LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ELECTION
December 11, 2020
INTRODUCTION
➢ Election law is quite technical, unlike Administrative Law and Law on
Public Officers, which were broad in scope.
➢ We will always go back to the Constitution, because that is the most basic
law upon which all other elections laws are derived.
Election is a process that is intended to benefit voters, more than they are to
benefit candidates and politicians. Election is a mode by which voters are able
to exercise and realize their sovereign power to participate in government.
➢ Another stakeholder, which is the primary stakeholder, is the candidates
and political parties.
➢ There is a procedure for election: voting, preparation for the election,
counting, canvassing, proclamation, etc.
➢ There is also the topic of election dispute resolution: election protests,
pre-proclamation controversies, the presidential electoral tribunal, the
house electoral tribunal, etc. These are things that happen after
elections.
➢ There are other electoral exercises that are more attune to democracy,
such as plebiscite, referendum, recall, and initiative.
When we talk about the legal framework of election law, these are the
classes of law that we are referring to:
1. Constitution;
2. International agreements and conventions;
3. Legislations or statutes;
4. Administrative regulations (regulations);
5. Case precedents; and
6. Other issuances.
➢ Constitution: Everything comes from the Constitution.
➢ International agreements and conventions: The Philippines is a signatory
to many international treaties that have provisions in them that we can
relate to elections.
➢ Legislations or statutes
○ The basic election law is still the Omnibus Election Code which
was passed in 1985.
○ The Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) was passed even before
the Constitution, yet, much of its provisions are still in effect
today; this is the reason why there are a lot of amendments to it.
➢ Administrative regulations
○ COMELEC calls its administrative regulations as resolutions.
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 ○ Resolutions are actually rules and regulations to implement
3) Secret ballot and secret vote;
legislations and to enforce the mandate of the COMELEC under the
Constitution.

Under resolutions, there are also those which COMELEC calls as general
instructions. The rules of procedure for voting, counting, canvassing, and
registration are called general instructions.

They are instructions to the electoral board or the board of election inspectors
who manage the elections at the polling place level.

The general instructions change every election. In working on an election case

or volunteering on election work, this is what you have to find out.

➢ Case precedents: These are Supreme Court decisions interpreting many

things about election laws.

INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CONVENTIONS

Genuine periodic elections

➢ For election law, the basic international agreements are:
➢ Periodic elections means that the elections are “regular” and “in
○ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR);
interval”.
○ International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);
○ United Nations Convention Against Corruption; and ➢ That is why when you hear “postponement of elections,” that is a flag that
○ Others. there might be something not regular about the way things are happening,
because elections should be periodic and be held at regular intervals.
➢ The UDHR is a declaration. It is not really a treaty.
➢ On the other hand, the ICCPR is a treaty.
Universality of suffrage
➢ However, take note that under the Constitution, international law forms
➢ Universal suffrage means everyone is part and is involved.
part of the law of the land, and we are obligated as a state to make sure
➢ No discrimination whatsoever should be imposed on the right to suffrage.
that the provisions of the treaties are implemented or enforced in our
country. ➢ This covers the right to vote and the right to stand for public office (to be
a candidate).

International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) For equal suffrage, this means one person, one vote.
1) Genuine periodic elections;
2) Universality of suffrage; and It is only in election that you will actually realize the principle of equality.
Regardless of status, ethnicity, or economic standing, one vote means one vote.

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Secret ballot and secret vote
➢ Secret vote is connected to the requirement that voting should be a free
expression of the will of the elector.
➢ In other words, secret vote means that the voter should be the only one
who knows who he voted for. This is for you not to be unduly influenced.
STATUTES
➢ When you go to the ballot and vote, it should be your decision only. You
should not write anything on the ballot on the basis of someone forcing
you to vote for anyone. It should be your own vote.
➢ Looking at election observations around the world, one of the most
important things that they would try to see in order to assess whether an
election is genuinely democratic, is the secrecy of ballots.
The right to vote is actually a human right. The UDHR says so: the right to
participate in government is a human right. It forms part of what makes human
beings have dignity.
B.P. BLG. 881 (OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE)
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION
➢ There are other obligations that we have to comply with, like the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption, which was passed in 2005 or 2006.
➢ Under this Convention, the electoral processes should make funding
sources of the candidates transparent.
➢ This is in order for you to know where candidates get their funds from.
➢ This should also form part of the decision of the voter to know who is
financially supporting the candidate.
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
➢ No discrimination whatsoever should be imposed on persons with
disabilities.
➢ This is not just physical disability; this includes mental disability in the
exercise of the right to vote.
Question: Is vote buying illegal or legal?
Answer: It is illegal. It is one of the election offenses. It has a technical
definition. There is a law that clearly says vote buying is illegal: Section 261 (a)
and (b) of the Omnibus Election Code.
➢ The basic election law is still the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).
➢ It is a law that was already in existence even before the adoption and
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.
➢ There is a provision in the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that laws that are not contrary to the Constitution shall
persist, unless amended or repealed.
➢ Among those laws would be B.P. Blg. 881.
➢ Historical context
○ Historically, B.P. Blg. 881 was passed at the time during the time
of Marcos.
○ There was martial law formally from 1972 to 1981, but the power
of the President to legislate stayed until 1986, notwithstanding
the fact that there was already a functioning legislature (the
National Assembly or Batasang Pambansa).
○ It was basically an autocratic government. And therefore,
election was a novelty.
○ It was something that is looked up to by some of the opposition
members at the time, for them to be able to shift some of the
powers of the Marcos regime.
➢ The Omnibus Election Code is very detailed, to the point that it does not
allow flexibility on the part of COMELEC to adopt to situations.
○ When the law is too specific, it means that when the situation or
the environment changes, the law may not be applicable anymore.
○ That is why there was a need to have several amendments.
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 ○ This also includes the fact that the structure of government upon ○ R.A. No. 8189 is the Continuing Registration Law. This is the law
which B.P. Blg. 881 was enacted was different from that that governs voter registration, and it is amended by R.A. no.
prescribed by the 1987 Constitution. 10367, which essentially requires voters to supply their biometrics
information to COMELEC.
○ R.A. No. 9189 is the procedure for voting and preparing for
elections.
○ R.A. No. 7904 is a requirement that every voter should be supplied
a list of candidates.
○ R.A. No. 9066 is the basic law on campaigning.

Biometric means thumb mark, eye retina data, voice, etc. However, at this
point, what we have are just fingerprints and pictures.

CONSTITUTION

➢ Section 1, Article II is really basic in Administrative Law, Law on Public

Officers, and Election Law.
○ It declares what kind of government we should have and who the
➢ This roadmap shows the laws that were passed to fit our election laws with real bosses are: the people.
the new constitutional framework. ○ The people is where sovereignty lies and all government
authority emanates from the people.
➢ Note that the ones in white are those laws that have already been
effectively repealed.
ARTICLE II, 1987 CONSTITUTION
The basic source of statutory power of the COMELEC and its organization is still
Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
in E.O. No. 292, which is the Revised Administrative Code.
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.

➢ Overview of some of the laws

○ R.A. No. 6646 is the first amendment.
○ R.A. No. 6679 is called the First Barangay Election Law.
○ R.A. No. 6735 is the law on initiative on local laws.
○ R.A. No. 7941 is the Party-List System Act.
○ R.A. No. 8046 is the law that calls for the pilot test of
computerized election in ARMM, which led to the computerized
election or the automated election law of 1997, amended by the
Automated Election Law in 2007, which is R.A. No. 9369.
➢ It is also a basic principle that electoral rights are human rights, and
therefore, respecting human rights means respecting the electoral rights
of every citizen of this country.
➢ There should be no discrimination on who goes to serve the government.
○ That is why there is this provision that says political dynasties
shall be prohibited, but the prohibition should be provided by
law.
○ However, since 1987 until now, there is no law that effectively
prohibits political dynasties.
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 ○ In 2007, there was an effort by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to do an initiative on a law for dynasties. However,
this did not gain ground, because it turns out that many lawyers
have members of dynasties as their clients.
Question: As to political dynasties, it looks like a law prohibiting it is really not
going to happen any time soon. Congress has not passed an anti-dynasty law yet.
Do you think that if a law was passed prohibiting political dynasties in the
country, would it be beneficial for the country, or do you think it will not make
a difference in terms of development and progress?
Answer: Under the Constitution, the design of our system of government
requires that everyone should have an opportunity for public service. The
assumption in political dynasties is that there should be no concentration of
political and economic power to just a few families related by blood. You
have to disperse political power to as many citizens as possible.
It recognizes the fact that countries like the Philippines, there is not much
equality yet in opportunity for public service, and that political power can
sometimes be used to perpetuate your economic power. That is why the system
requires that not a single family should dominate politically in a single
constituency.
It also assumes that not just a few families can be public officials. Opportunity
should be given to as many citizens as possible. That way, you will actually be
gaining more, because you will be expanding the opportunity for better
management and better policies.
In the United States, in their House of Representatives and Senate, there is no
prohibition on dynasties. But then again, the reason for that is that they did not
see as a problem the fact that ordinary citizens may have to compete with more
powerful families.
Also, in the United States, there is no term limit. On the other hand, under the
Philippine Constitution, Congressmen and Senators have term limits. This is
because we believe that in every election, there should be equal opportunity
for other people to win.
The law against political dynasties is a requirement under our Constitution that
our legislature has neglected acting on, probably because the effects of political
dynasties are very pervasive, and you cannot expect that people would be
legislating things that may not benefit them.
ARTICLE III, 1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of
expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances.
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil
or political rights.
Section 18 (1). No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political
beliefs and aspirations.
Why can these provisions under the Bill of Rights be considered to fall under
election law?
➢ When you campaign you should be able to campaign freely; you should be
able to say what you want; you should be able to form organizations.
➢ These are basic rights that go along with having a genuine democratic
election.
➢ You cannot have genuine democratic elections if there is no freedom of
the press, expression, and when people cannot assemble or rally.
➢ You cannot have real democratic elections if there is no freedom of
expression.
➢ There has to be no test involving religion in the exercise of civil and
political rights, and no person shall be detained by reason of political
beliefs.
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ARTICLE V, 1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not
otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who
shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
wherein they propose to vote, for at least six months immediately preceding
the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be
imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Section 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
The Congress shall also design a procedure for the disabled and the illiterates
to vote without the assistance of other persons. Until then, they shall be allowed
to vote under existing laws and such rules as the Commission on Elections may
promulgate to protect the secrecy of the ballot.
➢ One requirement to note here is those who have resided for at least one
year in the place wherein they propose to vote.
○ This means that every voter should be identified with a particular
place.
○ If you register as a voter, you should identify yourself with a
particular residence.
○ It is not permitted that you are merely a resident of the
Philippines, without any permanent address.
REGISTRATION
Question: Why is there still registration? Why do you still need to register? There
are countries that do not require registration.
Answer: A general comment on the universality of suffrage, as embodied in the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, says that there can be
reasonable restrictions, such as registration, because you want to prevent
fraud from happening. A registration process becomes a necessary
requirement. The law also talks about securing the sanctity and secrecy of the
ballot. The law also emphasizes that there should be absentee voting.
ARTICLE VI, 1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who shall be
elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be provided
by law.
Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall
commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of
June next following their election. No Senator shall serve for more than two
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term of which he was elected.
Section 5 (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
➢ These provisions under Article VI of the 1987 Constitution are the basis on
how we elect for Senators and Members of House of Representatives.
TERM OF OFFICE
SENATORS MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
3 years 6 years
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 MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the
ELECTED BY DISTRICT PARTY LIST SYSTEM seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
How are districts formed? This refers to the party list system of cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
representation. It is election through provided by law, except the religious sector.
Districts should be contiguous. proportional representation.

The ratio should be progressive. One-half of the seats shall be filled by selection from the following sectors.
HOWEVER, THAT IS JUST FOR THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS AFTER THE
By uniform, this means that the RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION.
population for each legislative
district, so that representation can When the party list system is actually implemented, and there is already a law,
really be equal. then the party list system becomes a purely proportional representation system.
This means that proportional representation is actually an alternative to the
The Constitution also requires that single member district representation that we are used to.
each province should have one
representative.
What is single member district representation?

MISCONCEPTION ABOUT THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION Single member district representation means that every district is separated.
Candidates within a district are going to run against each other, and only one
Some people say that party list representation is sectoral representation. of them will win (the candidate in that district who obtained the highest
Therefore, it should be limited to the so-called marginalized sector. number of votes).

However, this is not how the Constitution understands or sees the party list
system of representation.
The case of Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC says what the party list system actually
is. IT IS A FORM OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION, not sectoral
representation. This is why Atong Paglaum has to repeal and reverse some
earlier decisions.
What is proportionate representation?
You choose the party, you elect the party, and then the party would have the
list of nominees. All votes for all parties would be added. These votes would be
ratioed and proportioned. If Party A’s votes is 20% of the total votes, then Party
A has 20% of the seat. If Party B’s votes is 30% of the total votes, then Party B
has 30% of the seat. This is what proportionate representation is in its real
sense.

SECTION 5(2), ARTICLE VI, 1987 CONSTITUTION However, our party list election law put a cap as to the total number of seats
each party can have. A party can only have a maximum number of 3 seats in
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total

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Congress. Even if Party C’s votes is 50% of the total votes, he will not get 50%
of the seats for parties. Again, the maximum for one party is 3 seats.
This is why some parties break themselves down into allied parties. An example
is the Makabayan Block. Before, they were just Bayan Muna. Afterwards, they
organized into Kabataan, Gabriela, and other parties. All of these parties would
end up becoming successful.
Actually, the cap compromises the proportionality principle in a partylist
system. However, this is what the law says: there is a cap of 3 seats.
Furthermore, before, there was a threshold which requires that a party needs
to have 2% of the votes, in order for them to be entitled to a seat. However,
this has been removed by BANAT v. COMELEC.
Even if a party gets only a few votes, the only requirement is that the 20%
requirement is filled. This is the reason why there are small parties who can
organized, and if they have control over the territory, they will get the required
number of votes. They will then get 1 seat each. This is what distorts the party
list system. This is not the real essence of the proportionate system. [Note
that this is Atty. Guia’s opinion only.]
Suffice it to say, there are two forms of representation that are in effect:
1) House of Representatives representation - 80% membership
2) Party list system of representation - 20% membership
Note that the computation for the 20% membership is not fixed, because it is
computed based on the membership in the House of Representatives.
ARTICLE VI, 1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a
term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon
on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the
House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term
for which he was elected.
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the
Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the
second Monday of May.
Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives,
a special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed
by law, but the Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected
shall serve only for the unexpired term.
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-
list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman.
ARTICLE VII, 1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected by direct vote
of the people for a term of six years which shall begin at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following the day of the election and shall end at noon of the
same date, six years thereafter. The President shall not be eligible for any re-
election. No person who has succeeded as President and has served as such for
more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any
time.
No Vice-President shall serve for more than two successive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of the service for the full term for which he was
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elected.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election for President and Vice-
President shall be held on the second Monday of May.
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by
the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the
certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty
days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of
the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the
Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in
the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but
in case two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of
them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of
both Houses of the Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
Section 10. The Congress shall, at ten o'clock in the morning of the third day
after the vacancy in the offices of the President and Vice-President occurs,
convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call and within seven
days, enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice-
President to be held not earlier than forty-five days nor later than sixty days
from the time of such call. The bill calling such special election shall be deemed
certified under paragraph 2, Section 26, Article V1 of this Constitution and shall
become law upon its approval on third reading by the Congress. Appropriations
for the special election shall be charged against any current appropriations and
shall be exempt from the requirements of paragraph 4, Section 25, Article V1 of
this Constitution. The convening of the Congress cannot be suspended nor the
special election postponed. No special election shall be called if the vacancy
occurs within eighteen months before the date of the next presidential election.
SIMPLE PLURALITY VOTING SYSTEM
➢ Note that June 30 is a fixed date; this is when the term of office ends.
➢ For the President, in France and many other countries, there is a term
called run-off.
○ Run-off means that if no candidate gets 50% of the votes, then
there would be no winner; there will be another election held.
○ This means that a candidate needs to get 50% of the votes so that
he can be elected as President.
➢ Run-off cannot happen in the Philippines.
○ Historically, no Presidential candidate has ever won with 50% of
the votes.
○ In fact, under our Constitution, it says that the person having
the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected as
President.
○ This is the simple plurality voting system.
SUPREME COURT AS THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
➢ The Supreme Court, sitting in En Banc, shall be the sole judge of all
election contests relating to the President and Vice President.
➢ It is called the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
➢ It sits as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, and not necessarily as the
Supreme Court.
RE-ELECTION OF PRESIDENT
➢ Under the Constitution, the President will not be eligible for re-election.
➢ A re-election means to run after your term.
○ In theory, you can skip one term of presidency, and you can run
again. That way, it will not be considered as a re-election. It is
another election in itself.
○ This is the Estrada v. Desierto case. However, this particular
matter was not tackled in substance. It is not as clear yet. Let
us see how this will be interpreted.
○ [Atty. Guia agrees with this view. It is not really a re-election,
but rather, a new election. Thus, this may be something that a
former President can do.]
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 parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections, constitute
Question: Under the Constitution, it says that for sectoral representation, there interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional
can be no seats allocated for religious sectors. However, there is a provision ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in
under the BANGSAMORO law regarding the Ulama. Does this not clash with the addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
prohibition for religious sectors in sectoral representation?
Section 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to
Answer: Let us study this further. Bakit nga ba pagbabawalan ang mga religious the free choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.
sectors, when they are precisely part of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao? [No definite answer] Section 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition
shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as
provided in this Constitution.
PARTY LIST SYSTEM
Section 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the
CLOSED LIST SYSTEM OPEN LIST SYSTEM party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters' registration boards,
boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies.
This is similar to what we have in the This is a system adopted in Indonesia. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with
Philippines. law.
The people will vote for the parties,
There is a list with names, and and they will also vote for the Section 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the
nobody will care who will take the nominee who will take the seat. This election period shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall
seat for the party. The order in the is so the people have a say as well on end thirty days thereafter.
list will determine priority, depending who exactly will take the seat.
on the number of seats that a party Section 10. Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any
becomes entitled to. form of harassment and discrimination.

Section 11. Funds certified by the Commission as necessary to defray the

ARTICLE IX-C, 1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 2 (5). Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must
present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of
the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful
means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are
supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
expenses for holding regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives,
referenda, and recalls, shall be provided in the regular or special appropriations
and, once approved, shall be released automatically upon certification by the
Chairman of the Commission.
➢ Pursuant to a free and open party system, if a person does not believe in
the ideals of two existing parties, then he can create his own party.
➢ The multi-party system is involved now all over the world.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political ARTICLE X, 1987 CONSTITUTION

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Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
Section 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial
elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The voters of
component cities within a province, whose charters contain no such prohibition,
shall not be deprived of their right to vote for elective provincial officials.
ARTICLE XVI, 1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 5 (3). Professionalism in the armed forces and adequate remuneration
and benefits of its members shall be a prime concern of the State. The armed
forces shall be insulated from partisan politics. No member of the military shall
engage, directly or indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote.
Section 5 (4). No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any
time, be appointed or designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations or any of
their subsidiaries.
➢ Special mention here is the strict non-partisanship on the part of the
Armed Forces.
ARTICLE XVIII, 1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution
shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the
President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the Members of the
Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or municipal
councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the
local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June
30, 1992.
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the
highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for
three years.
Section 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters
of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
Section 4. All existing treaties or international agreements which have not been
ratified shall not be renewed or extended without the concurrence of at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
Section 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President
elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of
elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992.
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Section 6. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers
until the first Congress is convened.
Section 7. Until a law is passed, the President may fill by appointment from a
list of nominees by the respective sectors, the seats reserved for sectoral
representation in paragraph (2), Section 5 of Article V1 of this Constitution.
Question: Why are our elections held at the same?
11
Answer: Our Constitution says that elections should be held simultaneously,
unlike in other countries where elections are held at different dates. By
constitutional mandate, our elections should be synchronized. This includes
elections in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.
Question: Regarding Duterte Youth, why are they called “youth” if the members
are all old?
Answer: According to the party list election law of our country, there are
different kinds of parties: national parties, regional parties, and sectoral
parties. If you are a sectoral party representing the youth, the members should
be less than 30 years old. Atty. Guia does not really know the answer to the
question, but here is his input:
The application of Duterte Youth was raffled to our division. Their vote was to
dismiss it outright. However, it was reversed when it reached COMELEC en
banc.
Nagtaka ako kung bakit ni-reverse na nila yung dismissal. Sabi ko, ang rule kasi,
before you can even accredit, there must be a hearing. Ang ginawa namin noon
sa division, we did not conduct a hearing anymore kasi kulang na agad sila ng
requirements at the outset. Thus, we dismissed it outright. Ngayon, sabi ko sa
en banc, at the very least, if they will accredit Duterte Youth, dapat ibalik sila
so that there would be publication and hearing. This means that you publish
their petition and invite everyone who opposed the petition to participate in
the hearing. That did not happen in the case.
In my written opinion, I indicated very clearly that since there was no hearing,
you cannot even accredit them. I think there were just two of us who dissented
in that case, and everything else became publicized. There was also an issue
about the substitution, because the one who was indicated as the nominee was
Cardema’s wife. And then the wife withdrew, and he was substituted by
Cardema.
Hindi talaga malinaw yung rule ng withdrawal. However, my opinion is that
there is a requirement that you need to publish all your nominees. Therefore,
kapag nagpalit ka ng nominee, that also has to be published so that the voters
would know who the nominees are, because that might be a part of the
consideration that the voter would have in choosing your party. However, there
was no publication that happened.
This is what Duterte Youth alleged: it is a YOUTH AND PROFESSIONAL PARTY.
By “professional”, that means any kind of profession. That is what they were
trying to say.
Because Duterte Youth was already accredited, that is no longer an issue. Now,
another thing we will learn is if you can still file a case against them,
questioning their qualification, even though they have already been
proclaimed. There is also a question as to whose jurisdiction the case would
fall under: COMELEC or the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
Pero ako, wala na akong gana. Hindi ko na pinapakinggan masyado because at
the outset, my personal opinion is that Duterte Youth should not have been
even accredited. Walang hearing. That is basic. Even the Constitution says that
there must be a hearing.
MORE MATTERS AS TO REGISTRATION
➢ Registration is necessary under our system.
○ In other countries, you can register even at the time of actual
voting.
○ However, in the Philippines, since there are many procedural
requirements, you have to do it not later than 120 days before
the election. This is the Kabataan Party List case.
➢ Under our Constitution, you have to be a qualified voter in order to
register.
TERM ROUGH DEFINITION AND EXPLANATION FROM ATTY.
GUIA
Registration It is for your name to be included in the list. This list is
the so-called “permanent list of voters in a municipality”.
12
 Thus, your name must be associated with a specific place
of residence.
Precinct This is the basic geographical territory that is used to
organize registered voters.
Precinct is not the place where to go to vote. Precinct is a
unit of territory. For instance, all of the residents of
Tomas Morato belong to one precinct. This is territorial.
Polling place This is the classroom where you vote.
Precinct map When you go and register, you will be asked what your
address is. COMELEC has a precinct map. COMELEC will
then put your name in the right precinct, corresponding
to the place where you reside.
Election When you go and apply for registration, and you will leave
registration board already, that does not necessarily mean that you are
already registered.
There is such a thing called that election registration
board, which is composed of a member of COMELEC as
the Chair, the highest-ranking DEPED official as the Vice-
chair, and the Local Civil Registrar as the Treasurer. Every
municipality has an election registration board.
Under R.A. No. 8189, the maximum number of voters allowed in a precinct is
200.
ELECTION REGISTRATION BOARD
➢ Four times a year (April, July, October, and January), the members of the
election registration board meet to approve the applications for
registration filed within the quarter.
○ Thus, the registration of a person is approved after the meeting
of the board every quarter.
○ There are hearings conducted in certain instances, particularly
when there is an objection to one’s registration.
➢ For example, a person objects, saying “X is not a real resident of Cebu
City.”
○ The election registration board will then decide.
○ Thus, X can now be subject to an INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION CASE.
INCLUSION CASE EXCLUSION CASE
When you are rejected by the When a person is allowed to be
election registration board, then you registered, when he should not be,
file with the Metropolitan Trial Court then you file a petition for exclusion
of the municipality, or the circuit against that person.
covering your municipality, a petition
for inclusion as a voter.
➢ Note that the COMELEC decides election issues, EXCEPT on the right
to vote.
○ Pursuant to this, inclusion and exclusion cases are decided by
the courts, not by COMELEC.
The general principle is that once you are a registered voter, you stay as a
registered voter until you die.
Question: If you fail to vote in two succeeding elections, what will happen to
you?
Answer: Your registration gets deactivated. When you fail to vote twice or when
you become a foreign citizen, your registration also gets deactivated. For
13
deactivated registration, you remain in the list. However, you cannot vote since
your status is that of a deactivated voter.
Question: Why is that your registration becomes deactivated if you fail to vote
in two succeeding elections?
Answer: The system does not know where you are. You might already be dead.
Question: How will COMELEC know if a person is already dead, so that they can
cancel his registration?
Answer: The Local Civil Registrar has a record of deaths, and even marriage. It
has records of any status of any person. However, the problem arises when you
do not die in the place where you are born. That would become difficult. Thus,
there is a memorandum of agreement between COMELEC and the Philippine
Statistics Authority, saying that the Philippine Statistics Authority should
regularly give COMELEC lists of those who have already passed away. Usually,
this is where complaints arise: why are there people still on the list, when they
are already dead?
Question: In registration, as long as there is no one complaining about the
registration, will that be approved? Can a person say that he lives in this
particular place, even though he does not, and his registration is approved, as
long as there is no one complaining?
Answer: Theoretically, yes you can do that. In the registration procedure (based
on the implementing guidelines of COMELEC), if you go to an election officer’s
office to register, you need to present a government-issued ID. Right from start,
COMELEC is already “filtering” those who are qualified to register from those
who are not. Atty. Guia personally challenges this: can they refuse me from
applying to register if I did not bring an ID? Atty. Guia believes that he cannot
be refused from applying, because anyone can apply. He can only be
disqualified after hearing of the court.
Furthermore, COMELEC’s system is that you will be entered into the biometrics
system, because when you go to register, they get your biometrics on the
assumption that you are qualified to vote. For Atty. Guia, at this point, a person
cannot be refused to apply for registration.
For example, X is claimed to be a resident of Papua New Guinea. When it comes
to the election registration board meeting, the election officer can say that they
should send X a letter, asking him to prove that he lives in the Philippines and
not Papua New Guinea. X will then be heard.
Question: Will COMELEC still issue an ID?
Answer: COMELEC suspended the production of ID because of the national ID
system. There might be a program that would combine all the IDs. However,
the requirement for the ID should be tamper-proof.
Usually, what happens is that you go to COMELEC and you ask for certification
that you are a registered voter.
Note that the ID is not a requirement for voting. We think that ID is just
something that you need in activities that are not related to election. However,
the law says that every voter should have an ID.
Other important notes and possible exam questions from this lecture:
1) Plus points for being registered voters
2) Computation for party lists
14
 December 16, 2020 ○ They register political parties; note that the word used here is
“register”, and not merely “regulate”.
○ By using the word “register”, this means that forming political
THE POWERS AND MANDATE OF COMELEC parties is a right; there is no criteria when a political party
becomes a political party.
○ Technically, all the COMELEC should do is to check off all the
requirements.
○ If the requirements are complete, then it becomes the duty of
COMELEC to register political parties.
➢ Accept and record certificates of candidacies
➢ Campaign and campaign finance law enforcement
➢ Regulate franchises for fair elections
○ COMELEC makes sure that television stations and print media
conform with election law.
○ COMELEC also has power over transportation franchises.
➢ Deputize government agencies when it finds it necessary, including the
Armed Forces of the Philippines

➢ Manage voter registration Side note from Atty. Guia: Technically, when COMELEC exercises its mandate
○ The one who sees if an applicant for registration is qualified to be and powers well, then it could be the most powerful agency during the election
registered or not is the election registration board. period. This is because it can do all these in the name of free and fair election.
○ However, the one who really manages the list of registered voters
would be the COMELEC, particularly the different election offices ➢ Investigate and prosecute election offenses
in the country. ○ COMELEC must have its own power or the capacity to investigate
○ COMELEC is one of the agencies in the government that has a and it can prosecute criminal violations of election laws.
presence in each of the 1,700 municipalities in the country. This
➢ Supervise voting, counting and result tabulation
means that COMELEC has employees in every city and municipality
➢ Proclaims election winners
in the country.
○ This is done through COMELEC’s Board of Canvassers or through
the COMELEC en banc, in the case of Senate and party lists.
ELECTION REGISTRATION BOARD COMELEC ○ The only position not proclaimed by the COMELEC are the winning
Presidential and Vice-presidential candidates.
Sees if an applicant for registration is Manages the list of registered voters
○ The entity that proclaims the winner for those positions, under
qualified to be registered or not
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, is the Congress in joint session
assembled.
➢ Prepare for elections
➢ Register political parties
15
 TWO FUNCTIONS OR POWERS OF COMELEC
THE RIGHT TO VOTE

ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL

Administer and manage election Decide election disputes

KINDS OF DISPUTES COMELEC CAN DECIDE ON

➢ COMELEC can decide on:

1) Political party disputes;
2) Disqualification of candidates;
3) Disputes pertaining to conduct of elections; and
4) Post-election contests.
➢ Disputes pertaining to the conduct of elections are those questions
whether there was a valid election conducted.
○ Note that the issue of the validity of the election is different from
the issue on the correctness of the count of votes. ➢ Internationally recognized as a human right
➢ It is post-election disputes that have something to do with the correctness ○ The right to vote is internationally recognized as a human right.
of the count. ○ It forms part of the dignity of the human being to be able to
○ The power to hear and decide election disputes is usually vested participate in the government of his country.
in COMELEC and the courts, depending on the position. ○ If you cannot vote, or if you are deprived or not given access to
○ This happens after the presumptive winner shall have been the facilities of voting, then there is somehow a deprivation of
proclaimed. your right as a human being.
○ This is the essence of what we are talking about in Election Law
and the Law on Public Officers.

➢ Necessity of registration
○ Although the Constitution already identifies who are entitled to
the right of suffrage, there is a requirement that those who are
qualified must register.
○ There is a need for registration because there must be some kind
of system to ensure that only those who are qualified to vote can
vote.
○ Likewise, for those who are qualified to vote, each of them can
only vote once.

16
 ○ Registration is an anti-fraud mechanism that is supposed to ensure
the integrity of the electoral process.
○ The basic principle there is that you are registered once and you
can only vote once.
○ This necessarily includes that no qualified person should be unduly
refused the right to vote.
➢ Qualifications
○ Under R.A. No. 8189, there is a reiteration of all the qualifications
under Article V of the 1987 Constitution.
○ For some of the requirements, the reference point is the day of
the election.
■ For example, this means that those who can register by
the end of the registration period are those who will turn
18 years old by May 9, 2022 (this is the day of the
elections; second Monday of May).
■ The same goes for the residency requirement: the
reference point is the day of the election.
LOCAL REGISTRATION
Question: What happens to a locally registered voter?
Answer: He is assigned to a precinct. To reiterate, a precinct refers to how
registered voters are organized. It is a geographical classification: where you
live or reside. The number of voters per precinct is 200.
THIS PART IS IMPORTANT: Under R.A. No. 8189, there are precinct numbers.
Example is 25A, 26A, 27A. It is also possible to see a precinct that says 26B.
The “B” in 26B means that it had already exceeded 200. The requirement of
R.A. No. 8189 is that when it already exceeded, then there is another precinct
created, thus, it becomes “B”. When it reaches 200 again, then it becomes “C”.
This is how precincts work.
What happens is that the digit (which is 26) represents the locality.
If it is 27A, then that means it is a different locality already. Thus, it is not the
same group of residents involved. On the other hand, if it is 26A at 26B, then
that refers to the same locality (although it is “A” and “B”, it is still “26”).
When you go to vote, you may see a precinct that says 26A-B or 26A-26B. This
means that it has been clustered or joined together. This is because for
example, the excess is just 3 (meaning, 203 people), then they would just join
those excess of 3 people to the first 200. It would not be practical to create a
new classroom or a new set of ballot boxes just for those 3 people.
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION
➢ Your application for registration becomes your voter registration record
(VRR), if it is approved by the election registration board.
➢ Those approved applications for registrations are compiled.
➢ Once compiled, they are arranged alphabetically per precinct.
➢ This compilation is called the precinct book of voters.
VOTER REGISTRATION RECORD (VRR) PRECINCT BOOK OF VOTERS
17
 One’s application for registration Compilation of voter registration However, take note that if you vote
records abroad, you can only vote for:
1) President;
➢ And then you are supposed to be issued Voter’s ID. 2) Vice-President;
3) Senators; and
➢ Furthermore, because of the amendment provided by R.A. No. 10037, all
4) Party List
registered voters must supply their biometrics information.
○ Biometrics is identification coming from your body.
○ At this point, what our biometrics can handle are the fingerprint REGISTRATION PROCESS
and the photo.
➢ For absentee voters, they will not vote in the Philippines, but in a foreign
country.
○ They can be initially registered locally or abroad.

REGISTERED LOCALLY (IN THE REGISTERED ABROAD

PHILIPPINES)

When they are registered in the
Philippines, then they go abroad and
decide they want to vote there, then
you have to apply to be included in
the certified list of overseas
absentee voters (CLOAV).
Dual citizens can now vote because of
R.A. No. 9225 (Dual Citizenship Law).
When they are registered abroad,
there is a national registry of
overseas absentee voters there.
For dual citizens, they are already
registered for the first time abroad.
However, a person has to inform
COMELEC whenever he is going to
vote in the place where he is
registered abroad.
It is also allowed that if you are
abroad, and you voted abroad in the
past elections, and then you would
vote locally because you already
returned home.
➢ Central file
○ There is a book of voters for each election office at the municipal
level.
○ There are officially two other copies of the printed copy:
1) One goes to the provincial election supervisor; and
2) Another goes to the national central file in COMELEC
Manila.
○ R.A. No. 8189 also requires the computerization or putting in a
digital database the list of voters.
■ Objective: To sort the database and use the database to
determine multiple registration, not only locally but
nationally.

18
 knowing the difference between the two.

CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOTERS

Question: What does COMELEC prepare on election day?

➢ There are instances when a person is already registered, and he wants to

Answer: Note that on election day, there are already voters. Looking back, way
transfer to another municipality.
before the election, there is a term called “sealing” of the voters list. Once
○ For example, transferring from Cebu to Manila; or within Quezon
sealed, a person can no longer be added to that list. Only the names on the list
City, transferring from Fairview to Kamuning
can be used basis as to who can vote in the precinct or cluster precinct.
➢ What do you have to do?
○ You just have to go to COMELEC and you have to tell them that
TWO KINDS OF LIST GENERATED FOR PURPOSES OF ELECTION you are transferring residence, and that you are going to be in
your new residence six months before the day of the election.
○ Otherwise, if you do transfer residences, then you become an
ELECTION DAY COMPUTERIZED POSTED COMPUTERIZED VOTERS LIST
illegal voter in the precinct of your former residence.
VOTERS LIST (EDCVL) (PCVL)

This is the list on the electoral This is the list posted outside the DEACTIVATION OF REACTIVATION OF CANCELLATION OF
boards. classroom, or outside the school when REGISTRATION REGISTRATION REGISTRATION
you are about to enter the polling
place. Deactivation of However, you can For cancellation of
registration means that reactivate. registration, this means
you will not be allowed that a person is already
THIS IS IMPORTANT: Know the distinction between precinct and polling For example, the reason dead.
to vote in a particular
place. Atty. Guia will not accept that you became his student without for having been
election.

19
 deactivated is that you
Example: You have not were not able to vote ➢ For those wrongfully denied for registration, you have the petition for
voted for two twice. In that case, you inclusion as a remedy.
succeeding elections, or can just go back to ➢ Those who are granted wrongfully registered exclusion.
you have become a COMELEC and say, “I am ➢ Atty. Guia’s example:
citizen of another still here. I am still ○ Before, one of their few cases as election lawyers was to file an
country, or you were alive.” exclusion proceeding against some voters registered for a
convicted of a crime All you have to do is to particular precinct in Metro manila.
that carries with it execute an affidavit of ○ There were formerly informal settlers of a barangay in Quezon
deprivation of the right reactivation. That way, City, but they were given housing in Antipolo. Their names were
of suffrage, or you you become an active not removed from the list in Quezon City.
became insane because voter again. ○ In this case, the remedy is a petition for inclusion. The petition
you were not able to should be for every precinct.
survive this class - in Note that you are not ○ The respondent should include their election registration board.
these cases, your really removed from This is because it is the election registration board, and not the
registration will be the voter’s list. You are COMELEC, which decides on the application for registration.
deactivated. just reactivated.
Question: In the above example, how did those informal settlers be notified
WRONGFULLY DENIED OR GRANTED REGISTRATION that they are already excluded from the list of registered voters of Quezon City?

Answer: Of course, this is pursuant to due process. If there is a petition for

exclusion against them, they have to be notified. They also have to respond,
meaning, they have to file their answer to the petition.

The challenge is if they do not respond. In that case, there is a procedure to

follow when a respondent does not respond. What will happen is that the lawyer
filing the petition for exclusion will look at the place where the respondent is
being excluded from, and check if he really has residence or not.

PETITION FOR INCLUSION
Remedy for those wrongfully denied
for registration
own initiative
➢ Exclusion proceedings can also be initiated moto propriu by the COMELEC.
○ Thus, a person can go to COMELEC and complain there.
○ The COMELEC would then have to investigate on its own, and find
out if in fact, there are no voters there anymore.
PETITION FOR EXCLUSION
○ Due process will always have to be observed.
Remedy against those wrongfully
granted registration

20
Example from Atty. Guia:
In Bulacan, a group of people live in Municipality A. Their house is in
MUnicipality A. However, they also have an address in Municipality B because
the mayor there gives sacks of rice.
This is a problematic thing. In a way, you want to give them the right of
suffrage. However, it is wrong for them to vote for the mayor in a place that
they are no longer residents of. They do not have an interest in the place
anymore.
The concept of resident are different between:
1) For voting; and
2) For being qualified to run as a candidate.
If a person will vote for President, Vice President, Senators, and other national
positions, then there would be no problem. Wherever you are, you can vote for
national positions. However, you can only vote for local positions where you
are resident of. That is the middle ground.
Question: With regard to the issue of residency, would that mean that the
possible remedy for the voter is to change resident from the place where he
lives, to the place where he has interest?
Answer: No, the law says “resident”. It still has to be the place where you are
a resident of: where you are habitually found, where you sleep, where you
identify yourself with, etc. That is the rule. For example, you cannot say that
you are a resident of the place where you work. When you are away because of
work or school, you are not deemed to have a new residence.
However, sometimes, these rules are relaxed; for example, for students who
live in the dorm. You always have to consider the definition of “residence” under
our legal framework: where you actually live.
One of the committees I handled when I was in COMELEC is the voting of those
persons deprived of liberty, or the detention prisoners. Prisoners are only
deprived of their right to vote when they are convicted. That is the only time
that they can no longer vote or they will not be allowed to vote. However, if
they are detained simply because they have pending cases, they still retain
their right to vote.
For these detained (but not yet convicted) prisoners, the place where they
are detained is NOT their place of residence. This is because they do not have
the intent to return there (to detention); that would be absurd.
However, to be able to have them registered so they can vote, there is a
requirement of residency of at least 6 months prior to election day. Thus,
nevertheless, they are considered residents of their jail facility. This is an
example of a way that the term “residence” is relaxed. The overriding
objective is to be more inclusive in their exercise of their right to vote.
However, of course, they should not be allowed to vote twice.
Input of Atty. Guia as to his daughter’s thesis:
My daughter is doing a thesis on the issue of insanity and incompetence as
declared by competent authority as prohibitions on the right to vote. His
daughter is arguing that it may not be constitutional to prohibit the insane and
incompetent to vote because that would violate our treaty obligations with the
ICCPR. In other countries, there is no such prohibition. In the United States of
america, even convicts are allowed to vote, because of the principle of
universality of the right of suffrage.
Nevertheless, even general comments on the ICCPR allow for reasonable
prohibitions on the right to vote. For our country, those who are not allowed
to vote are listed under R.A. No. 8189.
VOTERS AND CANDIDATES
➢ The voters are the first stakeholders of the election.
➢ It then follows that there would be no election if there would be no
candidates.
21
 ➢ However, election is actually for those who will vote more than it is for
the candidate.
○ Election is a mechanism for the people to be able to participate
in government.
➢ The right of suffrage is not only the right to vote, but the right to stand
for election.
➢ However, there has to be some qualification for those who will be allowed
to run for elections.
○ The most acceptable qualifications all over the world is
citizenship: You would want your candidate, or public officers to
be citizens of the country, and that is a reasonable qualification.
○ As to the age, you would want someone capable.
○ As to the residence, you would want those who are familiar with
the constituency before they are allowed to run.
➢ The qualifications of the candidates are listed in the Constitution for the
Senate and the House of Representatives.
ARTICLE VI, 1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age,
able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for
not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.
Section 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless
he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is
at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-
list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election.
➢ For the President and the Vice-President, you have the Constitution and
R.A. No. 7160 (Local Government Code).
ARTICLE VII, 1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least
forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines
for at least ten years immediately preceding such election.
R.A. NO. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE)
Section 39. Qualifications. -
(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered
voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice-governor, or member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-mayor or member of the sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of
age on election day.
(c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice-mayor of independent
component cities, component cities, or municipalities must be at least twenty-
one (21) years of age on election day.
(d) Candidates for the position of member of the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the
sangguniang barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election
day.
(f) Candidates for the sangguniang kabataan must be at least fifteen (15) years
of age but not more than twenty-one (21) years of age on election day.
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude
or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within
two (2) years after serving sentence;
22
 (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the
Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the
right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the
effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Question: Can a dual citizen be a candidate in the Philippines?
Answer: NO, A DUAL CANNOT BE CANDIDATE IN THE PHILIPPINES.
This is under R.A. No. 9225. Dual citizens can vote, but they cannot be a
candidate. Dual citizens have to renounce their foreign citizenship in order to
run for elections. There is a procedure for this: the renunciation and oath of
affirmation, and subsequent acts.
Example: If you use your foreign passport, it would appear as if you renounced
your renunciation. This is the case of Maquiling v. COMELEC.
CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY AND THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD
➢ A candidate is one who filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC).
○ A person can declare all he wants that he is a candidate, but if he
has not filed his CoC, then he is not a candidate.
○ The filing of a CoC is a person’s formal announcement that he is
running for public office.
➢ Way before, when elections were still conducted manually, the deadline
for filing for CoC is pegged at the day before the first day of campaign.
➢ However, now that the elections are automated, because of technology
issues, COMELEC, under the Automated Law, was given the power to
change or adjust the schedules provided by law.
○ One of those periods adjusted is for the filing of CoCs.
○ The period for filing CoCs is usually fixed in October prior to the
election year. However, the campaign period starts 45 days before
election.
○ Thus, when you file a CoC, technically you should have been a
candidate already as early as October.
However, while Congress gave COMELEC the authority to adjust the
schedule, the effectivity of the application of all criminal offenses is only AT
THE START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD.
Thus, even if a person already announced to the whole world that he is a
candidate, he will not be considered to be violating any election rules or
campaign rules because the law itself says that any violations will only start at
the start of the campaign period. This is the case Penera v. COMELEC.
➢ Again, a CoC is an announcement to the whole world that you are running
as candidate for a particular position. The rules that govern the CoC are
under the Omnibus Election Code (Sections 66 and 73 to 76) and R.A. No.
7166 (Section 7)
B.P. BLG. 881 (OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE)
Section 66. Candidates holding appointive office or positions. - Any person
holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-
owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 73. Certificate of candidacy. - No person shall be eligible for any
elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the
period fixed herein.
23
A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election,
withdraw the same by submitting to the office concerned a written declaration
under oath.
However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of candidacy may
declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the
certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.
The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever
civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office
stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political
party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he
will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are
true to the best of his knowledge.
Unless a candidate has officially changed his name through a court approved
proceeding, a certificate shall use in a certificate of candidacy the name by
which he has been baptized, or if has not been baptized in any church or
religion, the name registered in the office of the local civil registrar or any other
name allowed under the provisions of existing law or, in the case of a Muslim,
his Hadji name after performing the prescribed religious pilgrimage: Provided,
That when there are two or more candidates for an office with the same name
and surname, each candidate, upon being made aware or such fact, shall state
his paternal and maternal surname, except the incumbent who may continue to
use the name and surname stated in his certificate of candidacy when he was
elected. He may also include one nickname or stage name by which he is
generally or popularly known in the locality.
The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph,
passport size; a statement in duplicate containing his bio-data and program of
government not exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.
Section 75. Filing and distribution of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate
of candidacy shall be filed on any day from the commencement of the election
period but not later than the day before the beginning of the campaign period:
Provided, That in cases of postponement or failure of election under Sections 5
and 6 hereof, no additional certificate of candidacy shall be accepted except in
cases of substitution of candidates as provided under Section 77 hereof.
The certificates of candidacy for President and Vice-President of the Philippines
shall be filed in ten legible copies with the Commission which shall order the
printing of copies thereof for distribution to all polling places. The certificates
of candidacy for the other offices shall be filed in duplicate with the offices
herein below mentioned, together with a number of clearly legible copies equal
to twice the number of polling places in the province, city, district, municipality
or barangay, as the case may be:
(a) For representative in the Batasang Pambansa, with the Commission, the
provincial election supervisor, city election registrar in case of highly urbanized
cities, or an officer designated by the Commission having jurisdiction over the
province, city or representative district who shall send copies thereof to all
polling places in the province, city or district;
(b) For provincial offices, with the provincial election supervisor of the province
concerned who shall send copies thereof to all polling places in the province;
(c) For city and municipal offices, with the city or municipal election registrar
who shall send copies thereof to all polling places in the city or municipality;
and
(d) For punong barangay or kagawad ng sangguniang barangay, the certificates
of candidacy shall be filed in accordance with the provisions of Section 39 of
24
Article VI of this Code.
The duly authorized receiving officer shall immediately send the original copy
of all certificates of candidacy received by him to the Commission.
Section 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. - The
Commission, provincial election supervisor, election registrar or officer
designated by the Commission or the board of election inspectors under the
succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge
receipt of the certificate of candidacy.
R.A. NO. 7166
Section 7. Filing of Certificates of Candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy of
any person running for the office of President, Vice-President, Senator, Member
of the House of Representatives or any elective provincial, city or municipal
official shall be filed in five (5) legible copies with the offices of the Commission
specified hereunder not later than the day before the date legally fixed for the
beginning of his campaign period.
(a) The certificate of candidacy for President, Vice-President and Senators shall
be filed with the main office of the Commission in Manila;
(b) The certificate of candidacy for the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be filed with the provincial election supervisor of the
province concerned. Those for legislative districts in the National Capital Region
shall be filed with the regional election director of said region and those for
legislative districts in cities outside the National Capital Region which comprise
one or more legislative districts shall be filed with the city election registrar
concerned;
(c) The certificate of candidacy for provincial offices shall be filed with the
provincial supervisor concerned; and
(d) The certificate of candidacy for city or municipal offices shall be filed with
the city or municipal election registrar concerned.
Whenever practicable, the names of registered candidates for local positions
shall be printed in the election returns: Provided, That, if a candidate has been
disqualified or declared a nuisance candidate, it shall be the duty of the
Commission to instruct without delay the appropriate election officials to delete
the name of said candidate as printed in the election return.
The certificate of candidacy shall be filed by the candidate personally or by his
duly authorized representative. No certificate of candidacy shall be filed or
accepted by mail, telegram or facsimile.
PROPER REMEDY
What happens if a person turns out to be unqualified?
The Constitution says that any contest involving qualifications of municipal
candidates will be under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts.
Thus, you do not file before the COMELEC a petition for disqualification, based
on the ineligibility of the candidate. This is the case of Fermin v. COMELEC.
B.P. BLG. 881 (OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE)
Section 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in
which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of,
or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution
prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections
80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant
to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under
this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
25
provided for in the election laws.
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
PETITION UNDER SECTION 78 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE (PETITION TO
DENY DUE COURSE OR TO CANCEL A CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY)
➢ When the ground used as basis is Article VI or VII of the 1987
Constitution, or Section 39 of R.A. No. 7160, then you cannot file a
petition for disqualification.
○ This is because the qualification or eligibility of the candidate
should be questioned before the courts.
➢ In that case, what should be filed is a petition under Section 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
○ This is a petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate
of candidacy.
➢ This is on account of a false representation of a material fact in the
certificate of candidacy; there is something not true in the CoC.
○ In this petition, it is not about the eligibility of the candidate
itself, but rather, the fact that there was something false in
the CoC.
➢ An example is the case of Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC.
○ Imelda Romualdez-Marcos claims that she is a resident of Palo,
Leyte, therefore, she can run for Congresswoman for that place.
○ However, everyone knew that in 1990, she was either in San
Juan, Ilocos, where the family of the Marcoses are.
○ The case filed against her was a petition to deny due course her
CoC, because of misrepresentation of a material fact.
➢ Another example is the case of Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC.
○ A petition to deny due course the COC of Grace Poe was filed,
because it was claimed that she is not a natural-born citizen.
○ However, this is incorrect, because it was not her eligibility per
se that must be questioned with a petition to deny due course.
○ For a petition to deny due due course, what is involved is
false representation of a material fact in a CoC; the fact
falsely represented must be material to the eligibility of the
office.
○ For example, if you say, “he is not a real lawyer” - that is not a
proper ground to file a petition under Section 78, because this
is not a material fact.
PETITION UNDER SECTION 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE (PETITION
FOR DISQUALIFICATION)
➢ However, when the petition has to do with Section 40 of R.A. No. 7160,
then what can be filed is a petition for disqualification under Section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code.
○ However, under Section 40, you have to indicate in your petition
that you are using those grounds.
○ This is because Section 40 refers to local candidates.
➢ If the position refers to President, Vice-President, Senators or
Congressmen (national positions), usually the only available remedy
before the election would be a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
○ In that case, jurisdiction would fall on COMELEC, because at
that point, they are still just candidates.
PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE OR PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION
TO CANCEL A COC (SECTION 68 OF THE OMNIBUS
(SECTION 78 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE)
ELECTION CODE)
Ground used as basis: Ground used as basis is Section 40 of
1) Article VI of the 1987 R.A. No. 7160 (local officials)
26
 Constitution (Senators and The grounds under Section 40 of R.A.
Congressmen); No. 7160 must be invoked and alleged PETITION UNDER SECTION 69 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE (PETITION TO
2) Article VII of the 1987 in the petition. These grounds DECLARE A CANDIDATE AS A NUISANCE CANDIDATE)
Constitution (President); and particularly apply for local officials.
3) Section 39 of R.A. No. 7160 NUISANCE CANDIDATE is one without any bona fide intention to run.
(local officials).
However, note that a person has the right to file his CoC (as long as he has the
What is being questioned here is not qualifications). Thus, this is a gray area. It is difficult to interpret. Still, there
really the qualification of eligibility of would be some operational issues if you allow just anyone to run. If you see that
the candidate; rather, it is a false the intention of a person’s candidacy is to put the election in mockery and
representation in the CoC, in which disrepute, then he is considered a nuisance candidate.
the fact falsely represented is
material to the eligibility of the
➢ Sample case: Dela Cruz v. People
office.
○ Prior to the automated election, the ballot we had was blank, and
then the voter would write the names of those candidates he
➢ Scenario: A petition under Section 78 is filed against X, a candidate, would vote for.
before the election. However, COMELEC failed to decide on it. Election ○ On the other hand, under the automated election, the names of
then took place without the COMELEC deciding on the petition. X won. the candidates are already printed, and then the voter simply
➢ In that case, the implication is that COMELEC can suspend the shades the circle opposite the names of the candidates he would
proclamation of X, if the evidence is strong as to the material vote for.
misrepresentation of his ineligibility. ○ Scenario: Two candidates with the same surname (Geom
➢ One element of material misrepresentation is that there should be an Gonzales and Celina Gonzales) both run for President.
intent to deceive the public that you are qualified. ■ During the manual election, when you simply write
➢ Otherwise, without such intent to deceive, it is not a misrepresentation if “Gonzales”, you would not know who was voted for; is it
you do not have intent to deceive. This is the essence of Romualdez- Geom or Celina?
Marcos v. COMELEC. ■ However, now, under the automated election, the names
“Geom Gonzales” and “Celina Gonzales” are already
B.P. BLG. 881 (OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE) printed; thus, you can already distinguish them.
○ However, in Dela Cruz v. People, the Supreme Court ruled that
Section 69. Nuisance candidates. - The Commission may motu proprio or upon
a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel when one of these two candidates becomes a nuisance candidate
a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to (for example, Geom becomes a nuisance candidate), then the
put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among votes for Geom would be counted for Celina.
the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona ➢ Subsequent cases: Santos v. People and Zapanta v. People
fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has
○ Scenario: Two candidates with the same surname (Geom Gonzales
been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the
electorate. and Celina Gonzales) both run for President.

27
 ○ In Santos and Zapanta, it was ruled that if the above scenario
Petition to deny Petition for Petition to Petition for
happens, ideally, Geom should not be considered to have been a due course or to disqualification declare a substitution
candidate. cancel a candidate as a
○ However, his name is already printed on the ballot. Thus, Geom certificate of nuisance
was already included in the system, and one cannot just easily candidacy candidate
reconfigure the system that late in time.
Section 78 of the Section 68 of the Section 69 of the Section 77 of the
○ Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that if the above scenario happens,
Omnibus Election Omnibus Election Omnibus Election Omnibus Election
the votes in the ballot will be counted manually, so that they will Code Code Code Code
be able to see the votes for Geom and the votes for Celina. That
way, the votes for Geom (the nuisance candidate) will not
automatically be counted for Celina (the legitimate candidate). Question: If a person’s CoC is denied because of financial reasons, is that based
on the ground that he is a nuisance candidate?
SUBSTITUTION OF A CANDIDATE
Answer: Yes, in that case, there can be no other ground other than nuisance
B.P. BLG. 881 (OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE) candidacy.

Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of
another. - If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an
official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws
or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the
same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate
who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by
the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office
affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of
the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur
between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said
certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political
subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted
for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
➢ Section 77 talks aboutthe rule on substitution: the event that a candidate
withdraws, becomes disqualified, dies, or becomes incapacitated.
➢ This provision is different from the substitution in a party list (like
Cardema for Duterte Youth).
REVIEW ON ACTIONS AND PROVISIONS
However, the COMELEC cannot disqualify someone solely because of his lack
of capacity to finance a nationwide campaign. This is the case of Marquez v.
COMELEC. It becomes a property qualification if you do not allow someone who
appears to be poor or does not have the resources to run.
➢ Sample case: Pamatong v. COMELEC
○ There were about 80 to 100 candidates whose names appeared in
the ballot for President; while 130 for Senators.
○ All of these people have the right to run for office, as long as they
have the qualifications.
○ Thus, the COMELEC looks at the bona fide intention to run.
■ Bona fide intention means that you are a candidate and
you have a platform. You have the capacity.
■ However, capacity to run is not measured merely by
personal financial capacity; you can have a nationwide
organization.
■ Even if you do not have money, you can have followers,
which can make you be seen as a serious candidate.
○ Again, there are so many candidates, and there is a requirement
that you need to have hearing, and thus, you need to notify each
and every one.
28
 ○ You cannot disqualify them right away. You need to have a
count who was proclaimed the winner
hearing.
○ Atty. Guia’s input: Sometimes, the hearings in COMELEC becaus
of these candidates become a joke. And those who have chances JURISDICTION OVER ELECTION CONTESTS
of winning might not be as capable as those who have been
deprived. That is the sorry state of our electoral system.
COURTS OF LIMITED REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMELEC
JURISDICTION
Question: When does the courts have jurisdiction, and when does the COMELEC (Municipal Trial Court,
have jurisdiction, when it comes to petitions to deny due course? Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Municipal Court
in Cities, etc.)
Answer: Everything that happens during the election (meaning, from the
start of the candidacy up to the proclamation of the winner), COMELEC is the Officials in the barangay Municipal officers City officials and
one with jurisdiction. Thus, petition to deny due course is a COMELEC level (Mayor, Vice-Mayor and provincial officials
dispute. Again, this is under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Councilors)

For the Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court, House of

Representatives Electoral Tribunal, Presidential Electoral Tribunal, and even
COMELEC, these are post-election remedies (meaning, after the winning ➢ The decisions of the RTC and the MTC in the protest under their
candidate has already been proclaimed). This is called an election protest. jurisdiction are appealable to the COMELEC, and not the Court of
Appeals.

JURISDICTION OF ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS

COMELEC MTC, RTC, HRET, PET, COMELEC

Disputes during the election (from the
start of candidacy up to the
proclamation of the winner);
EVERYTHING BEFORE
PROCLAMATION
TWO KINDS OF ELECTION CONTESTS
HRET SET PET
Post-election disputes (after the
Members of the House of Senators President and Vice-
winning candidate has already been Representatives President
proclaimed); EVERYTHING AFTER
PROCLAMATION
➢ The HRET, SET and PET have their own rules of procedure.
➢ COMELEC has its COMELEC Resolution.
➢ The Supreme Court also prescribed rules for MTCs and RTCs in hearing
election protests.

ELECTION PROTEST QUO WARRANTO POLITICAL PARTIES

The issue is the correctness of the The issue is the eligibility of the one

29
 ➢ This distinction is actually used by COMELEC in accrediting those who will
join the party-list system representation, and those who would ask for
registration or accreditation either as regional party or a local party.
○ A regional or local party’s area of concern would only be limited
to a particular geographical territory.

NATIONAL PARTY REGIONAL PARTY SECTORAL PARTY

The constituency Majority of the The principal advocacy

spreads in the majority provinces and cities in of a party pertains to a
of the country the region particular sector

➢ Parties can coalist and they can join together electorally.

➢ Two parties can come up with a coalition agreement, and then seek
COMELEC to recognize the coalition.
➢ That way, COMELEC will recognize the coalition as one political entity
POLITICAL PARTY is an organized group of persons having the same ideology,
for purposes of that particular election.
political ideas, platforms, principles, and policies for the general conduct of the
governments, which regularly nominates and supports its leaders and members
as candidates for office. It should have its ideas, platform, principles, and COALITION under our election law pertains to a coalition for purposes of
ideologies. election. Of course, there is going to be a coalition even after the election, but
that is more like alignment of their programs in government.
For example, there are coalitions in the House of Representatives and the
The following may not be registered as political parties by COMELEC:
Senate, in which the purpose is to determine which becomes the majority party
1) Parties that advocate violence;
and which becomes the minority party.
2) Parties that are actually religious denominations; and
3) Parties that will not support the Constitution.
Other important notes and possible exam questions from this lecture:
➢ Again, the power of COMELEC is to register political parties. 1) Precinct v. Polling place
➢ This means that when there is a group of people who have the same ideals,
then they can nominate a candidate. They then acquire juridical
personality when they register before the COMELEC.

DISTINCTION OF PARTY LISTS

➢ The Party List System Act of 1995 distinguishes between a national party,
a regional party, and a sectoral party.

30
 December 18, 2020
PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION
➢ The party list system of representation can be found in R.A. No. 7941.
➢ The party list system of representation actually offers an alternative way
of representation.
➢ Note that the key jurisprudence here are:
1) Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC;
2) BANAT Party List v. COMELEC; and
3) Abang Lingkod v. COMELEC.
➢ While the party list system of representation is intended for the
marginalized sectors of society, in order to empower them, it is not a
reserved seat system.
Question: What is a reserved system in Congress?
Answer: This means that a portion of the legislature cannot be occupied,
except by those belonging to a particular sector or group of people.
MISCONCEPTION ABOUT THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION
The party list system representation, contrary to the initial perception that it is
reserved for marginalized sectors, is really an alternative way of
representation.
This is the same with the United States and Britain. Their Congress is filled in
such a way that you divide the entire country into different constituencies or
districts, and then each and every district would be represented by a
representative.
Usually, there is a political party. The rule is that the one who obtains the most
number of votes, no matter how few the votes, gets to be the party list
representative of that district.
Scenario: Assume that a country has a two-party system. There is a 100-person
House of Representatives or Parliament. In each district, Party A won, obtaining
51% of the votes. On the other hand, Party B received 49% of the votes.
1) Who will sit in the House of Representatives or in the Parliament?
a) The candidate of Party A
2) How many in the 100-seat House of Representatives or Parliament will
come from Party A?
a) All of the districts would be represented by Party A
3) How many representatives will be coming from Party B?
a) None
This example shows the first-past-the-post single member district system that
we are familiar with.
However, looking at this example, you will realize that 49% of the population
(voters of Party B) would not have a representative. That is a very substantial
portion of the population. This is the reason why other countries have a different
electoral system design: THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEM.
THE PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION SYSTEM
➢ The proportional representation system, which is an alternative to first-
past-the-post single member district system, is supposed to put
representatives in Congress in accordance with the proportion of the
votes that they obtain.
➢ Thus, in a country which observes a 100-seat parliament, if you obtain
even just 1% of the votes, you will be entitled to 1 seat.
○ This is what is observed in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao.
○ They have a 40-seat system, and thus, you need to get 2.5% of
the total votes in order to be entitled to 1 seat.
○ 1 / 40 = 0.025 = 2.5%
➢ The proportional representation system is NOT A RESERVED SEAT
SYSTEM; it is not reserved for any particular sector.
31

➢ It is for the marginalized, but what it means is that it is theoretically
easier for the marginalized to win in an election under a proportional
representation system, than it is for them to win in a single member
district representation.
➢ In a proportional representation system, you vote for a party, and not an
individual.
➢ The party then has a list of nominees, who shall be the ones to sit in the
House of Representatives, depending on the number of seats that the
party is entitled to, based on the votes it obtained.
➢ Again, this is the principle of proportional representation system.
➢ Under the Constitution, the term “party list” has a technical term taken
from other countries and jurisdictions, which already had party list
systems since the 1800s.
○ Also, the reason why it is called “party list” is because there is a
list of nominees.
ARTICLE VI, 1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who,
as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total
number of representatives including those under the party list. For three
consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the
seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law,
except the religious sector.
PROBLEM ABOUT OUR PARTY LIST SYSTEM OF REPRESENTATION IN THE OPINION
OF ATTY. GUIA
➢ The party list system has not been interpreted quite correctly, even by
the Supreme Court, at the start of its implementation when R.A. No. 7941
was enacted.
○ It was first implemented in the 1998 election.
➢ In truth, if what we have is proportional representation, then a party
should be able to get as many seats as the proportion of votes that it
obtains.
➢ However, there is a limit of the number of seats that a party can be
entitled to under our party list system of representation: 3.
○ Thus, even if Party A obtains 50% of the total votes for the party
lists, it would be entitled to a maximum of only 3 seats.
○ Assuming there are 5 million votes for the party lists; and of those
votes, Party A received 2.5 million votes, Party A is entitled to
only 3 seats.
○ This ruins the proportionality because there would be excess
(butal); many of the seats would remain vacant because the full
number of seats were not filled in accordance with the proportion
of votes obtained.
➢ This is the reason why in the past, 20% of the House of Representatives
(which is allotted for the party lists under the Constitution) is not filled.
○ Out of 250 seats, only 20 seats are appointed for party lists,
instead of 50 (250 x 20% = 50).
➢ Note that the case of BANAT v. COMELEC removed the 2% threshold,
but it maintained the 3-seat cap.
○ Thus, there is still a disproportion.
○ What happens then is that even if you only obtained a few votes,
but you reach 20%, then you can already be entitled to even just
a single seat in the House of Representatives.
➢ For Atty. Guia, the result of this is that the “elite” of provinces become
entitled to a seat in the House of Representatives.
○ It is as if they have a “back door entry”, because even if they only
spend a small amount for campaigning and running, just as long as
they have control over a specific territory, then they can already
obtain as much votes as would entitle them to a single seat.
➢ Ultimately, our party list system of representation does not observe strict
proportionality.
32
 An organization and a political party need to have itself accredited in
COMELEC, so that it can participate or nominate a candidate or candidates in
the party list system of representation.
To reiterate, the party list system is a mode of representation, not a reserved
seat system.
Limitation for a political party who can participate in the party list system of
representation:
If a political party has nominees or candidates in the district representation,
then such political party can no longer participate in the party list system of
representation. This is provided in the case of Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC.
Question: Is the party list system in the Philippines a means or a mode to further
strengthen the power of the current administration, just like the Duterte Youth
party list?
Answer: Well, many politicians will “game the system”. By “game the system”,
this means that since they are familiar with the processes, nuances and
weaknesses of the system, they will use that knowledge to gain political power.
However, if you think about it, that is really the nature of political power. A
candidate will try as much as he can to obtain votes, and ideally, through
acceptable legal means.
Ultimately, we ask the question: who put them in power? We did. We can only
blame the system so much, but at the end of the day, we are the ones who
voted. People seem to blame the system more, than the candidates’ abilities to
obtain votes.
Question raised by Atty. Guia: Is the opportunity given to each candidate
equal, in order for them to let their existence be know to the voting public?
Is the opportunity given to each candidate equal in order to convince the
voting public to vote for them?
➢ If the opportunity of candidates to campaign and to bring their platform
to the people is not equal, then you can say that there is a flaw in the
system.
➢ This is because our system should be able to afford everyone equal
opportunity to campaign.
➢ In reality, those who are more wealthy or those who already have a
following (such as celebrities) would already have an advantage.
➢ Even though A is a serious candidate, and he is more capable than other
candidates, but people do not know who he is, then that would be a
disappointment.
POLITICAL CAMPAIGN
➢ Our law on political campaigns is basically embodied in R.A. No. 9006.
➢ However, of course, there are still trickles of provisions in the Omnibus
Election Code which also govern election campaigns.
➢ For political campaigns, some of the basic principles involve the
constitutional rights: freedom of expression, freedom of speech,
freedom of the press, and freedom of association.
○ You cannot have a genuine democratic election if there is non-
observance of freedom of the press and freedom of association.
○ Without these rights, there can be no effective campaigning; a
candidate who campaigns will not be able to freely speak his mind,
and in turn, convince the people to vote for him.
○ If people are afraid to speak, there can be no genuine election,
even if the voting and counting are accurate.
○ FREEDOM OF SPEECH IS THE FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL
CAMPAIGNS.
➢ However, campaign laws must also be viewed from the perspective of
the voter.
○ More than the right of candidates to campaign freely, it is also
important to recognize the right of the people to receive
information from their candidates.
○ This would ultimately enable the people to vote well.
33
 ○ This is the essence of political campaigns: In reality, campaigns
are there for the voters, more than they are for the politicians,
because the voters would need to listen to their candidates.
○ Thus, the right of equal access to campaign by candidates are
actually the rights of the people to hear equally from all the
candidates, more than it is the right of the candidates to talk.
Atty. Guia’s personal framework when it comes to election:
Election is like an employment process. The boss or the employer is the people;
and the applicant for the job are the candidates.
The people are going to be the ones to assess who deserves to be “hired”.
Thus, the campaign period is actually like the “job interview” period. The
people get to “interview” the candidates for public office.
Question: What is the essence of campaign laws?
Answer: It is a recognition that by default, the playing field is not leveled the
same for everyone. There are people who have more money, more resources,
who are more endowed, and therefore, would have an advantage over the
others.
Thus, there is a need for regulation or imposition of limits in order to equalize
the playing field. These “limits” are actually imposed on freedom of expression
and freedom of speech.
➢ Section 3 of R.A. No. 9006 enumerates the lawful election propaganda.
R.A. NO. 9006 (FAIR ELECTION ACT)
Section 3. Lawful Election Propaganda. – Election propaganda, whether on
television, cable television, radio, newspapers or any other medium is hereby
allowed for all registered political parties, national, regional, sectoral parties
or organizations participating under the party list elections and for all bona fide
candidates seeking national and local elective positions subject to the limitation
on authorized expenses of candidates and political parties, observance of truth
in advertising and to the supervision and regulation by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC).
For the purpose of this Act, lawful election propaganda shall include:
3.1. Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers or other written or printed
materials the size of which does not exceed eight and one half inches in width
and fourteen inches in length;
3.2. Handwritten or printed letters urging voters to vote for or against any
particular political party or candidate for public office;
3.3. Cloth, paper or cardboard posters, whether framed or posted, with an area
not exceeding two (2) feet by three (3) feet, except that, at the site and on the
occasion of a public meeting or rally, or in announcing the holding of said
meeting or rally, streamers not exceeding three (3) feet by eight (8) feet in size,
shall be allowed: Provided, That said streamers may be displayed five (5) days
before the date of the meeting or rally and shall be removed within twenty-four
(24) hours after said meeting or rally;
3.4. Paid advertisements in print or broadcast media: Provided, That the
advertisements shall follow the requirements set forth in Section 4 of this Act;
and
3.5. All other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by the Omnibus
Election Code or this Act.
Section 4. Requirements for Published or Printed and Broadcast Election
Propaganda. – 4.1. Any newspaper, newsletter, newsweekly, gazette or
magazine advertising, posters, pamphlets, comic books, circulars, handbills,
bumper stickers, streamers, sample list of candidates or any published or
printed political matter and any broadcast of election propaganda by television
or radio for or against a candidate or group of candidates to any public office
shall bear and be identified by the reasonably legible or audible words "political
advertisement paid for," followed by the true and correct name and address of
the candidate or party for whose benefit the election propaganda was printed
or aired.
34
4.2. If the broadcast is given free of charge by the radio or television station, it
shall be identified by the words "airtime for this broadcast was provided free of
charge by" followed by the true and correct name and address of the broadcast
entity.
4.3. Print, broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to the candidate or
political party shall not be printed, published, broadcast, or exhibited without
the written acceptance by the said candidate or political party. Such written
acceptance shall be attached to the advertising contract and shall be submitted
to the COMELEC as provided in Subsection 6.3. hereof.
➢ Note that under the law, this is the operative order, but there are still
others, as it says “all other forms of election propaganda not prohibited
by the Omnibus Election Code or this Act”.
➢ R.A. No. 9006 also provides for the rights of candidates and political
parties to procure, subject to discounts, print space and airtime for their
political advertisements.
○ The discount under R.A. No. 9006 has been modified by a new law,
R.A. No. 11207.
○ The discount rates of political advertisements in print media and
broadcast media were increased.
➢ How exactly is this limited?
○ This is limited by the size.
○ For example, a wealthy political candidate can easily use a whole
bulletin for his campaign material; thus, that is already
advantageous to him.
○ Thus, the size of his campaign material is limited, in order to give
those who are not-so-wealthy to be able to afford space for their
campaign materials.
Question: When we talk about regulating the print space and air time in
broadcast media, what constitutional principle is involved here? Does COMELEC
have the power to regulate?
Answer: Yes, COMELEC has the power to regulate.
ARTICLE IX-C, 1987 CONSTITUTION
Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or
regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the
operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of
communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions
granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its
subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal
opportunity, time, and space ,and the right to reply, including reasonable,
equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among
candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
➢ This constitutional provision is implemented by R.A. No. 9006.
➢ There is also a provision under R.A. No. 9006 which provides that
COMELEC shall procure airtime and print space, so that it can be
allocated for candidates who do not have much money.
R.A. NO. 9006 (FAIR ELECTION ACT)
Section 8. COMELEC Space and Time. – The COMELEC shall procure shall in at
least one (1) newspaper of general circulation and air time in at least one (1)
major broadcasting station or entity in every province or city: Provided,
however, That in the absence of said newspaper, publication shall be done in
any other magazine or periodical in said province or city, which shall be known
as "COMELEC Space": Provided, further, That in the absence of said
broadcasting station or entity, broadcasting shall be done in any radio or
television station in said province or city, which shall be known as "COMELEC
Time". Said time shall be allocated to the COMELEC free of charge, while said
space shall be allocated to the COMELEC upon payment of just compensation.
The COMELEC time and space shall be utilized exclusively by the COMELEC for
35
 public information dissemination on election-related concerns.
➢ R.A. No. 9006 also mandates mass media entities not to unduly favor
particular candidates by repeatedly referring to them in their shows and
broadcasts.
➢ It also requires that mass media personalities and broadcasters to resign
from their posts when the election season begins, if they are connected
with or are candidates themselves.
Atty. Guia’s opinion on the penal provision in R.A. No. 9006
R.A. NO. 9006 (FAIR ELECTION ACT)
Section 13. Authority of the COMELEC to Promulgate Rules; Election
Offenses. – The COMELEC shall promulgate and furnish all political parties and
candidates and the mass media entities the rules and regulations for the
implementation of this Act, consistent with the criteria established in Article
IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution and Section 86 of the Omnibus Election
Code (Batas Pambansa Bldg. 881).
Rules and regulations promulgated by the COMELEC under and by authority of
this Section shall take effect on the seventh day after their publication in at
least two (2) daily newspapers of general circulation. Prior to effectivity of
said rules and regulations, no political advertisement or propaganda for or
against any candidate or political party shall be published or broadcast
through mass media.
Violation of this Act and the rules and regulations of the COMELEC issued to
implement this Act shall be an election offense punishable under the first and
second paragraphs of Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Bldg. 881).
Section 12. Substitution of Candidates. – In case of valid substitutions after
the official ballots have been printed, the votes cast for the substituted
candidates shall be considered as stray votes but shall not invalidate the
whole ballot. For this purpose, the official ballots shall provide spaces where
the voters may write the name of the substitute candidates if they are voting
for the latter: Provided, however, That if the substitute candidate of the
same family name, this provision shall not apply.
➢ Atty. Guia believes that this penal provision is overbreadth.
➢ Another important provision in R.A. No. 9006 is the provision on
substitution of candidates.
➢ Atty. Guia also believes that matters relating to social media are
difficult to regulate or interpret, thus, there should be a law that
tackles social media.
○ COMELEC cannot effectively regulate social media if there no
enacted law enabling them to do so.
For Atty. Guia, the 2022 elections have three important issues:
1) COVID-19 pandemic
Even if there is already a vaccine, people will still not be comfortable
to go out and vote.
2) Competitiveness of election
For election to be meaningful, people should have choices. This does
not necessarily mean choosing among people, but rather, choosing
among beliefs and convictions.
3) Disinformation
This is a problem not only in the Philippines, but all around the world.
It has even been exacerbated by social media. People should verify the
information they see on social media, especially if it has impact on
people. As educated people, our duty is to make people understand the
truth. The truth is the foundation of decent political regime.
36
MONITORING CAMPAIGN FINANCE
➢ The civil society should be trained to monitor campaign finance.
➢ Money in politics is very important.
○ It goes into the substance of an election.
○ Money is politics; there is an important connection between
political power and economic power.
➢ According to research, politicians are like venture capitalists.
○ This means that politicians invest, so that they would have a “win
fall”.
○ When politicians are actually in office already, they would get
even more money because of their investments.
➢ This kind of motivation on the part of politicians does not support the
principle of leveling the playing field among candidates.
➢ Also, vote buying is a money-in-politics issue.
The rules on campaign finance hope to make sure that money would not be
such an influential consideration in election success. This is the purpose of
campaign finance laws here in the Philippines and in other countries.
➢ The Omnibus Election Code (Sections 94 to 112) and R.A. No. 7166
(Sections 13 to 15) contain provisions relating to campaign finance.
➢ You limit the expenditure or the expense that the campaign can spend.
○ The purpose of the expenditure cap is so two candidates can be
on equal footing, since they can only spend a maximum amount of
money.
■ For example, A owns 100 million pesos, while B owns only
1 million pesos.
■ In this case, there needs to be a limitation on the
expenditure cap, which is 1 million pesos.
■ A would have no advantage over B, just because A has
more money.
R.A. NO. 7166
Section 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. - The
agreement amount that a candidate or registered political party may spend for
election campaign shall be as follows:
(a) For candidates. - Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice-President; and
for other candidates Three Pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently registered in
the constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That a
candidate without any political party and without support from any political
party may be allowed to spend Five Pesos (P5.00) for every such voter; and
(b) For political parties. - Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently registered
in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding any contribution in cash or
in kind to any candidate or political party or coalition of parties for campaign
purposes, duly reported to the Commission shall not be subject to the payment
of any gift tax.
➢ At present, the expenditure cap is 3 pesos per registered voter.
○ If in Cebu, there are 5 million registered voters, then the amount
of money that a candidate in Cebu can spend will be 5 million x
3 pesos, if the candidate is a member of a political party.
○ However, if the candidate is not a member of a political party,
then the candidate can spend up to 5 pesos per registered voter.
MEMBER OF A POLITICAL PARTY AND NOT A MEMBER OF A POLITICAL
WITH SUPPORT FROM ANY POLITICAL PARTY AND WITHOUT SUPPORT
PARTY FROM ANY POLITICAL PARTY
3 pesos x 5 pesos x
number of registered voters in the number of registered voters in the
constituency where he filed his CoC constituency where he filed his CoC
37
NATIONAL CANDIDATE RUNNING FOR PRESIDENT OR VICE-PRESIDENT
A SENATORIAL SEAT The other side of the accounting is how the candidate spends it. Both of these
have to be reported by the candidate to COMELEC.
3 pesos x 10 pesos x
number of registered voters in the number of registered voters in the
Philippines (?) Philippines (?) As to the donation, the candidate has to report that he received something, and
he also has to report what he spent it on. For the purposes of determining the
expenditure limit, what will be looked at is the candidate’s expenses.
➢ For donations it shall be included in the candidate’s expenses ONCE HE
USES THAT DONATION.
○ Note that a donation cannot be a valid donation if it is not Question: What if the donor did not donate it, but the donor himself is the one
formally accepted. who spent his own money to campaign for the candidate? Would that be included
○ It has to be a written acceptance to that donation. in the expenses of the candidate, even if it was the donor who spent it for him?
➢ If the donation is given but was not formally accepted, then that would
be an ILLEGAL POLITICAL DONATION. Answer: This is tricky, because again, the donation has to be accepted.
➢ A political donation to a candidate must be accepted by the candidate,
and reported by the candidate. Scenario: I firmly believe that A should be a Senator. Even if A does not know
○ Both the donor and the donee have to report the donation it, I will be the one to campaign for him, and I will spend my own money for
made; there should be separate reports. him, no matter how much.
➢ There is also a disclosure requirement:
○ 30 days after the elections, a candidate and political parties are Technically, this is not allowed under our election laws, because A should
supposed to submit to COMELEC an itemized report of the accept my donation. However, if either me or A will be sued, I can invoke
contributions that they received and the expenses that they my right to freedom of speech, as I am supporting A.
incurred.
Another scenario: A gave me money, but I will not say that it came from him. I
will say that it is my own money, and then I will spend it for A.

In this case, that would be a “cheat” and a mischief. This is a gap in the law
regarding political donations.

Question: What if the donor is the one who campaigned, like if the donor is the STATEMENT OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXPENDITURES
one who used the expenses for the candidate? Would that count as part of the
expenses of the candidate?
➢ The things you have to report all have to be itemized.
➢ This is called the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures
Answer: Yes, it will count as part of the expenses of the candidate. The
(SOCE).
money of the candidate can be his own money, a donation, or those who raised
➢ When you report the expenditures, all the expenses have to be there in
funds for him (which still counts as a donation). This is one side of the
order for COMELEC to determine if you exceeded the cap.
accounting.

38
 ➢ There are also things that you have to report, but they are not used to
determine whether the limit was exceeded.
○ Some of these are legal expenses.
○ You can actually pay your lawyer 1 billion pesos, but COMELEC will
not include that in the computation for purposes of determining
whether you breached the expenditure limit.
➢ Ideally, what COMELEC does is to match the candidate’s expenses based
on the report he submitted to COMELEC and with the people he contracted
with.
○ If they do not match, then there is a violation of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
B.P. BLG. 881 (OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE)
Section 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in
which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of,
or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution
prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections
80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant
to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under
this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws.
➢ Note that overspending is one of the grounds to be administratively
disqualified as a candidate.
➢ Under Section 68, a candidate can be disqualified even if he has already
taken post; he can be unseated.
FAILURE TO REPORT
➢ Prior to R.A. No. 7166, failure to report is an election offense, punishable
with one to six years of imprisonment without probation.
➢ However, under R.A. No. 7166, failure to report is no longer a crime.
○ WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE REPORT: The report of a DONOR.
○ If you are the DONOR, and you failed to report the donation you
made, then you can still be imprisoned.
○ However, if you are the donee and you failed to report, that is not
a crime.
○ It is Atty. Guia’s opinion that the lawmakers just forgot to include
the donor’s failure to report as one of the decriminalized acts;
nonetheless, that is what the law says.
FAILURE TO REPORT SOCE
➢ Failure to report Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE)
under Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 is an administrative offense.
○ COMELEC can impose a fine upon the person who failed to report
his SOCE.
○ Two failures to submit the SOCE results in perpetual special
disqualification from holding public office.
R.A. NO. 7166
Section 14. Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to
File Statement. - Every candidate and treasurer of the political party shall,
within thirty (30) days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the
offices of the Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all
contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
No person elected to any public offices shall enter upon the duties of his office
until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein
required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the
winning candidate fails to file the statement required herein within the period
prescribed by this Act.
Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements or
39
 reports in connection with electoral contributions and expenditures are required Note that this is a technical term.
herein shall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall
be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging from One thousand pesos Promoting to defeat a candidate is termed “negative campaigning”.
(P1,000.00) to Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the
Commission.

The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such Question: Do the words “vote for” have to be indicated in a particular material
failure; otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the for it to be considered partisan political activity?
Commission against the properties of the offender.
Answer: No. This is subjective. Nevertheless, if it is intended to promote the
It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to advise in candidacy of particular person, then it is by all means a partisan political
writing, by personal delivery or registered mail, within five (5) days from the activity, and thus, it is covered by the law.
date of election all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with their
obligation to file their statements of contributions and expenditures.
CANDIDATE
For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, the
administrative fine shall be from Two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty
thousand pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, A candidate is one who files a certificate of candidacy.
the offender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
No matter how much I announce to the whole world that I will run for President,
PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF STATE RESOURCES but if I do not file a certificate of candidacy, then I am not a candidate.

➢ This is an offense usually committed by incumbent officials who are again Thus, not being a candidate, I can campaign even in the high heavens, but I will
running for office. not commit election offenses. However, this is subject to any other laws or any
other liabilities.
➢ Since they are still in office, they can influence the use of the
government’s money and facilities in order to promote their candidacy.
MOREOVER, THE EFFECT OF THE PENAL PROVISIONS OF ELECTION LAWS (like
➢ Examples:
the Omnibus Election Code), WILL ONLY START AT THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD.
○ Tarpaulins saying “this project is done through the efforts of…”
○ Holding of only a small project, but the picture of the incumbent
Even if I have filed my certificate of candidacy, but the campaign period has not
official is very big
started, then the penal provisions of the election laws are not applicable yet.
○ Using state state media and state facilities for transportation,
This is the case of Penera v. COMELEC.
such as dump trucks and ambulances

PARTISAN POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS Other important notes and possible exam questions from this lecture:
1) Read R.A. No. 9006 (Fair Election Act)
a) Penal provision
Political campaigns and partisan political activity is any act that is designed
b) Provision on substitution
or will tend to promote the election and defeat of a candidate.
2) Effect of filing of certificate of candidacy by appointive and elective
officials
40
 a) There is an amendment to Section 66 and 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code
3) Definition of partisan political activity
4) Definition of candidate
5) Law on Public Officers: Read the law on filing of SALN

41
 less than that provided for in Section 7, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Similar
I. ELECTION LAW: THE PHILIPPINE ELECTORAL SYSTEM AND PRINCIPLES to Section 8, the only exception is when another term is "otherwise provided by
A. Philippine Elections in General law." Again, R.A. 11243 did not provide for a term less than three years, as
provided in the 1987 Constitution.
BANAS-NOGRALES ET AL V. COMELEC
The elections for the First Legislative District of the Province of South Cotabato
QUICK FACTS: On March 2019, President Duterte signed into law RA 11243, scheduled on May 13, 2019 should not have been suspended, and the candidate
wherein the 1st district was reapportioned, creating the lone legislative district obtaining the most number of votes for the said position must be proclaimed.
of General Santos City. The creation of this legislative district was to "to Consequently, the holdover provision under Section 2 of R.A. 11243 would be
commence in the next national and local elections after the effectivity of this inapplicable since there would already be a newly elected and qualified
Act." Consequently, R.A. 11243 took effect on April 4, 2019 — just over a month Representative.
before the 2019 general elections. COMELEC issued a resolution which suspended
the election of Representatives for the First Legislative District, including General
Legislative districts are apportioned under the Constitution by population and
Santos City, in the Province of South Cotabato, scheduled on May 13, 2019. In case
they must be contiguous and adjacent. It should be in proportion to the
the position for Member, House of Representatives in the First Legislative District,
population and new legislative districts are created by law.
including General Santos City, is voted upon in the May 13, 2019 elections, all
votes for the said position shall be considered stray; and SETS the first regular
Note that elections are prepared way before, maybe because of the automated
election for the new Representatives of the First and Third Legislative Districts of
election, you have to configure the system so that the printed ballot can match
the Province of South Cotabato, within six (6) months from May 13, 2019. The issue
the way the machines would count. Kasi diba optical scanning yan eh. If it’s an
is whether the resolution is valid.
optical scanning system, you have to make sure that what the machine will read
will correspond to the printed ballot. The printed ballot is the one that will be
DOCTRINE: The 1987 Constitution is clear: Elections for Congress should be held
read or which the voters would have interaction with. Kaya dapat magpareho
on the 2nd Monday of May unless otherwise provided by law. The term "unless
and you have to do that earlier.
otherwise provided by law" contemplates two situations (1) when the law
specifically states when the elections should be held on a date other than the
What happens with the term of office of those who are incumbents, assuming
second Monday of May; and (2) when the law delegates the setting of the date
COMELEC postpones or resets the election if they have the authority to do
of the elections to COMELEC.
so?
Section 1 of R.A. 11243 categorically states that the reapportionment of the 1st
Public officials whose term are fixed by law, and the end of the term of every
District shall "commence in the next national and local elections after the
elected official, because of the synchronized nature of our election, is June 30
effectivity of this Act." R.A. 11243 did not specifically provide for a different date.
of every election year, that end of term cannot be extended. So there is no
Neither did it delegate unto COMELEC the setting of a different date.
hold over power on the part of incumbent officers whose term of office are
provided under the Constitution. So even if COMELEC can postpone elections,
The law was passed with the view of implementing the reapportionment of the
the term of office cannot be extended. That is why postponement of elections
First Legislative District of the Province of South Cotabato at the most feasible
is a very dangerous proposition because it can create a vacuum in leadership.
and practicable time, i.e., during the next elections on the second Monday of May
2022. Congress could not have intended to enforce R.A. 11243 during the 2019
general elections as the election period had already begun when R.A. 11243 was KIDA V. SENATE
enacted. To require implementation last May 13, 2019 would lead COMELEC to act
precipitously. QUICK FACTS: Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, R.A.
No. 10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in
Also, if the Court were to follow COMELEC's interpretation, an incongruity would Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Said law also gave the President the power to appoint
result as the winning candidate in COMELEC's special elections would serve a term officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume the elective positions in the ARMM

42
for the intervening period (period starting the time the terms of the elected
officials expired, up to the time of the next elections; kasi nga diba isususpend
yung elections for the ARMM, so magkakaroon ng period na walang elected
officials).
DOCTRINE: The Supreme Court ruled that R.A. No. 10153 is constitutional. The
Constitution itself mandates the synchronization of national and local
elections. This includes the ARMM, which is a regional government. Being an
autonomous region, the ARMM has more powers and attributes as compared to
other local government units (provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays).
Nevertheless, the ARMM still remains under the category of “local governments”
under the Constitution. Thus, elections held in autonomous regions are also
considered as local elections, and in turn, it is part of such synchronization.
R.A. No. 10154 does not amend R.A. No. 9054, which is the first Organic Act
of the ARMM. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections subsequent to the first
election, R.A. 10153 merely filled the gap left in RA No. 9054. R.A. No. 10153 is
separate and distinct from the Organic Acts of the ARMM. Thus, R.A. No. 10153
does not need to be ratified in a plebiscite.
Under R.A. No. 9054 (the first Organic Act of the ARMM), there is a holdover
provision. The holder provision allows the regional officials to remain in their
positions in a holdover capacity. Such holdover provision is unconstitutional.
Under the Constitution, the term of local officials is three years. Congress has no
authority to extend the three-year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in
R.A. No. 9054.
Moreover, in this particular case, COMELEC has no authority to postpone the
elections in the ARMM. The ARMM elections were postponed by law (R.A. No.
10153), in furtherance of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of
national and local elections. This does not fall under any of the circumstances in
Section 5 or Section 6 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code). Under said Section
5 and Section 6, the COMELEC may only postpone elections due to violence,
terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure,
and other analogous causes of such a nature, as these reasons would cause failure
to elect. Also, R.A. No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next ARMM
elections and the COMELEC has no authority to set a different election date.
The President has the power to appoint OICs for the elective positions of the
ARMM for the intervening period. The Constitution itself gives the President the
power to appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law
to appoint. These include the elective officials of the ARMM. Also, R.A. No. 10153
is clear in its wording that once the President has appointed the OICs for the
offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the ARMM Legislative
Assembly, these same officials will remain in office until they are replaced by the
duly elected officials in the May 2013 elections. The President does not have the
power to recall such appointments he already made.
The Supreme Court admits that the synchronization of elections will temporarily
disrupt the election process in a local community, such as the ARMM. However,
such synchronization is mandated by the Constitution itself. Moreover, the
implementation of the provisions of R.A. No. 10153 as an interim measure is similar
to the interim measures traditionally practiced when the President appoints
officials holding elective offices upon the creation of new local government units.
Always remember the context on which RA No. 10153 was enacted in. There
are unique factual and legal circumstances which led to the enactment of R.A.
No. 10153. It was passed in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the
national and local elections, which is mandated by the Constitution. In the course
of synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local elections,
Congress had to grant the President the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM.
Important things to take note:
Number 1, synchronization of elections is a constitutional requirement. No
law can be passed to desynchronize elections. Number 2, there is no holdover
because the term of office of local officials, as well as the President, Vice
President, Senators and members of constitutionally created offices, are
fixed in the Constitution. Thus, there is no holdover.
B. The Party-List system of Representation
ATONG PAGLAUM ET AL V. COMELEC
QUICK FACTS: Fifty-two party-list groups and organizations assailing the
Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them
from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their
registration and accreditation as partylist organizations. The main reason for
denial of the registrations was because the COMELEC considered the groups as
those not falling under the marginalized or underrepresented sectors, which leads
to the main issue of the case of whether non-sectoral groups can participate in
the party-list system.
43
DOCTRINE: The Court in this case ruled that the party-list system can include both
sectoral and non-sectoral groups. The Court used three different sources in order
to rule on the case: 1) Constitutional Commission’s deliberations; 2) The
Constitution and 3) RA 7941 or The Party-list System Act.
As per the Constitutional Commission’s deliberations, the Court pointed out from
Commissioner Monsod’s statements that the goal is to open up the party list
system, that’s why it’s considered to not be synonymous to sectoral
representation. There may be some groups that may not have the constituency
to win a seat on a legislative district basis, hence the system may allow them to
be able to still have a seat in the House. They clarified that the only condition is
that they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors
national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and
(3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do
not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they
register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-
list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register
under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent
sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.Cdtai

that we shall designate in this Constitution. 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It
As per the Constitution, the Court relied on statutory construction. Section 5 (1), is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and
Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." The underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
commas after the words "national[,]" and "regional[,]" separate national and indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas
regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies"
intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." Thus, the party-list system 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that
is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the
regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly,
National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
or organizations. "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they
represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
As per RA 7941, R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent
organizations to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong
To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for
represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
system. Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be
party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and
underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough
What the Constitution said is that there should be a party list system of
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
representation, and for the first three terms after the ratification of the
sector. Also, as per Section 6, none of the 8 grounds stated therein, to refuse
Constitution, half of the segment in Congress that is allotted for party lists
or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized and
should be filled by members of those sectors. Henceforth, it should be by party
underrepresented."
list system. It is the case of Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC which said that the
party list system of representation is limited to the marginalized and
New Parameters for qualification of party list groups
underrepresented sectors. The case interpreted R.A. No. 7941 that way.
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1)

44
 2 percenters, that leaves 40 (55-15) remaining seats.
2. In the first stage, additional number of seats is given to the two-percenters
Atong Paglaum reinterpreted what has been the prevailing concept that the
by determining the whole number obtained when the percentage share of
party list system is limited to the marginalized, but it is open to everyone.
the party list group is multiplied by the remaining number of seats.
EXCEPT those parties who may have fielded candidates under the district
Suppose, for example, that there are 40 remaining seats. TPLV = Total
representation.
Party List Votes
a. If Party List A (PL-A) has 6% of the TPLV then 6% x 40 = 2.4. Thus,
The party list system of representation, under this decision, means that its
PL-A is given 2 additional seats.
not a reserved-seat system. It’s not reserved for the marginalized. It is for the
b. If Party List (PL-B) has 3% of the TPLV then 3% x 40 = 1.2. Thus,
marginalized in the sense that it is easier for those belonging to the marginalized
PL-B is given 1 additional seat.
sector, or those that do not have well-defined political constituencies, to
c. If Party List (PL-C) has 2% of the TPLV then 2% x 40 = 0.8. Thus,
possibly gain seats in Congress.
PL-C is not given an additional seat.
3. There is a second stage if there are still vacant seats.
They won’t win in the district elections, but if they go through the party list,
a. In the second stage, one seat is awarded to the highest ranking (in
they have more of a chance to win. But that doesn’t mean that the seats are
terms of percentage share) party list group that did not receive
reserved for them only. They just have to get enough, not as much as they
any additional seat in the first stage. If there are still vacant seats,
should be getting under district representation, to get a seat under the party
then one seat is awarded each to the next ranking party list groups
list system.
until all the vacant seats are given.
4. Apply the three seat limit.
This is essentially what it is. Party list system is a system of proportional
representation. It is not a reserved system. It is not a sectoral election. Party
list system is not a sectoral election, it is a system of proportional
representation. You start with Republic Act 7941 and the case of Veterans Federation. Republic
Act 7941 ang sabi niya there is a 2% threshold yung 2% threshold ibig sabihin
noon is that you must have at least 2% of the votes of the entire party-list votes
BANAT PARTYLIST V. COMELEC
to be entitled to a seat. Ibig sabihin kung di ka umabot sa 2% votes -- wala kang
seat. So bibilangin mo lahat ng votes ng lahat ng parties under the party-list
QUICK FACTS: In June 2007, Barangay Association for National Advancement and
system. Tapos yung boto ng each party dun mo kukunin yung proportion ng vote
Transparency (BANAT) filed before the National Board of Canvassers(NBC) a
versus the total votes of all those who participated -- but you should have at
petition to proclaim the full number (that is 20%) of party list representatives
least 2% at yun ang rule sa Veterans Federation.
provided by the Constitution; That the full 20% of party list representatives should
be proclaimed; That the 2% threshold votes should only pertain to the first party-
But our system also has a cap, kung may cap siya ibig sabihin diba
list representative seats; The 3 seat limit should be applied; That all the 2% should
proportional siya kung may cap siya maximum of 3 seats. Kahit na marami
be given a seat (the first seat) but the additional seats should be given in
kang boto you cannot get more than 3 seats, that is under 7941. So mahirap
proportion of the percentage of votes in relation to the total votes cast. COMELEC
maging proportional kasi meron kang cap eh, kahit maraming boto hanggang
promulgated a resolution proclaiming 13 parties as winners in the party-list
tatlo ka lang. The effect is hindi napupuno yung 50 seats.
elections in May 2007. It also announced that it would compute the total number
of seats per party according to the Veterans formula.
sa Veterans case po meron po tayong tinatawag na 2-4-6 rule. So ang 2-4-6 rule
is pag naka 2% ka may 1 seat ka guaranteed, kapag naka 4% ka, 2 seats na yon
FORMULA:
tapos pag naka 6% ka, 3 seats ka. Since sinabi nga ni sir kanina na may 3 seat
1. Always remember, two-percenters are given one guaranteed seats each.
cap rule, kahit maka more than 6% ka maximum of 3 seats lang makukuha mo.
Then the remaining number of seats after the guaranteed seats are given
So yun yung mga important rules, yung 2-4-6 rule and the 3 seat cap rule.
is distributed in two stages.
a. For example, if there are 55 seats available and there are fifteen

45
 under the party-list elections shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
So before, filling up the entire seat for the entire party list is not mandatory.
each,
But now filling up the number of seats allocated for party list system is
3. Votes amounting to two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
mandatory. Second, the 2% is no longer a threshold for you to have at least
list elections obtained by each of the participating parties, organizations,
one seat. It only gives you a guarantee for one seat. So dati, no way you can
and coalition should then be deducted from the total votes each of
get a seat if you did not reach the 2%. Dito you can still get a seat even if
these party list groups that have been entitled to and given guaranteed
you did not get 2%.
seats.
4. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall thereafter be re-ranked
Sample na bakbakan nina sir and barcelon:
from the highest to lowest based on the recomputed number of votes,
Sir halimbawa sir, yung sa case po 17 party-lists groups yung naka kuha 2%. Bale
that is, after deducting the two percent stated in paragraph 3
yung 17 na yun guaranteed na sila na may 1 seat each. So 55-17 is 38. Tapos may
5. The remaining partylist seats (or the additional seats”) shalle then be
38 seats pa na natitira. Kukunin mo ngayon yung percentage ng votes na nakuha
distributed in proportion to the recomputed number of votes in paragraph
ng party-lists tapos imumultiply mo dun sa .38. So halimbawa si Buhay Party-
3 until the additional seats are allocated
List naka 7.9% siya dun sa case so magiging 7.9 x 38 po yung computation.
6. Each party, organization or coalition shall be entitled to no more than
three (3) seats
Tapos yung product niya, yung whole integer will represent the number of seats.
So ilalagay mo yun simula from the start. So yung may guaranteed seats na lets
DOCTRINE: The court held that all votes were counted, considered and used
say Buhay meron na siyang isa madadagdagan pa kung lets say +2 edi meron na
during the first round of seat allocation, not just those of two-percenters. But in
siyang 3. Di mo siya pwede lagyan ng +3 kasi magiging 4 na yun.
the end, the non-two-precenters simply did not meet the requisite voting to be
allocated a guaranteed seat. The “total number of votes cast under the party-list
Kung may tira pa, dito pwede makakuha ng slots yung mga naka less than 2%,
system”, the very divisor of the formula, the very index of proportionality,
requires that all votes cast under the party-list system be counted and considered
Summing up the jurisprudence:
in allocating seats in the first round, be it in favor of a two-percenter or a non-
Because in the case of ANG BAGONG BAYANI, the SC was very clear in saying,
two-percenter. This only goes to show that all votes were counted and considered
and BAYAN MUNA case, that major political parties cannot join the partylist
in the first round. Just because the non-two-percenters were not allocated a
system of representation.
guaranteed seat does not mean that their votes were accorded lesser weight, let
alone discarded. It simply means that they did not reach the proportional
Sa BANAT, they tried to join, hindi inabot ng boto, sa ATONG PAGLAUM,
threshold in the first round.
nareverse. But mind you, RA 7941 says that major political parties, that top 5
political parties cannot join the partylist in the election immediately preceding
The petitioners’ proposal that the imposition of a deduction against the two-
the passage of the law. It does mean then that after the first election
percenters at the start of the second round, which would actually result in a
immediately after the passage of the law, pwede na. But ANG BAGONG BAYANI
violation of “one person, one vote” principle. They propose that all votes in favor
said hindi pa rin pwede. Until BANAT came, and then ATONG PAGLAUM.
of non-two-percenters would be counted and considered in both the first and
second round, albeit whether they would be awarded a seat in COngress is a
ANGKLA ET AL V. COMELEC different matter altogether. Meanwhile, the 2% voted for two percenters would
be counted and considered in the first round, but not in the second round. This
QUICK FACTS: This case challenges the BANAT formula and proposes the following clearly put the twopercenters at a glaring disadvantage even though they fared
framework: significantly better in the election. Surely, this is not what the Legislature, nay,
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions taking part in the party-list the framers of the Constitution intended.
elections shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the total
number of votes they each garnernered in the party-list election Section 11, Article VI of COnstitution does not proscribe absolute proportionality
2. Each of the parties, organizations and coalitions taking part in the party- in distributing seats to party-list parties, organizations or coalitions. Neither does
list elections receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast it mandate the rant of one seat each according to their rank. On the contrary,

46
Congress is given a wide latitude of discretion in setting the parameters for modify the Commission on Elections’ interpretation of the formula stated in BANAT
determining the actual volume and allocation of party-list representation in the v. COMELEC by making the divisor for the computation of the percentage votes,
HOR from total number of votes cast minus the votes for the disqualified party-list
candidates, to the total number of votes cast regardless whether party-list
groups are disqualified; The petitioner suggests that the formula used by the
Commission on Elections is flawed because votes that were spoiled or that were
In other words, this case merely reaffirms the computation of BANAT.
not made for any party-lists were not counted. According to the petitioner, around
The essence here is that the SC is looking for a good, better formula to assure
7,000,000 votes were disregarded as a result of the Commission on Elections’
proportionality of the vote. Kumbaga yung number of seats mo will really
erroneous interpretation. The Commission on Elections through the Office of the
reflect, the number of votes that you obtained will be reflected in the seats
Solicitor General took the position that invalid or stray votes should not be
that will be given to you.
counted in determining the divisor.
Yun bang BANAT, something ideal in terms of determining proportionality. When
DOCTRINE: The divisor, thus, helps to determine the correct percentage of
you look at electoral systems designed books, ang daming way of looking at
representation of party-list groups as intended by the law. This is part of the
proportionality: largest integer formula which is used in Germany and in
index of proportionality of the representation of a party-list to the House of
Netherlands, but definitely ours is different. Be that as it may, it’s enough, I
Representatives. It measures the relation between the share of the total seats
think at this point, for you to understand that the partylist system of
and the share of the total votes of the party-list.
representation is:
1. A proportional representation system more than it is a reserved seat
We agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined
for the so-called marginalized and under-representation.
to be invalid due to no cause attributable to the voter should not be excluded in
2. Being a proportional representation system, the essence is that the
the divisor. In other words, votes cast validly for a party-list group listed in the
number of votes obtained should be reflected in the seats that would
ballot but later on disqualified should be counted as part of the divisor. To do
be given to the winning party.
otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good
faith that that ballot contained all the qualified candidates.
Our system does not allow full proportionality primarily because there is a cap
of 3 seats. So even if you obtained 15% of the partylist vote, the most that you
However, following this rationale, party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose
can get is still 3 seats. One political group, yung BAYAN MUNA, GABRIELLA, they
disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose
are called the makabayan black (??), ang laki ng boto na nakuha nila in 2001
disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections
election. They would have been entitled to at least 9 or even...4 or even 5 seats
to the voters prior to such elections should not be included in the divisor.
from what I remember. So in the next election, what they did, dahil may limit,
nag break sila, meron silang Youth Wing, Women Wing, Urban Poor Wing, iba’t
The total votes cast do not include invalid votes. The invalid votes, for the
ibang party, kanya-kanyang kuha ng boto. So collectively, they got 8-9 seats. So
determination of the denominator, may be votes that were spoiled or votes
yun yung nagging political behavior because of the cap. Had there been no cap,
that resulted from the following: improper shading or having no shade at all;
then there would just be one party having more representative in Congress
existence of stray or ambiguous marks; tears in the ballot; and/or ballots rejected
because of the principle of proportionality.
by the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines under the paper-based
automated election system. All these are causes that nullify the count for that
ARARO V. COMELEC vote that can be attributable to the voter’s action.

QUICK FACTS: The Commission on Elections En Banc sitting as the National Board
of Canvassers initially proclaimed 28 party-list organizations as winners involving
a total of 35 seats guaranteed and additional seats. The result was based on the
Commission on Elections’ count of 121 Certificates of Canvass or a total of
29,750,041 votes for the Party-List System. Petitioner ARARO asks the Court to
Votes cast for the party-list system should, however, include all votes cast for
party-list groups contained in the ballot even if subsequently they are
disqualified by the Commission on Elections or by our courts. Thus, the content
of the divisor in the formula to determine the seat allocation for the party-list
component of the House of Representatives should be amended accordingly.

47

Thus, the formula to determine the proportion garnered by the party-list group
would now henceforth be:
The total votes cast for the party-list system include those votes made for
party-list groups indicated in the ballot regardless of the pendency of their
motions for reconsideration or petitions before any tribunal in relation to their
cancellation or disqualification cases
LICO ET AL V. COMELEC
QUICK FACTS: Ating Koop was declared as one of the winning party-list groups on
December 8, 2010. It earned a seat at the House of Representatives, with
petitioner Atty. Isidro Q. Lico as its party-list representative. On May 14, 2011,
Ating Koop introduced amendments to its constitution, which cut short the three-
year term of the incumbent members. On Dember 5, 2011, the Interim Central
Committee of Ating Koop expelled Lico for disloyalty. There were allegations of
graft and corruption, and Lico’s refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement. The
Lico group held a special meeting in Cebu City, while the Rimas group held a
Special National Convention in Paranaque City. The Rimas group filed a Petition
with COMELEC praying that Lico be ordered to vacate his office and to nullify the
meeting that happened in Cebu. Basically, both the Lico and Rimas group had
elected their own conflicting set of officers into the new Central Committee.
COMELEC Second Division upheld the expulsion of Lico and declared Roberto
Mascarina, the elected representative during the Paranaque meeting, as the duly
qualified nominee of the party-list group. COMELEC En Banc COMELEC recognized
the Rimas Group as the legitimate representative of Ating Koop considering that:
1) It found nothing in the records to show that the Lico Group made a valid
call for the special election of Central Committee members as required
under the Amended Constitution and By-Laws;
2) There is nothing on record indicating that a minimum of 100 attended the
Cebu meeting; and
3) The Parañaque convention was in accordance with Ating Koop's Amended
Constitution and By-Laws.
DOCTRINE: Neither the Lico nor the Rimas group legitimately represents Ating
Koop since the amendments to the Constitution and By-Laws of Ating Koop
were not registered with the COMELEC.
First, the COMELEC's jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership within the
party is well established. This power to rule upon questions of party identity
and leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident of its enforcement
powers.
That being said, the SC held that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in declaring the Rimas Group as the legitimate set of Ating Koop officers
for the simple reason that the amendments to the Constitution and By-laws of
Ating Koop were not registered with the COMELEC. Hence, neither of the
elections held during the Cebu meeting and the Parañaque conference pursuant to
the said amendments, were valid.
While both the Lico Group and the Rimas Group assert that their respective
elections were conducted pursuant to the amendment introduced in the Second
National Convention of Ating Koop, there is no showing, however, that the
amendments were actually filed with the COMELEC.
A party-list organization owes its existence to the State and the latter's
approval must be obtained through its agent, the COMELEC. In the case of
Dayao v. COMELEC, it was held that it is the State, acting through the COMELEC,
that breathes life to a party-list organization.
The implication is that the State, through the COMELEC, is a party to the
principal contracts entered into by the party-list organization and its members
(the Constitution and By-laws) such that any amendment to these contracts would
constitute a novation requiring the consent of all the parties involved. An
amendment to the by-laws of a party-list organization should become effective
only upon approval by the COMELEC.
There being no showing that the amendments on the by-laws of Ating Koop were
filed with and subsequently approved by the COMELEC, any election conducted
pursuant thereto may not be considered valid. Without such requisite proof,
neither the Lico Group nor the Rimas Group can claim to be the legitimate set of
officers of Ating Koop.
Even assuming arguendo that the amendment calling for a special election were
48
effective, the Court still cannot declare any of the feuding groups as the legitimate
set of officers considering that the respective sets of evidence presented were
evenly balanced.
As neither group can sufficiently lay claim to legitimacy, the equipoise doctrine
comes into play.
Equipoise Doctrine: When the evidence in an issue of fact is in equipoise (when
the respective sets of evidence of both parties are evenly balanced) the party
having the burden of proof fails in that issue. Since neither party succeeds in
making out a case, neither side prevails. The courts are left with no other option
but to leave them as they are. The consequence is the dismissal of the
complaint/petition.
The Rimas Group, being the petitioner before the COMELEC, had the burden of
proving that it is them that is the legitimate group. As the evidence of both parties
are in equipoise, the Rimas Group failed to discharge its burden. The COMELEC
should have dismissed the petition of the Rimas Group insofar as it sought to be
declared the legitimate group representing Ating Koop.
IT IS THE INTERIM CENTRAL COMMITTEE WHO IS THE LEGITIMATE LEADERSHIP
OF ATING KOOP. The SC found such legitimate leadership to be the Interim
Central Committee, whose members remain as such in a hold-over capacity.
C. The Commission on Elections
1. Power to enforce and administer election laws
AQUINO V. COMELEC
QUICK FACTS: On January 8, 2010, Aquino, as President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC), issued a
reassignment order directing the reassignment of several PHIC officers and
employees. On January 11, 2010, Aquino issued an Advisory implementing the
reassignment order. Because of this a complaint was filed against Aquino for
violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737 in relation to Section 261(h) of BP 881
or the ban on personnel transfer during election period. COMELEC then directed
the law department to file the necessary information against Aquino. On the other
hand, Aquino contends that COMELEC exceeded its authority to implement the
election laws when, in interpreting Section 261 (h) of BP 881, it added
reassignments as a covered offense when the prohibitions speaks only of transfer
and detail.He argues that while the COMELEC indeed has the exclusive authority
to implement the election laws, and with it the authority to issue rules and
regulations to supply details or clarify gaps in the law, it cannot validly extend
what these laws provide without running afoul of the basic precept that the power
to make laws is exclusively lodged in the legislature.
DOCTRINE: The Court held that it is the obvious and unequivocal intent of the
framers of the Constitution and of the law to grant the COMELEC with powers,
necessary and incidental to achieve the objective of ensuring free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and credible elections. Thus, expressly, the Constitution and
the laws grant the COMELEC with the power, first and foremost, to "[e]nforce and
administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election," and
second, to "promulgate rules and regulations." Together, these powers ensure
that the COMELEC is well armed to properly enforce and implement the election
laws and enable it to fill in the situational gaps which the law does not provide for
or which the legislature had not foreseen.
In exercising these powers and fulfilling its mandate, the COMELEC, in addition,
must necessarily interpret the provisions of the law that they are to enforce and
for which they will craft the guidelines. Thus, to this extent and in this sense, the
COMELEC likewise exercises the power of legal interpretation pursuant to the legal
principle that the grant of a power includes all the powers necessary for the
exercise of the power expressly given. Like all grant of powers, however, the grant
to the COMELEC of its express — enforcement and administration, and rule-making
— and implied — interpretative — powers are not without limitations. The exercise
of these powers should always be read in conjunction with, not in isolation
from, the Constitution and the laws from where it draws the power.
COMELEC's interpretation of the phrase "transfer or detail whatever" as we find
the Regalado interpretation consistent with the legislative intent. Indeed, as used
in Section 261 (h) of BP 881, the term whatever should be not be read strictly in
conjunction with only either the term transfer or the term detail; nor should the
phrase transfer or detail whatever be read in isolation from the purpose of the
legal prohibition. Rather, consistent with our rules in reading provisions of law,
the term — whatever — as well as the phrase — transfer or detail whatever —
should be understood within the broader context of the purpose of BP 881.
They should likewise be understood within the context of all other laws that
the COMELEC is required to administer and enforce. This is the proper approach
that anyone, including this Court, should take when reading Section 261 (h), as
well as all other provisions of BP 881 and other election laws. To our mind, the
interpretation that includes any form of personnel action, such as
reassignment, within the coverage of the phrase precisely guards against any
such electioneering and political harassment situations. This interpretation also
more vigorously enforces the aim not only of BP 881, but more importantly of the
Constitution to secure free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Thus, to reiterate and emphasize — the election law's prohibition on transfer or
49
detail covers any movement of personnel from one station to another, whether or
not in the same office or agency when made or caused during the election period.
But the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in this case because Aquino
made or caused the reassignment of the concerned PHIC officers and
employees before the election period, hence no violation was made.
DUMARPA V. COMELEC
QUICK FACTS: The COMELEC declared a total failure of elections in seven (7)
municipalities, including the three (3) Municipalities of Masiu, Lumba Bayabao and
Kapai, which are situated in the 1st Congressional District of Province of Lanao del
Sur. The conduct of special elections in the seven (7) Lanao del Sur municipalities
was originally scheduled for 29 May 2010.
On 25 May 2010, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8946, resetting the special
elections to 3 June 2010. Subsequently, COMELEC issued the herein assailed
resolution which provided, among others, the constitution of Special Board of
Election Inspectors (SBEI) in Section 4 and Clustering of Precincts in Section 12.
Dumarpa filed a Motion for Reconsideration concerning only Sections 4 and 12
thereof as it may apply to the Municipality of Masiu, Lanao del Sur. Dumarpa
claims that provisions will definitely doom him to certain defeat, if its
implementation is not restrained or prohibited by the Honorable Supreme Court.
DOCTRINE: COMELEC's power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election
COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution, in the exercise of its plenary powers in
the conduct of elections enshrined in the Constitution and statute. Thus, it brooks
no argument that the COMELEC's broad power to "enforce and administer all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall,carries with it all necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections.
The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do everything in
its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In
the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given a considerable
latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure the accomplishment of
the great objective for which it was created - to promote free, orderly, and honest
elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they
are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered
with.
Dumarpas objections conveniently fail to take into account that COMELEC
Resolution No. 8965, containing the assailed provisions on re-clustering of the
precincts and the designation of special board of election inspectors, was issued
precisely because of the total failure of elections in seven (7) Municipalities in the
Province of Lanao del Sur, a total of fifteen (15) Municipalities where there was a
failure of elections. Notably, the COMELEC's declaration of a failure of elections
is not being questioned by Dumarpa. In fact, he confines his objections on the re-
clustering of precincts, and only as regards the Municipality of Masiu.
Plainly, it is precisely to prevent another occurrence of a failure of elections in
the fifteen (15) municipalities in the province of Lanao del Sur that the COMELEC
issued the assailed Resolution No. 8965. The COMELEC, through its deputized
officials in the field, is in the best position to assess the actual condition prevailing
in that area and to make judgment calls based thereon. Too often, COMELEC has
to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to
subvert the will of our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be
impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable.We cannot, however, engage in an
academic criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult circumstances.
2. Power to adjudicate election disputes
LEGASPI V. COMELEC
QUICK FACTS: Feliciano Legaspi sought for the disqualification of Alfredo Germar,
Rogelio Santos Jr. and Roberto Esquivel on the ground of rampant vote-buying
during the days leading to the elections. Germar emerged as the highest vote
getter in the mayoralty race. Santos, for his part, also appeared to have secured
enough votes to be the second councilor of the municipality. Esquivel, though,
failed in his bid to become vice-mayor of Norzagaray.
The COMELEC’s Special First Division has disqualified Germar and Santos. Motions
for Reconsideration were filed which resulted in a split vote. A rehearing was
conducted insofar as the electoral aspect of the case but the COMELEC en banc
again failed to come up with a majority consensus. The COMELEC en banc
dismissed the disqualification case based on Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedures, which states that “”When the Commission en banc
is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case
shall be reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or
proceeding shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission.”
Unconvinced, the petitioner filed the present petition before the Supreme Court.
50
DOCTRINE: Sec. 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules on Procedure: Section 6.
Procedure if Opinion is Equally Divided. — When the Commission en banc is equally
divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be
reheard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action or proceeding shall
be dismissed if originally commenced in the Commission; in appealed cases, the
judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and all incidental matters,
the petition or motion shall be denied.
Outline:
1. If the action or proceeding is originally commenced in the COMELEC,
such action or proceeding shall be dismissed;
2. In appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand
affirmed; or
3. In incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
such cases stands affirmed.
In conclusion, Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution bestows on the COMELEC
divisions the authority to decide election cases. Their decisions are capable of
attaining FInality, without need of any affirmative or confirmatory action on the
part of the COMELEC en banc. And while the Constitution requires that the motions
for reconsideration be resolved by the COMELEC en banc, it likewise requires that
four votes must be reached for it to render a valid ruling and, consequently, to
GRANT the motion for reconsideration of private respondents. Hence, when the
private respondents failed to get the four-vote requirement on their motion for
reconsideration, their motion is defeated and lost as there was NO valid ruling to
sustain the plea for reconsideration. The prior valid action — the COMELEC Special
First Division's October 3, 2013 Resolution in this case — therefore subsists and is
affirmed by the denial of the motion for reconsideration.

Verily, classifying the pending case or matter before the COMELEC is a prerequisite
What happened here is that I think when the petition for disqualification was
to identifying the applicable effect (the case at hand falls under the third effect,
filed, it was filed after proclamation. So, if it is filed after the proclamation,
but I will discuss the first and second effect).
wala ng jurisdiction ang COMELEC. That is how I personally voted. Sayang, we
would have wanted the fact that it does not say pwede na or may impunity na.
For the first effect to apply, the pending case or matter must be an original action
He can still be criminally liable under SECTION 261 (a) (b) or (AB). Two things:
or proceeding originally commenced before the COMELEC. This could take either
Administratively/Electorally disqualified because he violated some rules of the
of two forms: those originally commenced with the COMELEC Division or those
game. The acts are also punishable criminally. They can be punished. So pending
originally commenced with the COMELEC en banc. Under Article IX-C, Sec. 2 (2) of
pa yung kaso dito. But, of course, what happened in this case is that some of
the Constitution, actions originally commenced before the COMELEC Division
the Commissioners did not see the same thing as we saw it. Kaya not enough
consist of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
votes. Yung isa hindi sumali. So that is what happened.
elective regional, provincial, and city officials. On the other hand, the cases
directly filed with the COMELEC en banc are those specifically provided in the
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, all cases that are filed before the COMELEC goes
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. In this case, while the motion for reconsideration
to a division. That is a constitutional requirement. That is not merely statutory.
was filed with the COMELEC en banc in the first instance, it cannot strictly be
Hindi lang rule yon. Nasa constitution that cases would have to pass through the
considered as an "action or proceeding" originally commenced with the
divisions.
commission as contemplated by the rules.
COMELEC WILL HAVE 2 DIVISIONS. If it is quasi-judicial, lahat yan division
The second effect cannot likewise be applied herein for it requires that the
dumadaan.
pending case or matter be an appeal. Worth maintaining is this doctrine in
Mendoza: a motion for reconsideration is a constitutionally guaranteed
There is a motion for reconsideration if you are not satisfied with your division
remedial mechanism for parties aggrieved by a division decision or resolution,
resolution. The motion for reconsideration will be taken up at the en banc.
but not an appeal.
Yung en banc, lahat yon. 7 yung commissioners. Each division will have 3
members. Walang membership yung chairperson. The chairperson will only
This leaves the court with the third effect: that the petition or motion will be
participate when it is deciding on the EN BANC matter. Meaning, motion for
dismissed in incidental matters. (AFFIRMATIVE, THIS IS THE ONE). Free from
reconsideration. It is basic. That is the constitution. There are 2 instances that
ambiguity, the plain meaning of the clarificatory resolution is that the motion
the COMELEC rules of procedure where EN BANC can take initial jurisdiction
for reconsideration, being an incidental matter, is deemed denied if no
over a matter. Pagpetition to declare failure of election. Pag Petition to
majority vote is reached. Consequently, the Court's prior majority action in

51

declare failure of election, EN BANC agad yan. Di na dumadaan sa division. Why?
Because the petition to declare failure of election is an administrative matter.
It is an enforcement matter. Not a quasi-judicial matter. You will see in the
case. There is a case in the case of DUMARPA V. COMELEC. Administrative matter
ang petition to declare failure of election. That is why it goes to the EN BANC
right away,
The same thing with resolution of preliminary investigation. The COMELEC has
the jurisdicition to conduct preliminary investigation over offenses that are
punishable by electoral laws by the Omnibus Election Code. Why does it have
go directly to the en banc? As you have learned, preliminary investigation are
administrative in nature and not quasi-judicial. Everything, all cases go to
division. Except, petitions to declare failure of election and a preliminary
investigation for election offense cases. BASIC. So you have to prepare.
II. THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE
KABATAAN PARTY LIST V. COMELEC (2015)
QUICK FACTS: Respondent COMELEC issued three resolutions implementing R.A.
10367, all stating that the registration records of voters without biometrics data
who failed to submit for validation on or before the last day of filing of applications
for registration for the purpose of the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections
shall be deactivated in the last ERB hearing to be conducted prior to said election,
and that deactivated voters shall not be allowed to vote.
On November 25, 2015, herein petitioners filed the instant petition with
application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction (WPI) assailing the constitutionality of the biometrics
validation requirement imposed under RA 10367, as well as COMELEC Resolution
Nos. 9721, 9863, and 10013, all related thereto.
The petitioners contend that the biometrics deactivation is not the disqualification
by law contemplated by the 1987 Constitution, implementation of such will
prejudice one’s right to suffrage, and deactivation by November 16, 2015 would
result in the premature termination of the registration period contrary to Section
8 of RA 8189.
DOCTRINE: The right to vote is not a natural right, but is a right created by law.
Suffrage is a privilege granted by the State to persons or classes that are most
likely to exercise it for the public good. Section 1, Article V of the 1987
Constitution provides:
One must meet the following qualifications in order to exercise the right of
suffrage:
1) He must be a Filipino citizen;
2) He must not be disqualified by law; and
3) He must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election.
The second qualification more prominently reflects the franchised nature of the
right of suffrage. The State may therefore regulate said right by imposing
statutory disqualifications. However, such disqualifications must not pertain to
literacy, property or other substantive requirement.
Inasmuch as substantive qualifications are not allowed, the law can provide
procedural requirements like requiring registration. A qualification is loosely
defined as the possession of qualities, properties (such as fitness or capacity)
inherently or legally necessary to make one eligible for a position or office, or to
perform a public duty or function.
The concept of a qualification should be distinguished from the concept of
registration. The act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not
one of the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter. One may be a
qualified voter without exercising the right to vote. Registration is a form of
regulation, and not a qualification for the right of suffrage. Registration regulates
the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.
Registration is a mere procedural requirement. The process of registration is a
procedural limitation on the right to vote. Although procedural, the right of a
citizen to vote remains conditioned upon it.
A citizen, in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the
minimum requirements set by the Constitution, is obliged by law to register,
under the provisions of R.A. No. 8189 (Voters Registration Act of 1996).
Biometrics validation is not a “qualification” to the exercise of the right of
suffrage, but a mere aspect of the registration procedure, of which the State
has the right to reasonably regulate. Biometrics validation was institutionalized
pursuant to the limitations of the 1987 Constitution. It is a mere complement to
the existing Voter’s Registration Act of 1996.
The act of registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage.
52
For registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable
element in the election process. Registration cannot and should not be KABATAAN PARTY LIST V. COMELEC (2009)
denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory requirement.
QUICK FACTS: COMELEC issued a resolution which set the period of December 2,
The biometrics validation requirement under R.A. No. 10367 advances a 2008 to December 15, 2009 as the period of continuing voter registration using the
compelling state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of biometrics process in all areas nationwide, except for the ARMM. The COMELEC
orderly, honest, and credible elections by containing or eliminating the problem issued another resolution adjusting the deadline of voter registration for the May
of having flying voters, as well as dead and multiple registrants. The objective of 2010 national and local elections to October 31, 2009 instead of December 15,
R.A. No. 10367 is to cleanse the national voter registry so as to eliminate electoral 2009 as previously fixed by the former resolution. Petitioner Raymond V. Palatino,
fraud and ensure that the results of the elections were truly reflective of the a youth sectoral representative under the Kabataan Party-list questions the
genuine will of the people. validity of the resolution because it infringes on their right to suffrage. The
petitioners are asking up to January 9, 2010 for voter registration.
Thus, biometrics validation is a manner of updating one’s registration for those
already registered under R.A. No. 8189, or a first-time registration for new
registrants. Here, the government is adopting a novel technology like biometrics DOCTRINE: Preserving the sanctity of the right of suffrage ensures that the State
in order to address the bane of electoral fraud. derives its power from the consent of the governed. The paramount importance
of this right is also a function of the State policy of people empowerment
articulated in the constitutional declaration that sovereignty resides in the people
and all government authority emanates from them, bolstered by the recognition
ang ginagawa niya, meron siyang system that automated fingerprint
of the vital role of the youth in nation-building and directive to the State to
identification system that compare, that matched your prints dito sa mga fingers
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs. It is against this backdrop
na to the rest of the registered voters na merong print. Malalaman niya if you
that Congress mandated a system of continuing voter registration in Section 8 of
are already registered in one place or if you have registered more than once.
RA 8189.
Making it mandatory makes it easier for COMELEC to be able to determine
multiple registration. Kasi kung hindi naman lahat meron ganon, meron
The clear text of the law thus decrees that voters be allowed to register daily
siyang print sa database the comlec, parang useless. Meron kang butal na
during regular office hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a
hindi makukuha in your analysis. Kaya naging mandatory. You know, ang
regular election and 90 days before a special election.
question nga diyan is an additional qualification that than provided under the
constitution.
By the above provision, Congress itself has determined that the period of 120 days
before a regular election and 90 days before a special election is enough time for
Apparently, the Supreme Court said it is not. It is allowed. It will make things
the COMELEC to make ALL the necessary preparations with respect to the coming
easier for COMELEC but mind you that is also very reason why you cannot
elections including: (1) completion of project precincts, which is necessary for the
register online right now in the time of the pandemic because it is the
proper allocation of official ballots, election returns and other election forms and
requirement of the law that you have to give your biometric data. So, the
paraphernalia; (2) constitution of the Board of Election Inspectors, including the
only way you can give it is when you go personally to do the office of the election
determination of the precincts to which they shall be assigned; (3) finalizing the
officer. That is precisely what I am saying in a debate. I was involved in a debate
Computerized Voters List; (4) supervision of the campaign period; and (5)
8 years ago whether to make this mandatory. Ang sabi ko you do not know the
preparation, bidding, printing and distribution of Voter's Information Sheet. Such
possibility of this becoming obsolete yung technology or that pagnasira, kasi dati
determination of Congress is well within the ambit of its legislative power, which
parati nasisira yung systema, does it mean to say if nasira walang biometrics
this Court is bound to respect. And the COMELEC's rule-making power should be
hindi na makakaboto. If it becomes an additional requirement, to me it is
exercised in accordance with the prevailing law. Both R.A. No. 6646, Section
unnecessary in the exercise of the right to vote. What could have happened is
29 and R.A. No. 8436, Section 28 grant the COMELEC the power to fix other
that COMELEC can be authorized to require it.
periods and dates for pre-election activities only if the same cannot be
reasonably held within the period provided by law. This grant of power,

53
however, is for the purpose of enabling the people to exercise the right of suffrage
– the common underlying policy of RA 8189, RA 6646 and RA 8436.

In the present case, the Court finds no ground to hold that the mandate of
continuing voter registration cannot be reasonably held within the period provided
by RA 8189, Sec. 8 – daily during office hours, except during the period starting
120 days before the May 10, 2010 regular elections. There is thus no occasion for
the COMELEC to exercise its power to fix other dates or deadlines therefor.

Hanging question from sir: For the election in 2022, the deadline for the
continuing application for registration was fixed to August 31, 2021. Are you
saying that it’s unconstitutional or invalid?

Apparently, there is a basis now for COMELEC to be adjusting pre-election

activities including setting the deadline despite the KABATAAN PARTYLIST case.

Even subsequent to that case, lahat yan 2013, 2016, 2019, the deadline was set
way before the October filing of the certificate of candidacy. The reason for
that is when you organize an election, the first most important thing is to
know how many voters will be voting. That will be your basis in determining
how many polling places you are going to constitute, how many schools you
are going to organize, how many machines you will deploy. If you do not know
the number of voters that will be very difficult operationally.

54
 JANUARY 8, 2021
III. CANDIDATES, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND ORGANIZATIONS
A. Candidates
➢ An individual becomes a candidate technically when he files his certificate
of candidacy. No matter how he proclaimed himself to be the best
President, Congressman or Mayor you can ever have, if he has not filed his
certificate of candidacy, then he is definitely not yet a candidate. Only
when he files his certificate of candidacy will he become technically a
candidate, and therefore, become bound by the rules.
Section 80 of Omnibus Election Code
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 says that although a person already filed a
certificate of candidacy, the criminal effect of such filing to the liability of the
person filing can only be had at the start of the campaign period. If you talk
about the term “premature campaigning”, there is technically no premature
campaigning, because partisan political activity technically means any act that
will tend to promote the election or defeat of a candidate. So kung wala pang
candidate, you are not technically promoting the election or defeat of a
candidate.
Sec 13 of RA 9369 (I put the important part lang)
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of
certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in
the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period
shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for
which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or
omissions applicable to a candidate shall effect only upon that start of the
aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public
appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and
officers, and employees in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall
be considered ipso factor resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same
at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certification of candidacy.
"Political parties may hold political conventions to nominate their official
candidate within thirty (30) days before the start of the period for filing
certificate of candidacy.
➢ Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 says that although a person already filed a
certificate of candidacy, the criminal effect of such filing to the liability
of the person filing can only be had at the start of the campaign period. If
you talk about the term “premature campaigning”, there is technically no
premature campaigning, because partisan political activity technically
means any act that will tend to promote the election or defeat of a
candidate. So kung wala pang candidate, you are not technically
promoting the election or defeat of a candidate.
➢ Therefore, Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code which punishes
premature campaigning has been rendered ineffective by R.A. No. 9369,
particularly Section 13. This is my interpretation.
Q: Why is the filing of a certificate of candidacy relevant in the Law on Public
Office?
A: Because public officers or career civil servants or members of the civil service
are not allowed to engage in partisan political activity. They are supposed to be
politically neutral. That is a basic principle in the Law on Public Officers here in
the Philippines.
Effects of Filing Candidacy
Sec. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or positions. - Any person holding
a public appointive office or position, including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
R.A. No. 9006 amended Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
Example:
From October 12 to 16, candidates for the 2016 polls will file their certificates
of candidacy (COC). When an appointed official files his/her COC, he/she is
deemed ipso facto resigned from his/her position (Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code [OEC]). Meanwhile, when an elective official, whether national
or local, files his/her COC, he/she is not deemed to have resigned (Section 14,
Fair Election Act which repealed Section 67 of the OEC). So, when Secretary Mar
Roxas files his COC for presidency in October, assuming he has not resigned by
then, he will be deemed ipso facto resigned from his position as secretary of the
Department of the Interior and Local Government. However, when Vice
President Jejomar Binay files his COC, he will not be considered resigned from
his post as vice president and will continue to hold his position until after he
leaves his post on June 30, 2016.
55
 Quinto v. COMELEC
resigned. You do not have to do anything else. You cease to be part of the civil
service.
Granting COMELEC’s Motion for Reconsideration, the SC reversed their original
Decision in the case of Quinto v. COMELEC and instead adopted the dissenting
Q: On the other hand, elective officials are those public officers who became
opinion of Chief Justice Puno.
public officers because they were elected. What happens to them?
The new Decision upheld Sec. 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Sec. 13 of R.A. 9363 and
A: They still continue their elective posts. Previously, they are also deemed
Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code. The Court adopted the view that these
resigned, except when running for the same position. This was under the Section
provisions satisfy the requisites of the equal protection test, especially the second
67 of the Omnibus Election Code. However, this was repealed by R.A. No. 9006.
requirement that it must be germane to the purposes of the law.
In this case, Quinto was then the Undersecretary of DENR. He was an appointive
It was emphasized that the purpose of the law is to defer to the sovereign will of
official, kas inga Undersecretary. He questioned the law. Sabi niya this is a
the people by letting elective officials serve until the end of the terms for which
violation of the equal protection of laws. Bakit yung elective pwede sila mag-
they were elected notwithstanding the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
continue, pero kaming mga appointive, we are deemed resigned?
On the contrary, the automatic resignation rule was imposed upon appointive
Q: The Supreme Court initially granted the petition of Quinto. However, it was
officials because unlike elected politicians, appointive officials, as officers and
reversed? What is the reason for the reversal?
employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan
political activity or from taking part in any election, except to vote.
A:Walang security of tenure ang elective officials. They have security of tenure
in the duration of their term. It is just that their term of office is fixed. You
Lastly, the Court underscored the fact that Mancuso v. Taft, the US case that was
have to be very clear about that. They cannot just be removed, because their
heavily relied upon by the assailed Decision, had already been overturned by
mandate basically comes from the electorate.
prevailing jurisprudence. The Court cited several US cases stating that the right
to express one’s views through candidacy is not a fundamental right and is neither
covered by the freedom of expression nor the right to association.

More importantly, it was ruled that the resign-to-run rule on appointive officials
does not violate a person’s right to run for public office because such right must
give way to the substantial public interest being protected by the rule: to maintain
a civil service that is impartial and free from the evils of partisan politics.
Q: What are the two modes by which a person becomes a public officer?
A: By appointment and by election.
Q: Appointive officials are those public officers na naging public officer because
they were appointed to that position. What happens when he files a certificate
of candidate?
➢ Filing of Certificate of Candidacy is a Ministerial Act. COMELEC cannot
refuse to accept a certificate of candidacy
Q: However, there may be people who are filing certificates of candidacy who do
not have the necessary eligibility for the position that they are seeking to be
elected to. So what is the remedy?
A: A: The remedy is basically Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (petition to
deny due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy). The second remedy is that
which is based on Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. This is generic.
Now, if it is a local government position, then that is Section 40 of R.A. No. 7160
(Local Government Code). Ang tawag dito ay petition for disqualification.

A: He is deemed to have resigned. Automatic yun. Kapag nag-file ka ng Pero again, kung Section 78, that is a petition to deny due course or cancel the
certificate of candidacy at na-receive ng COMELEC, you are deemed to have certificate of candidacy.

56
 Judicial (Division) Administrative (En Banc)
Section 78 of Omnibus Election Code
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A Disqualification Failure of Elections
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any Election Protest Postponement of Election
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days Quo Warranto Election Offense (filling of
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, information)
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
Pre-Election Annulment of Book of Voters
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
Annulment of Proclamation Cancellation of Certificate of
Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent Candidacy based on final judgement
authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for on conviction with ancillary penalty of
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been disqualification
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, Intra and inter party Allocation of Party-list seats
unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
Cancellation of Certificate of Accreditation of Major Parties
This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed Candidacy
removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or
incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years Registration of Political Parties
from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified.

Q: What is the difference? Section 78 of the Omnibus Election

Code Misrepresentation
A: All of these are electoral matters, and therefore, should be filed before
COMELEC; not in any other tribunal or court. These are pre-election issues or Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to
matters that have something to do with candidacy. Because it has something to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. -
do with candidacy , the jurisdiction of which falls before COMELEC. COMELEC A verified petition seeking to deny due Pleasing: Petition to Deny Due COurse
has jurisdiction to decide all questions relating to elections, except the right to course or to cancel a certificate of to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy
vote. candidacy may be filed by the person
exclusively on the ground that any Misrepresentation must be Material
material representation contained (pertains to qualification and
Jurisdiction therein as required under Section 74 disqualification; not surnames,
hereof is false. The petition may be profession or political party) and
Q: What tribunal must take jurisdiction over disputes regarding the right to vote? filed at any time not later than twenty- Willful/ Deliberate; Even if there is
five days from the time of the filing of “misrepresentation,” if actually
A: It is the Metropolitan Trial Court that has jurisdiction when it involves the right the certificate of candidacy and shall qualified, should not be disqualified
to vote. be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days 25 days from filing of COC
COMELEC JURISDICTION

57
before the election Remedy: Quo Warranto (d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or

Material Entries Formal Entries non-political cases here or abroad;

Qualification-Related: Non-qualification related (f) Permanent residents in a foreign

country or those who have acquired
➢ Citizenship ➢ Political Party
the right to reside abroad and continue
➢ Residency ➢ Profession to avail of the same right after the
➢ Registered Voter Legitimacy or illegitimacy effectivity of this Code; and
➢ Age ➢ Use of another surname
➢ Literacy ➢ Civil Status (g) The insane or feeble-minded.

To disqualified under
Misrepresentation Section 12 of Local Government Code
➢ The misrepresentation must
be material Sec. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person
➢ The candidate had the intent who has been declared by competent
to defraud the voters authority insane or incompetent, or
(deliberate) has been sentenced by final judgment
➢ The Candidate is not actually for subversion, insurrection, rebellion
qualified or for any offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more
Section 40 of Local Government Code than eighteen months or for a crime
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The involving moral turpitude, shall be
following persons are disqualified from disqualified to be a candidate and to
running for any elective local position: hold any office, unless he has been
given plenary pardon or granted
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment amnesty.
for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable This disqualifications to be a candidate
by one (1) year or more of herein provided shall be deemed
imprisonment, within two (2) years removed upon the declaration by
after serving sentence; competent authority that said insanity
or incompetence had been removed or
(b) Those removed from office as a after the expiration of a period of five
result of an administrative case; years from his service of sentence,
unless within the same period he again
(c) Those convicted by final judgment becomes disqualified.
for violating the oath of allegiance to Section 68 of Omnibus ElectionCode
the Republic;
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any

58
candidate who, in an action or protest Petition: Petition to Declare a
in which he is a party is declared by Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. - The Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate
final decision of a competent court Commission may motu proprio or upon
guilty of, or found by the Commission a verified petition of an interested
of having (a) given money or other party, refuse to give due course to or
material consideration to influence, cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is Who is a Nuisance?
induce or corrupt the voters or public shown that said certificate has been ➢ Campaign Capability
officials performing electoral filed to put the election process in ➢ Intention
functions; (b) committed acts of mockery or disrepute or to cause ➢ Performance
terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) confusion among the voters by the
➢ Exposure
spent in his election campaign an similarity of the names of the
➢ Platform
amount in excess of that allowed by registered candidates or by other
this Code; (d) solicited, received or circumstances or acts which clearly ➢ Party Affiliation
made any contribution prohibited demonstrate that the candidate has no ➢ Organization
under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; bona fide intention to run for the Profession
or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, office for which the certificate of ➢ Income
85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, candidacy has been filed and thus ➢ Health
and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be prevent a faithful determination of the ➢ Education
disqualified from continuing as a true will of the electorate. ➢ Name
candidate, or if he has been elected,
from holding the office. Any person Where to file?
who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall Comelec Division
not be qualified to run for any elective
office under this Code, unless said When to file?
person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a Within 5 days from Last Day of Filing of
foreign country in accordance with the Certificate of Candidacy
residence requirement provided for in
the election laws No other remedy Available if not filed
on time
Section 69 of Omnibus Election Code

Grounds

Aspects Lack of Qualification Commission of Election Offense Material Misrepresentation Nuisance Candidate
(Local Government Code) (Section 68 of the Omnibus Election (Sec. 78 Omnibus Election (Sec. 69 of Omnibus Election Code)
Code) Code)

59
 Pleadings Petition to Disqualify a Petition to Disqualify a Candidate Petition to Deny Due Course Petition to Declare a Candidate as aNuisance
Candidate to ot Cancel a Certificate of Candidate
Candidacy

Allegations (1) Candidate does not
possess all qualification
(2) Candidates possesses
some or all of
disqualification
Candidate committed any of enumerated (1) Misrepresentation is CoC has been filed to:
election offenses: material (1) Put the election process in mockery
(1) Vote buying (2) Candidate intended or disrepute
(2) Terrorism to defraud voters (2) Cause confusion among the voters by
(3) Unlawful Expenditures (3) Candidate is not the similarity of the names of the
(4) Unlawful Campaign actually qualified registered candidates
(5) Coercion of Subordinates (4) Candidates violated
(6) Threats on term limits [as Candidate no bona fide intention since
(7) Prohibition against Release of discussed in the case no/not:
Public Funds of Areata and (1) Campaign Capability
(8) Failure to submit Statements of Abundo] (2) Bona fide intention to run for office
Contributions ans Expenditures in (3) Track Record
at least 2 election (4) Exposure
(5) Platform
(6) Party Affiliation
(7) Funds
(8) Good Health
(9) Appropriate election

Where to file Comelec Division

When to file Any time before proclamation Any time before proclamation Within 25 days from Filing of Within 5 days from the Last Day Filing of
COC Certificate of Candidacy

Who Files Registered voter or registered Registered voter or registered political Registered voter or Registered candidate for the same position
political party party registered political party

Comelec Campaign Finance Office, Sec-

registered Ngos and CSOs

Remedy After Quo Warranto [ Section 253] Election Offense Quo Warranto[ Section 253] No remedy
Period

Fermin v. COMELEC After the creation of Shariff Kabunsuan, the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous
This case involves consolidated petitions. Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), passed Autonomy Act No. 205. This created
the Municipality of Northern Kabuntalan in Shariff Kabunsuan. This new
FIRST PETITION (FILED BY DILANGALEN) municipality was constituted by separating several barangays from the
Municipality of Kabuntalan.
60

Mike Fermin (Fermin) was a registered voter of Barangay Payan in Kabuntalan. He
claimed that he had been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for 1 year and 6 months,
thus, he applied with the COMELEC for the transfer of his registration record to
the said Barangay Indatuan.
In the meantime, the creation of North Kabuntalan was ratified in a plebiscite.
This formally made Barangay Indatuan a component of Northern Kabuntalan.
Thereafter, COMELEC approved Fermin’s application for the transfer of his voting
record and registration as a voter to Precinct 21A of Barangay Indatuan, Northern
Kabuntalan.
Thereafter, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan
in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections.
Dilangalen’s contentions
Umbra Ramil Bayam Dilangalen (Dilangalen), another mayoralty candidate, filed a
Petition for Disqualification against Fermin with the Office of the Provincial
Election Supervisor of Shariff Kabunsuan. Dilangalen alleged that Fermin did not
possess the period of residency required for candidacy, and that he perjured
himself in his CoC and in his application for transfer of voting record.
Elections were then held without any decision on Dilangalen’s petition.
Thereafter, Dilangalen emerged as the victor. Because of this, Fermin filed an
election protest with the Regional Trial Court.
SECOND PETITION (FILED BY FERMIN) - Most important to the topic
Acting on Dilangalen’s petition, the COMELEC Second Division disqualified Fermin
for not being a resident of Northern Kabuntalan. It ruled that, based on his
declaration that he is a resident of Barangay Payan, then Fermin could not have
been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for at least one year. This ruling was
affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc.
Fermin’s contentions
Because of this, Fermin filed a petition with the Supreme Court. He contends that
Dilangalen’s petition is a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Furthermore, Fermin argues that he has been a resident of Barangay Indatuan long
before the creation of Northern Kabuntalan. This change of residence prompted
him to apply for the transfer of his voter’s registration record from Barangay Payan
to Barangay Indatuan.
Moreover, the one-year residency requirement under the law is not applicable to
candidates for elective office in a newly created municipality, because the length
of residency of all its inhabitants is reckoned from the effective date of the new
municipality’s creation.
Dilangalen’s contentions
Dilangalen contends that the petition he filed is one for disqualification under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. This may be filed at any time after the
last day for filing of the CoC, but not later than the candidate’s proclamation
should he win in the elections. He filed the petition on April 20, 2007, long before
the proclamation of the eventual winning candidate. Thus, it was filed on time.
Dilangalen also claims that Fermin failed to comply with the one-year residency
requirement for him to be able to run for an elective office in Northern
Kabuntalan. He applied for the transfer of his voting record on December 13, 2006,
and this was approved only on January 8, 2007.
THIRD PETITION (FILED BY DILANGALEN)
During the pendency of Fermin’s petition with the Supreme Court, Dilangalen filed
with the RTC a motion to dismiss Fermin’s election protest, on the ground that he
had no legal standing to file such protest. This is because the COMELEC En Banc
already affirmed his disqualification as a candidate.
However, the RTC denied the motion to dismiss. It ruled that Fermin’s election
protest was separate and distinct from the COMELEC proceedings, and the RTC
would continue hearing the protest.
Dilangalen then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the COMELEC.
The COMELEC ruled in his favor, setting aside the orders of the RTC. Fermin then
filed another Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
1. Important to the topic: W/N Dilangalen’s petition is one under Section
68 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
2. Also important: W/N it was filed on time
3. W/N Fermin is a resident of the locality for at least one year prior to the
May 14, 2007 elections
61
 4. W/N it was correct on the part of COMELEC to dismiss Fermin’s election
protest because had no legal standing to file it
Ruling:
YES, DILANGALEN’S PETITION IS ONE UNDER SECTION 78 OF THE OMNIBUS
ELECTION CODE. IT IS A PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE OR CANCEL COC.
The main distinction between the two is that a Section 78 petition is filed before
proclamation; while a petition for quo warrant is filed after the proclamation of
a winning candidate.
What is a Section 68 petition (petition for disqualification)?

What is a Section 78 petition and its essential allegations?
Dilangalen’s petition contains the essential allegations of a “Section 78”
petition:
1) The candidate made a representation in his certificate;
2) The representation pertains to a material matter which would affect the
substantive rights of the candidate (the right to run for the election for
which he filed his certificate); and
3) The candidate made the false representation with the intention to deceive
the electorate as to his qualification for public office or deliberately
attempted to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render him ineligible.
Dilangalen’s petition also raises a question on a candidate’s eligibility for public
office, which in this case is Fermin’s possession of the one-year residency
requirement under the law.
Alleging that the candidate made a material representation that is false
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the
lack of qualifications, but on a finding that the candidate made a material
representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of
the public office he is running for. Here, the candidate states in his CoC that he is
eligible for the office he seeks.
Therefore, Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public
office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC
that is false, the COMELEC is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such
certificate.
A Section 78 petition and a Section 68 petition are different remedies, based on
different grounds, and resulting in different eventualities.
Dilangalen’s insistence that the petition it filed before the COMELEC is in the
nature of a disqualification case (Section 68), as it is in fact captioned as a
“Petition for Disqualification”, does not persuade the Supreme Court.
The ground raised in Dilangalen’s petition is that Fermin allegedly lacked one of
the qualifications to be elected as mayor of Northern Kabuntalan (that he did not
have the one-year residency requirement). Failure to meet the one-year
residency requirement for the public office is not a ground for the
“disqualification” of a candidate under Section 68. Section 68 refers only to the
commission of prohibited acts and the possession of a permanent resident
status in a foreign country as grounds for disqualification.
Likewise, other provisions of law referring to “disqualification” do not include the
lack of the one-year residency qualification as a ground for such disqualification.
These provisions include Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 40
of the Local Government Code.
Petition for disqualification v. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC
Petition for disqualification (Section Petition to deny due course to or
68) cancel a CoC (Section 78)
Premised on Section 12 of the Can only be grounded on a statement
Omnibus Election Code, Section 68 of of a material representation in the
the Omnibus Election Code, or Section said certificate that is false
40 of the Local Government Code

Similar to a quo warranto proceeding under the Omnibus Election Code A person who is disqualified under A person whose certificate is
Section 68 is merely prohibited to cancelled or
Indeed, the Supreme Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to continue as a candidate denied due course under Section 78 is
a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, since not treated as a candidate at all, as if
they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate. he never filed a CoC

62

A candidate who is disqualified under A person
Section 68 can validly be substituted whose CoC has been denied due
under Section course or cancelled under Section 78
77 of the Omnibus Election Code, cannot be
because he remains a candidate until substituted because he is never
disqualified considered a candidate
A COMELEC rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary legislative enactments
In support of his claim that he actually filed a petition for disqualification, and
not a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC, Dilangalen takes refuge in
Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, specifically Section 1. It states that
any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as
provided for by the Constitution or by existing law may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate. Dilangalan also takes refuge in COMELEC Resolution No.
7800 (Rules Delegating to COMELEC Field Officials the Authority to Hear and
Receive Evidence in Disqualification Cases Filed in Connection with the May 14,
2007 National and Local Elections).
However, a COMELEC rule or resolution cannot supplant or vary the legislative
enactments that distinguish the grounds for disqualification from those of
ineligibility, and the appropriate proceedings to raise the said grounds. In other
words, Rule 25 and COMELEC Resolution No. 7800 cannot supersede the dissimilar
requirements of the law for the filing of a petition for disqualification under
Section 68, and a petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of CoC
under Section 78.
The lack of a provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates cannot be
supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of
action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its
rule-making power, cannot do.
Disqualification v. Ineligibility
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility
into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law.
The grounds and consequences of proceedings for “disqualification” are different
from those for a declaration of “ineligibility.”
“Disqualification” proceedings are based on grounds specified in Section 12 and
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in Section 40 of the Local Government
Code. These are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a
candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. Their purpose is to
eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress.
“Ineligibility” refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the
Constitution or the statutes for holding public office. The purpose of the
proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office
does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing
as a candidate for a public office, and vice versa. Furthermore, the procedure laid
down in Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cannot be used in Section 78
proceedings, because a different rule (Rule 23) specifically governs petitions to
deny due course to or cancel CoCs.
YES, THE PETITION WAS FILED ON TIME.
Being a petition under Section 78, the petition has to comply with the 25-day
statutory period for its filing. A Section 78 petition may be filed at any time not
later than 25 days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Construed in relation to reglementary periods and the principles of prescription,
the dismissal of Section 78 petitions filed beyond the 25-day period must come
as a matter of course.
Accordingly, it is necessary to determine when Fermin filed his CoC in order to
ascertain whether Dilangalen’s petition filed on April 20, 2007 was well within
the restrictive 25-day period. If it was not, then the COMELEC should have
dismissed the petition outright.
In this case, Fermin filed his CoC for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan on March
29, 2007. Therefore, the petition to deny due course to or cancel Fermin’s CoC
was filed by Dilangalen well-within the 25-day reglementary period.
YES, FERMIN IS A RESIDENT OF BARANGAY INDATUAN FOR AT LEAST ONE YEAR
PRIOR TO THE MAY 14, 2007 ELECTIONS.
HOWEVER, THE PETITION STILL DOES NOT MAKE A PRIMA FACIE CASE. IT MUST
BE DENIED.
The COMELEC ruled that Fermin is not a resident of Barangay Indatuan for at least
one year prior to the May 14, 2007 elections. However, COMELEC merely relied on
a single piece of evidence to support its finding that he was not a resident of
Barangay Indatuan. This piece of evidence was the oath of office subscribed and
sworn to before Governor Datu Andal Ampatuan, in which Fermin indicated that
63
he was a resident of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan as of April 27, 2006.
However, this single piece of evidence does not necessarily support a finding that
Fermin was not a resident of Northern Kabuntalan as of May 14, 2006, or one year
prior to the May 14, 2007 elections. Fermin merely admitted that he was a resident
of another locality as of April 27, 2006, which was more than year before the
elections.
Moreover, given that a voter is required to reside in the place wherein he proposes
to vote only for six months immediately preceding the election, Fermin’s
application for transfer on December 13, 2006 does not contradict his earlier
admission that he was a resident of Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court finds that Dilangalen’s petition does not make out
a prima facie case. Its dismissal is warranted. The mere filing of a petition and
the convenient allegation therein that a candidate does not reside in the
locality where he seeks to be elected is insufficient to effect the cancellation
of his CoC. Convincing evidence must substantiate every allegation.
NO, IT WAS NOT CORRECT ON THE PART OF COMELEC TO DISMISS FERMIN’S
ELECTION PROTEST.
The COMELEC’s order for the dismissal of Fermin’s election protest is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion, as it is premised on Fermin’s alleged lack of legal
standing to file the protest, which in turn, is based on Fermin’s alleged lack of
residency qualification. To reiterate, Fermin satisfied the residency
requirement, which gives him legal standing to file the election protest.
➢ The Court here emphasized that a petition for disqualification must be
premised on Sec. 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec. 40 of
the LGC.
➢ However, a petition to deny due course or cancel a COC can only be
grounded on a statement of material representation which is false.
➢ The effects of these petitions are also different. When a person is
disqualified under Sec. 68 he is merely prohibited to continue as a
candidate, and therefore he can be substituted based on Sec. 77 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
➢ While if his COC is cancelled or his petition is denied due course under
Sec. 78 he is not treated as a candidate at all; it’s as if he or she never
filed a COC.
Substitution of Candidate
➢ A candidate can only be substituted if he is a member of the same
political party as the one who will be substituted. And also, when the
one who is to be substituted is a candidate because you cannot
substitute a non-candidate.
➢ When your COC is denied due course then substitution cannot operate.
However if it was only disqualification under Sec. 68 there is no
cancellation of the COC.
64
 Areta v COMELEC

This case stemmed from a mayoral race between Lonzandia and Antipolo.
The SC held in this case held that when a candidate files a Certificate of
However, under Section of 78, Rodolfo filed a petitioner to to disqualify Lonzanida
Candidacy and makes false material representations with regard to his
and to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy on the
eligibility and/or qualifications. In this case, the 3-term-limit rule is
ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San Antonio,
considered a ground for determining whether or not a certain candidate is
Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the term for the May
qualified to run for public office.
2010 elections. A resolution was issued by the COMELEC to cancel Lonzanida’s CoC,
but the motion for reconsideration remained pending during the elections. Hence,
Ang mabuting balita ayon kay Tito
during the elections, Lonzanida and his Vice Mayor Aratea won. Afterwards,
Ganito sabi ng Supreme Court and this is the one quoted by subsequent court
COMELEC issued a resolution disqualifying Lonzanida from running Mayor. With
decision; “although wala sa Section 74, meron kasi sa Certificate of Candidacy
this, Aratea took an oath as Mayor. But Antipolo claimed her right to be proclaimed
na “I undertake and I say that I am eligible to the office that I am seeking to be
as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate
elected”” So pag wala sa Section 74, you can get it from -- there is a generic all
when the COMELEC issued the Resolution, ordered the cancellation of his
encompassing line in the certificate of candidacy that says I am eligible to
certificate of candidacy. So the issue in this case is determining who should
occupy the position where I am seeking to be elected.
properly fill in Lonzanida’s vacancy.
So if I violate that, even if that particular ground is not in Section 74, then I also
The Court held that Lonzanida’s candidacy is considered void ab initio thus, it
made false material representation. So it need not be -- may mga pilosopo wala
should be Antipolo who should fill in the vacancy. The conviction of Lonzanida by
naman sa Section 74 yan eh, that’s why the Supreme Court took a painstaking
final judgment, with the penalty of prisión mayor, disqualifies him perpetually
effort to say na yung sections, yung line na yon would include the grounds that
from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office.
are enumerated in Section 39 of the LGC as well as the Constitution.
Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code because this accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which
means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office. On the 3-term limit
issue, Lonzanida misrepresented his eligibility because he knew full well that he
had been elected, and had served, as mayor for more than three consecutive terms Giron v. Comelec
yet he still certified that he was eligible to run for mayor for the next succeeding
term. Thus, Lonzanida's representation that he was eligible for the office that he This case is a Petition assailing the constitutionality of Sec. 12 (Substitution of
sought election constitutes false material representation as to his qualification or Candidates) and Sec.14 (Repealing Clause) of RA 9006 (Fair Election Act). It also
eligibility for the office. As compared to Section 68, which refers to the seeks to prohibit COMELEC from further implementing the sections of the Fair
commission of prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident status in a Election Act on the ground that these provisions would enable elective officials to
foreign country, any other false representation regarding a material fact should gain campaign advantage and allow them to disburse public funds from the time
be filed under Section 78, specifically under the candidate's certification of his they file their certificates of candidacy until after the elections.
eligibility.
Petitioner Giron asserts that the insertion of Secs. 12 and 14 in the Fair Election
A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid Act violates Sec. 26 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically
candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was requires: "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
cancelled because he was ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor. Whether his shall be expressed in the title thereof."
certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial
because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from Giron avers that these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair
the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Sec. 12 refers to the treatment of
only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections — Antipolo, who the votes cast for substituted candidates after the official ballots have been
therefore received the highest number of votes. printed, while Sec. 14 pertains to the repeal of Sec. 67 (Candidates holding

65
elective office) of the Omnibus Election Code.
Sec. 67 of this law concerns the ipso facto resignation of elective officials
immediately after they file their respective certificates of candidacy for an office
other than that which they are currently holding in a permanent capacity. On the
other hand COMELEC argues that this matter was already resolved in Farinas v.
Executive Secretary. Hence, this petition.
Whether or not the inclusion of Secs. 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates
Section 26 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, or the "one subject-one title"
rule (NO
Ruling:NO, petitioners were unable to present a compelling reason that would
surpass the strong presumption of validity and constitutionality in favor of the
Fair Election Act.
The SC had already ruled in Farinas that the title and the objectives of RA 9006
are comprehensive enough to include subjects other than the lifting of the ban on
the use of media for election propaganda. The entire title of RA 9006 is "An Act
to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Election Practices."
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Sec. 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Sec. 67 of the
Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its
content.
It has been held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in the title,
may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so
long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and
may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general subject.
In relation to the syllabus:
Upon inspection of the Bicameral Conference Committee deliberations, it is seen
that Congress viewed the act of considering an elective official as ipso facto
resigned once he filed his Certificate of Candidacy as unfair:
“The unfairness was in the opportunity to run and then you're disqualified when
you run for something else. Ngayon we restrict it only for the President and Vice
President.”
Sec. 14 of RA 9006 repealed Sec. 67 because Congress viewed the ipso facto
resignation of an elective official as “a form of harassment or discrimination.”
After combing through various laws, they found other election practices that they
considered inequitable.
Some of these practices included the appreciation of the votes cast in case of a
late substitution of candidates and the ipso facto resignation of certain elective
officials upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy. Thus, to "level the
playing field," Congress fashioned a law that would address what they determined
were unfair election practices; hence, the birth of the Fair Election Act.
Hence, the assailed Sec. 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Sec. 14 (Repealing
Clause) are indeed germane to the subject expressed in the title of RA 9006: An
Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Election Practices.
Villafuerte v. COMELEC
Petitioner and respondent were both candidates for the Gubernatorial position of
the Province of Camarines Sur in the May 13, 2013 local and national elections.
Petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Verified Petition to deny due course to or
cancel the certificate of candidacy (COC) of respondent, alleging that respondent
intentionally and materially misrepresented a false and deceptive name/nickname
that would mislead the voters when he declared under oath in his COC that "L-RAY
JR.-MIGZ" was his nickname or stagename and that the name he intended to
appear on the official ballot was VILLAFUERTE, L-RAY JR.-MIGZ NP; that
respondent deliberately omitted his first name "MIGUEL" and inserted, instead
"LRAY JR.," which is the nickname of his father, the incumbent Governor of
Camarines Sur, "LRay Villafuerte, Jr."
In his Answer, respondent denied the commission of any material
misrepresentation and asserted, among others, that he had been using the
nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ" and not only "MIGZ"; that the choice of name/word to
appear on the ballot was solely his choice or preference; and that the presumption
that the voters would be confused on the simple fact that his name would be
placed first in the ballot was misplaced.
The COMELEC's First Division denied the petition for lack of merit and disposed as
follows: “no compelling reason why the COC of respondent should be denied due
course to or cancelled on the sole basis of an alleged irregularity in his
name/nickname. Laws and jurisprudence on the matter are clear that material
misrepresentation in the COC pertains only to qualifications of a candidate, such
as citizenship, residency, registration as a voter, age, etc. Nothing has been
66
mentioned about a candidate's name/nickname as a ground to deny due course or
cancel his/her COC.”
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc, which
denied the same in a Resolution. The COMELEC found that its First Division did not
err in denying the petition as existing law and jurisprudence are clear in providing
that a misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy is material when it refers to
a qualification for elective office and affects the candidate's eligibility; and that
a misrepresentation of a non-material fact is not a ground to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. It found that petitioner's allegations did not pertain to respondent's
qualifications or eligibility for the office to which he sought to be elected. The
candidate's use of a name or nickname is not a ground to deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy.
Whether or not respondent committed a material misrepresentation under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code so as to justify the cancellation of his COC.
NO. RESPONDENT DID NOT COMMIT A MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATION UNDER
SECTION 78 OF THE OMNIBUS CODE.
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code states that no person shall be eligible for
any elective public office unless he files a sworn COC within the period fixed
herein. And the proper procedure to be taken if a misrepresentation is committed
by a candidate in his COC is to question the same by filing a verified petition
pursuant to Section 78.
Clearly, Section 78 states that the false representation in the contents of the
COC required under Section 74 must refer to material matters in order to
justify the cancellation of the COC.
In Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, the Court held that “in case there is a
material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the Comelec is
authorized to deny due course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing of a
petition by any person pursuant to Section 78. As stated in the law, in order to
justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78, it is
essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain[s] to a material
matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive
rights of a candidate — the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the
certificate of candidacy. Therefore, it may be concluded that the material
misrepresentation contemplated by Section 78 of the Code refers to
qualifications for elective office. Aside from the requirement of materiality, a
false representation under Section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible." In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the
electorate as to one's quali􏰁cations for public office. The use of surname, when
not intended to mislead, or deceive the public as to one's identity is not within
the scope of the provision.”
In Aratea v. Commission on Elections, We find that violation of the three-term
limit is an eligibility affecting the qualification of a candidate to elective office
and the misrepresentation of such is a ground to grant the petition to deny due
course or cancel a COC. Section 74 requires the candidate to certify that he is
eligible for the public office he seeks election. Thus, Section 74 states that "the
certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing . . . is eligible for said
office. In a certificate of candidacy, the candidate is asked to certify under
oath his eligibility, and thus qualification, to the office he seeks election. Even
though the certificate of candidacy does not specifically ask the candidate for
the number of terms elected and served in an elective position, such fact is
material in determining a candidate's eligibility, and thus qualification for the
office.”
In Justimbaste v. Commission on Elections, the Court said that “at all events, the
use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material
misrepresentation, as "material misrepresentation" under the earlier-quoted
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code refers to "qualifications for elective
office."
Clearly, from the foregoing, for the petition to deny due course or cancel the
COC of one candidate to prosper, the candidate must have made a material
misrepresentation involving his eligibility or qualification for the office to
which he seeks election, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or
any other legal qualification necessary to run for local elective office as
provided in the Local Government Code. Hence, petitioner's allegation that
respondent's nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ" written in his COC is a material
misrepresentation is devoid of merit. Respondent's nickname written in the
COC cannot be considered a material fact which pertains to his eligibility and
thus qualification to run for public office.
Moreover, the false representation under Section 78 must consist of a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise
render a candidate ineligible. As we said, respondent's nickname is not
considered a material fact, and there is no substantial evidence showing that
in writing the nickname "LRAY JR. MIGZ" in his COC, respondent had the
intention to deceive the voters as to his identity which has an effect on his
eligibility or qualification for the office he seeks to assume.
67

Notably, respondent is known to the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur as
the son of the then incumbent Governor of the province, popularly known as
"LRay." Their relationship is shown by the posters, streamers and billboards
displayed in the province with the faces of both the father and son on them. Thus,
the voters of the Province of Camarines Sur know who respondent is. Moreover, it
was established by the affidavits of respondent's witnesses that as the father and
son have striking similarities, such as their looks and mannerisms, which remained
unrebutted, the appellation of LRAY JR. has been used to refer to respondent.
Hence, the appellation LRAY JR., accompanied by the name MIGZ written as
respondent's nickname in his COC, is not at all misleading to the voters, as in
fact, such name distinguishes respondent from his father, the then incumbent
"Governor LRAY," who was running for a Congressional seat in the 2nd District
of Camarines Sur. As we ruled in Salcedo II v. COMELEC, the use of a surname,
when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one's identity, is not
within the scope of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus,
respondent's nickname written in his COC, without intending to mislead the
voters as to his identity, cannot be canceled. We find no grave abuse of
discretion committed by the COMELEC En Banc in finding that respondent did
not commit material misrepresentation in his COC.
This case is a petition to deny due course and to cancel COC on the ground of a
statement of a material representation that is false; to be material, such must
refer to an eligibility or qualification for the elective office the candidate seeks
to hold. Here, respondent's nickname is not a qualification for a public office
which affects his eligibility. Notably, respondent's father, who won 3 consecutive
terms as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte, is popularly known as
"LRAY," so when respondent wrote in his COC, "LRAY JR. MIGZ" as his nickname,
he differentiated himself from Governor "LRAY," which negates any intention to
mislead or misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible.
It bears stressing that Section 74 requires, among others, that a candidate shall
use in a COC the name by which he has been baptized, unless the candidate
has changed his name through court-approved proceedings, and that he may
include one nickname or stagename by which he is generally or popularly
known in the locality, which respondent did. As we have discussed, the name
which respondent wrote in his COC to appear in the ballot, is not considered a
material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, as
it does not pertain to his qualification or eligibility to run for an elective public
office
Poe-Llamanzares. V. COMELEC
This is a consolidated petition about Grace Poe-Llamanzares' Certificate of
Candidacy and her eligibility to run for as President of the Republic of the
Philippines.
On September 3, 1968, Mr. and Mrs. Militar who found the infant Grace in a church
in Iloilo. She was eventually adopted by Mr. and Mrs. Poe, and her name was
changed from 'Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar' to 'Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe'. She married Teodoro Llamanzares on July 27, 1991. She became a
naturalized US citizen on October 18, 2001 and was able to obtain a US passport
afterwards. After a few years, her father suffered a stroke which led to his
untimely demise and Spouses Llamanzares decided to return to the Philippines and
live here. On July 7, 2006, Poe took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003). She then filed with the Bureau of Immigration a sworn petition to reacquire
her Philippine Citizenship. On July 12, 2011, Poe executed an 'Oath/Affirmation
of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States, by October 21, 2010, she
effectively lost her US nationality. On October 2, 2012, she filed a COC for Senator
in the 2013 Elections where she answered that she has lived in the Philippines for
6 years and 6 months (Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013).
She won and became a Senator. By October 15, 2015, she then filed another COC,
this time running for President. She declared that she is a natural-born citizen and
has been living in the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months (from May 24, 2005).
Elamparo's Arguments:
➢ Poe committed material misrepresentation when she stated she was a
natural-born citizen and that she has been a resident of the Philippines
for at least 10 years and 11 months.
➢ Poe cannot be considered to be a natural-born citizen because she is a
foundling
➢ International law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino
citizenship on foundlings
➢ Natural-born citizenship must be continuous from birth.
➢ In her 2012 COC, Poe stated that she had lived in the Philippines for 6
years and 6 months
➢ Even if she was qualified to regain her natural-born status under RA 9225,
she fell short of the 10-year residency requirement because her residence
could only be counted from July 2006.
➢ Poe also failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.
Tatad's Arguments:
➢ Poe lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the
Presidency
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 ➢ Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of
unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be considered
natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determined of
natural-born status.
➢ Foundlings are also not expressly included in the categories of citizens in
the 1935 Constitution
➢ The burden of proof lies on Poe to prove that she is a natural-born citizen.
➢ There is no standard state practice that automatically confers natural-
born status to foundlings.
➢ Poe did not comply with the 10-year residency requirement, she only
acquired her domicile in Quezon City in 2010 or 2011
➢ Her 2012 COC wherein she stated she has been residing in the Philippines
for 6 years and 6 months work against her
Contreras' Arguments:
➢ Poe's 2015 COC should be cancelled because she did not qualify for the 10-
year residency requirement
➢ she made a false entry when she said she has been a legal resident of the
Philippines for 10 years and 11 months
➢ Poe's physical presence in the country before July 18, 2006 could not be a
valid evidence of reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was
here as an American citizen.
RTC ruled that Poe is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and that she
failed to satisfy the 10-year residency requirement.
COMELEC First Division also concluded that she is not qualified to run as President.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not Grace Poe's COC should be denied due course or cancelled
on the exclusive ground that she made in the certificate a false material
representation. - NO.
(2) Whether or not Grace Poe committed a false material representation when
she stated in her 2015 COC that she been a resident of the Philippines for
10 years and 11 months. - NO.
(3) Whether or not Grace Poe is a natural-born Filipino citizen. - YES.
Ruling:
(1) NO. It must be noted that the COMELEC in itself cannot decide the
qualification or lack thereof of the candidate. Section 2, Article IX(C) of
the 1987 Constitution enumerates the powers and functions of the
COMELEC. Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the
exactitude of the provisions of Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. In this same provision, it is clear which tribunals have
jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of the President, Vice-
President, Senators and the Members of the House of Representatives.
Rule 23 and 25 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 do not allow the
COMELEC to determine the qualification of the candidate. The facts of
qualification must be established beforehand in a prior proceeding before
an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. If a candidate cannot be
disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a
disqualification, neither can a candidate's COC be cancelled or denied due
course on the grounds of false misrepresentation.
(2) NO. The Constitution requires that presidential candidates must have 10
years residence in the Philippines before the day of the election. In this
case, the elections will be held on May 9, 2016, Poe must have been a
resident of the Philippines prior to May 9, 2016 for 10 years. When Poe
immigrated to the US in 1991, she lost her original domicile (Philippines).
To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence, and establish a new residence
with definite acts which correspond with purpose. Here, Poe presented
voluminous evidence showing that she and her family had already
abandoned their US domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good.
When coupled with Poe's eventual application to reacquire her Philippine
citizenship and her family's actual and continuous stay in the Philippines
over the years, it is clear that when Poe returned on May 24, 2005, it was
for good. It must be noted that there has been no judicial precedent that
comes close to the facts of residence of Poe. The Court further ruled that
it was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as
a binding and conclusive admission against Poe. Poe admitted that she got
confused as to what to put. So, when she claimed to have been a resident
of the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months, she did so in good faith.
Therefore, Poe is declared qualified to be a candidate for President in the
elections of May 9, 2016.
(3) YES. Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and
the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and
consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The
presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the
empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more than
69
 99% and is a virtual certainty.
Commissioner Arthur Lim also admitted that at the time Poe was found in Iloilo in
1986, the majority of the population in Iloilo are Filipinos. Furthermore, there are
also other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of Poe:
she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church
she has typical Filipino features: height, flat nose, straight black hair, almond
shaped eyes and an oval face.
All of these indicate that more than ample probability if not statistical certainty
that Poe's biological parents are Filipinos. To assume otherwise would be absurd.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just
because there may be a theoretical chance that one among these thousands of
foundlings might be the child of a foreigner is downright discriminatory, irrational
and unjust.
Mabuting Balita ayon kay Tito
➢ COMELEC is not a tribunal which will it dig into the qualification
➢ Under the constitution, the jurisdiction in election returns, qualification
of those in position resy on the Presidential Electoral Tribunal which in
effect a status quo warranto proceeding after election.
➢ BEFORE ELECTION, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is merely electoral
in nature about the candidate.
➢ Whatever is the decision of the COMELEC in the petition to deny due
course can still be raised on a Quo Warranto proceeding after election.
FRANCISCO V. COMELEC
Francisco is a registered voter in Cainta, Rizal, while Nieto was elected as mayor
of the same municipality in 2013. Nieto filed a certificate of candidacy (COC) to
signify his bid for re-election for the 2016 National and Local Elections. On April
8, 2016, Francisco filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against
Nieto, alleging that on April 1-2, 2016, respondent made financial contributions
out of the government coffers for the asphalt-paving of the road entrance along
Imelda Avenue of Cainta Green Park Village. This, according to petitioner,
amounted to the expending of public funds within 45 days before the 2016 polls
and to illegal contributions for road repairs, respectively punishable under Secs.
261(v) and 104of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC). Petitioner further claimed that the said asphalt paving was
one of the accomplishments that respondent reported on his Facebook page. In
his Answer, Nieto countered that the questioned asphalting project was subjected
to public bidding on March 15, 2016, with a Notice of Award issued on March 21,
2016. Thus, the asphalting project falls within the excepted public works
mentioned in Sec. 261(v)(l)(b) of the OEC. While the case was on-going, Nieto
would be re-elected as municipal mayor of Cainta, Rizal, having garnered the
plurality of votes upon the conclusion of the 2016 polls.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a prior judgment is not a precondition to filing a Petition for
Disqualification. (YES)
RULING:
Petitioner is correct in his contention that a prior judgment is not a precondition
to filing a Petition for Disqualification. Nevertheless, the petition must necessarily
fail for lack of substantial evidence to establish that private respondent
committed an election offense.
The essence of a disqualification proceeding that invokes Sec. 68 of the OEC is to
bar an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for
public office based not on the candidate's lack of qualification, but on his
possession of a disqualification as declared by a final decision of a competent
court, or as found by the Commission.The jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify
candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the OEC. All other
election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. Meanwhile, for a
Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel COC under Sec. 78 of the OEC to prosper,
the candidate must have made a material misrepresentation involving his
eligibility or qualification for the office to which he seeks election, such as the
requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to
run for elective office enumerated under Sec. 74 of the OEC. Moreover, the false
representation under Sec. 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.The
relief is granted not because of the candidate's lack of eligibility per se, but
because of his or her false misrepresentation of possessing the statutory
qualifications.
The doctrine in Poe was never meant to apply to Petitions for Disqualification. A
prior court judgment is not required before the remedy under Sec. 68 of the OEC
can prosper. This is highlighted by the provision itself, which contemplates of two
scenarios: first, there is a final decision by a competent court that the candidate
is guilty of an election offense and second, it is the Commission itself that found
that the candidate committed any of the enumerated prohibited acts. Noteworthy
is that in the second scenario, it is not required that there be a prior final
judgment; it is sufficient that the Commission itself made the determination. The
70
conjunction "or" separating "competent court" and "the Commission" could only The photographs petitioner presented depicting the construction and works done
mean that the legislative intent was for both bodies to be clothed with authority on the asphalting project would only prove the fact of paving, which is not even
to ascertain whether or not there is evidence that the respondent candidate ought contested. They do not, however, establish that respondent expended public funds
to be disqualified. or made financial contributions during the election Prohibition. On the other hand,
respondent Nieto sufficiently parried the alleged commission of the election
Furthermore, the quantum of proof necessary in election cases is, as in all offenses by proving that the asphalting project squarely falls under the exception
administrative cases, substantial evidence. This is defined as such relevant in Sec. 261 (v)(l)(b).
evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion.To
impose prior conviction of an election offense as a condition sine qua non before
Ang mabuting balita ayon kay Tito:
a Petition for Disqualification can be launched would be tantamount to requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is significantly beyond what our laws
It was Sec. 68 petition. But, COMELEC dismissed the case because allegedly
require.
there was no authority in filing. May or may not look at the case, I think I
dissented from the COMELEC decision here.I did not agree with the decision
We are, therefore, constrained to rule that the COMELEC erred when, relying on
there because basically the ground was Sec 68 and it was not a 78 petition.
Poe, it imposed the requirement of a prior court judgment before resolving the
Whatever they… You don't really need a prior authoritative judgement.
current controversy.
However, the Supreme Court, through Justice Velasco,went on to discuss: una,
Sec 68 and not Sec. 78, Second,The SC did not really abandon the power of the
The records are bereft of evidence to hold that respondent violated Secs. 261(v)
COMELEC to inquire to the qualification of a candidate in the Poe-LLamanzares
and 104 of the Omnibus Election Code.
case.
Notwithstanding the COMELEC's error in applying Poe, the petition must
The main doctrine in this case is a prior court judgement is not required for
nevertheless fail. Thoughthe COMELEC can properly take cognizance of the
further remedy under Sec 68 of the Omnibus Election Code can prosper before
Petition for Disqualification without issue, petitioner miserably failed to tender
the COMELEC
evidence that respondent committed the election offenses imputed.
A prior court judgment is not required before the remedy under Sec. 68 of the
The quantum of proof necessary in election cases is substantial evidence, or such
OEC can prosper. This is highlighted by the provision itself, which contemplates
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a
two scenarios: first, there is a final decision by a competent court that the
conclusion. Corollarily, the rule is that he who alleges must prove Thus, the burden
candidate is guilty of an election offense and second, it is the Commission itself
is on Francisco to establish through substantial evidence that Nieto unlawfully
that found that the candidate committed any of the enumerated prohibited
disbursed government funds during the election ban, a burden that Francisco
acts. Noteworthy is that in the second scenario, it is not required that there be
failed to discharge.
a prior final judgment; it is sufficient that the Commission itself made the
determination. The conjunction "or" separating "competent court" and "the
There is simply a dearth of evidence to support petitioner's claim that respondent
Commission" could only mean that the legislative intent was for both bodies to
violated Sec. 261(v) of the OEC. To be sure, petitioner merely submitted the
be clothed with authority to ascertain whether or not there is evidence that the
following to support his allegations:
respondent candidate ought to be disqualified.
1. Pictures of the asphalt-paving along Imelda Avenue of Cainta Green
Park Village, Barangay San Isidro, Cainta, Rizal;
The court, therefore, constrained to rule that the COMELEC erred when, relying
2. Picture of the Facebook page of the respondent acknowledging the
on Poe, it imposed the requirement of a prior court judgment before resolving
project as one of
the current controversy.
the accomplishments of his administration; and
3. Picture of a tarpaulin banner expressing gratitude for the asphalt-
paving.
ABUNDO V. COMELEC

71
 During the period of one year and ten months, title to hold such office and the
To be considered as interruption of service, the law contemplates a rest period
corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent,
during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to
as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and
exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction
exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following the
of a particular local government unit.
resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate for only a little over one year
and one month. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served less. The
During the period of one year and ten months, title to hold such office and the
almost two year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually served as Mayor
corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his
is and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity
opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the
of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the
office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration, following
disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of counting the
the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate for only a little over one
three-term threshold. It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable
year and one month. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served
resolution of his
less. The almost two-year period during which Abundo’s opponent actually
election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his
served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of
opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the
Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the
mayoralty seat. Hence, even if declared later as having the right to serve the
context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of
elective position such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to the finality
counting the three-term threshold.
of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact,
had no legal right to said position.

For four successive regular elections, Abelardo Abundo vied for the position of
Side case: Halili v. Comelec
municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In the 2004 electoral derby, the Viga
These are illustrations of how effectively some candidates were able to increase
municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Torres, who, in
their term. Yung isa, na-unseat siya right before the elections, or the next
due time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested and
election or even after the election. Na-unseat siya, sabi interruption yun,
was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest. Then
involuntary. So, it should not be counted.
came the 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other and
Torres lost no time in seeking the former’s disqualification to run, predicated on
Tallado and Dimapilis Case
the three-consecutive term limit rule. Comelec First Division ruled in favor of
his concerns disqualification under Sec. 40 of the LGC, yung provision na those
Abundo. Vega commenced a quo warranto action before the RTC to unseat Abundo
removed from office by reason of administrative cases. The position of COMELEC
on essentially the same grounds Torres raised. The RTC declared Abundo ineligible
has always been, that the removal must be by virtue of a final decision in the
to serve as municipal mayor because he has already served three consecutive
administrative case. Dapat maging final na. Ang nangyayari kasi under the rules
terms.
of the Ombudsman, when a decision of the Ombudsman is for the dismissal of
Comelec’s second division and en banc affirmed.
the person/official, the decision is immediately executory. So you can already
implement the decision, notwithstanding that there is still the remedy of
Issue: Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms.
appeal. So ang mga ginagawa nun mga kalaban, since may order of dismissal,
nag file na sila ng petition for disqualification under Sec. 40 sa COMELEC to
Ruling:
prevent someone who has been meted the penalty of dismissal by the
Pursuant to Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC,
Ombudsman, although may pa sa CA, para they cannot continue to be candidates
voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for
anymore.
any length of time shall not, in determining service for three consecutive terms,
be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
The position of COMELEC has always been that you need the decision to become
which the elective official concerned was elected.

72

final, because what if nareverse and there are decisions of cases of dismissal
were actually reversed. You already prohibited an official who was initially
dismissed, pero nareverse yung decision niya, from exercising his right of
suffrage, that is to run for public office. But read the case of Tallado v.
COMELEC. Ito naman although suspension ito, the Court seems to imply that
having implemented an order of suspension or dismissal is already an
interruption. It seems to imply that pwede na rin maging ground for
disqualification under Sec. 40, although hindi pa naging final.
Tallado v. Comelec
The petitioner was duly elected as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte
in the 2010, 2013 and 2016 elections. He fully served his 2010-2013 and 2013-2016
terms.
Relevant are three administrative cases decided by the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB).
One Edgardo Gonzales filed in the OMB an administrative complaint charging the
petitioner with grave misconduct, oppression or grave abuse of authority.
While the case was pending, the petitioner won as Governor in the 2013
elections. On October 2, 2015, while he was serving his 2013-2016 term, the
OMB found and declared him administratively liable and imposed upon him the
penalty of suspension for one year, which suspension was immediately
implemented by the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG).
Acting on the petitioner's appeal, the CA promulgated its decision reducing the
imposed penalty of suspension from one year to six months. He immediately re-
assumed his position after the lapse of six months, and his re-assumption later
became the subject of the third OMB case. However, under the resolution
issued, the CA restored the one-year suspension of the petitioner.
On November 4, 2015, several persons initiated the second OMB case against the
petitioner. In a decision, the OMB held the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct
and oppression/abuse of authority and ordered his dismissal from the service.
Although the petitioner appealed to the CA, the DILG implemented the OMB
decision by ordering the petitioner to vacate his position as Governor.
On the same date, the DILG issued another memorandum addressed to then
Vice Governor Jonah Pedro G. Pimentel (Pimentel) directing him to assume as
Governor of Camarines Norte. The memorandum stated that there was a
permanent vacancy in the office of Governor as a consequence of the
petitioner's dismissal from the service. In ordering Pimentel to assume as
Governor.
On November 16, 2016, Pimentel took his oath of office as Governor of
Camarines Norte, and thereupon assumed office and exercised the functions
of Governor.
On December 12, 2016, the CA issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the DILG from implementing or continuously implementing the decision of the
OMB. Thus, the petitioner was able to re-assume his post as Governor.
The third OMB case concerned the petitioner's re-assumption of the office of
Governor after the CA had initially reduced the penalty imposed in the first
OMB case to suspension for six months. The complainant thereat initiated
another complaint on the basis that the petitioner had violated the first OMB
decision by re-assuming office without having fully served his suspension.
On January 11, 2018, the OMB rendered another decision finding the petitioner
guilty of grave misconduct, and ordering his dismissal from the service. The
petitioner appealed the decision to the CA. To implement the decision of the OMB,
the DILG issued a Memorandum ordering Pimentel to assume as Governor.
On March 15, 2018, Pimentel again took his oath of office as Governor, and
assumed office and exercised the functions of Governor. On September 26,
2018, the CA ruled on the petitioner's appeal by modifying the penalty of
dismissal to six months suspension.
On October 29, 2018, the DILG issued its memorandum directing the
implementation of the decision of the CA, and the reinstatement of the
petitioner as Governor if he had already served the six-month suspension. On
October 30, 2018, the petitioner took his oath of office as Governor of
Camarines Norte.
In the meanwhile, on October 15, 2018, the petitioner filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Camarines Norte for the May 2019 elections.
This prompted respondents Norberto B. Villamin and Senandro M. Jalgalado to file
their separate petitions with the COMELEC praying for the denial of due course
to and/or for the cancellation of the petitioner's COC, which petitions were
consolidated and predicated on the application of the three-term limit rule.
The COMELEC First Division granted the petitions and ordered the cancellation
73
of the petitioner's COC. The COMELEC First Division concluded that the petitioner
had fully served three consecutive terms considering that his suspension and
dismissals from the service were not interruptions of his term because he had
not thereby lost title to the office; that the OMB's decisions ordering his
dismissals were not yet final; and that there had been no permanent vacancy and
no succession in accordance with Section 44 of the LGC.
The COMELEC En Banc declared that the petitioner's dismissal from the service
had been temporary inasmuch as he had appealed the OMB decisions; that the
DILG's implementation of the dismissals, the petitioner's removal from office,
and the Vice- Governor's assumption as Governor did not affect the
temporariness of the vacancy in the office of the Governor; that the petitioner
had later on re-assumed his post as Governor; and that the DILG's
implementation of the ruling on the third OMB case, on the basis of Section 46 of
the LGC, had corrected its earlier erroneous reliance on Section 44 of the LGC in
implementing the ruling in the second OMB case. The COMELEC En Banc took the
view that it was Section 46 of the LGC that was applicable inasmuch as there was
only a temporary vacancy.
The petitioner eventually garnered the highest number of votes for the position
of Governor of Camarines Norte in the May 13, 2019 elections. On May 16, 2019,
the petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected Governor of Camarines Norte.
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION
The petitioner contends that his third term as Governor of Camarines Norte was
involuntarily interrupted when the Ombudsman's dismissal orders were
implemented, thereby preventing the application of the three-term limit rule.
According to him, it is immaterial that the CA subsequently modified the
Ombudsman's decisions to reduce the penalty because the modification did not
change the fact that he had involuntarily ceased to hold his title when the DILG
ordered him to vacate his office on November 8, 2016 and again on March 14, 2018
pursuant to the decisions. He thereby lost his title to the office, and the
continuity of his service as Governor was involuntarily interrupted.
The petitioner argues that contrary to the findings of the COMELEC, his removal
from office caused a permanent vacancy that necessitated the appointment of
Pimentel as his successor, and that even the DILG itself had recognized the
existence of the permanent vacancy and consequently ordered Pimentel to
succeed him pursuant to Section 44 of the LGC.
OSG
THEe Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that the COMELEC had acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
finding and holding that the petitioner was ineligible to run for Governor in the
May 2019 elections under the three-term limit rule.
The OSG submits that the implementation of the Ombudsman's decisions on the
petitioner's removal from office must be considered as term interruption
because he thereby ceased to exercise the functions and prerogatives of the
office; and that he must be deemed not to have fully served his third term as
Governor considering that he involuntarily lost his title to the office.
To support its submission, the OSG cites Lonzanida v. COMELEC wherein this Court
has held that an elective official could not be deemed to have served the full
term if he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term;
that the petitioner's third term as Governor was validly interrupted twice when
he complied with the DILG's memoranda ordering him to vacate his post; and that
the petitioner's loss of title to the office was manifested by the fact that Pimentel
took his oath of office as Governor, and discharged all the functions and
responsibilities thereof.
COMELEC’S CONTENTION
COMELEC contends that the three-term limit rule must be strictly construed in
order to avoid attempts to circumvent and evade the application of the same;
the petitioner's exoneration from the charge of grave misconduct rendered the
"dismissal" nothing more than a mere preventive suspension, which was not the
term interruption that effectively precluded the application of the three-term
limit rule; that the dismissal and its resultant legal effects must not be
recognized in view of the reduction of the penalty from dismissal to
suspension; that because the petitioner's position as Governor was never
permanently vacant, he was able to re-assume the office and functions of
Governor, thus warranting the conclusion that the vacancy was only temporary.
Issue: Whether there was a loss of title to petitioner’s office which constituted
an involuntary term interruption.
Ruling: For the application of the disqualification under the three-term limit
rule, therefore, two conditions must concur, to wit:
1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms
to the same local government post; and
2. that he or she has fully served three consecutive terms.
Thus, there is an involuntary interruption in the term of an elective local
74
official when there is a break in the term as a result of the official's loss of title
to the office.
The first requisite for the application of the three-term limit rule is present
inasmuch as the petitioner was elected as Governor of Camarines Norte for three
consecutive terms. But the second requisite was not satisfied because his
intervening dismissals from the service truly prevented him from fully serving
the third consecutive term.
Interruption of term entails the involuntary loss of title to office, while
interruption of the full continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective
position equates to failure to render service. "Interruption" of a term exempting
an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than
the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have
involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an
effective interruption to occur.
An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost
the right to hold on to his office, and cannot be equated with the failure to
render service. The latter occurs during an office holder's term when he retains
title to the office but cannot exercise his functions for reasons established by law.
Of course, the "failure to serve" cannot be used once the right to office is lost;
without the right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be rendered so
that none is really lost.
Moreover, it should be pointed out that the decisions directing the dismissal of
the petitioner included no indication of the petitioner being thereby placed
under any type of suspension. In fact, the decisions did not state any conditions
whatsoever. As such, he was dismissed for all intents and purposes of the law in
the periods that he was dismissed from office even if he had appealed. In that
status, he ceased to hold the title to the office in the fullest sense. The length
of time of the involuntary interruption of the term of office was also immaterial.
Verily, the COMELEC failed to recognize the true effect of the executed
decisions of dismissal because it strained its reading of the OMB's Rules, and
ignored the relevant law and jurisprudence in so doing. Thus, it gravely erred.
As earlier explained, the vacancy was not temporary because the petitioner was
fully divested of his title to the office of Governor in both instances of his
dismissal. Under Section 44 of the LGC, a permanent vacancy arises whenever an
elective local official fills a higher vacant office, or refuses to assume office, or
fails to qualify, or dies, or is removed from office, or voluntarily resigns, or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office. In
contrast, Section 46 of the LGC enumerates as resulting in a temporary vacancy in
the office of the local chief executive leave of absence, travel abroad, and
suspension from office. However, the petitioner's dismissals, even if still not
final, were not akin to the instances enumerated in Section 46 of the LGC
because the loss of his title to the office denied to him the expectancy to re-
assume his term.
To be considered as interruption of the term, "contemplates a rest period during
which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise
power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a
particular local government unit. " Conformably with said ruling, the period
during which the petitioner was not serving as Governor should be considered
as a rest period or break in his service because he had then ceased to exercise
power or authority over the people of the province. Indeed, it was Pimentel
who then held title to the office and exercised the functions thereof. As such, the
petitioner did not fully serve his entire third term even if his re-assumption to
office subsequently occurred.
The DILG's execution of the OMB decisions for the petitioner's dismissal clearly
constituted loss of the petitioner's title to the office. The dismissals were
involuntary interruptions in the petitioner's 2016-2019 term. As such, he
cannot be considered to have fully served a third successive term of office.
In fine, the petitioner was not disqualified from seeking the same elective post
during the 2019 elections. The COMELEC thus gravely abused its discretion in
ordering the cancellation of the petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy for the 2019
elections.
Dimapisil v. Comelec
in the October 2010 Barangay Elections, Joseph Dimapilis (Dimapilis) was elected
as Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul. In the 2013 Barangay Elections, he
ran for re-election for the same position. He filed his Certificate of Candidacy,
declaring under oath that he is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected to.
He won and was proclaimed as the duly elected Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung
Maragul.
On the same day of his proclamation, the COMELEC Law Department filed a
petition for disqualification against Dimapilis. Under Section 40(b) of Republic Act
No. 7160 (Local Government Code), Dimapilis was barred from running in an
election, since he was suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office. This was a consequence of his dismissal
75
from service as then Kagawad of Brgy. Pulung Maragul. He was one of those found
guilty of the administrative offense of Grave Misconduct, in a decision by the
Office of the Ombudsman.
DIMAPILIS’ CONTENTIONS
Dimapilis contended that the petition should be dismissed for three reasons:
1. While the petition prayed for disqualification, it partakes the nature of a
petition to deny due course or cancel CoC. This would be under Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, by combining these two distinct and
separate actions in one petition, the petition should be dismissed pursuant
to the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
2. The COMELEC Law Department is not a proper party to a petition for
disqualification.
3. The implementation of the decision of the Ombudsman (finding Dimapilis
guilty of Grave Misconduct) has been enjoined by the RTC in a separate
case, on the ground of the condonation doctrine.
Issue: W/N COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling Dimapilis’ COC
Ruling: NO, COMELEC DID NOT GRAVELY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN CANCELLING
DIMAPILIS’ COC. In other words, it was proper for the COMELEC to have
cancelled Dimapilis’ CoC.
Dimapilis’ perpetual disqualification to hold public office is a material fact
involving eligibility.
A CoC is a formal requirement for eligibility to public office. The Omnibus Election
Code provides that the CoC of the person filing it shall state, among others, that
he is eligible for the office he seeks to run, and that the facts stated therein are
true to the best of his knowledge.
To be “eligible” relates to the capacity of holding and of being elected to an
office. Conversely, “ineligibility” has been defined as a disqualification or legal
incapacity to be elected to an office or appointed to a particular position. Thus,
a person intending to run for public office must not only possess the required
qualifications, but must also possess none of the grounds for disqualification.
In this case, Dimapilis was found guilty of Grave Misconduct by a final judgment.
He is punished with dismissal from service with all accessory penalties, including
perpetual disqualification from holding public office. This rendered Dimapilis’
CoC void from the start. He was not eligible to run at the time he filed his CoC.
COMELEC has the duty to motu proprio bar from running for public office
those suffering from perpetual disqualification to hold public office.
Under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC has the
duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election.
Even without a petition filed under the Omnibus Election Code or the Local
Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the CoC of anyone
suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run
for public office, by virtue of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment
of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the convict. The
law itself bars the convict from running.
Whether or not the COMELEC is expressly mentioned in the judgment to implement
the disqualification, it is assumed that the portion of the final judgment on
Dimapilis’ disqualification is addressed to COMELEC.
The denial of due course and cancellation of one’s CoC generally necessitates the
exercise of the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial functions, commenced through a
petition based on either the Omnibus Election Code or the Local Government
Code. However, when the grounds therefore are conclusive on account of final
and executory judgments, the exercise falls within COMELEC’s administrative
functions.
Ultimately, as Dimapilis’ disqualification is pursuant to the final and executory
decision of the Ombudsman, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC to cancel the
petitioner's CoC as a matter of course.
Dimapilis is deemed to have not been a candidate in the 2013 Barangay
Elections. All his votes are to be considered stray votes.
A person whose CoC had been cancelled is deemed to have not been a candidate
76
at all because his CoC is considered void ab initio. In this case, Dimapilis’ win for two consecutive elections), the corresponding accessory penalty of
ineligibility is existing at the time of filing of his CoC. This cannot give rise to a perpetual disqualification from holding public office had already rendered him
valid candidacy, and necessarily, to valid votes. Thus, he was never a valid ineligible to run for any elective local position.
candidate.
The term “perpetual” in this administrative penalty connotes a lifetime
The cancellation of Dimapilis’ CoC essentially renders the votes cast for him or restriction, and it is not dependent on the term of any principal penalty. This
her as stray votes. They are not considered in determining the winner of an accessory penalty sprung from the same final Ombudsman decision. Therefore, it
election. This would necessarily invalidate his proclamation, and entitle the had already attached and remained effective at the time Dimapilis filed his CoC
qualified candidate receiving the highest number of votes. on October 11, 2013 and his later re-election in 2013. Therefore, Dimapilis could
not have been validly re-elected, so as to avail of the condonation doctrine.
When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided.
The victory is then awarded to the next in rank, who does not possess any of the Agustin v. Comelec
disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications for eligibility. The second-
A petition to deny due course and/or cancel the certificate of candidacy was filed
placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified
against petitioner Agustin, alleging that he made a material misrepresentation in
candidates.
his CoC by stating that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos for 25
years despite having registered as a voter therein only on May 31, 2012; that when
The ineligible candidate who was proclaimed and who already assumed office (in
he travelled to Hawaii, USA on October 6, 2012, he still used his USA passport
this case, Dimapilis) is a de facto officer by virtue of the ineligibility. The rule
despite his renunciation of his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012 and after filing
on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code (meaning, that the vice
his CoC on October 5, 2012. Agustin countered that the one-year requirement
will succeed to the position) cannot apply when a de facto officer is ousted from
referred to residency, not to voter registration; that residency was not dependent
office and the de jure officer takes over. The ouster of a de facto officer cannot
on citizenship, such that his travel to Hawaii for business purposes did not violate
create a permanent vacancy. There is no vacancy to speak of, because the de
the residency requirement. But the COMELEC en banc cancelled his CoC for failure
jure officer (the rightful winner) has the legal right to assume the position.
to prove that he was able to accomplish the requirements set forth in RA 9225.
Dimapilis’ re-election in the 2013 Barangay Elections cannot condone his
The Court held that Agustin filed a valid CoC but the use his US passport after his
misconduct.
renunciation of foreign citizenship rendered him disqualified from continuing
as a mayoralty candidate
In Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court abandoned the
“condonation doctrine.” Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative
A valid CoC arises upon the timely filing of a person's declaration of his intention
offense. There is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to
to run for public office and his affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the
support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of
position he seeks to assume. The valid CoC renders the person making the
any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term.
declaration a valid or official candidate.
Even then, in this case, the Ombudsman decision dismissing Dimapilis for Grave
There are two remedies available under existing laws to prevent a candidate
Misconduct had already attained finality on May 28, 2010. This date came even
from running in an electoral race. One is by petition for disqualification, and
before his first election as Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the October
the other by petition to deny due course to or to cancel his certificate of
2010 Barangay Elections. Although the principal penalty of dismissal appears to
candidacy.
have not been effectively implemented (since Dimapilis was still able to run and
77

The COMELEC En Banc canceled the petitioner's CoC not because of his failure to
meet the residency requirement but because of his failure "to sufficiently show
that he complied with the provisions of RA 9225." In our view, such basis for
cancelation was unwarranted considering that he became eligible to run for
public office when he expressly renounced his USA citizenship, by which he
fully complied with the requirements stated in Section 5 (2) of Republic Act No.
9225.
More particularly, the petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on March 9, 2012 and
executed his Affidavit of Renunciation on October 2, 2012. By his Oath of
Allegiance and his renunciation of his USA citizenship, he reverted to the status
of an exclusively Filipino citizen. On October 5, 2012, the date he filed his CoC
he was, therefore, exclusively a Filipino citizen, rendering him eligible to run
for public office. His CoC was valid for all intents and purposes of the election
laws because he did not make therein any material misrepresentation of his
eligibility to run as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.
Nonetheless, we uphold the declaration by the COMELEC En Banc that the
petitioner was ineligible to run and be voted for as Mayor of the Municipality
of Marcos, Ilocos Norte. It is not disputed that on October 6, 2012, after having
renounced his USA citizenship and having already filed his CoC, he travelled abroad
using his USA passport, thereby representing himself as a citizen of the USA. He
continued using his USA passport in his subsequent travels abroad despite having
been already issued his Philippine passport on August 23, 2012. He thereby
effectively repudiated his oath of renunciation on October 6, 2012, the first time
he used his USA passport after renouncing his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012.
Consequently, he could be considered an exclusively Filipino citizen only for the
four days from October 2, 2012 until October 6, 2012. cSEDTC The petitioner's
continued exercise of his rights as a citizen of the USA through using his USA
passport after the renunciation of his USA citizenship reverted him to his earlier
status as a dual citizen. Such reversion disqualified him from being elected to
public office in the Philippines pursuant to Section 40 (d) of the Local
Government Code
The petitioner was declared disqualified by final judgment before election day;
hence, the votes cast for him should not be counted.
Caballero v. COMELEC
Enrique Nanud filed a petition to cancel Rogelio Caballero’s certificate of
candidacy (COC) on the ground of false representation. It was alleged that
Caballero was actually a Canadian citizen, hence ineligible to run for mayor.
Caballero argued that he already took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic and
has renounced his Canadian citizenship. Comelec nevertheless cancelled the
Caballero’s COC for failure to comply with the one year residency requirement,
reasoning that Caballero’s naturalization as a Canadian citizen resulted in the
abandonment of his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. Caballero insisted that
the requirement of the law in fixing the residence qualification of a candidate
running for public office is not strictly on the period of residence in the place
where he seeks to be elected but on the acquaintance by the candidate on his
constituents' vital needs for their common welfare; and that his nine months of
actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a substantial compliance
with the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Caballero abandoned his domicile.
Ruling: Yes. Caballero abandoned his domicile. The term “residence” is to be
understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or
“habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, the place where
a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter
where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain
(animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is
usually the place where the child's parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only
in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. In this case, Caballero was a
natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could
be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later
worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. Naturalization in a foreign
country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds
true in Caballero's case as permanent resident status in Canada is required for the
acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Hence, Caballero had effectively abandoned
his domicile in the Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada.
His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada
cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment. Moreover, it was held that
Caballero’s retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 did not
automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still
prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had
reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned
from the time he made it as such.
78
 and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF
Maquiling v. COMELEC AMERICA” and that he “divest(s) [him]self of full employment of all civil and
political rights and privileges of the United States of America.” This act of using a
foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid
The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is a
for public office, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for an
positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality and
elective local position.
citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it
recants the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective
position.
Arnado v. COMELEC

When a candidate for public office use a foreign passport after renouncing his
FACTS: Rommel Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Filipino
foreign citizenship, he is not divested of his Filipino citizenship but it recants
citizenship as a consequence of his subsequent naturalization as a US citizen.
the Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
Arnado applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 before the Consulate General
A candidate who holds dual citizenship is disqualified to run for public office.
of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC
citizenship. Thereafter, Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. Linog Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a
In Cristobal v. Labrador and Pelobello v. Palatino, which were decided under
petition seeking Arnado’s disqualification and/or cancellation of Arnado’s CoC
the 1935 Constitution, wherein the provision granting pardoning power to the
contending that Arnado is a foreigner. To bolster his claim of Arnado’s US
President shared similar phraseology with what is found in the present 1987
citizenship, Balua presented evidence indicating that Arnado has been using his
Constitution, the Court then unequivocally declared that "subject to the
US Passport in entering and departing the Philippines even after his repatriation
limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be
and execution of affidavit of renunciation. Petitioner Casan Maquiling intervened
restricted or controlled by legislative action." The Court reiterated this
in the instant case after having garnered the second highest number of votes
pronouncement in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. thereby establishing that, under
during the elections. ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after
the present Constitution, "a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not
renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made
be circumscribed by legislative action." Thus, it is unmistakably the long-
and affects one’s qualifications to run for public office. (YES) RULING: By using his
standing position of this Court that the exercise of the pardoning power is
foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily represented himself as an
discretionary in the President and may not be interfered with by Congress or the
American, in effect declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that
Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution.
he is an American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the
United States of America. The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada
oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day.
shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory
It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and
penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive
a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country that
clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the
granted the citizenship. While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the
Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
acts enumerated in C.A. No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
latter is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment.
citizenship, it is nevertheless an act that repudiates the very oath of renunciation
The sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to
civil and political rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that
be qualified to run for a local elective position.
attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply
Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that
In this case, when Arnado used his US passport just eleven days after he renounced
the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute
his American citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation that he “absolutely

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disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of
reclusion perpetua. From both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public
elective office is unequivocally considered as a political right.
FACTS: The Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of
plunder in criminal case. Thereafter, however, former President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo (former President Arroyo) extended executive clemency, by way of pardon,
to former President Estrada. Former President Estrada “received and accepted”
the pardon by affixing his signature beside his handwritten notation thereon. On
2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
President. During that time, his candidacy earned three oppositions, however, in
separate resolutions, all three petitions were effectively dismissed on the uniform
grounds that (i) the Constitutional proscription on reelection applies to a sitting
president; and (ii) the pardon granted to former President Estrada by former
President Arroyo restored the former’s right to vote and be voted for a public
office. The subsequent motions for reconsideration thereto were denied by the
COMELEC En banc. After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections,
however, former President Estrada only managed to garner the second highest
number of votes. On petition for certiorari, Supreme Court dismissed the
aforementioned petition on the ground of mootness considering that former
President Estrada lost his presidential bid. On 2012, former President Estrada once
more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this
time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Subsequently, Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal (Risos-Vidal), filed a Petition for
Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC, anchoring
her petition on the theory that "[Former President Estrada] is Disqualified to Run
for Public Office because of his Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan
Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual
Absolute Disqualification." She relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code
(LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).” In a
Resolution, the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for
disqualification for lack of merit as Risos-Vidal failed to present cogent proof
sufficient to reverse the standing pronouncement of this Commission declaring
categorically that [former President Estrada’s] right to seek public office has been
effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M.
Arroyo. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by Risos-Vidal was
denied. Hence, this petition. While the case was pending before the Court, former
President Estrada was elected into the said office. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), one of
former President Estrada’s opponents for the position of Mayor, moved for leave
to intervene in this case and was subsequently granted. Lim subscribed to Risos-
Vidal’s theory that former President Estrada is disqualified to run for and hold
public office as the pardon granted to the latter failed to expressly remit his
perpetual disqualification.
ISSUE: Whether former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in
public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo?
Ruling:
The petition for certiorari lacks merit. The pardoning power of the President
cannot be limited by legislative action. The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section
19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the President of the
Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons. It is apparent from the
constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President may not
extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not
yet resulted in a final conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election
laws, rules and regulations in which there was no favorable recommendation
coming from the COMELEC.
Therefore, it can be argued that any act of Congress by way of statute cannot
operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President. In Cristobal v. Labrador
and Pelobello v. Palatino, which were decided under the 1935 Constitution,
wherein the provision granting pardoning power to the President shared similar
phraseology with what is found in the present 1987 Constitution, the Court then
unequivocally declared that "subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative
action."
The Court reiterated this pronouncement in Monsanto v. Factoran, Jr. thereby
establishing that, under the present Constitution, "a pardon, being a presidential
prerogative, should not be circumscribed by legislative action." Thus, it is
unmistakably the longstanding position of this Court that the exercise of the
pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be interfered with
by Congress or the Court, except only when it exceeds the limits provided for by
the Constitution.
This doctrine of non-diminution or non-impairment of the President’s power of
ardon by acts of Congress, specifically through legislation, was strongly adhered
to by an overwhelming majority of the framers of the 1987 Constitution when they
flatly rejected a proposal to carve out an exception from the pardoning power of
the President in the form of "offenses involving graft and corruption" that would
be enumerated and defined by Congress through the enactment of a law. The
Articles 36 and 41 of the of the Revised Penal Code cannot, in any way, serve to
abridge or diminish the exclusive power and prerogative of the President to pardon
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persons convicted of violating penal statutes.
The Court cannot subscribe to Risos-Vidal’s interpretation that the said Articles
contain specific textual commands which must be strictly followed in order to free
the beneficiary of presidential grace from the disqualifications specifically
prescribed by them. It is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that where the words
of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est
recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure. It is this
Court’s firm view that the phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which declares
that former President Estrada “is hereby restored to his civil and political rights"
substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration.”
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada
shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory
penalties are included in the pardon. The first sentence refers to the executive
clemency extended to former President Estrada who was convicted by the
Sandiganbayan of plunder and imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua. The latter
is the principal penalty pardoned which relieved him of imprisonment. The
sentence that followed, which states that "(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights," expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the RPC, it is indubitable from the
text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual
absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal
penalty of reclusion perpetua. In this jurisdiction, the right to seek public elective
office is recognized by law as falling under the whole gamut of civil and political
rights. From both law and jurisprudence, the right to seek public elective office is
unequivocally considered as a political right. Hence, the Court reiterates its
earlier statement that the pardon granted to former President Estrada admits no
other interpretation other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the pardon
granted to him, he regained his FULL civil and political rights – including the right
to seek elective office.
Furthermore, the disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of
the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the
absolute pardon granted to him. Risos-Vidal maintains that former President
Estrada’s conviction for plunder disqualifies him from running for the elective local
position of Mayor of the City of Manila under Section 40(a) of the LGC. However,
the subsequent absolute pardon granted to former President Estrada effectively
restored his right to seek public elective office. This is made possible by reading
Section 40(a) of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC. While it may be
apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute
terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a
plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person
who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final
judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold
any public office, whether local or national position. The third preambular clause
of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon,
i.e., “[w]hereas, Joseph Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek
any elective position or office,” neither makes the pardon conditional, nor militate
against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and to
seek public elective office have been restored. This is especially true as the pardon
itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering the
unqualified use of the term “civil and political rights” as being restored.
Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is
an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the reasons for the enactment,
usually introduced by the word “whereas.” Whereas clauses do not form part of a
statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of
the statute. In this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the
decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make the
pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of the
aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
A preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to
show its intent or purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where
the meaning of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble can neither
expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text. If former President
Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise never
to seek a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same
in the text of the pardon itself. Since former President Arroyo did not make this
an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is constrained to rule
that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon
extended to former President Estrada. Absent any contrary evidence, former
President Arroyo’s silence on former President Estrada’s decision to run for
President in the May 2010 elections against, among others, the candidate of the
political party of former President Arroyo, after the latter’s receipt and
acceptance of the pardon speaks volume of her intention to restore him to his
rights to suffrage and to hold public office.
Where the scope and import of the executive clemency extended by the President
is in issue, the Court must turn to the only evidence available to it, and that is the
pardon itself. From a detailed review of the four corners of said document, nothing
81
therein gives an iota of intimation that the third Whereas Clause is actually a
limitation, proviso, stipulation or condition on the grant of the pardon, such that
the breach of the mentioned commitment not to seek public office will result in a
revocation or cancellation of said pardon. To the Court, what it is simply is a
statement of fact or the prevailing situation at the time the executive clemency
was granted. It was not used as a condition to the efficacy or to delimit the scope
of the pardon.
Therefore, there can be no other conclusion but to say that the pardon granted
to former President Estrada was absolute in the absence of a clear, unequivocal
and concrete factual basis upon which to anchor or support the Presidential intent
to grant a limited pardon. To reiterate, insofar as its coverage is concerned, the
text of the pardon can withstand close scrutiny even under the provisions of
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The COMELEC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
assailed Resolutions.
Hayundini v. COMELEC
On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the
position of Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi in the May 13, 2013 National
and Local Elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Ten days
after, Mustapha J. Omar (Omar) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel
Hayudini's CoC. Omar basically asserted that Hayudini should be disqualified for
making false representation regarding his residence. He claimed that Hayudini
declared in his CoC that he is a resident of the Municipality of South Ubian when,
in fact, he resides in Zamboanga City.
Thereafter, Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters
in Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC). Despite the opposition of Ignacio Aguilar Baki, the MCTC granted
Hayudini's petition on January 31, 2013. On that same day, the COMELEC's First
Division dismissed Omar's earlier petition to cancel Hayudini's CoC for lack of
substantial evidence that Hayudini committed false representation as to his
residency.
Oppositor Baki, subsequently, elevated the case to the Bongao Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 5. The RTC, on March 8, 2013, reversed the MCTC ruling and ordered
the deletion of Hayudini's name in Barangay Bintawlan's permanent list of voters.
In view of said decision, Omar filed before the COMELEC a Petition to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Gamal S. Hayudini by Virtue of a Supervening Event on
March 26, 2013. Hayudini appealed the March 8, 2013 RTC decision to the Court
of Appeals but was denied.
On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi. He
was proclaimed and, consequently, took his oath of office. On June 20, 2013, the
COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution granting Omar’s second petition to
cancel Hayudini's CoC.
Hayudini, thus, filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc,
arguing that its Second Division committed grave error when it gave due course to
a belatedly filed petition and treated the March 8, 2013 RTC Decision as a
supervening event. The COMELEC En Banc denied Hayudinis Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit. The COMELEC declared Omar as the mayor.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to cancel the petitioner
Hayudini’s CoC and declare his proclamation as null and void.
Ruling: Under the rules, a statement in a certificate of candidacy claiming that a
candidate is eligible to run for public office when in truth he is not, is a false
material representation, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
It bears stressing that one of the requirements for a mayoralty candidate is that
he must be a resident of the city or municipality where he intends to be elected.
Thus, under Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is required that a
candidate must certify under oath that he is eligible for the public office he seeks
election. In this case, when petitioner stated in his CoC that he is a resident of
Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi and eligible for a public office, but
it turned out that he was declared to be a non-resident thereof in a petition for
his inclusion in the list of registered voters, he therefore committed a false
representation in his CoC which pertained to a material fact which is a ground for
the cancellation of his CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Petitioner's ineligibility for not being a resident of the place he sought election is
not a ground for a petition for disqualification, since the grounds enumerated
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code specifically refer to the
commission of prohibited acts, and possession of a permanent resident status in a
foreign country.
As held in Aratea v. COMELEC, which is a case for cancellation of CoC under Section
78 of the Omnibus Election Code, a cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab
initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Whether
a certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial,
because the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from
the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. We then found
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that since the winning mayoralty candidate's certificate of candidacy was void ab
initio, he was never a candidate at all and all his votes were considered stray
votes, and thus, proclaimed the second placer, the only qualified candidate, who
actually garnered the highest number of votes, for the position of Mayor.
The Court finds the factual milieu of the Aratea case applicable in the instant
case, since this is also a case for a petition to deny due course or cancel a
certificate of candidacy. Since Hayudini was never a valid candidate for the
position of the Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, the votes cast for him
should be considered stray votes. Consequently, the COMELEC properly proclaimed
Salma Omar, who garnered the highest number of votes in the remaining qualified
candidates for the mayoralty post, as the duly-elected Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi
Tawi.
Finally, contrary to Hayudini's belief, the will of the electorate is still actually
respected even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded. The
votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in
determining the winner of an election for these do not constitute the sole and
total expression of the sovereign voice. On the other hand, those votes for the
eligible and legitimate candidates form an integral part of said voice, which must
equally be given due respect, if not more.
Jalosjos v. Comelec
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence
of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing
concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or
residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same
time.” Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and positive
proof, the date of acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the critical date,
must also be established to be within at least one year prior to the elections
using the same standard of evidence.
FACTS: On 20 November 2009, petitioner filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC)
for mayor of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental for the 10 May 2010 elections. She
indicated therein her place of birth and residence as BarangayTugas, Municipality
of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental (Brgy. Tugas).
Asserting otherwise, private respondents filed against petitioner a Petition to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy, in which they argued that
she had falsely represented her place of birth and residence, because she was in
fact born in San Juan, Metro Manila, and had not totally abandoned her previous
domicile, Dapitan City.
On the other hand, petitioner averred that she had established her residence in
the said barangay since December 2008 when she purchased two parcels of land
there, and that she had been staying in the house of a certain Mrs. Lourdes Yap
(Yap) while the former was overseeing the construction of her house.
Furthermore, petitioner asserted that the error in her place of birth was
committed by her secretary. Nevertheless, in a CoC, an error in the declaration of
the place of birth is not a material misrepresentation that would lead to
disqualification, because it is not one of the qualifications provided by law.
The Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
remained pending as of the day of the elections, in which petitioner garnered the
highest number of votes. On 10 May 2010, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of
Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, proclaimed her as the duly elected municipal
mayor.
On 04 June 2010, the COMELEC Second Division ruled that respondent was
DISQUALIFIED for the position of mayor. The COMELEC En Banc promulgated a
Resolution on 19 August 2010 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner
for lack of merit and affirming the Resolution of the Second Division denying due
course to or cancelling her CoC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
holding that petitioner failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency
requirement for local elective officials.
RULING: No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in holding
that petitioner failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency
requirement for local elective officials. Petitioner failed to comply with the one-
year residency requirement for local elective officials.
Petitioner’s uncontroverted domicile of origin is Dapitan City. The question is
whether she was able to establish, through clear and positive proof, that she had
acquired a domicile of choice in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, prior to the May
2010 elections. When it comes to the qualifications for running for public office,
residence is synonymous with domicile.
Accordingly, Nuval v. Gurayheld as follows: “The term residence as so used, is
synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed
place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative
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of such intention.” There are three requisites for a person to acquire a new
domicile by choice.
First, residence or bodily presence in the new locality. Second, an intention to
remain there. Third, an intention to abandon the old domicile. These
circumstances must be established by clear and positive proof, as held in
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC and subsequently in Dumpit- Michelena v. Boado:
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence
of origin should be deemed to continue.
Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence
requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal
residences at the same time.”
Moreover, even if these requisites are established by clear and positive proof, the
date of acquisition of the domicile of choice, or the critical date, must also be
established to be within at least one year prior to the elections using the same
standard of evidence. In the instant case, we find that petitioner failed to
establish by clear and positive proof that she had resided in Baliangao, Misamis
Occidental, one year prior to the 10 May 2010 elections. There were
inconsistencies in the Affidavits of Acas-Yap, Yap III, Villanueva, Duhaylungsod,
Estrellada, Jumawan, Medija, Bagundol, Colaljo, Tenorio, Analasan, Bation,
Maghilum and Javier.
First, they stated that they personally knew petitioner to be an actual and physical
resident of Brgy. Tugas Since 2008. However, they declared in the same Affidavits
that she stayed in Brgy. Punta Miray while her house was being constructed in
Brgy. Tugas. Second, construction workers Yap III, Villanueva, Duhaylungsod and
Estrellada asserted that in December 2009, construction was still ongoing.
By their assertion, they were implying that six months before the 10 May 2010
elections, petitioner had not yet moved into her house at Brgy. Tugas. Third, the
same construction workers admitted that petitioner only visited Baliangao
occasionally when they stated that "at times when she (petitioner) was in
Baliangao, she used to stay at the house of Lourdes Yap while her residential house
was being constructed."
These discrepancies bolster the statement of the Brgy. Tugas officials that
petitioner was not and never had been a resident of their barangay. At most, the
Affidavits of all the witnesses only show that petitioner was building and
developing a beach resort and a house in Brgy. Tugas, and that she only stayed in
Brgy. Punta Miray whenever she wanted to oversee the construction of the resort
and the house.
Assuming that the claim of property ownership of petitioner is true, Fernandez v.
COMELEC has established that the ownership of a house or some other property
does not establish domicile. This principle is especially true in this case as
petitioner has failed to establish her bodily presence in the locality and her intent
to stay there at least a year before the elections. Finally, the approval of the
application for registration of petitioner as a voter only shows, at most, that she
had met the minimum residency requirement as a voter. This minimum
requirement is different from that for acquiring a new domicile of choice for the
purpose of running for public office.
Sabili v. COMELEC
COMELEC denied Sabili’s Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Lipa due to failure
to comply with the one year residency requirement When petitioner filed his COC
for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had been
a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) month. However, it is
undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and
his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San
Juan, Batangas.
Respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due
Course and to CancelCertificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for
Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification. Allegedly, petitioner falsely
declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident of LipaCity for
two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections.
In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010, the COMELEC Second Division granted the
Petition of private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking
the mayoralty post in Lipa City, and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his
not being a resident of Lipa City and for his failure to meet the statutory one-year
residency requirement under the law.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the
COMELEC, during the pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local elections were
held. The next day, he was proclaimed the dulyelected mayor of Lipa City after
garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said position. Heaccordingly
filed a Manifestation with the COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact.
In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010, the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion
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for Reconsideration Of petitioner. Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition
(Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Applicationfor the Issuance of a
Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of this Case) under Rule
64in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the annulment of the 26
January 2010 and 17 August2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC.
Issues:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding Sabili failed
to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective
officials.
Ruling:
As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELEC’s
appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been
established, including when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of
evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction.
In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to
intervene and correct the COMELEC's error. As a concept, "grave abuse of
discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty.
Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that
the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to
taint a decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion.
Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition,
under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the
COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable.
In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily
review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence.
Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regardgenerally involves an error of judgment,
not of jurisdiction.
In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation
and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of
being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the
constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is
present,resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of
judgment to one of jurisdiction.
Dela Cruz v. COMELEC
In this petition for certiorari, Casimira S. Dela Cruz assails COMELEC Resolution
No. 8844 considering as stray the votes cast in favor of certain candidates who
were either disqualified or whose COCs had been cancelled/denied due course but
whose names still appeared in the official ballots or certified lists of candidates
for the May 10, 2010 elections. During the canvassing of the votes by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers (MBOC) of Bugasong on May 13, 2010, Casimira insisted that
the votes cast in favor of Aurelio be counted in her favor. However, the MBOC
refused, citing Resolution No. 8844. The Statement of Votes by Precinct for Vice-
Mayor of Antique-Bugasong showed the following results of the voting:
Total Rank
Dela Cruz, Aurelio N. 532 3
Dela Cruz, Casimira S. 6389 2
Consequently, John Lloyd M. Pacete was proclaimed Vice-Mayor of Bugasong by
the MBOC of Bugasong. Considering that Pacete won by a margin of only thirty-
nine (39) votes, Casimira contends that she would have clearly won the elections
for Vice-Mayor of Bugasong had the MBOC properly tallied or added the votes cast
for Aurelio to her votes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the votes cast in favor of a nuisance candidate declared as
such in a final judgement should be considered in favor of the legitimate
candidate.
RULING: Yes. The votes cast in favor of a nuisance candidate declared as such in
a final judgement should be considered in favor of the legitimate candidate. It
bears to stress that Sections 211 (24) and 72 applies to all disqualification cases
and not to petitions to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of candidacy
such as Sections 69 (nuisance candidates) and 78 (material representation shown
to be false).
Notably, such facts indicating that a certificate of candidacy has been filed "to put
the election process in mockery or disrepute, or to cause confusion among the
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voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates, or other
circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona
fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been
filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate"
are not among those grounds enumerated in Section 68 (giving money or material
consideration to influence or corrupt voters or public officials performing electoral
functions, election campaign overspending and soliciting, receiving or making
prohibited contributions) of the OEC or Section 40 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991).
In Fermin vs. COMELEC, this Court distinguished a petition for disqualification
under Section 68 and a petition to cancel or deny due course to a certificate of
candidacy (COC) under Section 78. Said proceedings are governed by different
rules and have distinct outcomes. At this point, we must stress that a "Section 78"
petition ought not to be interchanged or confused with a "Section 68" petition.
They are different remedies, based on different grounds, and resulting in different
eventualities.
To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised
on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a
petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a
statement of a material representation in the said certificate that is false. The
petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified under
Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose
certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.
Thus, in Miranda vs. Abaya, this Court made the distinction that a candidate who
is disqualified under Section 68 can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the
OEC because he/she remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose
CoC has been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be
substituted because he/she is never considered a candidate.
Strictly speaking, a cancelled certificate cannot give rise to a valid candidacy,
and much less to valid votes. Said votes cannot be counted in favor of the
candidate whose COC was cancelled as he/she is not treated as a candidate at all,
as if he/she never filed a COC. But should these votes cast for the candidate whose
COC was cancelled or denied due course be considered stray? The foregoing rule
regarding the votes cast for a nuisance candidate declared as such under a final
judgment was applied by this Court in Bautista vs. COMELEC where the name of
the nuisance candidate Edwin Bautista (having the same surname with the bona
fide candidate) still appeared on the ballots on election day because while the
COMELEC rendered its decision to cancel Edwin Bautista’s COC on April 30, 1998,
it denied his motion for reconsideration only on May 13, 1998 or three days after
the election.
We said that the votes for candidates for mayor separately tallied on orders of
the COMELEC Chairman was for the purpose of later counting the votes and hence
are not really stray votes. These separate tallies actually made the will of the
electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by a potential
nuisance candidate. But since the COMELEC decision declaring Edwin Bautista a
nuisance candidate was not yet final on election day, this Court also considered
those factual circumstances showing that the votes mistakenly deemed as "stray
votes" refer to only the legitimate candidate (petitioner Efren Bautista) and could
not have been intended for Edwin Bautista. We further noted that the voters had
constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action of the COMELEC delisting
Edwin Bautista as a candidate for mayor.
A stray vote is invalidated because there is no way of determining the real
intention of the voter. This is, however, not the situation in the case at bar.
Significantly, it has also been established that by virtue of newspaper releases and
other forms of notification, the voters were informed of the COMELEC’s decision
to declare Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate. In the more recent case of
Martinez III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this Court likewise
applied the rule in COMELEC Resolution No. 4116 not to consider the votes cast
for a nuisance candidate stray but to count them in favor of the bona fide
candidate notwithstanding that the decision to declare him as such was issued only
after the elections.
As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance
candidate on election day inevitably exposes the bona fide candidate to the
confusion over the similarity of names that affects the voter’s will and frustrates
the same. It may be that the factual scenario in Bautista is not exactly the same
as in this case, mainly because the Comelec resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a
nuisance candidate was issued before and not after the elections, with the
electorate having been informed thereof through newspaper releases and other
forms of notification on the day of election.
Undeniably, however, the adverse effect on the voter’s will was similarly present
in this case, if not worse, considering the substantial number of ballots with only
"MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative - over five
thousand - which have been declared as stray votes, the invalidated ballots being
more than sufficient to overcome private respondent’s lead of only 453 votes after
the recount.
Here, Aurelio was declared a nuisance candidate long before the May 10, 2010
86
elections. On the basis of Resolution No. 4116, the votes cast for him should not
have been considered stray but counted in favor of petitioner. COMELEC’s
changing of the rule on votes cast for nuisance candidates resulted in the
invalidation of significant number of votes and the loss of petitioner to private
respondent by a slim margin. We observed in Martinez: Bautista upheld the basic
rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect to, rather than
frustrate, the will of the voter.
The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise into an uneven
playing field where the bona fide candidate is faced with the prospect of having a
significant number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the mere
presence of another candidate with a similar surname.
Any delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the probability of votes lost in
this manner. While political campaigners try to minimize stray votes by advising
the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the ballot, still,
election woes brought by nuisance candidates persist.
The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be
implemented in the May 2010 elections will lessen the possibility of confusion over
the names of candidates. What needs to be stressed at this point is the apparent
failure of the HRET to give weight to relevant circumstances that make the will of
the electorate determinable, following the precedent in Bautista. We hold that
the rule in Resolution No. 4116 considering the votes cast for a nuisance candidate
declared as such in a final judgment, particularly where such nuisance candidate
has the same surname as that of the legitimate candidate, not stray but counted
in favor of the latter, remains a good law.
Ang mabuting balita ni Tito
So what happened here, the Court said that, assuming natuloy, hindi naging
effective yung pagcancel ng Coc of a nuisance candidate, you have to count
the votes obtained by the nuisance candidate in favor of the bona fide
candidate. Yun yung presumption
Zapanta v. COMELEC
For the May 9, 2016 elections Reynaldo Zapanta and Alfred Zapanta both filed
their respective certificates of candidacy for city councilor of the Second District
of Antipolo, Rizal. The Second District of Antipolo City is entitled to eight (8) seats
(multi-slot office) in the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Alfred, a nominee of political party Aksyon Demokratiko, was then an incumbent
city councilor of the Second District of Antipolo City. Reynaldo, a member and
nominee of Lakas-CMD, filed his Certificate of Candidacy on December 10, 2015
to replace another candidate. Alfred filed before the Commission a Verified
Petition To Deny Due Course and/or To Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of
Reynaldo S. Zapanta as Nuisance Candidate. To prove his allegations, Alfred
attached a printed copy of Reynaldo's social media accounts, which showed that
Reynaldo was using the name "Rey Zapanta."
Alfred averred that Reynaldo's use of the name "Alfred" was "designed to mislead
the voters to steal the votes intended for him. He contended that Reynaldo "has
no bona fide intention to run for the office and only aims to cause confusion among
the voters of Antipolo City and thus prevent the faithful determination of the true
will of the electorate of Antipolo City." He prayed that Reynaldo be declared as a
nuisance candidate and that Reynaldo's Certificate of Candidacy be canceled. He
further prayed that Reynaldo's name be excluded in the official ballots and, should
his Petition be decided after the elections, that the votes Reynaldo would have
received be counted in his favor.
COMELEC SECOND DIVISION DECISION
COMELEC’s Second Division ruled that Reynaldo Zapanta’s preferred name to
appear on the Official Ballot is likely to produce confusion among the voters. It
also found that Reynaldo Zapanta has no bona fide intention to run for the office
for which COC has been filed. Hence, he should be declared a nuisance candidate
and his Certificate of Candidacy for Member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of
Antipolo City for the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections be CANCELLED.
Reynaldo Zapanta filed a petition for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc
COMELEC EN BANC DECISION
The Commission En Banc denied Reynaldo's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of
merit. It held that since the name "Alfred" could not be directly connected to
Reynaldo's name, Reynaldo should have presented sufficient evidence to establish
his allegation. Otherwise, his use of the nickname "Alfred" would confuse the
electorate and prejudice Alfred's candidacy. The Commission En Banc ruled that
Reynaldo failed to provide credible proof that he was publicly known as "Alfred";
the submitted affidavits alone did not suffice.
The Commission En Banc ruled that the votes in favor of Reynaldo should be
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credited to Alfred, pursuant to the ruling in Dela Cruz.
DELA CRUZ v. COMELEC
“The possibility of confusion in the names (sic) of candidates if the names of
nuisance candidates remained on the ballots on election day, cannot be
discounted or eliminated, even under the automated voting system especially
considering that voters who mistakenly shaded the oval beside the name of the
nuisance candidate instead of the bona fide candidate they intended to vote for
could no longer ask for replacement ballots to correct the same.”
PETITIONERS CONTENTION
Petitioner contends that having the same nickname as private respondent does
not automatically translate to an insincere candidacy. He maintains that the
affidavits prove that he was known as "Alfred" and stresses his affiliation with a
political party. He again argues that there can be no confusion in an automated
election. Moreover, private respondent actively introduced himself during the
campaign period as "21. ZAPANTA, ALFRED (AKSYON)" in the official ballots; thus,
the electorate was aware of his identity, and there could be no confusion between
them.
Petitioner further argues that if the votes he garnered will be added to the votes
of private respondent, then the electorate will be disenfranchised; their right to
suffrage, violated. He asserts that it is "preposterous, if not downright foolish.”
for voters if public respondent assumes that all those who voted for petitioner
were confused.
Lastly, petitioner claims that public respondent's earlier rulings violated
petitioner-intervenor's right to due process, as he "was never involved or heard in
the proceedings therein."
Petitioner-intervenor Eddie Lagasca also filed its comment as a party-in-interest
because he will lose his seat as the 8th placer in the elections if the votes for
Reynaldo Zapanta are transferred to Alfred Zapanta.
(1) COMELEC DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RULING
THAT REYNALDO ZAPANTA IS A NUISANCE CANDIDATE
After a perusal of the case records, this Court holds that petitioner was not able
to sufficiently show that voters can clearly identify that his chosen nickname
pertains only to him. The affidavits he presented are not enough to show that he
had been using the name "Alfred" or that he is publicly known by that name.
Moreover, despite being given an opportunity to counter private respondent's
allegations, petitioner failed to deny that he had no campaign materials using the
name "Alfred Zapanta," or present evidence to the contrary. He merely banked on
his membership in a political party to support his claim that he had a bona fide
intention to run for office. Association to a political party per se does not
necessarily equate to a candidate's bona fide intent; instead, he or she must show
that he or she is serious in running for office. This, petitioner failed to
demonstrate.
(2) COMELEC’s RESOLUTION ON THE BASIS OF DELA CRUZ V. COMELEC
MUST BE SET ASIDE BECAUSE THE DECISION IN THAT CASE REFERS TO
SINGLE-SLOT OFFICES
COMELEC explained that it based its ruling on Dela Cruz, where this Court held
that the votes for the nuisance candidate should be added to the votes for the
bona fide candidate. Despite involving a single-slot office, where only one (1)
candidate can win for the position, COMELEC applied Dela Cruz as it was the
prevailing doctrine when it decided on this case. More, there were then no rules
or jurisprudence dealing with the votes of a nuisance candidate in a multi-slot
office.
The Court followed the new ruling in the case of Santos: “Here, the Santos
doctrine must be applied: the votes for petitioner alone should be counted in
favor of private respondent; if there are votes for both petitioner and private
respondent in the same ballot, then only one (1) vote should be counted in the
latter's favor. This will not only discourage nuisance candidates, but will also
prevent the disenfranchisement of voters.”
Marquez v. COMELEC
Norman Cordero Marquez (Marquez) filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for
the position of Senator in the May 13, 2019 national and local elections. He is a
resident of Mountain Province, a real estate broker, and an independent
candidate.
Thereafter, the COMELEC Law Department filed a petition to declare Marquez a
nuisance candidate. The Law Department argued that:
Marquez was virtually unknown to the entire country, except maybe in the locality
where he resides; and
Though a real estate broker, there is no clear proof of financial capability that he
will be able to sustain the financial rigors of a nationwide campaign.
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MARQUEZ’S CONTENTIONS
Marquez countered that he is the co-founder and sole administrator of Baguio
Animal Welfare (BAW), an animal advocacy group. Thus, he is known in various
social media and websites. He is also a member of relevant task forces and
advisory committees. He is in regular consultations with government offices to
discuss animal welfare issues and concerns. He has been interviewed in television
and radio shows. He has travelled all over the country to promote his advocacy.
He has received donations and contributions from supporters.
He maintains that he has a bona fide intention to run for office, and he can sustain
a nationwide campaign, given the campaign-enhanced support from existing and
expanded donors base, locally and internationally, and the overwhelming
hospitality and endorsement of pet organizations and animal-based livelihood
groups all over the Philippines. More so, he explains that the power of social media
has emerged as a potent, yet cost-effective, element in his ability to wage a
nationwide campaign.
He also argues that Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 represents the expense ceilings,
but not necessarily the actual expenses, that a candidate must spend out of his
personal resources.
Issue: Whether or not Marquez is a nuisance candidate for his failure to prove is
financial capability to mount a nationwide campaign
Ruling:
NO, MARQUEZ IS NOT A NUISANCE CANDIDATE.
COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
There is grave abuse of discretion:
1) When an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence; or
2) When it is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice,
ill will or personal bias.
Both elements appear to be present in this case.
The right to vote and to be voted for shall not be made to depend upon the
wealth of the candidate. The COMELEC cannot condition a person’s privilege to
be voted upon as Senator on his financial capacity to wage a nationwide campaign.
Quite obviously, the financial capacity requirement is a property requirement.
No property qualification of any kind is required under the Constitution.
Freedom of the voters to exercise the elective franchise at a general election
implies the right to freely choose from all qualified candidates for public office.
The imposition of unwarranted restrictions and hindrances precluding qualified
candidates from running is violative of the constitutional guaranty of freedom in
the exercise of elective franchise. It seriously interferes with the right of the
electorate to choose freely from among those eligible to office whomever they
may desire. Nuisance candidates, as an evil to be remedied, do not justify the
adoption of measures that would bar poor candidates from running for office.
In this case, COMELEC has effectively imposed property qualifications are
inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in
our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same.
THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO RUN FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the State shall
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service. It is equally undisputed
that there is no constitutional right to run for public office. Rather, it is a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law.
RATIONALE BEHIND PROHIBITION AGAINST NUISANCE CANDIDATES
The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are
rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account
the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the
number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, and
there is an increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the
election.
These practical difficulties should never exempt the State from the conduct of a
mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be
available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper.
Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency,
but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions.
SECTION 69 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND SECTION 1, RULE 24 OF
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO, 9523
In order to give effect to this rationale, Congress included Section 69 in the
Omnibus Election Code, which provides for nuisance candidates.
Sec. 69. Nuisance candidates. — The Commission may motu proprio or
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 upon a verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course
to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate
has been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to
cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the
registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly
demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the
office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus
prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.
Section 1, Rule 24 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, which governed the May 13,
2019 elections, is virtually an exact copy of Section 69 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
A cursory examination of these provisions would show that they both are silent as
to the requirement of proof of financial capacity before an aspirant may be
allowed to run in the national elections.
SECTION 13 OF R.A. NO. 7166
Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 also does not impose a financial capacity requirement
on those seeking to run for national office:
Sec. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. — The
agreement amount that a candidate or registered political party may
spend for election campaign shall be as follows:
(a) For candidates. — Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice-President;
and for other candidates Three Pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy:
Provided, That a candidate without any political party and without support
from any political party may be allowed to spend Five Pesos (P5.00) for
every such voter; and
(b) For political parties. — Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has official
candidates.
This provision merely sets the current allowable limit on expenses of candidates
and political parties for election campaign. It does not require a financial
requirement for those seeking to run for public office, such that failure to prove
capacity to meet the allowable expense limits would constitute ground to declare
one a nuisance candidate.
By invoking this provision, COMELEC violates the equal protection rights of
Marquez and all of the other disqualified candidates based on this ground. Since
the COMELEC did not require all candidates for Senator to declare the amount of
money they had to fund their campaign, one would wonder how the COMELEC
chose who to target for
disqualification. In fact, COMELEC disqualified 70 Senatorial candidates. Thus, it
seems the COMELEC Legal Department employed a cookie-cutter motion,
generally alleging lack of financial capacity in a transparent attempt to shift
the burden of proof upon the candidate, without setting forth by rule the
acceptable minimum financial capacity. This process puts an unfair and
impermissible burden upon the candidate.
CANDIDATE’S FINANCIAL CAPACITY DOES NOT NECESSARILY EQUATE TO HIS
BONA FIDE INTENTION TO RUN
A candidate’s financial capacity to sustain the rigors of waging a nationwide
campaign does not necessarily equate to a bona fide intention to run for public
office. The COMELEC’s burden is to show a reasonable correlation between
proof of a bona fide intention to run, on the one hand, and proof of financial
capacity to wage a nationwide campaign, on the other. A State has a legitimate
interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot, but it cannot achieve
its objectives by totally arbitrary means. The criterion for differing treatment
must bear some relevance to the object of legislation. Whatever may be the
political mood at any given time, the tradition has been one of hospitality toward
all candidates, without regard to their economic status.
COMELEC’S RELIANCE ON THE CASES OF PAMATONG AND MARTINEZ III IS
MISPLACED
In this case, Marquez was disqualified not on the basis of the similarity of his name
with another senatorial candidate, which is a ground explicitly provided for in
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. Rather, Marquez was disqualified for the
sole reason that he failed to show proof of his financial capacity to wage a
nationwide campaign.
Ang Mabuting Balita ayon kay Tito:
The SC declared that you cannot use inability to wage a nationwide campaign
because of lack of resources as the basis to declare a candidate to be a nuisance.
The context here is that ang daming nag file ng certificate of candidacy.
There are actually candidates who file COC na ganun ang pagiisip. Sabi ng SC,
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COMELEC cannot use as basis to disqualify or to cancel the COCs of these
candidates on the basis of financial capacity alone. That’s the essence of the
case.
he substitution of candidates, the essence here is what I told you earlier. A
substitution can only take effect between or among members of the same party.
In other words, kung candidate PDP-Laban hindi siya pwedeng ma substitute sa
candidate ng ibang party. An independent candidate cannot be substituted.
Because if nag substitute yung independent candidate late na yung kanyang
filing ng COC. Technical substitution can happen before the filing of the COC.
Pero kung tapos na yung deadline hindi na pwede isubstitute ang independent
candidate because only members of political parties can be substituted by
members of the same political party.
Secondly, the candidate should be a valid candidate whose COC must not have
been cancelled. That’s the case of Tagolino v. HRET. Ang involved dyan is si
Richard Gomez and Lucy Torres. The issue there has to do with the validity of
the COC. Kasi kung na cancel yung certificate of candidacy it is as if there was
no COC, and if there was no COC there is no candidate, and if there is no
candidate then there is no one to substitute.
Substitution of candidates
Grounds:
➢ Death
➢ Withdrawal
➢ Disqualification: (not allowed)
○ If violate term limit
○ Not meet the residency requirement
○ CoC denied due course or cancelled
➢ Until when? Up to mid-day of election day
➢ The substitution must be qualified and same party
➢ Limitation: Substituted candidate can still run for other elective position
Engle v. COMELEC
Petitioner and private respondent vied for the position of Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Babatngon, Province of Leyte in the May 13, 2013 Automated
Synchronized National, Local and ARMM Regional Elections (the May 13, 2013
Elections, for brevity). Petitioner's late husband, James L. Engle, was originally a
candidate for said contested position; however, he died of cardiogenic shock on
February 2, 2013.3 Due to this development, petitioner filed her certificate of
candidacy4 on February 22, 2013 as a substitute candidate for her deceased
spouse.
Menzon filed petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner arguing
in the main that the latter misrepresented that she is qualified to substitute her
husband who was declared an independent candidate by the COMELEC. It appears
that Lakas CMD to which James Engle’s was a member failed to submit to the
COMELEC law department the authorization of Romualzdez to sign the Certificate
of Nomination and Acceptance of Lakas-CMD candidates in Babatngon as
prescribed by Sec 6 (3) of COMELEC Resolution, Thus, the COMELEC Law
department considered all lakas cmd candidates whose CONA’s were signed by
Romualdez as independent cadidates. For this reason, private respondent charged
Engle which disallows the substitution of an independent candidate.
Engle then won the election as vice mayor- It was only July 2013 did the COMELEC
promulgate the resolution which denied due course to and cancelled petitioner’s
COC resulting in the annulment of petitioner’s previous proclamation as vice
mayor and as winner of the contested position.
Engle filed for MR but was denied for lack of merit in COmelec en banc. Hence
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not James Engle was an independent candidate that may not be
substituted by his wife.
(CONA) – certificate of nomination and acceptance
HELD:
No. Verily, it was publicly known that James L. Engle was a member of Lakas-CMD.
As far as the party and his wife were concerned, James L. Engle, as a member of
Lakas-CMD, may be substituted as a candidate upon his death. There was no
evidence on record that the party or petitioner had notice or knowledge of the
COMELEC's classification of James L. Engle as an independent candidate prior to
February 22, 2013 when petitioner filed her COC as a substitute for her deceased
husband. The only document in the record indicating that Lakas-CMD had been
notified of James L. Engle's designation as an independent candidate is the Letter
dated March 21, 2013 sent by the COMELEC Law Department to Romualdez 21
stating that James L. Engle was declared an independent candidate due to the
failure of Lakas-CMD to submit the authority of Romualdez to sign James L. Engle's
CONA to the Law Department as required under Section 6(3) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9518 and in view thereof petitioner's COC as her husband's
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substitute was denied due course.
The records also show that when petitioner's husband filed his certificate of
candidacy on October 4, 2012 with the Office of the Election Officer in Babatngon,
Leyte he clearly indicated therein that he was a nominee of Lakas-CMD and
attached thereto not only the CONA signed by Romualdez but also the Authority
to Sign Certificates of Nomination and Acceptance dated September 12, 2012 in
favor of Romualdez signed by Lakas-CMD President Revilla and Lakas-CMD
Secretary-General Aquino.
Section 6. Filing of Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance of Official
Candidates of a Political Party / Coalition of Political Parties. - The Certificate
of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) of the official candidates of the duly
registered political party or coalition of political parties shall be, in five (5) legible
copies, attached to and filed simultaneously with the Certificate of Candidacy.
The CONA shall also be stamped received in the same manner as the Certificate
of Candidacy.
The CONA, sample form attached, shall be duly signed and attested to under
oath, either by the Party President, Chairman, Secretary-General or any other
duly authorized officer of the nominating party and shall bear the acceptance
of the nominee as shown by his signature in the space provided therein.
For this purpose, all duly registered political parties or coalition of political
parties shall, not later than October 1, 2012, submit to the Law Department,
the names and specimen signatures of the authorized signatories of their
official party nominations.
No duly registered political party or coalition of political parties shall be allowed
to nominate more than the number of candidates required to be voted for in a
particular elective position; otherwise, in such a situation, all of the nominations
shall be denied due course by the Commission. (Emphases supplied.)
Federico v. COMELEC
Under Sec. 15 of RA 9369 which governs the conduct of automated elections,
the Comelec is empowered by law to prescribe such rules so as to make
efficacious and successful the conduct of the first national automated election:
“the Comelec, which has the constitutional mandate to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,” In resolving that
the deadline for all substitutions must be made on or before Dec. 15, 2009
pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 8678, COMELEC did not abuse its discretion.
Facts: Edna Sanchez (Edna) and private respondent Osmundo M. Maligaya
(Maligaya) were candidates for the position of municipal mayor of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas, in the 2010 Elections. On April 27, 2010, Armando Sanchez, husband of
Edna and the gubernatorial candidate for the province of Batangas, died. Edna
withdrew her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of mayor. She then
filed a new COC and a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) for the
position of governor as substitute candidate for her deceased husband. On May 5,
2010, petitioner Renato M. Federico (Federico) filed with the Office of the Election
Officer his COC and CONA as official candidate of the Nationalista Party and as
substitute candidate for mayor, in view of the withdrawal of Edna. Maligaya filed
his Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Federico
before the Comelec. Maligaya sought to have Federico declared ineligible to run
as substitute candidate for Edna since the period to file the COC for substitute
candidates had already lapsed after December 14, 2009. The COMELEC En Banc
gave due course to the COC of Edna as substitute gubernatorial candidate in the
Batangas province and to that of Federico as substitute mayoralty candidate. But
the official ballots had already been printed. On the day of elections, the name
“SANCHEZ, Edna P.” was retained in the list of candidates for Mayor of Sto. Tomas,
and garnered the highest number of votes - 28,389 against Maligaya’s 22,577 votes.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC) proclaimed Edna as the winning
mayoralty candidate. Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Edna
Sanchez. This petition was later withdrawn. The MBOC credited the same number
of votes garnered by Edna to Federico and proclaimed the latter as the winning
candidate. Maligaya filed his Petition to Annul Proclamation of Federico as mayor.
Meanwhile, Maligaya’s petition to deny due course and to cancel the COC of
Federico was denied by the Comelec Second Division. The Comelec First Division
denied Maligaya’s petition to annul the proclamation of Federico for having been
filed out of time. Maligaya elevated the matter to the Comelec En Banc. The
Comelec En Banc issued the assailed Resolution granting Maligaya’s partial motion
for reconsideration. The Comelec En Banc was of the view that the annulment of
Federico’s proclamation was in order because of his invalid substitution of Edna,
as his substitute COC was filed beyond the deadline and due to the illegality of
the proceedings of the MBOC in generating the second COCVP without authority
from the Comelec and without notice to the parties. Federico filed the present
Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court. Pending resolution of the case,
Vice-Mayor Armenius Silva (Intervenor Silva) of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, filed his
Motion for Leave to Intervene, praying essentially that as Federico failed to
qualify, he should be adjudged as his legal successor as mayor, under the Local
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Government Code.
ISSUE: 1st issue: Whether or not Federico could validly substitute Edna who
withdrew her candidacy for the mayoralty position.
2nd issue: Granting that Federico was disqualified, should he be succeeded by
Intervenor Silva under the LGC or be replaced by Maligaya.
RULING:
1st issue: No. Federico could not validly substitute Edna who withdrew her
candidacy for the mayoralty position. There being no valid substitution, the
candidate with the highest number of votes should be proclaimed as the duly
elected mayor. Regarding the May 10, 2010 automated elections, the Comelec
came out with Resolution No. 8678. On substitution, Section 13 thereof provides,
“the substitute for a candidate who withdrew may file his certificate of candidacy
as herein provided for the office affected not later than December 14, 2009.” In
case of withdrawal, which is the situation at bench, the substitute should have
filed a COC by December 14, 2009. When Batangas Gov. Armando Sanchez died
on April 27, 2010, Edna withdrew her candidacy as mayor and substituted her late
husband as gubernatorial candidate for the province on April 29, 2010. The party
actually had the option to substitute another candidate for Governor aside from
Edna. By fielding Edna as their substitute candidate for Governor, the party knew
that she had to withdraw her candidacy for Mayor. Considering that the deadline
for substitution in case of withdrawal had already lapsed, no person could
substitute her as mayoralty candidate. The sudden death of then Governor
Sanchez and the substitution by his widow in the gubernatorial race could not
justify a belated substitution in the mayoralty race.
2nd issue: No. Federico should not be succeeded by Intervenor Silva under the LGC
or be replaced by Maligaya. As Federico's substitution was not valid, there was
only one qualified candidate in the mayoralty race in Sto. Tomas, Batangas -
Maligaya. Being the only candidate, he received the highest number of votes.
Accordingly, he should be proclaimed as the duly elected mayor in the May 10,
2010 elections. Considering that Maligaya was the winner, the position of
Intervenor Silva that he be considered the legal successor of Federico, whom he
claims failed to qualify, has no legal basis. There is simply no vacancy. When there
is no vacancy, the rule on succession under Section 44 of the LGC cannot be
invoked.
Taglino v. COMELEC
Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking congressional office as
Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the
Liberal Party. Subsequently, one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura
Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, alleging that Richard, who was actually
a resident of San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he
resided Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet
the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared
disqualified/ineligible to run for the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that
Richard’s CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled. COMELEC First Division
rendered a Resolution granting Juntilla’s petition without any qualification.
On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC
together with a Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party
endorsing her as the party’s official substitute candidate vice her husband,
Richard, for the same congressional post. The COMELEC En Banc allow the
substitution of private respondent. Mr. Buenaventura O. Juntilla, thru his counsel,
opposing the candidacy of Ms. Lucy Marie Torres Gomez, as a substitute candidate
for Mr. Richard I. Gomez. The crux of the opposition stemmed from the issue that
there should be no substitution because there is no candidate to substitute for. It
must be stressed that the resolution of the First Division, speaks for
disqualification of candidate Richard I. Gomez and not of cancellation of his
Certificate of Candidacy. The said resolution was then affirmed by the Commission
En Banc. The disqualification of a candidate does not automatically cancel one’s
certificate of candidacy, especially when it is nominated by a political party. In
effect, the political party is still allowed to substitute the candidate whose
candidacy was declared disqualified. After all, the right to substitute is a privilege
given to a political party to exercise and not dependent totally to a candidate.
During the elections, Richards, whose name remained on the ballots, garnered
101, 250 votes while his opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and herein
petitioner Silverio Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493 votes, respectively. In view
of the aforementioned substitution, Richard’s votes were credited in favor of
private respondent and as a result, she was proclaimed the duly-elected
Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte.
Petitioner filed a Petition or quo warranto before the HRET in order to oust private
respondent from her congressional seat, claiming that she did not validly
substitute Richard as his CoC was void ab initio.
Ruling of the HRET:
Dismissed the quo warranto petition and declared that private respondent was a
qualified candidate for the position of Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative
District). It observed that the resolution denying Richard’s candidacy i.e., the
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COMELEC First Division’s Resolution, spoke of disqualification and not of CoC
cancellation. Hence, it held that the substitution of private respondent in lieu of
Richard was legal and valid.
Issue: Whether or not the Richard was validly substituted by private respondent as
candidate for Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in view of the
former’s failure to meet the one (1) year residency requirement provided under
Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
Ruling:
A.Distinction between a petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due
course to/cancel a certificate of candidacy
The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a
candidate’s bid for public office. Among these which obtain particular significance
to this case are: (1) a petition for disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a
petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a certificate of candidacy under
Section 78. The distinctions between the two are well-perceived.
Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either:
(a) a candidate’s possession of a permanent resident status in a foreign country;
or (b) his or her commission of certain acts of disqualification. Anent the latter,
the prohibited acts under Section 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, and
not to violations of other penal laws.
It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically
considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only
because of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his or her
statutory eligibility. In other words, while the candidate’s compliance with the
eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and
citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such
candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by the commission of the election
offenses.
On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC
proceeding under Section 78 of the OEC36 is premised on a person’s
misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the elective
office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the relevant qualification;
he or she must have also made a false representation of the same in the CoC.
The nature of a Section 78 petition was discussed in the case of Fermin v.
COMELEC,38 where the Court illumined:
Let it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC
is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made
a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications
required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidates
states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section
78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and
statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false,
the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel
such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section
78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both
deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly
in the fact that a "Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition
for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. (Emphasis
supplied)
Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the
misrepresentation, much less one’s intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a
Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person’s declaration of a material
qualification in the CoC be false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds that an
express finding that the person committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of
little consequence in the determination of whether one’s CoC should be deemed
cancelled or not.39 What remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to
deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of one’s ineligibility and
that the same be granted without any qualification.
Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to
have been a candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person
whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is
deemed to have not been a candidate at all. The reason being is that a cancelled
CoC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and
necessarily, to valid votes.
B. Valid CoC as a condition sine qua non for candidate substitution
Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person
belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a CoC to replace
the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified.
Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before
candidate substitution proceeds. Thus, whether the ground for substitution is
death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, the said section
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unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited
party may be substituted.
As defined under Section 79(a) of the OEC, the term "candidate" refers to any
person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office who has filed a certificate
of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or
coalition of parties. Clearly, the law requires that one must have validly filed a
CoC in order to be considered a candidate. The requirement of having a CoC
obtains even greater importance if one considers its nature. In particular, a CoC
formalizes not only a person’s public declaration to run for office but evidences
as well his or her statutory eligibility to be elected for the said post.
Absent of a valid CoC one is not considered a candidate under legal contemplation.
Considering that Section 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for
substitution to take place, as well as the precept that a person without a valid
CoC is not considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily follows that if a person’s
CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled, he or she cannot be validly
substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid CoC is therefore a
condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted.
C. Divergent effects of disqualification and denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of CoC cases vis-à-vis candidate substitution
As explained in the case of Miranda v. Abaya (Miranda), a candidate who is
disqualified under Section 68 can be validly substituted pursuant to Section 77
because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has
been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 cannot be
substituted because he is not considered a candidate. Stated differently, since
there would be no candidate to speak of under a denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of a CoC case, then there would be no candidate to be substituted;
the same does not obtain, however, in a disqualification case since there remains
to be a candidate to be substituted, although his or her candidacy is discontinued.
On this note, it is equally revelatory that Section 77 expressly enumerates the
instances where substitution is permissible, that is when an official candidate of
a registered or accredited political party "dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause." Noticeably, material misrepresentation cases are not included in the said
section and therefore, cannot be a valid basis to proceed with candidate
substitution.
Application to the case at bar:
In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10,
2010 elections due to his failure to comply with the one year residency
requirement.49 The confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word
"disqualified" in the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, which was adopted
by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of private respondent, and
even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. In
short, a finding that Richard was merely disqualified – and not that his CoC was
denied due course to and/or cancelled – would mean that he could have been
validly substitute by private respondent, thereby legitimizing her candidacy.
The clear and unequivocal basis for Richard’s "disqualification" is his failure to
comply with the residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the
Constitution which is a ground for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation
a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, misrepresentation contemplated under a
Section 78 petition refers to statements affecting one’s qualifications for elective
office such as age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born
Filipino status. There is therefore no legal basis to support a finding of
disqualification within the ambit of election laws.
Talaga v. COMELEC
A candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly substituted,
because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate in much the
same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a candidate. Ramon
was absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena
City for the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and
ineffectual ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his false
declaration of his eligibility to run. The invalidity and inefficacy of his CoC made
his situation even worse than that of a nuisance candidate because the nuisance
candidate may remain eligible despite cancellation of his CoC or despite the
denial of due course to the CoC pursuant to Section 69 of OEC.
Facts: Ramon Talaga was elected Mayor of Lucena City in the 2001, 2004 and 2007
elections. He served all his terms uninterrupted although he was preventively
suspended in two occasions: a) October 13 - November14, 2005 b) September 4 -
October 30, 2009. He again tried to run in the 2010 elections and filed his
certificate of candidacy. Philip Castillo, the incumbent Vice Mayor and also a
candidate for Mayor in the 2010 election filed a motion in the COMELEC to cancel
the COC of Mayor Ramon Talaga as it is in contravention with the 3 term limit
imposed by the Constitution. COMELEC gave due course to the petition and as a
result Ramon Talaga was disqualified to run for Mayor.
Initially, Ramon Talaga filed an MR but later on withdrew and substituted his wife
to run for the position of the Mayor instead. On election day on May 10, 2010, the
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name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor
were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute candidate, resulting in
Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s
39,615 votes.
It was only on May 13, 2010 when the COMELEC En Banc, upon the recommendation
of its Law Department, gave due course to Barbara Ruby’s CoC and CONA through
Resolution No. 8917, thereby including her in the certified list of candidates.
Consequently, the CBOC proclaimed Barbara Ruby as the newly-elected Mayor of
Lucena City. Hence, Castillo filed a petition for annulment of proclamation of
Barbara Ruby Talaga. Castillo contends that there was no valid substitution hence
the votes for Talaga should be considered stray votes and he should be declared
as the Mayor instead.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid substitution by Barbara Ruby Talaga.
Ruling: There was no valid substitution. A non-candidate like Ramon had no right
to pass on to his substitute. For there to be a valid substitution, there must be a
valid COC. The declaration of Ramon’s disqualification rendered his COC invalid;
hence he was not a valid candidate to be properly substituted.
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can
be no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of OEC. It should be
clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be validly
substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a candidate
in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a
candidate.
Likewise, a candidate who has not withdrawn his CoC in accordance with Section
73 of OEC may not be substituted. A withdrawal of candidacy can only give effect
to a substitution if the substitute candidate submits prior to the election a sworn
CoC as required by Section 73 of OEC.
To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was
absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City
for the fourth consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual
ab initio for containing the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of
his eligibility to run. The invalidity and inefficacy of his CoC made his situation
even worse than that of a nuisance candidate because the nuisance candidate may
remain eligible despite cancellation of his CoC or despite the denial of due course
to the CoC pursuant to Section 69 of OEC. Labo doctrine should apply. The only
time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning
candidate is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully aware
in fact and in law of that candidate’s disqualification as to bring such awareness
within the realm of notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes
in favor of the ineligible candidate. Under this sole exception, the electorate may
be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously
misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible
candidate with the second highest number of votes may be deemed elected. But
the exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply because the second element
was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least aware of the fact of
Barbara Ruby’s ineligibility as the substitute. In fact, the COMELEC En Banc issued
the Resolution finding her substitution invalid only on May 20, 2011, or a full year
after the decisions
POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, CAMPAIGN FINANCE, AND VOTER EDUCATION AND
INFORMATION
Penera v. COMELEC
Motorcades conducted after filing of the certificate of candidacy prior to the
campaign period constitute premature campaigning. When the campaign period
starts and a person proceeds with his/her candidacy, his/her acts, after the
filing of his/her certificate of candidacy and prior to the campaign period, as
the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, constitute premature
campaigning, for which s/he may be disqualified.
Rosalinda Penera (Penera) and Edgar Andanar (Andanar) ran for Mayor of Sta.
Monica, Surigao Del Norte, during the May 14, 2007 elections. A motorcade by
Penera’s political party was held. Thereafter, she filed her Certificate of
Candidacy.
Because of this, Andanar filed a petition to disqualify Penera for engaging in
election campaign before the start of the campaign period. Andanar claimed
that Penera and her party mates went around Sta. Monica, announcing their
candidacies and asking the people to vote for them in the coming elections.
Penera claimed that although a motorcade preceded the filing of her CoC, she
merely observed the usual practice of holding a motorcade on such momentous
occasion, but this ended as soon after she filed her CoC. Penera claimed that no
one made a speech during the event. All they had were lively background music
and a grand standing for the purpose of raising the hands of the candidates in the
motorcade.
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The case was then forwarded to the Second Division of COMELEC. However, the
elections of May 14, 2007 overtook it. Penera won and was elected as Mayor of
Sta. Monica. She then assumed office.
Thereafter, the COMELEC’s Second Division issued a resolution, disqualifying
Penera from continuing as a mayoralty candidate, on the ground that she
engaged in premature campaigning. This is in violation of Sections 80 and 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code. The Second Division found that Penera, her party
mates, and their supporters held a motorcade of two trucks and numerous
motorcycles laden with balloons, banners, and posters that showed the names of
the candidates and the positions they sought. One of the trucks had a public
speaker that announced Penera’s candidacy for mayor.
Penera now contends that:
● She was not yet a candidate at the time of the incident;
● The petition for disqualification failed to submit convincing and
substantial evidence against her, for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus
Election Code;
● Penera never admitted the allegations of the petition for disqualification,
and she has consistently disputed the charge of premature campaigning;
and
● The admission that Penera participated in a motorcade is not the same as
admitting she engaged in premature election campaigning.
Issue: Whether or not Penera should be disqualified as mayoralty candidate on
the ground that she engaged in premature campaigning
Ruling: NO, PENERA SHOULD NOT BE DISQUALIFIED. SHE DID NOT ENGAGE IN
PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING.
DEFINITION OF CANDIDATE
Section 79(a) of the Omnibus Election Code defines a candidate as any person
aspiring for or seeking an elective public office, who has filed a CoC.
Furthermore, Section 15(3) of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9369, provides that any person who files his Certificate of Candidacy within
the period for filing shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the
campaign period for which he filed his Certificate of Candidacy. It also provides
that unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only
upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period.
To understand more easily:
● Candidate – Any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office,
who has filed a CoC
● Start of campaign period – The day immediately after the last day for
filing CoCs
RELIANCE ON THE LANOT CASE
A person who files a CoC is not a candidate until the start of the campaign
period.
The essential elements for violation of Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code
are:
1) A person engages in an election campaign or partisan political activity;
2) The act is designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular
candidate or candidates;
3) The act is done outside the campaign period.
The second element requires the existence of a “candidate”. Under Section 79(a)
of the Omnibus Election Code, a candidate is one who has filed a CoC to an
elective public office. Unless one has filed his CoC, he is not a candidate. The
third element requires that the campaign period has not started when the election
campaign or partisan political activity is committed.
Assuming that all candidates to a public office file their CoCs on the last day,
which under Section 75 of the Omnibus Election Code is the day before the start
of the campaign period, then no one can be prosecuted for violation of Section
80 for acts done prior to such last day. Before such last day, there is no particular
candidate or candidates to campaign for or against.
On the other hand, on the day immediately after the last day of filing, the
campaign period starts. At this point, Section 80 ceases to apply, since Section
80 covers only acts done “outside” the campaign period.
Thus, if all candidates file their CoCs on the last day, then Section 80 may only
apply to acts done only on such last day. That is before the start of the campaign
period, and after at least one candidate has filed his CoC. This is perhaps the
reason why those running for elective public office usually file their certificates
of candidacy on the last day or close to the last day.
When Congress amended R.A. No. 8436, Congress decided to expressly incorporate
the Lanot doctrine into law. The clear intention of Congress was to preserve the
election periods as fixed by existing law, and that one who files to meet the early
deadline will still not be considered as a candidate.
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Congress wanted to insure that no person filing a CoC under the early deadline
required by the automated election system would be disqualified or penalized
for any partisan political act done before the start of the campaign period.
ELECTION OFFENSES CAN BE COMMITTED BY A CANDIDATE, “ONLY” UPON THE
START OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD
Election offenses can be committed by a candidate “only” upon the start of the
campaign period. This clearly means that before the start of the campaign
period, such election offenses cannot be so committed.
PENERA IS NOT LIABLE FOR PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING
Thus, in ruling that Penera is liable for premature campaigning for partisan
political acts before the start of the campaigning, the clear and express provision
of the law is ignored. What the law says is “any unlawful act or omission applicable
to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period”. The
plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political
acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts.
Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are
lawful.

In this case, Penera is not a candidate for purposes other than the printing of
Ang mabuting mabilat ayon kay Tito
ballots, until the start of the campaign period. There is absolutely no room for any
This is the case which affirms Section 13 of the RA 9369. Dito ang nangyari nag
other interpretation.
file siya ng COC pagkatapos ng filing niya nag motorcade siya. Candidate na siya
nung nag motorcade siya. Prior to RA 9369, the last day of filing of COC is usually
A person, after filing his CoC, but prior to his becoming a candidate (thus, prior to
scheduled one day before the start of the campaign period. One day before nung
the start of the campaign period), can already commit the acts under Section 79(b)
manual pa yung election. What happens there is when you file a COC dapat
of the Omnibus Election Code as election campaign or partisan political activity.
hintayin mo yung the next day. Nagyon ang ginawa, pagkatapos mag file
However, only after said person officially becomes a candidate (which is at the
sumayaw sayaw sila. That was campaigning. So dinemanda sila. Premature
beginning of the campaign period) can said acts be given effect as premature
campaigning kasi wala pang campaign period. What happened there was ang
campaigning under Section 80 of the Omnibus Election Code. Only after said
sabi ng SC, merong Section 13. Yung mga liabilities mo as a candidate can only
person officially becomes a candidate (which is at the start of the campaign
take effect upon the start of the campaign period. Notwithstanding the facts
period) can his disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature
that the filing of the COC was advanced before the start of the campaign period.
campaigning. Obviously, it is only at the start of the campaign period, when the
Hindi ka liable. Itong doctrine na ito came about as a motion for reconsideration.
person officially becomes a candidate, that the undue and iniquitous advantages
of his prior acts, constituting premature campaigning, shall accrue to his benefit.
Compared to the other candidates who are only about to begin their election
campaign, a candidate who had previously engaged in premature campaigning Nicholas- Lewis v. Comelec
already enjoys an unfair head start in promoting his candidacy.
There is no provision in the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
The mere fact that the law does not declare an act unlawful ipso facto means that
2003/dual citizenship law requiring "duals" or dual citizens to actually establish
the act is lawful. Thus, there is no need for Congress to declare in Section 15
residence and physically stay in the Philippines first before they can exercise
of R.A. No. 8436, as amended by RA 9369, that political partisan activities
their right to vote. On the contrary, said Act, in implicit acknowledgment that
before the start of the campaign period are lawful. It is sufficient for Congress
“duals” are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same
to state that “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take
right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under the Overseas Absentee
effect only upon the start of the campaign period”.
Voting Act of 2003. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence,
to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the
A candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the
residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions,
campaign period, not before. Any election offense that may be committed by a
are qualified to vote
candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the
campaign period.
Petitioner possesses dual citizenship (Filipino and American), whose right to vote

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under R.A. No. 9189, as amended, or the absentee voting system, was upheld by
the Court En Banc in the 2006 case of Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC.
Petitioner alleges, albeit notably sans support, that she, "together with thousands
of Filipinos all over the world," were prohibited by different Philippine consulates
from conducting information campaigns, rallies, and outreach programs in support
of their respective candidates, especially for the positions of President and Vice-
President for the 2016 Elections, pursuant to the above-cited provisions.
In the main, petitioner argues that the prohibition is a violation of Article III,
Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner explains that the prohibited partisan
political activities as defined under the law are acts of exercising free speech,
expression, and assembly. Corollary, these activities are necessary for the voters
to be informed of the character, platforms, and agenda of the candidates to the
end of having an educated decision on who to vote for. As such, it is petitioner's
position that the prohibition on partisan political activities is a clear curtailment
of the most cherished and highly-esteemed right to free speech, expression, and
assembly, as well as the right to suffrage.
Issue: Whether Section 36.8 of RA 9189, as amended by RA 10590, is
unconstitutional for violating the right to speech, expression, assembly, and
suffrage; for denial of substantive due process and equal protection of laws; and
for violating the territoriality principle of our criminal law?
Ruling:YES, RA 10590 is unconstitutional for it violated the cherished freedom of
the petitioner, which is the right to participate in electoral processes, which
includes not only the right to vote, but also the right to express one’s preference
for a candidate or the right to influence others to vote or otherwise not vote for
a particular candidate.
Rightfully so, since time immemorial, "it has been our constant holding that this
preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when
what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more
meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage." In the recent case of 1-United
Transport Koalisyon (1- UTAK) v. COMELEC, the Court En Banc pronounced that
any governmental restriction on the right to convince others to vote for or against
a candidate — a protected expression — carries with it a heavy presumption of
invalidity.
However, these freedoms are not absolute. Simply put, a law or statute regulating
or restricting free speech and expression is an outright departure from the express
mandate of the Constitution against the enactment of laws abridging free speech
and expression, warranting, thus, the presumption against its validity.
Section 36.8 of R.A. No. 9189, as amended by R.A. No. 10590, is an impermissible
content-neutral regulation for being overbroad, violating, thus, the free speech
clause under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The questioned provision is clearly a restraint on one's exercise of the right to
campaign or disseminate campaign-related information. Prior restraint refers to
official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in
advance of actual publication or dissemination. Undoubtedly, the prohibition
under the questioned legislative act restrains speech or expression, in the form of
engagement in partisan political activities, before they are spoken or made.
The restraint, however, partakes of a content-neutral regulation as it merely
involves a regulation of the incidents of the expression, specifically the time and
place to exercise the same. It does not, in any manner, affect or target the actual
content of the message. It is not concerned with the words used, the perspective
expressed, the message relayed, or the speaker's views. More specifically, the
prohibition does not seek to regulate the exercise of the right to campaign on the
basis of the particular message it conveys.
The failure to meet the fourth criterion (check relevant notes) is fatal to the
regulation's validity as even if it is within the Constitutional power of the
government agency or instrumentality concerned and it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest which is unrelated to the suppression of speech,
the regulation shall still be invalidated if the restriction on freedom of expression
is greater than what is necessary to achieve the invoked governmental purpose.
To reiterate, the perceived danger sought to be prevented by the restraint is the
purported risk of compromising the integrity and order of our elections. Sensibly,
such risk may occur only within premises where voting is conducted, i.e., in
embassies, consulates, and other foreign service establishments. There is,
therefore, no rhyme or reason to impose a limitation on the protected right to
participate in partisan political activities exercised beyond said places. By
banning partisan political activities or campaigning even during the campaign
period within embassies, consulates, and other foreign service establishments,
regardless of whether it applies only to candidates or whether the prohibition
extends to private persons, it goes beyond the objective of maintaining order
during the voting period and ensuring a credible election.
The challenged provision, whether on its face or read with its IRR, constitutes a
restriction on free speech that is greater than what is essential to the furtherance
of the governmental interest it aims to achieve. Section 36.8 of RA 9189 should be
struck down for being overbroad, there were no well-defined standards, resulting
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to the ambiguity of its application, which produces a chilling effect on the exercise
of free speech and expression, and resulting to invasion of area of protected
freedoms.
SWS, et. al v. COMELEC
The names of those who commission or pay for election surveys, including
subscribers of survey firms, must be disclosed pursuant to Sec. 5.2(a) of the Fair
Election Act. This requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of police
power and effects the constitutional policy of guaranteeing equal access to
opportunities for public service. The nature of the speech involved, as well as
the Fair Election Act's purpose of ensuring political equality, calls into operation
the equality-based approach to weighing liberty to express vis-a-vis equality of
opportunities. In an equality-based approach, politically disadvantaged speech
prevails over regulation but regulation promoting political equality prevails over
speech.
FACTS: Comelec Resolution No. 9674 (Resolution) directed SWS, Pulse Asia and
other survey firms of similar circumstances to submit to Comelec the names of all
commissioners and payors of all surveys published from Feb. 12, 2013 to April 23,
2013, including those of their “subscribers.” SWS and Pulse Asia assailed the
Resolution as having been issued ultra vires. They contended that the Resolution
is in excess of what the Fair Election Act requires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rights of petitioners to free speech will be curtailed by
the requirement to submit the names of their subscribers. (NO)
RULING: The names of those who commission or pay for election surveys, including
subscribers of survey firms, must be disclosed pursuant to Sec. 5.2(a) of the Fair
Election Act. This requirement is a valid regulation in the exercise of police power
and effects the constitutional policy of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities
for public service. The nature of the speech involved, as well as the Fair Election
Act's purpose of ensuring political equality, calls into operation the equality-based
approach to weighing liberty to express vis-a-vis equality of opportunities.
In an equality-based approach, politically disadvantaged speech prevails over
regulation but regulation promoting political equality prevails over speech.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches
into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of
a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative
speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a
candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c)
narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the opportunity of all
candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free
expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that
object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner
of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited or
censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether
the speech is made with or on private property.
SWS and Pulse Asia’s free speech rights must be weighed in relation to the Fair
Election Act's purpose of ensuring political equality and, therefore, the speech of
others who want to participate unencumbered in our political spaces. On one
hand, there are petitioners' right to publish and publications which are attended
by the interests of those who can employ published data to their partisan ends.
On the other, there is regulation that may affect equality and, thus, strengthen
the capacity of those on society's margins or those who grope for resources to
engage in the democratic dialogue. The latter fosters the ideals of deliberative
democracy. It does not trump the former; rather, it provides the environment
where the survey group's free speech rights should reside.
Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named
candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted “in return for
consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-list group. Personal
opinions, unlike sponsored messages, are not covered by the second paragraph
of Sec. 1(4) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 defining “political advertisement”
or “election propaganda.”
Bishop Vicente M. Navarra posted two (2) tarpaulins, each with approximately six
feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size, for public viewing within the vicinity of San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. One of the tarpaulins stated: "Conscience Vote"
and lists of candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark or
“(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark.The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of the RH Law. Those who voted for the
passing of the law were classified as comprising "Team Patay," while those who
voted against it form "Team Buhay.
When the said tarpaulin came to the attention of Comelec, it sent a letter to
Bishop Navarra ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin because it was in
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violation of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 as the lawful size for election
propaganda material is only two feet (2’) by three feet (3’); otherwise, it will be
constrained to file an election offense against the latter. Concerned about the
imminent threat of prosecution for their exercise of free speech, Bishop Navarra,
et al. prayed for the Court to declare the questioned orders of Comelec as
unconstitutional, and permanently restraining the latter from enforcing them
after notice and hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not the controversial tarpaulin is an election propaganda which
the Comelec has the power to regulate; otherwise its prohibition shall constitute
an abridgment of freedom of speech. (NO)
RULING: It is not election propaganda.While the tarpaulin may influence the
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not
necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or
posted “in return for consideration” by any candidate, political party, or party-
list group. Personal opinions, unlike sponsored messages, are not covered by the
second paragraph of Sec. 1(4) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 defining “political
advertisement” or “election propaganda.” The caricature, though not agreeable
to some, is still protected speech. That petitioners chose to categorize them as
purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single issue—and a complex piece of
legislation at that—can easily be interpreted as an attempt to stereotype the
candidates and partylist organizations. Not all may agree to the way their thoughts
were expressed, as in fact there are other Catholic dioceses that chose not to
follow the example of petitioners. But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our
Constitution is an enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed
code that prescribes good conduct. It provides space for all to be guided by their
conscience, not only in the act that they do to others but also in judgment of the
acts of others.
GMA Network v.COMELEC
Section 9 (a) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the
“aggregate-based” airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed
freedom of speech and of the press. It is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly
restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach
out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing
the “aggregate-based” airtime limits—leveling the playing field—does not
constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial
restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate
their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government
Petitioners GMA Network, Incorporated (GMA), ABS-CBN Corporation (ABS-CBN),
ABC Development Corporation (ABC), et. al. are owners/operators of radio and
television networks in the Philippines, while petitioner Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) is the national organization of broadcasting
companies in the Philippines representing operators of radio and television
stations and said stations themselves. They sent their respective letters to
Comelec questioning the constitutionality of Section 9 (a) of Comelec Resolution
No. 9615 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of
candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate
total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes,
respectively.
During the previous May 2007 and 2010, Comelec issued Resolutions implementing
and interpreting the airtime limitations, to mean that a candidate is entitled to
the aforestated number of minutes "per station.” For the May 2013 elections,
however, respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 9615, changing the
interpretation of said candidates' and political parties' airtime limitation for
political campaigns or advertisements from a “per station” basis, to a “total
aggregate” basis. Petitioners contend that such restrictive regulation on allowable
broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people's right to suffrage
as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose
who to elect during the forth coming elections. However, Comelec contended that
its issuance of the assailed Resolution is pursuant to Section 4, Article IX (C) of the
Constitution which vests on the Comelec the power to supervise and regulate,
during election periods, transportation and other public utilities, as well as mass
media.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 9 (a) of the assailed Comelec resolution violates
freedom of speech and of the press. (YES)
RULING: Section 9 (a) of Comelec Resolution No. 9615, with its adoption of the
“aggregate-based” airtime limits unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom
of speech and of the press. It is unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts
and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the
“aggregate based” airtime limits—leveling the playing field—does not constitute a
compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the
freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas,
philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in
the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.
In this particular instance, what the Comelec has done is analogous to letting a
bird fly after one has clipped its wings.
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It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based
time limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only
composed of so many islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken
among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to
really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be
necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements in languages
and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add
all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such
candidate to express himself - a form of suppression of his political speech.
1-Utak v. COMELEC
The "captive-audience" doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be
exposed to an unwanted message in circumstances in which the communication
cannot be avoided.Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-
audience doctrine may not be justified if the supposed "captive audience" may
avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. The prohibition under Section
7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the captive-
audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the
election campaign materials posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are
they incapable of declining to receive the messages contained in the posted
election campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find
the same unbearably intrusive.
FACTS: In 2013, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the
rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national
and local elections and subsequent elections. One of the sections enumerates the
prohibited forms of election propaganda including the posting of any election
campaign or propaganda material in public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys,
trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or not, and
within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports,
seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the like.
ISSUE: Whether or not the provisions which prohibit the posting of any election
campaign or propaganda material in PUVs and public transport terminals are
constitutional. (NO)
RULING: Such prohibitions unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people
to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of individuals,
i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their
preference, through the posting of election campaign material in their property,
and convince others to agree with them. The prohibition constitutes a clear prior
restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of PUVs and transport
terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals
are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under
the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their franchise
or permit to operate.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents
of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under
well-defined standards,is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right
to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur: first, the
government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government;
second, it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; third, the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral
regulations since they merely control the place where election campaign materials
may be posted. However, the prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech
clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral
regulation. The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as
a practical matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted.The
"captive-audience" doctrine recognizes that a listener has a right not to be exposed
to an unwanted message in circumstances in which the communication cannot be
avoided. Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine
may not be justified if the supposed "captive audience" may avoid exposure to the
otherwise intrusive speech. The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the captive-audience doctrine; the
commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials
posted on PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to
receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign materials since
they may simply avert their eyes if they find the same unbearably intrusive.
Maturan v COMELEC
On October 16, 2015, the petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of Provincial Governor of Basilan to be contested in the 2016 National and
Local Elections. Allan Patiño, claiming to be a registered voter of Basilan, filed a
petition for the disqualification of the petitioner on the ground that based on the
list issued by the COMELEC Campaign Finance Officer the latter had failed to file
his SOCE corresponding to the 2010 and 2013 elections.
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The petitioner opposed the petition for his disqualification by arguing that the
petition had been rendered moot on account of his withdrawal from the mayoralty
race during the 2013 elections; and that, consequently, he could only be held
accountable for the failure to file his SOCE corresponding to the 2010 elections
when he ran for Provincial Governor of Basilan, and for which he had already paid
a fine of P15,000.00.
The COMELEC First Division issued a resolution declaring perpetually disqualified
to hold public office. In its resolution, the Court cited the case of Pilar v.
COMELEC:
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a
statement of contributions and expenditures because he was a 'non-
candidate,' having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after
its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that the
candidate must have entered the political contest, and should have either
won or lost." Petitioner's argument is without merit. Section 14 of R.A. No.
7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement
of contributions and expenditures.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bench, as the law does not make any distinction or
qualification as to whether the candidate pursued
his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be
deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but
also to one who withdrew his candidacy. The COMELEC, the body tasked
with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall, issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementation or interpretation
of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7166 on election contributions and
expenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No. 23488 categorically refers to "all
candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy." Furthermore, Section
14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word
"'shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a
duty which may be enforced, particularly if public policy is in favor of this
meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the general rule.
The petitioner appealed the case to COMELEC en banc, but was also denied hence
this petition. Petitioner submits:
1. That he only failed to submit his SOCE once, in 2010. He pleads good faith
because he thought that he was no longer required to submit his SOCE for
the 2013 elections because of his having withdrawn from the mayoral race
in that year.
2. That the penalty of perpetual disqualification is excessive, harsh and
cruel, and, consequently, unconstitutional since failure to file SOCE is a
less grave offense than the crimes under the RPC and under the civil
service laws.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion for imposing
perpetual disqualification on petitioner? (NO)
Whether or not the imposition of perpetual disqualification to hold public office
for those who failed to file their SOCE more than once is gravely excessive and
disproportionate ? (NO)
Ruling:
1. COMELEC acted within their jurisdiction coming from the provisions of Sec.
14 of RA 7166 (see provision in notes). The petitioner should have paid
heed to the 1995 ruling in Pilar v. Commission on Elections, which the
COMELEC properly cited in its assailed resolution. Based on Pilar, every
candidate, including one who meanwhile withdraws his candidacy, is
required to file his SOCE by Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166. Accordingly, the
petitioner could not invoke good faith on the basis of his having withdrawn
his candidacy a day before the 2013 elections.
2. The law would always enforce a statute like R.A. No. 7166 unless there is
a clear showing that it contravenes the Constitution. The petitioner has
not demonstrated herein how R.A. No. 7166 could have transgressed
the Constitution. On the contrary, a review of R.A. No. 7166 convincingly
indicates that perpetual disqualification from public office has been
prescribed as a penalty for the repeated failure to file the SOCE and does
not constitute cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. We have
already settled that the constitutional proscription under the Bill of Rights
extends only to situations of extreme corporeal or psychological
punishment that strips the individual of his humanity. In Lim v. People:
SDHTE
Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not
cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the offense
unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly
disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral
sense of the community. It takes more than merely being harsh,
excessive, out of proportion or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious
to the Constitution. Based on this principle, the Court has consistently
overruled contentions of the defense that the penalty of fine or
imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and
degrading. In People vs. Tongko, this Court held that the prohibition
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 against cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed at the
form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in
respect of its duration or amount, and applies to punishments which
never existed in America or which public sentiment regards as cruel
or obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at the
whipping post or in the pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking on
the wheel, disemboweling and the like. The fact that the penalty is
severe provides insufficient basis to declare a law unconstitutional
and does not, by that circumstance alone, make it cruel and
inhuman.
Moreover, that Congress has deemed fit to impose the penalty of
perpetual disqualification on candidates who repeatedly failed to file their
SOCEs cannot be the subject of judicial inquiry. Congress has the absolute
discretion to penalize by law with perpetual disqualification from holding
public office in addition to administrative fines the seekers of public office
who fail more than once to file their SOCEs. Such penalty is intended to
underscore the need to file the SOCE as another means of ensuring the
sanctity of the electoral process.
Salvador v. COMELEC
Mario Salvador (Salvador) is a member of the political party Bagong Lakas ng Nueva
Ecija. Salvador was a mayoralty candidate in San Jose City, Nueva Ecija in 2010.
However, after the elections, Marivic Violago-Belena, the wife of Alexander
Belena (Belena), won over Mario.
BELENA’S CONTENTION
Belena then filed a complaint-affidavit against Salvador for overspending or a
violation of Section 100 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Belena claimed that Salvador exceeded the expenditure limit allowed by law for
a mayoralty candidate. Belena cited Salvador’s Statement of Election Contribution
and Expenditure (SOCE), saying that Salvador spent P449,000.00 in the 2010
election, when the maximum expenditure allowed is P275,667.00.
Belena contended that under Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166, a candidate (other than
for presidency and vice presidency) is allowed to spend P3.00 for every voter
currently registered in the constituency where he filed his CoC. However, if a
candidate is without any political party and without any support from any political
party, he may be allowed to spend P5.00 for every such voter.
Pursuant to this, considering that the total number of registered voters in San Jose
City, Nueva Ecija is 91,889 and that Salvador is a member of a political party, then
he was only allowed to spend P275,667.00 only.
SALVADOR’S CONTENTIONS
For his part, Salvador maintained that while he is a member of a political party,
he did not receive any support from any political party. Hence, he falls under the
exception for Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166.
COMELEC EN BANC: The COMELEC En Banc disregarded Salvador’s interpretation.
It was held that the P5.00 cap applies only to a candidate who is not a member of
a political party and who did not receive any support from any political party.
Here, Salvador is still a member of a political party
Whether or not Salvador committed overspending or a violation of Section 100 in
relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code
YES, SALVADOR COMMITTED OVERSPENDING.
CANDIDATE WITH A POLITICAL PARTY v. CANDIDATE WITHOUT A POLITICAL
PARTY
Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166 provides for the allowable expenses of a candidate
and political parties. It is an amendment to Section 100 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Sec. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. — The
aggregate amount that a candidate or registered political party may spend
for election campaign shall be as follows:
1. For Candidates. — Ten pesos (P10.00) for President and Vice President;
and for other candidates Three Pesos (P3.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy;
Provided, That a candidate without any political party and without support
from any political party may be allowed to spend Five Pesos (P5.00) for
every such voter; and
2. For political parties. — Five pesos (P5.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has official
candidates.
With the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7166, a distinction was made
between a candidate without a political party and without support from any
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political party and a candidate with political party and who receives support from
a political party. The former is allowed to spend the P5.00 cap, while the latter is
allowed to spend the P3.00 cap.
RATIONALE FOR THE RULE
With this, the legislature intended to ensure equality between and among
aspirants with deep pockets and those with less financial resources. Congress
understood the apparent disparity between candidates who are members of
political parties and candidates who are not members of political parties. The
political advantages which necessarily goes with a candidate’s membership in
a political party include the machinery, goodwill, representation, and resources
of the political party.
These advantages are not enjoyed by non-members of a political party. Thus, it is
necessary that an independent candidate be afforded equal chances.
WITHOUT POLITICAL PARTY “AND” WITHOUT SUPPORT FROM ANY POLITICAL
PARTY
In construing Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166, the word “and” between “without
political party” and' “without support from any political party” as conjunctive. It
means “in addition to”. The word “and” must be accepted as binding together
and as relating to one another.
Applying this to Section 13, the proper construction is that the allowable
expenditure for candidates without any political party and without support
from any political party is P3.00. After all, the word “support,” which is explicitly
provided by the law, is not solely limited to financial aid. Political parties are
designed to assist a candidate in his desire to win the vote of the populace.
Political parties use its machinery and its resources to achieve such end.
The law is clear: the candidate must both be without a political party “and”
without support from any political party for the P5.00 cap to apply. In the
absence of one, the exception (which is the P3.00 cap) does not apply.
To allow Salvador’s contention (that he is part of a political party, but did not
receive any support from it) is to deviate from the intention of the legislature in
enacting the law, as the same would find all candidates on equal footing,
whether member of a political party or not.
Ultimately, Salvador is entitled to spend the amount of P275,667.00 only, as he is
allowed to spend P3.00 for each registered voter. However, Salvador spent the
amount of P449,000.00 as declared in his SOCE. Clearly, he exceeded the
allowable limit provided by law. As such, it constitutes an election offense.
Ejercito v. COMELEC
EN BANC The phrase “those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate”
is sufficiently adequate to cover those expenses which are contributed or
donated in the candidate’s behalf. By virtue of the legal requirement that a
contribution or donation should bear the written conformity of the candidate, a
contributor/supporter/donor certainly qualifies as “any person authorized by
such candidate or treasurer.”
Ejercito and San Luis are both candidates for the position of Governor of the
Province of Laguna. Ejercito is assailing the resolution made by Comelec granting
the petition for disqualification filed by San Luis against Ejercito pursuant to the
latter’s alleged violation of Sec. 68(a) and (c) of the Omnibus Election Code on
the grounds that:
(1) Ejercito distributed Health Access Program or ER “Orange Cards” that
could be used in any public hospital within Laguna for medical needs.
These are material considerations given to influence the people to vote in
his favor
(2) Ejercito exceeded the total allowable expenditures for his election
campaign - P4,576,566. Advertising expenses incurred were 6x more than
that allowed - P23,730,784; and this was the result of Ejercito’s
acceptance of a donation in the form of tv ads to be aired on ABS CBN
Ejercito raises the following arguments:
The Orange Cards was a project of his administration as incumbent governor of
Laguna. His subsequent proclamation as governor rendered the petition for
disqualification moot and academic. San Luis, however, contends that Ejercito’s
proclamation as winner does not affect Comelec’s jurisdiction to continue with
the trial and hearing of the pending disqualification case until it is finally resolved.
A suspension of proclamation may be ordered pursuant thereto. The limit set by
law applies only to election expenditures of candidates and not to campaign
contributions and donations made by third parties
WON contributions (tv ads) of third parties (donor) made with the consent of the
candidate (Ejercito) are excluded from the total allowable expenditures allowed
by the OEC.
No, contributions of third parties made with the consent of the candidate are
included in the total allowable expenditures allowed by the OEC.
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Sec 100 of the OEC states that expenses for election campaigns shall include those
incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate. Sec 103 of the OEC also states
that persons authorized to incur election expenditures include any person
authorized by the candidate or the treasurer of a political party. Corollary thereto,
the Fair Election Act states broadcast advertisement donated to the candidate
shall be broadcasted with the written acceptance of the candidate, which shall be
attached to the advertising contract signed by the donor, the candidate or by the
authorized representative of a political party, and submitted to Comelec.

Since a donation should bear the written acceptance of the candidate, a donor
certainly qualifies as “any person authorized by such candidate or treasurer of a
political party to incur election expenditures”. Thus, the phrase “those incurred
or caused to be incurred by the candidate” covers expenses donated for election
campaigns on the candidate’s behalf. Thus, Ejercito should be disqualified for
spending an amount in excess of what is allowed by the OEC for election
campaigns, considering that a huge amount thereof was donated by a third party
for tv advertisements, and with his acceptance

R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the
candidate shall not be broadcasted without the written acceptance of the
candidate, which shall be attached to the advertising contract and shall be
submitted to the COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising contracts shall
be signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly- authorized
representative of the political party.

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 JANUARY 10, 2021

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9639

From Uncle’s lectures and his briefing paper about RA 9369.

➢ RA 9369 is the law that governs the conduct of elections that we have
today.
➢ On January 23, 2007, less than four months before the May 14, 2007
congressional and local elections, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
signed into law Republic Act (RA) No. 9369. This law amended and
repealed almost all of RA 84361, a 1997 law that authorized the conduct
of an automated election.
➢ Philippine elections have always been conducted manually. Voters have to
write by hand the names of their chosen candidates on the ballots.
Counting of votes is done at the polling place with the Board of Election
Inspectors (BEI) reading the votes aloud and simultaneously recording
➢ The basic law of our election is still BP 881 or the Omnibus Election Code
them by means of sticks or taras on a tally sheet or election return, and
(OEC), in 1985.
on a black board or tally board. The precinct results, as contained in
○ The 1985 election code repealed all previous laws, kaya na-
election returns, are sent to the municipal or city Boards of Canvassers
codify.
(BOC), who would then canvass or tabulate the precinct results by writing
them in a document known as statement of votes. The municipal or city ➢ That’s why it was necessary for Congress to come up with another law just
results are reflected in a municipal or city Certificate of Canvass (COC), to authorize the use of technology.
which are sent to higher canvassing levels. The same process is observed ○ While you have provisions like Sec. 52 of the OEC, which seem to
as the tabulation goes up to higher stage of canvassing. allow the use and adoption of the latest technological and
electronic devices, the law itself, as a whole, is so detailed and
so specific that there is not much leeway to change the way you
vote, the way votes are counted and tabulated.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8046

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 ■ In other words, it just counts and it does not transmit or
receive anything. That’s why it’s a stand alone.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8436

➢ In 1995, Congress passed a law authorizing the pilot testing of the use
of computers, they call it computerized election at that time, in the
regional elections in the ARMM.
➢ In 1995, Congress passed RA 8046 authorizing a nationwide
demonstration of a “computerized” election system and the pilot-
testing of the same in the ARMM for the region’s March 1996 elections.
○ The system that was adopted for the pilot testing involved the
use of an optical scanning/mark- sense reading device. Ballots
➢ In December of 1997, Congress, after much debate, passed RA 8436, a law
were accomplished at the polling places but they were
that authorized the nationwide automation of the voting and counting,
transported to a central counting center, where the optical
as well as the canvassing processes, in the then upcoming May 1998
scanning counting machines were situated, after the closing of the
national and local elections and in subsequent elections.
polls.
➢ This law adopted the optical scanning technology as the sole automated
➢ So what did the law authorize COMELEC to do? Yung pilot test, ibig sabihin
election system that could be used.
ng pilot test ay “subukan” in one region.
○ However, in the said elections the law was applied only to the
➢ Parameters of the kind of technology that should be adopted:
ARMM region.
○ There must be a paper ballot.
➢ Optical Mark Reader System yung prinescribe. So what does RA 8436 have?
➢ What does “stand alone machine” mean? ➢ It tells COMELEC that it can now use appropriate technology for voting.
○ So what you have there is not really a voting machine, but a
➢ It prescribes electronic devices for canvass and then the requirement
counting machine that will count the votes. It is not connected to
for a stand alone machine was retained and it envisions a central count.
any network.
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 ➢ But since this law, RA 8436 was passed in December 1997 and the next
presidential election at that time was scheduled in May 1998, atrasado na
to use technology.
○ So what did COMELEC do? What COMELEC did was to use
computers or counting machines in the ARMM, but this was a
national election, except that in the ARMM, nagkaron na ng
makina, while the rest of the country, we were still using
manual process.
○ So it was implemented in the ARMM and out of that
implementation came one case, yung LOONG V. COMELEC.
LOONG v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 133676, April 4, 1999
Facts: In a bid to improve our elections, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8436 on
December 22, 1997 prescribing the adoption of an automated election system.
The new system was used in the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of
Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have
administrative oversight of the elections in Sulu.
Held: YES. In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a
remedy where the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight
is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent
the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of
the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this
provision is to have COMELEC all the necessary and incidental powers for it to
achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections. Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in defining
the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the conduct of our elections.
Our elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running for public
offices, candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post. Too often, COMELEC has
to make snap judgments to meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to
subvert the will of our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not
be impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable. We cannot, however, engage in
a swivel chair criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult
circumstances.

During the election it was noticed that there was an error in the printing of the
local ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated machines failed to
read them correctly.

Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local candidates and
the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu elections. The meeting discussed
how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. Some
recommended a manual count while others insisted on an automated count. In
view of their differences in opinion, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. requested the parties to
submit their written position papers.

Petitioner argues that the automated counting is mandatory and could not be
substituted by a manual counting. Where the machines are allegedly defective,
the only remedy provided for by law is to replace the machine. Manual counting What do you have to remember in the case of LOONG V. COMELEC?
is prohibited by law.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC had the authority to order a manual count.
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 ➢ In the case of Loong vs. COMELEC, et. al., involves the resolution of an
issue relating to the inaccurate count of the OMR machines used in the
ARMM during the 1998 national elections.
➢ You have paper ballot, then you have the names of the candidates and
there are ovals opposite the name of each candidate, and when you shade
the ovals, ipapasok mo yan dun sa makina, babasahin ng scanner and that
scanner would convert what it has read into votes.
➢ Ang nangyari dito, yung printing ng ballot, parang hindi nagtapat doon sa
oval. So what happened was the machine read the vote for, let’s say, the
one whose name is in line 1 and credited to the one whose name is in line
2. So mali, nadiscover yun. Now, the issue here is, how do you correct it?
The debate then was when you do a recount, do you use the machine or
do you use your eyes? The decision of the SC is there is nothing that will
prohibit COMELEC from using manual process in correcting/checking
whether the machines counted the votes correctly.

ITFP ET AL V. COMELEC has to do with the election with the supposed automated
election being implemented in the 2004 election, it did not happen because the
bidding was seen by the SC to have been illegal. So hindi natuloy yung automated
election.
➢ More than a year before COMELEC awarded the contract for the supply of
OMR machines to Mega Pacific consortium. But the law was again left
unimplemented as the Supreme Court voided the Mega Pacific award
on the principal ground that the bidding was plagued by irregularities.
The 2004 presidential elections employed the old manual process instead.
➢ So despite the fact that there was already RA 8436, that mandates the
nationwide implementation of the automated election, no automated
election on a nationwide basis took place from 1998, 2001, 2003, 2004.
The first nationwide automated election happened in 2010.

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REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9369
"1. Automated election system, hereinafter to as AES - a system using
appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in the voting, counting,
consolidating, canvassing, and transmission of election result, and other
electoral process;

"2. Electronic transmission - conveying data in electronic form from one

location to other;

"3. Official ballot - where AES is utilized, refers to the paper ballot, whether
printed or generated by the technology applied, that faithfully captures or
represents the votes cast by a voter recorded or to be recorded in electronic
form;

"4. Election returns - a document in electronic and printed form directly

produced by the counting or voting machine, showing the date of the election,
the province, municipality and the precinct in which it is held and the votes in
figures for each candidate in a precinct in areas where AES is utilized;

"5. Statement of votes - a document containing the votes obtained by

candidates in each precinct in a city/municipality;

"6. City/municipal/district/provincial certificate of canvass - a document in

electronic and printed form containing the total votes in figures obtained by
each candidate in a city/municipality/district/province as the case may be. The
electronic certificates of canvass shall be the official canvass result in the
aforementioned jurisdictions;

"7. Paper-based election system - a type of automated election system that

use paper ballots, records and counts votes, tabulates, consolidates/canvasses
and transmits electronically the results of the vote count;"

"8. Direct recording electronic election system - a type or automated election

DEFINITION OF TERMS UNDER RA 9639
SEC. 2. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act, the following terms shall
mean:
system that uses electronic ballots, records, votes by means of a ballot display
provided with mechanical or electro-optical component that can be activated
by the voter, processes data by means of a computer programs, record voting
data and ballot images, and transmits voting results electronically;
"9. Counting center - a public places within the city/municipality or in such
other places as may be designated by the Commission where the official ballots
cast in various precincts of the city/municipality shall be counted. Polling places
or voting centers may also be designated as counting centers;

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 "10. Continuity plan - a list of contingency measures, and the policies for ➢ The principal objective of R.A. No. 9369 is to ensure secrecy and sanctity
activation of such, that are put in place to ensure continuous operation of the of the ballot. Secrecy of the ballot goes into the very core of election
AES; integrity. It is important that secrecy of the ballot is observed because
that would mean na merong autonomy of will yung bumoboto; na hindi
"11. Disabled voters - a person with impaired capacity to use the AES; siya pwedeng maimpluwensyahan whatever decision he would make
when he votes.
"12. Source code - human readable instructions that define what the computer
equipment will do; and ➢ It should be a transparent and credible process.
➢ It should be fast and accurate.
"13. Station- refers to a polling place, counting center, municipal or provincial ○ The reason for this is that the slow process in the previous
canvassing center." manual election seemed to be the reason why fraud took place.
The opportunity for fraud is higher when the process has a lot of
➢ RA 9369 defines automated election system (AES) as the use of an stages in it that have manual intervention.
appropriate technology which has been demonstrated in voting,
counting, and the consolidation, canvass, and transmission of election TYPES OF AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM
results.
○ It does not include other aspects of election process, such as voter
registration, or precinct boundary setting.
➢ Yung RA 8436, a 1997 law, kasi prescribes a particular technology. Ang
sabi niya, dapat it must use paper ballot.
○ Dapat COMELEC should be able to explore all appropriate
technology for voting, counting, consolidation and transmission
of election results.

PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES OF RA 9369

Q: What types of election system are allowed under R.A. No. 9369?

A: First, it is paper-based. It should have a paper ballot.

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Second, one that uses direct recording electronic system. Thus, instead of a
paper ballot, what you have is an electronic ballot. When you use your pencil and
shade the oval, that is analog.
HOW DOES PAPER BALLOT or DIRECT RECORDING ELECTRONIC SYSTEM WORK?
➢ The voter interacts with the paper ballot. This is manual and analog,
because you directly reflect your vote on the paper.
➢ On the other, yung direct recording electronic, you input your vote in a
receptacle. It can be a screen or trackpad, basta wala kang papel.
○ At the point of voting, digitized na yung data mo. It is when the
machine is scanned by the ballot, and the data is inputed, that
the data becomes digital.
Q: Ano ang issue dito? Merong differing interpretations and this has not been
resolved yet.
A: In COMELEC, many of my colleagues would think that only these two kinds of
system are allowed. My interpretation is that looking at the preamble and
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9369, ang sinasabi doon is COMELEC is given the
authority to choose the most suitable and appropriate technology.
It can be anything actually. In the United States, there is now a technology
called the “ballot generator”. What happens there is that you do not use paper
ballot initially; you input your vote sa machine or trackpad, pagkatapos
maglalabas ng papel yung makina. Yung nilabas na papel, yun yung paper ballot
mo. You will then put that in a ballot box, and then sa counting, iniiscan mo
yun. So you have a paper copy.
In other words, if you interpret R.A. No. 9369 strictly, yung paper-based at
direct electronic recording lang ang pwede. But my own thinking is that it is
really up to COMELEC to decide, because that is the authority given by
Congress to COMELEC to decide on.
What kind of “automated election system” is provided for under the law?
➢ Under the law, AES can either be paper-based or a direct recording
electronic election system.
➢ The law defines paper-based election system as a type of AES that uses
paper ballots, records and counts votes, tabulates,
consolidates/canvasses and transmits electronically the results of the
vote count.
➢ Direct recording electronic (DRE) election system, is defined as one that
uses electronic ballots by means of a ballot display in a mechanical or
electro-optical component that can be activated by the voter.
○ It must also be able to record voting data and ballot images, and
to transmit voting results electronically. It can be likened to an
Automated Teller Machine (ATM) used in bank transactions.
➢ Whether the AES is paper-based or DRE, the paper ballot, whether
printed or generated by the technology applied, is considered as the
official ballot.
➢ COMELEC is the agency empowered to prescribe the kind of AES that
can be used in elections.
○ But whatever AES COMELEC chooses, it should be able to ensure
the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot.
➢ When DRE is used, electronic displays must be constructed in such a way
as to present the names of all candidates for the same position in the same
page or screen, or in a series of sequential pages but with the voter being
able to see all of the ballot options on all pages before completing his or
her vote.
○ The DRE display must also allow the voter to review and change
all ballot choices prior to completing and casting his or her ballot.
○ The DRE machine is required to generate a printed copy of the
vote, so as to enable the voter to find out whether the machine
has correctly registered his choice.
➢ In a paper-based AES however, what is envisioned by the law is that
machine-readable ballots are prepared by voters at the polling places,
but said ballots, after the closing of polls, are brought to counting
centers for counting.
○ It is in these counting centers that the election returns are printed
and electronically transmitted.
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 ➢ Under this system, it is very possible that no precinct results would be
available before the ballots are transported from the polling places to
the central counting centers. This would make the transport stage very
crucial and dangerous. Once the uncounted ballots are stolen or snatched
in transit, there would be no precinct result whatsoever, thus a failure in
election.
○ The vulnerability of this system is especially true in high
security risk areas, like the ARMM region. It would be best to
situate the counting centers within the polling centers or school
compounds to reduce this risk.
➢ The law also provides that election returns, whether the system is
paper-based or DRE, must be generated in both electronic and printed
form.
➢ The election returns transmitted electronically and digitally signed shall
be considered as official election results and shall be used as the basis
for the canvassing of votes and the proclamation of a candidate.
○ what the law consider as official election results are those coming
from the electronically transmitted certificates of canvass.
FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN CHOOSING A SYSTEM
Q: What are the parameters of it?
A:
1) Suitable and appropriate technology.
2) It has to have demonstrated capability.
➢ The demonstrated capability means that when you procure a system or
a technology, that technology must have been used in previous
election.
○ Kasi nga ang sabi, demonstrated capability: it must have been
used in previous election. Eh wala pa naman tayong election na
gumamit ng makina.
➢ In hoping to ensure a reliable and accurate AES, the law requires that it
should have “demonstrated capability,” meaning, it must have been
successfully used in previous elections, here or abroad.
○ Untested system and machines are, therefore, not allowed.
3) Another parameter is that kung ano yung prevailing in the area, and
suitable in the area.
4) And another is, kung may pera.
➢ For situations prevailing in the area, one issue in the briefing paper I sent
you is whether or not it is necessary to have the same technology all
over the country. Kumbaga, uniform ba dapat?
○ My answer there is that it is not necessary. You can use manual
elections in one area, automated elections in another area, and
maybe another one in some other area.
■ Because that is what it means to say that you have to
choose a technology that considers the situation in the
area.
Q: With regard to “situation in the area”, would that include mail-in voting?
Because in the United States, there is a mail-in vote system. So is that counted
as a system in voting that is allowed?
A: Yes, my thinking is yes. My view is that the law itself gives that discretion
to COMELEC to adapt what is appropriate. In this time of pandemic, it would
seem that mail-in voting would be the most appropriate technology or
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process that would have to be adapted; some say, even the use of internet.
And some would even say the use of cellphone or text messaging.
But the issue there is that it might compromise the integrity of the process.
Remember, one of the requirements that COMELEC must observe in choosing
a technology is that it must ensure secrecy of ballot.
Can you ensure secrecy of ballot if you allow mail voting? Probably yes, if you
design the process in such a way that you will be assured that the voter will not
consult anyone when he prepares his ballot.
➢ But the essence here is that the technology should not be limited to the
two systems.
➢ The key and the essence of R.A. No. 9369 is COMELEC being given the
authority to choose any technology as long as these minimum
requirements are observed.
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS UNDER AES
1) It has to have security against unauthorized access.
2) Accuracy is given.
3) Error-recovery.
➢ This means that kung may nagkamali o pumalpak, the voter can
still vote; and the data he might have supplied, lalo na kung
boto yun, can be recovered. Hindi siya mawawala; kumbaga
meron kang back-up at hindi mabubura.
4) Integrity of the system.
5) Voter verifiable paper audit trail.
In the case of Bagong Bayan, COMELEC chose a paper-based election (COMELEC
did not choose direct recording electronic).
➢ The stand of COMELEC here is that you do not need a voter verifiable
paper audit trail, because you already have the ballot as the paper
audit trail.
➢ But Bagong Bayan sued COMELEC, saying that COMELEC should allow
the system to produce another paper, in spite of the fact that paper
ballot is already being used, in order to ensure that the machine
counted the votes registered by the voter in the ballot.
➢ Nung binasa ng machine, dapat may lalabas.
○ Ito yung tinatawag nilang resibo. When you vote and insert your
ballot in the machine, the machine should produce the receipt.
This is the voter verifiable paper audit trail or VVPAT.
6) The system has to be auditable.
➢ In other words, you have to be able to verify the count.
➢ meaning the capability to provide supporting documentation
for verifying the correctness of reported election results.
7) It should have an election management system.
➢ This means that the printing of the ballot, counting of the votes,
and transmission of the results should be part of a bigger
election management software.
➢ It should be accessible to illiterates and persons with disabilities.
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8) It should have a data retention provision.
➢ In other words, ang ibig sabihin ng data retention provision is that
the system should be able to restore the data that has been put
there.
9) Provide the voter a system of verification to find out whether the
machine has registered his choice.
➢ This was the provision that was used by Bagong Bayan in arguing that
the paper ballot is not enough as an audit trail. There must be another
way by which the voter should be able to verify his vote or choice.
➢ Initially, what COMELEC adopted was that the machine will tell you
(there is a screen in the machine) that your vote has been counted. But
the Supreme Court said that it really is not enough. There should be a
paper ballot
OTHER MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE AES
10) It has to have a continuity plan or back-up plan.
➢ Paano kapag nag-brownout sa buong Pilipinas? Dapat meron kang
back-up na procedure para mabilang pa rin at makaboto pa rin
yung mga botante.
➢ COMELEC required is to come up and publish and make public a
continuity plan. That is what is referred to in the law.
➢ As a fallback mechanism, the law requires a continuity plan in
case of a systems breakdown or any such eventuality which will
result in the delay, obstruction or nonperformance of the
electoral process.
11) There has to be a random manual audit.
➢ What is a random manual audit?
○ The second Bagong Bayan case discussed this.
➢ Ang ginagawa dito, randomly magpipick-up ka ng presinto
coming from all over the country. Represented dapat ang bawat
legislative district. Then you will draw ballots from this
precinct, and manually count the votes using your eyes.
➢ What COMELEC did from 2010 up to the most recent election is
that it invited the Philippine Statistics Authority to do the random
sampling methodology, para hindi sabihin na pumipili ka ng
presinto na gusto mong ma-verify. No, hindi ganon. It has to be
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 randomly selected. Hindi yan pre-determined. And then what
you do is to compare the visually counted vote with the
electronically tallied vote.

12) There has to be education of stakeholders.

13) A field test and a mock election is required.

14) There has to be a source code review.

➢ What is a source code review?

○ A source code is the human readable instruction.
○ So yung source code review must be done by an
international certification entity.
■ At yung international certification entity na ito,
siya magsasabi (dapat may reputation siya) that
the system is ready for use.
15) The source code should also be made available to representatives of
political parties.
BASIC FEATURES OF THE AES
➢ As to the ballot, this is a mandatory requirement.
➢ The surnames of the candidates must be arranged alphabetically (Sec.
13).
○ As for the fixed space per ballot, under the manual elections,
dapat pumipirma sa likod yung isang teacher, yung sa Board of
Election Inspectors, dito pwede din, may requirement.
➢ This is also a requirement: The ballot should be printed by the National
Printing Office or the Bangko Sentral of the Pilipinas printing facilities.
Ballots cannot be printed by private entities.
○ There should be barcodes, securities, holograms.

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 ➢ The election returns of each precinct are now canvassed, or tabulated at
the municipal or city level. So hindi na individual vote yung binibilang mo,
yung binibilang mo na is yung figure na naka reflect sa election returns.

➢ So election returns are canvassed, and the summary of election

returns at the municipal level is called the Certificate of Canvas.
○ So yung certificate of canvas na yun, yun yung may resulta ka
na sa mga nanalong city officers, vice mayor, councillor.

➢ Pero sa governor, wala ka pa. You will again bring the certificate of
canvas produced by the municipalities and cities to the provincial
canvas. The provincial canvassing will produce a Provincial Certificate
of Canvas.

➢ Now sa national or sa Congress, kung President at Vice President, kung

senators and party-list, what they canvas are not actually votes but the
Provincial Certificate of Canvas, which are the summary of votes at
➢ So a voter uses a ballot to register his vote. the provincial level.
➢ The ballot is counted at the polling place.
➢ Then once the ballot is counted, you write on a tally sheet. ➢ Yung summary of votes sa provincial level are actually summaries of
○ The tally sheet, where you write your ballot vote, nung manual the municipal level; and yung summaries ng municipal level are
election yan yung taras. summaries of the ballots that came from the ballots that were
○ You write that in a document, they call it a tally sheet but counted at the precinct level. It’s a hierarchy of consolidation.
technically it’s called an election return. The summary of the
votes in a precinct is an election return. So you have a ballot
for the voter, and the precinct produces election returns.
➢ The law also provides that election returns, whether the system is
paper-based or DRE, must be generated in both electronic and printed
form.
○ The printed form should be directly produced by the counting,
or by the voting machines. The AES should be able to print at
least 30 copies of the election returns to be distributed to
designated recipients.

What is our canvassing process?

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 ➢ The canvassers must also have IT capable personnel. The winning local
Yung election returns ang requirement dito dapat may electronic copy na digitally candidates are to be proclaimed on the basis of the electronically
signed. The electronic copy goes to four places: transmitted election returns.

1. One goes to municipal canvas

a. (the official one)
2. One goes to the dominant majority or minority parties
a. (so parties can receive copies of the electronic return)
3. One copy goes to the citizens arm
a. (COMELEC accredits some who will receive precinct results)
4. One goes to the Kapisanan ng mga Broadkaster sa Pilipinas
a. (the media)

➢ The one used in the proclamation of the election results is the one that
goes through the board of canvassers.
➢ The one that goes through the media are the ones that you actually see
on television when you monitor the election results.

➢ It is also a requirement that aside from the three-member Board of

Election Inspectors, one must be IT-capable, as certified by the
Department of Science and Technology.

➢ Now, aside from the electronically-transmitted results, the precinct

counts should be able to produce 30 paper copies. So aside from those
that were transmitted electronically, there’s also 30 paper copies ng
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 election returns that are produced by the machines at the polling place
level, and it goes to 30 different recipients.
➢ The same thing, the Certificate of Canvas from the municipal to the
provincial has to be produced in 30 copies as well, so there’s a lot of
paper from which you can verify the electronically-transmitted results or
summaries.
➢ In fact what you can do actually, and this is also the intention of the law,
that there are 30 different groups that can do their own tabulation and
verify whether the arithmetic of the electronic tabulation is correct.
➢ The electronic copy is the official result, that is in the law.
➢ The law also provides for the procedure by which Congress can canvass
the votes for president and vice president.
○ It is different from the rules that will govern how the COMELEC
or the provincial board of canvassers can canvass results for
senators and party-lists on one hand and provincial and
congressional candidates on the other.
➢ The provincial board of canvassers are the ones that canvass the results
for congressmen, yung mga district representatives.
➢ There’s a requirement that Congress should be able to determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvas coming
from provincial boards of canvassers.
IMPLEMENTING THE AES
Now, in the choice of technology.
➢ Advisory Counsel
○ The advisory council is created by law to assist the COMELEC in
making a choice on the kind of technology it will adopt.
○ The Advisory Council, which is a body created by the law to
recommend the most appropriate, secure, applicable and cost-
effective technology to be applied in the AES, theoretically, may
recommend to COMELEC an election technology that is only
partially automated because it sees it as most appropriate,
secure, applicable and cost-effective for a particular election.
➢ Technical Evaluation Committee
○ a Technical Evaluation Committee composed of representatives
from the COMELEC, the CICT and the Department of Science and
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 Technology (DOST), with the latter as chair, was created by the
law to certify and categorically state that the AES, including its
My view there is that that’s not a binding judicial interpretation of the law since
hardware and software components, is operating properly,
it seems like it’s just obiter. Because I think COMELEC, if it deems it necessary,
securely, and accurately.
can still say that we can use a manual system if that is the one that is most
○ This is the body that certifies whether the system is ready for
appropriate based on the context.
implementation. It will look at if all the requirements have been
complied with.
RANDOM MANUAL AUDIT
STEPS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AES

Atty: We have a synchronized election.

ROQUE v. COMELEC
DOCTRINE: Pilot testing is not a mandatory requirement for the enactment of a
fully automated election system. The mechanism of the machines does not infringe
on the constitutional right of the people to secrecy of the ballot enshrined in
Article V, Section II of the Constitution.
➢ For the case of Roque v. COMELEC, Harry Roque sued COMELEC saying
that COMELEC should have pilot-tested the system before it implemented
it. In the end the SC decided na valid yung ginawa ng COMELEC.
➢ The SC said that “Henceforth all elections shall be automated.”
➢ That means that in one single ballot, all the candidates are there, front
and back on the ballot itself.
○ Not all the positions are counted by COMELEC because if COMELEC
did, the audit would be too much.
➢ What COMELEC does is just to choose certain positions representative of
all the other positions in the ballot.
○ The logic behind this is that the system is programmed, and that
what you’re testing in the system is if the optical scanner is
accurate when it reads the marks and shadings on the ballot.

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➢ These are the penal provisions of RA 9369, just read them, including
yung pag post ng isang election return.
SEC. 28. Section 29 of Republic Act No. 8436 is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"SEC. 35. Prohibited Acts and Penalties. - The following shall be penalized as
provided in this Act, whether or not said acts affect the electoral process or
results:
"(a) Utilizing without authorization, tampering with, damaging, destroying or
stealing:
"(1) Official ballots, election returns, and certificates of canvass of votes used
in the system; and
"(2) Electronic devices or their components, peripherals or supplies used in the
AES such as counting machine, memory pack/diskette, memory pack receiver
and computer set;
"(b) Interfering with, impeding, absconding for purpose of gain, preventing the
installation or use of computer counting devices and the processing, storage,
generation and transmission of election results, data or information;
"(c) Gaining or causing access to using, altering, destroying or disclosing any
computer data, program, system software, network, or any computer-related
devices, facilities, hardware or equipment, whether classified or declassified;
"(d) Refusal of the citizens' arm to present for perusal its copy of election return
to the board of canvassers;
"(e) Presentation by the citizens' arm of tampered or spurious election returns;
"(f) Refusal or failure to provide the dominant majority and dominant minority
parties or the citizens'' arm their copy of election returns; and
"(g) The failure to post the voters' list within the specified time, duration and in
the designated location shall constitute an election offense on the part the
election officer concerned."
"Any person convicted for violation of this Act, except those convicted of the
crime of electoral sabotage, shall be penalized with imprisonment of eight years
and one day to twelve (12) years without possibility of parole, and perpetual
disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage.
Moreover, the offender shall be perpetually disqualified to hold any non-elective
public office."
MANUAL ELECTION UNDER RA 9369
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 ➢ RA 9369 is actually a law that has two parts.
○ RA 9369, Sec. 1-31 or 32, that’s automated.
○ But starting Sec. 32, it became manual.
What if manual elections are implemented?
➢ These are the amendments to the Omnibus Election Code and RA 7166,
election returns (hand-prepared), 30 copies of ER are to be produced.
➢ There are provisions that will govern manual elections and amended
previous laws on manual elections.
➢ Before, election returns under the manual process, are required to be
reproduced in only 8 copies, but now here in RA 9369 it’s 30 copies.
○ So the requirement is that you should have a printer in each
polling place, and you should also be able to store the summary
result in a data capturing device (can be a camera or a scanner).
■ So you should have a printer and a scanner in your precinct
to copy the election returns.
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ELECTORAL SABOTAGE (POSSIBLE EXAM QUESTION)
➢ Section 42 of RA 9369 defines electoral sabotage as tampering, increasing
or decreasing the votes received by a candidate in any election, or
refusing, after proper verification and hearing, to credit the correct
votes or deduct such tampered votes on large scale or in substantial
numbers. The crime is punishable by life imprisonment.
○ This crime includes tampering, etc. with the votes of national
candidates and the election results are affected, or when the
tampering, etc. of votes of is done on a single document and the
votes affected are more than 5,000, or in any other instance when
the votes affected exceed 10,000.
➢ This amendment is a positive development, as it highlights the
seriousness of the problem of election fraud, especially those involving
tampering of election documents. This is a departure to the across the
board one to six year imprisonment imposed by existing laws for all
election offenses.
➢ Moreover, this law can serve as a deterrent to the commission of
election anomalies.
SEC. 42. Section27 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is hereby amended to read as
follows :
"Sec. 27. Election Offenses; Electoral Sabotage. - In additional to the prohibited
acts and election offenses enumerated in Section 261 and 262 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881,as amended, the following shall be guilty of an election offense or a
special election offense to be known as eletoral sabotage:
"(a) x x x
"(b) Any person or member of the board of election inspectors or board of
canvassers who tampers, increases or decreases the votes received by a
candidates in any election or any member of the board who refuses after
proper verification and hearing ,to credit the correct votes or deduct such
tampered votes: Provided, however, That when the tampering, increase or
decrease of votes or the refusal to credit the correct votes and /or to deduct
tampered to deduct tampered votes are perpetrated on large scale or in
substantial numbers, the same shall be considered not as an ordinary election
offense under Section 261 of the omnibus election code. But a special election
offense to be known as electoral sabotage and the penalty to be imposed shall
be life imprisonment.
"The act or offense committed shall fall under the category of electoral sabotage
in any of the following instances;
"(1) When the tampering, increase and / or decrease of votes perpetrated or
the refusal to credit the correct votes or to deduct tampered votes, is/are
committed in the election of a national elective office which is voted upon
nationwide and the tampering, increase and/ or decrease votes refusal to credit
the correct votes or to deduct tampered votes, shall adversely affect the results
of the election to the said national office to the extent that losing candidate/s
is /are made to appear the winner/s;
"(2) Regardless of the elective office involved, when the tampering, increase
and/or decrease of votes committed or the refusal to credit the correct votes
or to deduct tampered votes perpetrated , is a accomplished in a single election
document or in the transposition of the figure / results from one election
document to another and involved in the said tampering increase and/or
decrease or refusal to credit correct votes or deduct tampered votes exceed
five thousand (5,000) votes, and that the same adversely affects the true results
of the election ;
"(3) Any and all other forms or tampering increase/s and/ or decrease/s of votes
perpetuated or in cases of refusal to credit the correct votes or deduct the
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tampered votes, where the total votes involved exceed ten thousand (10,000)
votes;

"Provided finally; That any and all either persons or individuals determined to
be conspiracy or in connivance with the members of the BEIs or BOCs involved,
shall be meted the same penalty of life imprisonment."

So ito yung pag punish ng crime ng pag dagdag-bawas. Kung national position
may dagdag-bawas, electoral sabotage. Regardless of the position if the
tampering is done in a single document and the alteration constitute more
than 5,000 votes, dagdag-bawas, electoral sabotage. What are the impacts of the passage of the law?
● Na-advance yung registration of voters -- deadline and we discussed this
In any case when the alteration involves 10,000 votes -- ibig sabihin 10,000 yung in the Kabataan Party-list case.
pinalitan kong -- electoral sabotage, punishable by life imprisonment.
EFFECT OF EARLIER DEADLINE FOR FILING OF COC
If you look at Republic Act 261-A and 262, these are the electoral offenses noh?
Parepareho ang punishment, 1-2 years ang imprisonment lang without
probation. But this law amended or added another crime -- electoral offense
called electoral sabotage and the punishment is life imprisonment.

When before COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction to undertake preliminary

investigation of election offenses or violation of Election Law, the jurisdiction
is concurrent with the other prosecutorial arm of government.

When you say other prosecutorial arm of government what are these?
- DOJ, Prosecutor’s Office, Office of the Ombudsman so lahat pwede mag
prosecute. They can also conduct preliminary investigation for offenses
which are violations or criminal violations of election law.

SCHEDULE OF REGISTRATION OF VOTERS

However, while Congress gave COMELEC the authority to adjust the schedule,
the effectivity of the application of all criminal offenses is only AT THE START
OF THE CAMPAIGN PERIOD.

Thus, even if a person already announced to the whole world that he is a

candidate, he will not be considered to be violating any election rules or campaign
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rules because the law itself says that any violations will only start at the start of
the campaign period. This is the case Penera v. COMELEC.

➢ We have the List of Voters.

➢ In the case of Quinto v. COMELEC, walang security of tenure ang elective
officials. They have security of tenure in the duration of their term. It is
just that their term of office is fixed. You have to be very clear about
that. They cannot just be removed, because their mandate basically
comes from the electorate
PROOF OF RIGHT TO VOTE
○ Certified List of Voters
■ 1 digital and 1 printed copy, when we were taking up
Republic Act 8189.
○ Posted Computerized Voters’ List
■ This is the list that you find outside of the polling place
or outside of the classroom posted near the door.
○ Election Day Computerized Voters’ List
■ which is the voters list used by the Board of Election
Inspectors or a group which we now call as the Electoral
Board because of a recent amendment.
■ Okay, dyan sinusulat yung mga boboto at dyan naglalagay
ng thumbmark.
○ Voter Registration Record (VRR)
■ This is the approved application for registration of every
voter.
○ The Book of Voters
■ This is the compilation of all VRR’s in a precinct.
■ This means the proof of the right to vote, meaning, if your
name is in the list of voters then you are a registered
voter. This is a primary evidence of your being a
registered voter.

PROOF OF VOTE

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 hindi yan binilang. So ang ginawa inimprinta yung picture image, dun sa picture
image isa lang yung binoto. Ang ginawa nung kandidato -- this happened in an
actual case. So pag kayo lawyers noh and you were asked to for advice, sabihin
niyo may picture image yan eh you can verify.

PROOF OF PRECINCT RESULTS

➢ Official Ballot.
○ It must be signed by the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI).
○ What if it's not signed by the BEI?
■ It can still be counted although there might be a basis
to at least question the genuineness and authenticity of
the ballot if there is no signature of the chair.
■ But the presumption is that every ballot is valid. But the
implication there is that the Chair of the BEI would be
liable for election offense if he fails to assign the ballot.

➢ Picture image of the ballot.

○ The system that was adopted by the COMELEC since 2010-2019 is
that the ballot that is scanned by the optical scanner is
photographed.
○ So in election protests, what lawyers usually ask COMELEC or the
➢ Electronic Returns
courts to do is to have picture images of the ballot printed.
○ You can ask for electronic certification.
○
○ That’s why it's important for candidates to be sure that they have
Example: copies of election returns -- na printed para pag may duda sila
they could do their own parallel count -- they could compare the
Mayor Celina and Mayor Geom pareho silang kandidato ang binoto lang si Celina, results, the tabulated results when they conclude what they have,
kaya lang matalino yung mga tao ni Geom eh -- sabi niya pag dating dyan ikwan when they do their own tabulation.
mo rin yung boto ni Geom ano. Pag binasa ng machine yon ang lalabas sa vote
ay stray. Kasi hindi pwedeng bilangin yung dalawa for a single position, so
actually yung botante isa lang yung binoto pero after election isshade yung isang
kandidato para sabihin mali yung makina. Kasi tignan mo yung 2 shinade pero
tignan mo binilang niya yung kay Celina. So mali yan dapat tignan natin, dapat PROOF OF CANVASSED RESULT
127

➢ Electronic Certificate of Canvass
➢ Electronic Statement of Votes
○ Other than the electronic certificate of canvass you also have 30
copies of the electronic certificate of canvass.
PROOF OF MACHINE PROCESSES
➢ Audit Logs
○ It is a requirement that our system should be auditable, so meron
kang log.
○ Lahat ng mga operations ng mga audit machine.
■ From the time it was turned on until the time that it
was turned off are registered in a log.
○ It is a receipt that is stored in the COMELEC and in the ballot
boxes.
➢ And then again there is this so called minutes of voting and counting that
you can find in COMELEC. They have 1 copy and another copy is in the
ballot box which the electoral board must report all the activities that it
did that is different from the process.
QUESTION AND ANSWER PORTION
Geronimo: Sir yung mga Highly Urbanized Cities po, yung mga independent
component cities yung ano po ba nila sir dumadaan din sa provincial canvass or
diretso na rin sila sa national sir?
Atty: Deretso sa national. It's not in 9369.
Geronimo: Sabi po kasi ng prof namin don sir may mga Highly Urbanized Cities
po na hindi vumovote sa provincial so parang nacurious lang po ako kung yung
hierarchy po ng canvass nila dumadaan pa po ba sa provincial or deretso na.
Atty: Deretso na. Nakikita mo doon yan kasi sa Charter. Yung Charter kasi is
the law that created the province. Let’s say Puerto Princesa which used to be
a component city of Palawan. I think in the late 2008, 2009 I think a law was
passed to convert Puerto Princesa to a Highly Urbanized City. So ang
complication noon, hindi na bumoboto yung mga botante or mga residente ng
Puerto Princesa sa provincial office. In fact there was a case there Mitra v.
COMELEC kasi taga Puerto Princesa yung tumakbo si Governor Reyes pero
sabi lumipat siya sa isang bayan outside of Puerto Princesa so, no hindi na…
depende yan sa Charter. There are cities where its results are no longer
canvassed at the provincial level.
Geom: Ano po yung written by 1 and written by 2 ballots po?
Atty: The RA was implemented first in the 2008 ARMM election, gumamit din
tayo ng push button in one province in Maguindanao that time, but yung
nationwide implementation, the first time was in 2010. But prior to that, all
elections are called manual.
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 - Yung manual yung ang pag-bilang using your eyes and your hands at ang
sistema natin, unlike in other places, you write the names. You write
the names of the one you voted for.
So alam mo naman kung penmanship, gustong gusto ng mga abogado yon
because kung malinaw ang penmanship, walang problema, pero kung masama
ang penmanship, talagang ang hirap niyan, ripe for litigaiton talaga yan. Masaya
kaming mga election lawyer kung hindi magaling magsulat kasi you can interpret
the handwriting more than one way.
Now, Sec. 2 (11) of the OEC, nandiyan yung rules on appreciation. There are
more than 25 rules on appreciation.
Atty: Okay, ako I am a witness...makikita mo kasi in certain areas na
controlled, makikita mo yung ballot nila, let’s say 5 ballots, parepareho
penmanship. Kasi ang posibleng nangyari sa ground, walang watcher, yung mga
balota dinistribute na sa mga supporters ng mga kandidato.
Isa lang ang nagsusulat ng mga boto. So that’s one ground for objection, at
usually pwede yan iraise during the count at the precinct level. These things
surface kapag election protest.
If you are questioning the validity of the ballot, then you will say “this groups
of 10 ballots are written by one and the same person.” Pag ang sabi ng judge,
oo nga written by one person, bawas yun sa boto.
IF WRITTEN BY TWO PERSONS
Yung iba talagang halata na iba ang penmanship sa national (vote) at sa local
(vote). Yun pala, bahala ka na sa national, pero iba ang mag aaccomplish ng
local. Yun, written by 2. So probably, the conclusion of the judge, if he affirms
or sustains the objection would be that that ballot, dalawa ang naghawak
niyan, and therefore it is void.
Atty: What if, let’s say, kandidato si Geomari Gonzalez and Celina Gonzalez,
ang sinulat sa balota Gonzalez lang, kanino yun? Hindi mo alam.
In the rules of appreciation, sa Sec 211, stray yun. You don’t count it to any.
Pag sinabing, G. Gonzalez, kay Geom yun. Pag sinabing C. Gonzalez, kay Celina
yun.
IDEM SONAS
Ito natanong sa isang bar question, yung IDEM SONAS, the same sounds.
● IDEM SONAS - a person's identity is presumed known despite the
misspelling of his or her name. The presumption lies in the similarity
between the Phonology, or sounds of the correct name and the name as
written.
➢ Let’s say ang nilagay niya “Trixie”, pero yung kandidato “ Pixie”, ito
ba dapat boto kay Trixie? Kung ikaw abogado ka nung kalaban ni
Trixie, hindi.
➢ Ang sasabihin ng abogado ni Trixie, “Trixie yan, eh. Yung botante medyo
illiterate lang ng konti.”
➢ Key consideration that you must use in appreciating manual ballot, yung
intent rule. Look for the intent of the voter, it must become evident
in the ballot.
Neighborhood Rules
- The neighborhood rule is a settled rule stating that where the name of
a candidate is not written in the proper space in the ballot, but is
preceded by the name of the office for which he is a candidate, the
vote should be counted as valid for said candidate.
SEVILLA v. COMELEC.
DOCTRINE: In order to ascertain and carry out such will, their ballots must be
read and appreciated according to the rule that every ballot is presumed
valid, unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection.
The Neighborhood Rule states that, where the name of a candidate is not
written in the proper space in the ballot, but is preceded by the name of the
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office for which he is a candidate, the vote should be counted as valid for said
candidate."
The Intent Rule originates from the principle that, in the appreciation of the
ballot, the objective should be to ascertain and carry into effect the intention
of the voter, if it could be determined with reasonable certainty.
The Written by Two Rule states that ballots which clearly appeared to have
been filled by two persons before being deposited in the ballot box are null and
void, in the absence of evidence aliunde that the second handwriting was placed
on the ballot after it was deposited in the ballot box, since the presumption is
that the entries on the ballot were made prior to the casting of the vote.
Atty: So they actually use the term neighborhood in referring to determining
the intent of the voter. But this happens in manual election and this was
pervasive in the manual election prior to the implementation of the
automated election.
SHADING OF VOTE FULLY OR HOW THE MACHINES WILL READ THE MARK
➢ In the election, ang advise is that you shade the oval fully. May mga iba
ina-underline yung mga pangalan. Will that be counted? That will not
be counted because the machine is configured to read the mark on
the oval. Of course, lawyers will always be happy because these are
election litigation prospects.
➢ Even the issue of “what threshold can the machine read?” doon sa oval.
That became a very critical issue. The rules say dapat at least 50%, of
course 50% in your eyes, the machine will read the pixels doon sa oval,
hindi yan mame-measure ng mata.
➢ What COMELEC did was to reduce the threshold, yung how the
machine will read the mark. Ang sabi ng COMELEC, THAT IS NOT HOW
THE MACHINE WAS CONFIGURED TO READ THE VOTE SO WHY WOULD IT
PREVAIL.
➢ The SC cannot have any other basis to determine how the machines
count the ballot EXCEPT on how the MACHINES WERE CONFIGURED
TO COUNT THE BALLOT.
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY
➢ These are litigations before the proclamation or the official
declaration of who won the election.
➢ Ang issue lang dito is not the correctness of the count, but the
proceeding that leads to the proclamation of winner ang pagbibilang.
➢ Let’s say for instance, the traditional pre-proclamation controversy is
that, yung election returns, you are questioning how it is read o kaya
yung election return is not the one that came from the precinct because
previously, magtataka ka there were instances that the canvassers will
receive 3 genuinely ‘APPEARING” election returns. Iba iba yung nanalo.
So sino yung paniniwalaan ng BOC doon? Dito nagkakaroon ng litigation
during the canvass. Pero wala nang ganoon na issue in an automated
election kasi electronic na nga.
So what are the pre-proclamation issues that happened?
1. Correction on manifest error (Obvious to the eyes)
2. Proceedings ng board when they did not follow the process laid out
in the rules of COMELEC or yung composition ng board.
Malalaman mo pala isang member ng BOC kamag-anak nung kandidato and
therefore is related to a candidate within a certain degree, which makes him
disqualified from sitting.
Now, your exams will be, baka mas maraming problem solving than...maybe just
30% yung concept mastery questions. When I ask you some problems, parang
something like “If you are the lawyer consulted by this candidate, what would
you advise, or what remedy will you result to?”, ganyan yung mga questions
ko, I want you to identify the remedy, and WHERE you should file them. Yun
ang complete, REMEDY AND WHERE YOU SHOULD FILE THEM AND PATI YUNG
BASIC THINGS THAT YOU SHOULD CONSIDER BASED ON THE CASES THAT WE
HAVE LEARNED.
Celina: With regards po doon sa shading ng ballot and in cases of recount, I
would like to ask if there is some sort of threshold in terms of recounting. Let’s
say automated election but in recounting gagamitin yung manual recount.
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Sir: Courts have been more comfortable using the manual recount. Wala ngang
tiwala sa makina kaya you use your eyes. Now, in the case of PET. Yung Marcos
v. Robredo you can look that up in the Supreme COurt. May sinabi doon kasi
what happens is that COMELEC, although nagseset siya ng threshold, hindi
siya naglabas ng official declaration kung anong threshold.
So, our advice was about 30% of the shade or 25% of the shade that is how we
configure the ballot. Despite the fact that it is in the rules of the Supreme
Court, what should matter is how COMELEC configure yung machine to read
the ballot. Kasi yun yung standard mo eh. That is the standard that you use
whether the machine correctly read the ballot.
In 2013, the COMELEC decided to lower the threshold to 25%. So, ang nakalagay
sa Rules ng COMLEC ay 50%. Nung nilower ng COMELEC yung threshold yung
Supreme Court hindi siya naglower ng threshold. Hindi niya pinalitan yung rule.
So, naiwan yung 50% doon. So, that’s what the Supreme Court has been using.
Ang problema ng COMELEC hindi niya ni renounce. Ang logic kasi is we want the
voters to shade the ovals fully. We don't want them to give them the idea that
their vote can be actually counted even if konti lang yung na shade.
I think you guys can help in voter information. Because now there is a proposal
to adopt a hybrid system of election meaning yung counting sa presinto manual
pa rin para transparent because many people do not trust the machine.
Angie: Because the case you mentioned earlier was Chato v. HRET with the
picture image of the ballot. So, she was assailing the election returns on the
ground that when they went back to check the voting ballot some of the ballots
were crumpled up and some of the minutes of the voting were missing. A while
ago, you said that people do mess with the ballots afterwards. After election,
after the polling, where do they place the ballots na natatamper pa rin sila.
Sir: The ballots, by law, this is in the Omnibus Election Dode, is stored in the
treasurer’s office of each municipality. Now, matagal na nating tinatanong bakit
sa treasurer’s office ng munisipyo. In each municipality, sila yung may storage
facility.
May nagsasabi naman yan yung tinatawag na Post-election operations. That is
actually manufacturing evidence to suit election protest. So akala mo nanalo ka
na. Yun pala habang nagcecelebrate ka kasi tinalo mo yung malakas, ginagalaw
pa yung balota.
I think the doctrine in the Chato case is when the integrity of the paper ballots
or its storage has become compromised, then you can resort to the other
proof of vote.
I need you to understand the process so that when you handle an election
protest you would know where to find yung mga alternative sources of evidence.
Because it is possible the ballots to be altered. Of course, that will be
circumstantial. You would of course have to prove that the storage has broken
into.
Read the case of Maliksi v. COMELEC. You result in the picture image to verify
if there is a discrepancy between the count in the protest and the result.
You can use the crypted picture image of the ballot to find out whether yung
electronic count is accurate.
Rach: What if there are 4 candidates running for kagawad bearing the same
surname and the voter just put the surname on the ballot and 4 yung tumatakbo
with the same surname. So, paano po i-cocount yung vote?
Sir: Stray yon.
If one Casimiro is incumbent then it will be counted in favor of the
incumbent. Pero if walang incumbent doon, it will not be counted in favor
of any Casimiro. That’s the rule.
Now, Dela Cruz v. COMELEC, pag manual election, yung mga boto ng lahat ng
Casimiro ibibilang doon sa legitimate na candidate if the other candidates
are found to be a nuisance.
131

One case is the Tanada case. The action that was chosen was a petition to
deny due course the COC on the ground of residence. Assuming na na declare
na disqualified siya because of residence, ang gusto mangyari ibilang din yung
boto. Sana ang kaso na finile ay nuisance because only when the disqualified
candidate was disqualified because he is a nuisance candidate will the vote
he garnered be counted in favor of the legitimate candidate. Kapag binilang
yun, ang panalo dapat yung legitimate candidate. Now, since hindi siya binilang
dahil, I think the petition that succeeded was not nuisance yung finile, hindi
binilang.
Let’s say, assuming na si Celina would decide to run for office. Ngayong kung
matalo siya kukunin ko si Geom. Pero ang kalaban niya hindi talaga actually si
Gonzales. May isa pa. Gusto mo lang guluhin. The action that you would want
to file would be a petition to declare Geom as a nuisance candidate. Tapos if
na declare siya as nuisance, bibilangin yung boto niya in favor of Celina.
But if the action that was filed is hindi siya resident. Hindi natin talaga ma prove
na hindi siya resident and therefore his COC should be cancelled. Hindi na
candidate si Geom pero hindi mo ibibilang yung boto niya. This situation would
arise kapag hindi nabura yung pangalan niya sa ballot at nabilang parin and
may nag votes. That will happen kasi sa automated election kapag na print
na yung ballot mahirap ibahin or mabura yung name sa ballot.
ang nangyari if may nag tie. If natalo yung isa tapos nag protest kasi hindi naman
dapat tayo tie. Kasi kung tama yung bilang mas nanalo ako.
Basic point sa Election protest, the only way your election protest can have
cause of action is that you yourself should allege that you should have won
had the count been correctly done.
Yes, Ms. Casimiro, that is allowed and required by law that there should be
drawing of lots. Yung toss coin was the remedy chosen but ang law nasa drawing
of lots. So by luck. Nangyari yan even in automated election. Kasi nung lumabas
yung result sa machine tie. Imagine more than 40,000 voters. Yung chances that
can happen.
Atty: Run-off siguro yung pwedeng alternative. The law requires that under
our election system. Another remedy there would be run-off elections. Ibig
sabihin nun ulitin mo. Pero ayaw na gumastos ng government. Sana ganun.
Isang vote lang sa isang botante tapos malaman mo hindi bumoto nanay mo sayo.
Every vote counts. Bumoto kayo. I don’t want to hear you complain later about
the government if you did not vote.

Rach: If mag tie yung vote toss coin daw po yung gagawing remedy to determine
kung sino yung winner. I find it absurd.

Atty: Yun yung desisyon ng tao eh. Ang decision ng tao ay pareho sila so what
do you do? You know, in Bocaue, in the 2016 elections, for mayor in Bocaue,
Bulacan, a very populous town may nag tie.

Actually that’s in the Omnibus Election Code. Read it. It is required by law.
Ang nasa law talaga the drawing of lots. Ang iniimplement na process toss coin.
Ilang beses na nangyari yan. Coin toss ang ginagamit. In fact, meron nang case
but hindi umabot sa SC. He questioned, ang sabi ng law drawing of lots pero toss
coin yung ginawa. Hindi na ata namin pinansin yun. Basically it’s by luck. Yun

132
 JANUARY 13, 2021
BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code), Section 6 Failure of election. - If, on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes
the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had
been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or
after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election
returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to
elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect
the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified
petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the
holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in
a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of the election not held,
suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days
after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the
election or failure to elect.
FAILURE OF ELECTIONS
➢ A failure of election is where there is no election that took place due to
the circumstances under Sec. 6
○ There may be voting, some activities related to voting, and
counting and canvassing may have been performed, but there is
no evidence or proof that the voters have already chosen who
they want for the elective position
○ If the above happens = failure to elect
➢ A declaration of failure of election means that what is being sought is
to have the election declared as not having been held
○ Seeks to make it as if no election was held
➢ When this can happen
○ Force Majeure (Ex: there was a strong typhoon or natural disaster
HOW FAILURE OF ELECTIONS CAN HAPPEN
so the elections could not be held)
➢ Example: It can happen in a municipality, like that election did not take
○ Violence (Ex: there was a shootout in the polling precinct)
place in one polling place, it didn’t push through
○ Terrorism
○ Fraud
○ Other analogous cases (Ex: improvident transfer of polling
places)
■ A usual example is one that happens in Mindanao
■ Before election tinatransfer yung voting venue, at ang
technique dyan tinatransfer yan malapit sa bahay nung
isang kandidato, so yung mga kalaban hindi makalapit or
makapunta doon sa malapit ng bahay ng kandidato na
kalaban.
○ “The election in any polling place has not been held on the date
fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting” (Sec. 6)
■ This means that the voters were not able to vote
■ For whatever reason, the following were not able to
arrive:
● Board of election inspectors; or
○ the electoral boards
○ It could also be like the voters could not enter the polling
precinct
○ Yung una, the elections were suspended
○ In other words, the election was supposed to be held 7am
to 6pm, but at 12pm, hindi na natuloy
➢ After the voting and during the preparation and the
transmission of the election returns:
○ The voters were able to vote, but you cannot have proof
of how they voted.
○ Ex: The results were lost
○ So you have no way of ascertaining who the voters voted
for
○ This is the situation envisioned in that phrase in Sec. 6
133
 ○ So technically, there was already a failure of election in that ■ You are sure who the winner is because the lead of the
polling place, but you are electing municipal leaders 1st ranking candidate over the 2nd ranking candidate is
more than the voters from the precinct where the
○ If the lead of the mayor over the second candidate is more than election had failed
the number of registered voters in that precinct/polling place
that failed, then there is no failure of elections because you can ○ FOR THE VICE MAYOR: The situation is not the same because it
still determine the winner was a close call for the votes for vice mayor. You cannot say that
there was a failure of election in the contest where the results are
➢ WHY: Because the number of votes in this case is immaterial; it is not not material.
the turnout of voters and not the actual number of votes but the ■ But in the positions where the result is material, then
number of registered voters there is a failure of election.
○ Because if there is a failure of election, potentially, there would
still be 100% turnout in that polling place where the election CAUSES IDENTIFIED IN SEC. 6 NOT CAUSES IDENTIFIED IN SEC. 6 ARE
failed PRESENT = NO FAILURE OF ELECTION PRESENT = THERE IS A FAILURE OF
○ That is how you will compute whether the election that failed is ELECTION
still material for determining the winner
In a local election there were only Let’s say that it is election time and
➢ Question: Suppose the lead of the number 1 ranked candidate for mayor three voters who voted in Barangay your precinct is in a school in Brgy. Sta.
is more than the number of registered votes in the precinct where the Merville. Only three went to the Maria, but suddenly, one day before
election failed. But, that is not the case for the vice mayor; let’s say for polling place. Let’s say there are 2,000 election, the precinct was
the vice mayor, it is a close call. Will there be a failure of election? registered voters in Merville. transferred 10 kilometers away from
where it is supposed to be located
Elections took place. It was and voters were not able to vote. Is
➢ Answer: YES, but only for the vice mayor. The votes not counted would
scheduled, it was open, there were there failure of election?
have to have affected the result of the election, so before the COMELEC
teachers there, but there was no
can act on a verified petition to declare a failure of election, two
violence, force majeure, or any of Yes, because this may be determined
conditions must concur.
the other reasons listed in Sec. 6. as an “analogous cause” under Sec.
○ NOTE: Even if just one of the two steps are not present, then
6.
the COMELEC cannot act on a verified petition to declare a failure
But for some other reason, only three
of election
registered voters came to vote Here, you can assume that there are
because all the other 2,000 voters did voters who are willing and able to
○ FOR THE MAYOR: There will be no failure of election for mayor,
not believe that the election vote, but were not able to vote
but there is failure of election for the vice mayor.
mattered. Is there a failure of because of circumstances not
election in Merville? attributed to them. They wanted to
○ WHY?
vote but could not vote.
■ The voters have already voted
NO, because there can never be
■ You are able to determine the winner
failure of election when the causes

134

identified in Section 6 are not
present.
If only three people decided to vote
and the others did not choose to vote
because they did not want to then
there is no failure of elections
➢ Yung failure of election, you measure that by precinct. You determine
that by precinct.
In such a case, you have to determine
how many of these voters wanted to
vote, but were not able to vote?
Once you determined the number of
voters who wanted to vote but were
not able to vote because of that
“analogous cause,” (or maybe
because of violence, kasi takot sila; or
because of force majeure, kasi
malakas ang bagyo), I think you can
make out a case of failure of
election.
As long as the number of those who
were not able to vote is still material
to determine the winner in the
election.
Meaning: You can argue that there is a
case of failure of election if the
number of votes from that precinct
will greatly affect the determination
of who the winner is
Ex: In that polling precinct there are
only 10 registered voters for candidate
A, but candidate B is already ahead by
100 votes.
In such a case, there would be no
failure of election since the number
is immaterial to determine the
winner in the election.
○ This means that other precincts may have not experienced the
same circumstances that amounted to failure to elect
○ So valid yung boto; nakaboto yung tao
○ Kapag nakaboto yung tao at hindi naman maaapektuhan yung
resulta, then there is no failure of election
○ If the number of voters in the places where failure of election took
place is not enough to offset the lead of other candidates, then
there is no failure of election insofar as those candidates are
concerned
○ There will only be failure of election to the election of the
positions where the votes corresponding to the places where
the failure of election are no longer enough to offset the lead
■ If they can still offset the lead, then theoretically, doon
lang magkakaroon ng failure of election
PETITION FOR FAILURE OF ELECTION
➢ The allegations that must be included in the petition for failure of
election should conform to the elements identified or stated in Sec. 6
of the OEC (see above)
➢ All those elements there indicate that either:
○ There was no election
○ The election was not held on the hour fixed by law, or
○ You cannot have any proof of the election so you would never
know who was elected
FAILURE OF ELECTION: IDENTIFYING THE CAUSE
➢ Before you can say that election failed, you have to identify how the
election failed, and you have to put in the number of votes that could
have been affected, so much so that the number of votes that were
affected by the failure or by the fraud or by the circumstances (meaning,
force majeure, violence, intimidation, and other analogous causes), are
material to affect the results of the elections.
WHAT IS THE IMPLICATION OF FAILURE OF ELECTIONS?
135
 ➢ They would have to have a special election
○ The special election will be held not less than 30 days from the
cessation of the cause
■ Ex: There was a typhoon so no election was held; 30 or
more days after the typhoon has very well cleared up and
it’s safe, that’s when special elections can happen
any polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing
of the voting on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other
analogous causes. The Court finds that COMELEC rightly declared so.
DOCTRINE EXPLANATION / RELATION TO THE CASE

○ If there is a failure of election, there must always be a special There can be a failure The SC held that there is a failure of election,
election of election if the because the two conditions were satisfied:
election in the polling 1. There was no voting that took place in the
○ The only way the elective position can be filled is if there would place has been precinct on the date fixed by law, or even if
be someone who has been validly elected suspended before the there was voting, the election resulted in a
hour fixed by law failure to elect;
Dibaratun v. COMELEC because of the closing 2. The votes not casted would have affected the
(Closing of polling place due to violence) of the polling place on result of the election
account of violence
Facts: Respondent Abubakar was a re-electionist candidate for the position of In this case, there were only 10 votes that were cast.
Punong Barangay and he filed a petition to declare a failure of elections and to The COMELEC found that it would be material if
annul the proclamation of Dibaratun as the duly elected Punong Barangay everyone who wanted to vote (but could not vote
due to the violence) would have voted
Abubakar alleged that on July 15 the casting of votes in the precinct was
commenced and while only ten out of 151 voters had actually voted, Gaffar, ➢ Ex: Elections for the Senate. Take note of the Bangsamoro Autonomous
the son of Dibaratun, got inside the polling place and wanted to insert 3 filled up Region of Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). There was a failure of election in the
ballots (voting for Dibaratun) inside the ballot box. entire BARMM region.

When the watchers confronted him, he got mad and disrupted and stopped the
➢ BUT you cannot merely say “just disregard the result in the BARMM, parati
casting of votes. Gaffar destroyed the ballot box, took the official ballet and
namang may failure of election doon eh. Hindi naman totoong may
inserted substitute ballots.
election doon, iproklama na lang natin yung mga Senador on the basis of
the results from the rest of the country.” Is that a valid and legal and
COMELEC Decision: Ruled that the proclamation of Dibaratun as the duly elected
constitutional proposition?
Punong Barangay is annulled and was ordered to cease and desist from
exercising powers and responsibilities.
➢ NO, they would have to determine as to how many voters there are in
the BARMM region before anything can take place.
ISSUE: W / N the COMELEC was wrong in declaring a failure of elections and in
○ It is important to determine if the voters of the BARMM region
annulling the proclamation of Dibaratun as the elected Punong Barangay (NO)
can materially affect the Senate election
RULING: The COMELEC based its decision to declare a failure of elections on the
POSTPONEMENT OF ELECTIONS
second instance stated in Sec. 6 of the Omnibus Election Code: the election in
136

Section 5 Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such as
violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records,
force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature that the holding of
a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any political
subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any
interested party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested
parties are afforded equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election
therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than
thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension
of the election or failure to elect.
➢ REQUIREMENTS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF ELECTIONS
1. The holding of elections becomes impossible due to:
a. Violence
b. Terrorism
c. Loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records
d. Force majeure
e. Other analogous cases of such a nature
■ Hold over capacity: Public officers “hold” office until
such time that a new candidate qualified for the position
is chosen
○ Technically, if you postponed elections in February of an election
year, it can be postponed to a date reasonably close to the
second monday of may.
■ The same reason and the same circumstances as that will
justify a declaration of failure of election
POST-ELECTION DISPUTES
➢ Post-election dispute occur when the election and the voting are done;
some may not be satisfied with the results so they hire election lawyers
to address their electoral grievances
➢ Where do you file these electoral grievances?
NOTE: The places where to file are ranked in the order of where to first file them, where
you can appeal the initial decision, and where to appeal the appeal, so please note the
order in which and where they can be filed

2. COMELEC acts, either motu proprio or upon a verified petition by NOTE FURTHER: Before you complain na ang daming kulay, I color-coded it so it’s easier
any interested party, after due notice and hearing, to postpone during the exam to spot and look for the right jurisdiction and place where to file
the election
ISSUES / WHERE TO FILE THEM / PROCESS
DISPUTES FOR
➢ When these conditions are applied that is the only time that the election ADJUDICATION
can be held on a date other than that fixed by law / RESOLUTION

Right to Election Registration Board:

➢ HOW POSTPONEMENT AFFECTS TERMS OF OFFICE OF
Vote Issues Objection to Application for Registration
CONSTITUTIONALLY CREATED POSITIONS
○ Constitutionally created positions: President, VP, Members of MTC / MCTC / MTCC:
the HOR, local government officials Petitions for Inclusion and Exclusions

○ All these positions are supposed to end at the 30th of June in an RTC:
Appeal from Decisions on Inclusion and Exclusion Cases
election year
CA:
○ So, if you postpone the election, there is no one elected. Then Petition for Review from Decisions of Appealed Inclusion and
there is no authority for constitutional office to hold over to Exclusion Cases
their position
137
 SC: Issues Related COMELEC DIVISIONS:
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the CA to Citizens Petition For Accreditation as a Citizen's Arm
Arms
COMELEC DIVISIONS: COMELEC EN BANC:
1. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel Certificates Motion for Reconsideration on the Division Resolution
of Candidacies
(within 25 days from filing of CoCs) SC:
Petitions for Certiorari of COMELEC En Banc Resolution (within
2. Petitions for Disqualification under Section 12 of BP 881 30 days; for all petitions aforementioned)
(OES) and Section 40 of RA 7160 (Local Government
Code), including disqualification under Section 14 of RA Issues Related COMELEC EN BANC:
7166 (before proclamation) to the Conduct 1. Petition for Postponement of the Elections under
Issues Related of Election Section 5 of BP 881 (OES)
to Candidacies 3. Petitions for Disqualification 2. Petition to Declare Failure of Elections under Section 6
Basta failure of of BP 881(OES)
under Section 68 of BP 881 (before proclamation)
election dapat
COMELEC EN BANC: COMELEC en SC:
Motion for Reconsideration on the Division Resolution (For all banc Petitions for Certiorari of COMELEC En Banc Resolution (within
petitions mentioned above) 30 days; for all petitions aforementioned)

SC: Pre- BOARD OF CANVASSERS:

Petitions for Certiorari of COMELEC En Banc Resolution (within
30 days; for all petitions aforementioned)
Issues Related COMELEC DIVISIONS:
to Political 1. Petitions for Registration of Political Parties
Parties
2. Petitions for Registration or Accreditation of Parties and
Organizations to Participate in the Party List System
3. Petition to Cancel Registration/Accreditation of Political
Parties/Organizations
4. Petition to Disqualify Party-List Nominees
COMELEC EN BANC:
Motion for Reconsideration on the Division Resolution (For all
petitions mentioned above)
SC:
Petitions for Certiorari of COMELEC En Banc Resolution (within
30 days; for all petitions aforementioned)
Proclamation 1. Objection on the Inclusion of Election Returns or
Controversies Certificates of Canvass (Manual Elections except
Barangay elections Sections 241, 242, 243 of BP 881
(OES) in relation to RA 7166)
2. Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors
3. Petition Questioning the Composition of the Board of
Canvassers
4. Petition Questioning the Proceedings of the Board of
Canvassers
COMELEC DIVISIONS:
1. Appeal from the Ruling of the Boards of Canvassers
2. Appeal from the Ruling of the Boards of Canvassers
a. Petition for Correction of Manifest Errors (a
second one is filed with the COMELEC Division;
different from one filed with Board of
Canvassers)

138
 3. Appeal from the Ruling of the Boards of Canvassers
a. Petition Questioning the Composition of the
Board of Canvassers (a second one is filed with
the COMELEC Division; different from one filed
with Board of Canvassers)
4. Appeal from the Ruling of the Boards of Canvassers
a. Petition Questioning the Proceedings of the
Board of Canvassers
5. Annulment of Proclamation (for improvidently issued
proclamations)
COMELEC EN BANC:
Motion for Reconsideration on the Division Resolution (For all
petitions mentioned above)
SC:
Petitions for Certiorari of COMELEC En Banc Resolution (within
30 days; for all petitions aforementioned)
Post MTC / MCTC / MTCC:
Proclamation 1. Election Protest involving elective positions in
Remedies/Elec Barangays and SK
tion Contests
2. Petition for Quo Warranto involving elective positions
in Barangays and SK
RTC:
(If municipality, straight to RTC)
1. Election Protest involving elective positions in
Municipalities (If municipality, straight to RTC)
2. Petition for Quo Warranto involving elective positions
in Municipalities (If municipality, straight to RTC)
COMELEC DIVISIONS:
(If cities, provinces, or regions, straight to COMELEC)
1. Election Protest involving elective positions in Cities,
Provinces and Regions (BARMM)
2. Petition for Quo Warranto involving elective positions in
Cities, Provinces and Regions (BARMM)
3. Appeal from the MTC Decision in an Election Protest
4. Appeal from the MTC Decision in an Petition for Quo
Warranto
5. Appeal from the RTC Decision in an Election Protest
6. Appeal from the RTC Decision in an Petition for Quo
Warranto
7. Special Civil Action (Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus) in Aid of COMELEC's Appellate Jurisdiction
COMELEC EN BANC:
Motion for Reconsideration on the Division Resolution (For all
petitions mentioned above)
HRET:
(If Member of the HOR, straight to HRET)
1. Election Protest involving the position of Representative
2. Petition for Quo Warranto involving the position of
Representative
NOTE: In order for HRET to have jurisdiction, they must be a
Member of the HOR
Requisites to be considered Member of HOR:
1. Valid proclamation that they are the winner
a. Meaning no final and executory COMELEC
decision saying otherwise
2. Took oath of office
a. Done before Speaker of the House
b. Done in open / plenary session
3. Assumed office already
SET:
(If Senator, straight to SET)
139
 is, then you go to a post-election protest as your remedy
1. Election Protest involving the position of Senator
➢ When you file an election protest, necessarily, you are deemed to
2. Petition for Quo Warranto involving the position of admit that there was an election; mali lang yung bilang. Yun yung post-
Senator election na election protest.

SC: PET:
1. Petitions for Certiorari (If Presidential or VP position,
of COMELEC En Banc straight to PET) POST-ELECTION PROTEST REQUISITES
Resolution (within 30 ➢ A post-election protest means that the election was held, only that the
days) 1. Election Protest process was not able to count the votes correctly
involving the positions
2. Petitions for Certiorari of President and Vice
➢ The allegations in an election protest should contain:
of the HRET Decision President
3. Petitions for Certiorari 1. That the protestant (the one who filed the protest) is an
of the SET Decision 2. Petition for Quo interested party
Warranto involving the ➢ Meaning he filed a CoC, that he himself was a candidate
positions of President
and Vice President 2. That the allegation essentially states that had the votes been
Election RTC: counted correctly, then the protestant should have won or
Offense Cases Trial of Election Offense Cases obtained the highest number of the valid votes cast

COMELEC EN BANC: POST-ELECTION PROTEST PROCESS

Preliminary Investigation ➢ PROTESTANT
(Complaints-Affidavits are filed through the Law Department or
○ The one filing the election protest
the Field Offices and investigated therein)
○ He identifies all the precincts where the alleged anomalies were
CA: committed
Appeals from Decisions of RTCs on Election Offense Cases
➢ PROTESTEE
SC:
○ Respondent in election protest
Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of CA
○ Would then file his counter-protest, deny the allegations in the
Administrative COMELEC EN BANC: protest, and allege (if he wants and needs to) that anomalies
Cases Complaints-are filed thru the Law Department or the Field happened in other precincts or in precincts that would have
Offices and investigated therein benefitted the protestee all the more

POST-ELECTION PROTEST ○ Doon lang pwedeng madagdagan yung precincts that will be
➢ When your issue has to do with the correctness of the declaration on who subject to protest (Referring to 10-day period to file)
the winner is, or the correctness of the proclamation of who the winner

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 ■ This is important because a lot of controversies in actual
practice revolve around which precincts should even be
DOCTRINE EXPLANATION / RELATION TO THE CASE
looked at

Ongsiako-Reyes v. HRET The presence of the Rule 6 does not make the Justices indispensable
three Justices is members to constitute a quorum but ensures that
Facts: Ongsiako-Reyes challenges the constitutionality of several provisions of the meant to tone down representatives from both the Judicial and
2015 Revised Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). In the political nature of Legislative departments are present to constitute
particular, she questions: the cases involved and a quorum
1. The rule which requires the presence of at least one Justice of the do away with the
Supreme Court to constitute a quorum impression that party
2. The rule on constitution of a quorum interests play a part in
3. The requisites to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives the decision-making
process
The HRET maintains that it has the power to promulgate its own rules that
would govern the proceedings before it. The HRET argues that the requirement HRET only has In order to be considered a member of the House
rests on substantial distinction because there are only three Justice-members of jurisdiction over a of Representatives, there must be a concurrence
the Tribunal as against six Legislator-members. member of the House of the following requisites:
of Representatives 1. A valid proclamation
The HRET further argues that the requirement of four members assures the 2. A proper oath
presence of at least two Legislator-members to constitute a quorum. The HRET 3. Assumption of office
adds that the requirement of the presence of at least one Justice was incorporated
A member of the The SC and the HOR have the authority to
in the Rules to maintain judicial equilibrium in deciding election contests and
Tribunal who inhibits designate a Special Member or Members who could
because the duty to decide election cases is a judicial function.
or is disqualified from act as temporary replacement or replacements in
participating in the cases where one or some of the Members of the
Petitioner's allegation that Rule 6 gives the Justices virtual veto power to stop the
deliberations cannot Tribunal inhibit from a case or are disqualified from
proceedings by simply absenting themselves is not only speculative but also
be considered present participating in the deliberations of a particular
imputes bad faith on the part of the Justices.
for the purpose of election contest when the required quorum cannot
having a quorum be met
Hence, the requirement of concurrence of these three requisites is within the
power of the HRET to make.
There is no basis to petitioner's claim that a member
who inhibits or otherwise disqualified can sit in the
Issue: W /N the provisions assailed by Ongsiako is unconstitutional (NO)
deliberations to achieve the required quorum
Ruling: Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules does not grant additional powers to the
Justices but rather maintains the balance of power between the members from Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC
the Judicial and Legislative departments as envisioned by the framers of the
1935 and 1987 Constitutions.
141
Facts: To give a timeline of what happened with Ongsiako, she was running to be oath-taking. Thus, HRET couldn’t take jurisdiction over her case because she
representative in the lone district of Marinduque: wasn’t an official member of the HOR yet and so COMELEC rightfully had
March 7, COMELEC First Division: Cancelled COC of Reyes due to the contrary declarations made
jurisdiction over her case.
2013 in her COC (she’s not a citizen of the PH)

Thus, she was declared ineligible to run for the position of Representative for the lone DOCTRINE EXPLANATION / RELATION TO THE CASE
district of Marinduque.

May 14, COMELEC En Banc: Denied Reyes’ Motion for Reconsideration; her COC is still cancelled
2013 HRET can only To have HRET take jurisdiction over your case, you have to
take jurisdiction have a valid proclamation, proper oath, and the
May 18, Reyes proclaimed winner of May 2013 Elections over a case if assumption of office.
2013 the petitioner is
already a valid
June 5, COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality for their Resolution
Member of the 1. VALID PROCLAMATION
2013 No valid proclamation because the COMELEC Resolution
The Certificate of Finality declares that the May 14, 2013 Resolution is final and executory, HOR
considering that more than 21 days have elapsed from the date of promulgation with no cancelling her COC came before her being proclaimed as
order issued by the SC restraining its execution. the winner, so this element was not fulfilled
Meaning Reyes did not appeal or contest the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc with the
SC, as the SC is the only one who can grant a TRO to stop the Resolution from reaching 2. PROPER OATH
finality.
While she did take the oath in front of the speaker of the
On the same day, Reyes also took her oath of office before the Speaker of the House of house, it didn’t fulfill the second requirement that it had
Representatives. However, Reyes has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts
at noon of June 30, 2013.
to be in open session

But ang nangyari kasi sa oath of office sa Ongsiako-Reyes

Reyes is now asserting that since she was proclaimed a winner and took her oath is nag-oath siya before the previous Speaker.
of office, it should be the HRET that has jurisdiction over her case since she is a
“Member” of the HOR. At the time that she took her oath of office, that was before
she could actually assume office, because that was before
Issue: W / N the COMELEC has jurisdiction over her (YES) June 30.

Ruling: YES, COMELEC has jurisdiction over Reyes’ case because she is not yet So the implication in that case is that you can only take
a Member of the HOR, thus the HRET cannot take jurisdiction over her case. your oath of office when the Speaker has been duly
elected after Congress has resumed or started its Session
Ongsiako did not petition to the SC to stop the COMELEC Resolution cancelling her for the new Congress. That would be on the fourth
COC because she let the proclamation continue so that she could later use it as Monday of July, which is way after the assumption of
a basis to say that COMELEC no longer had jurisdiction over her case because it office.
would then be the HRET since she would be considered as a member of the HOR.

The SC explained that even if she had already been proclaimed winner and she 3. ASSUMPTION OF OFFICE
had taken her Oath of Office it was not a valid proclamation nor was it a valid

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Since it wasn’t June 30 yet, and all of these events came
prior to 12 noon, June 30, Ongsiako-Reyes did not assume
her office yet, so she couldn’t be considered a member of
the HOR
➢ In this case the proclamation of the winner was done after 4 days after
the decision. Under the Rules of COMELEC, petitions to deny due course
will become final and executory 5 days after the promulgation of the
decision.
➢ What happened here is there was another case filed. It is a petition to
annul the petition because the proclamation was done even before the
decision or the petition to direct due course has become final and
executory
➢ In fact, the SC said that you cannot change the situation anymore because
there is nothing that can be done even if you have to wait for 5 days to
expire
➢ "election" and "returns" as above-stated and hence, properly fall under the HRET's
Tanada v. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Wigberto Tanada was filing a case against Alvin Tanada, who was
the respondent in this case to declare him as a nuisance candidate and to cancel
his COC.
However, later on when the proclaimed winner was the other respondent
(Angelina Tan), Wigberto Tanada filed a petition to annul the proclamation of
Tan and asserting that had the PBOC followed pertinent rulings, the votes cast for
Alvin Tanada would have been counted in his (Wigberto) favor, which would have
then resulted in his victory.
Issue: W / N the SC has jurisdiction over this case (NO)
Ruling: The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election
divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor of the
HRET.
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" refers to all matters affecting
the validity of the contestee's title. In particular, the term "election" refers to
the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" refers
to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation of the winners, including
questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the
authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" refers to matters that
could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner,
such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his CoC.
Considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as a Member of the HOR,
has taken her oath, and assumed office past noon time of June 30, 2013, the SC
is now without jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar.
As they stand, the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting
proclamation of Angelina are matters which fall under the scope of the terms
sole jurisdiction.
CAUTION: Sir said he believes that the COMELEC loses jurisdiction over a candidate
once they are proclaimed, but in the subsequent class he clarified that COMELEC
loses jurisdiction once the candidate is proclaimed, took the oath of office,
and assumed office, in accordance with Rule 17 of the 2015 Rules of the HRET
(HRET can only assume jurisdiction over MEMBERS of the HOR)
RULE 17. Election Protest. – A verified election protest contesting the election
or returns of any Member of the House of Representatives shall be filed by any
candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for
the same office, within fifteen (15) days from June 30 of the election year or
the date of actual assumption to office, whichever is later. It can only be filed
by the candidates who obtained the second or third highest number of votes.
The party filing the protest shall be designated as the protestant, while the
adverse party shall be known as the protestee.
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An election protest shall state:
1. The date of proclamation of the winner and the number of votes
obtained by the parties per proclamation;
2. The total number of contested individual and clustered precincts per
municipality or city;
3. The individual and clustered precinct numbers and location of the
contested precincts;
4. The specific acts or omissions complained of constituting the electoral
frauds, anomalies or irregularities in the contested precincts; and
5. A statement as to whether or not there is a need for a revision of ballots.
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES
➢ Pre-proclamation controversies are proceedings that are prior to the
proclamation
➢ These are controversies that pertain to the process of canvassing of the
election results
○ When you question the correctness of the vote count, that is
not a proper subject of a pre-proclamation controversy
➢ The proclamation of the winner is the stage of the counting process
where those listed below (canvassing and proclaiming body) make a
formal declaration as to who obtained the highest number of valid
votes and thus won the position
○ COMELEC or Boards of Canvassers
■ In case of all other elective positions and for Senators
○ Congress in joint session
■ In the case of the President and Vice President
➢ What is being questioned here is the process of proclamation, and thus
the process for questioning it is called pre-proclamation controversies
○ The proper ground that you can raise in a pre-proclamation
controversy is merely procedural
○ You are merely correcting, and not questioning how the votes
were registered
■ You are only questioning the transposition of the figures
from the election return to the statement of votes by
precinct, and eventually into the certificate of canvass
➢ In RA 7166 (before there was a system of automation) pre-proclamation
controversies referred to questioning the tally sheets and the election
returns, whether they’re authentic or not
○ That is to prevent the proclamation from happening so that
there will be no proclamation for someone who did not actually
obtain the highest number of votes
○ However this doesn’t happen anymore
➢ What happens now is the pre-proclamation controversy on the ground
of:
○ Illegal proceedings
○ Illegal composition of the Board of Canvassers
○ These are the proceedings which the SC consider as still available
as remedy prior to the proclamation of winner
Taguiam v. COMELEC
(Petition of correction of manifest error)
Facts: This case is about the challenge of one of the candidates for the position
of the Member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Tuguegarao City against the
person who actually won the seat as a member.
In this case, Tuddao filed a petition of manifest error because he claimed that
Taguiam who was the one who proclaimed as the winner was credited with more
votes because of the discrepancy between the statements of the precincts and
the election returns.
Along with this petition of manifest of errors, he prayed for the annulment of the
proclamation of Taguiam as the winner. In order to oppose this, Taguiam
contended that Tuddao filed his petition beyond the reglementary period
provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
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Under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, it should have been filed within 5 days
from the date of the proclamation of said winner. However, Tuddao filed his
Petition for Correction of Manifest Error 6 days after.
Issue: W/N COMELEC properly annulled Taguiam’s proclamation, even though
Tuddao’s petition was filed beyond the reglementary period under the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure (YES)
Ruling: YES, COMELEC properly annulled Taguiam Proclamation. Under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure any pre-proclamation controversy (such as the
petition of correction of manifest error) should be filed not later than 5 days
following the date of the proclamation.
The SC ruled that it was proper for COMELEC to annul the proclamation of Taguiam
because incidental to the power of COMELEC to promulgate its own rules of
procedure, it may also relax such rules in the interest of justice.
There was a need for COMELEC to relax its procedures in order to determine the
true will of the electorate, which in this case is to proclaim Tuddao as the real
elected member of the Sangguniang Panglungsod because of said discrepancy in
the votes.
TERMS DEFINED IN THIS CASE
➢ ELECTION RETURN: The tally sheet where the canvassed votes are put
when the electoral board or the BEI (Board of Election Inspectors) actually
count the ballots
➢ STATEMENT BY VOTE OF PRECINCT: The compilation of the tallies in the
Municipal canvass.
○ In the municipal canvass, mayroong statement of vote by precinct
which is a matrix. Dyan mo tina-tally yung mga returns na na-
canvas.
DOCTRINE EXPLANATION / RELATION TO THE CASE
The manifest error in For instance, nakasulat doon “1 + 1 + 1” tapos ang
a “Petition for nilagay 5. That's a manifest error.
Correction of Manifest
Error” is something You can correct by way of petition or motu proprio
visible to the eye yung Board of Canvassers.
If there was a proclamation because of that error
then you can file a petition for annulment of
proclamation because of that error because the
error is visible to the eye.
Let’s say doon sa tally, you can say that the tally says
that the votes obtained are 25 pero doon sa
statement of vote (which is used to total the
municipal result) ang lumabas ay 35.
Then that’s a manifest error because it’s visible to
the eye. That can be corrected motu proprio before
the Board of Canvassers.
Q: What if the Board of Canvassers failed to notice that or when to proclaim
the new winner?
A: Traditionally, you have to go towards the route of an election protest but a
remedy that is quicker was made available by jurisprudence and na-adopt narin
ng COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
➢ Yun yung correction of manifest error or if yung error became apparent
within 5 days of the proclamation then you can file a petition for the
annulment of the proclamation because of a manifest of error in the tally
➢ The only issue in the Taguiam case is that the petition for correction
for manifest error was filed 6 days but the rules says it should be filed
5 days.
Chua v. COMELEC
Facts: Chua and Gil were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay for the
2013 Barangay Election. After the canvassing of the votes, Chua was proclaimed
the winner after obtaining votes as against Gil’s 460 votes.
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 which necessarily includes those which raise the issue of fraud, terrorism or
He filed a proclamation protest with the MTC alleging that fraud and illegal acts other irregularities committed before, during or after the elections.
marred the voting and counting thereof in the fifteen precincts of the Barangay.
She questioned the following: To deprive the HRET the prerogative to annul elections would undermine its
1. The presence of voters who are not residents of the barangay constitutional fiat to decide election contests. The phrase "election, returns and
2. That votes were erroneously counted in favor of Chua by Chairmen of the qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters
Board of Election Tellers (BETs) affecting the validity of the contestee' s title.
3. That ballots where the space provided for the Punong Barangay was left
blank and her name was mistakenly written on the first line for Kagawad As to the important distinctions between annulment of elections by electoral
slots were not credited for her tribunals v. the declaration of failure of election by COMELEC:
ANNULMENT OF ELECTIONS BY DECLARATION OF FAILURE OF
Issue: Whether the case has been rendered moot and academic by the recently- ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS ELECTION BY COMELEC
concluded Barangay and SK Elections held on May 14, 2018 (YES)
An incident of the judicial function of An exercise of the COMELEC's
Ruling: The 2018 barangay election wherein Chua won as the Punong Barangay electoral tribunals administrative function and it is the
which is the very same office which is subject of his election protest albeit in the COMELEC En Banc that takes
immediately preceding barangay election in 2013. Considering that there is no Electoral tribunals only annul the jurisdiction over a petition for failure
longer a position to vacate or assume, the petition filed has been dismissed election results connected with the of election
and is declared as moot and academic. election contest before it
COMELEC’s declaration of failure of
ABAYON v. HRET in annulling elections, the HRET does election relates to the entire
(Annulment of elections by electoral tribunals v. declaration of failure of so only to determine who among the election in the concerned precinct
elections by COMELEC) candidates garnered a majority of the or political unit
legal votes cast
Facts: In this case, there was an election protest by Daza for fraud, vote buying, COMELEC declares a failure of
intimidation, and terrorism. Here, HRET, due to the petition of Daza since Abayon When electoral tribunals annul elections with the objective of
won, deduced the votes received by the parties concerned, and concluded that elections on the ground of violence, holding or continuing the elections,
Daza won. Basically, they deduced the winner of this election. intimidation, terrorism or other which were not held or were
irregularities, they do so in the suspended, or if there was one,
Issues: performance of their quasi-judicial resulted in a failure to elect
1. W / N HRET has jurisdiction to annul the elections (YES) functions
When COMELEC declares a failure of
Ruling: The Court agrees that the power of the HRET to annul elections differ elections, special elections will have
from the power granted to the COMELEC to declare failure of elections. to be conducted

The Constitution granted the HRET with exclusive jurisdiction to decide all There is no overlap of jurisdiction
election contests involving the members of the House of Representatives, because when the COMELEC declares

146

ELECTION PROTEST
(As differentiated by Tito Tito)
In an election protest what you’re
saying is that there was an election,
it’s just that the one declared as the
winner is not the real winner
because he did not obtain the highest
number of VALID votes cast
In an election protest your allegation
should necessarily be that the one
who was proclaimed was not the true
winner because many of his votes
should not have been counted; they
should be illegal, OR, many of my
votes that were not counted should
have been counted and if you correct
the count and consider only the valid
votes then the petitioner should
have obtained the highest number of
valid votes
That is an important allegation in an
election protest because that is the
essence of an election protest
So in terms of standing (ibig sabihin
sino ba dapat ang mag file) only
those who have interest in declaring
who the real winner is can file
a failure of elections on the ground of Meaning dapat you run for the
violence, intimidation, terrorism or election, you file your COC, and then
other irregularities, it does so in its you should have been the winner but
administrative capacity you were NOT declared the winner
because the count was wrong
DECLARATION OF FAILURE OF
ELECTION BY COMELEC That is why it’s also essential that
(As differentiated by Tito Tito) you attach in an election protest or
petition the COC of the one declared
In a failure of election what you’re
winner and your COC because you’re
saying is that there was no election
showing that as the petitioner you
have an interest in the case as being
When you say failure of election,
a candidate yourself that was
there was actually no election held;
wrongfully deprived of having been
the voters were not able to choose
proclaimed the winner
Whether hindi natuloy or kaya even
if natuloy yung botohan, hindi mo Garcia v. COMELEC
malaman kung sino yung mga nanalo (Imperative that election protest is filed within the 10-day period; this rule is
kasi nawala yung mga resulta jurisdictional)
Facts: Petitioner Garcia was then proclaimed as winner and then respondent
Payumo received the Certificate of Canvas of Votes and Proclamation on May 15.
He now hinges his election protest on the fact that he received the said COCV on
May 15, hence he filed the election protest on May 27, alleging that there were
irregularities and doubts over the counting machines which are the PCOS
machines.
On the other hand petitioner Garcia argued that it was on May 14 in which she
was proclaimed as the winner as manifested by the manual COCV that was
issued.
Issue: W / N private petitioner was able to file the election protest within the 10-
day period as defined by law (NO)
Ruling: Contrary to Payumo's assertion, the manual COCP is the official Comelec
document in cases wherein the canvassing threshold is lowered.
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In fact, clear from the language of the Resolution is that the winners, in such
instances, are proclaimed "by manually preparing a Certificate of Canvass and
Proclamation of Winning Candidates.”
It is incorrect to state that only the printed COCP can serve as a basis for
ascertaining the date of Garcia's proclamation. As in this case, it is the manual
COCP which contains the true and exact date of Garcia's proclamation — May
14, 2013, not the printed COCP.
DOCTRINE EXPLANATION / RELATION TO THE CASE
The controlling The law provides that the starting point of the 10-
document to be day period to file the election protest will start
followed in reckoning from the proclamation date.
the period to file an
election protest is the In this case the controlling document was the
manual COCV MANUAL COCV. They issued the manual COCV
because they lowered the threshold because
petitioner Garcia already won, even if not all the
votes were counted.
The 10-day period to Meaning, if you fail to file your election protest
file an election protest within the 10-day period, the case should be
is jurisdictional dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
More than that, in an election protest (ang sabi ko
nga alleged yun na dapat kayo yung nanalo) it also
becomes jurisdictional for the protestant to
enumerate the specifics where the result was
supposedly wrong.
Dapat naka enumerate yan and naka lista yan
clearly and individually and specifically in the
alleged protest because if you fail to do that, your
protest will be dismissed.
ANOTHER SITUATION: SUPPLEMENTING THE PROTEST PAST THE 10-DAY LIMIT
➢ You put in your protest that you’re protesting the results in three
precincts, then later on after 30 days you find out that there were 5 new
precincts you want to protest, then you amend your protest, you
supplement your protest, you add the five other precincts.
➢ That will NOT be considered because the jurisdiction will be acquired
only within 10 days
➢ Meaning wala na siyang jurisdiction dun sa additional precincts
EXCEPTION TO THE 10-DAY PERIOD
➢ The only exception to the 10-day period is this: When a counter-protest
is filed
○ Ex: Diba meron protest, then 10-day period, the respondent won
(in an election protest dapat nanalo siya kasi syempre siya yung
na proclaim na winner), now the respondent is saying na “Hindi
naman ako nangdaya ah, siya talaga yung nangdaya.”
➢ So now the respondent will file a counter-protest
○ He alleges na “In these precincts, nangdaya din siya. Pag binilang
ng tama to, I could’ve gotten more votes than the one who is
protesting.” This is what the respondent can do.
➢ That’s the only instance where you can ADD precincts that you are
contesting and may jurisdiction pa rin yung court if you raise it within
the period to file the Answer with counter-protest
Chato v. HRET
(Picture images of ballots are the equivalent of the original paper ballot)
Facts: Chato was trying to renew her bid as the representative of the district of
Camarines Norte. At the base of this is the validity of the picture image of the
electronic ballots.
Chato was contesting that because there was such a great discrepancy when 25%
of the pilot polling precincts were recounted, she wanted a recount of the rest of
148
the 75% but at the same time she didn’t want the picture image ballots to be used,
saying that they couldn’t be considered as the official ballots themselves.

Issue: W / N the picture images of the ballots may be considered as the official
ballots or the equivalent of the original paper ballots which the voters filled out
(YES)

Ruling: YES, the picture image of the ballots is the equivalent of the original
paper ballots filled out by the voters. The picture images of the ballots, as
scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise official ballots that faithfully
capture in electronic form the votes cast by the voter.

DOCTRINE EXPLANATION / RELATION TO THE CASE

Picture Images of The printouts of the picture images are the functional
ballots are the equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the
equivalent of the voters and may be used for purposes of revision of
original paper ballots votes in an electoral protest.
for purposes of
determining the true
will of the electorate
(for recounts)

Note for possible questions:

➢ In election offenses I want you to just be familiar with the Omnibus
Election Code, Secs. 261, a and b. Ito yung vote buying

➢ We’ll have a discussion on that. In relation to that, the provision that

the case of Aquino v. COMELEC is referring to, ito yung appointment

➢ Be familiar with the concept of electoral sabotage and what constitutes

election sabotage

➢ I will pay special attention to the matter of execution pending appeal,

because that happens almost all the time and I will definitely tackle the
case of Pecson v. COMELEC
149
 JANUARY 15, 2021 ➢ Another important thing that you should remember in election protests
in quo warranto petitions for:
ELECTION CONTESTS NOT RELATED TO THE COUNT
➢ There can also be contests not related to the count PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A
○ Ex: let’s say it’s a petition to deny due course that is not resolved TO CANCEL COC UNDER SEC. 78 CANDIDATE UNDER SEC. 68
by COMELEC by the time when the election was held
COC is cancelled as if there is no The grounds here are disqualification,
○ Sometimes COMELEC cannot finish the cases on time because they
certificate of COC filed meaning these are acts committed
involve complicated legal issues during the time the candidate is
If there is no certificate of candidacy campaigning or during the campaign
➢ WHAT HAPPENS TO THE CASES THAT AREN’T RESOLVED ON TIME? filed, then there is no candidate period
○ Sec. 6 of RA 6646 says that the case shall continue
IMPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE ON If he was disqualified as a candidate
SUBSTITUTION CANDIDATE: on this basis, then he was a
SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.—Any candidate who has been declared If there is no candidate, then legitimate candidate in the first
by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast assuming that the one whose case is place and was only disqualified for
for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by pending is substituted, the the acts
final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and substitution will not be valid
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or because you cannot substitute IMPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE ON
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or someone who has never been a SUBSTITUTION CANDIDATE:
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the candidate He can be substituted because the
pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate law of substitution includes those who
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. have been disqualified

➢ The proclamation can even be suspended when the evidence of guilt is The meaning of those who had been
strong disqualified is those who have been
○ It can also be suspended when the evidence supporting the disqualified under Sec. 68
cancellation of the COC is strong
Q: What if the petition is granted, will that mean that the COC was also
absent if the ground used as the basis is Sec. 12 or Sec 40 under the LGC?
➢ WHAT HAPPENS TO THE CASE THAT IS ALLOWED TO CONTINUE BEFORE
THE COMELEC? A: YES, if the basis for the disqualification already existed at the time of the
○ COMELEC gives way to the quo warranto case before congress filing of COC = COC is cancelled (Aratea v. COMELEC)
lalo na kung meron ng proclamation
○ You can only file the quo warranto anyway when there is a Q: Assuming that the case continues up to the election and even then it was not
proclamation either: resolved, will it become final and executory by election or when the people
■ 15 days after June 30 or already voted and na disqualify or na cancel? Who is going to occupy that
■ 15 days after the actual assumption to the office position?

PETITION FOR QUO WARRANTO IN A SEC. 78 AND SEC. 68 PROTEST

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A: If you will say that he is deemed to never have been a candidate in the first
place then all his votes cannot and should not be counted. All the votes that
have been credited to him are declared stray, not counted. The ballot is valid
but is counted as a stray vote.
➢ This means that the # 1 vote getter would be the one who is the second
placer
○ He is the one who is deemed to be elected, not the one who
initially got the highest number of votes because you will declare
all the votes stray.
CANDIDACY OF THE ONE DISQUALIFIED IS VALID
➢ Q: What if the candidacy of the one disqualified is valid, lets say for
instance those disqualified because of Sec. 68 of Omnibus election code?
➢ A: You cannot declare the votes as stray kasi wala lang na-elect kasi
the one who got the mandate of the people was not elected, but his
candidacy was valid
➢ What will happen now is that the rules on succession will be followed
○ When no one is elected and no one can occupy the office, the rules
of succession apply
○ It is as if nag resign yung nakaupo, so the Vice Mayor gets to
occupy the position
ELECTION OFFENSES
➢ Generally, election offenses are criminal offenses
○ So, you have to go through a preliminary investigation, you have
to go through trial, like a criminal trial just like any criminal
offense, so parang special law ito sa criminal law dedicated to
election
➢ Election Offenses under Sec. 261, OEC (there’s a lot but focus on vote-
buying daw)
➢ NOTE: If you are planning to run for office, you must be truthful in your
○ Vote-buying and vote-selling
COC because besides running the risk of being disqualified or having your
○ Conspiracy to bribe voters
candidacy cancelled or denied due course, you can also be criminally
○ Wagering upon result of election
liable (Sec. 262, OEC)
○ Coercion of subordinates
○ Threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other
forms of coercion
○ Coercion of election officials and employees.
○ Appointment of new employees, creation of new position,
promotion, or giving salary increases 45 days before an election or
30 days before a special election
○ Transfer of officers and employees in the civil service
○ Intervention of public officers and employees in the elections
○ Undue influence
○ Unlawful electioneering
○ Prohibition against dismissal of employees, laborers, or tenants
○ Appointment or use of special policemen, special agents,
confidential agents, or the like
○ Illegal release of prisoners before and after election
○ Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment,
facilities owned or controlled by the government for an election
campaign
○ Deadly weapons
○ Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business
○ Use of armored land, water or air craft
○ Wearing of uniforms and bearing arms
○ Policemen and provincial guards acting as bodyguards or security
guards
○ Organization or maintenance of reaction forces, strike forces, or
other similar forces
○ Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public
funds
○ Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of
materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and
similar devices
○ Suspension of elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay
officer
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 ○ Even if your disqualification case is dismissed it does not mean
that the criminal aspect of your case will also be dismissed
■ Pwede kang maging criminally liable because Sec. 74 is
included
➢ PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD OF ELECTION OFFENSES: 5 YEARS
○ Five years from the date of their commission (Sec. 267, OEC)
VOTE-BUYING
Section 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election
offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. -
(1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money or anything of value, gives
or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or
makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an
expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation, entity, or
community in order to induce anyone or the public in general to vote for or
against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or
against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention
or similar selection process of a political party.
(2) Any person, association, corporation, group or community who solicits or
receives, directly or indirectly, any expenditure or promise of any office or
employment, public or private, for any of the foregoing considerations.
(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. - Two or more persons, whether candidates or
not, who come to an agreement concerning the commission of any violation of
paragraph (a) of this section and decide to commit it.
○ In order to induce anyone or the public in general to vote for or
against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to
vote for or against any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a
candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political
party
➢ Conspiracy to bribe voters (elements)
1. Two or more persons, whether candidates or not
2. They come to an agreement concerning the commission of any
violation of paragraph (a)
3. They decide to commit it
➢ Vote buying can disqualify you, and can also amount to your being held
criminally liable
JURISDICTION
➢ The OEC says that COMELEC has jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation of election offenses
➢ However, RA 9369 gave other prosecutorial arms of the government
concurrent jurisdiction with COMELEC in conducting preliminary
investigation of charges relating to election offenses
○ So the fiscal, the Ombudsman, and all other prosecutorial armes
of the government can investigate offenses identified in Sec. 261
of the OEC on their own
○ So pwede na kahit hindi galing sa COMELEC
○ They ,by themselves, have the authority to conduct preliminary
investigations

QUESTION NI ABASTILLAS
➢ Who may be guilty of vote-buying:
➢ Q: What is the required number of votes for a sole candidate? And what if
○ Any person who:
hindi siya nameet, ano yung remedy? Hindi siya failure of election sir
■ Gives, offers or promises money or anything of value
diba? Kasi hindi naman siya under Sec. 6.
■ Gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or
grant, public or private
■ Makes or offers to make an expenditure, directly or ➢ A: Let’s say in an improbable situation, where only one voted out of 10,000
indirectly voters, will that be enough? Yes,if the 9,999 voters who desisted from
■ Causes an expenditure to be made to any person, voting desisted voluntarily.
association, corporation, entity, or community

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 ○ In other words, hindi na kami boboto kasi wala naman mangyayari.
That one vote can actually elect all your public officials under
our system.
○ There’s no such thing as the 50% +1
■ Our system of election is that kahit isang boto lang.
■ Now pag hindi lang bumoto, the turnout is really low, wala
kang magagawa.
■ A single vote, theoretically, can already be a basis for
giving elective officials a mandate
■ Ours is a plurality system
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six
years.
COMELEC moved for reconsideration citing Sec, 268 of the Omnibus Election Code,
which provides that the RTC shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try
and decide any criminal action or proceedings for violation of the Omnibus
Election Code.
Issue: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the criminal case filed against Genovia
for violation of the OEC, with the penalty of imprisonment of not less than one
year but not more than six years (YES)

➢ In relation to failure of election, yes (counted ang votes) as long as Ruling: YES, the RTC has jurisdiction. The METC, MTC, and MCTC do not cover
there is no fraud, a single vote can actually be considered a source of those criminal cases which, by specific provision of law, fall under the exclusive
mandate of elective officials jurisdiction of the RTC and the Sandiganbayan.

COMELEC v. Trinidad Pe Aguirre DOCTRINE EXPLANATION / RELATION TO THE CASE

(Affirmed the jurisdiction of the RTC over criminal offenses involving violations
of election law)
RTCs have exclusive Sec. 268 of OEC must be construed as an exception
Facts: The COMELEC’s Law Department filed before the RTC an Information jurisdiction to try and to B.P. Blg. 129, which is the general law on
against Genovia, for violation of Section 261(z)(3) of the Omnibus Election Code. decide any criminal jurisdiction of courts.
It penalizes any person who votes in substitution for another whether with or action or proceedings
without the latter’s knowledge or consent. for violation of the BP 129 could not change this in spite of the
Omnibus Election amendment because the OEC is a special law as
It was alleged that during the July 15, 2002 synchronized barangay and SK elections Code, except those regard to jurisdiction of election offenses in
Genovia casted her vote in substitution of another person. She misrepresented relating to the offense relation to BP 129.
herself to be Emily Genovia (Emily) and voted in her substitution. Emily is a of failure to register
registered voter in another precinct. or failure to vote. Applying the principles of statutory construction, the
special law will prevail over the general one.
Under Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code, violation of any election
offense is punishable with imprisonment of not less than one year but not more This case is the one that affirmed the jurisdiction of
than six years. the Regional Trial Court over criminal offenses
involving violations of election law.
However, pursuant to the B.P. Blg. 129 (Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980),
the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under Sec. 32 thereof, it is
provided that the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall exercise exclusive original

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JUDGEMENT PENDING APPEAL
DOCTRINE EXPLANATION / RELATION TO THE CASE

Pecson v. COMELEC
(Judgement pending appeal) The general rule is There is an exception: If you can ask the court to
that a decision cannot implement or execute the judgement pending
Facts: Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayor position in Pampanga be implemented until appeal
where Cunanan won over a margin of 61 votes. This prompted Pecson to file an after the case has
election protest in the RTC where the RTC favored Pecson and as such they stated become final and Magbabayad ka ng bond. Though if mali yung pag
that Pecson actually won by a margin of 1131 votes. Because of this Cunanan filed executory and the execute, kukunin yung bond na binigay mo
a notice of appeal. case will not become
final and executory That’s a procedural rule that applies as well to
This prompted Pecson to file for an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution when there is an election cases. That’s an Urgent Motion for Execution
Pending Appeal. The RTC granted the motion via a special order but the actual appeal of Judgement Pending Appeal.
issuance of the motion was suspended for 20 days.
The court may, at its REQUISITES:
Cunanan assailed that: discretion, order the 1. There must be a motion by the prevailing party
1. Pecson’s victory was not clearly established. Such establishment is execution of the with three-day notice to the adverse party
required by Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the Rules decision in an election 2. There must be prior notice and hearing before an
2. The RTC constructively relinquished its jurisdiction by issuing the order contest before the execution pending appeal can be issued
directing the transmittal of the records expiration of the
period of the appeal, 3. There must be good reasons for the execution
Issue: W / N there has been compliance with the standards required for an provided that the pending appeal; such reasons must be:
execution pending appeal in an election contest (YES) requisites are met a. Stated by the court in a special order to
justify the execution pending appeal
Ruling: YES, the standards to justify the issuance of a special order granting a
motion for execution pending appeal were satisfied. The Court here ruled that the b. Constitute superior circumstances
standards were clearly followed because Cunanan was assailing that there was no demanding urgency that will outweigh the
good reason as the victory of Pecson was not clearly established. However the injury or damage should the losing party
Court stated that they were able to do so because the error that was in the RTC secure a reversal of the judgment on appeal
was merely a clerical error.
c. Be manifest, in the decision sought to be
The COMELEC stated that the RTC used the wrong formula in computing on which executed, that the defeat of the protestee
candidate won the mayoral elections. Given that the issue was only clerical in or the victory of the protestant has been
nature and is not in the tabulation of votes, and that the COMELEC stated that the clearly established
error did not affect the outcome since either way Pecson was the one who won
the election. Given this, it shows that there was a clear establishment that it was
Pecson and not Cunanan who won the elections.
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 “Good reason stated in a special order”: What are
the good reasons that can justify the execution of
judgement pending appeal?
The reason usually used by the protestant is the
proximity of the expiration of the term
“Malapit na mag-expire, na declare na ng RTC na ako
panalo, paupuin niyo na ako, pinapatagal niyo yung
appeal.” That is the usual basis.
➢ So the issuance of execution of judgement pending appeal was held valid
➢ If an execution of judgement pending appeal has been granted that means
that while the case is pending or even when the case is pending the
one who won in the election protest can already occupy the seat
➢ Q: What will now happen here?
➢ A: Kasi the one who was proclaimed assumed office already, presumably,
despite the election protest. Nakaupo na siya. Now because of the election
protest, you will now unseat the one who is sitting and put into office
the one who won in the election protest if you grant the motion for
execution of judgement pending appeal.
➢ In COMELEC what usually happens is like this:
○ The ruling of the court is questioned when the court grants the
motion for execution of judgement pending appeal
○ So the nature of the action filed before COMELEC is a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65
○ A Rule 65 petition for certiorari alleges grave abuse of discretion,
it’s not an appeal
■ Appeal is something that you will raise to a higher court
of a final judgement of a lower court. Dito, hindi pa final
judgement yung ruling that you brought to the COMELEC
➢ At the end of the day, the COMELEC will have two cases:
1. The special civil action questioning the ruling of the trial court
granting the execution pending appeal (petition for certiorari);
and
2. The appeal itself coming from the decision of the trial court on
the merits
➢ So dalawa yung pending sa COMELEC. They are two separate cases but
they are related. So pending pa yung merit as to who actually won, then
there is another case, a twin case, the issue of which is the validity of
the execution of judgement pending appeal.
Umali v. COMELEC
(The ones who should vote should be from both the city and the province)
Facts: This case involves the conversion of Cabanatuan city from a component city
to a highly urbanized city. What is required here under the Local Government Code
is that the process must involve a plebiscite, so the people will vote if they want
to convert Cabanatuan city to a highly urbanized city.
The implication if it becomes a highly urbanized city is that it will have its own
income. It won’t share or be limited in the share of the province of Nueva Ecija.
The question was should it be the registered voters of Cabanatuan, or should it be
the registered voters of the ENTIRE province of Nueva Ecija?
Issue: Who will vote in the plebiscite to approve the conversion of Cabanatuan
city from a component city to a highly urbanized city? (BOTH the registered
voters of Cabanatuan city and the registered voters of Nueva Ecija)
Ruling: The Court said that the ones who should vote in the plebiscite are those
who would be affected by the political and economic changes, which is the
whole province.
If Cabanatuan was changed to a highly urbanized city, the province would lose
political jurisdiction over Cabanatuan and at the same time the income of Nueva
Ecija would be lessened because the fiscal autonomy of the new highly
urbanized city would be separated. So the ones who should vote are both the
registered voters from the city AND the province.
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 ○ Does that violate violence?
TOPICS TO FOCUS ON:
Public Officers:
● 3 Fold-Rule
● When is a public officer deemed to be a public officer? At what point?
○ Ano yung mga process.
● Appointment or Election
○ Kung appointment, at what point is a public officer deemed
appointed?
● Termination
○ When siya na terminate?
○ Sino ang responsible?
● Read and revisit RA 6713, yung Code of Ethics. Particularly the
requirement for SALN.
● De facto officer.
○ What is a de facto officer?
○ What is the effect of the acts of the de facto officer?
● Remedies against erring public officers
○ Nandito na yun sa 3 Folds Rule
○ Criminal, Civil, and Administrative
● Administrative process
○ General principles without which wala kayong karapatang pumasa
sa subject if you do not know.
● Ombudsman
● Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman

Election:
● Know the basics of the Right of Suffrage of Individuals
● Principles of voter registration and its requirements
● Deactivation
● Inclusion and exclusion of voters
○ Lumalabas yan sa bar
● Jurisdiction of tribunals in election complaints
● What kind of cases do you file given a certain set of circumstances and
where do you file them?
● Cases involving candidates
● Process of registering political parties
● What are the qualifications of the political parties?
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