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Ali M. Rizvi
alimrizvi@gmail.com
Abstract: In this paper I challenge modern philosophy’s self-conception as an absolute critique (i.e., a
critique of everything/anything). I argue that such a conception is not only misconceived, it is also
ideological in character. Looking back to its origins, I develop a genealogy of modern philosophy’s self-
philosophy, arguing for a more modest conception of philosophy as a subject which provides tools for
The wise in every age conclude, what Pyrrho taught and Hume renewed, that
Thomas Blacklock1
recent book. As Williamson rightly claims, to talk about philosophy is itself doing
philosophy (Williamson, 2007, pp. ix-x). In this sense, a discourse about philosophy
cannot be metaphilosophy, done from beyond and above (from an Archimedean vantage
point beyond the bounds of specific space and time) (cf. Heidegger, 1956, pp. 21ff.).
Acknowledgements: thanks to John Campbell and Dirk Maclean for detailed written comments on an
earlier draft of this paper and for ensuing discussion. Jürgen Franz, Sara Monira Ludin, Chris Iliopoulos,
Muhammad Yasin, and Jeremy Lowe also provided valuable feedback. I’m grateful to all of them.
1
Quoted in Popkin, 1993, p. 517.
1
Willard Quine, following Otto Neurath, has likened science (and) philosophy to “a boat
which, if we are to rebuild it, we must rebuild plank by plank while staying afloat in it”
(Quine, 1960, p. 3). Quine uses this metaphor principally to demonstrate the piecemeal
character of philosophy, but it can also be invoked (as I do here) to allude to its immanent
character. This discussion is closely connected to the nature of philosophy (or at least to
the prominent part of it). Philosophy is not only a reflective but also a self-reflective
Sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas has connected this double reflexive
language suggests a difference in level that does not exist. It is one of the
most interesting features of natural languages that they can be used as their
What Habermas says about natural language applies to philosophy as well, and it is
2
Reflection involves distance from the object of enquiry, while self-reflection requires that the subject
2
Philosophy has existed in many cultures, and it can be safely said that, in a sense,
if the properties of reflection and self-reflection are coterminous with human life,
philosophy is also coterminous with it. Such reflective attitudes towards the self, the
universe, and the other can be found in various places across space and time, and the
commonality among them can be observed (v. Cohen, 1995; Moore, 1995; Saksena,
1995; Mei, 1995). However, this slight, almost banal, observation should not lead one to
conclude that philosophical reflection has taken the same form across space and time, and
thus elide the distinctions and specificities which give particular attempts at reflection
of other eras and epochs of human civilisation, but that is not what is interesting in
understanding its essence: what is interesting is its uniqueness, that which gives it its
differential characteristics (in the lingua of Aristotelian logic, what we are interested in is
Europe, an epoch defined by a transition from the medieval worldview to the modern
worldview (so-called ‘modernity’). This specific development not only defines (at least in
part) the modern world (and especially its ‘view’), but also the self-image of philosophy
3
Of course, many philosophers deny that philosophy has existed or can exist in any culture. For them,
philosophy needs the fulfilment of specific social conditions in order to exist. It’s safe to say, however, that
in making such claims they have a very specific conception of philosophy in mind, and not philosophy in
general (Barry Stroud is one such philosopher: see Stroud, 2001, p. 28. Cf. Cohen, 1995).
4
Although I use the term ‘modern philosophy’ throughout the paper, it should be clear that my critique is
focused on certain specific conception of it (as represented by Graham Pirest, for example); thus, my
3
itself: the self-image that philosophy is debating intensely as the distance from the
‘founding act’ is becoming remote (v. Williams, 2000; Cottingham, 2009; Solomon,
2001).
writings of its undisputed father, the Frenchman René Descartes,5 who claimed that all
knowledge needs a radical new beginning and new foundations.6 Descartes was writing in
were publicly questioned and sharply disputed across a war-torn Europe. The
Counter Reformation, together with the proliferation of religious sects and the
This points to the important fact that modern philosophy emerged in a milieu in which
Christianity was still a dominant and ruling force, but was nonetheless finding itself
increasingly on the defensive, and was losing ground to the new emerging forces of
5
Some have suggested two fathers, one for the French side and the other for the English side; the English
Descartes, and not the specific method (that is, the method of radical doubt) which he uses to accomplish it.
4
rational debate. Philosophy7 was one of those forces, and this helped define the self-
image of philosophy as the revolutionary force without parallel, which corresponds to,
and is attested by, the notion of philosophy as a new beginning (at times an absolute
beginning) put forth by both Descartes and Bacon. “Just like Francis Bacon, his
human knowledge. The old philosophy of schools could not be reformed: Aristotelianism
had to be rejected in toto” (Matthews, 1989, p. 88, emphasis in the original; v. Copleston,
1994, 1).8 Similarly, Francis Bacon saw in the emergence of the new philosophy and the
new sciences the prospect of an entirely new age, which would be quantitatively and
The issue here is not whether they were justified in their assumption that they
were making a complete break with the past; it suffices for my argument to establish that
this is how they saw things. Moreover, as Frederick Copleston aptly notes, they were not
entirely unjustified in this self perception: “Men such as Bacon and Descartes were
7
Of course, philosophy at the time was not separated from science, and the founding fathers especially.
Descartes was a great scientist and mathematician (especially the latter) in his own right, and had a crucial
impact on the early development and orientation of Sir Isaac Newton’s thought. This also partially explains
Gadamer, 2004 [1975], pp. 276-277). For the theme of an absolute new beginning one should of course
consult Descartes’ Discourse on Method (see Descartes, 1985, pp. 111-151). Descartes often couches his
argument in terms of not relying on others’ opinions, and thinking through the matter for oneself, and he
claims that common sense is often a better guide than scholarly tomes. This can legitimately be taken as an
expression of modern individual self-determination, but, more crucially, Descartes is trying to establish a
new tradition, a new common sense (as opposed to the dominant but receding tradition and idea of common
sense).
5
doubtless unaware of the extent to which their minds were influenced by former ways of
thought; but their consciousness of standing at the threshold of a new era is not
Thus, modern philosophy began its life as part of a revolutionary movement that
heralded a new age, different from the one it was aiming to replace. Furthermore, it
started its life in an environment in which it was a minority view, albeit one which was
growing.9 These two facts make it natural that the critique10 of dominant worldviews11
(medieval civilisation and its remnants in this instance) became the main vocation of
modern philosophy and part and parcel of its self-image – not critique in general, as in
the critique that must accompany any philosophical reflection, but a specific conception
of critique, which characterises (and understands) itself as limitless and absolute. The
great German philosopher Immanuel Kant famously articulated this notion when he
wrote:
Our age is the genuine age of criticism, to which everything must submit.
Religion through its holiness and legislation through its majesty commonly
seek to exempt themselves from it. But in this way they excite a just
suspicion against themselves, and cannot lay claim to that unfeigned respect
9
It is interesting to note that almost none of the founders of modern philosophy were professional
philosophers based in universities (only Kant, who is a much later author), and almost all of them wrote in
the vernacular and not in Latin, the scholarly language of the day (Copleston, 1994, p. 5). Descartes and
Bacon did both write in Latin, and also in French and English respectively. Locke and Hume wrote all their
6
that reason grants only to that which has been able to withstand its free and
public examination.
Note here that it is reason which “grants” the sought-after “unfeigned respect” – reason is
the sole authority which decides which other authorities deserve respect, and to what
extent. On the other hand, although we find similar requirements for reason elaborated on
later in the Critique (A 738-B 766), it’s clear that in order to gain respect reason doesn’t
need to (shouldn’t) submit to any other authority but itself; reason, in the Kantian
What is of further interest (from our perspective) in this paper is Kant’s use of the
exceptions; the critique is total.12 True, Kant was writing in an age considerably different
from that of Descartes and Bacon – if not already the Age of Enlightenment, it was at
least much nearer to it than that of Descartes and Bacon. Here is how Kant himself saw
things:
If it is now asked whether we live in an enlightened age, the answer is: No,
more is required for people on the whole to be in the position, or even able to
12
Critique is total, but this totality doesn’t necessarily imply a wholesale critique (that is, a critique of
everything at once) – it can be carried out piecemeal. Thus the totality of critique in the sense used here
shouldn’t be confused with ‘wholesale’ critique; a total critique can take either piecemeal or wholesale
7
be put in the position, of using their own understanding confidently and well
intimations that the field is now being opened for them to work freely in this
And here we can see that the self-conception of philosophy has already started to become
detached from the ‘founding act’ (as something which is universal irrespective of space
and time).
A word or two must be said about Kant’s notion of critique and its relation to that
of Descartes. Kant’s enterprise is clearly very different from that of Descartes in many
respects, and not only in the fact that Kant was living much nearer to the actual Age of
the methodic doubt as a way to establish absolute and certain foundations of knowledge.13
He doesn’t share Descartes’ search for absolute certainty either (in this he is much closer
to Nietzsche than to Descartes);14 Kant instinctively realises that the demise of the
medieval Christian world also meant the demise of the idea of absolute certainty, and as a
13
On Descartes’ methodic doubt and its revolutionary character see Williams, 1998, pp. 28-49.
14
Kant – as is well known – does claim apodictic certainty for his system (see for example Kuehn, 2006,
especially p. 655), but such a claim is limited to cognitive knowledge and its conditions, and does not
encompass reason and its territory as a whole. There is a vast grey area outside this, which will always
remain as long as we are humans. In this, Kant is much closer to John Locke than to Descartes, although
8
true believer in reason he was willing to sacrifice certainty as a price for believing in
for Kant, belief in reason is not presuppositionless (although he does think that reason
must justify its presuppositions in its own manner if it’s to retain its authority). With
these qualifications, Kant retains Descartes’ notion of absolute critique in the following
substantial sense: every authority and every source of knowledge must justify itself on
the altar of reason in order to deserve consideration and legitimacy, and there is no
authority which has a right to compete with the authority of reason. Kant’s oft-talked
about ‘humility’ is not about this point at all; he doesn’t concede anything as far as the
absolute authority of reason is concerned. His humility is related, rather, to another point.
What he does concede is that in order to retain its authority, reason has to justify it, even
if in its own terms, and that this justification cannot be based on presuppositionless15 and
absolute grounds, but is an ongoing project.16 His humility pertains to the fact that his
positive estimate of the powers of reason in certain aspects is much weaker than that of
Descartes.
Thus, Kant’s notion of critique is not aimed at absolute certainty, and it doesn’t
(internally) as long as the presuppositions are justified (internally). Also, total critique is not necessarily
opposed to piecemeal critique (a critique can be total in its intentions but piecemeal in its execution; or,
alternatively, it can be total externally but piecemeal internally). For a critique to be total (critique of
integration rather than as once and for all laying foundations” (O’Neill, 1992, p. 292, also p. 303).
9
The attitude of questioning is aimed at alien17 authorities – the authorities that are not
vindicated by reason. Reason is absolute, but not in the sense of being presuppositionless:
it is only absolute in the sense that every authority must justify itself in front of it in order
reason itself needs vindication, but in its own terms, while everything else be justified in
This is evidently the effect not of the thoughtlessness of our age [i.e., the Age
which will no longer be put off with illusory knowledge, and which demands
that reason take on anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of
secure its rightful claims while dismissing all its groundless pretensions, and
17
For Kant, the ‘essence’ of reason is freedom: “[t]he very existence of reason depends upon … freedom”
(Kant, 1999, p. A738/B766). The authorities which rely on coercion or dictatorial powers (such as God,
Church, State, religion, nature, etc.), whose dictates are ‘givens’ that cannot be questioned, are termed by
Kant ‘alien’ authorities because their nature is alien to the essence of reason, i.e., freedom. Kant also terms
these authorities arbitrary because, even in principle, their dictates cannot be shared by everyone (the
Christian Church’s commands make sense only to its devotees, for example); reason’s dictates are at least
in principle sharable by everyone. Obviously, this argument is valid only if Kant is working here with a
very thin conception of reason, which is the common property of all (mature) humans. In my opinion,
however, Kant’s argument fails precisely because he presupposes a very substantive conception of reason
that hinges on and presumes the notion of autonomy (self determination). (My interpretation here is heavily
indebted to O’Neill, 1992, p. 293 and passim, though O’Neill doesn’t make the objection I allude to at the
end; also, see her other seminal works, referenced below in the text. Cf. Schneewind, 1998, pp. 483-507).
10
this not by mere decrees but according to its own eternal and unchangeable
laws; and this court is none other than the critique of pure reason itself.
While everything else is answerable to reason and its authority, reason is answerable only
to itself.
Hence, Kant differs from Descartes not in delegetimising all authorities, which
are in potential or actual competition with reason, but in determining how to justify the
rational enterprise and how to build the edifice of reason once the negative work has been
performed. Here we can see that Kant clearly comes to differentiate between what is
Kant’s notion of critique is much more complex than can be fully explored here,
but it can be claimed with some justification that his notion of philosophy as the
custodian of reason, as the critique of ‘everything’, has remained. This is clearly evident
known and well-respected contemporary philosopher and logician, Graham Priest. The
that there is nothing that may not be challenged. Anything is a fit topic for
18
For an elaboration on these points, see the seminal works of Onora O’Neill (1989, 1992, 2004).
11
critical scrutiny and potential rejection, including . . . even the efficacy of
As a good logician, Priest qualifies his claims carefully: he says he does not mean to
he is only claiming that if they wanted to they could do so. Philosophers qua philosophers
and philosophy qua philosophy can potentially criticise everything and anything; nothing
typically did not question the claim that God exists, and insists that this does not violate
their status as philosophers because if they had wanted to question the existence of God
“they could have done so” (p. 201)! This is a bizarre example, and a poor one at that.
potentially do anything. What is special about philosophy in that? Such a thin conception
of potentiality dilutes the notion of criticism to such an extent that it becomes trivial.
Priest’s dilemma here corresponds to the one faced by modern political theorists,
who, in order to make room for a diversity of beliefs, have put forth the idea of ‘reasons
that all can accept’ as the final arbitrator of disputes in the political arena. James Bohman
19
Henceforth, where possible, I shall refer to criticism of anything/everything simply as absolute critique or
absolute criticisms.
12
and Henry Richardson (2009) have justifiably taken them to task by pressing them to
come up with an example of reasons that a person could not accept. As they write:
To be sure, there are plenty of reasons that, as it may be, a person does not
accept. Perhaps not caring about flowers, you do not take the presence of
They conclude: “[t]he important question, for our purposes, is really whether it is ever the
case that a reason that one single person intelligibly accepts is not also that could be
intelligibly accepted by each and every person” (p. 258). Surely the answer should be a
resounding ‘no’. With such a thin conception of potentiality, if one person can accept
something, then surely anyone else should (in principle) be able to do so. In a similar
vein, like his modern counterpart, the medieval philosopher qua philosopher (and I would
say qua human being) could surely (in principle) have rejected or doubted the existence
of God (and some actually did).20 The dilemma faced by Priest is that if he works with a
thin conception of the possibility of criticism, this dilutes the uniqueness of the
20
In both the Christian and Islamic discourses in the Middle Ages one occasionally finds the names of
authors who questioned the idea of God altogether. In general, the discussion of the arguments for the proof
of the existence of God by Christian and Islamic philosophers of the Middle Ages on their own are
sufficient to establish that such a group of people existed, even though, naturally enough (and consistent
with my theory) their names have largely gone unmentioned in the dominant discourses of the age.
13
philosophy he wants to establish. If he works with a robust conception of the possibility
of criticism (however defined), then he cannot claim that there was equal (or near equal)
becoming increasingly difficult to be a robust theist doing philosophy in our time). One
could avoid this dilemma by either denying that medieval philosophy, by Priest’s lights,
was really a philosophy (one could claim that it was, rather, a theology in disguise).21
Perhaps Priest would not like to take this route because he is eager to preserve the
universality of philosophy. Or, one can take the route of distinguishing between
philosophy in general and the specific forms it takes, in which case Priest’s description
would fit modern philosophy (especially its self-image) but not philosophy as such.
I have so far differentiated between philosophy as such and the specific forms it
takes, and I would argue that modern philosophy (at least its self-conception) as an
absolute critique22 is one conception of philosophy among many, and it is the product of
in the 16th and 17th centuries in Western Europe. This specific form cannot be
universalised without confusing philosophy in general with one of the specific forms it
philosophy, I would argue, is against the spirit of philosophy itself (and against the spirit
21
According to a different conception of philosophy than Priest’s, such a dilemma would not necessarily
arise. Thus, one can define philosophy as a conceptual analysis at the highest level of generality and
abstraction: in which case, one can find much to admire in medieval philosophy despite the many
14
of reflection and critique in general). It would be tantamount to closing off the openings
for thinking, because one of the things crucial for thought and its prosperity is to always
keep open alternatives – the avenues of thinking differently. Difference is crucial not for
its own sake but because it is our only panacea against the tyranny of the same. As
not the critical work of thought on itself? And if it does not consist in the
outside, to dictate to others, to tell them where their truth is and how to find
its right to explore what might be changed, in its own thought, through the
understood as the test by means of which one modifies oneself through the
play of truth and not as the simplistic appropriation of others for the purpose
that philosophy is still what it was in times past, i.e., an “ascesis”, an exercise
23
I have used here the modified translation by Professor Clare O’Farrell, found on her website
15
This is not to claim that difference is value in itself; it is only to say that without the
possibility of real alternatives there is no thinking. Thus, when we press and question a
particular traditions in order to prosper. By denying its own specificity,25 its own
situatedness, modern philosophy26 also denies the very source of its own life because
there is no thinking without thinking in a particular space and time. Thinking transcends
particularity only by locating itself surely and securely within its own particularity (and
the fallacy of modern philosophy’s claim to universality (which involves the denial of its
own particularity). It is also in the interest of thinking itself that we defend various
possible to universalise such a philosophy, but that’s another matter. Also, my objection is not to the
as such, but its specific claim that it’s critical in a way in which other traditions (including philosophical
traditions) are not. Basically, in my opinion, the claim to absolute critique (taken on face value and without
my argument is only against certain interpretations of what modern philosophy is, as exemplified by the
reflection, imagination, and alternative thinking, but how we use those powers is not determined by
philosophy, it’s determined by us, our interests, and the wider social conditions.
16
The mistake behind the claim that philosophy is absolute critique is to ignore two
distinct but interrelated aspects of criticism. Let us call them internal (positive) criticism
in which one critiques one’s own ideas or one’s own world view (at the level of the
system).28 In external criticism, on the other hand, one criticises another worldview at the
level of individual ideas, or at the system level. Internal criticism can also either be an
immanent criticism where one acts and argues “within the framework of [her] own
ideas”, or it can be carried out as “the philosophical activity of reflecting on those ideas at
a more general level and trying to make sense of them” (Williams, 2000, p. 491). The
latter activity still remains within the ambit of immanent criticism as long as this ‘making
sense of’ stops at the points which are essential to our view (without which our view
would lose its rationale and collapse as a coherent and self-evident whole for us). If we
transit to that latter option, internal criticism loses its immanent status and becomes a
transcendent29 criticism, and no longer remains internal; it transforms itself into a species
of external criticism, since now we’re reflecting on our fundamental ideas in a neutral or
impartial way (as if from the viewpoint of someone outside our worldview – we become
28
There is also a possibility for internal critique of worldviews other than our own – for example,
empathising with them to such an extent that we internalise them, although whether such identification is
possible is controversial.
29
Kant uses ‘transcendent’ to refer to “objects (Objects) that cannot be encountered in … experience”
(quoted in Kant, 1999, p. 717 n6; original quote is from Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, edited by the Royal
Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reiner, later Walter de Gruyter & Co.,
1900- ), vol. 18, p. 10 ). My use of ‘transcendent’ here is different from that of Kant, and merely alludes to
the fact that in transcendent criticism, relation of immanence with the object of criticism is totally severed.
17
strangers to our own view), in the same way in which we criticise a view which is
have seen, its self conception as absolute criticism emerged at the particular juncture of
history when philosophy (and her allies) was a minority activity pitted against the still-
dominant but receding and retreating worldview that had prevailed in Europe since the
Middle Ages (whether it goes under the name of feudalism, or Christendom, or Christian
its hand on precisely because it was a minority view aiming to destroy and overcome the
prevalent worldview. But the same cannot be true today, when modern philosophy (and
her allies) is without doubt a dominant force (although this obviously does not imply that
they have absolute power).30 Even today, modern philosophy is at its best when it takes
aim at the remnants of the old forces. But it is a totally different ballgame when
(that is, a species of external criticism) is always much harder than criticising others, and
one of the most outstanding and perceptive of post-war British philosophers, writes:
alternative ways, that is to say various ways, in which human beings have
lived and hence can live. Indeed, in those terms we may be able to conceive,
30
For my argument here I don’t need to presume that philosophy itself is a dominant force in today’s
world; it’s sufficient to suppose that the worldview presupposed by the modern philosophical enterprise is
dominant today.
18
if only schematically and with difficulty, other ways in which human beings
might live in the future. But that is not the point. What in this connection
our ethical and political outlook, and in those terms there are no alternatives
for us. Those elements are indeed unhintergehbar . . . we can identify with
the process that led to our outlook because we can identify with its outcome.
But we cannot in our thought go beyond our outlook into the future and
remain identified with the result: that is to say, we cannot overcome our
outlook.
The point is not that we cannot factually overcome our outlook. That would be
empirically wrong; people overcome their outlooks all the time (even if such people are
only can individuals factually overcome their outlook, civilisations can transform
civilisation).
The latter, however, is much rarer: civilisational shifts don’t occur everyday.
31
Straightforward examples of this are conversions: people converting from one religion to another,
atheists becoming religious, religious people becoming non-religious, secular, or atheists, and so on.
19
in a way in which non-fundamental precepts or precepts of another system are not.32 It’s
only in times of crisis (the ‘crisis of explanation’, as Williams calls it) that fundamental
precepts become amenable to criticism.33 But the crisis of explanation itself can be
divided into two types: the crisis which can be resolved by internal revisions without any
fundamental changes, and the crisis which cannot be resolved without revising (or giving
32
This essentially corresponds to Quine’s view about the types of statements which can be revised easily
(without much disturbance to the system as a whole in which they are embedded), and the types of
statements that cannot be so revised (without drastic changes in the system as a whole) (see Quine, 1961,
pp. 20-46). For Quine, some beliefs are more fundamental or important than others, in the sense that
revising or giving them up would involve many more far-reaching changes elsewhere in our belief system
in order to maintain their coherence. But for Quine this is a continuum – that is, a matter of degree – and
even at the most fundamental area of the continuum there are no beliefs that are so fundamental that they
are immune to potential revision. One group that Quine has in his sights are the empiricists/positivists who
thought you could start with foundations of sense data of which you were absolutely certain, and then build
up all knowledge from those foundations (akin to the way that Descartes thought you could build up
knowledge, although his foundation was of course different from the empiricists’ sense data). There is,
however, no fundamental difference between Quine’s and my position here; in my opinion, one does not
need to subscribe to foundationalism in order to preserve Williams’ distinction between ‘essential’ and
‘non-essential’ elements of a worldview. Quine’s distinction between elements which require wide-ranging
adjustments if rejected, and elements which do not require wide-ranging changes, will suffice. Thus, when
Williams talks about ‘essential elements of our worldview’, I take him to mean those elements the rejection
of thought’: “I would like to distinguish between the ‘history of ideas’ and the ‘history of thought’. Most of
the time a historian of ideas tries to determine when a specific concept appears, and this moment is often
identified by the appearance of a new word. But what I am attempting to do as a historian of thought is
something different. I am trying to analyze the way institutions, practices, habits, and behavior become a
20
up) some or all of our fundamental precepts. If most of the fundamental precepts of our
worldview become suspect, or lose their hold on us, then the crisis of explanation can be
There are two possible ways to overcome a fundamental crisis. The civilisation
precepts – this can happen, for example, by giving a new rationale or new justification to
the old ideas – or it becomes unable to hold on to the old ideas, in which case it
ultimately gives way to a new set of fundamental precepts and transforms itself into a
new civilisation (there are, of course, many other options, like extinction or assimilation
into another dominant civilisation, a prospect faced by many civilisations today vis-à-vis
the dominant modern Western civilisation). The transformation into a new civilisation,
however, doesn’t mean that the civilisation totally abandons its erstwhile ideas – what’s
required is only that the fundamental precepts are rejected and/or their internal
configuration is changed, and, with that in place, previous ideas can still retain their role,
albeit with changed emphases, reinterpretations, and reconfigurations (all of these are
empirical points).34 Thus, the point is not that we can’t (may not) potentially or actually
problem for people who behave in specific sorts of ways, who have certain types of habits, who engage in
certain kinds of practices, and who put to work specific kinds of institutions. . . . The history of thought is
the analysis of the way an unproblematic field of experience, or a set of practices which were accepted
without question, which were familiar and out of discussion, becomes a problem, raises discussion and
debate, incites new reactions, and induces a crisis in the previously silent behavior, habits, practices, and
institutions” (Foucault, 2001, p. 74). What Foucault calls here ‘problematisation’ is the same thing that
of demolition is over, but their conception of God and its role in the worldview they erect is fundamentally
21
doubt the essentials of our worldview; the point is, rather, that the probability of it is very
low as long as a worldview is dominant.35 The insight behind all this is that every
civilisation creates an intellectual climate (an intellectual milieu) 36 in which certain things
seem obvious, self-evident, and more probable; and certain other things less so.37 In the
medieval Christian civilisation, the belief in God and its particular Christian
interpretation was a ‘natural’ thought to occur, and thinking against it was normatively
and factually difficult and improbable, but in the age of crisis (roughly from the 16th to
the 19th centuries) such doubts became easier, and eventually lead to the collapse of
medieval Christian civilisation as a whole. Muslim civilisation faced the same dilemma,
with the advent of the age of colonialism, and still is in a transitional phase. The same
rule applies to modern Western civilisation, including its philosophical schools, but since
it’s so overwhelmingly dominant today, not only culturally, but economically and
technologically, this situation is hard to see. Thus Williams’ point, as I see it, is not an
argument for relativism, but about the way human rationality works.38
different from that in the Christian civilisation of the Middle Ages. Kant’s idea of autonomy is a rejection
of the idea of servitude and complete submission to God (found in classical Judaism, medieval Christianity,
and Kant’s own days in Pietism) (for perceptive remarks see Kuehn, 2001, pp. 53-54). It’s beside the point
to say that Descartes or Kant don’t reject the idea of God altogether; what really matters is their conception
of God, and that’s no doubt essentially different from the one predominant in the Middle Ages).
35
This is almost a tautological claim, but its significance is often not fully realised.
36
See Taylor (2007, pp. 2-4 and 25-28) on this point.
37
In the beautiful words of Paul Feyerabend: “ . . . argument works only on people who have been properly
critical ethos.
22
It might be claimed at this point that the fundamental difference between modern
philosophy and the civilisation it defends (and is associated with) is that, whereas in
Christian or Jewish civilisations (for example) it’s normatively prohibited to critique their
fundamental precepts (“[i]n religion one is explicitly not allowed to question certain
things” – Priest, 2006, p. 201), in modern philosophy (and, in the case of Priest, in
constraints determine the actual possibility and extent of such criticisms. The point is
powerful, but only on the surface. If we look at the actual philosophical practice of, say,
Descartes or Kant (and their descendants), we realise that although philosophy (and
modern civilisation in general) claims that it’s normatively permissible to criticise any of
its precepts, in actual fact the odds of this happening are the same as criticising God in a
fundamental questions about reason, autonomy,39 etc., but in actual practice it’s almost
always a normal criticism (internal criticism), and never a fundamental critique. The
point will only be proven if we see fundamental critiques of reason or autonomy within
modern philosophy and worldview as a normal practice (and I submit this is not only not
A word or two must also be said about the distinction between piecemeal
criticism and wholesale criticism. It might be objected that there is an ambiguity here that
39
Just think of the rage and disgust poor fundamentalism (a term never properly defined and arbitrarily
used) elicits at all intellectual levels. The reason is because fundamentalism presents a view of religion that
supposedly transcends the well-defined limits of the Enlightenment tolerance of religion (see Habermas,
2006, pp. 3-25, especially pp. 10-11; cf. Rawls, 1996, pp. 64ff. and passim). The list of gag rules keeps
piling up.
23
I’ve overlooked in my explication of Williams’ quote, above. It might be claimed that
Williams (or I on his behalf) has failed to acknowledge ambiguity in his (or his and my)
position. It is one thing to say that you cannot question everything all at once, and that all
questioning has to be done from a fixed point or outlook that we take for granted, but it is
another thing to say that there are some things that we cannot ever question, and that
there are some fixed points or aspects of our outlook that we must always take for
granted. The first could be true, while the second false. Going back to the Neurath/Quine
analogy of the boat, our critic might add that it is one thing to say that you cannot rebuild
all the bits of the boat all at once. If you are going to, e.g., rebuild or alter the left side of
the boat, then for those purposes you have to take the right side of the boat as a given or
fixed point in order to get anything done. But it would be quite another thing to say that
there are some bits of the boat that cannot ever be changed or rebuilt: the right side of the
boat could be altered or changed too.40 But the criticism misses the point here. For my
start with, the boat analogy leaves many other options out of view; e.g., it might be the
case that the boat is so rotten that there is no option for repairing at all – piecemeal or
otherwise. In such cases the better option might be to jump to another available boat. But,
aside from this, the more fundamental point is whether a criticism is fundamental or not,
not whether it’s piecemeal or wholesale. A similar point applies to a crisis of explanation,
40
Thanks to John Campbell for pressing me to clarify these points.
41
Generally speaking, in civilisational transformations, piecemeal changes occur over long stretches of
time and are followed by the event of wholesale transformation, the so-called ‘revolutionary event’. In this
24
critique can be non-fundamental, for example, when one jettisons her precepts en masse,
but the precepts involved don’t belong to the core of her worldview; or, a piecemeal
critique can be fundamental when it progresses in piecemeal fashion, but pertains to the
core of our worldview. Thus, the issue here is not whether criticism is piecemeal or
wholesale – the issue is rather whether the critique pertains to fundamentals of our
worldview or not.
other worldview in the dynamics of change sketched above. Modern philosophy, which
has the reputation of throwing everything upside down, taking nothing as sacrosanct,
apparently has its own idols in front of which it trembles lest it utter any unwarranted
words. I am not talking about the fringes here; I am thinking of mainstream modern
philosophy. In modern philosophy one would search in vain for any fundamental critique
of the notions of autonomy, democracy, secularism, and science.42 There are powerful
these concepts, but no fundamental critiques in the sense of the ‘fundamental’ elaborated
reading, piecemeal changes and wholesale changes are not contradictory (rather, they are complementary).
42
I think philosophers are justified in taking science seriously. What is missing is the distance from science
(and a certain irreverence towards it) which should be natural for a view which prides itself on its open-
ended and critical character. Thus, for example, I would like to see more persistent problematisation of
‘science’ as a generic word or concept (what we should take seriously are ‘facts’ and not science as such;
there is also the sort of rubbish which goes along with the ‘factual’ element in discourse about science).
The same point goes for the other concepts mentioned above. It should be added here that I presume the
veracity of the point made in the text without any real argument; if I’m wrong in this assumption, my
25
above. The typical response is expressed with atypical honesty and frankness by Burt
tradition of thought which it is our job to explore and see whether it can be
made coherent and consistent. . . . We are not arguing for such a society. We
take for granted that today only a fool would not want to live in such a
democracy, if one does not see the virtue of that ideal, then I do not know
around speaking for Rawls, What do you say to an Adolf Hitler? The answer
is [nothing]. You shoot him. You do not try to reason with him. Reason has
A typical medieval philosopher would no doubt have held the same sentiments
about an atheist, a diehard royalist in the early modern age would have harboured similar
views about a democrat, and so on. What makes political philosophy (for example)
absolute critique that makes the otherwise understandable views of Williams and Dreben
43
Lest anyone think that these are isolated views of the characteristically combative Dreben, and not those
of Rawls, one should be reminded that Rawls himself likens the views that reject constitutional democracy
to war and disease: he talks about “the practical task of containing them” as they are “war and disease”
(Rawls, 1996, pp. 64 n.19, also pp. 64ff.). But one does not just contain diseases, one tries to eradicate
them!
26
(however atrociously expressed by the latter) so bizarre. Again, I am not advocating any
form of relativism and its cogency here. Recall that I have not denied the universality of
philosophy as absolute critique.44 What the above discussion makes clear is that modern
especially when this internal criticism involves the fundamentals of the modern
worldview.
absolute critique mostly applies to its criticism of external forces, and not to the
fundamentals of its own worldview. When it comes to this it is as meek as any other
enterprise in modern society (and at times even more so because of the guilty
consciousness that stems from the explicit claim of its own status as absolute criticism).
Having accomplished the above, it is easy to summarily dispose of three corollaries that
Priest derives from his notion of philosophy as absolute critique, viz: a) philosophy (read
import. I will briefly examine all these claims (and reject them as they stand – the
44
So, those philosophers who have a different conception of philosophy or modern philosophy are not my
targets here. Although not all modern philosophers theorise about what modern philosophy is (in fact they
rarely do), they might still have the same conception of philosophy or modern philosophy criticised here.
27
Subversiveness of philosophy. Modern philosophy indeed claims to be subversive; but it
is subversive only when it critiques external forces (forces that are still lingering on from
the ‘dark ages’, in its view). When it comes to its own internal matters, philosophy is not
only not subversive, but is in fact highly conservative in the original sense of the word
(the contemporary supporters of the American Republican Party do not have exclusive
copyright on the term). It is conservative in the sense that it is the custodian of the
worldview and civilisation that replaced the medieval Christian civilisation of Europe,
and which then imposed itself (through whatever means) on almost the entire world.45
There are, naturally, differences of interpretation and emphasis among its different foci,
constitutional democracy, human rights, capitalism,46 and science. There are internal
debates about these fundamentals within philosophy, but there is no dispute whatsoever
about their desirability and the need to defend them singlehandedly. Philosophy today is
around the world follow the same sorts of topics, subjects, authors, and debates.
45
My analysis here and below is purely functional; I don’t assume that philosophers or philosophy do any
of this consciously. This should exclude any suspicion of a ‘conspiracy theory’ approach.
46
The bankruptcy of the so-called critical and innovative powers of modern thinking becomes starkly clear
when one realises that, despite financial crises and pending environmental disaster, modern thinking
(including philosophical thinking) has not gone beyond the dichotomy of capitalism and socialism (both
part of Enlightenment thinking – one mainstream, the other maverick), and the most innovative one gets is
humanities and social sciences – in America (the most advanced capitalist country), for example, see Gross,
28
Philosophers are not wandering outsiders. They write not in vernaculars as such, but in
the official language of the empire (English) or in a few other main languages
(predominantly French and German) which replaced Latin as the official languages of
higher education in Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries and onwards.48 Philosophers
are, relatively speaking, highly paid professionals, and part of the ruling elite (defined
broadly): responsible49 for producing and reproducing the standard discourse about the
self, the other, and the universe, and the relationship between them. Philosophy today has
almost the same role (perhaps combined with journalism and novel (fiction) writing, and
now increasingly popular science writings) that religion played in the Middle Ages.50
Philosophers are at the forefront of defending modern civilisation, and at the battlefront
today. In fact, it is the custodian of conservatism, as far as defending the basics of the
acquaintance.
49
‘Responsibility’ construed in functional terms here.
50
As Richard H. Popkin writes: “Seventeenth-century epistemological and religious scepticism has left a
legacy that continues to affect our twentieth-century world. (It would seem that one function of our present
professional philosophers is to act as a new priestcraft, exorcising the sceptical demons as they turn up, day
after day” (Popkin, 1993, pp. 514-515). Note, however, that my construing of a ‘sceptical problem’ is much
broader than that of Popkin, and the quote here should be read in the context of the paper as a whole.
51
Just notice the plethora of books in recent decades defending evolution, science, etc. authored by
philosophers.
52
Again, I don’t make any claim about the actual influence of philosophy today; my claim is primarily
about philosophy’s self-conception and, more fundamentally, its relation to the modern worldview.
29
Philosophy as unsettling subject for students. As a reflective subject, philosophy
questions our assumptions about ourselves, the other, and the universe (for example) –
there is no doubt about that. However, any reflective subject will do this; one can go
through unsettling experiences reading history or physics, depending on the way they are
taught and the way they are received. Where philosophy is the subject that makes
reflection and its possibility its prime concern, it is bound to be more unsettling than any
other subject studied within the modern university. But the unsettling experience Priest is
referring to must be more fundamental than the sort of unsettling experiences I just
sense? Perhaps, but principally only for students coming from backgrounds radically
different from the secular modern worldview propagated by modern philosophy; it is not
(typically) unsettling in the absolute sense because it doesn’t challenge students with
background beliefs mostly congruent with the modern worldview. Thus, a believing Jew,
or Muslim, or Christian (to give a straightforward example) will generally feel the force
of the absolutely unsettling nature of philosophy (if she lets herself be pulled by the lure
Philosophers generally tend to minimise their own influence (in line with their overall victimhood
narrative), but my own impression of philosophy’s influence is that it’s much deeper, especially on the
general humanities, social sciences and, through them, wider culture. This influence is augmented by the
existence of public intellectuals like Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, Michel Foucault, and others. Thanks
30
liberal will be unlikely to experience any such discomfort.53 The reason is obvious from
our discussion in this paper. Modern philosophy is absolute critique only vis-à-vis the
views which are external to its own preferred views; its venom and its cutting sword are
reserved exclusively for the views which are historically challenged by her, and not the
views which are constructively favoured by her (a different sort of critique is applied in
that context).
would not deny Priest’s claim that philosophy has this quality. But it is also clear from
the context that what Priest is claiming is not the universal import of philosophy as such,
but his specific conception of philosophy as absolute critique. But, as I have shown, this
furthermore, is true only as self-understanding of this specific philosophy, and not of its
reality. In reality, even this specific philosophy is absolute critique only in the limited
as a revolutionary force, but it faces the dilemma that any revolutionary force must face.
Once it is successful, every revolution must abolish any possibility of further revolution
or counter-revolution (recall Kafka: “Every revolution evaporates and leaves behind only
the slime of a new bureaucracy. The chains of tormented mankind are made out of red
tape”. Janouch, 1971, pp. 119-20). Any revolutionary force, once successful, must
53
She would (typically) rather find confirmation of her views (and hence comfort and reassurance) in her
31
become fundamentally a non-revolutionary and conservative force;54 its main purpose
becomes safeguarding the house it has successfully built. Its revolutionary venom
expresses itself mainly in safeguarding its victory against opposing forces. This is
something very natural, and we cannot blame modern philosophy, or any other
revolutionary force, on that account. What we can blame modern philosophy for, though,
is its pretension that even after the victory it remains some sort of a revolutionary
minority pitted against endless powerful enemies that are threatening to engulf it from
sees philosophy as a permanent revolutionary force (see Priest, 2006, p. 202).55 Thus,
although he admits that there is a difference between normal and revolutionary science, in
fact – following Khun – he claims that “a certain dogmatism is essential to both the
teaching of science and to its progress” (ibid.). On the contrary, philosophy, claims Priest,
progress in science is not only not essential for philosophy’s progress, but in fact would
undermine the very meaning and existence of philosophy (Priest thinks that when science
is in its revolutionary phases the distinction between philosophy and science becomes
revolutionary force par excellence, became conservative once it established its hegemony; we have only to
look at its current dilemma, where the system’s imperatives require it to move on from an oil-based
economy, but self-entrenched interests refuse to go along with it. This is something part and parcel of
human nature conjoined with the human condition. For a very perceptive review of the future of capitalism
32
enterprise – is not new to Priest, but one would have hoped that Wittgenstein56 and
countless other philosophers might have educated us out of this nonsense. Alas, this is a
vain hope. There is no end to revolutionary pretensions. Martin Wolfson, writing in 1958,
claimed the following, which succinctly captures the mindset of those who believe
why the intellectual life in its true self can be nothing but revolutionary. It is
But even old Kant, who made ‘revolution’ central to his philosophical enterprise, knew
cognition as science (for science must always be dogmatic, i.e., it must prove
has been using for a long time without first inquiring in what way and by
33
procedure of pure reason, without an antecedent critique of its own
capacity.
Once the initial revolutionary task is accomplished, it’s all back to normal. The
argument of this paper has been that philosophy, like any other human activity, can be
conditions. Descartes and Kant were true revolutionaries because they were living in an
age of revolution. But the heirs of Descartes and Kant can’t claim the same, because their
revolution has long-since succeeded, and today they are necessarily apologists of that
system. Again, this not to deny the existence of true revolutionary philosophical
individuals, ideas, and minority traditions, but, firstly, those traditions are by definition
not norms, and, secondly, they don’t belong to the tradition of Descartes and Kant.57
Trotsky of philosophy is doomed. Like any other human activity, philosophy has its
normal and revolutionary periods; what is normal is ‘normal’ philosophy, and not a
revolutionary philosophy.58 Like the sciences, and like human civilisations, revolutionary
57
It’s no wonder that works like After Virtue (McIntyre, 2007 [1981]) belong to the Thomistic tradition and
are compelled to continuously hark back to presumed revolutionary periods of their discipline – for
Heidegger it was going back to the Pre-Socratics, for example. It also explains the certain infatuation with
the mythic figure of Socrates, the martyr of philosophy. But, if we take my account as the correct
34
periods in philosophy are exceptional and far apart. The only way philosophers can
maintain the aura of perpetual revolutionary activity for their trade is by falsely claiming
that, even today, they are a minority, often a persecuted minority (even though the
persecution is not as bad as it used to be: it mainly consists of the occasional closure of
philosophy departments, and in the belief that the philosopher kings of our age are not
given their due or share of power, or those in power don’t heed to their advice as often as
they ‘should’). This self-perception of philosophers that they are a permanent minority
comes out in the following quote from a prominent Kantian, Allen Wood:
The obstacle, now as in the eighteenth century, is simply that the world is
ruled by enemies of this enlightened ethos [i.e., the life of reason and self
interpretation then we can accommodate such figures from the past and in the present without making
philosophy into what it is not: that is, a timeless revolutionary force. Compare this with Karsten Harries,
2001, pp. 47-73, who claims that the origin of philosophy lies “in a sense of homelessness”, and that
“[t]hose who are secure in the knowledge of their place have little need for philosophy, just as those who
think themselves at home are not likely to suffer from homesickness” (p. 61). I can agree with Harries on
this if we add two clauses to his definition: a) that it applies in revolutionary times only; b) such philosophy
is not restricted to any particular content. Modern philosophy and its proponents felt a sense of
‘homelessness’ in the late Middle Ages because they were in fact not at home in that world, and wanted to
build a new world in which they would be at home. But today, when they have built the home, philosophers
can’t pretend that they are still homeless. At most they can worry about the condition of the home, and its
viability in the face of future challenges. On the other hand, those who feel ‘homeless’ in the modern world
are true revolutionaries today even if the ‘content’ of their ideas is very ‘conservative’ by the lights of the
35
“philosophical life” into their real lives. This in turn is because, as Diderot’s
One can say only two things about Wood’s claim here: either his conception of
talking about philosophy in more historical and realistic terms, the claim that
Enlightenment ideals are not ruling force today (at least in the developed world) seems to
me not just not true. Of course, these ideals aren’t absolutely dominant, but absolute
dominance is itself another unrealistic ideal. Of course, the claim that philosophy today
belongs to the ruling party doesn’t mean that there are no internal conflicts between
different groups within the party, and is not to deny that philosophy is a minority within
the ruling party. Gary Malinas explains one form that these internal conflicts take and its
nature succinctly:
they belong. They explore their consequences, test them for consistency, and
compare them with alternatives. At their best, the only master that
36
reasoning carry their own presuppositions and assumptions that are not
examinations of social and institutional norms and the practices based upon
them can put them in conflict with the aims and projects of the institutions
that employ them. These conflicts become poignant when institutions are
ignore.
This, in my view, properly explains some of the internal conflicts that some philosophers
get into from time to time, but they are precisely internal conflicts; alternatives and
strategies which are in contention are almost as a rule internal as well. Such conflicts are
part and parcel of any living system, and there is nothing unique about the modern system
Modern philosophy is one of the ruling forces in the world today,59 and when it
denies its ruling character, its conservative function (conservative relative to the system
as a whole, and not necessarily regarding internal alternatives within the system), it
becomes an ideology; and it is modern philosophy qua ideology and not qua philosophy
that must be rejected. All ideologies are dangerous; especially the ideologies with
revolutionary pretensions. This is a lesson which we have (or should have) learnt from
59
Again, here I’m not making any claim about the relative influence of philosophy in the modern world.
My claim is that it is a group within the ruling party. The internal power struggle of the ruling party doesn’t
concern me here.
37
All ideologies must be seen in perspective. One must not take them too
seriously. One must read them like fairytales which have lots of interesting
things to say but which also contain wicked lies, or like ethical prescriptions
which may be useful rules of thumb but which are deadly when followed to
the letter.
The notion of philosophy as absolute critique is one such fairytale today, and it is doubly
constitutional democracy, etc. Again, this is not necessarily to reject philosophy, science,
or constitutional democracy, but to reject the elements of them which have become
Feyerabend’s discussion of science in this context provides strong support for the
view I have taken in this paper towards modern philosophy. Comparing the different
roles that science played in the 17th and 18th centuries to the one it plays today, he writes:
Any ideology that breaks the hold of a comprehensive system of thought has
on the minds of men contributes to the liberation of man. Any ideology that
reigns without checks and balances is a tyrant who must be overthrown, and
welcomed. It follows that 17th and 18th century science indeed was an
38
bound to remain such an instrument. There is nothing inherent in science or
This exactly parallels my argument in this paper regarding modern philosophy, and
especially the distinction between the role it played when it was a minority revolutionary
force and the role it plays today, when it has become a dominant power (at least) in its
only one among others; even still, it has its own limitations. I have also argued that the
in its character and inherently oppressive, especially in societies (and minority traditions
within modern philosophy) which do not share the historical experiences of 17th- and 18th-
world.
60
For an uncanny resemblance between Feyerabend’s argument here and Karl Popper’s notion of scientific
method as critique see Popper, 1969, pp. 190-192; the difference, however, is that Popper is still enthralled
by the myth of absolute critique while Feyerabend is not: he merely uses it pragmatically.
61
This last claim follows from my discussion of the different roles of internal and external criticism within
modern philosophy.
39
practiced throughout the world, including America and other first-world countries.62 And
something universal and part of the human condition. Reflection and self-reflection,
cultures as the essence of humanity, differentiating humans from other beings, and
philosophy – as the study of this unique capacity and the impulse to develop instruments
society and culture, in order for those communities to survive and develop a human
civilisation imbued with the virtues of honour, courage, self-respect, and independence of
mind.
Despite the role of philosophy as a dominant ideology in today’s world, the bulk
of the philosophical enterprise is not ideological but constructive. This type of philosophy
is necessary to develop the thinking and reflective capacities of individual, society, and
culture. Every society and every culture needs these tools in order to deepen its
understanding of itself and the other: reflectively, independently, and critically. In this
paper, I have used Priest’s views as a foil to develop my argument, but, to be fair to him,
most of his work in philosophy is not ideological at all. It is only when he attempts to
develop his self-understanding of philosophy qua philosophy that part of it comes across
as highly ideological. Priest’s work, especially in logic, is in fact revolutionary; and any
62
One of the reasons for this might be that most philosophers ‘do’ philosophy rather than philosophising
about what it is; so, it might still be the case that they implicitly share the view of philosophy propounded
by Priest, but are not bothered about it much. It might also be possible that Priest’s view is not a majority
view. In a recent excellent collection of essays (perhaps with the exception of Nussbaum and Apel’s
essays) at least Wood seems to share Priest’s view of philosophy (see Ragland and Heidt, 2001).
40
culture would be impoverished if it were to be deprived of such a contribution. What we
need is Priest’s great efforts in logic, not his ideological views about what philosophy is.
Similarly, just to give one more example, the counter-example method used by modern
analytic philosophers should be learnt, and should be part and parcel of the modern
university education system because it is a great tool in enhancing the power of the
imagination,63 which in turn is crucial for developing the capacity to see alternative
scenarios when considering an issue, and consequently for assessing any issues regarding
any subject matter critically and thoughtfully, and arriving at a considered judgement
about it.
We can add on particular examples here, but that is something to be left for
another occasion. What I have tried to do in this paper is to make a case against a
particular conception of philosophy, and to show that it is not the only conception of
philosophy: this, I believe, is the first step towards reasserting the liberating role of
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