Block 1

BPYG-172
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
SCHOOL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY AND TRANS-DISCIPLINARY STUDIES

(SOITS)
INDIRA GANDHI NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY

NEW DELHI
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EXPERT COMMITTEE
Prof. V. T. Sebastian,
Visiting Professor, JNU Dr. Ruplekha Khullar
& Professor of Philosophy, Punjab Department of Philosophy
University, Chandigarh Janki Devi Memorial College,
University of Delhi
Dr. Sudnya N. Kulkarni,

Department of Philosophy Dr. Meeta Nath,
Janki Devi Memorial College, Department of Philosophy
University of Delhi Ramajs College, University of Delhi
Dr. Amit Kumar Pradhan, Dr. Garima Mani Tripathi

Department of Philosophy Department of Philosophy Mata Sundri
Ramjas College, University of Delhi College for Women, University of Delhi
Dr. Bins Sebastian, Dr. Vijay Kumar

Department of Philosophy Department of Philosophy, Shyama Prasad
St. Stephen’s College, Mukherjee College for Women,
University of Delhi University of Delhi
Mr. Sumesh M. K. Ms. Priyam Mathur,

Department of Philosophy Consultant (Philosophy),
Faculty of Arts, University of Delhi SOITS, IGNOU
SOITS FACULTY
Prof. Nandini Sinha Kapur, Prof. B. Rupini, Prof. Shubhangi Vaidya,

Dr. Sadananda Sahoo
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COURSE PREPARATION TEAM
BLOCK UNIT WRITER

Block 1 Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion
Unit 1 Meaning and Nature of Religion Thomas Muppathinchira
Unit 2 Theories of the Origin of Religion Antony Kalathil
Unit 3 Religion, Philosophy of Religion, and Theology Ariba Zaidi
Unit 4 Religious Language Augustine Mundiath
Unit 5 Religious Experience George Antony
Block 2 Problem of Affirming God’s Existence
Unit 6 Different Conceptions of God Preeti Rani
Unit 7 Nature and Attributes of God Alok Nag
Unit 8 Traditional Arguments for God’s Existence Savio D’Souza
Unit 9 The Problem of Evil Himanshu Parcha
Unit 10 Challenges of Atheism and Agnosticism Joy Kachappilly
Block 3 Religious Pluralism
Unit 11 Religious Pluralism and Secularism Augustine Perumalil
Unit 12 Religious Fundamentalism Mary Paul
Unit 13 Inter-religious Dialogue J. A. Carvalho
Unit 14 Contemporary Debates Himanshu Parcha
CONTENT EDITORS
Dr. Sudnya N. Kulkarni, Janki Devi Memorial College, Delhi
Dr. Shriddha Shah, Hindu College, University of Delhi
Dr. Tarang Kapoor, Daulat Ram College, University of Delhi
FORMAT EDITORS
Prof. Nandini Sinha Kapur, SOITS, IGNOU, New Delhi
Dr. Ashutosh Vyas, Consultant (Philosophy), SOITS, IGNOU, New Delhi
PROGRAMME COORDINATOR
Prof. Nandini Sinha Kapur, SOITS, IGNOU, New Delhi
Academic Consultation: Dr. Ashutosh Vyas, Consultant (Philosophy), SOITS, IGNOU
PRODUCTION TEAM
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Content
Block 1 Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion
Unit 1 Meaning and Nature of Religion
Unit 2 Theories of the Origin of Religion
Unit 3 Religion, Philosophy of Religion, and Theology
Unit 4 Religious Language
Unit 5 Religious Experience
Block 2 Problem of Affirming God’s Existence
Unit 6 Different Conceptions of God
Unit 7 Nature and Attributes of God
Unit 8 Traditional Arguments for God’s Existence
Unit 9 The Problem of Evil
Unit 10 Challenges of Atheism and Agnosticism
Block 3 Religious Pluralism
Unit 11 Religious Pluralism and Secularism
Unit 12 Religious Fundamentalism
Unit 13 Inter-religious Dialogue
Unit 14 Contemporary Debates
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COURSE INTRODUCTION
One of the relevant fields of philosophy is “Philosophy of Religion.” It is the philosophical
thinking about religion. In this sense, it differs from religious philosophy, which is the
philosophical thinking that is inspired and directed by religion, such as Christian
philosophy and Islamic philosophy. It’s scope is not merely limited to questions related to
the existence of God, but goes beyond all this and deals even with questions like, ‘Who is
the God that one believes in?,’ ‘What is the God that I believe like?’, and so on. The
whole thrust of this discipline is looking at religion from a philosophical point of view,
going into the rationality of religion. Philosophy of religion explores some social and
personal practices as well. A vast number of people are affected in some way by the
phenomenon of religion. Philosophy of religion, therefore, is existentially relevant; its
subject matter is not all abstract theory. It has to do with our everyday practices in which
we involve ourselves.
This Course consists of three blocks further subdivided into fourteen units.
Block 1 introduces the course that we are going to pursue by looking into the nature, the
problems involved in defining religion, the various theories that are proposed regarding the
origin of religion, the difference among religion, theology and philosophy of religion. This
block also studies the role of language in the expression of our belief or disbelief in God,
concept of religious language and the concept of religious experience.
Block 2 deals with the various conceptions of God, the nature and attributes of God,
various traditional arguments that affirm the existence of God, the problem of evil and
finally deals with the problem of atheism and theism,
Block 3 familiarizes us with the modern trends in philosophy of religion like the
religious pluralism, secularism religious fundamentalism and the inter-religious dialogue
and also gives an overview of contemporary debates in the philosophy of religion.
These units will clarify the notion of religion from a philosophical or critical perspective
and in a way it may allow us to give a rational explanation to one’s religious stance.
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BPYG-171
Block 1
Introduction to the Philosophy of

Religion
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Block Introduction
The question of the origin of religion, perhaps, is as old as the question of the origin of
human itself. The human mind by its very nature is reflective, no matter how
undeveloped it might be. In the cultures of India and Greece matters of religion have been
well-debated since the beginning of their history. The Upanishads and other literatures
testify to this fact. Although a philosophical discussion on this notion is a later one, religion
had its place in human life in its primitive and unorganized form. Etymologically, the
word ‘religion’ is derived from the Latin root religare and it means ‘to bind fast’. Then
‘religion’ has certainly a strong emphasis on community aspect. It is something that binds
fast the members of religion together. But a general definition, which is accepted by all, is
very difficult and involves a series of problems. Religion as a whole is looked at from
various angles like: Historical, Psychological, Sociological, Ethical and Aesthetical
perspectives.
This block, consisting of five units, will deliberate on the nature, the definition of religion,
present a comparison among religion, philosophy of religion and theology, studies the
theories that are put forward for the origin of religion, the concept and nature of religious
language and religious experience.
Unit 1 studies the Meaning and Nature of Religion. The question of religion is a very
complex one. Hence in this unit we will be looking at the etymological meaning and then at
different meanings that are connoted by the term religion.
Unit 2 looks at some of the Theories of the Origin of Religion from the naturalistic,
anthropological, psychological, social, socio-political point of views and in last this unit will
present a critical exposition on these various theories related to the origin of religion.
Unit 3 deals with the elements of religion, and tries to present that Religion, Philosophy of
Religion, and Theology have separate provinces. This unit also throws light on their
interrelationship.
Unit 4 gives us an overall view of Religious Language. It studies the possibility of religious
language as a sacred substance, the words as sacred, and the role of the speaker and the
hearer, the medium and the context, the functions of the language. Beginning with the three
traditional ways of approaching religious language, this unit studies some of the theological
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predicates, the possibility of verifying the theological statements.
Unit 5 deals with the preliminary analysis of religious experience. Here we will study the
meaning and nature of religious experience with the study of the views of two eminent
thinkers William James and Rudolf Otto on Religious Experience. William James analyzed
the religious experience mainly from the psychological point of view and Rudolf Otto tried
to bring out the aspects of Divinity and religious experience, which according to him go
beyond the rational and deductive method or enquiry.
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UNIT 1 MEANING AND NATURE OF RELIGION*
Structure
1.0 Objectives
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Meaning of Religion
1.3 Nature of Religion
1.4 Developmental Stages of Religion
1.5 Let Us Sum Up
1.6 Key Words
1.7 Further Readings and References
1.8 Answers to Check Your Progress
1.0 OBJECTIVES
In this unit we will try to understand

• the etymological meaning of religion,
• different meanings of religion from the background of various disciplines like
phenomenology, sociology, psychology etc.,
• nature and the developing stages of religions.
1.1 INTRODUCTION
What is religion? This is a very complex question! Religion is an intrinsic part of our lived
reality, but, how do we explain or define religion? There are many theories proposed
regarding the origin of religion, that have emerged in part, as a result of the differences in
the understanding of the development of the mind as either speculative, intellectual, or
scientific. However, in spite of the differences in the understanding of this important
*
Thomas Muppathinchira, Darsana Institute, Wardha.
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element, it is generally accepted that religion is purely a human activity, and it has become
an inevitable aspect of human life. In the West, with the dominance of the inherited
tradition of the Judeo-Christian faiths, religion is largely understood theistically, while in
the East, it is mostly seen as a response to the experience of the natural powers that are
beyond human control, although both take into account the inner urge for an ethical, and
moral reference with regards to the practice of religion.
1.2 MEANING OF RELIGION
Etymologically, the word ‘religion’ is derived from the Latin root religare and it means ‘to
bind fast’, thus establishing that religion certainly has a strong emphasis on the community
and society. It is meant to be something that binds the members of a community together.
When we start thinking seriously about religion, we naturally ponder about the definition of
religion. There are numerous definitions of religion. The different points of view based on
whether a sociological, psychological, political, or any combination of these, and other
perspectives is being espoused, influences the meaning and understanding of religion.
Some definitions are phenomenological, and try to expose the common elements that we
see in the acknowledged world religions. For example, ‘the human recognition of a
superhuman power entitled to obedience and worship’. Some others are interpretative
definitions. Under this we may group the psychological definitions – the feelings, acts and
experiences of the individual men, in so far as they consider themselves to stand in relation
to what they may call the divine; sociological definitions– a set of beliefs, practices and
institutions which men have evolved in various societies; naturalistic definitions – a body
of scruples which impede the free exercise of our faculties; and spiritual definitions –
religion is the recognition that everything in the world is the manifestation of a power that
is beyond human intellect.
None of these definitions, nevertheless, are complete and exhaustive. The word religion is
not an exclusive word, rather it is inclusive. It includes manifold elements and aspects of
life like beliefs, feelings, experiences, values, symbols, worship, rituals, festivals, cult and
cultures, myth and mythology.
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Studying the primitive religion, the anthropologist Sir E.B. Tylor in his book Primitive
Culture gives a short definition of religion where he understands religion as “the belief in
spiritual beings.” There are many objections raised against such an understanding of
religion on the basis of its incompleteness. The critics argue that ‘besides belief, practice
also must be emphasised.
Another objection is that the faith, belief, and practices are not always towards spiritual
beings, our scope of definition must be extended and widened to include even ‘nothing’.
However, there are also positive sides in looking at religion from this perspective. It makes
the religious attitude of the believers quite clear, and also the object to which the believers
refer to. According to another anthropologist Sir J.G. Frazer, as presented in his book the
Golden Bough, religion is a ‘propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which
are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life’. This shows that
powers referred to in this context are always of superior nature (superior to man). To cope
with this supra-human powers, it is argued ancient religion made use of magic, sorcery,
taboos, myth and mythological stories, and so on. Philosophically, religion is seen as
offering a diagnosis of the human condition in the world, and it also, offers a path towards
remedying that condition.
1.3 NATURE OF RELIGION
1.3.1 The Primitive Forms of Religion

Religion is often spoken in relation to something sacred. There is no religion without
having such a notion. The various aspects/ concepts used to express the general
characteristics of this ‘sacred’ in terms of traditional anthropological analysis in the
primitive religions were very simple. The notions like ‘unseen’, ‘unknown’, ‘infinite’
‘immanence and transcendence’ etc. are not generally found in these faiths. Scholars trace
the following general characteristics of the ‘sacred’ which may explain the nature of it in
the primitive thought.
i) The sacred as the forbidden: Polynesian term ‘taboo’ in the primitive religions
could be one that comes close, and conveys the sense of ‘sacred’ – sacer and sanctus. This
points to the idea that something is ‘marked off’ as to be shunned, thus, an enforced sense
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of mystic sanction or penalty, if avoided. Due to this aspect of sanction and punishment
added, taboo comes to stand for un-cleanliness and sin on the one hand, and while it can
also be interpreted as means of self-protection, against defying the norms of the sacred, on
the other hand.
ii) The sacred as the mysterious: What was strange and new was treated in the earlier
times, as sacred, having a non-normal nature. It cannot be called abnormal, rather it was
non-normal nature. It was seen as mysterious, something beyond the human grasp, human
understanding, and control.
iii) The sacred as the secret: The sacred was also understood as having a mystic and
mysterious power, and therefore, it was something secret. This sense of secret was
emphasized, and projected strongly through the insistence on practices of initiation,
exclusion of women etc. from the religious moments of rites and rituals.
iv) The sacred as potent: Perhaps one of the positive and most fundamental
conceptions of the sacred is that the efficacy of the sacred is identified with the magical and
mystical power attributed to it. Everything is understood as having an indwelling potency,
but whatever is sacred manifests this potency to an extra-ordinary degree.
v) The sacred as the animate: There is a lot of evidence to suggest that the primitive
gods were conceived as personified, anthropomorphic characters, dwelling somewhere
apart.
vi) The sacred as ancient: Another element found in primitive religions is the practice
of ancestor worship. Ancestor worship is found even in various other religions such as the
Chinese primitive religions, and aspects of Hinduism as well.
1.3.2 Higher Forms of Religion

Religion has evolved over time, and it has largely been in response to the demands of
modern thought. Certain concepts, and practices have developed over time in need to
satisfy the life of the modern man. Some of the motive forces that urged for a different
presentation of religion could be:-
i) The rapid progress of scientific knowledge and thought;
ii) Changes in the social order of man;
iii) A deeper intellectual interest in the subject; and

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iv) The modern tendencies to avoid magic and mystery, and to substitute it with more
rational and scientific thought. The higher forms of religion discuss reality in terms
of transcendence, oneness, supremacy and absoluteness, and also about the ethical
schemes in relation to social unity and harmony, justice, human destiny, human
freedom, etc.
The ethical element is of fundamental importance in determining the development of a

religion. It is a powerful factor in elevating the object of worship, the religious relation, and
the religious life. Another important aspect that religion is concerned with is the problem of
eschatology. It is related to the ultimate destiny of man, and the world. Eschatological
motives may powerfully affect the working of religion. Major world faiths such as
Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism, and Sikhism have strong eschatological
articulations.
We see different approaches to God and religion; from a negative perspective, we see the
trend of atheism. It is the belief that there is no God of any kind. Another perspective is
agnosticism, which literally means ‘not-knowing’, which implies we are unable to affirm
or deny the existence of God. Still another stand is scepticism. This approach simply means
doubting – we cannot have certainty about anything in the world, then, obviously, we
cannot speak with surety about metaphysical and abstract realities. There is still another
perspective of naturalism. According to this theory, every aspect of human existence, and
experience, including moral and religious life could be adequately explained in terms of
our understanding of nature. Coming to the more affirmative approaches to God and
religion, deism refers to the view according to which, this universe was created and set in
motion by a God and then left alone to operate. The deists teach that natural theology is
enough to explain religious matters. Finally, though perhaps not the last, a stand commonly
understood is that of theism. It refers to a particular doctrine concerning the nature of God
and its relationship to the universe. It conceives of God as personal, and active in the
governance and organization of the world and the universe.
Check Your Progress I
Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.
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1. What is the meaning of religion?
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2. What are the various ways of defining religion?

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1.4 DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES OF RELIGION
Religion has taken various forms in its development, and it is necessary to investigate some
of these forms, in order to understand religion better. These forms of religion can be
enumerated as Totemism, Animism, Pantheism, Polytheism, Monotheism, and Monism.
The essential feature of totemism is the belief in a supernatural connection between a

group of people, and objects such as certain animal species, plants, or more rarely some
other thing. Usually there is a taboo on killing or eating an animal totem. Animism denotes
the belief that everything which has life or motion also has a soul or spirit, and all natural
phenomena are caused by direct personal agency.
The theistic tradition recognizes and accepts the existence of God. Theism is often
understood as a synonym for monotheism, though that is not the case. Theism manifests
itself in several forms. Pantheism is ‘God-is-all-ism’. According to this view all is God
and God is all. God is identical with the world and nature. In other words, God and
universe are one. God is not a reality separate from the world and remote from it. The
particular individual objects have no absolute existence of their own, rather they are either
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the different modes of the universal substance, or parts of the divine whole. Polytheism is
the belief in and worship of many individual Gods. Indeed, it was the result of the
anthropomorphic personification of the natural powers that were believed to be beyond the
control of humans. Monotheism is the belief in one supreme God, whereas, Monism is the
belief in one reality, and does not necessarily involve the conception of a personal God.
1.5 LET US SUM UP

Religion being an undeniable aspect of human life, any study on human life will remain half
done if it is not taken into consideration. Religion is studied from different perspectives, and
it could be investigated from sociological, anthropological, phenomenological,
philosophical, ethical, and aesthetic perspectives. In the contemporary scenario there is an
added scope, that is, the field of comparative religion. It is an urgent need, and a demand of
the present world community, to promote mutual, mature and unprejudiced understanding of
others, and their religions. We are living in a world marked by globalization, that
consistently brings up predicaments for peaceful co-existence. In such a scenario, it becomes
imperative for us to understand and accept the plural ways of living, and religions across the
world. Such forms of knowledge can mitigate prejudices, and promote an integrated way of
living with other communities.
Check Your Progress II

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer
b) Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit
1. What are the various forms of the evolution of religion?
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2. Why is the study of religion, especially the comparative study of religion relevant and
urgently needed today?
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1.6 KEY WORDS
Agnosticism : it means ‘not-knowing’ which implies that we are not able to affirm or deny
the existence of God.
Animism : it the belief that everything which has life or motion also has a soul or spirit.
Atheism : it is the belief that there is no God of any kind.
Deism : it means this universe was created and set in motion by a God, and left alone to
operate.
Monism: it is the belief in the existence of only one reality.
Monotheism : it is belief in one supreme God.
Naturalism : it means every aspect of human existence, and experience including moral and
religious life could be adequately explained in terms of our understanding of nature.
Pantheism : it is ‘God-is-all-ism’, which means that all is God, and God is all, and God is
not a reality separate from the world and remote from it.
Polytheism : it is the belief in and worship of many individual Gods.
Scepticism : it means doubting. That means, we cannot have certainty about anything,
either of material or of spiritual things.
Totemism : it is the belief in a supernatural connection between a group of people, and
objects like certain animal species, sometimes plants, or more rarely some other things.
1.7 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Charlesworth, Max. Philosophy and Religion: from Plato to Postmodernism. England: One
World Pub., 2006.
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Hastings, James. Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Vols. 12. New York: T 7 T Clark,
1980. Hick, John H. Philosophy of Religion. 4th Edition. Delhi: Pearson Education Pte. Ltd.,
1990.
Nayak, G.C. Understanding Religious Phenomenon. Bangalore: Dharmaram Pub., 1997.

Schleiermacher, Friederich. On Religion. London: Harper Tochbook, 1958.
Smith, Huston. The Religions of Man. New York: Harper and Row Pub., 1958.
Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. The Meaning and End of Religions: a Revolutionary Approach to
the Great Religious Traditions. London: SPCK, 1978.
Thiselton, Anthony C. A Concise Encyclopaedia of the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford:

One World Pub., 2006.
1.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Answers to Check Your Progress I
1. The word ‘religion’ is derived from the Latin root religare and it means ‘to bind
fast’, thus establishing that religion certainly has a strong emphasis on the
community and society. It is meant to be something that binds the members of a
community together.
What we call religion is very complex and inclusive. It includes manifold elements
and aspects of life like beliefs, feelings, experiences, values, symbols, worship,
rituals, festivals, cult and cultures, myth and mythology.
2. The different ways of defining religion are phenomenological, psychological,
sociological, naturalistic, and religious.
Answers to Check Your Progress II
1. The various forms of the evolution of religion are - Totemism, Animism, Pantheism,
Polytheism, Monotheism, Monism.
2. We are living in a world marked by globalization, that consistently brings up

predicaments for peaceful co-existence. We encounter elements of social unrest and
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atrocities on the basis of religion in every part of the world. It is due to the fanatic
thoughts that creep into the minds of people due to sheer ignorance about the true
teachings of both one’s own religion, and of other religions. In such a scenario, it
becomes imperative for us to understand and accept the plural ways of living, and
religions across the world. Such forms of knowledge can mitigate prejudices, and
promote an integrated way of living with other communities. Hence it is relevant and
much needed in the modern world.
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UNIT 2 THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION*
Structure
2.0 Objectives
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Naturalistic Origin of Religion
2.3 Anthropological Origin of Religion
2.4 Psychological Origin of Religion
2.5 Social Origin of Religion
2.6 Socio-political Origin of Religion
2.7 Critical Exposition
2.8 Let Us Sum Up
2.9 Key Words
2.0 OBJECTIVES
The main objective of this unit is to present an overview of some popular vantage points from
which the origin of Religion has been discussed and theorized. By the end of this Unit you
should be able to become conversant with the theories concerning the,
• Naturalistic,
• Anthropological,
• Psychological,
• Social, and
• Socio-political origins of Religion.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
*
Antony Kalathil, Assisi Ashram, Kottayam. (This unit is a revised version of Units ‘Theories of the origin
of Religion-I’ and “Theories of the origin of Religion- II’ of BPYE-001 compiled by Mahak Uppal,
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Hindu College, University of Delhi.)
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In the secular-based theories concerning its origin, religion is viewed as an empirical entity
that can be traced historically and mapped geographically, such that all religions are regarded
as being human creations whose history is part of the wider history of human culture.
Thinkers subscribing to this view trace the development of the concept of religion by
identifying it as a clear and bounded historical phenomenon. They speculate that the first
religions were a response to human fear, and were established to give people a feeling of
security in an insecure world, and a feeling of control over the environment where there was
otherwise little or no control. Here we shall deal with naturalistic, anthropological,
psychological, sociological, and sociopolitical theories of the origin of religion.
2.2 NATURALISTIC ORIGIN OF RELIGION
From Enlightenment onwards there have been several attempts at giving a naturalistic
account for the genesis of religion. Why is it that people in almost all societies seem to
believe in the existence of invisible supernatural beings that may influence human life for
good or ill and whom it is advisable to pray to or propitiate? And why have almost all
societies developed rituals, both elaborate and demanding, in connection with such beliefs?
Despite much discussion, general agreement on answers to such questions has hardly
emerged.
Ernst Haeckel (1834 – 1919), a scientist turned philosopher, came to be identified as one of
the pioneers of the naturalistic theory of the origin of religion. He held that the discoveries of
nineteenth century science present a solution to the enigmas that have perplexed mankind
over the centuries. He regarded his view as “monistic” in its essence, as it stood in opposition
to all “dualisms” which drew distinctions between God and nature, soul and body, spirit and
matter. Haeckel believed that there is only a single substance and it manifests itself both as
matter and energy or body and spirit. Every material atom has a rudimentary soul which is far
below the level of consciousness. In the course of evolution, the rudimentary psychical
character of substance gradually advances to consciousness which, according to him, is a
purely natural phenomenon. “Monism”, in Haeckel’s understanding, therefore implied that
there is no matter without spirit or energy, and no spirit without matter.
This monism is founded on the demonstrable results of science and pledges to solves the
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riddles of existence. It gives negative answers to the traditional problems of God, freedom
and immortality, suggesting that the very ideas of God, freedom and immortality are in fact
based on a mistaken dualism. It tells us that there can be no God apart from the universe. An
invisible God who thinks, speaks, and acts is considered to be an impossible conception. In
the monistic deterministic cosmos, there appears to be no room for the immortality of the soul
or the freedom of the will.
2.3 ANTHROPOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF RELIGION
The naturalistic interpretation of religion gained support from the developments in the
discipline of anthropology as well. The ideas of Edward Burnett Tylor (1832 – 1917) inspired
other thinkers like James George Frazer (1854 – 1941) and Salomon Reinach (1858 – 1932)
to formulate the anthropological theory of the origin of religion.
Tylor began with two assumptions: (1) that human culture (including knowledge, arts,
religion, customs, etc.) has certain laws of its own, which can be studied scientifically, such
that just like in nature, in culture too we can find the uniform action of uniform causes; and
(2) that the varied kinds of cultures found across the human race can be identified as stages in
an ongoing process of development or evolution. Apart from these assumptions, another idea
to which he drew attention was the phenomenon of ‘survival’. He believed that an idea or a
custom, once it gets established, tends to persist and survive, to the extent that it may
continue to penetrate into the later stages of cultural development, despite having the
tendency of losing its original meaning and significance. Tylor’s main contribution came in
the form of his theory of “animism’, i.e., the belief in spiritual beings. He explained that on
being confronted with the phenomena such as death, sleep, dreams etc., the primitive man
accounted for them in terms of a spirit separable from the body. These ‘Spirits’ were believed
to animate almost all aspects of nature, with some of them occupying the ranks of powerful
deities as well. Since these spirits were supposed to control events and to affect human
lives, it was natural and expected of humans to revere and seek to propitiate them. According
to Tylor this is how the very beginnings of religion might have originated, with the belief in
such ‘spiritual’ and ‘animated’ beings as its minimal condition. As far as the higher, more
sophisticated forms of religions was concerned, Taylor asserted that they too developed out
of the matrix of primitive animism. The superiority of the higher religions specifically
consisted in their moral ideas, which were almost entirely lacking in the primitive form of
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religions. And it is these moral ideas, that have turned out to be the abiding fruit of animism.
James George Frazer explained that we can distinguish three stages in the mental
development of mankind: magic, religion and science. At the magical level humans depend
on their own strength to overcome the difficulties that trouble them in their attempt to gain
the ends. They believe that there exists a certain order of nature which they think they can
understand and manipulate by occult means. But experience teaches them that they are
mistaken and this is where they turn to religion. In religion humans no longer rely on
themselves but seek the help of invisible beings. They believe that these beings possess the
power to control natural events, which magic failed to accomplish. The religious attitude
supposes that there is some elasticity in the course of nature, but experience again teaches
humans that they are mistaken here as well. The rigid uniformity of nature is discovered, and
religion, which was otherwise regarded as an explanation of nature, is displaced by the
scientific temperament. In science humans revert back to self-reliance, but not through occult
means (as in the stage of magic) but rather through rational methods.
Salomon Reinach was primarily an archaeologist and an anthropologist who was extremely
devoted to the investigation of religion. He considered his times to be the most appropriate
for the development of a science of religion. He believed that just like in all fields of
knowledge, secular reason must exercise its right to investigate even the domain of religion.
He wanted to present religion as a natural phenomenon, and defined it as a sum of scruples
which hinder the free exercise of our faculties. Through this definition Reinach wanted to
eliminate from the domain of religion the concepts of God, spiritual beings, and the infinite.
These scruples, he believed, have arisen from the irrational taboos of primitive societies
where they were associated with an animistic view of the world. While those scruples which
have proved useful continued to persist and got transformed into rational rules of conduct,
those which showed no such usefulness sank into the background. Thus, human progress,
according to Reinach has taken place through the gradual secularization of those elements
which were originally enveloped in the sphere of animistic beliefs. This process has not only
led to the transformation of taboos into moral rules but has also led to the development of
science out of magic. He visualized further progress in the direction of education and the
extension of the rational outlook.
22
Check your progress I

1. What, according to George Frazer, are the three stages in the mental development of
mankind?
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2.4 PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF RELIGION
The naturalistic interpretation of religion received further stimulus from the development of
the psychology of religion. The main proponents of this theory were Sigmund Freud (1856 –
1939) James Henry Leuba (1867 – 1946).
According to Leuba the reason for the existence of religion is not the objective truth of its
conceptions, but its biological value. He clarifies this idea with the example of the belief in a
personal God. Earlier theologians had put forward metaphysical arguments, such as the
argument from design, for the existence of such a God. The progress of the physical sciences
has destroyed the strength of such arguments, leading subsequent theologians to change their
arguments and appeal to inner experience instead. Here, as Leuba thinks, they have to agree
with psychology, which applies the scientific method onto the innermost experiences of the
individual. The inner experience, instead of establishing the existence of a personal God,
shows how belief in such a God has arisen from the gratification it provides for affective and
moral needs. Leuba paid special attention to mystical experiences which are considered to be
the pinnacle of religious experience of God and tried to explain it in psychological and
physiological terms. He compared it to the sublimation of sexual passion in the ascetical life,
as well as to an altered state of consciousness induced by certain drugs. He also pointed out
its affinity with such pathological conditions as hysteria and epilepsy. For the psychologist
who remains within the province of science, religious mysticism is not the revelation of God
23
but of man himself. Human beings can no longer subscribe to a religion and its associated
transcendent beliefs with intellectual honesty.
Sigmund Freud, the originator of psychoanalysis, regarded religious beliefs as illusions and
fulfillments of the oldest, strongest, and most insistent wishes of mankind. He considered
religion as a mental defense against some of the most threatening aspects of nature –
earthquake, flood storm, disease, and the inevitableness of death. He explains that it is inn
and through these forces, that nature appears to be rising up against us, with its majestic,
cruel, and inexorable forcefulness. In response, human imagination transforms these forces
into mysterious personal powers and the impersonal forces remain eternally remote. Now, if
the natural elements are identified as having passions that rage as they do in our souls, if
everywhere in nature there are beings around us of a kind that we know in our own society,
then we can breathe freely, can feel at home in the uncanny and can deal by psychical means
with our senseless anxiety. Though we are still defenseless, yet we are no longer helplessly
paralyzed. We can at least react. We can apply the same methods against these violent
supermen outside that we employ in our own society. We can try to adjure them, to appease
them to bribe them, and, by so influencing them, we may rob them of part of their power.
Freud divides the mind into three provinces— Id, Ego, and Superego. “Id” is the unconscious
region in which the basic instincts of our nature crowd together with no sense of order or
value. “Ego” is the region in which contact with the external world is maintained, and it aims
at self-preservation, selecting some of the Id’s demands for satisfaction and rejecting others,
according to circumstances. “Superego” is the deposit of the parental influences of childhood,
and it exercises a further control by banning those activities which are socially undesirable.
We come to know about consciousness and the mind through an analysis of its disguised
manifestations. It contains primal instincts or drives as well as repressed experiences. These
repressed experiences still live on in the unconscious and become manifest in varied ways.
These manifestations are what lead to ‘neurosis’ and Freud thinks that religion is the
universal obsessional neurosis of humanity which may be left behind when humans learn to
face the world relying no longer upon illusions but upon scientifically authenticated
knowledge.
Freud utilizes his idea of the Oedipus complex (based on the Greek myth of a tragic hero who
murdered his father and married his mother) to explicate the origin of religion. He believes
that in primitive times human beings lived in small groups, each under the domination of a
father who possessed all the females. The sons were driven out or killed as they induced the
24
father’s jealousy. But they grouped together and killed the father, and partook of his flesh so
as to share in his power. This was the primal crime, the parricide that has set up tensions
within the human psyche out of which developed moral inhibitions, totemism, and the other
phenomena of religion. Having slain their father, the brothers were struck with remorse, at
least of a prudential kind. They also found that they cannot all succeed to his position and that
there is therefore a continuing need for restraint. The dead father’s prohibition accordingly
takes on a new (moral) authority as a taboo against incest. This association of religion with
the Oedipus complex, which is renewed in each individual, is held to account for the
mysterious authority of God in the human mind and the powerful feeling of guilt which make
men submit to such a phantasy. Religion is thus the return of the repressed. The idea of God
is therefore a magnified version of the image of the human father. The transformation of the
father into God takes place both in the history of the race and in the history of individuals.
Individuals in adult life project upon the world the infantile memory of the father, and raise
this image to the rank of a Father God. The father who gave them life, protected them, and
demanded their obedience, becomes the God who is similarly the creator, preserver, and
lawgiver.
What Freud wished to emphasize upon through this explanation was that a religious belief is
determined by the psychological history of the person who holds it, and that such a belief is
essentially infantile and neurotic. It is a projection of the nursery upon the world, and is thus
a flight from reality. In the real world, which is a rigidly determined atheistic cosmos, there is
no Father God who reigns over it.
2.5 SOCIAL ORIGIN OF RELIGION
In the work of Emile Durkheim (1858 – 1917) the theory of the origin of religion gets a
sociological slant. His views not only imbibe a sociological theory of the origin of region but
they represent a complete philosophical perspective known as ‘sociological positivism’. In
Durkheim’s philosophy the idea of society occupies the center position and functions as the
key for understanding several other philosophical problems. According to him the idea of
Truth and Falsehood are objective only in so far as they express collective and not individual
thought. Even the laws of logic are taken by him to reflect the needs of civilized society. Here
a Society needs to be understood not merely as the sum of the individuals included in it, but
25
rather it represents a peculiar kind of entity which is the source of constraints, governing the
thought and behavior of its members.
In his social philosophy Durkheim devoted special attention to the subject of religion.
According to him the character of primitive religion is best seen not in animism but totemism,
which he considers as the more fundamental and primitive form of religion. The totem stands
in a peculiar relationship to a particular social group, normally a tribe or clan. The totem is
for this group the type of the sacred and the basis for the distinction of sacred and profane,
and this he takes to be essence of religion.
Taking totemism as the type of religion Durkheim concludes that religion is to be understood
as a social phenomenon. Religion serves the needs of the society in which it is practiced; and
the object of its cult, concealed under the figures of its particular mythology, is the society
itself. He points out that the earlier theories of primitive religion suffered from the defect of
a one-sided concentration upon religious belief; whereas his own theory regards religion
primarily from the point of view of action. So, he claims that there is something eternal in
religion, for although particular beliefs become outworn, any society must from time to time
reaffirm itself, and such reaffirmation is essentially religious.
Religion and society are so closely interwoven for Durkheim that religion is regarded as the
matrix out of which other human activities, including science, appear to have grown. Religion
is by no means discredited by the sciences, but it must always be looking for more adequate
symbols in order to express its realities. In modern times, he explains, we have come to
understand that the ideas of divinity and of society are foundationally the same. So, though
no new religion of humanity has displaced the traditional religion, but this may happen in due
course. There are no gospels which are immortal, but neither is there any reason for believing
that humanity is incapable of inventing new ones.

1. Explain the sociological positivism of Emile Durkheim.
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26
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2.6 SOCIO-POLITICAL ORIGIN OF RELIGION
Here we shall mainly discuss the thoughts of Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx.
“God” was Feuerbach’s first thought: the young Feuerbach was a theologian. He was
studying theology to become a protestant pastor but from the standpoint of a rational
religiosity. “Reason” was his second thought: for Feuerbach the theologian became a
Hegelian. Oscillating between philosophy and theology and inwardly torn apart, longing for
truth he came to Hegel’s lectures. After having attended Hegel’s lectures Feuerbach said “I
knew what I ought to do and wanted to do: not theology but philosophy. Not to believe, but to
think”. “Man” was Feuerbach’s third and last thought: for now, the Hegelian became an
atheist. He wanted to follow Hegel’s path consistently to the very end. He believed that the
old split between here and hereafter must be removed, not only in thought (as with Hegel) but
in reality too, so that humanity can again concentrate wholeheartedly on itself, on its world
and on the present time. In his “Essence of Christianity” Feuerbach enthroned materialism
and dethroned God. He said that apart from nature and man nothing exists and the higher
beings produced by our religious imaginations are merely the weird reflections of our own
nature. He was against the idea of a personal God as well as the selfish belief in immortality.
To Feuerbah, consciousness of God was self-consciousness, and the knowledge of God was
self- knowledge. Religion, was thereby the source of humanity’s earliest (though indirect)
form of self-knowledge. The universal man, the community, and the unity of man with man
was considered by Feuerbach as the Supreme Being and the measure of all things. The
consciousness of the infinite was nothing else than the consciousness of the infinity of
consciousness. In the consciousness of the infinite, the conscious subject has for his object
the infinity of his own nature. Thus, the notion of God merges; man sets up his human nature
out of himself; he sees it as something existing outside himself and separated from himself;
and he projects it. In short, the notion of God becomes nothing but a projection of man
himself. The absolute to man is his own nature. God appears as a projected, hypostatized
reflection of man, behind which nothing exists in reality. The divine is the universality of the
human, projected onto the hereafter. The attributes of God—love, wisdom, justice etc.— in
reality are the attributes of man, i.e., of the human species.
27
The personal God of Christianity, believed to be independent and existing outside man, is
nothing other than the specific notion of man given independent existence—the personified
nature of man. Man contemplates his nature external to himself. The attributes of God are
really the attributes of the objectified nature of man. It is not that God created man in his own
image, but rather man created God in his own image. Man is a great projector and God is the
great projection. God as intellectual being is a projection of human understanding. Here God
is nothing but the objectified universal nature of human intelligence. God as the all loving
Being, is also a projection of human heart. In prayer, man worships his own nature, and
venerates the omnipotence of feelings. My own interest is declared as God’s interest. My own
will is identified as God’s will. My own ultimate purpose is regarded as being God’s purpose.
Karl Marx maintained a negative attitude towards religion, for he found the latter to be
incompatible with his theory of action, and therefore he rejected religion altogether. Marx
inherited speculative atheism from Feuerbach. He was an atheist, even before he developed
his theory of action.
Feuerbach’s atheism was rooted in a speculative theory of man. According to him all the
predicates attributed to God were purely human. It was for this reason that he said that the
subject of these predicates should also be human. Thus, man simply projects his own infinite
powers on to a transcendent being. God is an alienation of man. It is a self-estrangement.
Feuerbach did not explain satisfactorily the origin of this alienation, though he maintained
that the reason behind it was the individual’s love of ease, sloth vanity and egoism.
According to Marx as well man exists as an alienated being. Unlike Feuerbach, Marx pointed
to the social and economic conditions of modern life as the cause of this alienation. Religion
is only its expression. As a result of the division of labor, the means of production became
the private property of individuals; the workers in the modern industrialized and
technologized process of production have nothing but their sheer labor – merely a
commodity– to offer. In the process of exchange, the product of their own labor becomes for
wage earners an alienated, commodity; something separated from them. As man is
frustrated in his earthly existence, he takes refuge in the phantasy world of the beyond. The
culprit behind the continuance of these frustrating conditions is not religion, but the political
structure which legalizes and protects the social status quo. Yet, neither the state nor religion
itself reveals the roots of alienation. State and religion lie in the economic conditions of a
society determined by private property. Religious alienation will get uprooted only when
relations between human beings again become intelligible and reasonable as a result of new
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modes of production.
Marx’s former friend Bruno Bauer proposed that the emancipation of man requires a secular
state which recognizes no religion. Existence of religion always indicates an incomplete
emancipation. However, Marx saw that even though the American state is entirely separated
from the church, still instead of being fully emancipated America continues to be a religious
country par excellence. Religion is not only an expression of alienation, but also a protest
against it. Religion is an inverted world consciousness; for an inverted, unjust, inhuman
society produces man’s religious consciousness. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed. It is the
heart of the heartless people. It is the spirit of the spiritless situation. Religion is the opium of
the people. Religion offers illusory happiness. For real happiness the abolition of religion is a
must. Religion is a symptom of social disease.
Atheism alone is insufficient to cure the ills of the human situation. It only attempts to cure
the symptoms without eradicating the disease. The disease is man’s social-economic
condition in a capitalist society. The social structure of private property produces the need for
God, and so, it has to be eradicated. To the orthodox Marxist, atheism is very important.
Atheism is the annulment of God. It is the theoretical humanism. Annulment of private
property is communism. It vindicates real human life. It is practical humanism.
Atheism and communism re-establish the true relationship between man and nature. This
relationship is an ever active one - a praxis. To be human is not to be something, but to do
something. Work and material production constitutes man’s fulfillment, not leisure. Re-
establishing the true relationship between man and nature is attained through praxis. Praxis
establishes a relationship between nature and consciousness - the two poles of human reality.
The only true philosophy, therefore, is a theory of action. The truth of man is in what he does,
not in what he knows or claims to know without his active relation to nature.
From a Marxist point of view religious belief always conflict with a truly humanistic attitude
because religion always projects beyond the human. Man becomes independent only if he is
his master. Man is his master when he owes his existence to himself. A man who lives by the
favors of another is a dependent being. Marx’s atheism is humanism, mediated through the
suppression of religion, and communism is humanism mediated through the suppression of
private property. Humanism does not consist of abstract postulates. It is to be realized
historically in a human society whereby truly human conditions are created. There must no
longer be a society where great number of human beings are degraded, despised and
exploited.
29
Marx remained an atheist because he thought the myth of the deity was an obstacle to the
rehabilitation of the poor and an impediment to complete happiness, for it stressed upon the
joy of the beyond and diverted attention from the suffering here on earth. Thus, religious
beliefs seem to be strikingly incompatible with the philosophy of Marx.
Check Your Progress III
1. Why are the religious beliefs totally incompatible with the philosophy of Marx?
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2.7 CRITICAL EXPOSITION
The naturalists, anthropologists and psychologists whom we have considered do have

something to suggest in their interpretation of religion. The strength of their argument rests
on the claim that their assertions are based on verifiable facts brought to light by scientific
investigation. However, a thorough examination of this claim reveals that they are noticeably
unfounded. The given facts must be interpreted and that almost all the thinkers whom we
have considered were scientists of one kind or another by training. In so far as they move
from the findings of their particular sciences into the sphere of philosophical interpretation,
they tend to bring along presuppositions, speculations and even prejudices which need to be
brought out and reasonably examined.
The most obvious problem with naturalism is that it involves us in a gigantic one-sided
abstraction. It takes one aspect of reality and presents it as the entire reality. Just as the
naturalists isolate the cognitive aspect of our experience of the world, similarly they
concentrate on the element of belief in religion. They even seem to think of religious beliefs
30
as offering an explanation of the world, however these beliefs can only be properly
understood from within the setting of the religious life as a whole, which involves conative
and affective elements as well. Some of the thinkers’ idea of God illustrates their own
misunderstanding of the nature of God. The abstract idea presented by the naturalists as the
whole reality ignores some facts and exaggerates others, thereby merely giving a distorted
picture.
What needs to be kept in mind is that the origin of a particular belief or practice does not
determine the question of its validity in its present form. Any human activity goes back to
humble beginnings. But this point is not remembered in the case of religion. We must judge
things by what they are today, not by what they have grown out of. Something derived from a
cruder origin may have acquired quite a new status and meaning.
Though psychology is indeed a valuable study, but it does not and indeed cannot be
determinative for the validity of religion. We tend to believe what we want to believe. Yet the
psychological criticism of belief can be carried only so far, or else it ends up in skepticism
which engulfs the psychologist himself, and makes rational arguments impossible. By tracing
the history of the idea of God in the projecting of the father figure, Freud discredits the very
belief in God. But his theory is not applicable to religion in general, rather it only applies to
those religions which recognize some kind of ‘Father God’. Even if men think of God in
terms of father figure, they tend to do so in the analogical language. The question of whether
or not this analogue indeed presents a true representation of the reality, is one which the
psychoanalysts fail answer.
Freud’s ideas of religion hardly had any considerable degree of acceptance. Usually, neurosis
is defined as a condition leading to difficulties in adjusting satisfactorily to one’s
environment, thereby leading to a noticeably negative outcome. Jung however pointed out
that religion is a healthy outcome. Religious practices seem to be a desirable, justifiable, and
realistic mode of activity. Freud says religion is a form of neurosis. All this suggests that
there can be good neurosis and bad neurosis. The fact that religion relieves individuals from
unconscious conflict, does not present a sufficient reason for labelling it as the universal
obsessional neurosis of mankind. None of the thinkers discussed thus far have been able to
coherently establish that in general religious believers are less able to form satisfying
personal relations and are less able to get ahead in their work than non-believers.
Freud even ends up committing the fallacy of psycho-mechanistic parallelism. This is the
fallacy of assuming that because two behavioral patterns are observed to exhibit that same
31
constituents or are reducible to the same component elements, they are to be attributed to the
same psychological mechanism. Religious beliefs display some marks of infantile regression.
From this one cannot conclusively derive that religion is reducible to infantile regression.
Similarity is not sameness. Moreover, there is no conclusive proof for the idea of the Oedipus
complex itself. The word “illusion” does not mean absence of an objective reality. Illusion is
only a perceptual error. Illusion is resulted from a presence not from an absence. It cannot be
taken to mean that God does not exist.
2.8 LET US SUM UP
The sociological and sociopolitical theories make it evident that religion is deeply intertwined
with numerous social factors, and that no account of religion which omits the sociological
aspect could be complete. But apart from this rather obvious truth, we get no clear guidance,
for there are many serious conflicts among the views we have seen. We have not been given
any single convincing answer to the question of what precisely is the relation of religion to
the society in which it is practiced. Can religious beliefs play a major role in giving rise to an
economic system? Does the economic system give rise to religion as a kind of by-product?
Durkheim recognizes religion as a social activity. In doing so he supplements a deficiency in
some of the earlier anthropological accounts, which had concentrated on religious beliefs. But
his general thesis relies too exclusively on identifying totemism as a type of religion.
However, totemism simply fails to fulfil this role, for the following reasons: (1) totemism is
not really primitive. Rather it has, as Freud recognized, a history of more primitive ideas
behind it. (2) Totemism is much less universal than religion, and cannot serve as a larger
category under which other types of religions get subsumed. Notably, it is precisely among
some of the most backward people that totemism is absent. (3) Most researchers now
recognize totemism as being primarily not a religious phenomenon but a social one. When
the foundation stone of totemism is withdrawn, Durkheim’s argument for the identity
between the ideas of divinity and society collapses.
Feuerbach says that religion is consciousness of the infinite, and that it is therefore nothing
else than the consciousness which man has of his own limited but infinite nature. Here he
implies only the orientation of human consciousness toward an infinite, but does not provide
any evidence of the existence or the non-existence of an infinite reality, independent of
consciousness. It may be noted that Feuerbach’s universal human being is itself a projection
32
as well as an abstraction, who projects something out of his existence that does not exist in
reality.
Marx’s praxis has primarily an economic character. For Marx, man is autonomous only in his
material life process. Thus, Marx’s praxis is restrictive. If religion indeed emerges out of the
social conditions in which man is an enslaved being, then religion must die out automatically,
when the ideal conditions are created, in which all human can he happy.
2.9 KEY WORDS
Praxis: Praxis is the process by which a theory, lesson, or skill is practiced. It is a practical
knowledge applied into one’s actions.
Totemism: Totemism is a religious belief that is frequently associated with shamanistic

religions. The totem is usually an animal or other natural figure that spiritually represents a
group of related people such as a clan.
Allen N.J., Pickering W.S.F. & Miller Watts, eds. Watts On Durkheim’s Elementary Forms
of Religious Life. Routledge Studies in Social and Political Thought, 10. London: Routledge,
1998.
Gay, Peter, ed. The Freud: Reader. United States of America. W. W. Norton & com. 1989.
Hick, John. Philosophy of Religion. Second edition. New Jersey: Prentice-hall, 1973.
James, Henry Leuba. A Psychological Study of Religion: Its Origin, Function and Future.
New York: HarperCollins, 2007
Lodge, Oliver, Sir. Life and Matter: A Criticism of Prof. Haeckel’s Riddle of the
Universe. New York: The Knickerbockers Press, 2006.
Stark, Rodney. Discovering God: The Origins of the Great Religions and the Evolution of
Belief. Norwood, Mass: Berwick & Smith, 1912.
33
1. The three stages in the mental development of mankind are magic, religion and science and
each of these do not follow one another in a clear-cut succession. At the magical level man
depends on his own strength to overcome the difficulties that trouble him in his attempt to
gain the ends. He believes that there exists a certain order of nature which he thinks he can
learn and manipulate by occult means. But experience teaches him that he is mistaken and
there he turns to religion. In religion man no longer relies on himself but seeks the help of
invisible beings. He believes that these beings possess that power to control natural events
which magic failed to gain. The religious attitude supposes that there is some elasticity in the
course of nature, but experience teaches man that man is mistaken again. The rigid uniformity
of nature is discovered, and religion, regarded as an explanation of nature, is displaced by
science. In science man reverts to the self-reliance but not through occult means but by
through the rational methods.
1. In Durkhiem’s philosophy the idea of society occupies the center position and functions as
the key for understanding philosophical problems. Truth and falsehood are regarded as being
objective in so far as they express collective and not individual thought. Even the laws of
logic reflect the needs of civilized society. Society is not just the sum of the individuals
included in it, but a peculiar kind of entity which is the source of constraints governing the
thought and behavior of its members. In his social philosophy, Durkheim devoted special
attention to the subject of religion. According to him the character of primitive religion is best
seen not in animism but totemism, which he considers as a more fundamental and primitive
form of religion. The totem stands in a peculiar relationship to a particular social group,
normally a tribe or clan. The totem is for this group the type of the sacred and the basis for
the distinction of sacred and profane and this he takes to be essence of religion.
Answers to Check Your Progress III
1. For Marx religion is an inverted world consciousness. An inverted, unjust, inhuman society
produces man’s religious consciousness. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed. It is the heart
34
of the heartless people. It is the spirit of the spiritless situation. Religion is the opium of the
people. Religion offers illusory happiness. For real happiness the abolition of religion is a
must. Religion is a symptom of social disease. From a Marxist point of view religious belief
always conflicts with a truly humanistic attitude because religion always projects beyond the
human. Man becomes independent only if he is his master. Man is his master when he owes
his existence to himself. A man who lives by the favor of another becomes a dependent
being. Marx’s atheism is humanism, mediated with itself through the suppression of religion;
and communism is humanism mediated with itself through the suppression of private
property. Humanism does not consist of abstract postulates. It is to be realized historically in
a human society; truly human conditions are to be created. There must be no longer a society
where great number of human beings are degraded, despised and exploited. Marx remained
an atheist because he thought the myth of the deity was an obstacle to the rehabilitation of the
poor and an impediment to complete happiness, by stressing the joy of the beyond and
diverting attention from the suffering here on earth. Thus, religious beliefs are totally
incompatible with the philosophy of Marx.
35
Unit 3 Religion, Philosophy of Religion, and Theology*
Structure
3.0 Objectives
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Religion
3.3 Philosophy of Religion
3.4 Theology
3.5 Let Us Sum Up
3.6 Keywords
3.0 OBJECTIVES
• To understand the elements of Religion
• To understand Philosophy of Religion as a subset of Philosophy
• To demarcate the separate provinces of Religion, Philosophy of Religion, and Theology
and to understand their interrelationship
Note: The content in the ponder boxes is not part of the conventional unit, but pondering
on it would enrich your understanding of the unit and would allow the assimilation of
knowledge in a broader context.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
It's not uncommon to witness intersecting domains of common interest giving an impression
of sameness even when they are not so, but a closer inspection quickly dissipates this
misconception. Religion, philosophy of religion, and theology too are domains that intersect,
*
Ariba Zaidi, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Zakir Husain Delhi College, University of
Delhi.
36
often giving an impression of resemblance, but a closer inspection suggests otherwise, for
domains might intersect, interests might align, but they do so with a different set of aims and
attitudes. Thus, this unit is an attempt to closely examine this intersection and give an
account of what differentiates the three.
In this effort, it seems reasonable to begin with 'religion', as apart from it being a domain in
its own right, it also happens to be the subject matter for the other two. Therefore, the
following is a brief account of what religion represents.
3.2 RELIGION
Although a precise number is difficult to arrive at, most of the estimations suggest that there
are over 4000 religions, sects and their offshootspractised worldwide. Thus, though it is not
entirely impossible, it is highly unlikely to find someone not acquainted with religion in one
form or the other, yet any effort to define it in some precise way is likely to end up as a
failure because religion represents such diverse beliefs, practices, observances and
adherences that have very few parallels.
Thus, maybe a more fruitful approach to understand religion is by delineating its general or
common features, and subsequently relying on such features, synthesise a broad and holistic
outlook regarding what the concept of religion represents.
Religion can be identified with some core set of beliefs, associated practices and observances
adhered by an individual or a group of people or a sect. Alternatively stated, religion
represents a core set of beliefs that dictates the way of life of an individual or a group. In the
context of the preceding statements and for the discussion to follow from here, it is
significant to understand what ‘beliefs’ are.
Beliefs are statements, claims or propositions considered or accepted to be true by an

individual or a group. For example, When someone considers the statement—‘the sun rises in
the east’ to be true, they adopt or form an affirmative mental attitude towards this
statement/proposition. This mental attitude is what we may call a belief.Belief, it needs to be
underscored, isnot representative of the truth or falsity of a proposition. Albeit, they represent
the consideration of anindividual or a group for the truth or falsity of a proposition. In view
of the afore-stated notion of belief and our common experience with them, it's reasonable to
state, without probably attracting any disagreement, that not all our beliefs are religious in
37
character, signifying that there have to be PONDER BOX-
BOX-I
some identifiable key characteristics that
Beliefs play a seminal role in the decision making of
separate our religious beliefs from our individuals, thereby shaping their entire lives. The same
commonly held other beliefs. One of the is to be expected in the context of religious beliefs if you
hold them.
promising ways, it appears, to decipher
List the decisions in your life that have been fully or
some of the essential characteristics of
partially influenced by religious beliefs. You may
religious beliefs— the claims that are discover the extent of your life influenced or conditioned
by religion.
considered to be true within the religious
domain— is by observing how the
organised religions function worldwide and arrive at some broad generalisations therefrom.
The following, therefore, is an effort to bring forth some of the essential characteristics that
can be solely associated with religion.
3.2.1 Salient Features of Religion

3.2.1.1 Claims to provide answers to some of the fundamental questions
To begin with, most world religions claim to be the sole repository of the answers to some of
the fundamental questions that concern us. Such fundamental questions, amongst others, may
include ‘what the ultimate reality is’, ‘why anything exists at all’, ‘what our place in such a
reality is’, ‘what our true nature is’ etc. These questions, arguably, suggest that religion
claims to offer the architecture of our reality. Most religions, if not all, provide answers to
these questions and often they project a reality that transcends our common experience but at
the same time is intimately connected to our lives and wellbeing.
Some examples may prove useful in driving home the essence of what is stated above.
Consider, for a moment, one of the questions mentioned above, ‘why anything exists at all’.
One may find, on investigation, that many religions offer some conception of a creator or an
uncaused cause as an answer to this question. Judaism, Christianity, Islam and many schools
of Hinduism fall in this category, where the appeal is made to some theistic notion wherein
God or gods, assume(s) the role of a creator along with many other roles. However, not all
religions, it is emphasised, subscribe to such a view. For example, Jainism and Buddhism
don’t offer any conception of a creator to explain the existence of this world. However, it
doesn’t mean the question of existence is abandoned. What differs is only the form of answers
offered.
38
Such answers are considered absolute truths within the fold of respective religions. Further,
such claims, owing to the immutable status accorded to them, are opaque to any challenges,
meaning their authority is considered final and their legitimacy is unquestionable in most
religions. However, the foregoing doesn’t imply that the prevalent beliefs in a religion are
always accepted by all the adherents alike. Internal disagreements often occur on account of
mostly varying interpretations of the same religious tenets, but the rigid character of such
tenets and their different interpretations often push religion towards schism. Various subsects
of all the major religions are a testimony to this propensity.
3.2.1.2 Gives a higher purpose that ought to guide our life
Another salient feature of most of the world religions is the concerted effort to address the
concern of meaning of life, i.e., addressing the questions like- ‘is there some inherent
meaning to life’ or ‘is there a higher purpose that ought to guide our life’. The afore-stated
concern probably stems from a foreseeable impending end to our lives, which forces upon us
some psychologically unsettling questions such as, is death the final truth staring us and our
loved ones, or is there some form of continuity that makes our lives more meaningful than
what is apparent. Most religions attempt to satisfy this human yearning for continuity by
advancing a conception of our true nature that is separate and distinct from our perishable
physical body. For an instance, most religions rely on some conception of soul, self or
consciousness to define our true nature and in effect establish a continuity and tranquillity
that cannot be jeopardised by mortality, impermanence, uncertainty or death. It is in the
context of this immortal true nature that most religions define or give meaning to the purpose
of life. Salvation for Judeo-Christian and Islamic religions, Mokṣa for Hinduism, Nirvāṇa for
Buddhism, Kaivalya for Jainism, represent such a higher purpose of life.
3.2.1.3 Offers general moral principles to guide one’s actions
Most religions, it appears, assume a central role in shaping the moral compass of their
followers. Alternatively stated, most religions demarcate the province of what is right and
wrong or good and evil, which means, that religion offers the general principles that the
adherents of a religion must follow while conducting the affairs of their life. For instance, the
doctrine of ‘niṣkāmakarma’, one of the key teachings of Bhagavad Gita,calls fora desire-less
or a self-less pursuit of an action in accordance with one’s duty.
As such the principles are considered to be the commandments of divine origin, meaning, the
adherents of a religion, in most such cases, are not assumed to have the autonomy to accept
39
or discard such principles or duties. Adherence to such principles by a follower can be seen
as a function of reverence or fear or a combination of both. Reverence for such principles is
understandable as they are believed to be divine commandments by a follower, whereas the
fear stems from undesirable consequences and punishments that such commandments append
to non-adherence.
3.2.1.4 Faith
Faith is another salient feature that is associated with religion in ways that are arguably
unparalleled in other walks of life. Faith, in one sense, is subscribing to a belief or a set of
beliefs without seeking justifications for having them. As mentioned earlier, belief is treating
a proposition, a claim or a statement to be true. Thus, faith, in the aforesaid sense, is treating
a claim/ proposition/ statement to be true without needing any justification to do so. The
adherents of any religion, it appears, place their faith, in the aforesaid sense, in the dictates
and claims of their respective religion and conduct their lives according to it.
Theforegoing doesn’t imply a complete absence of justification from the domain of religion.
Having faith doesn’t meanthe adherents or practitioners completely renounce justification.
Quite the opposite, justification is central to religion when it comes to the conduct of a
follower or a practitioner, but such justifications always come from the tenets, claims and
principles advanced by the religion. What they cannot seek, in most religions, is the
justification for these tenets, claims and principles themselves that make up the edifice of a
particular religion. In fact, questioning the core set of beliefs and their basis is often regarded
as irreverence for the religion. Most religions, therefore, have instruments of deterrence to
prevent such blasphemy.
3.2.1.5 Revelation as the source of ultimate knowledge
Religious beliefs often hinge on a specific source of knowledge which starkly differentiates
them from most other forms of beliefs. In most religions, the source of knowledge isclaimed
to be some form of divine revelation, or some authority, such as scriptures, prophets or
inscriptions, that is treated to be the repository of all knowledge, the veracity and legitimacy
of which is supposedly unchallenged and unrivalled. As explained earlier, all justifications
for religious practices rely on them whereas their justification generally lies in their claimed
divinity or absolute authority.
40
3.2.1.6 Ritualism
Ritualism, a socio-cultural phenomenon in general, is also an integral part of most religions.

Rituals, in this sense, constitute religion instituted specific set of practices and observances
oftenfor their supposed benefits to the practitioners. These are generally the practices
seamlessly integrated with even the most secular aspects of the socio-cultural sphere of a
person, dictating ‘whats’ and ‘hows’ to them. The extent of penetration of rituals often goes
unnoticed, but it can be understood from merely inspecting the various stages in a religious
person’s life from birth to death.
3.2.1.7 Prayer
Prayer is a phenomenon associated with most of the religions. It is conceived as a medium of

communication between the divine and its subject. Prayers can be classified based on the
intent of such communication. One such intent is to demonstrate adulations and reverence for
the divine, and the prayer fulfilling such intent, therefore, involves elements demonstrative of
worship or praise. Different from the preceding are petitionary prayers, where the intent is to
see some desire getting fulfilled or to seek forgiveness for some wrong conduct or just to
ensure that the blessing of the divine doesn’t abandon the petitioner. A significant facet of
petitionary prayer is the conception of the divine or the God.
3.2.1.8 Spiritualism
Spiritualism, although is often identified with religion, is a secular notion. It’s a quest to
understand one’s own nature or what may be called the quest for self-actualisation. In the
above sense, it’s closely associated with the yearning to understand the meaning of life, but
when such a meaning is sought within the confines of a religion, or when the quest to
understand one's own nature takes one to the doorsteps of religion, it becomes integrated with
religion. Thus, in the above sense, spiritualism is an integral part of religion but it is not
exclusive to it.
Hitherto, some of the essential features of religion have been introduced to aid the reader in
identifying and segregating beliefs and practices that are representative of religion. Preceding
is not an exhaustive list of features characterising religion, yet they afford enough
generalisations to assist in drawing a tentative perimeter around its domain for further
exploration.
41
b) Check your answer with that provided at the end of the unit.
1. Delineate the general features of religion.
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
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3.3 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

This section provides an exposition of what constitutes ‘philosophy of religion’, but any
definitive progress in the stated direction is inconceivable without alluding to what
philosophy, in general, represents.
Philosophy marks an attitudinal shift from what has been witnessed in the context of religion
in the preceding section. If religion is about faith as its underpinning, philosophy adopts a
posture of scepticism*or doubt for any assertion. This attitude of scepticism for any apparent
or obscure is at the core of philosophy. In the preceding sense, philosophy offers a prospect
of unrestrained scrutiny into the edifice of our notions.
Consider the following questions and reflect for a moment. ‘what is reality’; ‘is there a reality
beyond our sense mediated experience’; ‘why anything exists’; ‘what is our place in this
world’; ‘is there any meaning to life’; ‘how do we know what we know’; ‘are we an
autonomous agent with free will’; etc. In the previous section, it was told that religion claims
to provide answers to these questions or at least some of these questions, but is it necessary to
rely on religion or any other authority to get answers to such questions, or can one exercise
the option to give into one’s sense of wonderment and curiosity and reflect on such issues.
When an individual exercises the latter option and reflects, it may rather quickly dawn upon
that each of these questions can be responded to in more than one way. Apparently, the
*
Scepticism is used in a specific sense here. It should be understood as the readiness to question any claim
to truth, to seek conceptual clarity of the categories forming such propositions and to look for the logical
coherency, all being done with an openness for accepting the limitation of such justifications and the
assumptions involved.
42
existence of each of the thousands of religions and their offshoots bears testimony to the
diversity and plurality in the responses to these questions, and when non-religious responses
too are added to the mix, it may seem prudent to adopt areasonable level of scepticism for
any assertion made regardless of the authority it is coming from. This attitudethat drives
philosophy is in stark contrast to religion, which has faith at its root and therefore is content
with embracing the words of authority.
Apparently, scepticism or doubt propels one to ask in what PONDER BOX -II
ways an assertion is true. This enquiry brings forth the
Usage of argumentation is not
significance ‘justification’ has in the context. Justification limited to the formal fields of
means supporting or grounding the assertion made by a enquiry. In fact, you employ them
in your day to day discourses more
declaration, which in common parlance is often called often than you probably appreciate.
reason, but in philosophy, it has a specific meaning and
Look up the following forms of
structure. The structure is called an argument, constituting arguments:
of a conclusion—aproposition that one intends to establish Induction,
Induction deduction and abduction
and premise(s)— proposition(s) that one advances to
Observe your discourses for how
establish the conclusion. The argument is the structure you and others around you employ
philosophy relies on to justify claims. these structures.
However, religion too, it may be argued, relies on arguments for justification. In fact, it’s a
fairly common structure often employed in even regular discourses. Thus, religion definitely
employs the structure of argumentation as philosophy does but doesn’t harness its potential as
philosophy does. Premises and conclusions in philosophical arguments are open to challenge,
and in the wake of newer information, if contradictions and inconsistencies emerge,
philosophical arguments are able to make a course correction, which is entirely missing in the
domain of religion. Also, in constructing arguments, philosophy attempts to keep at bay
logical-fallacies* and cognitive-biases†, which, it seems, is not a particularly strong suit of
religion. In the foregoing sense, Philosophy is organic, ever-growing, adding newer corpus
*
Logical fallacies corrode the integrity of an argument. One of the ways in which they get actualised is by
diluting the form or structureof the argument, i.e., by not adhering to the proper rules of inference,
therefore suitably termed as formal fallacies. Informal fallacies are yet another manifestation of logical
fallacies, where some devious instruments are advanced disguised as arguments
†
Cognitive biases create a tunnel vision before us, hiding contradictions and inconsistencies that are often
in plain sight. Cognitive biases remind us that we are not merely born in a physical world. We are also
born in a socio-cultural environment, where before even getting to one’s full cognitive capacities, one is
conditioned by the prevalent beliefs of one’s environment, preventing one from being considerate for the
alternate views.
43
PONDER BOX
BOX - III
of knowledge. On the contrary, the claims of religious
If you have been enthusiastic about the
previous activities, you may have arguments, as explained in the previous section, are
discovered arguments crucially shape considered to be absolute truths and therefore can’t be
your discourses, beliefs and decisions. In
this sense, they shape your life, but you subjected to any challenge. Thus, in the event of
might not be as adept as you think you inconsistencies or contradictions too, they remain rigid.
are in employing them in your life.
Thus, relying on the instrument of argumentation and
Examine common cognitive biases and
logical fallacies that plague your espousing an attitude of reasonable scepticism for the
judgements. apparent and the obscure in equal measures, philosophy
addresses some of the fundamental concerns. Very few concerns, if there are any, can be as
fundamental as understanding the nature of reality itself. In philosophy, this domain of
inquiry is labelled as metaphysics. Other fundamental concerns of philosophy are
epistemology, the investigation into the nature of knowledge and its associated aspects, and
value theory, which in its broadest sense is an effort to arrive at general principles that can
guide evaluative judgements such as in the context of ethics, where philosophy strives to
arrive at a sound basis to evaluate acts, behaviours and intents of individuals into categories
of good and bad or right or wrong.
The above-stated pursuits and maybe a few others may occupy the bedrock of philosophy,
but a domain-specific confinement of philosophy is probably ill-conceived, for philosophy
embraces the mundane as it embraces the profound and the fundamental. The essence of
philosophy, therefore, is probably not to be sought in the domain of exploration. Rather, it
seems to reflect in the act of exploration, spurred by a penchant for scepticism and
irreverence for authority, challenging the most fundamental of the assumptions and beliefs.
It is in the backdrop of the elements of philosophy revealed hitherto, the pursuit of

philosophy of religion needs to be understood. The discussion thus far clearly demonstrates
that the religious considerations and some of the fundamental concerns of philosophy share
the same domain, but both approach these shared common provinces with a different set of
pursuits. Where philosophy is an enquiry in such areas critically inspecting a wide range of
possibilities, most religions don’t come across as an enquiry into such domains. Instead, they
mostly claim to be an exclusive, legitimate and unrivalled repository of the knowledge in
such domains.
44
Philosophy of religion critically inspects such claims by religion, relying on a specific
attitude and instrument underscored earlier. In doing so, it scrutinises religion from the point
of view of identifying logical inconsistencies and incoherencies between its various concepts
and claims. Also, it scrutinises the religious tenets in view of the developments and outcomes
associated with general philosophical enquiry, scientific investigation and other competing,
contending and even concurring positions. The rest of
the section is an elucidation of how, philosophy of PONDER BOX-
BOX-IV
religion, as a second-order activity, subjects religious If you are in a habit of exercising your
reflective prowess, you are likely to
claims to an unrestrained scrutiny. have reflected on the meaning of life.
If you have not, you can do it now.
• Most religions, as stated in the previous
Critically examine your own views on
section, claim to offer the architecture of the subject in the light of
reality, and although not always, but often in existentialism,
existentialism absurdism and
Nozick’s
Nozick’s experience machine.
machine
such religions, God is central to such an
architecture. However, given there is pluralism in religious beliefs and other
competing and contending belief systems such as atheism, agnosticism and
scientific and philosophical positions, philosophy of religion scrutinises the claims
and arguments offered for the existence of God in the light of opposing positions
and available empirical evidence.
• Philosophy of religion also examines the attributes of God claimed by various

religions and their implications. For an instance, most monotheistic religions
ascribe omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, eternality and benevolence, etc.
to God. In philosophy of religion, these attributes are scrutinised to demarcate their
conceptual domain, to identify how different attributes relate to each other and to
understand their implication in terms of consistencies and contradictions. For an
instance, a philosophically challenging issue for many religions is ‘the problem of
evil’, which brings to the fore the contradiction between two of the attributes of
God, ‘benevolence’ and ‘omnipotence’. If God is omnipotent, i.e., all-powerful, and
benevolent, i.e., who is kind and desires the wellbeing of its subjects, it seems fair
to assume that evils such as crimes, wars, genocide, exploitation, socio-economic
crisis, pandemics and epidemics, congenital disorders, natural disasters etc.
shouldn’t impact the lives of innocents, infants and children, yet evil exists,
meaning one of these two traits can’t be ascribed to God, or else these traits have to
45
be understood in a different sense, something that most religions seem to have
refrained from attempting.
• Many religions, as elucidated in the previous section, offer an answer to what the
‘meaning of life’ or the true purpose of life is. As stated, such answers often
involve what constitutes our true nature, which, as alluded to in the previous
section, happens to be ‘soul’ in many religions. Soul, it can be observed, has been
conferred with a wide variety of attributes that derive their meaning from the larger
context of reality professed by all such religions. Philosophy of religion scrutinises
these conceptions of soul in the context of investigating our true nature and the
purpose of life. For example, many of the attributes ascribed to soul such as vitality,
consciousness, experience, rationality, emotions etc. seem to be untenable when
looked at from the point of view of theory of evolution, neuroscience and molecular
biology in particular. Philosophy of religion, therefore, examines the conception of
soul or other contenders for our true self in light of a much broader set of arguments
than what religion offers.
• Most religions claim to be the legitimate source of knowledge. Thus, philosophy of

religion dons its sceptic visor to inspect such claims. In doing so, it inspects the
premises advanced as a justification for a claim to be true, but, as stated in the
previous section, religious claims appeal to authority for such justifications, and
therefore are opaque to further investigation, but philosophical inquest is unbridled
by such restrictions and consequently questions the appeal to authority itself as a
legitimate or reliable mode of justification.
• Again, as stated in the previous

PONDER BOX-
BOX-V
section, most religions define and
Although seeking and providing justification is
central to philosophy, philosophy is not blind to the demarcate the province of good and
limitation of justification. bad or right and wrong and issue
Can justifications be sought for every claim without commandments/ imperatives to dictate
slipping into an infinite regress? actions, behaviours and intents in
If Justifications can’t be sought indefinitely, does it accordance with such conceptions.
mean that some propositions/claims have to be taken
as axioms or unjustifiable foundations for the rest of
However, philosophy of religion
the knowledge system to be built over them, or are scrutinises such notions and
there ways to provide justifications without
imperatives in view of the
presupposing foundations?
46
developments and outcomes of such developments in the domain of ethics, which
strives to understand the notions the terms good or evil represent, how such notions
have been constructed in the society and can there be a universal basis for such
categorisations as religions seem to prescribe.
The foregoing is a glimpse of what philosophy of religion strives for. It may give an
impression that philosophy of religion is critical of
PONDER BOX-
BOX-VI
religion. Such an impression is definitely true, but it may
Revisit the list of decisions you be reminded that philosophy at its core is a critique
earlier made under the influence of
religious beliefs. Given the option, machinery that is fuelled by scepticism for any given.
would you consider any change in Thus, one may find it to be true as well that philosophy is
them in the light of what you
understood of philosophy? equally critical of the claims of other domains such as that
of psychology, polity, law and sciences, etc. Philosophy
displays the same level of scepticism for the arguments, conceptual apparatuses, modes of
justification, standards of proof and the reality constructed and advanced by any such
domains. Most of all, philosophy eyes its own corpus of knowledge, standards of truth, modes
of investigation and justification too with an equal measure of scepticism.

1. Briefly discuss the relationship between religion and philosophy of religion?
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3.4 THEOLOGY
Theology is a systematic study of religion. The afore-stated may propel one to ask what it
studies about religion that philosophy of religion doesn’t. One crucial difference is that
47
theology, unlike philosophy of religion, is appended to specific religions, meaning most
religions have their own theology, and in many cases, even the sub-sects of religions have
their own theology. However, both, Philosophy of religion and theology, it may be argued,
don’t differ in the content as much as they differ in the intent of the study and the attitude
with which they study religion.
Theology is the study of religion with the intent to systematize/ formalize/ organise its
declarations and dictates into coherent and logically consistent doctrines. It has already been
explained that the fundamental tenets of any religion are considered immutable on account of
they being generally divine revelations or the words of a revered final authority and therefore
act as justification for any practice, observance, ritual or belief endorsed by the follower of
that religion. However, these fundamental tenets, regardless of their holiness, can appear
ambiguous and incoherent and therefore are open to interpretations and often attract
challenges.
Thus, to take the correct interpretation to the followers who can reliably practice, profess and
preach with faith; to avoid ambiguities and vagueness; to pass the religious message to the
subsequent generations and to those who are not yet in the fold of religion; and to prepare a
defence against the challenges posed by philosophical scrutiny, scientific developments and
other competing and contending beliefs, theology undertakes the intensive study of religion
and strives to systematise and formalise it on a sound footing. The following are some of the
instances where theology can be witnessed attempting the same.
3.4.1 Furnishing proofs for the existence of God

It has been expounded earlier that the conception of God is central to many religions. The
collapse of this conception, therefore, may be coterminous with the collapse of such religions.
Possibilities of such an occurrence for any particular religion often emerge from the
challenges from other religions, philosophy and science. Consequently, one of the major
tasks theologians of any particular religion have undertaken is to prove the existence of (their
version of) God. To actualise the foregoing, theologians too, as philosophers do, rely on
arguments, but, unlike philosophy, theology frames the argument with a foregone conclusion
that God exists. Further, a refutation of challenges often requires theology to adopt
argumentation as a tool for the purpose, yet, in adopting argumentation, appeal to authority is
not renounced. Thus, theology, in the above-alluded sense, is stuck somewhere between the
48
need to address the mounting challenges of its time and the need to preserve the absolute
authority of the religious tenets.
3.4.2 Interprets the notion of God and attempts to demonstrate the

consistency between different attributes of God
One of the major contributions of theology in most religions is to clarify and crystallise the
conception of God, which is not just consistent with the metaphysics that a particular religion
advances but is also able to withstand philosophical scrutiny. Theology, in doing so, often
relies on the traditional attributes of God in a particular religion such as theologies of most
monotheistic religions rely on omnipotence, benevolence, omnipresence, eternality and
omniscience to define God. However, some of these traits, on philosophical scrutiny, don’t
seem to be compatible with each other such as the ones cited in the previous section, viz.,
‘omnipotence’ and ‘benevolence’ in the context of evil. Theologians, however, contest such
contradictions on account of the existence of ‘free-will’. Thus, non-intervention of God to
prevent evil, from the vantage point of theology, doesn't pose any conflict between God's
attributes.However, philosophical scrutiny still contends that such a conception of evil is very
narrow as it leaves natural disasters, epidemics, diseases etc. unexplained. Be that as it may,
the purpose of the aforesaid is not to demonstrate the strength or weakness of theological
arguments. Albeit, it is to show how theology complements religion by attempting to bring
together its various parts as a coherent whole.
3.4.3 Codification of ethical and moral precepts

Another significant task performed by theologians with implicationsfor the organisation of
society and directing the moral compass of individuals in the context of many religions has
been the codification of ethical and moral principles and their interpretations. Most religions
have commandments or imperatives that ought to be followed by a true follower, but mostly
such principles are open to interpretations. Theology, in this backdrop, provides contextual
interpretations to them and elaborates them for the reference of adherents, thereby playing a
significant role in demarcating the right and wrong for a section of society. Such a role in
many societies is not merely confined to the demarcations that can inform personal
conscience. There are legal implications too, governed by religion instituted jurisprudence.
Theology plays a crucial role in shaping and codifying its tenets. Most religions have their
own schools of jurisprudence, dictating the legal dynamics of the societies where they are
followed. For example, many countries of the world structure their whole legal system
49
around such doctrines whereas, in many others, a partial employment can be seen such as in
India, where it is only confined to personal laws.
3.4.4 Clarifies the religion instituted ways to self-actualise
It has been mentioned earlier that the meaning of life or the higher purpose of life is a
significant question that most religions address, but it is theology that strives to bring clarity
to the attributes of true human nature that is in consonance with the true purpose of human
life as religion conceives it. In doing so, it also, as in other instances, strives to address the
challenges that other religions, philosophy and science mount on it. Theology also
systematises the rituals and ceremonies to be performed while leading one's life according to
the dictates of religion. It includes specifying the rituals to be performed, their modes of
performance and when to perform them. Such systematisation often also includes prayers and
modes of worship as well.
Above-mentioned are some of the instances to demonstrate how theology systematically

studies religion to organise its imperatives and claims into coherent and logically consistent
canons.
The preceding effortof demarcation in this unit may seem suggestive of a clear distinction
between all three domains, but in practice, it has often been found that it’s not as plain sailing
as it seems. Various intersections between these domains do present situations where the
subject content of one province can be mistaken for the other. Such errors in judgement are
fairly common place. For instance, an oft-made error in judgement is to consider the
arguments advanced regarding the existence and nature of God, soul, self, etc. as theological
merely on the ground that the subject content involved is religious in character. However,
philosophy of religion too can indulge in the same subject content, advancing the arguments
with the same intent, i.e., to prove the existence of God or soul, to understand their nature;
and in doing so, it is not stripped off its philosophical character in any way.
Likewise, advertently or inadvertently, theological arguments too are offered in the guise of
philosophy. Argumentation is indeed central to both theology and philosophy of religion, but
it is not sufficient to characterise a dialogue as philosophical. For example, if an argument is
advanced to prove the existence of god, soul etc. without abandoning the appeal to authority
as the final justification, can one call such arguments philosophical, where positions are rigid,
truths are absolute, contending views are not given due considerations and the mode of
justification is not questioned? On the other hand, philosophical arguments can also be made
50
for the existence of God and soul etc.with a critical scrutiny of one’s own position and modes
of judgement, an openness and due consideration for alternate and contending positions, an
incessant vigilance for cognitive biases and fallacies. Philosophy is not hesitant to question
the foundation of any knowledge system and if reason dictates, it is prepared to alter its
position, meaning it is ever-cautiousof slipping intoan abyss of absoluteness.

1. In the event of already existing religious doctrines, what do you think is the role of
theology?
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3.5 LET US SUM UP

As stated in the beginning, religion, philosophy of religion and theology represent an overlap
of domains, which may evoke a false sense of resemblance. The effort has been made in the
unit to present an uncluttered elucidation of their distinction.
Religion is a socio-cultural phenomenon represented by a set of beliefs, associated practises

and observances that dictate and shape the way of life of its adherents. It’s influence lies in
itsclaimto offer answers to some of our fundamental concerns such as nature of reality and
existence, our place in it, our nature and purpose in such a reality and a conception of good
and evil within the contours of such a reality. In doing so, it uncompromisingly relies on the
appeal to authority as a mode of justification, entailing that an adherent doesn’t have any
other recourse other than to rely on faith to embrace such a belief system.
Theology, on the other hand, is a religion-specific or even a sub-sect specific attempt to

systematise and formalise religious tenets into a coherent organic whole. Such an endeavour
is often undertaken with the intent to present an unambiguous version of religion to its
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adherents to ensure their unhindered following, practices and observances, to impart religious
teachings to the initiated and the uninitiated, and also to address the challenges mounting
from other religions, philosophical examination and challenging scientific facts.
Philosophy of religion, however, in its scrutiny, adopts a posture of scepticism for religious
tenets, and attempts to understand the soundness of religious belief systems within the larger
context of theological formalism of religion, the outcomes and developments associated with
general philosophical enquiries inother domainsand incessant scientific developments and
other opposing or concurring positions.
3.6 KEYWORDS
Philosophy of Religion: A second order activity that inspects aspects of religion(s) and the
arguments advanced by their respectivetheologieswith a critical eye.
Theology: An effort to systematise/organise/formalise religious tents into a coherent body of beliefs

for the adherents to practice, profess, preach and teach them with faith and for addressing the
challenges posed by philosophical scrutiny, scientific developments of the time and other competing
and contending belief systems.

Galloway, G. The Philosophy of Religion in Relation to Philosophy & Theology. In The
philosophy of religion (pp. 46-53). Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1914.
Hick, J. Philosophy of religion (4th ed.). Prentice Hall, 1990.
Moore, B. N., & Parker, R. Critical thinking (13th ed.). McGraw-Hill Education, 2021.
Yandell, K. E. What is philosophy? What is religion? What is philosophy of religion? In

Philosophy of religion: A contemporary introduction (pp. 15–19). Routledge, 2002.
Answer to Check Your Progress I

1. Religion is a core set of beliefs, associated practices and observances with crucial
identifiable elements that demarcate its territory. The following are some of these
elements that allow such a demarcation.
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Firstly, most religions claim to provide the architecture of our reality, where our life,
physical world and associated aspects are provided with a meaning often in a broader
context than what is apparent. Such a context, for most religions, generally involves a
detailed exposition of our true nature and a well-defined purpose of our life that is in
consonance with such a nature and the rest of the reality. Secondly, the source of such
knowledge, in most religions, is some religious authority, scriptures or revelations. Thus,
inevitably, most religious doctrines hinge on faith and appeal to authority for justification.
Thirdly, most religions demarcate the territory of good and bad, and by issuing
commandments or imperatives which ought to be followed, they attempt to ensure ethical
conduct that is coterminous with the religion defined purpose of life. Finally, most
religions systemically institute modes of worship, rituals to be practised, prayers to be
offered and ceremonies to be conducted as a meaningful part of their constructed reality.
Answer to Check Your Progress II
1. Philosophy of religion is a second-order enquiry into the beliefs, associated practices

and observances that characterise religion, espousing an attitude of scepticism and
relying on the tool of argumentation for justification. In carrying out its enquiry, it
examines the concepts and propositions advanced by religion for logical
inconsistencies and incoherence. Further, it also scrutinises the religious tenets in
view of the developments and outcomes associated with general philosophical
enquiry, scientific investigation and other competing, contending and even concurring
positions. Religion, in the aforementioned sense, is the subject matter of philosophy
of religion.
Answer to Check Your Progress III

1. Theology is the study of religion with the intent to systematize/ formalize/ organise its
declarations and imperatives into doctrines. The task is undertaken to take the correct
interpretation to the followers who can reliably practice, profess and preach with
faith; to avoid ambiguities; and to pass the religious message to the subsequent
generations and to those who are not yet in the fold of religion. Further, the emphasis
of theology, in the foregoing context, is to weed out inconsistencies and establish
coherency between various components of religion in a way that is also capable of
addressing the challenges posed by philosophical scrutiny, scientific developments,
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and other competing and contending belief systems. To give effect to its intent,
theology, much like philosophy of religion, relies on the instrument of argumentation
but in doing so it doesn’t abandon the appeal to authority as its final means of
justification.
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Unit 4 RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE*
Structure
4.0 Objectives
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Religious Language as a Sacred Substance
4.3 Three Traditional Ways
4.4 Meaning of Theological predicates
4.5 Non-Assertive Interpretations
4.6 Let Us Sum Up
4.7 Key Words
4.0 OBJECTIVES
The main objective of this unit is to make the learner understand the various approaches
to religious languages including – its meaning, its problems and the ways in which
language has been regarded as the manifestation of the sacred. In this regard the present
unit will familiarize you with the following issues:
• Language as sacred substance
• the traditional understanding
• the meaning of Theological predicates
• non assertive interpretations
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Language, as a fundamental mode of human expression and communication, becomes a
central element in every religious tradition. Traditional terms used to describe the
forms of religious discourse include prayer, praise, petition, confession, exhortation, etc.
*
Augustine Mundiath, Sawangi Meghe, Wardha. (This unit is a revides version of units ‘Religious
Language-I’ and “Religious Language- II’ of BPYE-001 compiled by Mahak Uppal, Assistant Professor of
Philosophy, Hindu College, University of Delhi.)
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An explanation of the nature of religious language depends upon how we define
religion and language. The key to the modern understanding of language is to see it as an
integrated system of components that are concerned with form and purpose, as well as with
meaning. Spoken languages manifest themselves as a purposeful human activity that can
be analyzed in terms of its intended effect within a social context. Various attempts have
been made to understand the relation between the religious and secular languages. On this
view three basic approaches to the study of religious language can be outlined.
1 The First approach assumes that religion refers to some transcendent ‘sacred’ reality
which concerns itself with certain all-encompassing questions such as the meaning of
life and death, good and evil, and suffering.
2 The Second approach views religion as basically an expression of emotions.
With both of these approaches, religious language is not to be taken literally but is to be
understood as being a symbolic representation of emotions that are non-cognitive. Many of
the terms that are applied in religious discourse tend to be used in special ways. Most of
them differ starkly from their use in ordinary contexts. There is, therefore, a long shift of
meaning between the familiar use of these words and their theological employment. When
we use these terms in a religious context, they all tend to adopt a peculiar meaning and
outlook.
3 The Third approach denies that there is anything special about religious language. This
approach draws upon the semantic theory of language and sides with Logical
Positivism in claiming that the meaning of religious language should be explained as
a part of ordinary language in which meaning is determined by the truth conditions
entailed by all languages.
4.2 RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE AS A SACRED SUBSTANCE
One of the most important aspects of the modern understanding of language is the
realization that meaning rests on the conventional relationship between the signified and
signifier. The signifier, which usually appears in the form of a word (written or spoken), is
comprised of both form and substance. Form is comprised of the phonological and
grammatical rules of proper formation and Substance is its sound (in the case of a spoken
word). The meaning of a word, however, is not inherent in either its form or substance.
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In pre-modern attitudes toward language, such distinctions were usually not made. To
regard some linguistic manifestation as sacred did not imply that it was exclusively the
meaning that was taken to be holy. More often it was the exact form or even the veritable
substance in which it was expressed that was felt to be the locus of the sacrality. This is
seen most clearly in the reluctance or refusal to allow the translation of certain religious
expressions into terms of other languages. Religious traditions have often held the position
that synonymy does not preserve sacrality.
Understandably, many of the world religions developed the idea that an entire language,
usually other than the vernacular, is sacred. Such languages are often reserved for liturgical
or ritualistic functions. A sacred language usually begins as a vernacular through which a
revelation is believed to have been received. This can lead to the belief that the language is
particularly suited for revelation, and that it is superior to other languages and thereby
inherently sacred.
Many traditional people, as well as high cultures, recite sacred doctrines and rituals in an
archaic form of speech that may appear to be only barely comprehensible to the ordinary
users of that language. In such cases the language itself is regarded as sacred, not because
it is different from the vernacular, but rather because it contains the doctrines of revered
figures from the past, such as gods, prophets, or ancestors. The desire to express the eternal
validity of some scripture or liturgy by disallowing any change in its language has the
potential for making the language itself, and the sacred meaning being conveyed thereby,
largely unintelligible to those without special training.
Whenever language becomes a mere “form” to the common person, having lost the ability
to convey any message beyond its symbolic representation of a particular manifestation of
sacrality, it incites a reaction by those who see a need for a scripture or liturgy that can
once again speak and teach. Many religious movements have begun on this very note,
railing against frozen formalism, demanding and usually producing vernacular expressions
of their religious feeling.
4.2.1 Set of sacred words

Not all religions, however, consider an entire language to be sacred; instead, most treat
some special subset of speech as an embodiment of the sacred. In such cases it is usually
held that the mere uttering or hearing of words from this special set, (which usually takes
the form of a collection of sacred scriptures), will be efficacious, irrespective of whether
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the meaning itself is understood. This emphasis on formulaic (as opposed to spontaneous)
language brings with it an emphasis on techniques of preservation and precise recitation of
the given texts, rather than on methods for inspiration and creation of new expressions.
4.2.2 The Speaker

The characteristics possessed by the speaker have often been regarded as equally
significant factors contributing to, or detracting from, the sacred impact of the words
uttered. The greatest impact comes when the speaker is regarded, in effect, as being a god.
Very dramatic are those cases where a god is believed to talk directly and immediately
through a person in the present tense as in the case of Oracles. For human persons, their
status also affects the sacrality attributed to their words. Particular status may even be a
necessary precondition for the use of sacred words. Priests for example, may have
exclusive rights to the use of liturgical utterances.
All religions have struggled with the problem of keeping their tradition of rites and prayers
from becoming an empty formalism. They insisted that a certain quality of heart or mind
must accompany the recitation of the sacred formulas. This usually involves a greater
attention to the meaning of the language and requires a different attitude on the part of the
speaker than a focus on mere exactness in the repetition of the forms.
4.2.3 The Hearer

There is a great difference in perspective on the issue of the sacrality of language between
the speaker and the hearer or audience. On many occasions, the intended hearer of the
sacred discourse is a God or a Deity. However, unlike the addressee of an ordinary
conversation, the addressed Gods and Deities seldom ever talk back. Many a times the
discourse ends up as a monologue, or even as a ritual where there may be multiple
speakers, where the participants are seldom responding to, conversing with, or addressing
one another.
4.2.4 The Medium

The spoken word uses the medium of sound for its transmission. This gives it qualities that
make it quite distinct from the written word, which is conveyed through the medium of
print. Many cultures regard the speaking of an utterance as the manifestation of power. The
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word thereby came to be viewed as an active force that is immediately and directly
responsible for shaping the world itself. For instance, the texts of ancient Sumer provide
the first example of the commonly found doctrine of the creative power of the divine word.
The major deities of the Sumerian pantheon first plan creation by thinking, then utter the
command and pronounce the name, and the object comes into being. In the first book of
Bible, namely Genesis, God brings order out of chaos by simply speaking “Let there be
light” and by naming “God called the light Day, and the Darkness he called Night”.
Adam’s giving of names to the plants and animals in the second chapter of Genesis further
embodies the idea of the manifestation of physical existence with linguistic utterance. The
Vedas too contain the most developed speculations which acknowledge that speech is a
basic cosmic force. One Vedic god, Prajapati (the god of creation) speaks the primal
syllables ‘bhur, bhuvah, svah’ to create the earth, atmosphere, and heaven. He is said to
give order to the world through name and form, which are elsewhere called his manifest
aspects. These two terms ‘nama-rupa’ are key elements in much of later Hindu Philosophy,
standing for the two basic dimensions of reality. The single most important term from this
earliest stratum of Indian thought on language is ‘vac’ meaning speech. It has been
personified as an independent deity, the goddess who is Prajapati’s wife and who is, in
some places, given the role of the true active agent in creating or becoming the Universe.
4.2.5 The Context

Any Language which is regarded as sacred quite often has as its context a ritual setting.
Yet, it may also find expression in settings other than the specified ritual, as in the case of
spontaneous prayers or the occasional use of magic spells. The relationship between the
ritual language and its context is much different from that between ordinary language and
its context. Since ritual language is, for the most part, the repetition of a fixed text, it may
be seen as preceding and, in effect, creating, its context rather than reflecting and
representing in speech a context regarded as prior and already defined. Therefore, much
ritual language tends to be directed towards defining the characteristics of the participants
and the nature of the ritual situation. The rich symbolism of both the object and the action
that marks off ritualistic behavior from ordinary behavior adds yet another distinctive trait
to religious language. Its message is often paralleled in the symbolic systems of those other
media—the visual and tactile properties of the physical objects, the kinesthetic sensibilities
of gesture and movement—which then serve to reinforce, enhance, or even complete the
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verbal meaning.
4.3 THREE TRADITIONAL WAYS

In the thirteenth century, St. Thomas Aquinas (1224-74) argued that religious language is
analogical, that is, it conveys truth but not literal truth. In the same century, John Duns
Scotus (1264-1308) contended that Thomas’s view was incoherent, and according to him
only two options were possible: univocal and equivocal language. For instance, the word
‘bat’ can mean two different things, a baseball bat or a flying mammal. If we do not
know which one of these objects is being referred to, then the use is equivocal; and if we
know which object is being referred then the use of that word is literal or univocal. Apart
from these two uses, Duns Scotus insists, no other alternative exists. The possibility of the
equivocal use of religious and scriptural language did not receive much attention, for it
was assumed that since religious language does appear to be meaningful, it must be either
univocal or analogical.
4.3.1 The Negative Way
The assertion that all religious language is equivocal led to the view that all words were
to be denied or negated in order to understand the Ultimate Reality truly. It is for this
reason that this alternative is often designated as the ‘negative way’ (via negativa). This
view was held by German mystic Meister Eckhart (1260-1327) and by the Jewish
Philosopher, Moses Maimonides (1135-1204). This tradition sees language as valuable
only in the sense of being evocative of an experience of the divine or the ultimate.
While this view may strike us as being skeptical, but interestingly, it has been defended
by those who have had the emphatic vision about the reality and vividness of an experience
of God. This is the view of the mystical traditions of all religions. In the West, this
idea is rooted in Platonic thought which was influenced by Eastern ideas mediated by the
Pythagorean School. Neo-Platonism emphasized the aspect of Plato’s thought that stressed
the transcendence of the One or Good and the way the One is beyond all categorical
language or thought.
Plotinus (204-70) in the third century asserted that the One is beyond all knowing and
saying. The One emanates into intellect and from intellect emanates soul and from soul
emanates matter. The ascent to the One happens through a purification from matter to
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soul and soul to intellect and from intellect to One. It is an imageless or apophatic
type of meditation. One quits oneself by getting rid of the ‘lowest’ and moving to the
‘higher’. One quits the body, followed by the images of the mind, then the words and
thoughts of the mind, opening up the possibility of the unmediated encounter with the
One. What is usually emphasized is that this experience is ineffable yet intensely real.
Pseudo-Dionysius or Dennis the Areopagite shows in “The Divine Names’ how the names
of God do not literally describe God, but that rather they point to God as the cause all
things. Treating this way of understanding God as subordinate to the negative way he
argues that “the higher we ascend the more our language becomes restricted” until finally
we arrive at “a complete absence of discourse and intelligibility”. The way we must follow
to this highest point is ultimately ‘via negativa’ which means that all terms must be
denied of God.
Similarly, in the Indian Philosophical tradition, the concept of ‘neti neti’ (not this not that)
reveals the indescribability of Brahman by any attributes or linguistic conceptions. The
idea of Nirguna Brahman as discussed by Shankaracharya explains that we cannot describe
Brahman either positively or negatively. Brahman is beyond all positive and negative
qualities and attributions.
A striking illustration of this approach can be noted from the following passage of Pseudo
– Dionysius’ ‘Mystical Theology’.
Once more, ascending yet higher we maintain that It is not soul, or mind, or endowed with the
faculty of imagination, conjecture, reason, or understanding; nor is It any act of reason or
understanding; nor can It be described by reason or perceived by the understanding, since
It is not number, or order, or greatness, or littleness, or equality or inequality, and since It is
not immovable nor in motion, or at rest, and has power, and is not power or light, and does
not live and is not life; nor It is personal essence, nor eternity, or time; nor It be grasped by the
understanding, since It is not knowledge or truth;…nor It is Spirit, as we understand the
term, since It is not son -ship or Fatherhood;…It transcends all affirmation by being the
perfect and unique Cause of all things, and transcends all negation by the pre-eminence of Its
simple and absolute nature – free from every limitation and beyond them all…
This passage relies on the common method of the negative way, whereby one moves
beyond words and concepts by denying them, thereby leading not to skepticism or
unbelief, but precisely to the truth and the insight of actual experience that God is beyond
all such words. This represents a reliance on language, but it is reliance in a functional
or evocative sense only. Not only are the negative terms–evil, falsehood, unreality– denied
but even the positive terms– goodness, truth, reality– also are negated. However at the
very end the author alludes to an unusually straight forward assertion. When he deals with
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the question of why we should approach God in this way, he relies upon a common rational
explanation of God’s relation to the world.
This last step in Dionysius’ analysis points to a perplexing inconsistency on the part of
most proponents of the equivocal way. It is very difficult to speak and write about what
one has experienced, and to communicate about it, when this is what you want to disallow
and deny. At the same time, this approach is a reminder, especially to the univocal way,
that language is notoriously unstable when applied to God. It is a warning against the
idolatry of language.
4.3.2 The Univocal way
John Duns Scotus defines univocal language as follows: “I call that a univocal concept
whose unity suffices for contradiction when it is affirmed and denied of the same things. It
also suffices as a syllogistic middle term”. For example, in the syllogism - All humans are
mortal; Socrates is human; therefore, Socrates is mortal – ‘human’ is used univocally as the
middle term. Scotus recognized that there is much figurative language in Scripture, but the
implication is that we would not know what such language meant apart from being able to
translate it into literal language.
Theologian Carl Henry follows Scotus is arguing that “only univocal assertions protect us
from equivocacy; only univocal knowledge is, therefore, genuine and authentic
knowledge”. Yet in the same breath Henry also tells us that “of course God is
epistemologically transcendent; of course human beings do not have exhaustive knowledge
of him”. This concession appears to take back with one hand what he gave with the other.
One can see in this Henry’s awareness of doing justice to the transcendence of God, and
that too at the risk of falling into self-contradiction, which was one of the dangers of the
equivocal way. Schubert Ogden is another theologian who in his later writings firmly
upheld the univocal way. He says that unless there is a univocal foundation, we cannot
ascribe meaning to the use of symbolic or metaphorical language.
While it is clear that the univocal way is still alive and well, but it needs to be recognized
that it has its inherent problems too. It may be that if the only choice is between equivocal
or univocal language, many may choose the latter; but the cost is high. It is difficult to see
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how we can move from literal language, with its context in everyday life, to the
transcendence of God without sacrificing something precious to common religious
sensibilities. That is why it is often that those who are most committed to spirituality opt
for the equivocal way.
4.3.3 The Analogical way
Thomas Aquinas opted for the analogical way, with the aim of doing justice to the
intentions of both the other ways and yet avoiding their shortcomings. His appeal to
analogy became the standard model for understanding religious language. He began with
the ‘via negativa’ and ruled out the possibility of the univocal way from the very outset.
He believed that God is not a being like other beings. God cannot be ‘classified’ into some
genus and species. Every term used of God must consequently be denied, “for what He is
not is clearer to us than what He is”. Aquinas agreed with Scotus that we do have
cognitive revelation, i.e., we know something of God and can express this knowledge in
language. As Aquinas says “If then, nothing was said of God and creatures except in a
purely equivocal way, no reasoning proceeding from creatures to God could take place.
But, the contrary is evident from all those who have spoken about God”. How do we
understand this “mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation”? Aquinas’
answer is that we know and speak of God ‘analogically’. We can understand this assertion
in two ways: analogy of attribution or proportion and analogy of proportionality.
Analogy of attribution can be understood through an example that Aquinas uses. We
attribute health to persons in a literal sense, that is persons possess health ‘formally’. On
the other hand, we might say of medicine that it, too, is healthy, but it certainly is not
healthy in the literal sense that people are healthy. The reason seems to be that medicine
causes people to be healthy; thus, it is healthy in a derivative or ‘virtual’ sense. When we
then turn to Aquinas’ famous emphasis on God as the first or uncaused cause of the world,
it follows that since God is the cause of everything, the names of everything can be
virtually attributed to God. God is love because God is the cause of love.
For Aquinas analogy is a much more potent category than metaphor. The second approach
to analogy, that of proportionality, follows from the name itself. We may say that a
cabbage has life or is alive. Probably we would consider that it has life literally in the way
that any other garden plant lives. On the other hand, we may consider that there is only a
proportional relationship between the life of a cabbage, and a rabbit. Life functions
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differently in both cases, but it is also similar, that is, analogical. When applied to God,
the proportionality is simply extended. We then would say that life is to a cabbage as life
is to God. God has life or love or goodness, or power, in the way appropriate to God. The
two approaches to analogy thus complement each other.
4.4 MEANING OF THEOLOGICAL PREDICATES
Most philosophers have located the difficulties of religious language in the predicates of
theological statements. What, for instance, does the term ‘good’ mean in ‘God is good’?
while it may seem that the starting point for understanding the meaning of such statements
should be the concept of God, yet it may be argued that the only way to make clear what
one means by ‘God’ is to provide an identifying description, such as ‘the creator of the
universe’; and therefore to have a coherent understanding of theological statements one
must understand the predicate ‘creator of the universe’ as applied to God.
4.4.1 Derivation and application

When one reflects on the use of predicates in theological statements one comes to realize
two fundamental facts. 1) This use is necessarily derivative from the application of the
predicates to human beings and other observable entities; and 2) The theological use of
predicates is markedly different from the application of predicates to human beings.
Theological predicates are derivative primarily because it is impossible to teach theological

language from scratch. How would one teach a child what it means to say “God has
spoken to me” without first making sure that child knows what it is for a human being to
speak to him? In order to do so one would have to have some reliable way of determining
when God was speaking to him, so that when this happens one could say to him “that is
what it is for God to speak to you”. And even if we admit that God does speak to people
from time to time, there is no way for one person to tell when God is speaking to
another person unless the other person tells him, which would require that the other
person have already mastered the theological use of language. Hence there is no alternative
to the usual procedure of teaching the theological use of terms by extension from their
application to empirically observable objects.
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As for the difference in the use of predicates as applied to God and to human beings, there
are many ways of seeing that terms cannot have quite the same meaning in both cases. If,
as in classical Christian theology, God is conceived of as not in time, then it is clear that
God’s performance of actions like speaking, making, or comforting is something
radically different from the temporally sequential performance of actions by human beings.
Aquinas in his famous discussion of this problem based the distinction between the
application of predicates to human beings and the application of predicates to God on the
principle that God is an absolute unity and that, therefore, various attributes and activities
are not distinguishable in God as they are in men. But even if we allow God to be temporal
and straightforwardly multifaceted, we are left with the corporeal–incorporeal difference. If
God does not have a body, it is clear that speaking, making, or comforting cannot be the
same thing for God as for man.
This leaves us with a serious problem. We must show how the theological use of these
terms derives from their non theological use. The usual way of dealing with this problem is
by cutting out the inapplicable portions of the original meaning of the terms, leaving the
remainder for theology. Thus, since God is incorporeal, his speaking cannot involve
producing sounds by expelling air over vocal cords. What is left is that God does
something which results in the addressee having an experience of the sort he would have
if some human being were speaking to him. The nature of the ‘something’ is deliberately
left vague. Since God is a pure spirit, it will presumably be some conscious mental act;
perhaps an act of will to the effect that the addressee shall have the experience of being
told such and such. More generally, to attribute any interpersonal action to God is to
attribute to him a purely mental act which has as its intended result a certain experience,
like the one that would result from such an action on the part of the human agent.

1. What are the traditional approaches to religious Language?
…………………………………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………..
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…………………………………………………………………………………..
4.4.2 Verifiability of Theological statements

In the last few decades a great many philosophers have come to accept some form of the
‘verifiability theory of meaning’, according to which one is making a genuine factual
assertion, a real claim as to the way the world is, only if it is possible to conceive of some
way in which what he is saying can be shown to be true or false by empirical observation.
Applying this theory to theology, it has been argued that since an empirical test is in
principle impossible to carry out for statements about a supernatural incorporeal personal
deity, these statements cannot be regarded as straightforward factual assertions, but must
be interpreted in some other way.
4.4.2.1 Are theological statements testable?
The question of whether theological statements are subjects to empirical test is quite
complicated. If we rule out mystical experience as a means of observation, then it is clear
that statements about God cannot be tested directly. But science is full of hypotheses about
unobservable entities –electromagnetic fields, social structures, instincts, etc.— which
verificationists accept as meaningful because they can be tested indirectly. That is,
from these hypotheses we can draw implications which can themselves be tested by
observation. The question is whether directly testable consequences can be drawn from
theological statements. We can phrase this question as follows: Would we expect any
possible observations to differ according to whether there is or is not a God? It would
clearly be unreasonable to require of the theologian that he specify a set of observations
which would conclusively prove or disprove his assertions.
One thing that makes this problem difficult is the fact that on this point religious belief
differs at different times and places. Supernatural deities have often been thought of as
dealing in a fairly predictable way with contingencies in the natural world and human
society. Thus, in many primitive religions it is believed that gods will bring abundant
crops or victory in battle if they are approached in certain ways through prayer and ritual.
Even in advanced religious traditions like the Judaeo-Christian, it is believed that God has
certain fixed intentions which will result in prayers being answered and will result in the
final victory of the people who believe in him.
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It would seem that such expectations provide a basis for empirical test. In so far as they are
fulfilled, the theology is confirmed; in so far as they are frustrated it is disproved.
However, things are not that simple. Even in primitive communities such tests are rarely
allowed to be decisive; the empirical implications are hedged around with a variety of
escape clauses. If the ritual dances are held and still the crops fail, there are several
alternatives to abandoning traditional beliefs about the gods. Perhaps there was an
unnoticed slip somewhere in the ritual; perhaps devils were conducting counter rituals.
More sophisticated explanations are employed in the more advanced religions. For
example, God will answer prayers, but only when doing so would be for the good of the
supplicant.
4.4.2.2 Are theological Statements assertions of fact?

As to whether a statement that cannot be empirically tested must not be construed as an
assertion of fact, a theologian might well challenge the application of the verifiability
theory to theology. If God is supernatural, we should not expect his behaviour to be
governed by any laws or regulations we could hope to discover. But we could never be
certain that, for example, the statement that God loves his creatures would imply that a war
should have one outcome rather than another. This would mean that, according to
verifiability theory, it would be impossible for us to make any statements, even false
ones, about such a being. But a theory which would prevent us from recognizing the
existence of a certain kind of entity, if it did exist, would be an unreasonable theory.

1. What are the fundamental facts concerning the use of predicates in theological
statements?
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4.5 NON-ASSERTIVE INTERPRETATIONS
Thinkers like George Santayana, without holding that theological sentences are factually
meaningless, were still unwilling to abandon traditional religious discourse. They feel that
somehow it has a valuable function in human life, and in order to preserve it they are
forced to reinterpret it so that the unwarranted factual claims are expunged.
Based on how the statements about God have been interpreted, non-assertive
interpretations can be divided into four groups, i.e., as 1) expressions of feelings of various
thoughts; 2) Symbolic presentations of a variety of vital aspects of experiences, from
natural facts to moral ideals; 3) Integral elements in ritualistic worship; and 4) A unique
kind of ‘mystical ‘or symbolic’ expression, not reducible to any other use of language.
1. Expressions of feeling
Theological utterances have been interpreted as expressions of feelings that arise in

connection with religious belief and activity. Thus we might think of “God made the
heavens and the earth” as an expression of the sense of owe and mystery evoked by
grandeurs of nature; of “God has predestined every man to salvation or damnation” as an
expression of a pervasive sense of helplessness; and of “God watches over the affairs of
men” as an expression of a sense of peace, security, at-homeness in the world. This is a
‘poetic’ expression rather than expression by expletives. It is like expressing a sense of
futility by saying “life is a walking shadow” rather than like expressing futility by saying
‘Ah, me’. That is, the feeling is expressed by depicting a situation which might naturally
evoke it; a sense of security, for instance, is evoked by some powerful persons looking
after one.
2. Symbolic Presentations
Symbolic interpretations of religious doctrines have been common for a long time. Many
of the traditional ways of speaking about God have to be taken as symbolic. God cannot
literally be a shepherd or rock. The shepherd functions as a symbol of providence and rock
as a symbol for God’s role as a refuge and protection in time of trouble. A symbol in this
sense is some concrete object, situation, or activity which can be taken to stand for the
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ultimate object of discourse through some kind of association, usually on the basis of
similarity. We speak symbolically when what we literally refer to is something which
functions as a symbol.
It is usually only a part of the theological discourse which is taken as symbolic. For if we
have to hold that the symbolic utterances are symbolizing facts about God, we will have to
have some way of saying what those facts are; and we cannot make that specification in
symbolic terms, on pain of infinite regress. But we are now considering views according
to which all theological discourse is symbolic, which means that if we are to say what is
being symbolized it will have to be something in the natural world that can be specified in
non-theological terms. The most common version of such a view is that theological
utterances are symbolic presentations of moral ideals, attitudes, or values. This position
has been set forth most fully and persuasively by George Santayana. According to him
every religious doctrine involves two components: a kernel of moral or valuational insight,
and a poetic or pictorial rendering it. Thus the doctrine that the physical universe is a
creation of a supremely good personal deity is a pictorial rendering of the insight that
everything in the world is potentially usable for the enrichment of the human life. It is
worthwhile embodying these moral insights in theological doctrine because this vivid
presentation, together with the systematic cultivation of feelings and attitudes that
accompanies it, provide a more effective way of getting across the insights than would a
bald statement.
3. Ritualistic interpretation
In the view under consideration, the practice of worship is the native soil from which talk
about God springs. Talk about the attributes, doings, and intentions of a supernatural
personal being has meaning as a part of the practice of worship and is puzzling only
when it is separated from that context. If we think of an utterance like “God made the
heavens and the earth” as the expression of a belief about the way things in fact originated
and then wonder whether it is true or false, we will be at a loss. To understand it we have
to put it back into the setting where it does its work. In that setting, these words are not
being used to explain anything, but to do something quite different.
Unfortunately, proponents of this view have never been very clear about what this
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‘something different’ is. The clearest suggestion they give is that the talk about God serves
to provide an imaginative framework for the conduct of worship. It articulates one’s sense
that something important is going on, and it keeps to indicate the appropriateness of one
response rather than another. This position presupposes, contrary to the usual view, that
ritual worship has an autonomous value, apart from an y theological foundation. It is
generally supposed that a given ritual has a point only if certain theological doctrines are
objectively true. But in ritualistic interpretation, theological doctrines are not regarded as
statements about which questions of truth or falsity are properly raised. Since these
doctrines depend for their significance on the ritual, it is supposed that the ritual has
some intrinsic value in forming and giving expression to valuable sentiments, feelings, and
attitudes.
4. Myths
Ernst Cassirer has developed the notion that the basis of religious discourse lies in a unique
‘symbolic form’ which he terms ‘mythical’. He maintains that it is found in purest form in
the myths of the primitive people and is based on a way of perceiving and thinking about
the world which is radically different from our accustomed mode. In the ‘mystical
consciousness’ there is no sharp distinction between the subjective and the objective. No
clear line is drawn between symbol and object, between wish and fulfillment, between
perception and fantasy.
The mythical consciousness carries its own special organizations of space and time. For
example, there is no distinction made between a position and what occupies it; every
spatial position is endowed with a qualitative character and exerts influence as such.
Sophisticated theology represents an uneasy compromise between mythical and scientific
modes of thought, and as such cannot be understood without seeing how it has developed
from its origins. It is basically a mythical view of the world, given a ‘secondary
elaboration’ in a vain attempt to make it acceptable to the rationalistic consciousness;
judged by rationalistic standards it may not only appear groundless, but meaningless.
To the mystic the only way to communicate with God is through mystical experience, and
this experience reveals God to be an ineffable unity. He can be directly intuited in
mystical experience. The most we can do in language is to direct our hearers to the mode
of experience which constitutes the sole means of access. Proponents of this view
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sometimes speak of theological language as ‘symbolic’, but this differs from our second
type of theory in that here there is no way to symbolize, and it is therefore questionable
whether we should use the term ‘symbol’. A symbol is always a symbol of something. In
fact, it is difficult to make clear just what, on this view, religious utterances are supposed to
be doing. They are said to ‘point to’, ‘adumbrate’ or ‘indicate’ the ineffable divine reality,
but all too often these expressions remain in-sufficient.
It would seem that any talk about God and the religious discourse itself is much more
complex than is recognized by any of the existing theories. Theological sentences
perform a great many closely interrelated linguistic functions. In saying ‘God, who
created the world, watches over the affairs of men,’ the believer is committing himself to
approach God in prayer and ritual in one way rather than another. And these functions
are intimately dependent on each other. What is therefore needed, is a description of the
relationship among these functions, one sufficiently complex to match the complexity of
the subject matter
1. What are the divisions of the non-assertive interpretations of Religious Language?
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4.6 LET US SUM UP
All religions have their own language to speak about the Ultimate, to express the feeling of
sacred, awe and holiness. Word has a power of creation and is a sacred substance.
Religious language is spoken in the atmosphere of speaker, hearer, medium and a context.
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It has a power of transformation and the participants can experience it in the ritual objects
and goals. Religious language is used as means of worship in invocation, praise, offering
and petition.
There are traditional and non- traditional approaches to understanding the nature of
religious language. All approaches have their own advantages and its own limitations.
The language of religion is comprised of a set of symbols, myths, metaphors, mysticism
and esoteric signs which help men of religion to share and convey their profound and
ineffable emotions and experiences. The same function is performed by various rituals,
practices and observances. They are all acts without ordinary meaning. They perform the
function of symbols, representing realities of religion. Just as poetic expressions arouse in
readers and listeners certain emotional aura felt and experienced by the poet, similarly,
religious languages, or ceremonies and observances convey to others some shared
experiences and certain intimations from unknown or unseen.
4.7 KEY WORDS

Analogy: Analogy is an inference or an argument from one particular to another particular,
as opposed to deduction, induction and abduction.
Language: Language is a particular kind of system for encoding and decoding
information.
Negative way: It is a theological theory that attempts to describe God, by negation, to

speak only in terms of what may not be said about the perfect goodness that is God.
Tradition: Belief or customs taught by one generation to the next.

Univocal: A word is used univocally when it means exactly the same thing in several
contexts. Symbolic presentation: It is the practice of representing things by means of
symbols or ofattributing symbolic meaning or significance to objects, events, or
relationships.
Alston, William P. “Religious Language.” In: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Vol.8.
Ayer, A. J. Language, Truth and Logic. New York: Dover Publications, 1946.
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Ferre, Frederick. Language, Logic and God. Chicago: University of Chicago press, 1961.
Ramsey, Ian. T. Religious Language. SCM press, 1957.
Ricoeur, Paul. Hermeneutics and Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action, and
Interpretation. Ed. John B. Thompson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981.
Stiver Dan R. The Philosophy of Religious Language: Sign, symbol and Story. Blackwell
publishers, Oxford,1996.
Tillich,Paul. Systematic Theology. Vol.1. London: Nislect& Co., 1953.

Tracy, David. The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and Culture of Pluralism.
crossRoad, New York, 1981.
Wade T., Wheelock. “Sacred language.” In: Encyclopedia of Religion. Vols.7&8. Ed.
Mireca Eliade. New York: Macmilliam,
Willam. P. Alston. “‘Religious Language’ in Encyclopedia of Philosophy,” Vols
VII&VIII. Edited by Paul Edwards. New York: Macmillan, 1967.

1. The traditional approaches to religious language are:

a) The Negative way
b) The Univocal way
c) The Analogical way
1. There are two fundamental facts concerning the use of predicates in theological
statements, 1. Emperical testability, 2. Assertion of facts.
Answer to Check Your Progress III
1. Non assertive interpretations can be divided into four groups:

a) Expressions of feelings of various thoughts
b) Symbolic presentations of a variety of vital aspects of experiences, from natural
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facts tomoral ideals;
c) Integral elements in ritualistic worship
d) A unique kind of ‘mystical’ or ‘symbolic’ expression, not reducible to any other
use of language.
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Unit 5 RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE*
Structure
5.0 Objectives
5.1 Introduction
5.2 William James’ View on Religious Experience
5.3 Rudolf Ottos’s Analysis of Religious Experience
5.4 Let Us Sum Up
5.5 Key Words
5.0 OBJECTIVES
Our objective in this unit is to study closely two eminent writers who analyzed the
dimensions of religious experience. At the end of this unit learner will be able to
understand,
• Psychological view of William James
• Phenomenological view of Rudolf Otto
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The word “Experience” is ordinarily used to refer to an active act of consciousness. While
none of the medieval theologians considered “experience” as being central to their
theological works, the significance of this phenomenon began to assume a definite shape in
the contemporary period with the works of William James and Rudolf Otto. While William
James looked at religious experience mainly from the psychological point of view, Rudolf
Otto, a well-known phenomenologist of religion, tried to bring out the aspects of Divinity
and religious experience, which cannot be expressed through rational, deductive method.
William James’ Varieties of Religious Experience (1901) and Rudolf Otto’s Das Heilige
(1917) translated as The Idea of the Holy opened up new horizons of theorizing about
*
George Antony, St. Jude Ashram, Mukhathala. (This unit is a revised version of units ‘Religious
Experience-I’ and unit “Religious Experience- II’ of BPYE-001 compiled by Mahak Uppal, Assistant
Professor of Philosophy, Hindu College, University of Delhi.)
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religious experience.
5.2 WILLIAM JAMES ON RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature, is one of the most
important books dealing with the analysis of religious experience, albeit specifically
from a psychological perspective. In The Principles of Psychology James defined
experience as a ‘stream of consciousness’, an idea which becomes vital to his
understanding of religious experience as well. Accordingly, he pointed out organic and
temperamental reasons for the various religious experiences. In his book Radical
Empiricism, he underlines the importance of experience, and clarifies the meaning of
experience as something continuous, changing, and personal. According to him,
experience is self-contained and self-sufficient. He held that everything real must be
somewhere experiential. This principle of radical empiricism is also fundamental to
James’ epistemology. If there is genuine or authentic religious experience, it is based on
this founding principle. He suggests a method and a theory of truth. His method proposes
to interpret concepts in terms of their consequences, while as a theory of truth James
considers truth as an attribute of ideas rather than of reality, which can be verified by the
norm of usefulness. In other words, for James truth can be verified by experience and
experience is also to be verified by experience itself.
5.2.1 Religious Experience

Religious experience, according to William James is “the consciousness which
individuals have of an intercourse between themselves and higher powers with which
they feel themselves to be related. This intercourse is realized at the time as being both
active and mutual”.
The phrase ‘higher powers’ is used quite broadly by James and it is meant to be inclusive
of a variety of religious objects. According to him a conscious person is continuous with
a ‘wider self’ through which experiences come. ‘Wider self’, for James, was not the
normal ‘self’ of the conscious person, rather it was to be understood as having a
dimension wider than the sensible world, ultimately involving the mystical and the
supernatural as well. This unseen world must also be regarded as a present reality
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because it affects individuals and transforms their lives. He also maintained that religious
experiences have positive content because they manifest as conversations with the
unseen; voices and visions; responses to prayer; changes of heart; deliverances from fear;
inflowing of help; assurance of support; etc. According to James there are many forms or
varieties of religious experience. The religious experience in which there could be touch
of the ‘unseen’ is only one such form of religious experience.
James states three hypotheses which according to him are applicable to all forms of
religious experience.
1. There is the touch of the ‘more’, which may be the ‘higher spiritual agencies’.
2. The subconsciousness which is the intermediary either for divine encounter or
for abnormal psychic invasion
3. The active consciousness in which the individual realizes the experience as
something real.
Using these hypotheses, James tries to explain all kinds of religious experience, both
healthy and unhealthy, normal and abnormal. The unhealthy or abnormal cases remain,
according to him, as mere psychological phenomena. They are due to the invasions from
subconscious region, which take objective appearances and suggest to the subject an
external control. James speaks of the reality of genuine, healthy and normal religious
experience as well. In this case there is the touch of a ‘more’, ‘the unseen’, or ‘the
divine’. As our primary, wide-awake, consciousness throws open our senses to the touch
of the material things, so it is logically conceivable that there can also be higher spiritual
agencies that can directly touch man. The possibility for such experience, James
explains, might stem from our possession of a subconscious region which ends up
yielding access to the spiritual beings. In short, then, genuine religious experience of the
encounter of the ‘more’, ‘the unseen’, or ‘the higher spiritual agencies’, appear through
the subconscious region of the self. In this sense, the subconscious region becomes the
intermediary between the normal self and the higher spiritual agency.
5.2.2 Validity of Religious Experience
In judging the validity of religious experience, James applies his pragmatic method, and
indicates three criterions to accomplish it. These include:
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(1) Immediate luminousness
(2) philosophical reasonableness
(3) and moral helpfulness
Immediate luminousness means direct evidence of the fact as in perception. It is the

criterion of judging, based on our own immediate feeling. By philosophical
reasonableness, he means that the fact must be consistent with logic and
experimentation. It is the consistency of the alleged fact with the accepted principles,
i.e., the indirect evidence of the fact. Moral helpfulness means the congruence of the fact
with the passionate nature, especially with the resolute will. In short, the given fact
should be contributing to the moral needs and to the rest of what we hold as true and
good. By these criteria, therefore, James seeks the direct evidence of the fact, its
consistency with the existing truths, and its moral usefulness.
If one’s experience manages to withstand these three tests, then whether or not one is
hysterical or nervously off, his description makes no difference. When a religious
experience passes through these tests successfully, it can be considered true and valid.
Consistently applying these criteria, James however finds that they are not fully verified
in the case of religious experience. It is mainly because of its individual and private
character. Religious experience is immediately evident and morally helpful to the person
concerned. But they cannot be tested by scientific experiment, as a result of which they
tend to lack scientific validity. But that does not mean that they are not valid or true at
the individual level. In fact, James advocates that it is literally and objectively true and
can be very well held to be so, at the individual level.
5.2.3 Mysticism: An Intense Form of Religious Experience
As we have seen, James holds religious experience to be the consciousness in which the
individuals have a feeling of union with the higher powers. Mysticism may be identified
as a peculiar and intense form of religious experience. Mystical intuition, according to
James is to be understood as a sudden and great extension of the ordinary `field of
consciousness`.
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James enumerates four elements of mystical experience including: ineffability, noetic
quality, transiency, and passivity. Ineffability implies that the experience cannot be
expressed in words, for language is found to be inadequate to express its nature and
significance to one who has not experienced it. Noetic quality of religious experience
means that it is not just remarkable or pleasant but that it also contains a degree of
knowledge, i.e., states of insight into depths of truth plumbed by the discursive intellect.
Transiency means that the experience is not long lasting. Mystical instances may last half
an hour or at the most an hour or two. The passivity highlights the fact that the
experience, although often facilitated by personal concentration and discipline, involves
the subject losing his or her own will. The person here is over taken by an experience
that is, so to speak, forced upon him. That means this experience is not something that
can be turned on and off at will.
James was concerned mainly with the cognitive aspect of mysticism and its value as a
way of revelation. He omits the mention of visual and auditory hallucinations, verbal and
graphic automatisms such marvels as `levitation’, and the healing of disease. Though the
mystics have presented these phenomena in their witnesses, but James does not consider
them as essential to mysticism itself. For him, consciousness of illumination is the
essential mark of `mystical` states. Whatever may be the mental condition of the mystics,
James does not take away the value of the knowledge of consciousness which the
mystical states induce.
James does not see any scientific reason, in the strict sense, to account for mysticism. He
also qualifies many of the mystical cases as pathological. But he was very particular to
distinguish some cases as unique. James writes “When mystical activity is at its height,
we find the consciousness possessed by the sense of a being at once excessive and
identical with the self: great enough to be God; interior enough to be me. The
‘objectivity’ of it ought in that case to be called excessivity, rather, or exceedingness.”
He even argues that there is no philosophic excuse for calling the unseen or mystical
world unreal. The ‘effect’ this unseen world creates forces James to accept its existence.
He emphasizes that so far as our ideal impulses originate in this region, call it mystical
region or the supernatural region, we belong to it in a more intimate sense than that in
which we belong to the visible world, for we belong in the most intimate sense wherever
our ideals belong. Since the experience of the unseen world produces effects in this
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world, the unseen region in question is not merely ideal. When we commune with it, the
effect is actually imparted to our finite personality. Therefore, that which produces
effects within another reality must, according to James, be termed a reality itself.

1. Explain the logical conceivability of religious experience according to William James

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2. According to James what are the three criteria to judge the validity of religious
experience? How does he consider the pragmatic criterion as important to prove the
validity of religious experience?
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5.3 RUDOLF OTTOS’S ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS

EXPERIENCE
Rudolf Otto, a well-known phenomenologist of religion tries to bring out the aspects of
Divinity and religious experience, which cannot be expressed through rational and
deductive method. Das Heilige (The Idea of Holy), is the most important work of Otto
wherein he describes the religious experience as the experience of the Numinous.
Rudolf Otto presented a phenomenological analysis of the religious consciousness. In

contrast to the traditional rational method, Otto’s method was descriptive and
phenomenological. Phenomenology tries to investigate into what actually appears to
direct intuition. Husserl the originator of Phenomenology wanted to pay attention to the
phenomena of experience. It is the study of immediate, direct experience with the
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intention to build an ‘exact science’ of description, or even a method of precise, sharable
and testable description.
Phenomenology of religion is particularly concerned with examining

phenomenologically the character of religious experience taking the presented aspect or
moment within the stream of experience as an object of analysis and reflection. In this
way Rudolf Otto tried to describe the essential character of ‘the Holy’ through
phenomenological analysis of religious experience. In his book The Idea of Holy, he
phenomenologically analyses and describes what he calls ‘non-rational or supra-rational
in our religious experience.
5.3.1 Analysis of the Non-Rational in Religious Experience
Otto analyses the fundamental religious experience and tries to understand it in its own
terms, especially by elucidating the non- rational core of religion. Otto holds religion to
have a non-rational core which cannot be articulated in language. He does not deny the
rational side of religion. Otto’s point is that if we focus only on the rational side, we miss
the essential character of religious experience. To this non-rational, non-explainable
element of religion he gave the name “Numinous”. Now it may be asked that if the
religious realm cannot be explained in words, how can it be known? Here Otto explains
that, it can be known because everyone has an inborn sense of the numinous. In order to
show this non-rational character of such experiences he avoids using ordinary words to
describe them, preferring to use Latin words instead. Numinous is said to be mysterium
tremendum et fascinans. Mysterium denotes that which is hidden and esoteric, beyond
understanding, extraordinary and unfamiliar. Though what is enunciated in the word is
negative, what is meant is absolutely positive. The most valuable contribution of Otto
consists of his careful analysis of the feeling- states which constitute the numinous
experience. There is on the one side what is called ‘creature-feeling’ that is the feeling of
nothingness of finite being. On the other side is the feeling of the presence of an
overwhelming Being, the ‘Numinous Being’, which strikes one with amazement. This
amazement is what is summarized by the expression “mysterium tremendum et
fascinans”.
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Mysterium denotes that which is hidden and esoteric, beyond understanding,
extraordinary and unfamiliar. Though what is enunciated in the word is negative, what is
meant is absolutely positive. It points to what is called the ‘wholly other’ character of the
numinous Being, which, as supra rational, utterly transcends the grasp of conceptual
thought. The word Trementum comes from ‘tremor’, which means normally the familiar
emotion of fear. But here the term is used analogically to denote a kind of emotional
response different from mere fear. It denotes an ‘awe’ or awe-filled-ness due to majestas,
it is a state of absolute ‘overpoweringness’ and dynamic energy of the numinous
presence. The element of Fascinans points to the captivating attraction of the numinous
Being, evoking rapture and love. Mysterium is expressed as trementum and also as
Fascinans or fascinating. These two qualities, the daunting and fascination are combined
in a strange harmony of contrasts. The reluctant dual character of the numinous
consciousness is at once the strongest and most noteworthy phenomenon in the whole
history of religion. The mystery aspect is for religious man not merely something to be
wondered at but something that throws him into a trance. The element of fascination is
what brings out the properties of love, mercy etc. in the religious experience. For
instance, what does one feel when one is in deeply felt personal prayer or when one
partakes in a solemn liturgical service or when one is in an old church or temple? The
appropriate expression to this feeling is mysterium trementum et fascinans. The feeling
of it may come sweeping like a gentle breeze or tide, it may burst in sudden eruption up
from the depths of the soul with spasm and convulsions, or it may lead one to strong
excitements or to ecstasy. It can also take wild and demonic forms and put one in horror
status. Though it cannot be explained, but we cannot rule out the possibility to evoke it
indirectly.
5.3.2 The “Wholly Other”
While “The more” is an expression used by William James to refer to the reality that
cannot be identified with the natural, Otto referred to it as the “Wholly Other”,
describing it as “that which is beyond the sphere of the usual, the intelligible, and the
familiar…”. According to Otto even on the lowest level of religious development, the
essential characteristic of religious experience is ‘stupor’ before something ‘Wholly
Other’, whether such this “Other” be named as ‘Spirit’, ‘Demon’, ‘Deva’ or be left
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without a name. This feeling of the ‘Wholly Other’ may be indirectly ‘aroused’ by means
of objects which are already puzzling upon natural plane. “Wholly Other’ as mysterious
is something which is absolutely beyond our understanding. But that which merely
eludes our understanding for a time is a ‘problem’ and not a mystery. Truly mysterious
object is beyond our comprehension not only because our knowledge has certain limits,
but because in it we come upon something inherently ‘wholly other’.
Mysticism contrasts the numinous object, the “Wholly Other’ with the objects of
ordinary experience. Not satisfied with contrasting with such objects of nature,
mysticism finally calls it ‘that which is nothing’. By this ‘nothing’ is meant not only that
of which nothing can be predicated, but that which is absolutely and intrinsically other
than the opposite of everything that is and can be thought. The ‘nothingness’ of the
Western mystics is termed as ‘sunyam’ or ‘sunyatha’ or ‘void’ and ‘emptiness’ by
Buddhist and Hindu mystics. All these are apparently synonymous to the Numinous
ideogram of the ‘Wholly Other’.
5.3.3 The Epistemological Grounding of the Experience of the Holy
Otto tries to locate a transcendental basis of the experience of Numinous in the subject as
Kant did in his epistemology. When the concept of the numinous and the schematizing
concepts are brought together, we have the complex category of ‘the Holy’ itself. Otto’s
analysis of the structure of the religious consciousness is based on a clarification of this
key-word of all religions namely ‘the Holy’. ‘The Holy’ is identified by Otto as the
‘category’ by which we apprehend the transcendent both in its rational and non-rational
aspects. In the case of non-rational elements of the category of the Holy we are referred
back to something still deeper than pure reason, i.e., to that which the mystics call ‘the
ground of the soul’. The word ‘holy’ can have varied forms of characteristics. One of the
characteristics can be that it is rational in its nature in the sense that it can be thought
conceptually. Thus, for example by holiness we can mean moral goodness and it is
possible to have some kind of understanding of what goodness is. But the rational
characteristics do not explain completely the meaning of the word holy. For Otto the
rational meaning is only derivative. In its fundamental sense the word holy stands for a
non-rational character. By it we mean that it is something which cannot be thought
conceptually.
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From this preliminary examination we can say religion is compounded of rational and
non- rational elements. We think of God in terms of goodness, personality, purpose, and
so on. These ideas are applied to God analogically. They are rational characteristics in
the sense that we have definite concepts of them. This rational side of religion is
something that cannot be dispensed with. But sometimes it neglects the deeper non-
rational core of religion. The idea of God is not exhausted via such rational attributions.
He is the holy God and the adjective points to His deeper, inconceivable, super rational
nature. Otto wishes to stress this non-rational side of religion, as against the traditional
philosophy and theology of his times which appeared to have lost sight of these aspects,
thereby giving an excessively intellectualistic interpretation.
But the problem is if the numinous core of religion is inconceivable, how can we talk
about it or explain it? According to him although it is inconceivable, it is somehow
within our grasp. We apprehend it in feeling, in the sensus numinous. This feeling is not
merely an emotion but an affective state of mind which involves some kind of valuation
and pre-conceptual cognition. The feeling revealed in the analysis of the numinous
experience, while analogous to natural feelings, have a unique quality. The sensus
numinous is something sui generis. It cannot be compounded out of merely natural
feelings. It cannot even be regarded as evolved from natural feelings. For Otto it is
connected with the faculty of divination which is a faculty for genuinely cognizing and
recognizing the holy in its appearance.
These speculations prepare the way for Otto’s assertion that ‘the holy’ is an a priori
category. Its non-rational or numinous element is said to arise from the deepest
foundation of cognitive apprehension that the soul possesses. Otto follows the Kantian
model to locate religion as well as the sense of God in man. According to Kant
knowledge arises from our faculty of cognition and sense impressions are occasions for
such knowledge. The knowledge of the Numinous could be described in the same
manner. It is derived from the deepest foundation of the cognitive apprehension of the
soul. The experience of the Numinous arises by means of sense experience but not in and
through sensory data. The latter provide the stimulus and the occasion for the numinous
experience to be stirred. The experience of the Numinous becomes purer when the soul
disengages itself from this sense experience and takes its stand in absolute contrast.
84
Not only the rational, but even the non-rational elements of the complex category of the
Holy have a priori elements. The non-rational content has its own independent roots in
the hidden depths of the spirit. The first stirring of demonic dread is purely a priori
element. This could be pictured as the experience of the Numinous in the primitive and
crude form. In the same way the developed form of the experience- mysterium,
trementum et fascinans is a priori. This non-rational element of the experience of the
Numinous may be compared with the aesthetic judgement and the category of the
beautiful. Intuitively I apprehend in the object only its sensuous qualities and its spatial
form and nothing more. The meaning ‘beautiful’ is not given by the sensory elements. I
must have an obscure conception of the ‘beautiful’ and in addition, a principle of
assumption by which I attribute it to the object. If not the simplest experience of a
beautiful thing is rendered impossible.
5.3.4 Religious Feeling and The Feeling of The Sublime

Otto tries to draw a clear distinction between numinous or religious feeling and the
feeling of the sublime. Numinous feelings have two primary aspects (i) a feeling of
religious dread (ii) a feeling of religious fascination. The closest analogue to religious
dread or awe is the feeling of uncanniness – the feeling one has when the hair on the
back of one’s neck rises, the shudder or terror on hearing a ghost story, the dread of
haunted places. The feeling of fascination by, attraction to, and prizing of the object
which arouses the feeling in question creates both the desire to approach the object and
the feeling that one possesses of value when considered in relation to the fascinating and
prized object.
His attempt to conceptualize and describe the various feelings must be clearly
distinguished from his theory about numinous. According to Otto numinous feelings are,
first of all, unique and it cannot be analyzed as a complex of non-numinous feeling such
as love, fear, horror, a feeling of sublimity, and so on. Secondly the capacity for
numinous feeling is unexplainable. Although the capacity may appear in the world only
when certain conditions are fulfilled, the conditions do not constitute an adequate
explanation of the capacity in question. Thirdly, numinous feelings are also cognitive.
The feelings are the source of the concept of the numinous – the concept of something
which is both a value and an objective reality. It is cognitive in the sense that they are
85
like visual experiences. They have immediate and primary reference to an object outside
the self, i.e., the numinous quality or object, which is an object of numinous feelings in
somewhat the same way that visible objects and qualities might be said to be the object
of visual experiences.
However, the relation between these two is not clear. There could be two interpretations.
In the first interpretation it is claimed that numinous feelings disclose the numinous
object. The encounter with the numinous object through numinous experiences gives rise
to the concept of the numinous in much the same way that encounters with objects and
qualities through visual experiences are thought to give rise to the concepts of those
objects and qualities. The concept of the numinous is both a priori and a posteriori. It is a
posteriori since it is not derived from the experience of an object or quality and it is a
priori because it is not derived from any sense experience. The feeling is the source of
the concept only in the sense that it discloses the object of the concept. It is the encounter
with the object that produces the concept of the object.
According to the second interpretation the feeling gives rise to both the concept and the
disclosure of the numinous object. However, it is not the encounter with the numinous
which gives rise to the concept of the numinous rather it is feeling that furnishes the
concept. The feeling which furnishes the concept also discloses the object to which the
concept applies. Now the problem is how are these two functions of numinous feelings
related, since neither the concept nor the object is given in isolation. The two are given
together although one is not derived from the other.
In both these interpretations Otto claims that feeling puts us in contact with and discloses
something outside of ourselves. Feeling becomes like visual and auditory experiences. It
has an objective referent whether this is structured by an a priori concept or whether it
simply gives rise to a concept. The object of numinous feeling, according to Otto, is
numen. Numen is both value and object and can be only indirectly characterized. For
example, the encounter with the numen evokes religious dread. This is analogues to fear.
So, it may be said that it is the property of the numen which arouses religious dread.
Still, we can schematize the numen by means of such rational concepts as goodness,
completeness, necessity and substantiality. It means that concepts of this kind can be
predicated of the numen.
86
1. What is the difference between religious feelings and the feeling of the sublime?
…………………………………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………..
2. Explain about the category of Holy?
…………………………………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………..
5.4 LET US SUM UP

A descriptive approach to religion seems to have much to acclaim it. It plainly places
before us what the basic elements in religious experience are, without distorting the
picture by introducing doubtful speculations about the possible genesis or ultimate
significance of such experience. One can aim at presenting the essence of the
phenomenon which appears in the religious consciousness. The thinkers discussed during
the course of this unit seem to have penetrated to the affective states of mind which lie at
the heart of religion which are so often overlooked both in intellectualist accounts and in
pragmatic accounts. The intellectualist accounts understand religion as a kind of world-
view and pragmatic accounts tries to assimilate religion to morality.
An accurate description of the typical experiences of the religious person would seem to
provide at least a firm starting-point for an investigation into religion. But the question
is, is it enough? Do we need something more? The answer to this question depends on
whether or not the religious experience can be regarded as sui generis, qualitatively
unique and irreducible. Some thinkers take this view but Marett is more cautious. Robert
Ranulph Marett (1866 – 1943), an English anthropologist aimed at translating a type of
87
religious experience remote from our own into such terms of our consciousness. Marett
believed that the word “awe” expresses the fundamental religious feelings most
accurately. For him what constitutes the core of the primitive religious consciousness is
nothing other than awe. He describes awe as human being’s reaction to the hidden
mysterious forces of its environment. It cannot be merely interpreted as fear of the
unknown. It is much more than fear. Viewing from this point we can say that religion
does not originate just in fear of the unknown. The essential constituents of awe are
wonder, admiration, respect, even love.
Otto and other thinkers think that it is important to maintain the unique quality of the
religious experience. But when they try to do this by talking of a faculty of divination or
of the theomorphic structure in man, they seem to have left the relatively firm ground of
description and receded into a more speculative realm. For example, Otto adopts Kantian
terminology and speaks of the numinous as an a priori category which undergoes
schematization into the idea of the holy.
However accurate the descriptions of religious experience that are offered to us may be,
it seems that they cannot establish the validity of such experience. Yet on the other hand
a clear description of religious experience must be the first step towards its assessment.
Perhaps there is no way at all in which the validity of religious experience can be
established. One can only be pointed to the kind of experience which Otto and the others
describe and be left to decide about it in the light of the most honest discrimination of
one’s experience that can be made.

1. What is the appropriate expression to the feeling of Numinous?

………………………………………………………………………………….
…………………………………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………………………………….
88
2. How does Otto follow the Kantian model to base religion and sense of God in man?
………………………………………………………………………………….
…………………………………………………………………………………..
…………………………………………………………………………………..
………………………………………………………………………………….
5.5 KEY WORDS
Phenomenology = It is a philosophical approach concentrating on the study of

consciousness and the objects of direct experience. It is the description or study of
appearances. This term was introduced by Lambert in 1764. It is philosophical method
restricted to the careful analysis of the intellectual processes which we are
introspectively aware of. Brentano, Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty are some the
important philosophers who used this method in their philosophy.
Sui Generis = is a Latin expression, literally meaning of its own kind/genus or unique in
its characteristics. The expression is often used in analytic philosophy to indicate an idea,
an entity, or a reality which cannot be included in a wider concept.

Clack, Beverley and Brian. The Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998.
Davison, R.F. Rudolf Otto’s Interpretation of Religion. Princeton, New Jersey, 1947
Forman, Robert K. C. Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness. Albany: State University of New

York Press, 1999.
Gerrish, Brian A. A Prince of the Church. Schleiermacher and the Beginnings of Modern
Theology. London / Philadelphia, 1984.
Hick, John. “Religious Faith as Experiencing-As.” In: God and the Universe of Faiths,.
London: Macmillan, 1973, pp. 37-52.
Hick, John. An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent. New

Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989. pp. 129-71.
89
James, William. The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. New
York: Mentor, Penguin Books, 1958.
Karuvelil, George. “Religious Experience and the Problem of Access.” In: Romancing
the Sacred? Towards an Indian Christian Philosophy of Religion. Ed. George
Karuvelil. Bangalore: Asian Trading Corporation, 2007.
Katz, Steven T. “Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism.” In: Mysticism and

Philosophical Analysis. Ed. Steven T. Katz. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1978.
Marett, Robert R. Faith, Hope, and Charity in Primitive Religion. Macmillan Company,
1932.
Marett, Robert R. The Threshold of Religion. Kessinger: 2004
Otto, Rudolf. The Idea of Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-rational Factor in the Idea of the
Divine and Its Relation to the Rational. Tr. J. W. Harvey. New York: 1958.
Otto, Rudolf. The Idea of the Holy: An Inquiry into the Non-Rational Factor in the Idea
of the Divine and Its Relation to the Rational. Tr. John W. Harvey. Oxford:
OUP, 1923. Reprint, 1936.
Pratt, Bissett James. The Religious Consciousness. New York: 2005.
Puthenkalam, Xavier. Religious Experience and Faith. Kottayam: Oriental Institute of

Religious Studies, 1989.
Smart, Ninan. The Religious Experience of Mankind. London: Fontana Library, 1969.
Stace, Walter T. The Teachings of the Mystics. New York and Toronto: The New
American Library, 1960, pp.10-29.
Yandel, Keith. The Epistemology of Religious Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1993.
90
1. James speaks of the reality of genuine, healthy and normal religious experience where
man has the touch of a ‘more’, the unseen or the ‘divine’. As our primary wide-wake
consciousness opens our senses to the touch of the material things, so it is logically
conceivable that if there be higher spiritual agencies that can directly touch man. The
possibility for such experience, according to him, might be our possession of a
subconscious region which should yield access to the spiritual beings. In this sense
subconscious region becomes the intermediary between the normal self and the higher
spiritual agency.
2. The criteria to judge the validity of religious experience indicated by James are three.
They are:
a. Immediate luminousness
b. philosophical reasonableness
c. moral helpfulness
He gives more importance to the pragmatic criterion. Since the experience of the unseen
world produces effects in this world, the ‘unseen region’ in question is not merely ideal.
When we commune with it, the effect is actually imparted to our finite personality.
Therefore that which produces effects within another reality must be termed a reality
itself. Therefore James finds no philosophic excuse for calling the unseen or mystical
world unreal. The ‘effect’ the unseen world creates makes him to articulate its existence.
1. In his book The Idea of Holy Rudolf Otto tries to make a clear distinction between
numinous or religious feeling and the feeling of the sublime. Numinous feelings have
two primary aspects (i) a feeling of religious dread (ii) a feeling of religious fascination.
The closest analogue to religious dread or awe is the feeling of uncanniness – the feeling
one has when the hair on the back of one’s neck rises, the shudder or terror on hearing a
ghost story, the dread of haunted places. The feeling of fascination by, attraction to, and
prizing of the object which arouses the feeling in question creates both the desire to
approach the object and the feeling that one possesses no value when considered in
relation to the fascinating and prized object.
2. When the concept of the numinous and the schematizing concepts are brought
91
together, we have the complex category of the holy itself. The word holy can have varied
forms of characteristics. One of the characteristics can be that it is rational in its nature
in the sense that it can be thought conceptually. Thus, for example by holiness we can
mean moral goodness and it is possible to have some kind of understanding of what
goodness is. But the rational characteristics do not explain completely the meaning of the
word holy. For Otto the rational meaning is only derivative. In its fundamental sense the
word holy stands for a non-rational character. By it we mean that it is something which
cannot be thought conceptually.
Answers to Check Your Progress III
1. To the non-rational, non-explainable element of religion, Otto gave the name

“Numinous”. The Numinous experience is expressed by him by three Latin words:
mysterium tremendum et fascinans. For instance, what does one feel when one is in
deeply felt personal prayer or when one partakes in a solemn liturgical service or when
one is in an old church or temple? The appropriate expression to this feeling is mysterium,
trementum et fascinans.
2. According to Kant the knowledge arises from our faculty of cognition. Sense
impressions are occasions for such knowledge. According to Otto the knowledge of the
Numinous could be described in the same manner. It is derived from the deepest
foundation of the cognitive apprehension of the soul. The experience of the Numinous
arises by means of sense experience but not in and through sensory data. They are
stimulus and occasion for the numinous experience to be stirred. The experience of the
Numinous becomes purer when the soul disengages itself from this sense experience
and takes its stand in absolute contrast.
92

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BPYG-172

SCHOOL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY AND TRANS-DISCIPLINARY STUDIES

INDIRA GANDHI NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY

Dr. Sudnya N. Kulkarni,

Dr. Amit Kumar Pradhan, Dr. Garima Mani Tripathi

Dr. Bins Sebastian, Dr. Vijay Kumar

Mr. Sumesh M. K. Ms. Priyam Mathur,

Prof. Nandini Sinha Kapur, Prof. B. Rupini, Prof. Shubhangi Vaidya,

BLOCK UNIT WRITER

Academic Consultation: Dr. Ashutosh Vyas, Consultant (Philosophy), SOITS, IGNOU

Block 1 Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion

Unit 1 Meaning and Nature of Religion

Unit 2 Theories of the Origin of Religion

Unit 3 Religion, Philosophy of Religion, and Theology

Unit 4 Religious Language

Unit 5 Religious Experience

Block 2 Problem of Affirming God’s Existence

Unit 6 Different Conceptions of God

Unit 7 Nature and Attributes of God

Unit 8 Traditional Arguments for God’s Existence

Unit 9 The Problem of Evil

Unit 10 Challenges of Atheism and Agnosticism

Block 3 Religious Pluralism

Unit 11 Religious Pluralism and Secularism

Unit 12 Religious Fundamentalism

Unit 13 Inter-religious Dialogue

Unit 14 Contemporary Debates

Introduction to the Philosophy of

1.2 Meaning of Religion

1.3 Nature of Religion

1.4 Developmental Stages of Religion

1.5 Let Us Sum Up

1.6 Key Words

1.7 Further Readings and References

1.8 Answers to Check Your Progress

In this unit we will try to understand

1.2 MEANING OF RELIGION

1.3 NATURE OF RELIGION

1.3.1 The Primitive Forms of Religion

1.3.2 Higher Forms of Religion

i) The rapid progress of scientific knowledge and thought;

ii) Changes in the social order of man;

iii) A deeper intellectual interest in the subject; and

The ethical element is of fundamental importance in determining the development of a

Check Your Progress I

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

2. What are the various ways of defining religion?

1.4 DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES OF RELIGION

The essential feature of totemism is the belief in a supernatural connection between a

1.5 LET US SUM UP

Check Your Progress II

1. What are the various forms of the evolution of religion?

1.6 KEY WORDS

1.7 FURTHER READINGS AND REFERENCES

Nayak, G.C. Understanding Religious Phenomenon. Bangalore: Dharmaram Pub., 1997.

Thiselton, Anthony C. A Concise Encyclopaedia of the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford:

1.8 ANSWERS TO CHECK YOUR PROGRESS

Answers to Check Your Progress II

2. We are living in a world marked by globalization, that consistently brings up

2.2 NATURALISTIC ORIGIN OF RELIGION

2.3 ANTHROPOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF RELIGION

Note: a) Use the space provided for your answer.

2.4 PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIGIN OF RELIGION