The Political Quarterly, Vol. 89, No.

4, October–December 2018

Why Britain Needs a Written Constitution—and

Can’t Wait for Parliament to Write One
BRUCE ACKERMAN

Abstract
The lecture explores basic constitutional choices confronting post-Brexit Britain, emphasising
dilemmas generated by Irish, Scottish, and Welsh demands for home rule. It argues that only
a specially elected Constitutional Convention, independent of Parliament, has the capacity
and legitimacy to hammer out a written constitution that tries to resolve these dilemmas in a
serious way. Once the Convention acts, its proposal should be submitted for approval at a
referendum, but only after special steps are taken to encourage an informed decision by the
electorate. Given the misinformation campaigns provoked by the last referendum, it is time
for Britain to try something new: create a new national holiday, Deliberation Day, at which
voters would be invited to gather at neighbourhood community centres to discuss the Con-
vention’s initiative. A host of social science experiments establish that a day’s deliberation
greatly improves public understanding, enhancing the democratic authority of a Yes vote at
the referendum.
Keywords: Constitutional Convention for the UK, written constitution, home rule for
Scotland and Wales, federalism in the UK, British referenda, Brexit

EVERYBODY IS immersed in Brexit-talk right Britain is at a great historical turning

now. But I’ll be asking you to spend the next
hour detaching yourself from the current
debate—and to join with me in confronting
the constitutional challenges Britain will face
once it reasserts its political independence
from the European Union.
I am more concerned with presenting the
fundamental questions rather than providing
definitive answers. By the end of my talk,
though, I’ll be explaining why my diagnostic
exercise leads me to call for immediate
action. While Theresa May and her succes-
sors struggle with Brexit-related matters for
the next few years, Parliament should enact
a statute creating a specially elected Consti-
tutional Convention to confront the post-
Brexit dilemmas facing Britain, and hammer
out a written constitution for submission to
the voters at a popular referendum.
A modest proposal, undoubtedly. But I
won’t try to defend it till the last part of my
talk. Regardless of its merit, I hope you will
find my exploration of post-Brexit problems
helpful in clarifying your own thoughts on
the subject.
point. Over the last three centuries, these
islands have been at the centre of a great
empire which has, since the American Revo-
lution, been regularly obliged to deal with
colonial efforts to gain independence. But
this time around, the shoe is on the other
foot. The EU is hardly an empire, but it is
the dominant power in Europe, and Britain
is the newly independent country trying to
reorganise itself for constitutional self-
government after deciding to go its own way.
Yet it faces a distinctive problem. For a
variety of historical reasons, the United
Kingdom has muddled its way into in a
curious arrangement in which significant
forms of home rule are extended to the 5
million people living in Scotland, the 3 mil-
lion living in Wales, and the 2 million living
in Ireland, but no home rule is granted to
the 52 million people living in England. Call
this spatially asymmetric federalism.
At the same time, the degree of home rule
enjoyed by the three regions differs very sig-
nificantly. Call this qualitatively asymmetric
federalism.

© The Author 2018. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2018
584 Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
 This double asymmetry generates big
problems. For starters, the House of Com-
mons can change the qualitative terms of
federation whenever it wants to, even
though the English don’t feel the direct con-
sequences of decisions which profoundly
affect the Scots, Irish or Welsh. This leads
the three minorities to organise regional
political parties to defend or expand their
autonomy. If these political parties win most
of their region’s seats in the House of Com-
mons, it is much tougher for the nationally
oriented Conservatives or Labour to form
stable majority governments, especially if
smaller parties like the Liberals win a few
seats as well.
At present, Theresa May’s weak govern-
ment is looked upon as an exception to the
general rule in which a strong Prime Minis-
ter commands the support of a clear parlia-
mentary majority. But over the next decades,
the dynamic of asymmetric federalism may
well make May-type governments far more
common—with the Prime Minister making
ad hoc deals with the regions to win repeated
no-confidence challenges presented by rival
national parties. This wheeling and dealing,
in turn, will lead to long periods of indeci-
siveness, punctuated by moments of angry
protest from alienated English voters who,
disgusted by ad hoc bargains with the region-
alists, are tempted to vote for a demagogic
leader who promises them ‘strong and deci-
sive government’ if they vote his out-party
into power.
This dynamic of political weakness, punc-
tuated by demagogic assertions of strength,
is not only disturbing in itself. It also threat-
ens to undermine traditional understandings
of British citizenship. Over the past three
centuries, most Britons have come to think
of themselves as citizens of something I shall
call an Enlightenment State—where they are
free to live out a rich variety of religious and
cultural lives without endangering their sta-
tus as equal members of the British nation.
This Enlightenment ideal of multi-cultural
citizenship is regularly belied by real-world
practice, but it nevertheless remains a pre-
cious aspect of the British tradition—and it
has been repeatedly challenged by a very
different ideal in many places throughout
the world. Since the early nineteenth cen-
tury, thinkers like Johann Gottfried Herder
WHY BRITAIN NEEDS
© The Author 2018. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2018
and his many followers have contended that
states should give up the aspiration to facili-
tate a broad variety of ways of life, and that
each particular state should dedicate itself to
the preservation of the particular culture
dominant in its region.
I shall call this the mono-cultural ideal of
the state, and it has repeatedly demonstrated
its powerful appeal over the course of the
last century. After the First World War, it
served as the ideological foundation for the
dismemberment of the Hapsburg Monarchy
into Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugosla-
via and then reached a terrible climax in
Nazi claims to cultural hegemony; and we
are seeing its powerful resurgence around
the world today.
It is of the first importance for all of us to
join forces against another outbreak of
mono-cultural militarism, but this lecture
concerns a more subtle danger: Britain isn’t
turning Nazi anytime soon, but its Enlight-
enment ideals could well be eroded by war-
ring mono-culturalisms generated by the
political dynamics of asymmetric federalism.
With the government of Scotland or North-
ern Ireland at the mercy of the English
majority in Westminster, regional parties will
increasingly defend local autonomy by
emphasising the crucial role that home rule
plays in preserving Scottish or Irish identity.
Such mono-cultural defences of home rule
may well encourage cultural nationalists in
the English regions to gain increasing politi-
cal support. As competing mono-cultural
rhetorics increasingly dominate politics, they
will undermine the Enlightenment ideal
which insists that, despite their very real cul-
tural differences, the inhabitants of this coun-
try are prepared to view one another as
equal citizens of Great Britain, prepared
to work together to solve their common
problems.
Instead, the escalating mono-cultural riv-
alry will lead to the rise of a less ambitious
ideal. Call it restrained mono-culturalism:
On this approach, the Scottish people will
grant fundamental rights to Englishmen who
live in their homeland, and vice versa. Nev-
ertheless, even when these non-conformists
are treated with respect, they will find it
increasingly difficult to understand them-
selves as fellow citizens engaged in an
Enlightenment project. Instead, they will
A WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 585
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 89, No. 4
understand themselves as rights-bearing out-
siders living in an increasingly alien foreign
land.
The way to pre-empt the danger of mutual
alienation is by reassuring all sides that the
terms of regional self-government are deeply
entrenched in existing constitutional arrange-
ments, and that they need not engage in
aggressive political organisation to protect
their rights to home rule.
But this reassurance is hard to come by
within the present Westminster structure, in
which the English have an overwhelming
majority of the votes, and the governing
party in the Commons may well find that
cultural nationalism serves its short-term
political interest. How then to avoid a dis-
United Kingdom?
I begin with a proposal that is radical by
British standards, but utterly conventional
everywhere else in the world. Consider the
possibility of transforming Britain’s asym-
metric federalism into a fully symmetric one.
As in Australia or South Africa, Germany or
the United States, why not divide the entire
country into an appropriate number of self-
governing provinces, giving each the same
powers of local self-rule, and limit Westmin-
ster supremacy to issues of truly national
concern.
Standard federalism has a lot to be said
for it in the British context. The dominant
interests and cultures prevailing in
metropolitan London are radically different,
say, from those prevailing in the north west
of England. Putting these different regions
into separate provinces would give each
region’s inhabitants the precious opportunity
to express their cultural differences in a
meaningful politics that transcends the lim-
ited concerns of local councils. To be sure,
the definition of regional boundaries would
be a tricky business. It would be best for all
the provinces to have similar populations,
but this would require metropolitan London
to divide itself up into three parts. It may
well be more sensible to make it a single
province of 15 million and make qualitative
adjustments to assure its fair share of finan-
cial and institutional support.
But I don’t want such problems of imple-
mentation to deflect us from the main point.
Apart from the opportunities for regional
self-government, standard federalism would
586 BRUCE ACKERMAN
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 89, No. 4 © The Author 2018. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2018
help pre-empt the dangers of cultural nation-
alism we have identified. If the central gov-
ernment threatened home rule in Scotland, it
would also be threatening it in the provinces
of Manchester and East Anglia. Rather than
resisting English imperialism in the name of
Scottish nationalism, the Scots would be
more likely to form political alliances with
the British provinces to defend their common
interests against Westminster.
This dynamic would not only support the
Enlightenment tradition of British citizen-
ship. It would also be far more effective in
inducing the House of Commons to respect
the division of powers between region and
nation, since English MPs would now find it
in their own interest to take their con-
stituents’ interests in federalism into account.
Indeed, standard federalism could well give
rise to the decline of regional parties at West-
minster. Once voters were assured that the
national parties will respect federal interests,
they will find it more important to vote
Labour or Tory or Liberal to express their
views on the central issues of national politics,
rather than waste their votes on regional par-
ties who use their Westminster seats to lobby
for matters of merely provincial concern.
But let’s put symmetry aside for a moment
and assume that one or another version of
the status quo will prevail in post-Brexit
Britain. What other steps might be taken to
pre-empt the dangers of weak national gov-
ernment, and increasing ethno-nationalism,
generated by the current set-up?
A familiar answer is to create a federal
Senate to check and balance the centralising
tendencies of the popularly elected House. If
adopted by Britain, this would involve abol-
ishing the Lords and creating an Upper
House that grants Northern Ireland, Scotland
and Wales greater representation than they
deserve on the basis of their populations.
I myself would be reluctant to endorse this
move. Obviously, a great deal depends on
the extent to which the federal Senate should
be permitted to delay or veto initiatives
passed by the Commons. There is a first-rate
literature on this subject and it does suggest
that a well-designed system can often oper-
ate in a constructive fashion.1
Nevertheless, I am more impressed by a
very real problem posed by even the clever-
est designs. Call it the deadlock problem. It
arises when the two Houses are controlled
by different political coalitions who are bitter
rivals—and who use bicameralism as a
weapon to generate an impasse that throws
their competitors out of power in a deeply
problematic fashion. The resulting crisis can
shake the foundations of the entire constitu-
tional order.
British history is replete with such bicam-
eral deadlocks, though they involve the
House of Lords, rather than a federal Senate.
Its political class has been relatively skilful in
resolving them, as in the artful manoeuvring
that finally gave rise to the Parliament Act of
1911. But other places have not be so lucky
in dealing with federalist Senates. Australia
experienced the greatest crisis in its history
during the 1970s, when opponents of the
left-leaning Whitlam government used
bicameral deadlock to expel it from power
despite the fact that Whitlam commanded a
majority in the popularly elected House of
Representatives.2 A similar crisis is currently
exploding in Italy—where the Five Star
Movement, the Northern League, and Silvio
Berlusconi are vying for power after a
bicameral deadlock destroyed the capacity of
the governing left-centre coalition to sustain
its authority. Worse yet, bicameral Germany
may well confront a similar crisis over the
next few years, as the Christian Democrats
and Social Democrats continue to lose
ground to competitors in the Bundesrat.
Given these dangers, I believe that the
UK would be better off, in the middle run,
if it retained a suitably reformed House of
Lords and resisted the temptations of a
federal Senate. At the very least, the dead-
lock problem should lead to a more sympa-
thetic view of the symmetric approach to
federalism I advanced earlier, since the cre-
ation of ten or twelve provinces throughout
the Kingdom will do far more to respond
to underlying pathologies of asymmetric
federalism and does not generate a compa-
rable deadlock problem.
Before passing final judgment, however,
we should add the Supreme Court into the
institutional equation. Perhaps Britain should
reject both a federal Senate and a standard
kind of federalism and rely instead on the
Court to play a leading role in mediating the
conflicts between Westminster and the three
minority regions?
WHY BRITAIN NEEDS
© The Author 2018. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2018
I would hesitate, however, before assign-
ing this task to the courts. This is because
the judges have an even more important job
to do. As Vernon Bogdanor has recently
argued, Brexit will require the courts to con-
front large gaps in traditional British doctri-
nes defining fundamental human rights.3 At
least since the Human Rights Act of 1998,
this has not been their primary concern.
Instead, the judges have focussed most of
their energies on contributing to a European-
wide effort to construct a firm foundation
for the protection of human rights all over
the Continent. But once Britain regains its
independence, the Supreme Court must
devote a large part of its energies to devel-
oping the British tradition of freedom and
fairness in ways that will be responsive to
more contemporary understandings of equal-
ity and human dignity developed in Europe
and elsewhere around the world.
This will be an inevitably controversial
matter, even if the Court’s project of doctri-
nal modernisation is explicitly affirmed by
the formal enactment of a Bill of Rights,
guaranteeing each citizen’s fundamental
right to human dignity.
Since the principle of human dignity was
never self-consciously elaborated in the Bri-
tish tradition, the Supreme Court will have
to define its contours in a series of concrete
cases. As they undertake this task, it will
rapidly become apparent that leading courts
around the world profoundly disagree over
the right doctrinal approach to disputes over
human dignity—Germany and Canada, for
example, have developed sharply conflicting
paradigms.4
This means that the judges won’t be able
to hide behind a ‘universal’ consensus in
developing a British doctrine of dignity.
They will be obliged instead to embark on a
series of highly controversial decisions, with
rival majority and minority opinions picking
and choosing amongst rival positions as the
Court slowly develops its own distinctive
approach to highly sensitive subjects. This
will make it particularly vulnerable to politi-
cal attack.
Since the Court must play an absolutely
essential role in defining and protecting fun-
damental rights, I think that it should save
its political capital to deal with these chal-
lenges—and that it should not compound its
A WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 587
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 89, No. 4
legitimation problems by forcefully interven-
ing on the federalism front as well.
To be sure, it won’t be possible to design
a plausible British Constitution without pro-
viding for a significant judicial role in medi-
ating tensions between centre and periphery.
But the priority of the Court’s rights-protec-
tion mission suggests the wisdom of relying
on other devices—like symmetry and federal
Senates—to do the heavy lifting over the
middle-run.
*****
As should be clear by now, there isn’t a
single magical answer to Britain’s constitu-
tional dilemmas—which leads me to a final
question: how should the country organise
itself to make the big decisions that will
shape its constitutional future?
Since I’ve been emphasising the complex-
ity of trade-offs till now, I hope you will for-
give me a bit of dogmatism on this issue. I
believe that there is one, and only one way,
for Britain to take charge of its constitutional
future—and that’s by taking the issue away
from Parliament and electing a special Con-
stitutional Convention to present a proposal
for approval by the British people at a spe-
cial referendum, after special steps are taken
to assure an informed decision by the voters
on the key issues.
My argument against parliamentary con-
trol is straightforward. The past half-century
has demonstrated that British Prime Minis-
ters—from Edward Heath through Harold
Wilson through Margaret Thatcher through
Tony Blair through David Cameron—have
systematically subordinated long-run issues
of constitutional design to short-run issues of
party management in the House of Com-
mons. There is no reason to think that
Theresa May’s successors will be any differ-
ent. To the contrary, they will be so over-
whelmed with the challenges of managing
Brexit over the next few years that they will
have little time left for anything else.
So, the only option with half a chance of
success is to call a Constitutional Convention
to debate the long-term, big picture issues—
and come up with a sensible solution. Elec-
tions to the Convention should not be con-
ducted in the standard single-member
district, winner-takes-all fashion. Instead,
political parties and other citizens’ groups
should be asked to present a slate of
588 BRUCE ACKERMAN
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 89, No. 4 © The Author 2018. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2018
candidates to the nation as a whole. The top
candidates on each slate will gain election in
direct proportion to the slate’s share of the
popular vote. This system—called ‘closed list
proportional representation’—has often been
deployed successfully in many countries. In
this particular context, it will encourage the
choice of candidates who can, on the basis of
their past performance, persuade British vot-
ers that they are worthy of their trust in
undertaking such a fateful enterprise. Given
the different interests and values at stake,
it’s virtually certain that no single slate will
win anything like 51 per cent of the vote.
Instead, the top candidates from different
slates will be obliged to take competing
views seriously as they try to hammer out a
sensible solution. This is a good thing, not a
bad thing, when fundamental issues of con-
stitutional design are at stake.
The Convention should be given a dead-
line for decision, but there is no need for a
rush. After all, Parliament will be attending
to business as usual. The Prime Minister and
her government will also be trying to influ-
ence Convention decisions. This is perfectly
fine, since they too have a mandate from the
voters. But at the end of the day, the deci-
sive question for Convention delegates is not
whether they will please the Prime Minister,
but whether they can convince ordinary citi-
zens to approve their proposed Constitution
at the coming referendum. A Yes vote will
not only add lustre to the delegates’ careers
and propel them into national prominence; it
will assure them a place in British history for
a very long time to come. If such a glorious
prospect doesn’t encourage them to rise
above the petty politics of the moment, noth-
ing will—especially if steps are taken to
encourage the voters to engage in a similar
effort at public-spirited engagement when
the time comes to cast their ballots at a refer-
endum. After the terrible mis-information
campaigns in the last referendum, I would
hope that public opinion on all sides would
support a reform that would prevent a repe-
tition of the same sad performance the next
time around.
In a book written with Jim Fishkin,5 I
make the case for a new national holiday,
Deliberation Day, to be held a couple of
weeks before referenda, which would
encourage ordinary citizens to discuss the
key issues at community centres throughout
the country.
Deliberation Day would begin with a
familiar sort of televised debate between the
leading defenders and critics of the Conven-
tion’s proposal. But after the show ends,
local citizens take charge as they engage the
main issues in small discussion groups of fif-
teen and larger plenary assemblies. The
small groups begin where the national
debate leaves off. Each group spends an
hour defining questions that the national
spokesmen left unanswered.
Everybody then proceeds to a plenary ses-
sion at which they join 500 other voters in
the neighbourhood to hear their questions
answered by local representatives of the Yes
and No sides. After lunch, they repeat the
morning procedure. By the end of the day,
participants will have moved far beyond the
top-down television debate of the morning.
Through a deliberative process of question-
and-answer, they will achieve a bottom-up
understanding of the constitutional issues
confronting the nation. Discussions begun on
Deliberation Day will continue during the
run-up to referendum day, drawing those
who did not attend into the escalating
national dialogue.
My proposal for Deliberation Day is based
on 108 social science experiments in twenty-
eight countries that my friend Fishkin,
together with his Stanford colleagues, have
conducted over the past twenty years.6 He
calls them Deliberative Polls, and they
involve a random sample of several hundred
citizens spending a day or two deliberating
on major issues of the day. Fishkin has con-
vincingly established that participants
greatly increase their understanding of the
issues and often change their minds on the
best course of action. Swings of 10 percent-
age points or more are very common. No
less important, people leave with a more
confident sense of their ability as citizens to
contribute constructively to political life.
A deliberative poll conducted held in Aus-
tralia in 1999 is most suggestive for present
purposes. It was held in response to a pro-
posal, advanced by a Constitutional Conven-
tion, to transform the country into a
republic. Before voters went to the polls to
decide the matter at a referendum, 347 Aus-
tralians came to Canberra for a Deliberative
WHY BRITAIN NEEDS
© The Author 2018. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2018
Poll, to engage in a structured discussion like
the one I set out for Deliberation Day. The
Australians invited to Canberra were
selected through rigorous statistical tech-
niques which assured that they were broadly
representative of the general voting public.
As discussion proceeded, they increasingly
favoured the proposal advanced by the
majority at the Constitutional Convention. In
contrast, a separate survey of the broader
public revealed that, while it was bom-
barded by mass media campaigns, it was far
less informed when the time came to cast
ballots on referendum day. While the Can-
berra deliberators had voted a strong Yes at
the end of their poll, the general public
voted No at the referendum.
Of course, Australia in 1999 is light years
removed from Britain in 2018. For present
purposes, I have no interest in debating
whether the Brexit referendum would have
come out the same way if it had been pre-
ceded by a day of deliberation. The aim of
this lecture has been to urge you to look for-
wards, not backwards. Nevertheless, given
recent experience with the Brexit referen-
dum, Deliberation Day certainly deserves a
try.
Of course, even if it were adopted, the
new holiday will only assure a much more
informed vote on referendum day. It hardly
guarantees a Yes vote. But even a No
hardly suggests that the exercise had been a
failure. To the contrary, it would have
vastly clarified the contours of constitutional
choice, setting the stage for a rerun of the
process with greater prospects for success.
Once again, there should be another call for
elections to another Convention, which
would make another proposal to place
before the voters in another deliberative ref-
erendum. The challenge for the second Con-
vention is clear enough: can they hammer
out a new proposal that takes account of
the principal objections that defeated the
old one?
There is reason for optimism here. While
Britain has lots of problems, it also has a
great tradition of problem-solving. But if the
second proposal goes down, it would be
time to call it quits, and return the matter to
direct parliamentary control.
By that point, three or four years will have
passed, and the Brexit clouds may have
A WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 589
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 89, No. 4
begun to lift, permitting Westminster to take
the issue with greater seriousness. Even on
this pessimistic scenario, the Convention
experiment should count as a noble failure—
since the Westminster effort at a solution
would be profoundly shaped by the course
of the preceding constitutional debate.
In contrast, if Britain never goes down the
Convention path, the ultimate outcome may
well be far worse—with the dynamics of
asymmetric federalism generating a persis-
tent pattern of weak coalition government at
Westminster, punctuated by competing cul-
tural nationalisms that may ultimately
destroy the hard-won ideals of multi-cultural
Enlightenment citizenship expressed by the
British tradition.
In accepting the Institute’s kind invitation,
I have taken this opportunity to speak as an
American who has spent much of his life
studying my country’s deep debt to the Bri-
tish constitutional tradition. This lecture is
one small way to repay this debt. But it is
for you, not me, to decide whether my diag-
nosis is sufficiently compelling to motivate
some of you to spend the time and energy
required to organise a broad popular move-
ment for a Constitutional Convention that
could gain the serious attention of Parlia-
ment.
Thank you very much.
590 BRUCE ACKERMAN
The Political Quarterly, Vol. 89, No. 4 © The Author 2018. The Political Quarterly © The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd. 2018
Notes
This is the text of the Annual Lecture of the Insti-
tute for the Humanities and Social Sciences at
Queen Mary University of London, delivered on 3
May 2018.
1 See G. Tsebelis and J. Money, Bicameralism,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997;
J. Waldron, ‘Bicameralism and the separation of
powers’, Current Legal Problems, vol. 65, no. 1,
2012, pp. 31–57.
2 B. Lim, Australia’s Constitution After Whitlam,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017.
3 V. Bogdanor, ‘How Brexit will erase your
rights’, Prospect Magazine, 18 April 2018;
https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/
how-brexit-will-erase-your-rights (accessed 21
May 2018).
4 See A. Barak, Human Dignity: The Constitutional
Value and the Constitutional Right, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2015, a book by the
long-time Chief Justice of the Israeli Supreme
Court, who describes the Canadian and German
case law in the course of elaborating his very dif-
ferent approach, which also has had a powerful
influence on judicial developments elsewhere.
5 B. Ackerman and J. Fishkin, Deliberation Day,
New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 2004.
6 J. Fishkin, Democracy When the People Are Think-
ing, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018, for
recent findings from deliberative polling, and a
discussion of their deployment in concrete deci-
sion-making contexts.
Copyright of Political Quarterly is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be
copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's
express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for
individual use.