cultural norms are all critical in determining
whether a person acquires the virtues, and in determining the distribution of
virtuous and vicious conduct in the society (ch. II p. 82, ch. IX pp. 228f).
Above all, education is pervasive in, and central to, this work of ethics, politi-
cal theory, philosophical anthropology, and social theory. The first edition’s
dedication includes a specific reference to ‘National Education’ (Todd, 1994,
p. 382n). The book begins by adverting to education:
I have turned over various books written on the subject of education, and
patiently observed the conduct of parents and the management of schools;
but what has been the result? – a profound conviction that the neglected
education of my fellow-creatures is the grand source of the misery I deplore.
(Wollstonecraft, 1994/1792, p. 71)
lead us from love of ourselves to the sublime emotions which the discovery
of his wisdom and goodness excites, if these feelings were not set in motion
154 Elizabeth Frazer
to improve our nature, of which they make a part? (Wollstonecraft,
1994/1792, p. 79)
The good effects resulting from attention to private education will ever be
very confined, and the parent who really puts his own hand to the plow will
always, in some degree, be disappointed, till education becomes a grand
national concern. A man cannot retire into the desert with his child.
(Wollstonecraft, 1994/1792, ch. XII p. 241, also II p. 86)
(of) the social affections that are to constitute the happiness of life as it
advances ... equality is the basis, and an intercourse of sentiments unclogged
by that observant seriousness which prevents disputation, though it may not
inforce submission. (p. 241)
Conclusion
Bridget Hill remarks that Macaulay’s Letters contain a ‘bewildering variety of
ideas’ and that large parts of it do not seem to be about education at all (Hill,
1992, pp. 160f). This raises the critical question of genre – are ‘educational
treatises’ actually about education? The matter is critical in reception and inter-
pretation of Wollstonecraft. Thoughts on the education of daughters is written very
much in the tradition of didactic advice books to parents and tutors (V. Jones,
2002). Although wider theses about reason and subjectivity, and philosophical
anthropology, are undoubtedly present there can be no doubt that this is a book
‘about education’. But the Vindication of the rights of woman is also a book that
is centred in the late eighteenth-century tradition of republicanism, and rights
theory, is steeped in theology, is a seminal contribution to feminist philosophy
156 Elizabeth Frazer
and ethics, contains an outline of prescriptive political theory, and, we must
add, makes a distinctive and lastingly significant contribution to social theory.
In focusing on the educational aspects of the Letters and the Vindication this
paper produces, accordingly, a partial reading. In doing so, though, I have
wished to resist the idea that we can ignore theology, ethics, cultural critique, or
political and social theory, when we analyse Macaulay and Wollstonecraft on
education.
Stoic ethics and concerns about theological and philosophical truth are
present in Wollstonecraft’s work from the outset, but Catharine Macaulay’s
extended discussion in the Treatise and the Letters undoubtedly influenced
Wollstonecraft in her writing of her second Vindication and later works, and
reinforce our sense that the two are united in a theoretical and political effort.
This effort is directed against currents of philosophy and politics that argue that
‘self-interest’ and ‘commercial’ impulses not only have to be accommodated, but
can further be made central to our ethics and promoted in our polity. For both,
any evident tendencies to individualism and the predominance of relations of
exchange and profit are to be understood both as corruptions of ethical life, and
also as explicable by reference to social and political conditions. Far from being
impressed by rationality as self-interest, we should see it as a matter of laws and
customs which can, of course, with political will, be reconstructed.
For both, this political reconstruction must involve the institutionalisation of
rights, including for women. But the discernment of right rights, and the politi-
cal construction of a virtuous polity, demands education. Macaulay was engaged
in direct demands on government: demands for a constitution centred on human
dignity and self-government, an administration that reflects republican values,
and policies and laws that reward virtue and punish vice. For Wollstonecraft, a
new distribution of rights is indissolubly linked to a thoroughgoing transforma-
tion in culture and in conduct. One reason why Wollstonecraft is such a signifi-
cant figure in the history of political theory is that her project is that of an
uncompromising politicisation of social and cultural relationships.12 The values,
virtues, and rights that her and Macaulay’s visions seek to realise in government,
and in political society, must also be realised in social and cultural settings.
Among these rights are those of women to work, and their rights to the
prerogatives, and the duties, of citizenship. Women’s citizenship is a condition
of the decent socialisation and education of children. But more, education is the
only way to morality and to effective citizenship, because morality requires
discernment, of truth and of virtue, and the rejection of what passes for truth in
a world of unequal power, and corruption.
Notes
1 For biography of Mary Wollstonecraft and accounts of intellectual and political context
see Todd, 2000; C. Jones, 2002; Taylor, 2003; Gordon, 2005.
2 For further detail on the writing of the Vindication see Bromwich, 1995.
3 For biography of Catharine Macaulay and intellectual context see Hill, 1992; Hicks,
2002; Davies, 2005; O’Brien, 2009.
Mary Wollstonecraft and Catharine Macaulay on education 157
4 In the case of both Wollstonecraft and Macaulay there is considerable controversy about
how to classify them in political theory terms – as republican, liberal, etc., and how
exactly they relate to subsequent feminisms – and about their exact position vis-à-vis
the complex range of religious and partisan positions of their time and inheritance; see
Barker-Benfield, 1989; Hill, 1992; Pocock, 1998; Taylor, 2002, 2003; Davies, 2005;
O’Brien, 2009. Wollstonecraft in particular has been taken to be a key figure in the
‘feminist canon’, although her understanding of sexuality and embodiment (and the
question of her ‘puritanism’) was a matter of controversy for late twentieth-century
feminist thinkers as also were her assumptions about domestic labour and class, and
hence the identification of feminism as a middle-class concern: see Gatens, 1991;
Coole, 1993.
5 For commentary and discussion of Macaulay’s work on education see Gardner, 1998;
Gunther-Canada, 2003.
6 The opposition between Rousseau as a ‘natural’ educator and Locke as ‘rationalist’ is
an interpretation that structures presentation of the two to now – see e.g. Curren (ed.)
2007; it is possible, of course, to read them in ways that bring them closer than this
emphasising e.g. Locke’s consistent emphasis on ‘age appropriateness’ and interpreting
Rousseau’s criticism of ‘reasoning with a child’ as criticism of arguing with a child.
7 For more detailed discussion of these engagements with Burke than is possible here see
Sapiro, 1992; Bromwich, 1995; Hicks, 2002.
8 For a more detailed account of rank and gender in 18th-century thought see O’Brien,
2009, esp. ch. 5.
9 It is difficult to locate the irony here, as Wollstonecraft’s own emotion overcomes her
in her criticism of Burke’s emotion; see Sapiro, 1992, pp. 204–206.
10 For more on this point, Cohen, 2005, esp. pp. 226ff.
11 For an account of Wollstonecraft’s educational theory that puts it in the context of
contemporary concerns about sex, see V. Jones, 2005, and 2002.
12 According to this interpretation, Wollstonecraft makes more congenial reading for
theorists who deconstruct models of political power, and resist the identification of
politics with public and state matters, than she does for either liberals or republicans of
later times.
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11 Self-cultivation (Bildung)
and sociability between
mankind and the nation
Fichte and Schleiermacher
on higher education
Alexander Schmidt
Introduction
In the decades around 1800 the German public witnessed a substantial and
controversial debate about the reform of higher education with contributions by
nearly every thinker of note. This debate was informed by a deep concern with
individual self-cultivation (Bildung) in a society marked by an increasing division
of labour and by the questions about the status and unity of (scientific) knowl-
edge that were posed by Kantian epistemology.1 Historically, this discussion
responded both to the institutional crisis of the university as an ancien régime
corporation and to French expansionism with its ensuing destruction of the
political structures of the German empire. This confrontation with Revolutionary
and later Napoleonic France intensified an ongoing German (and European)
controversy about the final purpose of education: should all education eventually
be ‘cosmopolitan’, as Kant contended (Kant, 1923, p. 448); or should it rather
be concerned with the political and cultural unity of the nation? And if higher
education had to form, in Wilhelm von Humboldt’s words, the ‘pinnacle of all
that is undertaken for the cultivation of the nation’ (Müller, 1990, p. 273)
should the university not be abandoned in favour of the seemingly more efficient
French model of polytechnics?
The somehow surprising reassertion of the university against the centralised
post-Revolutionary French system of special écoles, particularly by Prussian think-
ers (Schubring, 1991), is usually considered as the starting point of what
was much later labelled as the ‘Humboldtian’ model of the modern univer-
sity, combining teaching with research in ‘solitude and freedom’ (Müller,
1990, p. 274). As a common narrative goes, this model, epitomised by the
newly-founded university of Berlin (1809/10), had a considerable influence on
nineteenth- and twentieth-century educational policies and university reforms
across Europe, including Britain, and North America (Turner, 1987; Rüegg,
2004; Schalenberg, 2002). In recent years, however, both this model and its
heroic narrative have been eroded and questioned in various ways. Historians of the
university have stressed that, within the plurality of German states, Berlin did not
present the only type of academic reform and that the characteristic combination
Self-cultivation (Bildung) and sociability 161
of research and teaching was achieved in various ways (Rüegg, 1997; cf. Eichler,
2012).
This historicising of the ‘Humboldtian university’ allows us to take a fresh
look at the plurality of competing visions for the future university around 1800.
This article concentrates on three pivotal contributions to the debate: Johann
Gottlieb Fichte’s Some lectures on the vocation of the scholar (1794) and his later
Deduced plan of a higher institute of education to be erected in Berlin (1807, fp.
1817), and the Occasional thoughts about universities in a German spirit (1808)
by Daniel Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834). The two latter texts were
interventions in the discussion about the foundation of a new university in
Berlin, of which both thinkers were later to preside as rectors. My analysis
focusses on two interrelated issues of the debate: first, the relation between indi-
vidual self-cultivation (Bildung), human society and the state and, second, the
role of the university in the acquisition, organisation, and economy of knowledge.
According to these thinkers, should priority be given to ‘universal’ knowledge or
to particular knowledge, preparing students for their future professions?
To understand the solutions Fichte and Schleiermacher offered to these
questions it is important to identify their historical context. It is no accident that
the debate about higher education was particularly differentiated in Germany,
which boasted 35 universities in 1789. In the absence of major urban centres like
Paris, provincial places such as Göttingen, Königsberg, or Jena were focal points
of intellectual life. In an essay that was published in the Monthly Register in 1803,
Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779–1861) succinctly depicted this national signif-
icance of the university to a British audience. Written in the year of the
Reichsdeputationshauptschluss, the last phase of the dissolution of the Holy
Roman Empire, he conceded that Germany lacked nearly every element usually
considered essential for a flourishing intellectual culture: economic wealth, a
capital city, a constitution, political power and civic spirit.
But that which in Germany supplies the want of almost all these advantages,
and in which it is unparalleled in any other country, is its Universities. To
them, more than to any thing else, Germany is indebted for its vast progress
in the arts and sciences. By means of them, Germany is that which it in all
other respects is, in so slight a degree, a nation. It may even be asserted, that
Germany is contained in its Universities.
(Wellek, 1931, p. 534)
Savigny pointed in particular at the moral and social effects of university training
and student life in the socialisation of every educated individual. Students from
poor backgrounds would, for the first time, experience independence and their
real moral worth, while students from wealthy and privileged families were
forced to accept equality – an aspect he later reasserted in his review of
Schleiermacher’s Occasional thoughts in 1808. Creative intellectual pursuit, he
wrote against Schleiermacher, was probably not the most formidable result that
should be highlighted in defence of academic freedom. Rather it was this
162 Alexander Schmidt
experience of mutual moral and intellectual exchange between students that
would ‘humble excessive sense of status’ and thus form a moral counterweight
to the often arbitrary differentiation of society old and new (Savigny, 1808/1990,
p. 265).
With a slightly different emphasis, modern social historians stress a similar
aspect of higher education around 1800. Despite declining student numbers,
university training was decisive in the gradual transformation of the old society
of estates (ständische Gesellschaft) into a modern bourgeois society (bürgerliche
Gesellschaft) based on functional differentiation, property, and individual skills
which predated the Industrial Revolution in Germany. As will be shown below,
university education was central in a social vision of a nonviolent evolution of
society. Preceding the Bildungsrevolution of the nineteenth century, recipients of
higher education increasingly believed that they formed a new meritocracy,
representing the common concern of mankind and the nation. Against an
eroding society of privileges based on birth, they claimed a prime access to key
positions of public life such as state and church service as well as literary and
scientific authority (cf. Müller, 1990, pp. 39–42). These claims were rooted in
the Enlightenment concern with, to borrow John Robertson’s coinage, the
‘betterment in this world, without regard for the existence or non-existence of
the next’ (Robertson, 2005, p. 8). An increasing part of the enlightened public,
however, was sceptical as to whether the majority of current universities or even
the institution itself would be up to the task. Many, particularly the smaller
universities, were underfunded, with outdated curricula, declining student
numbers, academic inbreeding and favouritism, and a general inability to reform.
A special problem was posed by student discipline, resulting from the privileged
corporate status of German universities with their own jurisdictions on the one
hand and a mercantile competition for students on the other. Many university
cities were filled with unruly and often armed adolescents. There was an endemic
problem of riots, abuse, duels, and alcohol. Student fraternities could exert
enormous pressure on university officials and fellow students, often leading to
rather mild punishments of transgressions.
Concerned with the problem of how to provide a wider population with
practical and morally useful knowledge, a number of German enlightened think-
ers such as Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), Joachim Heinrich Campe
(1746–1818), and the members of the famous Wednesday Society in Berlin thus
agreed in a scathing criticism that the university was a moribund medieval insti-
tution (Stölzel 1889, cf. König, 1935, pp. 22–29). These vocal critics wanted
profound reform of many universities, if not their complete abolition, in order
to promote enlightenment and meet the demands of the state, social utility, and
a greater adaptation to future professions. Echoing a Rousseauian scepticism
about the wider use of theoretical knowledge, Herder and the Popularaufklärer
put their main emphasis on school reform, leaving the future of intellectual
debate to the select few scientific and literary academies. They harangued against
young men allegedly flocking in their thousands to universities to gain the useless
knowledge of a scholarly type, although student numbers were in fact declining.
Self-cultivation (Bildung) and sociability 163
To achieve reform of learning, Herder and others demanded, governments had
to rein in academic autonomy through review committees and to exert greater
control of student numbers, particularly those from poorer backgrounds
(Schmidt, 2012).
The scholar is especially destined for society. More than any other class,
his class, insofar exists only through and for society. Accordingly, it is his
particular duty to cultivate to the highest degree within himself the social
talents of receptivity and the art of communication.
(Fichte, 1988, p. 173; Fichte, 1966, p. 55)
To live on the streets like the Ancients, to fill them with music and singing
like people from the Mediterranean, to feast like the rich, as long as money
lasts, and then to despise all comforts of life like ancient Cynics, complete-
ly to neglect one’s clothing or to dress up fashionably ... that is academic
Freedom.
(Schleiermacher, 1998, p. 73)
Acknowledgements
The first version of this chapter was written during a fellowship at the Centre for
Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities (Cambridge) in spring
2012. The author is grateful to David James, Isaac Nakhimovsky, Chris Newfield
and James Vigus, as well as to the editors of this volume, for their many helpful
suggestions.
Notes
1 Among the vast literature on the debate about Bildung around 1800, see Bollenbeck,
1994; Geuss, 1996; Reitz, 2003.
2 See König, 1935; Turnbull, 1937; Hahn, 1969; Reiß, 2006, pp. 84–102.
3 Johannes von Müller, Prussian court historiographer and later to be the secretary for
education in the kingdom of Westphalia, leaked to his friend Böttiger in Dresden in
174 Alexander Schmidt
October 1807 that, according to Fichte’s plan, the future university in Berlin would
resemble a college of the Oxford or other English type (Fuchs, 1987, p. 60).
4 It is important to note here against a reading of Fichte as a theorist of an authoritarian
national state, which is associated with Isaiah Berlin, that the role of the state is not
defined as compelling virtue but as controlling the social interference that prevents the
internal capacity for culture and morality from operating. See Berlin, 2000, pp. 191 and
195–197.
5 For a differing interpretation see Crouter, 2005, p. 149.
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12 Education and utopia
Robert Owen and Charles Fourier
David Leopold
Introduction
The aims of education, and the appropriate means of realising those aims, have
been a persistent, if not universal, concern of utopian authors (Massõ, 1927;
Fisher, 1963; Ozmon, 1969). Thomas More (1478–1535) might be thought to
bear much of the responsibility here, since education plays an indispensable role
in the commonwealth of ‘Utopia’ (whose citizens are said to be so well educated
that they need few laws). However, whilst More named he did not invent the
utopian tradition, and this preoccupation with education certainly predates him.
Plato (429–347 BCE) would be an obvious example; the central role of education
is made clear in Book Four of the Republic, a work plausibly considered the first
great political utopia. (I use the term ‘utopia’ here to refer to a detailed
description of an ideal society, whether or not that description takes the narrative
form typical of what we might call a literary utopia proper – in which a traveller
from the world of the author visits a superior society in a chronologically or
geographically distant location.)
It is tempting to contrast this longstanding and characteristic preoccupation
with educational questions on the part of utopian authors with a lack of
equivalent interest in utopia on the part of educationalists. That contrast looks
real enough, but should not be overdrawn. Not least, the relation is a shifting
one. In the nineteenth century, for instance, when educationalists were perhaps
more engaged with wider issues of social reform, their links with certain kinds of
utopia were stronger. Moreover, the lack of utopian enthusiasms on the part of
modern educationalists is not universal. There are recent signs, for example, of a
minority interest in what are sometimes (predictably) labelled ‘Edutopias’
(Halpern, 2003; Peters & Freeman-Moir, 2006).
My ambition here, however, is not to unpack the many and complex connec-
tions between education and utopia, but to give a taste of what two nineteenth-
century utopian writers thought about education. Robert Owen (1771–1858)
and Charles Fourier (1772–1837) are usually characterised as ‘utopian socialists’
(a somewhat problematic label popularised by Karl Marx (1818–1883)). Both
authors placed human nature at the centre of their educational views, and they
both saw their educational views as forming an important and integral part of
Education and utopia 179
their wider project of radically transforming the social and political world.
However, they developed their educational and other views independently of
one another, and they conceptualised the fundamental importance of human
nature in very different ways. (Their direct engagement was largely limited to a
brief and unproductive correspondence, and a few passing and unsympathetic
comments on the myriad errors of the other.)
Robert Owen
Born in Newtown in central Wales, Robert Owen left home at the age of ten.
He worked first as a draper’s assistant, before moving – with considerable
entrepreneurial success – into the expanding cotton industry in Manchester. As
manager and part-owner of the New Lanark Mill in Scotland, he sought to
implement his already-formed views about human character and the environ-
ment: improving working (and living) conditions, moderating child labour, and
providing infant education. Those views and that social experiment were
promoted in A new view of society (1813–1814). Owen subsequently sought a
larger public role, initially as an authoritative voice on factory legislation, and
then as a radical critic of contemporary society. In increasingly millenarian
language, he prophesied the imminent collapse of the old order and the
emergence of a new moral world. He now recommended small communitarian
settlements, initially as an alternative to poor relief, and then as an alternative
form of society. Owen lost most of his personal fortune on a communal experi-
ment at New Harmony, in Indiana (1825–1827), but subsequently pursued
another settlement at Harmony, in Hampshire (1839–1845). Between these two
transatlantic communal experiments came the brief period when (parts of) the
growing Owenite movement coalesced with two mass working-class movements:
the first wave of the cooperative movement (when Owenite ‘labour exchanges’
issued labour notes as currency); and a period of dramatic growth in trade union-
ism (culminating in the short-lived Grand National Consolidated Trades Union).
The Owenite movement subsequently retreated into its so-called ‘sectarian’
phase, with Owen promoting his ‘new religion’ through The book of the new
moral world (1842–1844) and lectures to the Rational Society. His last years
were marked by a conversion to Spiritualism, to the embarrassment of some of
his subsequent admirers. (Happily, following a spiritual communication from the
former Duke of Kent, Owen was able to confirm the absence of titles in the
afterlife.)
Owen’s central claim about human nature (repeated endlessly in his writings)
has two (equally contestable) component parts. First, he insists that individuals
do not form their own character, rather their character is wholly formed for them
by circumstances. Second, he insists that individuals are consequently not
accountable for their own sentiments and habits; to imagine that they merit
rewards for some actions and punishments for others is a fundamental mistake.
Owen maintains that with the application of the right means any ‘general
character’ from the ‘best’ to the ‘worst’ can be created in a community. In A new
180 David Leopold
view of society, the contrast here is broadly between a ‘good’ character that is
intelligent, rational, and happy, and a ‘bad’ character that is ignorant, irrational,
and miserable. (An elaborated version has ‘manly’, ‘just’, ‘generous’, ‘temper-
ate’, ‘active’, ‘kind’, and ‘benevolent’ traits, being contrasted with ‘effeminate’,
‘deceitful’, ‘ignorantly selfish’, ‘intemperate’, ‘revengeful’, and even ‘murderous’
ones (Owen, 1993a, p. 62).) It is not that human nature provides no constraints
whatsoever on what can be created, but rather that human nature is sufficiently
plastic that, with the appropriate means, it can be formed into either the best or
the worst of characters.
The appropriate means of forming human nature consist of education in what
we might call broad and narrow senses. In a broad sense, education is synony-
mous with the social environment in which all individuals are circumstanced. In
a narrow sense, education is concerned with the training of the young, typically
in specialised institutions. The right direction of these means requires their being
controlled by a minority with an understanding of, and authority in, human
affairs. (Even in his most radical moments, Owen subscribed to a variety of
socialism ‘from above’, a socialism that viewed ‘self-emancipation’ and democratic
control with mistrust.)
Initially, Owen wrote as a ‘manufacturer for pecuniary profit’, advising his
peers to take as much care of their ‘vital machines’ as they did of their ‘inanimate
machines’, ensuring that both were kept neat, clean, kindly treated, and well-
supplied (Owen, 1993a, p. 28). The workers of New Lanark before his own
arrival are portrayed (perhaps exaggeratedly) as sunk in vice: they lived ‘in
idleness, in poverty, in almost every kind of crime; consequently, in debt, out of
health, and in misery’, all this overlain, in Scotland, by religious sectarianism
(Owen, 1993a, p. 45). However, with a few judicious changes Owen claimed to
have transformed their sorry condition. Circumstances were instituted which
quickly and effectively formed habits of order, regularity, health, temperance,
industry, and faithfulness to employers. Some changes were of general applica-
tion. For example, housing conditions were improved, roads were maintained,
and a company shop providing necessities at low prices was established. Other
changes were more closely linked to specific kinds of behaviour. For example, to
reduce alcohol abuse, public houses were closed, alternative recreation was
provided (gardening and walking are identified as economical and innocent
pleasures which individuals can be trained to enjoy), and the health benefits of
temperance were explained to workers (when they were most receptive – whilst
suffering from hangovers).
Owen was keen to appeal to New Lanark as experimental proof of the veracity
of his claims about the formation of character. He presented himself as a success-
ful practical man (not yet another speculative theorist), whose thorough study of
human nature was reflected in a combination of self-evident propositions and
empirically proven recommendations.
Having succeeded locally, Owen sought to work on a national scale to form
character and ameliorate the ‘lower classes’. He initially urged the British
government to institute a series of measures – said to follow from abandoning
Education and utopia 181
the absurd and damaging notion that individuals form their own characters –
including: restricting the sale and consumption of alcohol; ending the state
lottery; removing religious tests; reforming the poor law (providing a modest
system of public works); and introducing a system of education along the lines
established at New Lanark (see below).
Owen insisted that these changes could be made without social upheaval and
injury to any part of society. Existing social arrangements are said to be held
together, not by class interests, but by an ignorance that the light of (Owenite)
truth was already beginning to dispel. Class struggle is ‘irrational’ because it pre-
supposes what is – on the Owenite account – false, namely that the ‘higher
classes’ are responsible for the misery of the ‘lower classes’. And it is ‘useless’
because it encourages (misplaced but nonetheless real) resistance to change on
the part of the ‘higher classes’. Rich and poor, Owen avers, have but one interest,
and the latter ought to view the former not as class enemies but as potential
friends and active collaborators.
Owen always retained both this foundational assumption about the formation
of character, and this innocence about the nature of political power. What
changes is that he subsequently adopted more radical views about the problems
besetting modern society and the measures required to solve them.
Contemporaries were outraged by Owen’s increasingly critical pronounce-
ments on contemporary religion and marriage. He attacked all of the religions
of the world (as currently taught) for their sectarian and superstitious attitudes,
and for being based on ideas (about character formation) destructive of human
well-being and happiness. And he attacked existing marriage arrangements for
compelling men and women who did not love each other to live together
(thereby generating selfishness, cunning, deception, prostitution, and crime).
However, it was his evolving economic and communitarian ideas which were
ultimately a more influential part of his growing radicalism.
Owen criticised the contemporary economic system – which was based on
competition and the idea of buying cheap and selling dear – on various grounds:
for being inefficient and wasteful; for creating unhealthy and unpleasant employ-
ment; for overproducing commodities with little or no intrinsic utility or worth;
and for encouraging injurious inequalities. Its central failing, however, was
predictably its effect on character, since competition encourages the ‘most
inferior feelings, the meanest faculties, the worse passions, and the most injurious
vices’ (Owen, 1991, p. 358).
Owen increasingly identified small communal settlements as both the means
to, and the final institutional form of, the rational and humane future. The
triumph of communitarian socialism would take a gradualist and non-
confrontational form; spreading by example from community to community,
country to continent, until the whole world is organised according to coopera-
tive principles. He enthused about the many advantages of communal life,
including the avoidance of domestic duplication; for example, better food would
be prepared at a fraction of the effort and cost of individual family arrangements.
He found it much harder to imagine any potential disadvantages of communal
182 David Leopold
living. Indeed, the only practical worry he raises concerns the dangers of people
living under the old order rushing precipitately into the new settlements.
A consistent picture of the ideal Owenite community emerges despite some
variation in the detail. Communities should be small, not falling below 500 or
rising above 2,500 persons. Agriculture (adopting a specific kind of spade culti-
vation) should predominate over manufacture; machinery could be used – for
example, to reduce harmful and laborious tasks – but must always be subordi-
nated to human interests. Each settlement should be built in a closed ‘parallelo-
gram’, with living quarters on each side, and school, church, and dining hall in
the middle. Property arrangements are a little less certain. Owen’s conviction
that labour was the source of all wealth, and that competition bred an undesir-
able kind of character, encouraged him to endorse common rather than private
property. However, his views on this issue are not always clear or consistent, and
he remained cautious about the speed with which divisions between rich and
poor might be overcome.
The place of politics and government in these communities is also uncertain.
Owen’s resistance to democratic control was constant, and he always personally
sought paternalistic authority over both communal experiments and the wider
Owenite movement. In later formulations of his communal plan, he settled on a
kind of gerontocracy as the ideal arrangement. In one version, he divides the
population of each settlement into eight age cohorts, the seventh and eighth of
which would control ‘domestic affairs’ (preserving communal harmony and
affection) and ‘foreign affairs’ (managing communications between communi-
ties), respectively. It seems that the artificial and irrational distinctions of class
and status are gradually to be replaced by natural and rational divisions based on
age and experience.
Turning from the broad to the narrow sense of education, Owen maintains
that the right kind of schooling is both crucial – the best-governed state is the
one with the best system of education – and seemingly relatively easy to accom-
plish. At least, forming the character of children is said to be much less difficult
than reforming the character of adults. Adults resist the need to unlearn and
abandon long acquired (bad) habits, whereas children are without exception
‘passive and wonderfully contrived compounds’. A rightly directed environment,
of which a rational system of schooling is a crucial part, might easily mould
this ‘plastic’ into an appropriate bundle of rational wishes and desires (Owen,
1993a, p. 41).
Discussion of Owen’s educational views typically focus on the schooling in
New Lanark and in the New Harmony settlement (Harrison, 1968). However,
it was William Maclure (1763–1840) rather than Owen who was the predomi-
nant influence on the latter project. It was Maclure who brought in European
teachers – part of the famous ‘boatload of knowledge’ – who had trained with
the Swiss reformer Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746–1827), who initiated the
School of Industry providing ‘useful’ rather than ‘ornamental’ education, and
who subsequently established the school as a separate entity under his direct
control (see Bestor, 1950, pp. 133–159, 190–201). Consequently, I concentrate
Education and utopia 183
here on New Lanark as the most extended and successful practical educational
experiment in which Owen was the predominant influence. Whilst the social
context of education alters radically in his later writings – schooling is now
organised within a global network of cooperative communities rather than the
towns and villages of a competition-ridden nation state – Owen’s narrowly
educational views are relatively unchanged. New Lanark appears to give us as
accurate a picture of the narrowly educational content of the future as we are
likely to get this side of the Millennium (Owen, 1993d, p. 166).
The ‘Institution for the Formation of Character’ at New Lanark (which
opened in 1816) admitted children from eighteen months (when they could
walk unaided) until ten when they could work in the factory (or occasionally, as
Owen would have preferred, until twelve). It occupied a two-storey building
with a playground. The upper storey was divided into two, and consisted of a
classroom for the older children – with the furniture arranged after the monito-
rial system associated with Andrew Bell (1753–1832) and Joseph Lancaster
(1778–1838), with desks against the walls and a free space in the centre of the
room – and a lecture room, complete with history time-lines, globes, models,
and specimens (Silver, 1996, pp. 49–52). The lower storey was divided into three
rooms for the younger children. The older children were taught for some five
hours daily, the infants for half of that (with supervised play for the rest of the
day). Younger children were taught in mixed-sex classes, whilst older children
were taught separately (although mixed for lectures). There was a school
uniform (improbably combining the shape of a Roman tunic with tartan mate-
rial). Parents were charged a small amount for the schooling of the older chil-
dren, much less than the full cost but thereby avoiding the stigma of a pauper
school. (Educational subsidies are easily justified, Owen maintains, by the wider
benefits to the community.)
Owen did not neglect education before and after these ages. The earliest
periods of a child’s life were particularly important on his account, since a great
deal of good or evil could be taught in the first twelve months. He sought to
influence this period before school indirectly, for example, by providing lectures
on parenting to workers, with a focus on forming children into valuable members
of the community. There were also evening classes for young persons (between
ten and twenty years old) who wanted to continue their education outside of
work. (Universities are not mentioned in A new view of society, but are later
portrayed as irrational and distorting ‘moulds’ for forming character that will
disappear with the triumph of communitarian socialism.)
The content of the Owenite curriculum might look broadly familiar, but
contains some innovations. The core curriculum consisted of reading (using
books which are practical and relevant to the young), writing (encouraging a
legible business hand useful in later life), and arithmetic (latterly adopting the
‘tables’ of Pestalozzi). The older children were also taught natural history, geog-
raphy, and history. Perhaps more striking, in terms of content, was the attempt
to balance physical and mental instruction. Owen viewed singing and dancing as
powerful means to forming a rational and happy character (appearance, bearing,
184 David Leopold
and health were all thereby improved), and they constituted a regular part of the
curriculum (charming many visitors but provoking the disapproval of his Quaker
business partners). Both sexes were to have equal opportunities to acquire useful
knowledge, although Owen presumes that the useful knowledge in question
would vary according to sex. Girls were taught to sew and make useful garments,
to prepare appetising food economically, and to keep a neat and ordered house.
Boys were instructed in the art of war – there were drill exercises in the
playground, training in the use of firearms, and some introduction to military
tactics. Owen enthuses about the individual and collective advantages of such
training: it encourages ‘attention, celerity, and order’, and provides for the self-
defence that would be necessary as long as irrational beings still remained in the
world (Owen, 1993a, p. 72).
The place of religious instruction at New Lanark was always controversial, and
the issue contributed to Owen’s eventual resignation from the school manage-
ment. Owen was a deist – believing in the existence of natural moral laws and a
supreme being – and he would have preferred to teach (only) the foundational
part of ‘pure and undefiled’ religion (the lesson that one should seek to promote
the interests of others). However, since neither his co-owners nor the parents
concerned shared these views, Owen was compelled to ensure that Christian
scriptures were read and the catechism taught.
Perhaps more remarkable than the curriculum are the teaching methods and
aims that Owen advocated.
The means of instruction were designed to make learning a pleasure and
delight to children. Reflecting Owen’s controversial views on responsibility,
there was to be no scolding or punishment (or rewards) of children; teachers
were required rather to show affection and ‘unceasing kindness’ to all their
charges (Owen, 1993d, p. 287). Children were not to be irritated or bored by
books, and every effort was made to use ‘sensible signs’ in lessons and lectures
(that is, models, diagrams, and specimens of the things themselves). Conversation
with teachers was to be the norm, and children were encouraged to ask questions
and seek clarification. Lessons might be held indoors or outdoors, and there
were occasional trips (to learn about agriculture and natural history).
The aim of Owenite instruction was to develop both character and reasoning.
The ‘New Institution’ was fundamentally a place of safety where children would
acquire the best habits. From their first admission, they were instructed that they
must never injure one of their ‘playfellows’, but must rather strive to make them
happy. This central precept was repeatedly emphasised until it became ‘easy and
familiar’ (and therefore ‘natural’) to them (Owen, 1993a, p. 57). Having
internalised this lesson in their behaviour, they were then taught the Owenite
theory of character formation that lay behind it. For example, they might learn
that if they had grown up in such and such a country, then they would have been
‘cannibals or Hindoos’ themselves (Owen, 1969, p. 158). Such a discovery
would: first, encourage interest in, and sympathy with, a wide sphere of human-
ity; and second, demonstrate the central Owenite claim that our characters are
formed for us, and that ‘consequently’ notions of individual praise and blame are
Education and utopia 185
misguided. As well as being formed with the best of characters, children would
be taught to reason for themselves. For example, when learning to read, the
content of books was to be discussed (not learnt by rote). If children could be
taught to think and reason correctly, Owen insists, they would discover how to
distinguish truth from falsehood for themselves.
This focus on character and reasoning was central to Owen’s criticism of
contemporary educational theory and practice. He did not doubt that the Bell
and Lancaster schemes, for example, constituted an improvement on what went
before, and contained much of pedagogic value at the level of detail. However,
both approaches, he noted, could produce individuals who – whilst undoubtedly
able to ‘read, write, account, and sew’ – had the worst of habits and characters.
Similarly, he maintains that so-called ‘national’ schools encouraged rote learning
at the expense of understanding. A visitor to these institutions, he recounts,
would be shown pupils able to reproduce the most precise answers to the most
insoluble theological questions, without those children having understood a
word of what they had memorised (Owen, 1993a, p. 87).
Owen thought that the results of his proposed transformation in the aims and
methods of education were liable to be underestimated (since contemporaries
were usually familiar only with the results of poor and erroneous instruction).
With the right direction, and the appropriate communitarian changes to the
wider society in place, he confidently predicted that children would soon outstrip
the learned of previous generations. In due course, the second of his eight age
cohorts (at least by the age of ten) would emerge as well-trained, rational beings,
whilst those of the fourth group (aged fifteen to twenty) would effectively be
men and women of ‘a new race’ – physically, intellectually and morally far supe-
rior to any who have previously lived upon the earth (Owen, 1991, p. 349).
Charles Fourier
Fourier was born in Besançon, in the French province of Franche-Comté. His
childhood was dominated by the commercial background and religiosity of his
family, against which he subsequently rebelled. In adulthood, Fourier earned a
modest living from a variety of commercial jobs (mainly in the silk and textile
industry of Lyon), but increasingly devoted his energies to producing a torrent
of idiosyncratic brochures, multi-volume treatises, letters, and polemics.
Educational themes took up a large part of his Traité de I’association domestique-
agricole (1822), and early references to Fourier often describe him as a theorist
of education. His lesser publications also include a strange pamphlet
(the Mnémonique géographique), which sought to function as both a coded
introduction to his own system and a critique of contemporary geography teach-
ing (Beecher, 1986, pp. 378–380). Despite a deserved reputation for being a
difficult and suspicious person, Fourier gradually accumulated a small school of
followers, complete with its own journals (Le Phalanstère and La Phalange). He
lived in Paris for the last fifteen years of his life, obsessed with the threat of plagia-
rism and the need to find a patron (to fund a trial community).
186 David Leopold
Fourier’s systematic and often extraordinary worldview includes: an account
of the origin and development of the universe; a philosophy of history (including
a 32-stage narrative of infancy, ascent, descent, and decrepitude); a critique of
‘Civilisation’ (a term used with ironical intent to refer to contemporary society);
and a vision of an ideal future (which, simplifying somewhat, we can identify with
the historical stage called ‘Harmony’). I will focus here on the social and educa-
tional arrangements of Harmony, but begin with Fourier’s views on Providence
and human nature.
Fourier shared Owen’s concern with human nature, but with a crucial
difference: he saw character as God-given and liable to discovery, rather than
plastic and open to creation. Given His own nature, it was impossible that God
had not provided for the terrestrial happiness of humankind. The role of the
social theorist was consequently to discover the key which would make that
earthly paradise achievable. Fourier acknowledges that he appears an unlikely
prophet, but maintains that God had once before chosen the most obscure man
to deliver the most important message to the world. The key in question involves
a divinely underwritten model of human nature, according to which individuals
are born with different innate dispositions and propensities. The problem with
all hitherto existing societies was that they had (unintentionally) constrained and
misdirected that nature. What was needed instead were social arrangements that
would facilitate the free development and deployment of these basic human
characteristics.
These opening assumptions about Providence and the liberation of a
God-given human nature may not seem so remarkable. The same cannot be said
of the ways in which Fourier elaborates these foundational ideas.
Fourier’s complex account of human nature identifies twelve basic drives or
‘passions’: five ‘luxurious’ passions corresponding to the senses (taste, smell,
hearing, sight, and touch); four ‘affective’ passions corresponding to the need for
other people (friendship, love, ambition, and ‘familism’); and three ‘distributive’
passions which govern the gratification of the others (the ‘Cabalist’ passion for
intrigue; the ‘Butterfly’ passion for variety; and the ‘Composite’ passion requir-
ing both spiritual and physical gratification). These twelve ‘passions’ were
combined in various ways to generate a ‘scale’ of some 810 basic personality
types (Fourier, 1972, p. 220). (Fourier often uses musical and mathematical
language to elaborate his ideas.)
Fourier illustrates this account with confident identifications of the character
types of various historical figures, and brief descriptions of the ways in which
social arrangements failed to discern and liberate the drives and propensities in
question. The Emperor Nero (37 BCE–68 CE) can provide both a representative
example and an introduction to Fourier’s educational views (Fourier, 1972,
pp. 303–307). Nero is identified as a relatively unusual character type; a ‘tetra-
tone’ dominated by four passions (cabalist, composite, ambition, and love). He
had been born with blood-thirsty inclinations, which his teacher Seneca
(3 BCE–65 CE) – mistakenly believing his nature to be corrupt – had foolishly
sought to deny and constrain. The result was that Nero’s natural dispositions
Education and utopia 187
subsequently reappeared in distorted and dangerous form, as he gave vent to the
inclinations repressed in childhood. For Fourier, it was not Nero who was
corrupt, but rather the society which had failed to utilise his natural inclinations
constructively. In a rational and humane world, Nero’s blood-thirsty penchants
would have drawn him at an early age to one of the work groups involved with
the preparation of meat for consumption, and by the age of twenty he would
have been an accomplished butcher happily serving the community.
Harmony is based on this account of liberating natural drives. All its basic
institutions are designed to facilitate rather than restrict human nature, and can
be seen as contributing to education in the broad sense. However, education in
the narrow sense is radically transformed, since there are no specialised institu-
tions for the training of the young (see below).
Perhaps the most obvious feature of Harmonian society is its communal
organisation. The ideal society would be organised into Phalanxes – intentional
communities of roughly two thousand individuals. (The ideal Phalanx would
have 1620 members, twice the complete ‘scale’ of basic personality types.) There
are few details of communal life that Fourier can resist describing, but its archi-
tecture is a particular obsession. He was especially enthusiastic about the covered
walkways (cooled in summer and heated in winter) encircling the Phalanstery –
the grand central building of the community, combining public and private
spaces – and connecting it to surrounding buildings.
The most striking social feature of the community is that it has class divisions
but no class antagonisms. There would be classes in that disparities of income
would coalesce to form three groups with slightly distinct lifestyles (the rich
would include wealthy shareholders helping to finance the community, and
drawing an income from their investment). There would be no class antago-
nisms, however, because their primary cause – poverty – would be absent.
Fourier insists that it is not inequality per se that causes class antagonisms;
disparities in wealth only provoke conflict in the absence of provision for our
essential needs. And Harmony would eradicate poverty by instituting what
would now be called a universal basic income; that is, an income paid to
individuals, irrespective of their income from other sources, and without requir-
ing the performance of any work. In Harmony, this income would be set at a
subsistence level (covering basic needs). Class antagonisms would also be
removed by Harmony’s property arrangements (in which labour, talent, and
capital all share an annual dividend), by rich and poor working together in small
groups, and by a unified system of education (establishing a commonality of
language and manners).
The political arrangements of the Phalanx are less clear. Initially, it appears that
the coercive and coordinating tasks undertaken by states in Civilisation would
either be unnecessary, or occur in a decentralised or informal manner. Closer
inspection, however, reveals a rather shadowy central body – the ‘Areopagus’
(made up of elders, large shareholders, and representatives from various work
groups) – that issues infrequent advice not backed by coercion (for example,
recommending the day on which to start the harvest). In addition, there is some
188 David Leopold
similarly shadowy use of something like punishment. At least, Fourier recognises
that circumstances might arise in which an individual would be excluded by their
peers from a workgroup, or even – although this seems almost unimaginable to
him – banished from a community as a whole (Beecher, 1986, p. 256).
It will already be apparent that productive activity plays a central role in
Harmonian life. Fourier rejects the familiar view of work as a necessary evil, as
something both unpleasant and which we are compelled to undertake. He sees
work rather as potentially creative and fulfilling, and identifies self-realisation in
work as a central part of the good life.
The adoption of a universal basic income (set at a substantive level) together
with the absence of coercion, raises the question of whether, and why,
Harmonians would engage in productive activity. Fourier’s answer is ‘attractive
work’; individuals would freely engage in productive activity as one of the central
ways in which to self-realise, to develop and deploy their essential human charac-
teristics. To facilitate this self-realisation, work in Harmony is organised ‘serially’.
That is, productive tasks are carried out by small groups (typically some fifteen
people) which are voluntary, hierarchical, socially diverse, and united by a passion
for the activity in question. A typical work session might last only an hour, but
there could be as many as ten sessions in a day (Fourier, 2001a, p. 193).
Education, in both senses, plays an important role in Fourier’s vision (Zeldin
1969). All social arrangements in Harmony are broadly educative, aimed at
liberating human nature and enabling individuals to discover and deploy their
own particular combination of human characteristics. Education in the narrow
sense plays this role at a vital early stage, revealing the various (plural) vocations
of each individual.
Fourier criticises the educational arrangements of contemporary Civilisation as
unnatural and incoherent. They are ‘unnatural’ in seeking to constrain the
passions, and in treating children as unproductive. They are ‘incoherent’ in that
what children are taught in schools not only varies according to sex and class, but
also conflicts with, and is undermined by, what they are taught by their peers and
family. Fourier had some limited knowledge of contemporary educationalist
ideas – he had certainly read about Pestalozzi and the ‘Lancastrians’ (Andrew
Bell and Joseph Lancaster) – although he was characteristically dismissive of the
opinions of others.
The most striking institutional feature of Harmonian education is that it takes
place without schools and without teachers. First, education occurs not in
schools, nor in the family, but in the wider community. It is the Phalanx that
collectively raises and educates Harmonian children. Fourier is usually said to
‘abolish’ the family, but that description is surely misleading. The modern family
certainly disappears, and there are communal arrangements for child rearing.
However, mothers breastfeed their children, biological parents often have close
relationships with their offspring, and the familial passion is identified as one
requiring expression. Second, there is no longer a class of professional educators.
Harmony would, of course, contain people who teach others, but they would do
so as one of many different activities as they go about their daily lives.
Education and utopia 189
Up to the age of four and a half, although they might be visited by their
biological parents, children would be brought up by adults working serially as
nurses (the latter drawn from the minority of adults attracted by nature to child
care). These nurses would introduce their charges to the world of work, but
thereafter (from the age of four or so) children would become free and
independent members of the Phalanx, contributing to production from the start.
Work is central to life in Harmony, and voluntary engagement in productive
activity is the context in which education usually occurs.
Fourier loved detailed typologies, although – to the frustration of commenta-
tors – these often vary without explanation between texts. One account has
children progressing through a series of eight ‘choirs’, corresponding approxi-
mately to age ranges. Progression through these choirs is governed by a satisfac-
tory performance in various practical tests. (Fourier does not worry quite as
much as we might like about the fate of those unable to progress; there is some
unclear talk of ‘half-character’ choirs, and of ‘late developers’ being able to catch
up.) For example, an ‘urchin’ of four and a half, hoping to enter the choir of
‘cherubs’, might have to perform the following tasks: participating in the choir
and corps de ballet at the opera; washing 120 plates in half an hour; peeling a
quantity of apples within a given time; and lighting (and extinguishing) a fire
promptly. Their success at these tasks would be judged by slightly older children,
who would prove much more reliable critics than the parents of Civilisation
(all too quick to praise the mistakes of their own offspring).
Those various tasks illustrate a number of features of Fourier’s views on
education, including the developmental importance of voluntary participation in
cooking and opera. He saw children as nascent gourmands, drawn instinctively
to the kitchen by smell and taste. Harmony would encourage participation in the
culinary arts, thereby developing the child’s manual dexterity and control, intro-
ducing them to the world of work, and engendering a practical interest in the
sciences of agronomy, biology, and chemistry. Similarly, opera would attract
children through sight and sounds, and develop their physicality. (Harmonian
opera is a superior art form unifying music, song, poetry, dance, gymnastics,
design, and gesture.) Every Phalanx would have an opera house in which
ordinary Harmonians combined to produce performances superior to those of
the largest cities in Civilisation.
One of the interesting formal features of Fourier’s writings is his use of narra-
tive and quasi-narrative, episodes alongside more conventional theoretical
passages. The following two examples – involving the shelling of peas and the
cleaning of sewers – illustrate both the importance of work and the changing
focus of education depending on the age of the child. Until the age of nine,
education focuses on physical faculties and senses; after nine, it focuses on moral
and emotional development. These episodes also convey Fourier’s love of
ceremony, and his interest in the ways in which decorations and ranks might
motivate a contribution to production.
In Harmony, the shelling and grading of green peas will be done by children
as young as two to four years old. We are asked to imagine a group of such
190 David Leopold
children sitting at a sloping table, with a number of slots in it, ranked from the
oldest at the top to the youngest at the bottom. Those at the top would shell
and handle the smallest of peas, those in the middle would collect the medium
peas, and the youngest would simply gather up the remaining large peas in a
basket and return the occasionally rogue medium pea up the table to the older
children. A new volunteer for the series – a candidate member of the green pea
shellers – would perform the latter role. Their task was the simplest, but they
would, if successful, feel that they had contributed as much as anyone, and be
rewarded with a decoration for their hat or collar. (A succession of such decora-
tions would, in due course, mark their ascent through the work group.) In
this way, social arrangements which encourage natural proclivities are used to
initiate children into the world of work. Fourier identifies the five dominant
tastes of children as: a desire to ‘ape’ or imitate; an eagerness to follow (slightly)
older children; a fondness for small things; the enjoyment of rummaging about;
and the love of making noise. The tableau of the little peas shows the first two
of these instincts, in particular, being used to constructive ends within the
Phalanx (Fourier, 1972, pp. 307–310).
Notoriously, Fourier also offers a solution to the problem of certain (literally)
‘dirty jobs’ in Harmony (cleaning the sewers, tending the communal dungheap,
and washing out slaughterhouses are all mentioned). He estimates that two-
thirds of boys, and one-third of girls, aged between nine and fifteen, enjoy
getting dirty (and, more generally, being fearless and creating havoc). Whereas
Civilisation sought to repress these proclivities, Harmony would encourage and
utilise them. These children would choose to enrol in the work group known as
‘the Little Hordes’, who dauntlessly perform certain tasks that ordinary workers
would find debasing. Marx would later charge Fourier with confusing work and
play, mistakenly imagining that sewer cleaning could become a game played by
children. Closer examination, however, shows that the Little Hordes are not
simply having fun, but are rather motivated by a concern for the community at
large, and for the honour of their own corporation. This is an age when selfless
devotion is at its strongest, and corporate pride is here directed towards the
common good. These moral motivations are accompanied, and reinforced, by a
bewildering range of ceremonial ranks and titles, which are highly sought after
by members who yield to no one in loyalty to their own intermediate association
(Fourier, 1972, pp. 317–318).
Two surprising absences in Fourier’s account of education (narrowly under-
stood) might be noted. First, despite Fourier’s deserved reputation as holding
extravagant and (to some) shocking views on love and sexuality, there is no place
for sex education. Adolescence arrives late in Harmony, and up until the age of
fifteen children have no interest in, or exposure to, sexual activity. Second, there
does not appear to be much room for ‘book learning’ narrowly understood. This
is surprising because elsewhere we are told that Harmony will have a huge
number of brilliant scholars and great authors (all well-remunerated and appro-
priately honoured). It seems that any engagement in narrowly intellectual
pursuits will have been largely self-motivated, and come later in life.
Education and utopia 191
Introduction
Harriet Martineau is a very apposite figure to choose for a collection which
examines the interrelationships of education, political and personal life, and
power. Throughout her life (1802–1877)1 she concerned herself with a wide
variety of political, economic, social, and cultural issues but both her voluminous
writings and her actions were underpinned by a fervent desire to educate the
public, unfailingly optimistic that if everyone was correctly educated necessary
social change would take place. Eager to publish the knowledge she gained
through extensive reading, travel, and active engagement in many intellectual
and social debates, her constant questioning of cherished assumptions and desire
for scientific answers, even in religion, made her both a celebrated and a contro-
versial figure. Her concerns and approach, especially her belief in certain educa-
tional principles, owed much to her Unitarian upbringing.
not attend the less [to their daily work] for having their minds enlarged and
enriched and their faculties strengthened by sound and various knowledge; ...
the most ignorant women I have known have been the worst housekeepers; ...
the most learned women ... have been among the best (provided they had)
been early taught and trained to household business (as?) every woman
ought to be. (Martineau, 1849, pp. 221–222)
Her example for this was Mary Somerville (1780–1872) whom she knew and
admired for her scientific prowess, her ‘womanly’ bearing and the ‘order and
beauty’ of her home (Martineau, 1983b, I, pp. 356–358, 1849, pp. 223–224).8
The argument that well-educated women were the best housekeepers, wives,
mothers, and teachers of the young, was significant. Although Martineau recog-
nised the father’s responsibilities in family education, she put mothers at the
centre of domestic economy – the basis of political economy (Martineau, 1849).
Aware that many women had now to support themselves, she welcomed devel-
opments that enabled them to leave ‘overstocked’ female industries and gain
access to wider, more skilled employment (Martineau, 1849, pp. 224–226,
283–287). Always deeply conscious of the importance of hygiene and of educa-
tion in it, she enthusiastically promoted Nightingale’s nursing reforms and the
scientific, practical, and moral education and training girls and women needed to
become professional nurses rather than ‘floating saints and virgins’ or ‘grovelling
mercenaries’. Equally she campaigned for women doctors and their education
(Logan, 2005, VI, pp. 161–202, 241–242, 258–291, 301–305 ff.; III,
pp. 162–163; V, pp. 105–106).
204 Ruth Watts
Supporting the early campaign for higher education for women, Martineau
ironically dismissed those who thought the whole purpose of such was merely to
fit women to be ‘companions to men’ and ‘mothers of heroes’. She had little
room for ‘female pedants’, preferring scholars who were useful to society such as
the Unitarian educational philanthropist Lady Byron (Martineau, 1870,
pp. 316–325, 386–392; Yates, 1985, pp. 74–78, 101–102). Above all women,
she praised Anna Barbauld, whom she knew as a child, for her ‘exquisite
writings’, moral character, and ‘womanly grace’ – a prime illustration of how a
well-educated, intellectual, rational woman could still be a virtuous and moral
role model, unlike the Mary Wollstonecrafts of this world (Yates, 1985, p. 103).9
A lifelong feminist, Martineau’s support of women’s rights permeated her
writings and actions. She signed the women’s petition for the vote in 1866,
championed ground-breaking Acts of Parliament which slowly gave more rights
to women, and was an ardent campaigner against the Contagious Diseases Acts
of the 1860s. She welcomed the Women’s Movement of the 1850s and ’60s and
their use of the National Association for the Promotion of Social Science to
promote their struggles for reform of women’s education, legal rights, and other
causes. This was the type of educative association that she liked, diffusing greater
knowledge about social issues and thus stimulating important legislation (Yates,
1985, pp. 51–83, 216–224, 239–267, passim; Hoecker-Drysdale, 1992,
pp. 135–137).
Conclusion
Harriet Martineau became an influential, well-known woman, speaking to
generations on political, economic, social and educational questions of the day.
A lifelong public educator who published over seventy volumes, dozens of articles
and nearly 2,000 newspaper leaders and letters (Hoecker-Drysdale, 1992, p. 2),
she was committed to social change and to representative democracy and both
campaigned for such and sought to educate potential new participants as liberal,
humane, and active citizens so that they could create a better world. She clarified
what she saw as muddled thinking and saw herself as a national educator, taking
significant ideas of the day to as many people as possible, often forging new
methods to do this. She was not afraid to challenge assumptions such as women
being fulfilled in patriarchal systems (Roberts, 2002, pp. 96–104, passim). She
tried to educate people in new ideas which had caught her interest; for example,
she was a significant figure in social science and the translator and purveyor of
Comte’s ideas to Britain and then back to France (Daily News, 1875).
Martineau was controversial but also successful and influential in her time, a
role model for younger women. On political economy, the abolition of slavery,
and women’s rights, for instance, her support was constantly requested. Her
subsequent neglect by historians has much to do with the not uncommon
difficulty before the late twentieth century of women being properly recognised
for their achievements. This has been complicated by factors such as her involve-
ment in and writing on so many issues. She also became unfashionable in the
Harriet Martineau and the Unitarian tradition in education 205
twentieth century for her economic liberalism. She was a pioneer on many issues
such as women’s rights, but her fame has been eclipsed by the struggles and
achievements of the generations who followed her.
In the very issues she became interested in, the way she sought to publish on
them and educate others, Martineau indicated her Unitarian heritage as she did in
thinking for herself, speaking freely, and, above all, upholding an environmentalist
form of education as underpinning all reform and progress. This has been recog-
nised both now (e.g. James, 2010) and in the nineteenth century. For example,
her old enemy the Quarterly Review traced her ‘uniformly condemned’ philoso-
phy to Hartley and Priestley (Heywood, 1877, pp. 484–503). Often helped by her
Unitarian networks, she was an active educationalist who surmounted both gender
and religious animosity to fulfil that which she termed her duty. Studying her writ-
ings and role as public educator gives us greater understanding of the struggles for
education in the nineteenth century and the part women could play in them.
Notes
1 Principal biographies are by R. K. Webb and Deborah Logan; Ella Dzelzainis and Cora
Kaplan’s edited book on Harriet Martineau has much useful recent analysis of her life.
2 It reopened in York 1803–1840, moved back to Manchester until 1853 when it moved
to London affiliated to University College, finally moving to Oxford in 1889. It is now
Harris Manchester College, Oxford.
3 The Revolution commemorated by this Society is the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688.
4 The school of Rev Isaac Perry who lost his pulpit and most of his boys’ school when
he changed from orthodox dissent to Unitarianism. Martineau thoroughly enjoyed the
rigorous teaching of Latin and French, writing composition, and doing arithmetic.
5 Martineau was writing this at a time when there was no national system of education
and the government involvement which did exist, although increasing, was only in
elementary education for the working classes. Martineau wished the latter to increase
until education was provided for all children but this was long before it was considered
that middle-class education would be part of a national system.
6 Jane Marcet’s Conversations on political economy of 1816 became an immensely popular
and successful book as did other of her works on political economy and science.
7 The Daily News was established in 1846 as a Liberal counterpoise to The Times. It
became successful from the 1850s (Webb, 1960, pp. 314–315 and ff., to 358).
8 Mary Somerville gained European fame for her insightful and wider ranging scientific
works from 1831. She also became part of the Unitarian networks in which Martineau
still moved.
9 After Wollstonecraft’s death, shortly after the birth of her daughter Mary, her husband
William Godwin published a memoir of his wife (Godwin, 1798) in which he told the
story of her life including her sexual relationships. In the atmosphere of conservative
political reaction against the French Revolution in the early 19th century, which was
accompanied by more general social conservatism, Wollstonecraft’s name was maligned
and she became a by-word for immorality.
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14 J. S. Mill on education
Alan Ryan
I have thought that in an age in which education, and its improvement, are
the subject of more, if not of profounder study than at any former period of
English history, it may be useful that there should be some record of an
education which was unusual and remarkable, and which, whatever else it
may have done, has proved how much more than is commonly supposed
may be taught, and well taught, in those early years which, in the common
modes of what is called instruction, are little better than wasted. (Mill,
1874a, p. 25)
Ethology
Mill’s Autobiography – the record of an unusual education – displays some
internal tension. It is both a piece of scientific analysis, in which the author
adopts a third-person stance towards the boy and young man whose upbringing
he analyses, and a Goethean Bildungsroman, where the ‘crisis in my mental
history’ is the central episode. Mill’s account of his transition from being the
pupil of ‘men of the eighteenth century’ to becoming his own man mirrors the
political drama of the epoch of the French Revolution: collapse of the ancien
régime, followed by a period of upheaval, followed by a new stability. On any
reading, however, an interesting question about education is at the heart of the
story. Both teachers and pupils have been known to wonder how far a student’s
attainments are her or his own; ‘is everything I achieve really owed to those who
taught me?’ is a not unfamiliar question. For Mill it was particularly acute, both
because of the intensity of the education he had received from James Mill, and
because his mental crisis coincided with his friendship with disciples of Robert
Owen, who held a rigidly determinist theory of character.11 Knowing that he was
widely regarded as a ‘manufactured man’ who had been ‘made’ by his father and
Bentham, Mill was haunted by the fear that he was trapped in the character
they had fashioned for him. He described this as the spectre of Owenite
necessitarianism, the idea that the educator is omnipotent, and individuals
are entirely and unchangeably what they have been reared to be. Not only in the
Autobiography but in the Logic, it is the ‘Owenite’ threat to the freedom of
the will that he discusses (Mill, 1843, VI, ii, 3, pp. 839–842; 1874a,
pp. 134–135). In both works, he provides an answer that he thinks consistent
with universality of causation. In the Autobiography, he also suggests that his
anxiety was short-lived.
Readers who expect Mill’s education to conclude with his rejection of his
father and Bentham, the ‘men of the eighteenth century’, and a declaration of
spiritual independence might find it surprising that he emanicipated himself from
James Mill only to find a new teacher in Harriet Taylor. That one of the main
J. S. Mill on education 213
purposes of the Autobiography is to explain just this emerges on the first page.
Having noted that ‘in an age of transition of opinions’, his intellectual
development may be of some interest, he emphasises his
Mill never says that he was dependent on Mrs Taylor in the same way as he
unavoidably was on his father, and he plainly was not. There was a good deal of
difference between the teacher–pupil relationship of James and J. S. Mill, and the
marriage of two minds represented by the way he and she learned from each
other. Mill drew a distinction between education in the widest sense of all the
influences that make us who and what we are, and education in the narrower
sense of the instruction we receive in schools and universities, and in his case
from his father.
The wider sense is his main concern, and it is all of a piece with his concern
for the formation of character. Mill’s response to Owen’s insistence that a man’s
character was made ‘for him and not by him’ was that we can be agents in our
own remaking. Only a person who wants to refashion his character will actually
do so, and Mill acknowledges like any rational person that we need resources
with which to achieve the remaking. Encouraging and intelligent, but not
uncritical, interlocutors are very effective resources. How valuable a teacher and
critic Harriet Taylor really was is hard to decide. Her influence was enhanced by
the fact that she kept the world very much at bay. Mill’s oldest and closest friends
were among those who thought his praise of his wife was hyperbolic (Mineka
and Lindley, 1972, pp. xxiii–xxxiv).
Even if life is a continuous process of education and re-education, some
readers will wonder whether there is meant to be a time when we have finished
our education. Mill himself invites the question with his rousing peroration at the
end of The subjection of women (Mill, 1869, p. 39). There he insists that nobody
wants to have their affairs managed even by the most benevolent tutor or parent.
They want adult independence. This, of course, is the question at least indirectly
answered by the distinction, drawn by Mill himself at the beginning of his
Inaugural address between the broad, all-inclusive and the narrower senses of
education. Mill’s education in the narrower sense was more or less complete
when he was fourteen. One might hope that the education of any of us in the
broader sense would be a matter of lifelong learning. The broader sense of
‘education’ is coterminous with the subject matter of the discipline that the Logic
baptised as ‘ethology or the science of the formation of character’ (Mill, 1842,
p. 869). Whatever influences the intellectual, emotional, political, or moral devel-
opment of the individual is in this broad sense ‘educational’. Taylor’s impact on
Mill was, if the expression is permissible, ethological rather than instructional.
214 Alan Ryan
We should therefore attend to Mill’s concern with, and hopes for, the social
science of ‘ethology’. Mill hoped that ethology would provide a theoretical grasp
of the mechanisms of socialisation, enabling us to control the process more effec-
tively than by unaided intuition. It would thereby facilitate, first, one aspect of
ordinary political socialisation. In the Logic Mill quoted his earlier essay on
Coleridge in extenso about the necessary conditions of effective government –
one element is that the citizens should possess a common sense of national
identity (Mill, 1843, pp. 921–924). The issue is the need to reconcile a strong
sense of national identity with the diversity of outlook to which liberals were
committed. Mill took from Alexis de Tocqueville’s description of democratic
America the suggestion that under favourable conditions these two desiderata
could be jointly achieved. Tocqueville had linked the fundamental drives of
human nature as he and Mill understood them to the historical and social condi-
tions in which that human nature displayed itself in America. In Democracy
Tocqueville gestured towards the thought that this wholly new society needed a
new social science to analyse it; Mill gave the new science a name – ethology –
and a description in the Logic.
A related aspect of the role of ethology is that it may illuminate the cultural
conditions of economic and social progress. Mill’s concerns are wide-ranging:
how might Ireland be set on the path to rational self-government and prosperity?
How might the Indian sub-continent achieve the same thing? Might an already
highly developed society such as contemporary Great Britain embrace the station-
ary state so dreaded by most classical economists, and treat it as an opportunity
to measure well-being, not by tons of steel and coal produced and consumed, but
by intangibles such as the spread of industrial self-government, the minimisation
of environmental destruction, and the emancipation of women from the burdens
of excessive child-bearing (Mill, 1848, pp. 752–757)? The choices we might
make, within the constraints of physics and political economy could change
dramatically if we educated ourselves to value the right sort of well-being.
Mill regretted that he had been unable to make a greater contribution to the
development of ethology as a social science (Capaldi, 1972). It is difficult to
know what he had hoped for, and what hopes had been dashed. The ‘science of
the formation of character’ covers a lot of territory, and seems to embrace both
the formation of individual character, and therefore child-rearing and education
in all its aspects – moral, cultural, and intellectual, and the formation of ‘national
character’, a better understanding of which might provide a key to the sorts of
progress with which Mill was so concerned.
It is harder to know what Mill hoped ethology might achieve and what he had
failed to do, in light of his attraction to the historical speculations of the Saint-
Simonians and Comte. He dismissed Comte’s developed system as something
that could ‘only have been invented by a man who had never laughed’ (Mill,
1865, p. 343). Comte sets out a theory of the three stages of intellectual
development, and this, according to Mill, let in a flood of light on the study of
history. But as a good empiricist Mill could not think that history was governed
by laws sui generis that did not in the last resort rest on individual psychology.
J. S. Mill on education 215
For Mill any such holistic theory of the way in which social, economic, political,
and intellectual formations give way to their successors demands decomposition.
It must rest on an understanding of individual human nature and how that first
nature is transformed into a second nature by upbringing.
That introduces the third and most obvious aspect of the importance of
ethology as a science of socialisation. Utilitarians must be concerned with
education for two reasons. First, if the ultimate end of action is the happiness of
those affected by the action in question, simple effectiveness requires an accurate
understanding of the consequences of our actions, and that can only be acquired
by some sort of educative process. Simple trial and error will teach children a lot,
just as it does all animals. Nonetheless, this is a slow and expensive method of
learning, and formal education is a way to reduce the cost of acquiring the
knowledge necessary for prudent behaviour. The second is moral education.
Education is not only about inculcating in children a proper appreciation of the
causal environment in which they are to pursue the goals they already have, but
inducing them to pursue goals that will ensure both their own happiness and that
of everyone with whom they interact.
This is the point at which ethology intersects with utilitarian ethics, and with
Mill’s ambivalence about the utilitarianism in which he had been reared.
Utilitarianism presupposes that moral training can ensure that children come to
associate the pursuit of other people’s interests with their own happiness and to
associate failure to pursue other people’s interests with their own unhappiness.
This is the process of giving children a conscience by contriving that they
internalise the approval and disapproval of other people. Mill takes it for granted
that dependence on adults enables the child to acquire the idea that morality
depends on an acceptance that everyone’s interests should be counted equally,
with the perhaps unintended implication that if we were born with a baby’s utter
selfishness but the physical strength of an adult, life might be poor, solitary, nasty,
brutish, and short for all of us. Moral philosophy, as opposed to moral socialisa-
tion, has an educative role of a different kind. It can affect our conduct much
later in the day, when we reflect on the nature of morality, reconsider which of
the convictions we absorbed as infants we should continue to take seriously, and
from which we should try to free ourselves. Its role should not be under-
estimated, since Mill relied on the possibility of a clearer understanding of the
nature of morality both to assist us in making moral progress, and to help us to
draw the essential distinction between ‘mere likings and dislikings’ and the moral
judgments strictly speaking on which the argument of Liberty depends.
Notes
1 Mill’s Principles were taught in Oxford until 1919, when Alfred Marshall’s Principles
of economics became the basis of economics teaching in most universities; System of logic
was in use in the University of London and elsewhere into the 1930s; although Mill’s
broader philosophical views were attacked by Idealists of all stripes during his lifetime
and afterwards it was a sign of his centrality to intellectual life that he could not be
ignored.
2 Review of Sarah Austin’s translation of Victor Cousin’s report on Prussian education.
George Edward Biber (1801–1874) wrote prolifically on educational theory, Christian
education and the history of the Church of England.
3 Compare with John Henry Newman (1801–1890) central in the Oxford Movement
of the 1840s, converted to Catholicism, created Cardinal in 1879, beatified in 2010;
The idea of a university (1852 and 1858) consists of lectures delivered as Rector of the
newly established Catholic University of Ireland; it remains the most often-quoted
discussion of the principles of a liberal education.
4 Collini, 1984, p. xlviii re the editing of Mill on education in the Complete works.
5 Two members of the House of Commons for each of the ancient universities dated to
a Royal Charter of 1603; all holders of the MA or Doctorate could vote; after 1918,
elections were conducted by the Single Transferable Vote system; abolished by the
Representation of the People Act of 1948, effected with the General Election of 1950;
London University returned one member from 1868 to 1950.
6 Set up in 1855; see Hart, 1972, pp. 63–81.
7 Mill set economics exams for Haileybury College, established 1806, the training
college for the East India Company whose administrators Mill considered to be meri-
torious and well trained.
8 Mill first articulated these ideas in The spirit of the age written in instalments for The
examiner spring and summer of 1831; left unfinished as the public agenda moved to
parliamentary reform.
9 Mill made friends with Gustave d’Eichthal (1804–1886) in 1829, though he was more
sceptical by 1831 when Saint-Simonians arrived in England.
10 Auguste Comte (1798–1857), founder of ‘Positivism’, coined the word ‘sociology’;
although he was influenced by Comte and sympathetic, Mill’s Auguste Comte and
positivism (1865) is unsparingly critical.
222 Alan Ryan
11 Robert Owen (1771–1858), Utopian Socialist, held that actions flow from character
which is made for not by us. In the 1820s, Mill debated with Owenites.
12 Andrew Bell (1757–1832), Anglican clergyman, spent ten years in Madras where he
devised the monitorial system (hence, ‘Madras schools’); Joseph Lancaster (1778–
1838) independently invented the monitorial system in South London; schools based
on the system were established in the United States and Canada; under the label ‘peer
supported learning’ it still has a place in American higher education; Coleridge was an
enthusiastic supporter although no friend to utilitarianism.
13 F. R. Leavis’s association of James Mill’s education of his son with Dickens’ Gradgrind
in Hard Times is a misidentification attributable to Leavis’s loathing for ‘Benthamism’;
it is unlikely that Dickens had read Bentham, who was anyway opposed to rote learning
(Fielding, 1956).
14 Mill was advised by Edwin Chadwick (1800–1890), Benthamite, responsible with
Nassau Senior (1790–1864), for the report on poverty that led to the Poor Law of
1834.
15 Mill mentions Christ’s Hospital established 1552 to co-educate, which in 1869 had
1129 boys and 28 girls. (The present author was Almoner of Christ’s Hospital in
the late 1990s when concerted effort was made to achieve equal numbers.) Mill may
have seized on Christ’s Hospital because he was a friend of Henry Cole (1808–1882),
former pupil there.
16 Henry Sidgwick and Millicent Garret Fawcett (1847–1929), sister of Elizabeth Garret,
campaigner for the right of women to practise medicine, supporter of women’s rights;
her husband Henry Fawcett (1833–1884), MP and economist, was an ally of Mill’s in
the campaign for female suffrage. In contrast to the USA where Oberlin was founded
as co-educational in 1833, even progressive, non-sectarian University College London
admitted women students only in 1878.
17 Alexander Bain (1818–1903) Professor of Philosophy, University of Aberdeen, first bi-
ographer of both James Mill and J. S. Mill. Mill’s delivery must have been deliberate –
the address is hardly longer than Isaiah Berlin’s inaugural, Two concepts of liberty.
18 The ancient universities were still governed by the Test Acts, repealed 1872; Mill
deplored the remaining Anglican monopoly (although when Henry Sidgwick asked
whether Mill thought he should resign his fellowship at Trinity College, Cambridge
because he no longer believed the Thirty-Nine Articles, Mill did not encourage him
to throw away his livelihood for a principle; in fact, Trinity behaved decently, and
kept Sidgwick as a lecturer until repeal allowed the college to elect him to a fellowship
once more).
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University of Toronto Press), 207–214.
Mill, J. S. (1867) [1984] Inaugural address delivered to the University of St Andrews, in:
Collected works, vol. XXI, Essays on equality, law, and education (Toronto, University of
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Mill, J. S. (1869) [1967] Endowments, in: Collected works, vol. V, Essays on economics and
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Mineka, F. & Lindley, D. (1972) [1981] Introduction to Collected works, vol. I,
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Urbinati, N. (2002) Mill on democracy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press).
15 Feminist thinking
on education in
Victorian England
Laura Schwartz
Conclusion
Theories of women’s education in the nineteenth century emerged out of wider
discussions on the ‘woman question’, and were shaped by feminists’ re-thinking
of gender roles, sexual difference, and the family. Arguments for and against
women’s education, and the kind of education they ought to receive, were
grounded in debates over sexual difference. While their opponents relied on
notions of women’s difference to argue against their receiving an education
outside the home, feminists were not united in asserting either women’s
intellectual equivalency or equality with men. Some, like Emily Davies and
Elizabeth Wolstenholme, did suggest that gendered characteristics were predom-
inantly socially constructed and they therefore championed access to education as
the means by which women might free themselves from the debilitating effects
of convention. Other feminists, however, such as Josephine Butler and Frances
Power Cobbe were more inclined to value ‘feminine’ virtues as the basis for the
transformation of society, which the education of women would make possible.
Different models of women’s education were thus put forward, and the main area
of contention was whether female students ought to compete directly with men
by pursuing a ‘male’ course of study, sitting examinations and reading for univer-
sity degrees. On this question, Girton and Newnham chose different approaches –
though the distinction ought not to be over-determined. Support for the first
two Cambridge women’s colleges was not mutually exclusive, and their advocates
frequently worked together as part of the same reforming networks.
Feminist thinking on education, like the Victorian women’s movement at
large, reflected and responded to many wider concerns and contemporary
political questions. It was imbued with a horror of idleness, and a belief in the
value of work, the dignity of economic independence, and individual self-
improvement. And it embraced a liberal vision of education which endorsed
institutional socialisation. It was fundamentally determined by the religious
controversies of the age and the religious outlooks of its practitioners. The more
conservative approach of many of the Oxford women, their ambivalence over
demanding women’s formal admission to the university, and their emphasis on
teaching ‘feminine’ values of self-sacrifice can therefore more fruitfully be under-
stood in the context of their High Church vision of women’s education. Even
the more radical of the educational reformers, however, believed that education
also entailed socialisation or a ‘moral’ element, and as a result the women’s
colleges both challenged and reproduced dominant ideas of middle-class
femininity – without ever rejecting such norms altogether.
The feminist campaign for women’s education was a case of ideas and institu-
tions developing in tandem. Though higher education colleges for women
234 Laura Schwartz
reflected the varying visions of their founders, such visions were often themselves
the result of pragmatism and compromise. Feminists were responding to the
pressing need for professional training and qualifications for middle-class women,
and such an imperative encouraged a degree of flexibility in their theorising and
a willingness to at least pay lip service to the concerns of their opponents. At the
same time, however, all practical efforts to improve the educational opportunities
of women had such important implications for their position in society more
generally, that more overtly political reverberations could not be avoided. The
movement for women’s education was implicated in feminist politics because
education during this period was so fundamentally identified with women’s
personal, intellectual, emotional, and spiritual emancipation.
Notes
1 By 1913 Wordsworth had come to accept that votes for women were inevitable, though
she remained unenthusiastic.
2 A handful of feminist women and radical men were interested in improving working-
class education, establishing the Working Women’s College in London in 1864 staffed
by Elizabeth Whitehead Malleson, Clementia Taylor, and Frances Martin, and assisted
by John, the husband of women’s rights advocate and London School Board member
Alice Westlake; see Levine, 1990; Purvis, 1991.
3 For Non-conformist contributions to secondary education, see Binfield, 1981.
4 E. Wordsworth, Isaiah I–XII (1907–08), Sermon manuscripts, Oxford, St Hugh’s
College Archive, XIII.3.
5 Girls were permitted to take these examinations for the first time in 1863.
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16 Idealism and education
Andrew Vincent
Introduction
Idealist philosophers wrote comparatively little directly on education. Despite
this, Idealism, as a more general philosophical movement, including the British,
American, German, and Italian kinds, featured a strong interest in education.
The comparative paucity of direct reflection can be explained by the fact that the
Idealists’ interest in education was integral to their whole philosophy. If one
takes a slightly more oblique perspective on education, one can argue that
between 1870 and the 1920s (in Britain in particular) there were notable
examples of sophisticated educational reflection, as well as, in some cases, direct
engagement with educational practices. This article will briefly elucidate the
meaning of idealism, then move to a consideration of Idealists’ educational
philosophy and their involvement with educational practice.
What is Idealism?
The first question is: what is Idealism? There are a number of commonplace
senses of the term. It can be thought of as corresponding to the conventional
sense of ideal, as in perfectionism or utopianism. This sense of idealism might
thus be opposed to an ordinary language sense of realism. But the use of idealism
in this essay has nothing to do with that sense. It is not referring to ideals or to
utopias, but to ideas, and specifically to human consciousness. This is
philosophical idealism. Versions of this sense of philosophical idealism are found
in ancient Greece, particularly in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle; but in
its current form it was initially influenced largely by the writings of Bishop
Berkeley (1685–1753). Berkeley’s subjective idealism also ran alongside some
different and much richer variants of idealism, generated in Germany in the
writings of, for example, Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) J. G. Fichte (1762–
1814), Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854) and G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831). In
Britain (including both Wales and Scotland – we aren’t talking just about Oxford
Idealism), it dominated philosophical thinking from the 1870s up to the 1920s.
Its key philosophical proponents were figures such as T. H. Green (1836–1882),
Edward Caird (1835–1908), Henry Jones (1852–1922), R. B. Haldane
238 Andrew Vincent
(1856–1928), F. H. Bradley (1846–1924), and Bernard Bosanquet (1848–
1923) (Boucher and Vincent 2011). From the 1920s and 1930s – when to a
degree it was being abandoned, but by no means refuted, in the academy –
Idealism still included such immensely significant figures as R. G. Collingwood
(1889–1943) and Michael Oakeshott (1901–1990).
It is important to note that Idealism was not one singular movement in
Europe or North America. It embodied a wide range of philosophical tenden-
cies, although space does not allow detailed analysis of them to form a substantial
part of this essay. There were subtle philosophical divisions between various
factions of Idealism, for example, personal idealism and absolute idealism. But if
there is one guiding principle of Idealism, in general, it is that reality, all that is
and appears, is for and in human consciousness. Thus, the known world cannot
be considered independent of a knower. There is no reality, as such, which is
antecedent to human consciousness. A natural or material cause could not there-
fore be antecedent to consciousness. If something is known in any way, it is
human consciousness which knows it. There could therefore be no pure natural
history of mind. There could be an ‘idea’ that mind has a natural history, but
such an idea could not logically be antecedent to the knowing consciousness. To
suggest that there is anything, therefore, absolutely outside of consciousness is
meaningless verbiage for Idealism.
[I]f learning limited itself to mere receiving, the effect would not be much
better that if we wrote sentences of water; for it is not the receiving but the
self-activity of comprehension and the power to use it again, that first makes
knowledge our possession.
(Hegel, 1909, p. 167)
In Hegel’s terms knowledge can only come about through a rounded grasp of
the sciences of humanity. To think through the detailed material of the various
sciences in class re-enacts the active principle of thought itself. A teacher must
therefore possess the knowledge themselves thoroughly (within a particular
domain) and think it through in front of the class; the pupils must then
themselves take on the ‘work of thought’ in order to possess the knowledge as
their own. In this process, the rich content of thought can then be assimilated.
Hegel’s idea was that his early Philosophical propaedeutic and later Encyclopaedia
of the philosophical sciences were premised on the generic formative structures of
Mind. The school or early university classes for Hegel are not, though, the place
for the singular advancement of knowledge; any such advancement lies farther
up the ladder of scholarly learning. The school and university are rather a place
to review internally and fully engage with the rich history of human thought.
This entails the individual understanding who they are, and developing a sense
of at-homeness in the world.
A parallel argument can be observed in, for example, T. H. Green’s
Prolegomena to ethics. For Green, knowledge of the world and nature does not
240 Andrew Vincent
explain the nature of knowledge. The producer precedes the product. Knowledge
of the world, including time and space, exists for the self-conscious human
subject, since the concepts of space and time presuppose this subject.
Psychological introspection will not tell us about the nature of knowledge,
because it also presupposes the conscious subject. There can, therefore, be no
experience of the world antecedent to consciousness. Thus, Green maintains that
pure sensationalism would be speechless. There may well be an external world,
but it could not be external to the conscious subject. Knowledge, as such, in any
shape is always mind apprehending itself (Green, 1907). For Green this argument
underlined the enormous significance of education in terms of the intellectual
and moral development of human beings.
These arguments can be illustrated finally in the work of the twentieth century
Italian Idealist Giovanni Gentile (1875–1944) – although this expresses a subtly
different sense of Idealism. Gentile wrote a number of works on education up to
the 1920s, for example, The Reform of education (1923). As Benedetto Croce
(1866–1952) noted, it is clear that Gentile saw a close connection between his
philosophical writings, such as The theory of mind as pure act, and his understand-
ing of education. Put at its simplest, education was viewed as the process of
thought itself, which (as indicated above) is the core of reality for Idealism. Mind
is its own creation. All roads converge here for Gentile; nothing is real save
mind’s self-creation. Gentile referred to this basic principle as ‘thoughtful think-
ing’ (pensiero pensante – see Gentile, 1920, pp. 18–19). Nothing therefore has
value unless it is resolved within the act of thinking. In this sense there is nothing
literally outside of thought. Every act of knowing, speaking or thinking about
something apparently external to us, for Gentile, becomes real in the very act of
thought. Strictly speaking an outside exists, but only insofar as we think it.
Through the activity of thinking and knowing we overcome every form of
externality. Gentile’s Idealism is more extreme than Hegel’s, in terms of its stress
upon the active role of thought.
As Croce comments:
Gentile’s Reform of Education book basically focuses on teachers (in fact it was
delivered as a series of lectures to trainee teachers in Trieste). He casts the whole
debate about education quite directly onto his philosophic concerns. This has no
direct bearing though upon formal training in philosophy; yet, at the same time,
it is tied intimately to the philosophical impulse. As Gentile comments, ‘special
philosophical training can be effectual only if all education, from its very begin-
ning, wherever that may be, has been philosophic’ (Gentile, 1923, p. 240).
Idealism and education 241
In essence, he contends that all the great philosophical disputes underpin ordi-
nary pedagogic concerns. Consequently all teachers should minimally become
aware of, for example, the philosophical implications of naturalism and realism,
over and against idealism. Realism makes ‘all reality consist of an external exist-
ence’. Naturalism asserts, variously, that ‘nature alone exists’ (Gentile, 1923,
p. 73). Idealism asserts, on the contrary, that ‘we discover the impossibility of
conceiving a reality which is not the reality of thought itself’ (Gentile, 1923,
p. 73). Gentile stresses that all teachers should be aware minimally that reality is
‘this very thought itself by which we think all things’ (Gentile, 1923, p. 74).
Modes of education
It is important to realise that in the Idealist understanding, education functions
at a number of levels. Experience, willing, action, cognition, and so forth are (as
indicated) all considered educative in terms of the way the person develops and
functions within a community. Idealist philosophy is thus as one with the idea of
education. We might though, more conventionally, tend to think of education as
more closely related to formal institutions such as schools and universities. Whilst
not denying this institutional dimension, the Idealists tended to consider it to be
multi-faceted. The philosophical background to this is that institutions are never
external. They are also, perfectly or imperfectly, the concrete manifestation of
ideas and will. To enter into the life of an institution is to become involved with
244 Andrew Vincent
the ideas present within it. Certain institutions, for Idealism, can carry the
individual forward, in an educative sense, by affecting will and action.
This can be illustrated, in a slightly formulaic manner, by Hegel’s writings.
He thinks, for example, of the institution of the family as having a primary educa-
tional function. At one level it ensures the mediation of adult sexual desires into
an ethical substance (the institution of the family itself) and consequently
educates and develops the cognition of young adults. The fact of individual
property becoming family property is part of this transformative process. The
family also, as importantly, provides a practical and moral basis for the child’s
education and ideally ensures that it develops skills necessary to earn its own
living. The child’s particular feelings are trained in the family, much of the
normative content being unconsciously assimilated via love, trust, and natural
feelings. The parent gives the child the matter of their own consciousness, yet
the child must begin progressively to take control autonomously of their own
life. Ultimately the consciousness of the maturing child supersedes the felt unity
of the family. In the school and potentially in the university, ideas and values are
more systematically inculcated. In the formal curriculum of the school, the
particular character of the child is superseded by the general rationality and rules
of the institution. As Hegel puts it ‘the immediacy of the child no longer counts;
here it is esteemed only according to its worth ... guided in accordance with
universal principles, moulded by instruction according to fixed rules, in general
subjected to a universal order’ (Hegel, 1971, p. 61, section 396, addition). For
Hegel, the school and university represent universality (in contrast to the
particularity of the family).
Only when the young adult has a sense of universality can she be free to follow
her own interests and seek satisfaction in the social realm – civil society. Civil
society looks, at first glance, like another realm of particularity. Initially it is a
realm for the satisfaction of individual wants – as in a classic market society.
However, the individual in civil society when faced with the arbitrary necessities
of making a living has to recast their desires as thought. This raises the individual,
at one level, to a formal sense of freedom. The world of necessity places demands
on the individual will; this entails rationally giving up youthful ideals. For Hegel,
‘the insight into the rationality of the world, liberates him from mourning over
the destruction of his ideals. What is true in these ideals is preserved in the
practical activity’ (Hegel, 1971, p. 62, 396, addition). The invisible hand (Adam
Smith’s understanding of the market) becomes in Hegel the underlying ‘cunning
of reason’ of the social and economic realm. In pursuing my own interests I am
forced by necessity to think rationally; I must restrain my interests and become
part of a chain of social connections. Ultimately in civil society the individual
gradually comes to recognize their dependence on fellow citizens. It is then
through participating thoughtfully in the complexity of public institutions that
the idea and practice of citizenship develops. This enunciates a more thoughtful
understanding of the state. These moments are all profoundly important for
Hegel for the all-round education of the human being. The school and the
university are just parts of this developmental process.
Idealism and education 245
we owe it to Gentile that Italian pedagogy has attained in the present day a
simplicity and a depth of concepts unknown elsewhere. ... And this ... is due
pre-eminently to the work of Gentile. His authority therefore is powerfully
felt in schools of all grades.
(Croce, 1923, p. ix)
Gentile’s reputation was, though, clearly blighted by Fascism, despite the fact
that the core of his curriculum reforms survived into the late twentieth century.
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17 ‘Affection in Education’
Edward Carpenter, John
Addington Symonds, and
the politics of Greek love
Josephine Crawley Quinn and
Christopher Brooke
‘The Love that dare not speak its name’ in this country is such a great affection
of an elder for a younger man as there was between David and Jonathan, such
as Plato made the very basis of his philosophy, and such as you find in the
sonnets of Michelangelo and Shakespeare. It is that deep, spiritual affection
that is as pure as it is perfect ... It is in this century misunderstood, so much
‘Affection in Education’ 255
misunderstood that it may be described as the ‘Love that dare not speak its
name’, and on account of it I am placed where I am now. It is beautiful, it is
fine, it is the noblest form of affection. There is nothing unnatural about it.
It is intellectual, and it repeatedly exists between an elder and a younger man,
when the elder man has intellect, and the younger man has all the joy, hope
and glamour of life before him. That it should be so, the world does not un-
derstand. The world mocks at it and sometimes puts one in the pillory for it.
(Wilde, 1895)
This is precisely the context in which such writers as Symonds and Pater
would come to assert, in all seriousness, that the Socratic eros was essential
to the survival of liberal England. For this erotic bond represented to them
a pure form of intellectual procreancy and regeneration, the two men insist-
ing on the truth and genuine Victorian relevance of Plato’s famous teaching
in Symposium 209 that at the highest level of masculine love, men who love
men are procreating ideas – generating the creative arts, philosophy, ‘wisdom
and all her sister virtues,’ especially that kind of wisdom ‘which governs the
ordering of society’.
(Dowling, 1994, p. 80)
‘Affection in Education’ 257
But in making this claim she passes over his later, more nuanced and contrarian
work which outlined his disillusion with the ideal of Platonic affection in favour
of his earlier idealistic work, including even his undergraduate essays. She quotes
his famous recollection in his memoirs that he ‘stumbled upon’ the Phaedrus and
the Symposium in his final year at Harrow and therein ‘discovered the true liber
amoris at last, the revelation I had been waiting for ... It was just as though the
voice of my own soul spoke to me through Plato, as though in some antenatal
experience I had lived the life of [a] philosophical Greek lover’ (Grosskurth,
1984, p. 99; Dowling, 1994, p. 67). She notes that when he arrived in Oxford
John Conington, the Corpus Professor of Latin, gave him William Johnson’s
1858 collection of poetry Ionica, which contained, as she puts it, an ‘Arcadian
world of friendship and chaste affection’ and which, as Symonds recalled, ‘went
straight to my heart and inflamed my imagination’ (Dowling, 1994, pp. 86–87,
quoting Grosskurth, 1984, p. 109). This does indeed place him, as an under-
graduate, right at the heart of Oxford aestheticism and its love of Socratic lovers.
But, like most undergraduates, his views changed.
As far as the Greeks were concerned, Symonds moved far beyond the views of
Pater. He took a much broader and more historicised view of Greek sexuality
than their depiction of a pederastic ‘Socratic eros’. Instead of encouraging iden-
tification with the Greeks, or advocating the straightforward recreation of Greek
culture in Victorian England, he was well aware of the cultural specificity of
Greek love. In ‘A Problem in Greek Ethics’, Symonds explained that paiderastia
was unknown to Homer (Symonds, 1901, p. 28), but appeared among the
Greeks after the heroic age in two forms. In the first, ‘chivalrous and martial
form’ – and here Symonds’ description of institutionalised sexual relationships
between males in Dorian states, such as Sparta, drew substantially on Karl
Müller’s groundbreaking German study of the Dorians, which had been trans-
lated into English in 1830 but then politely ignored – an older ‘Inspirer’ handed
down heroic traditions to a younger ‘Hearer’, with whom his bond was essen-
tially educational and military rather than sensual or lustful, although it was
nonetheless physical – everything except ‘outrage’ (stuprum) was allowed
(Müller, 1830, vol. 2, pp. 306–313; Symonds, 1901, pp. 30, 13–14; Dowling,
1994, p. 79). There was then also a sensual and lustful form of ‘boy-love’ which
first appeared in Crete – an import perhaps from oriental Phoenicia, but if so,
one that quickly acquired Hellenic characteristics, received religious sanction,
and spread far and wide (Symonds, 1901, pp. 30, 17–20, 60, 5). Just as Achilles
and Patroclus had become – after Homer – the ideal-typical heroic lovers,
Ganymede became the focal point for this kind of boy-love (p. 6).
These two forms of masculine passion – the noble and the base, the spiritual
and the sensual – were the antecedents of ‘that mixed form of paiderastia upon
which the Greeks prided themselves’ (p. 8), which drew its ‘military and enthu-
siastic elements’ from the Dorian immigration into Greece, while its ‘refinements
of sensuality and sanctified impurity are referable to contact with Phoenician
civilization’, both aspects having been organised and moulded by the Hellenic
spirit (p. 18). This state of affairs arose, apparently, because ‘gymnastic exercises
258 Josephine Crawley Quinn and Christopher Brooke
tended to encourage and confirm the habit of paiderastia’ (pp. 40, 61–62) and
the martial mentality made the production of future soldiers the major reason for
marriage (pp. 62–63). Nonetheless, the majority of Greek men were still more
‘susceptible’ to women; boy-love ‘distinguished warriors, gymnasts, poets, and
philosophers from the common multitude’ (p. 67; see also Dowling, 1994,
pp. 29–31). One thing on which Symonds agreed with the other Oxford
aesthetes was that Greek love was pederastic, involving relationships between
older and younger men. Indeed, he pinpointed male adolescence as the crucial
and most attractive stage of life for the Greeks: ‘In the bloom of adolescence the
elements of feminine grace, suggested rather than expressed, are combined with
virility to produce a perfection which is lacking to the mature and adult excel-
lence of either sex’ (Symonds, 1901, pp. 68–69). Unlike the other Hellenists,
however, he contended that it was also physical, and he even contended that the
Dorian martial love of Achilles and Patroclus ‘by no means excluded the ordinary
sexual feelings’ (p. 3). Symonds, in short, was attempting to understand the
Greeks as they were historically, rather than as Plato portrayed them.
Not only did Symonds look to history rather than philosophy for his
Hellenism, he also came explicitly to reject the philosophical ideal of the Socratic
eros (Symonds, 1901, p. 48). He described it as an attempt by Socrates ‘to
reform and to ennoble paiderastia’ (Symonds, 1901, p. 50) by modifying the
practical educational function of the Dorian martial model into a philosophical
one, in which passionate friends sought ‘to advance in knowledge, self-restraint,
and intellectual illumination’ (p. 51; also Symonds, 1893, p. 69). But he decided
that Socrates failed, and that this transcendental conception, like that of chivalric
love, veiled a physical reality that, in the essay on the ‘Dantesque and Platonic
Ideals of Love’, he said included ‘social evils of the gravest kind’ (p. 78).
Furthermore, the ‘philosophical ideal of paiderastia ... met with little but
contempt ... Like his republic, his love existed only in heaven’ (Symonds, 1901,
p. 55) ‘There is’, he remarked in both of his treatments of this subject, ‘a deeply
rooted mysticism, an impenetrable Soofyism, in the Socratic doctrine of Erôs’
(Symonds, 1893, p. 71; 1901, p. 52).
Symonds’ stand against the Socratic eros was not only based on its implausibil-
ity and mysticism, but also on its political undesirability. On his account, this
version of Greek love could not ‘have anything to do with those connections
profitable to the State and useful to society, which involve the procreation and
rearing of children, domestic cares, and the commonplace of daily duties’
(Symonds, 1893, p. 76). The more historically realistic version of Greek love,
however, could provide such a positive social example: the Greeks gave us the
example ‘alone in history ... of a great and highly-developed race not only toler-
ating homosexual passions, but deeming them of spiritual value, and attempting
to utilise them for the benefit of society’ (Symonds, 1901, p. 1). In the laws and
customs governing ‘Dorian love’, ‘we discern the intention of promoting a
martial spirit in the population, securing a manly education for the young, and
binding the male members of the nation together by bonds of mutual affection’
(Symonds, 1893, p. 63). This had practical consequences: ‘Nearly every city had
‘Affection in Education’ 259
some tale to tell of emancipation from tyranny, of prudent legislation, or of
heroic achievements in war, inspired by the erotic enthusiasm’ (p. 64). As
Dowling has noted, the resulting picture was, among other things, a stand
against a civic republican intellectual tradition which identified the health of the
state with virtue, virility and a warrior ideal, and had long identified love between
men with effeminacy and weakness (Dowling, 1994, p. xv). Symonds turned the
language of corruption and effeminacy around. For him, Greek love was ‘the
very fountain of civic health’ rather than a source of corruption and decay
(Symonds, 1893, p. 64; see also Symonds, 1901, pp. 3, 8, 51), just as, he wrote
in ‘A Problem in Modern Ethics’, the ‘fighting peoples of the world’, from the
Turks to the Tartars, ‘have been distinguished by the frequency among them of
what popular prejudice regards as an effeminate vice’ (Symonds, 1896, p. 109).
For Symonds, then, there was a political and social point to Greek love, at least
in its best and most martial incarnation. He did not, however, pursue this theme
further in his account of the problem in modern ethics. Rather, this late work
presented suggestions for legal reform, as well as a sympathetic account of the
views of the mid-nineteenth century German lawyer and writer Karl-Heinrich
Ulrichs for English readers (Weeks, 1990, p. 54). Ulrichs took the view that
modern ‘Urnings’ – he took the word from Plato’s distinction between Aphrodite,
daughter of Dione, the goddess of earthly love, and Aphrodite Urania, the
goddess of heavenly love, who had no mother – were the result of an anomalous
development of the embryo in the womb, where although the genitals develop
male or female characteristics, a matching differentiation in the part of the brain
determining sex drives fails to take place. The result was an anima muliebris virile
corpore inclusa – a harmless variation rather than a defect (Weeks, 1990, p. 27).
Debate over the innate and acquired versions of ‘inversion’ had been raging
on the Continent for some time, and although Ulrichs’ notion of a third or
intermediate sex was influential, it had played no real part in the writings of the
aesthetes, for whom the love of boys and young men seems to have been under-
stood as a positive choice, and as a behaviour rather than an ingrained preference.
For Symonds, as for Ulrichs, a sexual preference for other males was, by contrast,
usually innate and inconvertible (Symonds, 1896, pp. 43ff; also p. 11; cf. p. 93;
Weeks, 1990, p. 26) – though Symonds also admitted other possible factors,
such as forced abstinence from females or ‘wantonness and curious seeking after
novel pleasure’ (p. 126), and he suggested that there have been historical epochs
when the habit had become institutionalised and endemic in whole nations –
such as that of the Dorian Greeks (pp. 63, 109). And just as Symonds had
insisted, against the dominant Oxford tradition, on the physicality of Greek love,
so he did later of modern love: ‘human nature being what it is, we cannot expect
to eliminate all sexual alloy from emotions raised to a high pitch of passionate
intensity’ (p. 119). On the other hand, he rejected pederasty as a feature of
modern love between men, noting with approval Krafft-Ebing’s opinion that as
well as not being predisposed to sodomy, Urnings ‘inasmuch as they always
prefer adults, they are in no sense specially dangerous to boys’, although there
were some ‘old debauchees or half-idiotic individuals, who are in the habit of
260 Josephine Crawley Quinn and Christopher Brooke
misusing boys’ (p. 110, paraphrasing Krafft-Ebing, 1889, p. 108; cf. Symonds,
1896, p. 86–7).
In summary, then, it appears to us that in his later writings at least, Symonds
was doing something quite different from the other exponents of aesthetic
Hellenism at Oxford with both Greek and modern love between men. For him,
Greek love was physical and practical in a social and political sense, rather than
being idealist and philosophical, while modern ‘inversion’ was innate, also
physical, but not pederastic. This stance was not only different from that of the
Oxford aesthetes; it was intellectually and politically opposed.
John Addington Symonds died in 1893, but from 1894 his contrarian stance
was developed by his friend and intellectual interlocutor Edward Carpenter.
Carpenter was born in 1844 into an upper middle-class Brighton family,
educated at Brighton College and Trinity Hall, Cambridge, took holy orders,
and became a fellow of Trinity Hall in 1868. He left the church in 1873 and
Cambridge the following year, moving to the North of England as a lecturer in
the Cambridge University extension scheme, and ending up from 1877 in
Sheffield. He became increasingly involved in radical movements, and was
devoted to rural life with his longtime companion George Merrill as a vegetarian,
market gardener, and sandal-maker. Carpenter is principally remembered for his
political writings, which he published in various collections, including Civilization,
its cause and cure, and for an epic poem in the tradition of Walt Whitman called
Towards democracy.
Homosexuality was, however, another constant theme in his work from 1894,
when a lecture on what Carpenter called ‘Homogenic Love’ – originally
intended, as noted above, to become an essay in the collection Love’s coming of
age – was instead turned into a pamphlet printed for private circulation. It is clear
from Homogenic love that Carpenter’s understanding of issues surrounding same-
sex love was in many ways consistent with that of Symonds before him. Modern
‘comradely love’ was not associated with ‘any distinct disease of body or mind’
(Carpenter, 1894, p. 20) and was certainly ‘capable of a healthy and sane expres-
sion’ (p. 31); it occurred universally (p. 5); it had a physical side – though this
was not as important as the emotional one (pp. 14, 16); and, like the Dorian
same-sex relationships from antiquity, it avoided ‘corruption and effeminacy’
(p. 41). Like Symonds, Carpenter was interested in legal changes as well as social
ones, protesting in particular against the Labouchère Amendment – or Section
11 of the 1885 Criminal Law Amendment Act – which created the somewhat
vaguely-specified criminal offence of ‘gross indecency’, for which Wilde was later
to be convicted (p. 49). In some areas Carpenter went further than Symonds had
before him. When it came to pederasty, for example, he not only rejected its
appropriateness for the modern world, but also seemed to downplay its
significance among the ancients as well. One of the reasons he had for rejecting
pederastic models was that he sought to present male love as ‘unswerving devo-
tion and life-long union’ (p. 4). Another was that Carpenter was far more inter-
ested in transgressing the boundaries of social class than those of age. Homogenic
love was a ‘passionate and lasting compulsion [that] may draw members
‘Affection in Education’ 261
of the different classes together’ (p. 47) – a view that Symonds had expressed in
correspondence with Carpenter, but not one that he ever publicly declared
(Schueller & Peters, 1967–9, letter #2079, 21 January 1893, vol. 3, p. 808; also
Kaplan, 2005, pp. 16–17).
Then there was the nature question. Carpenter agreed with Symonds that the
scientific study on the Continent of the previous three decades had established
‘that sexual inversion – that is the leaning of sexual desire to one of the same
sex – is in a vast number of cases quite instinctive and congenital, mentally and
physically, and therefore twined in the very roots of individual life and practically
ineradicable’ (Carpenter, 1894, p. 18). But he added that in born inverts, ‘the
person concerned has difficulty in imagining himself affected otherwise than he
is; and to him at least the homogenic love appears healthy and natural, and
indeed necessary to the concretion of his individuality’ (p. 18). This last phrase
suggests that sexual inclination was for Carpenter a constitutive part of personal
identity, something that Symonds never quite said, and something which would
have been meaningless to Dowling’s transcendental Oxford Hellenists, for whom
the act or the relationship was the thing, not the permanent inclination. It may
even have been objectionable to Wilde, too, if we accept Jonathan Dollimore’s
argument that Wilde deliberately portrayed the subject as dispersed, disruptive,
and decentered, as part of a reaction against the repressive ordering of sexuality
and the bourgeois ideology of the unified subject (Dollimore, 1987, pp. 56–61).
Carpenter hardly merits a mention in Dowling’s book, perhaps because he was
a Cambridge man, or perhaps because his views did not fit comfortably into her
version of homosexual counterdiscourse. The only attention he does receive, in
a footnote, is somewhat misleading. ‘Matriculating at Cambridge’, Dowling
writes, ‘Carpenter developed into a homosexual apologist along the earnest,
enthusiastic and activist lines characteristic of that university, although he was no
less dependent on the ideal of the Socratic eros so central to the Oxford writers
treated here’ (Dowling, 1994, p. 79 n. 5). Dowling supports her point by quoting
a passage from Homogenic love, that ‘just as the ordinary sex-love has a special
function in the propagation of the race, so the other love should have its special
function in social and heroic work, and in the generation – not of bodily
children – but of those children of the mind, the philosophical conceptions and
ideals which transform our lives and those of society’ (Carpenter, 1894,
pp. 42–43). But her interpretation of this passage ignores Carpenter’s first claim
here, that the ‘other’ sex-love should have a special function ‘in social and heroic
work’, and over-emphasises the transcendentalism of the second part, that this
other love will generate children of the mind rather than the body. Carpenter was
not propounding an intellectual individualist creed, but rather emphasising the
general social benefits of homosexuality. Although the concept of the ‘generation
of ideas’ as opposed to bodies is taken (perhaps indirectly) from Socrates’ speech
in the Symposium about the generation of the beautiful and good through peder-
astic love, Carpenter’s version of this concept was much more political and active
than transcendental and intellectual. The resemblance to the Hellenists’ ideal of
boy-love is purely at the level of vocabulary; Carpenter’s heart was elsewhere.
262 Josephine Crawley Quinn and Christopher Brooke
And this social and political interpretation of this passage is congruent with the
rest of his writing on homosexuality.
Like Symonds, Carpenter listed examples of Greek love in the service of the
state (p. 5; Symonds, 1901, p. 11–12), but his views of such service in the
modern world were more radical than those of Symonds, and more focused than
Walt Whitman’s romantic vision of democratic comradeship (Weeks, 1990,
p. 49).1 He explained that homogenic love was essential for ‘the State’, since
those involved in male–female relationships could not neglect the home to
perform other social duties, neither could a single person, who lacked the happi-
ness of an affectionate tie.
His illustration was Greek: if ‘the love of Harmodius had been for a wife and
children at home, he would probably not have cared, and it would hardly have
been his business, to slay the tyrant’ (p. 44). In this the Greeks were a much
better example than the Romans, ‘whose materialistic spirit could only with
difficulty seize the finer inspiration of the homogenic love, and which in such
writers as Catullus and Martial could only for the most part give expression to
its grosser side’ (p. 8).
This paper is chiefly concerned with Carpenter’s essays from the 1890s, but
this theme – the social benefits of homosexuality – was one that he continued to
expound over the course of his writing career, and a later work from 1914,
Intermediate types among primitive folk – a fascinating and extremely odd study
of the origins of homosexuality among early humans and its subsequent practice
among the Greeks and the Japanese – dated them all the way back to pre-history.
There he suggested that ‘intermediate types’ were responsible for the evolution
of the human race out of their caves: for in a world of male hunters and female
gatherers or homemakers there was no impetus towards social development, but
equally also no obvious social function for those who did not fit comfortably into
the categories of male and female. These types had to find new activities
and roles for themselves, and they did so as warriors, sages and priests, artists and
potters, and so on – in the process inventing rational thought, religion, art, and
so on (Carpenter, 1914, esp. pp. 10–12). In the modern world, intermediates
could usefully adopt similarly socially useful work such as teaching, and could act
as communicators and reconcilers between men and women (Weeks, 1990,
p. 75). Indeed, Carpenter inverted the case that Symonds had made against the
Socratic eros: where Symonds had argued that that version of Greek love was not
useful to society because it did not involve procreation and domestic functions,
Carpenter made the lack of procreation and domesticity a social virtue in his own
‘Affection in Education’ 263
theorisation of homogenic love. Homosexual relationships held out the promise
of new forms of solidarity, which Carpenter explicitly contrasted with the
connections that had to be maintained between marriage, materialism, and
commerce (Carpenter, 1894, p. 45).
Let us return, at last, to ‘Affection in Education’. It is clear that some of the
themes of Dowling’s transcendental or aesthetic Oxford Hellenism are on display
in this essay, and that we are closer to the world of what we might call Socratic
pederasty here than in, for example, Homogenic love. The relationships Carpenter
advocates are not between equals in terms of age, there is an explicitly
pedagogical or developmental aspect to them, and some of the language is
redolent of the transcendentalism of the earlier Hellenists: ‘I believe affection,
attachment ... springs up normally in the youthful mind’, Carpenter wrote, ‘in a
quite diffused, ideal, emotional form – a kind of longing and amazement as at
something divine – with no definite thought or distinct consciousness of sex in
it’ (Carpenter, 1899, p. 488). Plato was mentioned briefly twice in the essay,
furthermore: once in one of the letters Carpenter quoted, where his correspond-
ent (‘an elderly man who has had large experience as a teacher’) noted that ‘Plato
fully understood’ the importance of affection, and ‘aimed at giving what to his
countrymen was more or less sensual, a noble and exalted direction’ (p. 485);
and again in a note that referred to an episode at the end of Plato’s dialogue Lysis
(p. 488n). At times it is tempting to think that Carpenter, having rejected
Socratic eros for the innate homosexuals described in Homogenic love, was now
recommending a version of this model of same-sex affection as being appropriate
for the development of heterosexual boys in England’s schools – for, as Carpenter
noted, ‘At that age love to the other sex has hardly declared itself, and indeed is
not exactly what is wanted’ (p. 485).
Yet despite these debts to the Platonic, aesthetic tradition, the weight of
Carpenter’s argument here too rested with the kinds of concerns that were
evident in Homogenic love, and which in turn could be traced back to the writings
of Symonds. Although Carpenter was nervous about premature sexual activity,
there was no Socratic flight from the physical expression of affection. Carpenter
suggested that the ‘natural expression’ of a boy’s affection was ‘in caress or
embrace’ (p. 493), and one of the correspondents he quoted approvingly in the
essay asserted that the right kind of ‘rapport’ between a teacher and a pupil was
‘not only of a merely intellectual nature’, but involved ‘a certain physical
element’ (p. 485). And although Carpenter may have concentrated his discus-
sion on the public schools, which only educated a small minority of the popula-
tion, his concern was directed far more towards what he described as ‘the
peculiar character of the middle-class man of today, his undeveloped affectional
nature and something of brutishness and woodenness’ rather than with anything
to do with the development of young aristocrats – indeed, he noted with
approval ‘the rapid rise which is taking place, in scope and social status, of
the state day-schools’ (p. 489n) – and we earlier mentioned one of the letters
from which Carpenter drew in his essay, concerning the ‘naughty’ working-
class boy.
264 Josephine Crawley Quinn and Christopher Brooke
Most importantly of all in this essay, far from a project of fashioning exemplary
individuals, Carpenter’s interest continued to lie in practical, institutional
reform. Carpenter’s was a political – civic, national, perhaps even martial –
agenda. ‘In almost all human societies except, curiously, the modern nations’, he
wrote, ‘there have been institutions for the initiation of the youth of either sex
in these matters’, initiations that ‘have generally been associated ... with inculca-
tion of the ideals of manhood and womanhood, courage, hardihood, and the
duties of the citizen or the soldier’ (p. 489). The Greeks were praised for their
recognition that friendship was ‘a national institution of great importance’ and,
as with Symonds before him, there was particular mention of Müller’s scholar-
ship on the ancient Dorians (p. 485). In Crete and in Sparta, the institution of
male friendship between an elder and a younger man ‘was entered into in quite
a formal and public way, with the understanding and consent of relatives’, and
‘they fought thenceforward side by side in battle’ (pp. 485–486). The task for
the schools of Carpenter’s day was to develop functionally equivalent institutions
and practices within and across schools in order to facilitate the proper emergence
and prevent the abuse of affection in education.
David Halperin, John. J. Winkler, and Froma I. Zeitlin have remarked that in
the Greek world, ‘Sexuality ... is not so much a subject in and of itself – a unitary
category of analysis – as it is one of the languages for defining, describing, inter-
preting, and (hence) transacting all manner of other business’ (Halperin et al.,
1990, p. 4). We have already argued for this much later period that the
Hellenising, pederastic, intellectual version of homosexuality, fetishised in particu-
lar at Oxford, was a way of clinging on to elite status and traditions in a rapidly
changing world, a way of maintaining difference and superiority at the dawning
of a democratic age – rather as we believe it often was in Athens itself (see also
Quinn, 2007a, 2007b). For Symonds, to some extent, but especially for Carpenter
in the 1890s, homosexuality was a way of engaging with that new world, a rejec-
tion of aristocratic self-fashionings in favour of a democratic, more inclusive,
reading and use of transgressive sexuality. These writers constructed homosexual-
ity as a means to democracy rather than as a way of avoiding it. Halperin has
written that we will understand Greek pederasty better ‘if we do not view it as an
isolated, and therefore “queer” institution but if we regard it, rather, as merely one
strand in a larger and more intricate web of erotic and social practices in ancient
Greece, ranging from heroic comradeship to commercial sex’ (Halperin, 1990,
p. ix). We believe that the same can be said for late Victorian Britain.
Nor is it simply the case that attention paid to the disagreements among the
advocates of same-sex love helps us to illuminate Carpenter’s project in works
such as Homogenic love or ‘Affection in Education’. Such attention also opens up
a pathway towards a new history of fin de siècle socialisms, for as well as being
two of the most eloquent apologists for love between men, Oscar Wilde and
Edward Carpenter were also two of the most imaginative (and, we might add,
still insufficiently appreciated) socialist thinkers of their age, and the same issues
that separated them when it came to thinking about same-sex love showed up in
their other political writings as well. Wilde’s affection for the individual
‘Affection in Education’ 265
intellectual benefits of the Socratic eros fitted well the view expressed in the
opening lines of The soul of man under socialism that the ‘chief advantage’ of
socialism would be to ‘relieve us from that sordid necessity of living for others’
in a world where the ‘majority of people spoil their lives by an unhealthy and
exaggerated altruism’ (Wilde, 2001, p. 127). Carpenter’s socialism, by contrast,
was one in which love taught citizens to be unselfish and anti-egoistic, rejecting
individualism along with commercialism, materialism, modern industrial
practices, and so on, in favour of a semi-anarchic, moralising vision of rural
utopianism (see, e.g., Carpenter, 1897). Different versions of homosexuality
could buttress different versions of socialism; to talk about sex – as ever – was
also to be talking about politics.
Note
1 Carpenter’s debts to Whitman are complex, and we have no space to explore them here.
For a variety of approaches to the question, see Carpenter, 1906, 1924; Sedgwick, 1985,
pp. 203–217; Robertson, 2008, ch. 4; Rowbotham, 2009, pp. 38–41, 43–45, 50–57,
72–73; Bevir, 2011, pp. 247ff.
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266 Josephine Crawley Quinn and Christopher Brooke
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18 John Dewey
Saviour of American education
or worse than Hitler?
Richard Pring
Introduction
John Dewey (1859–1952) was born in Burlington, Vermont. Aged sixteen he
attended the University of Vermont where he read Darwin’s The origin of species
(1859), although it was not on the college curriculum. Its evolutionary theory,
especially as developed by T. H. Huxley (1825–1895) in his Elements of
physiology, profoundly influenced his ‘distinctive philosophical interest’ and
thereby his educational theory. Indeed, in later reflections on his life, Dewey
wrote:
There was derived from that study a sense of interdependence and interre-
lated unity that gave form to intellectual stirrings that had previously been
inchoate, and created a type or model of a view of things to which material
in any field ought to conform ... I was led to derive a picture of it, derived
from the study of Huxley’s treatment.
(quoted in Ryan, 1997, pp. 53/54)
Graduating from Vermont in 1879, Dewey taught (not very well) for three years
in two schools and then entered Johns Hopkins University to study philosophy.
There he was influenced by C. S. Peirce (1839–1914), the ‘founding father of
pragmatism’, and by the pervading influence of Hegelian idealism, and thereby
the Oxford idealist F. H. Bradley (1846–1924).
In 1884, Dewey was appointed to the University of Michigan. His reading
there of the Oxford idealist philosopher, T. H. Green (1836–1882), who had
argued strongly for the role of philosophy in helping to understand the problems
of social life, influenced Dewey’s conviction of the centrality of such social life in
the transformation of experience – and thus of the link between educational aims
and the development of community. Hence, Dewey was deeply influenced by
evolutionary theory, by the philosophy of pragmatism, and by Hegelian idealism.
These came together in his arguments for the essential unity but evolving nature
of all experience, for the active pursuit of that unity through inquiry and
problem-solving, for the key place of community in the enrichment of that
experience, for the reduction (following such enquiry) of the notion of ‘truth’
268 Richard Pring
to that of ‘warranted assertion’, and for the gradual transformation of such
‘warranted assertions’ through further enquiry and the abolition of ‘dualisms’ –
in particular, between ‘the spectating mind’ and ‘the spectated material world’,
and between knowledge and action, which had bedevilled traditional education.
The child’s experience, inquiry arising from that experience, integration of
thought and action, and nurturing of community should be central to educa-
tional thinking and practice, not peripheral as usually is the case.
In 1894 Dewey was appointed to the University of Chicago. His arrival was
welcomed by William James:
That ‘new system of philosophy’ is what Dewey spent the next forty years
developing and expounding. But the ‘School of Thought’, which endured for
much more than the predicted quarter of a century, finally neglected the integra-
tion of theory and practice integral to Dewey’s philosophy. For Dewey, theory
had to be an illumination of intelligent practice. That integration of theory and
practice became, instead, the academic study of education, placed in the School
of Social Sciences. The department of education was closed in 1997. Therefore,
to all Departments or Schools of Education: ‘Beware Chicago!’ Once
theory loses touch with practice, then why have a Department or School of
Education?1
In 1904 Dewey moved to Columbia University, New York City, where he
remained for the rest of his academic life, and where he produced the major
synthesis of his educational thinking Democracy and education. The title is
significant because the creation of democratic communities was a principal aim
of education. But his writings were many, as his ideas evolved or needed defence
against his critics.
Saviour or Hitler?
John Dewey was, and still is, a controversial figure in the history of education.
That is reflected graphically in the title of this paper. It is taken from the account
of Dewey by Nel Noddings; not only has he:
John Dewey 269
been hailed as the saviour of American education by those who welcome
greater involvement of students in their own planning and activity [but also]
he has been called ‘worse than Hitler’ by some who felt that he infected
schools with epistemological and moral relativism, and substituted socialisa-
tion for true education.
(Noddings, 2005)
This is a far cry from the idea of knowledge being ‘warranted assertion’ or from
truth being associated with the resolution (tentative and temporary maybe) of
problems faced.
Therefore, one either loved Dewey or hated him, although, as with educational
disagreements generally, the arguments were polarised without too much close
attention to what Dewey actually said. Dewey was himself a fulsome critic of
much that fell under the title of ‘progressive education’. In Experience and
education, responding to his critics in 1938, he steered a middle way between
the traditionalists and the progressives, condemning equally both of these
warring opposites. But such an understanding of his position itself reflects the
way educational thinking is so easily translated into slogans. As Scheffler argues
in The language of education,
it is highly plausible to see the egalitarianism which stems from the writings
of John Dewey as the proximate cause of our educational decline.
(O’Hear, 1991a, p. 28)
O’Hear’s pamphlet about Dewey, published by the Centre for Policy Studies,
was entitled Father of child-centredness (O’Hear, 1991b). Indeed, when the
present author arrived in Oxford in 1989 and was seated at dinner next to Keith
Joseph who had been Secretary of State for Education under Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher, he was accused of being responsible for all the problems in
our school – because he had introduced teachers to John Dewey.2 Much more
recently, he was asked by a present Cabinet Minister whether he did not think
that John Dewey was the cause of all our educational problems. More recently
still, however, when a former Secretary of State for Education (an historian by
reputation) was asked why the Conservatives were so against John Dewey, he
simply replied, ‘Who is John Dewey?’ Perhaps, then, the perceived influence of
Dewey himself is waning, though not, evidently, what he was purported to stand
for. In a recent interview, the present Secretary of State for Education blamed
the decline in social mobility as having more to do with ‘progressive teaching
methods and softer subjects in state schools – a move away from traditional
subjects rigorously taught’ (The Guardian, 25.5.12). The conflict between
Hutchins and Dewey continues, though without reference to the original
protagonists.
272 Richard Pring
What were the reasons behind such assumptions? The Plowden Report
seemed to have inherited the view, fairly common in previous decades amongst
influential educationists, that growth of the inner potentials of the child was the
aim of education, and that the guiding principle of the educational process was
to identify and nurture those interests which led to further growth. As with
Dewey, the ‘mortal sin’ was to bore children, to deaden those very forces which
would lead to further growth and to the expansion of the interests of the child.
The teacher’s task was, at least in part, to remove the barriers to the growth of
personality, including building on the natural curiosity to understand and to
know. The Report urged schools ‘deliberately to devise the right environment
for children to allow them to be themselves and to develop in the way and at the
pace appropriate to them’ (Plowden Report, 1967, para. 507). This, of course,
would be different for different children – a far cry from Hutchins’ ‘education
should everywhere be the same’. That required the identification of those
interests which had the potential for such growth – not an easy task, as the
Plowden Report admitted:
We are still far from knowing how best to identify in an individual child the
first flicker of a new intellectual or emotional awareness, the first readiness to
embrace new sets of concepts or to enter into new relations.
(Plowden, 1967, para. 9)
The metaphor of the oak-tree, or of plants, was not untypical amongst the
‘education as growth’ theorists, such as Friedrich Froebel (1782–1852), who
were suspected by the critics to lie behind Plowden.
It would be (and was) mistaken to identify Dewey with such a view, despite
his constant reference to education as ‘growth’ (for example, Dewey, 1916,
ch. 4). He completely rejected the biological metaphor. Rather, he argued for
growth as emerging from social interaction, initially with those in immediate
social contact, then with the wider community in which one lived, and later with
the community accessed through formal education in which one is challenged by
what others have said and done, including ‘the wisdom of the race’ as that is
embodied in science, history, and so on. Growth occurs through interaction
John Dewey 273
between the active enquiries of the learner and the social and cultural
environment in which those enquiries are pursued. The task of the teacher is to
help in making the connections.
Behind Dewey’s understanding of the individual learner’s ‘growth’ are signif-
icant and controversial issues in philosophy – in particular, in the theory of
knowledge and in ethics (that is, in how one determines what is worth learning).
Before, however, such philosophical matters are approached, it would be useful
to set out Dewey’s ‘manifesto’ for education which was underpinned by such
philosophical positions.
• was disconnected from the experiences that the students brought from their
homes and their communities;
• was disconnected from the practical and manual activity through which they
were engaged with the physical world;
• ignored the interests that motivated young people to learn;
• treated knowledge as something purely symbolic and formal – organised in
textbooks, ‘stuck on’ without connections to existing ways of understanding;
• maintained discipline through external authority rather than through the
active engagement of young people in activities and enquiries.
In contrast to this, the school should be an extension of the home and the
community – building on the knowledge and experience already gained, and
expanding and deepening it with a view to feeding back to those communities
greater understanding and an intelligent contribution to community life.
Second, in being such an extension of home and community, the school should
value practical and manual activity through which one understands the material
world and the necessities for everyday survival. ‘Knowing how’ is as demanding
as ‘knowing that’, and the former might be said logically to precede the latter.
Third, the interests of the learner are to be respected in their own right, not
simply harnessed by the teacher to help motivate the learners to be interested in
something which, in itself, they find uninteresting. The interests themselves need
to be educated.
Fourth, the division of public knowledge into subject compartments must be
seen, not as valuable in itself; rather, they are the cultural resources created by
others which are useful in finding solutions to the problems one faces and to the
enquiries one is pursuing. To transmit them as ‘bodies of knowledge’, discon-
nected from the enquiries to which they are a response, is not simply bad
psychology of learning. It is a misunderstanding of the nature of knowledge and
274 Richard Pring
its logical organisation. Finally, external authority is necessary only because the
activity of the learners has not been disciplined by the intrinsic interest in the
activities or enquiries to be pursued. In an ideal educational setting, externally
imposed discipline should be unnecessary. In practice, such will rarely be
completely achieved. But it needs to be the educational ideal constantly striven for.
These educational ideas were put into practice in his own experimental school
at the University of Chicago.
Philosophical foundations
Dewey was much influenced by the evolutionary theory of Charles Darwin
(1809–1882) and the idealism of G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831). Following the
former, he rejected the notion of human beings as constituted of mind and body
(the dualism of Descartes). Rather, evolutionary theory pointed to the contin-
uity between primitive organisms, the animal world, and the human species, in
which the organism adapts to the environment in increasingly sophisticated ways,
gradually through sensory and then reflective and self-conscious capacities. The
criticism of Cartesian dualism
Hence, the further dualism – between thought and action – is also dismissed.
Human beings are not ‘thinkers’ and then ‘doers’. They are active and adaptive
organisms, and thinking is but coping with problems arising from the barriers to
adaptation and action. The meaning therefore of a belief is the guidance it gives
to action and to the overcoming of a problem.
The influence of idealism, particularly through the work of T. H. Green,
reinforced this through its emphasis upon the essential unity of experience. That
idealism rejected both the atomisation of experience and thus the atomisation of
the so-called knowledge of that experience. Reality was a construction or an
interpretation of the human mind, and that mind could not isolate one area of
‘constructed reality’ from another. To understand anything fully would be to see
its connections with the whole. The distinction between contingent and
necessary connections between ideas was ultimately unsustainable. Furthermore,
coming to see things as a whole (never completely accomplished) evolved
through yet further experience and through the interaction between different
sets of ideas, different arguments, different protagonists. Ideas are always in a
state of evolution.
Pragmatism, as that is usually attributed to C. S. Peirce, tallied with much of
this. Again, a human being is not a mind in a body, a thinking part set aside from
the physically active part, contemplating a ‘true account’ of the physical world.
Rather, a human being is an organism whose life is one of actively adapting to
John Dewey 275
the environment in terms of how that environment is conceived and how it has
affected the capacities of the organism to adapt. Language embodies a way of
conceiving the world in which one is constantly adapting, but the meaning of the
words and of the propositions in which they occur is the practical effect which
they have. So long as ‘they work’, the beliefs that they reflect are ‘warranted’. As
soon as they do not have the desired effect, the beliefs become problematic, in
need of refining and involving a reorganisation of how one sees practically the
environment within which one is acting and adapting to meet one’s goals. In
order to get at the meaning of a theory, one might ask what practically follows
from it.
Such a criterion would see off much educational theory. If nothing follows
practically from the statement ‘all children are curious’ or if no observed practice
would lead to its rejection, then it is meaningless. Pragmatism is and was a radi-
cal shift in philosophy from an empirical tradition in which truth lies in the
correspondence between statements and reality and in which bodies of such
statements in theories of various kinds reflect a reality independent of them.
Pragmatism may be a philosophical position which many would reject. But in
doing so would they necessarily have to reject the educational theory, and its
implications, of John Dewey?
Transformation of experience
In his major work on education, Dewey defines education as the
the child and the curriculum are simply two limits which define a single
process. Just as two points define a straight line, so the present standpoint of
the child and the facts and truths of studies define instruction. It is a continu-
ous reconstruction, moving from the child’s present experience out into that
represented by the organised bodies of truth that we call studies.
(Dewey, 1902, pp. 126–127)
We may compare the difference between the logical and the psychological to
the difference between the notes which an explorer makes in the new coun-
try, blazing a trail and finding his way along as best he may, and the finished
map that is constructed after the country has been thoroughly explored.
(1902, p. 136)
roughly speaking, [schools] come into existence when social traditions are so
complex that a considerable part of the social store is committed to writing
and transmitted through written symbols ... As soon as a community de-
pends to any considerable extent upon what lies beyond its own territory and
its own immediate generation, it must rely upon the set agency of schools to
ensure adequate transmission of all its resources ... Hence, a special mode of
intercourse is instituted, the school, to care for such matters.
(Dewey, 1916, p. 19)
John Dewey 279
The school provided an enrichment of community in two ways. First, the
greater the diversity of the social group, the greater would be the enrichment
and possible transformation of the meaning attached to social experiences,
especially beyond the rural communities. Received assumptions and ways of
seeing the world are more likely to be challenged. Other points of view have to
be reconciled with one’s own. One’s experiential grasp of reality must be chal-
lenged in wider interaction with others of different experiences. Second, the
school put the young people in touch with the wider community, which ‘lies
beyond [their] own territory and own immediate generation’.
Dewey argued for the common school, because a diverse school population
would be enabled, with direction and support from the teacher, not simply to
tolerate the different views and backgrounds of the other learners, but to be
challenged and informed by them. Diversity of background was to be seen as an
asset rather than barrier to learning. School would not only nurture the sense of
community amidst diversity, but also provide the basis, the shared understand-
ings, necessary for the development of future communities.
Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common.
What they must have in common in order to form a community or society
are aims, beliefs aspirations, knowledge – a common understanding.
(Dewey, 1916, p. 14)
I believe that the teacher is the true prophet and the usherer in of the king-
dom of God.
(Dewey, 1985, p. 30)
The reason for this exalted view of teaching is that teaching lies in that bridg-
ing of the gap between the enquiries of others (the ‘logical aspects’ of the under-
standings we have inherited) and the modes of understanding and experiences of
the learners (the ‘psychological aspect’). That requires on the part of the teacher
not only the pedagogical skills to bridge that gap, but also a profound love and
knowledge of the different modes of inquiry. These are our inheritance and the
teacher is both the guardian of them and ‘the prophet’, pronouncing their
importance and relevance to the next generation.
The failure to recognise this by the public school system:
in such a way that every teacher has some regular and representative way in
which he or she can register judgement upon matters of educational impor-
tance, with assurance that this judgement will somehow affect the school
system, [means that] the assertion that the system is not, from the internal
standpoint, democratic, seems to be justified.
(Dewey, article in The Elementary School Teacher, 1903).
NCLB introduced a new definition of school reform ... In this new era,
school reform was characterised as accountability, high-stakes testing, data-
driven decision-making, choice, charter schools, privatisation, deregulation,
merit pay and competition between schools. Whatever could not be mea-
sured did not count.
(Ravitch, 2010, p. 217)
The present author shows how Ravitch’s trenchant critique is equally relevant to
England and Wales – as also is the response that Dewey would give in the light
of the ideas summarised above (Pring, 2012). First, local community responsibil-
ity for education has been gradually eroded over a long period, but it has
quickened under present policies with the creation of ‘free schools’ (based on the
model of the US Charter Schools) and ‘academies’, under direct contract to
the Secretary of State. Gone is local accountability of the education within the
community. Furthermore, the creation of greater choice within a more market
driven system has polarised rich and poor, ethnic groups and social classes. There
is a severance between the aims of education as a personal good and those aims
as a public service for the creation of common experiences, common culture,
common understandings which were at the heart of Dewey’s notion of
democracy – and indeed of that of R. H. Tawney (1880–1962) (Tawney, 1938).
Second, the new language of education, adopted from performance manage-
ment, bears little relation to that of Dewey’s ‘transformation of experience’ –
respecting, as a starting point, the experiences and ways of understanding which
the learners bring with them into school. There is little room in such performance
282 Richard Pring
management for the ‘exploration of ideas’, the ‘tentative inquiring’, the ‘struggle
to understand’, the ‘targets’ imposed by Government, the ‘performance
indicators’ by which learners and teachers and schools are tested, the ‘audits’ by
which schools are classified and failed. There is a need to ask, as Dewey constantly
asked, what are the aims of education in the light of what we mean by saying we
help all young people to develop their humanity within the wider society.
Third, the Hutchins/Dewey disagreement remains with us still. What is the
nature of the school subjects which shape the curriculum? Dewey’s critique of
the curriculum as ‘the transmission of knowledge’ (and of the dualism between
thinking and doing, theory and practice) is as relevant today as it was then – the
transmission of inert ideas, failing to illuminate the experiences and interests of
young people and leading to disengagement of so many.
Finally, Dewey’s extolling of the teachers as ‘the true prophet and the usherer
in of the kingdom of God’ may seem over the top, but it is in sharp and refresh-
ing contrast with the teacher as the deliverer of the curriculum, in the creation
of which he or she has had little or no position. For Dewey, a healthy education
requires a profound respect for the teacher.
Rather should
The public school system [be] organised in such a way that every teacher
has some regular and representative way in which he or she can register
judgment upon matters of educational importance, with assurance that this
judgment will somehow affect the school system[?]
(Dewey, 1903)
There is a revolution in both the content and the provision of education in the
United States and Britain – an underlying disdain for the practical, a deregulation
of educational provision, a transfer of responsibility from public to private and
for-profit companies, an emphasis on competition at the expense of partnership,
a deprofessionalisation of teachers, a reduction of worth-while learning to what
is measurable. Those who wish to question such a revolution may find support
in the very different vision of education of John Dewey.
Notes
1 It is important to distinguish between ‘School’ in the sense of an informal collection
of like-minded thinkers, ‘School’ as a formally constituted university department, and
‘school’ as a place where young people go. Here ‘School’ refers to the first, although
John Dewey 283
such like-minded interests would seem to have developed into ‘School’ in the second
sense (the one which in recent years, has closed), and not to the third sense, or the Lab
School, which Dewey helped create.
2 After several lengthy discussions, I can report that Lord Joseph no longer holds these
views.
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Index