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Abstract—Millimeter wave (mmWave) vehicular communica- To mitigate these challenges, keyless physical layer (PHY)
tion systems have the potential to improve traffic efficiency and security techniques [9]-[20], which do not directly rely on
safety. Lack of secure communication links, however, may lead to upper-layer data encryption or secret keys, can be employed
a formidable set of abuses and attacks. To secure communication
links, a physical layer precoding technique for mmWave vehicular to secure vehicular communication links. These techniques are
communication systems is proposed in this paper. The proposed based on the use of one or more of the following approaches:
technique exploits the large dimensional antenna arrays available (i) directional beamforming [10]-[13], (ii) distributed arrays
at mmWave systems to produce direction dependent transmission. (or nodes) [14] [15], (iii) dual-beam techniques [16], and (iv)
This results in coherent transmission to the legitimate receiver switched arrays [17]-[20]. In all of these techniques, the trans-
and artificial noise that jams eavesdroppers with sensitive
receivers. Theoretical and numerical results demonstrate the mitter uses multiple antennas to create interference or artificial
validity and effectiveness of the proposed technique and show that noise within the null space of the receiver. Such interference
the proposed technique provides high secrecy throughput when will degrade the channel of potential eavesdroppers and will
compared to conventional array and switched array transmission not impact the receiver’s channel.
techniques. Despite their effectiveness, the techniques in [10]-[16]
Index Terms—Millimeter-wave, PHY security, beamforming, require fully digital baseband precoding, which is difficult
V2X. to realize in mmWave vehicular systems. This is due to
the limited number of available RF chains and additional
I. I NTRODUCTION hardware and power constraints in mmWave systems [21] [22].
Future intelligent transportation systems (ITSs) will rely While it might be justifiable to deploy large number of RF
on vehicular communication technologies to enable a variety chains in cellular base stations with relaxed power constraints,
of applications for safety, traffic efficiency, driver assistance, this leverage might not be possible in vehicular transmitters.
and infotainment [1], [2]. The abundance of bandwidth in Due to both power and hardware constraints, switched array
the millimeter wave (mmWave) will enable higher data rate techniques [17]-[20] might be suitable for vehicular mmWave
communication between vehicles to exchange the raw data systems with large number of antennas. These techniques use
from LIDAR, radar, and other sensors to support advanced antenna switches to associate a subset of antennas with every
driver-assisted and safety-related functionalities. transmission symbol. This results in coherent transmission
Like regular communication systems, vehicular communi- towards the receiver and induces artificial noise in all other
cation systems are prone to a set of abuses and attacks that directions. Nonetheless, it was recently shown that switched
could jeopardize the efficiency of transportation systems and array security techniques can be breached by exploiting the
the physical safety of vehicles and drivers. Security threats and sparsity in the transmit antenna array [23] [24].
attacks in vehicular environments have been described in detail In this paper, we propose a new PHY security technique for
in [2]-[6]. To preserve the privacy and security of vehicular vehicular communications that does not require the exchange
communication networks, higher-layer encryption techniques of keys between vehicles. We assume a single transmitter
have been proposed in [6]-[8], and references therein. These communicating with a single receiver in the presence of an
techniques, however, are based on digital signature methods eavesdropper as shown in Fig. 1. The proposed technique
that require vehicles to store large number of encryption uses an antenna architecture with a single RF chain (in-
keys. These keys must also be regularly exchanged, hence stead of multiple RF chains), and performs analog precoding
creating, in addition to the processing overhead, an additional with antenna selection. To transmit an information symbol,
communication overhead [1], [2]. With the emergence of new a random set (called a subset) of antennas are co-phased
time-sensitive ITS applications and the increasing size of the to transmit the information symbol to the receiver, while
decentralized vehicular network, the implementation of these the remaining antennas are used to randomize the far field
higher-layer techniques becomes complex and challenging. radiation pattern at non-receiver directions. This results in
Additionally these techniques fail to secure communication coherent transmission to the receiver and a noise-like signal
links if the encryption keys are compromised, and/or key that jams potential eavesdroppers with sensitive receivers. Note
distribution becomes difficult. that the proposed technique is robust to plaintext attacks and
2
beamforming vector f (k) is fn (k) = √1N ejΥn (k) . Using (3) Since the entries of IM (k) and IL (k) are randomly selected
T
and (4), the received signal at the receiver along θR becomes for each data symbol, (8) can be simplified to
r r NT −1
P αNR 1 X
Wn ej ( 2 −n) λ (cos θR −cos θE ) , (9)
N −1 2πd
yR (k, θR ) = gR s(k)× β =
X NT NT n=0
e−j ( 2 −m) λ cos θR ej ( 2 −m) λ cos θR +
N −1 2πd N −1 2πd
where Wn is a Bernoulli random variable and Wn = 1 with
m∈IM (k) probability (M + (NT − M )/2)/NT = N2NT +M
, and Wn = −1
X (5) T
e−j ( ) 2πd
λ cos θR ej ( 2 −n) λ cos θR −
N −1 N −1 2πd NT −M
2 −n with probability 2NT .
n∈EL (k)
X IV. P ERFORMANCE E VALUATION
λ cos θR j ( 2 −n) λ cos θR
−j ( N 2−1 −n) 2πd N −1 2πd
e e + z(k),
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
n∈OL (k)
mmWave secure transmission technique. As shown in (7), the
where gR is the channel gain at the receiver, NR is the received signal at an arbitrary eavesdropper is subject to both
receiver’s array gain, and NT is a power normalization term. multiplication and additive noise. This makes the derivation of
Grouping similar terms in (5) we obtain a simple closed form expression for the signal-to-noise ratio
r (SNR) and a secrecy rate formula challenging, if not possible.
P αNR
yR (k, θR ) = s(k)gR × To evaluate the performance of the proposed mmWave secure
NT
X transmission technique, we define the the secrecy throughput
ej ( 2 −m) λ (cos θR −cos θR )
N −1 2πd
R (bits per channel use) as
m∈IM (k)
X R = [log2 (1 + γR ) − log2 (1 + γE )]+ , (10)
j ( N 2−1 −n) 2πd
λ (cos θR −cos θR )
+ e
where γR is the SNR at the target receiver, γE is the SNR at
n∈EL (k) (6)
X the eavesdropper, and a+ denotes max{0, a}. From (3) and
ej ( ) 2πd
N −1
− 2 −n λ (cos θR −cos θR ) + z(k) (6), the SNR at the receiver can be expressed as
n∈OL (k) P αNR (E[h∗ (θR )f (k)])2
√
r γR = (11)
NR P αNR var[h∗ (θR )f (k)] + σ 2
= s(k) gR P α M + z(k) .
|{z} | {z } NT |{z} P αNR M 2 gR2 2P αNR M 2 sin2 (ΦR /2)
information effective channel | {z } additive = 2
= , (12)
symbol gain array gain noise NT σ NT σ 2
Similarly, the received signal at the eavesdropper can be where (12) follows since the array gain is constant at the target
written as receiver and gR2 = 12 (1 − e−jΦR )(1 − ejΦR ) = (1 − cos(ΦR )) =
r
P αE NE 2 sin2 (ΦR /2), and ΦR is the phase angle between the receiver’s
yE (k, θE ) = gE s(k)× direct and the reflected path.
NT
X Similarly, the SNR at an eavesdropper can be expressed as
e−j ( 2 −m) λ cos θE ej ( 2 −m) λ cos θR +
N −1 2πd N −1 2πd
8
0.3
6
4.5
4 Proposed (simulation) 0.2
Proposed (theoretical approx.)
2 4 Switched array
Proposed (simulation) 0.1
0 Proposed (theoretical approx.)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
Switched 160
array 180
Angle Direction (degrees) 3.5 0
Conventional 4 8 12 16 20 24 28 30 2 5 10 15 20 25 30 32
Subset Size M Subset Size M
Fig. 3: Numerical and theoretical (eq. (18)) values of the se- Fig. 4: (a) Numerical and theoretical (eq. (18)) values of the
crecy throughput versus the eavesdropper’s angular direction; secrecy throughput versus the transmission subset size M ;
(a) NT = 32 and M = 24, (b) NT = 16 and M = 12. NT = 32, θR = 100◦, and θE = 95◦ . (b) Beam variance
at θE = 50◦ and θE = 95◦ (superimposed).
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