FF - FF M&a Strategies & M&a Performance, A Meta-Analysis - Palm Et Al. (2023)

Journal of Management
1-32
DOI: 10.1177/01492063231178027
© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions
Family Firms, M&A Strategies, and M&A

Performance: A Meta-Analysis
Marina Palm*
Priscilla S. Kraft *
Nadine Kammerlander
WHU–Otto Beisheim School of Management
Extant research has yielded conflicting theoretical and empirical predictions about whether
family firm acquirers perform better or worse in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) than their
nonfamily firm counterparts. To help resolve this controversy, we take a socioemotional
wealth (SEW) perspective to theorize that family members’ desire to preserve their SEW
favors the pursuit of M&A strategies that are both beneficial (industry-related M&As) and det-
rimental (domestic M&As) to M&A performance. We further theorize that the desire to preserve
SEW leads to family firm idiosyncratic SEW resources that help family firm acquirers, on
average, achieve better M&A performance than nonfamily firm acquirers. Meta-analytic
results based on 51 primary studies covering 242,123 M&A deals are in line with our predic-
tions. Thus, our study contributes to the literature on family firms and M&A performance by
explaining how the different M&A strategies chosen by family firms have positive and negative
consequences for M&A performance. Our theory and findings have implications for future family
business and M&A research.
Keywords: family firms; mergers and acquisitions (M&As); M&A performance; socioemotional
wealth; meta-analysis
Acknowledgments: We thank the associate editor Jim Combs and the anonymous reviewers for their extremely helpful
guidance in the revision process. We also thank Martin Eisend, Marc van Essen, and Michael Withers for their very
helpful comments on the manuscript.
Supplemental material for this article is available at http://jom.sagepub.com/supplemental.
*
The first two authors contributed equally to this study.
Corresponding Author: Marina Palm, WHU–Otto Beisheim School of Management, Burgplatz 2, 56179 Vallendar,
Germany.
E-mail: marina.palm@whu.edu
1
2 Journal of Management
Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) represent a promising source of firm growth and have
become an essential pillar of firm strategies in recent decades (Bauer & Matzler, 2014;
Graebner, Heimeriks, Huy, & Vaara, 2017; Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, &
Davison, 2009). However, an abundant body of research suggests that the majority of
M&As fail to create value (Datta, Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992; King, Dalton, Daily, &
Covin, 2004; King, Wang, Samimi, & Cortes, 2021). Due to family firms’ nonfinancial
goals and unique resources (Chrisman, Sharma, Steier, & Chua, 2013; De Massis, Kotlar,
Chua, & Chrisman, 2014), an increasing number of scholars have examined the performance
of M&As conducted by family firms (e.g., Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Caprio, Croci, &
Del Giudice, 2011; Feldman, Amit, & Villalonga, 2019).
This literature is characterized by several challenges. First, there is a controversial theoret-
ical discussion on whether family firm acquirers are superior or inferior M&A performers as
compared with their nonfamily firm counterparts. Due to family firms’ idiosyncrasies
(Chrisman et al., 2013; De Massis et al., 2014), some researchers refer to the potential self-
serving motives of family members engaging in M&As (e.g., Bauguess & Stegemoller,
2008), whereas others highlight their superior M&A decision-making processes (e.g.,
Feldman et al., 2019). Thus, coherent theorizing that accounts for family firms’ idiosyncrasies
with regard to M&A performance is still lacking. The controversy in the literature is also
reflected in conflicting empirical findings on the family firm acquirer–M&A performance
relationship (Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Feldman et al., 2019; Miller, Le
Breton-Miller, & Lester, 2010). Second, prior research has typically focused on questions
regarding the direct M&A performance effect of family firm acquirers (e.g., Ben-Amar &
André, 2006; Caprio et al., 2011) and therefore neglected to examine the strategic mecha-
nisms that explain the influence of family firm acquirers on M&A performance. This omis-
sion constitutes a relevant research gap because the general M&A literature emphasizes
that specific M&A strategies,1 such as diversifying M&As, substantially influence M&A per-
formance (e.g., Datta et al., 1992; King et al., 2021; Meckl & Röhrle, 2016). To help resolve
these theoretical challenges and extend this stream of research, we examine the following
research questions: Which strategic mechanisms help explain the contradictory findings in
the literature on the M&A performance of family firm acquirers? Do family firm acquirers
over- or underperform their nonfamily firm counterparts with regard to M&A performance?
To answer these questions, we build on theory about socioemotional wealth (SEW). SEW
is a multidimensional umbrella term capturing all the affect-related value that family members
derive from their firm ownership (Berrone, Cruz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2012; Gomez-Mejia,
Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson, & Moyano-Fuentes, 2007). We propose that the theoretical
and empirical inconsistencies of prior research on the M&A performance of family firm
acquirers can be explained by theorizing that family members’ desire to protect their SEW
influences the pursuit of specific M&A strategies, which in turn has diverging performance
implications. We focus on two important M&A diversification strategies—industry related
versus industry diversifying and country related (i.e., domestic) versus country diversifying
(i.e., cross-border)—for two reasons. First, prior M&A literature has demonstrated their
impact on M&A performance (Datta et al., 1992; King et al., 2021; Meckl & Röhrle,
2016). Second, these M&A strategies are likely to be influenced by family members’ SEW
Palm et al. / Family Firms and M&A Strategies/Performance 3
preservation concerns (Gomez-Mejia, Patel, & Zellweger, 2018). Building on prior family
firm research (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2018; Gomez-Mejia, Makri, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010),
we argue that due to their desire to protect their SEW, family firms engage more in
industry-related and domestic M&A strategies than their nonfamily firm counterparts. By
integrating insights from the M&A literature (e.g., Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee, &
Jayaraman, 2009; Datta et al., 1992) that industry-related (vs. industry-diversifying) M&As
are beneficial for M&A performance whereas domestic (vs. cross-border) M&As are detri-
mental to M&A performance, we suggest that family firm acquirers can influence M&A per-
formance both positively and negatively.
We build on recent theoretical advancements suggesting that the desire to build and pre-
serve SEW not only affects family firms’ strategic behaviors (as proposed) but also leads to
the development of specific SEW resources (Combs, Jaskiewicz, Ravi, & Walls, 2022),
which enable family firms “to do it better” (Combs et al., 2022: 22). Applied to our
setting, we theorize that SEW resources support family firms in their M&A target selection
and integration, leading to overall better M&A performance as compared with their nonfam-
ily firm counterparts irrespective of the underlying M&A motives. To empirically examine
our predictions, we conducted a meta-analysis based on 51 primary studies and 210 effect
sizes, covering 242,123 M&A deals. Meta-analytic methods are particularly appropriate for
our research purpose, given the existing body of primary studies. Specifically, we performed
meta-analytical structural equation modeling (MASEM; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995), which
allowed us to examine our theoretically derived but previously unexplored mediation model
(Bergh et al., 2016; Combs, Crook, & Rauch, 2019).
Building on empirical evidence from more than 20 years of research, our study contributes
to the family firm and M&A literature in the following ways. First, we contribute by providing
novel insights into the strategic mechanisms that help explain the relationship between family
firm acquirers and M&A performance. We theorize and find that family firms engage in dis-
tinctive M&A strategies—industry-related and domestic M&As—with contrary effects on
M&A performance. Our theory is that family members’ SEW preservation desires are asso-
ciated with the pursuit of performance-enhancing and performance-destroying M&A strate-
gies, which helps reconcile prior conflicting findings on family firm acquirers’ M&A
performance (e.g., Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013).
Second, our study helps advance the controversial theoretical discussion on the family firm
acquirer–M&A performance relationship (e.g., Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Feldman
et al., 2019; Miller et al., 2010) by providing novel theorizing: Building on the perspective
that the pursuit of SEW not only affects the strategic behaviors of family firms
(Gomez-Mejia, Cruz, Berrone, & De Castro, 2011) but also generates important SEW
resources (Combs et al., 2022), we theoretically explain why family firm acquirers—irrespec-
tive of their M&A motives—outperform their nonfamily firm counterparts in M&As due to
better target selection and integration. Our meta-analytic evidence is in line with our
theorizing.
Literature Review on Family Firms and M&A Performance

M&As have become a prominent strategy for firm growth (Bauer & Matzler, 2014;
Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006; Haleblian et al., 2009; Steigenberger, 2017). A substantial
body of literature has thus focused on M&A performance (e.g., King et al., 2021), which is
defined as “the amount of value, in cost efficiencies and revenue growth, generated by the
complete transaction process” (Zollo & Meier, 2008: 56).2 The value potentially created
by M&As can cover short-term effects (i.e., stock market reactions affecting firm value)
and long-term effects, which typically cover the entire integration process (e.g., synergies
through economies of scale and scope; Zollo & Meier, 2008).
Despite potential growth benefits, M&A research suggests that most M&A deals do
not create and often destroy value (Datta et al., 1992; King et al., 2004; King et al.,
2021).3 Researchers have mainly attributed acquirers’ lack of M&A value creation to
managers’ pursuit of M&As to advance their self-interests, such as their personal job
security (Amihud & Lev, 1981) or managerial compensation and prestige (Avery,
Chevalier, & Schaefer, 1998), rather than to maximize shareholder returns (Hoskisson,
Hill, & Kim, 1993; Jensen, 1986). Moreover, a growing body of research indicates
that the integration phase, including the organizational integration and alignment of
the target, is critical for M&A performance but challenging for acquirers (for a review,
see Graebner et al., 2017; Steigenberger, 2017). In light of often unsatisfactory M&A
performance consequences for acquirers, M&A research has turned to identifying the
drivers of M&A performance (Haleblian et al., 2009), such as the relatedness of the
acquirer and target and the method of payment (Bilgili, Calderon, Allen, & Kedia,
2016; King et al., 2004; King et al., 2021).
In recent years, scholars have increasingly investigated the effect of family firm acquirers
on M&A propensity and M&A performance (for a review, see Worek, 2017). Family firms
are typically defined as firms that are “governed and/or managed with the intention to
shape and pursue the vision of the business held by a dominant coalition controlled by
members of the same family or a small number of families in a manner that is potentially sus-
tainable across generations of the family or families” (Chua, Chrisman, & Sharma, 1999: 25).
They are not only the most prevalent type of organization around the world (La Porta,
Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999) but also differ in their behaviors from nonfamily
firms. Prior research has shown that family firms have a lower propensity for M&As
(Caprio et al., 2011; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2018; Miller et al., 2010; Requejo, Reyes-Reina,
Sanchez-Bueno, & Suárez-González, 2018). These studies theorize that family members
focus on building and protecting SEW and pursuing nonfinancial goals, the most important
of which is maintaining control over the firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007); this and their
wealth concentration in the firm render them risk averse (Donckels & Fröhlich, 1991;
Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2002) and thus less likely to engage in M&As (Caprio et al.,
2011; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2018). When family firms decide to pursue M&As, they tend to
engage in smaller M&A deals in terms of financial value as compared with nonfamily
firms (Miller et al., 2010).
Research on the M&A performance of family firms has put forth conflicting theoretical
arguments and yielded mixed empirical results regarding whether family firm acquirers
perform better or worse in M&As (e.g., Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Feldman et al.,
2019; Miller et al., 2010). Several researchers contend that family members conduct
M&As to advance their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, which leads
to principal-principal conflicts (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino,
& Buchholtz, 2001) and therefore lower M&A performance among family firm acquirers
(e.g., Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Shim & Okamuro, 2011). By contrast, other researchers
argue that family members can effectively monitor managers, which restrains principal-agent
conflicts (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and leads to better M&A perfor-
mance among family firm acquirers (André, Ben-Amar, & Saadi, 2014; Basu, Dimitrova, &
Paeglis, 2009; Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013).
To extend this stream of research, we propose that prior research has overlooked two
important aspects. First, the specific M&A strategies pursued by family firm acquirers
might be different due to their SEW considerations. Second, building and protecting SEW
can also yield family firm idiosyncratic “SEW resources” (Combs et al., 2022) that might
help family firms cautiously select and integrate their M&A targets. In the following, we
rely on theory about family firms’ desire to maintain SEW endowments to develop hypoth-
eses about the family firm acquirer–M&A performance relationship.
SEW Preservation and M&A Strategies

Research suggests that family firms differ from nonfamily firms in their strategic behaviors
(Arregle, Duran, Hitt, & van Essen, 2017; Duran, Kammerlander, van Essen, & Zellweger,
2016; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). The literature on family firms explains their distinctiveness
predominantly through family members’ desire to build and preserve their SEW (Berrone
et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011), which often takes prece-
dence over their financial wealth considerations in their strategic decision making (e.g.,
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). To preserve their SEW, family
members typically maintain their personal wealth in the family firm because this safeguards
their ability to exercise control over the firm (Duran et al., 2016; Gedajlovic & Carney, 2010).
This wealth concentration in turn shapes the strategic decision making of family members
(e.g., Donckels & Fröhlich, 1991), leading, for instance, to fewer innovation investments
(Duran et al., 2016), lower use of leverage (Hansen & Block, 2021), and lower M&A propen-
sity (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2018; Miller et al., 2010). Thus, family members typically adopt
conservative strategies to preserve or even enhance their SEW, which serves as their main
reference point for decision making at the cost of not maximizing financial returns (Combs
et al., 2022; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011).
In the following, we build on this theorizing to suggest that family members’ SEW pres-
ervation concerns influence the firms’ choice of specific M&A strategies, which according to
the M&A literature, affects M&A performance (e.g., Datta et al., 1992; King et al., 2021). We
propose that at least three SEW dimensions (Berrone et al., 2012) help explain how SEW
affects M&A strategies: family members’ transgenerational control desires, their desire for
enduring stakeholder relationships, and their strong identification with the family firm.4
We focus on these three dimensions because prior research suggests that family firms’
growth strategies are influenced by their transgenerational control intentions (Miller et al.,
2010; Zahra, 2003), enduring stakeholder relationships (Arregle et al., 2017; Arregle, Hitt,
Sirmon, & Very, 2007), and strong identification with the firm (Hussinger & Issah, 2019;
Zahra, 2003). We examine two important M&A diversification strategies that are likely influ-
enced by family members’ SEW preservation concerns: industry-related and domestic M&A
strategies. Furthermore, we build on prior M&A research to propose that pursuing these two
M&A strategies influences M&A performance.
Industry-Related M&As
We propose that family firm acquirers have a higher preference for industry-related as
compared with industry-diversifying M&As than do nonfamily firm acquirers. From a port-
folio perspective (Markowitz, 1952), industry-diversifying M&As offer acquirers the oppor-
tunity to reduce a firm’s unsystematic risk by depending less on one industry (Miller et al.,
2010). However, we propose that despite these benefits, family firms prefer industry-related
M&As over industry-diversifying M&As. Our theory is that industry-related M&As better
protect three dimensions of SEW: transgenerational control, strong stakeholder relationships,
and the family’s identification with the firm.
First, we argue that family members favor industry-related M&A deals because they allow
them to maintain higher levels of transgenerational control over their firm (Berrone et al.,
2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). The underlying reason is that industry-related M&A
deals reduce the need to hire outside industry experts because the family firm already pos-
sesses the required industry expertise. Although industry-related M&As may lead to more
power in the hands of the firm’s existing nonfamily managers, prior research argues that non-
family managers in family firms are typically loyal and trustworthy regarding the owning
family and thus do not threaten the family’s control (Aronoff & Ward, 2011). By contrast,
industry-diversifying M&As require delegation of more decision-making power to newly
hired managers who possess the necessary industry expertise to manage the newly acquired
target (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Muñoz-Bullón & Sánchez-Bueno, 2012). However, the
trustworthiness and loyalty of these new executives are “yet to be tested” (Aronoff &
Ward, 2011: 15). Because giving power to outside industry experts would, to some degree,
erode the family’s control over their firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Schulze et al., 2003)
and therefore threaten their transgenerational control (Berrone et al., 2012), family
members might prefer M&A targets that operate in related industries.
Second, industry-related M&As typically allow acquirers to mostly rely on the same sup-
plier and customer networks (Hitt, Harrison, & Ireland, 2001) as well as on their existing
employees, thereby enabling family firms to preserve and strengthen their established stake-
holder relationships (Berrone et al., 2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). By contrast, industry-
diversifying M&As typically require the establishment of new relationships with unfamiliar
stakeholders (e.g., new suppliers) in the new industry (Hitt et al., 2001). These efforts have the
potential to break the tight-knitted social networks that characterize family firms
(Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011). In anticipation of these threats to their existing stakeholder rela-
tionships in industry-diversifying M&As (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010), family members will
select industry-related M&A targets.
Third, industry-related M&As allow family members to retain a strong focus on their core
industry (Hussinger & Issah, 2019). This is important because it helps them maintain their
traditions and routines (e.g., decision-making processes, operational procedures; Dyer,
1988), which are typically deeply anchored in the firm’s core industry (Berrone et al.,
2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; Hussinger & Issah, 2019). Upholding these traditions and
routines allows family members to preserve their strong identification with the firm
(Hussinger & Issah, 2019; Pratt & Foreman, 2000). In contrast, industry-diversifying
M&As typically require new routines and ways of operating (Barkema & Schijven, 2008;
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Family members likely perceive such changes to their traditions
and routines as a potential threat to their identification with the family firm (Casson, 1999;
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007) and thus prefer industry-related M&A targets.
Together, these arguments suggest that family firm acquirers will engage more in
industry-related M&As than their nonfamily firm counterparts:
Hypothesis 1a: Family firm acquirers are more likely to engage in industry-related M&A deals as
compared with nonfamily firm acquirers.
Building on insights from the extant M&A literature (Datta et al., 1992; Martynova &
Renneboog, 2011; Singh & Montgomery, 1987), we argue that the strategic preference for
industry-related over industry-diversifying M&As is associated with higher M&A perfor-
mance. Extant research argues that industry-related M&As allow firms to benefit from
resource complementarities (Hussinger & Issah, 2019) and economies of scale and scope
(Helfat & Eisenhardt, 2004; Singh & Montgomery, 1987), which lead to lower costs (e.g.,
through efficiency gains), higher revenues (e.g., through acquisition of competitors’ custom-
ers), and subsequently better M&A performance than unrelated M&A deals (Datta et al.,
1992; Salter & Weinhold, 1979). The synergy gains in terms of economies of scale and
scope are significantly higher in industry-related M&As than in industry-diversifying
M&As because core resources (i.e., technologies) and skills (i.e., know-how on production,
marketing, or distribution) can be transferred to or shared with the M&A target (e.g., Datta
et al., 1992; Singh & Montgomery, 1987). In contrast, industry-diversifying M&As often
require restructuring and building new skills and relationships that can be costly to the
acquirer (Barkema & Schijven, 2008) and therefore reduce M&A performance. Finally,
industry-related M&A deals can increase the acquirer’s market power (Singh &
Montgomery, 1987) and thus help shape product pricing and reduce supplier costs (i.e., quan-
tity discounts; Bhattacharyya & Nain, 2011). Therefore, we argue that industry-related M&As
are associated with better M&A performance.
Hypothesis 1b: Industry-related M&A deals are associated with a higher M&A performance than
industry-diversifying M&A deals.
Combining research on family firms with the M&A literature, we further propose that
industry-related M&A strategies represent a crucial mediating mechanism in the family
firm acquirer–M&A performance relationship. Specifically, we argued in Hypothesis 1a
that family firm acquirers, due to their desire to protect their SEW (e.g., Gomez-Mejia
et al., 2007), engage more in industry-related M&As. As described in Hypothesis 1b, a sub-
stantial body of M&A research argues that industry-related M&A strategies are beneficial for
M&A performance because they increase economies of scale and scope and market power
(e.g., Datta et al., 1992).
Combining Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we propose that family firms are more likely to engage
in industry-related M&A deals (vs. industry diversifying), which in turn relates positively to
M&A performance:
Hypothesis 1c: Higher levels of industry-related M&A deals positively mediate the relationship
between family firm acquirers and M&A performance.
Domestic M&As
We further argue that family firm acquirers have a higher preference for domestic over
cross-border M&As. Although cross-border M&As offer diversification advantages similar
to industry-diversifying M&As (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010), we submit that the desire to pre-
serve the same three SEW dimensions—transgenerational control, strong stakeholder rela-
tionships, and the family’s identification with the firm—lead family firm acquirers to
pursue more domestic M&As.
First, family members should prefer domestic M&As over cross-border M&As because
they allow greater transgenerational control (Berrone et al., 2012). Cross-border M&As typ-
ically require more external upfront financing because of higher initial transaction costs and
more complex integration relative to domestic M&As (Chen, Huang, & Chen, 2009; Graves
& Thomas, 2008). The required financial resources may lead to a long-term dependency on
financial capital providers from outside the family firm (i.e., banks and investors;
Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Such external financing dilutes family ownership and power
and thus threatens family members’ transgenerational control (Gallo, Tàpies, & Cappuyns,
2004). Moreover, in domestic M&As, family members can exert more direct control over
the newly acquired firm due to closer proximity in terms of distance, thereby ensuring that
it is run according to their preferences. For instance, family members or their trusted nonfam-
ily managers can monitor acquired firms through unannounced irregular plant visits.
Cross-border M&As, in contrast, typically require more reliance on new executives who
have foreign country knowledge from outside the family firm (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010).
This reduces the autonomy of family members (Haider, Li, Wang, & Wu, 2021) because
they have to delegate some decision-making authority to these new executives. Since
cross-border M&As likely threaten family members’ ability to exercise control across gener-
ations, they are more likely to select M&A targets within their familiar domestic sphere than
to pursue cross-border M&As.
Second, family members prefer domestic M&As because they allow the family to rely
more on existing stakeholder relationships with people in relevant positions (e.g., politicians,
bankers, and lawyers) that support their M&A endeavors, for instance, with regard to legal or
financial issues (Bird & Wennberg, 2014; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). In contrast,
cross-border M&As require family firms to establish new relationships with unfamiliar stake-
holders (e.g., foreign banks, government bodies, and local suppliers) to close the deal and suc-
cessfully integrate the target (Arregle et al., 2017; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997; Moeller &
Schlingemann, 2005). Due to family members’ strong desire to preserve their established
network of stakeholder relationships, we suggest that they will be more likely to pursue
domestic rather than cross-border M&As.
Third, while domestic and cross-border M&As entail dealing with the different corporate
cultures of the acquirer and the target, cross-border M&As bring a foreign national culture to
the M&A deals, which prompts a “double-layered acculturation” process (Barkema, Bell, &
Pennings, 1996: 151). However, family members are concerned about conserving the estab-
lished values, traditions, and routines of their firm and its modus operandi (Eisenmann, 2002)
to preserve their strong identification with the family firm (Berrone et al., 2012; Bird &
Wennberg, 2014; Casson, 1999). In domestic M&As, family firms’ values, traditions, and
routines (e.g., decision-making structures and failure cultures) can be better passed on to
M&A targets because the acquirer and target share a mutual understanding based on the same
national culture (Schneider & De Meyer, 1991). Thus, domestic M&As help family members
preserve coherent family identification with their firm over time (Pratt & Foreman, 2000). In
contrast, cross-border M&As and the associated national cultural foreignness (Arregle et al.,
2017; Zaheer, 1995) make it more difficult to transfer the family firm’s values and routines to
the target, which might threaten family members’ identification with the firm (Berrone et al.,
2012; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007). In anticipation of such threats, family members likely prefer
domestic M&A targets.
In summary, we propose that family firm acquirers, due to their desire to protect their
SEW, conduct more domestic M&As than cross-border M&As relative to nonfamily firm
acquirers:
Hypothesis 2a: Family firm acquirers are more likely to engage in domestic M&A deals than non-
family firm acquirers.
While some researchers argue that domestic M&As have lower integration costs, for
example, due to lower complexity and similar cultures (e.g., Moeller & Schlingemann,
2005), other researchers argue that the shortcomings of domestic M&As outweigh their ben-
efits for M&A performance (Bertrand & Capron, 2015; Chakrabarti et al., 2009; Markides &
Ittner, 1994; Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998). We follow this line of argumentation and
propose that domestic, in contrast with cross-border, M&As are associated with lower
M&A performance for the following reasons.
First, cross-border M&As provide the opportunity to access new international markets
(Hitt et al., 1997; Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004), whereas domestic M&As
largely restrict acquirers’ operations to the current domestic market. Hence, due to access
to new markets, cross-border M&As permit higher revenue growth as compared with domes-
tic M&As (Hitt et al., 1997), thereby leading to better M&A performance.
Second, in addition to increased market access, cross-border M&As allow exploitation of
favorable government policies and regulations in other countries to, for instance, optimize
taxation (Markides & Ittner, 1994) or reduce factor costs (i.e., wages, material, capital
costs; Bertrand & Capron, 2015; Kogut, 1985). Cross-border M&A deals allow for greater
opportunities to benefit from efficiency gains resulting from economies of scale and scope
on a global scale through, for instance, standardized products and production processes
across countries (Bertrand & Capron, 2015; Doukas & Travlos, 1988; Kogut, 1985).
Cross-border M&As can thus lead to increased bargaining power (i.e., over suppliers, distrib-
utors, or customers), which helps to reduce costs (Hitt et al., 1997; Kogut, 1985). In summary,
we argue that based on fewer opportunities to increase revenues and reduce costs, domestic
M&As underperform cross-border M&As:
Hypothesis 2b: Domestic M&A deals are associated with lower M&A performance than
cross-border M&A deals.
Combining research on family firms with the literature on M&A performance, we further
propose that domestic M&A strategies mediate the relationship between family firm acquirers
and M&A performance. As we theorized in Hypothesis 2a, family firm acquirers, due to their
desire to maintain transgenerational control, stakeholder relationships, and their identification
with the firm, conduct more domestic M&As than their nonfamily firm counterparts. We
propose in Hypothesis 2b, based on the M&A literature, that domestic M&As are less bene-
ficial for M&A performance than cross-border M&A deals. Combining Hypotheses 2a and
2b, we propose that family firms are more likely to engage in domestic M&As, which in
turn are associated with lower M&A performance:
Hypothesis 2c: Higher levels of domestic M&A deals negatively mediate the relationship between
family firm acquirers and M&A performance.
SEW Resources and M&A Performance

While it is well established that family members’ desire to grow and preserve their SEW
affects their strategic behavior (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2011), more
recent theorizing suggests that pursuing SEW generates SEW resources that can provide
family firms with competitive advantages under certain conditions (Combs et al., 2022; Naldi,
Cennamo, Corbetta, & Gomez-Mejia, 2013). Building on this perspective, we argue that aside
from influencing the M&A strategies that family firms pursue, the family members’ SEW endow-
ments create SEW resources that affect the selection and integration of M&A targets and thus,
ultimately, M&A performance. Specifically, according to Combs et al. (2022), the three SEW
dimensions used in our theorizing before (i.e., family members’ transgenerational control
desires, their desire for enduring stakeholder relationships, and their strong identification with
the family firm) lead to three specific SEW resources—long-term orientation (LTO), strong stake-
holder relationships, and favorable firm reputation—which are disproportionately generated in
family firms and help them to “reap more bang for their buck” (Combs et al., 2022: 21).
Building on and extending the research by Combs et al. (2022) to the M&A context, we
propose that these three specific SEW resources help family firms achieve better M&A perfor-
mance. This theorizing is in line with the general M&A literature emphasizing the role of
resources in target integration (Graebner et al., 2017).
First, family members’ desire for transgenerational control not only affects their strategic
behaviors but also yields an LTO (Combs et al., 2022; Lumpkin & Brigham, 2011), which
endows them with patient capital (König, Kammerlander, & Enders, 2013; Sirmon & Hitt,
2003). Family firms typically face less pressure to meet short-term results (i.e., quarterly earn-
ings; Flammer & Bansal, 2017), which enables them to focus on transgenerational investment
decisions with longer time horizons (Sirmon & Hitt, 2003; Strike, Berrone, Sapp, & Congiu,
2015). We therefore propose that family firms, because of their LTO resource, are particularly
interested in and well equipped for pursuing only M&A deals with targets that provide them
with clear long-term benefits (i.e., long-term fit, synergies, adequate price) and the prospect of
enhancing the viability and family firm value across generations. To identify promising
targets, we argue that LTO encourages family firms to evaluate M&A targets more carefully,
including, for instance, the technological, product, or market complementarities that are
crucial for M&A performance (Bauer & Matzler, 2014; Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999).
Hence, due to their LTO, family firms should be, irrespective of their specific M&A
motives, better able to conduct thorough assessments of potential targets, leading to more
realistic synergy expectations and thus fewer failures in due diligence (e.g., overoptimistic
expectations; Welch, Pavić ević , Keil, & Laamanen, 2020). Moreover, the LTO resource
provides family firms with more time to carefully integrate M&A targets, which is crucial
because integration processes can last for years (Graebner et al., 2017). Their LTO, including
patient capital and long-term commitment (Combs et al., 2022), constitute important
resources required to integrate organizational structures, processes, employees, and cultures
(Graebner et al., 2017). Family firms should therefore be, on average, better able to carefully
integrate their targets, which helps them avoid disruptions in the firm’s operations (Feldman
et al., 2019), thereby decreasing long-term integration costs and improving the acquisition
value (Birkinshaw, Bresman, & Håkanson, 2000).
Second, the resource of strong stakeholder relationships (Combs et al., 2022), which
again stems from family firms pursuing SEW, improves stakeholder trust (Zellweger &
Nason, 2008), collaboration, and knowledge sharing (Zahra, Neubaum, & Larrañeta,
2007). We propose that employees in family firms, due to this specific resource, better col-
laborate and exchange with one another in the M&A context. Such collaboration facilitates
a more thorough exchange of relevant information (i.e., from different departments, such
as finance, sales, production) and coordination of different M&A-related tasks, which
improves the due diligence process (e.g., target identification). Employees in family
firms are often more committed to the firm and tend to trust their managers (Kets de
Vries, 1993; Zahra, Hayton, Neubaum, Dibrell, & Craig, 2008), which is particularly
helpful for the integration of the target firm (Colman & Lunnan, 2011). Strong stakeholder
relationships might help family firms reduce interorganizational frictions and potential
feelings of frustration, which could reduce costly postacquisition voluntary turnover
among target firm employees (Steigenberger, 2017). Strong personal relationships with
external stakeholders, such as suppliers, should also help family firms better integrate
the newly acquired target into their established networks (e.g., with suppliers). Better inte-
gration into the supply chain reduces friction and thus enables realization of synergies
(e.g., reduced costs through realized economies of scale; Langabeer & Seifert, 2003),
which increases M&A performance.
Finally, family members’ strong identification with their firm leads to the resource favor-
able firm reputation (Combs et al., 2022; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2014). We propose that
possessing better corporate reputations (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013) can be strategically
valuable when approaching and negotiating with M&A targets. Prior research suggests that
the acquirer’s reputation sends important signals about the firm’s trustworthiness and its
ability to stick to its commitments regarding the M&A deal and its future prospects
(Chalençon, Colovic, Lamotte, & Mayrhofer, 2017). Because of their favorable reputation,
which serves as an important intangible asset (Rindova, Williamson, & Petkova, 2010), we
propose that family firms will be better able to attract and negotiate favorable M&A deals,
resulting in better M&A prices (i.e., less likely to pay high acquisition premiums), thereby
increasing M&A performance. Moreover, we argue that employees of the newly acquired
M&A target are more likely to have a favorable attitude toward the M&A deal because of
the family firm’s good reputation. Hence, this resource motivates new employees from the
target firm to become part of the family firm acquirer, leading to less voluntary employee turn-
over and thus better retention of relevant expertise. This positive attitude should reduce
tension and friction and foster effective interactions, knowledge retention, and the creation
of synergies that are important for successful integration (Graebner et al., 2017), thereby
helping increase the value created from the M&A deal.
In summary, we propose that the three SEW resources that prior theory anticipates from
family firms’ desire to preserve SEW—LTO, strong stakeholder relationships, and favorable
firm reputation—help family firms in the selection, negotiation, and integration of M&A
deals, which lead to better M&A performance:
Hypothesis 3: Family firm acquirers are associated with a higher M&A performance as compared
with nonfamily firm acquirers.
Methods
Meta-Analytic Database and Coding
To empirically examine our hypothesized model, we built a meta-analytic database to
perform MASEM (Bergh et al., 2016; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995). The advantage of
MASEM is that it enables testing of the hypothesized mediation model based on the cumu-
lative statistical evidence of existing studies, while controlling for other variables (Bergh
et al., 2016; Combs et al., 2019; Tihanyi et al., 2019). Following previous meta-analyses
(e.g., Arregle et al., 2017; Duran et al., 2016; Tihanyi et al., 2019), we used five complemen-
tary search strategies to identify studies that investigated the relationship between family
firms and M&A performance. First, we searched three major electronic databases
(EBSCO, ABI/INFORM Global, and Google Scholar) using the following family firm
search terms (e.g., Duran et al., 2016): family firm*, family business*, family compan*,
family own*, family control*, family enterprise, family led, founding family, family
manag*, privately held firm*, privately held compan*, and founder*. We combined these
family firm keywords with M&A-related keywords (e.g., King et al., 2021; Meckl &
Röhrle, 2016): mergers and acquisitions, M&A*, merger*, acquisition*, takeover*,
industry-related, industry-divers*, industry related, industry divers*, related, domestic,
cross-border, international*, foreign, divers*. Second, we consulted extant literature
reviews on M&As in family firms (e.g., Worek, 2017) and searched their reference lists
for relevant studies. Third, we conducted a targeted manual search of 17 selected academic
journals to ensure that key studies were not omitted.5 Fourth, to reduce the threat of publica-
tion bias (Rosenthal, 1979), we searched for dissertations in the ProQuest database, examined
conference proceedings (and contacted authors), and posted on the Listservs of the Academy
of Management and Family Enterprise Research Conference to identify relevant unpublished
papers. Fifth, we applied the two-way snowball sampling technique (Von Hippel, Franke, &
Prügl, 2009), which entails backward tracing of all references in the identified studies and
forward tracing of all articles that referenced these studies.
The studies obtained through this sampling process had to meet two inclusion criteria to be
retained. First, studies needed to empirically examine the relationship between family firm
acquirers and the specific M&A strategies (i.e., industry related and domestic), between
family firm acquirers and M&A performance, or between the specific M&A strategies and
M&A performance using a sample of family and nonfamily firms. Second, studies had to
report Pearson’s correlation coefficients or other appropriate statistics (e.g., t statistics from inde-
pendent group tests) that could be converted into correlation coefficients.6 We corresponded with
61 authors on missing correlation coefficients or omitted information that would allow conver-
sion to correlation coefficients, which enabled us to include seven additional studies.
To enhance the robustness of our study (Landis, 2013), we included (in addition to the
findings from the primary studies) the meta-analytic effect size estimates from the most
recently published meta-analyses on the relationship between industry-related M&As
and M&A performance (King et al., 2021) as well as between domestic M&As and
M&A performance (Meckl & Röhrle, 2016) in our database.7 We included only these
two meta-analyses to avoid sample overlap. By December 2021, this search process had
led to a final sample of 51 primary studies (38 published and 13 unpublished, including
5 working/conference papers and 8 dissertations) and 210 effect sizes, capturing
242,123 M&A deals between 1950 and 2017.8
Following our search process, we read all primary studies and developed a coding protocol
outlining all information to be extracted from the studies (e.g., effect sizes and control variables)
to reduce coding error (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). All the studies were manually coded according
to the coding protocol by the first author. The second author independently coded all studies with
high interrater reliability (Cohen’s kappa coefficient = 0.97; Cohen, 1960). Disagreements were
resolved by discussion. Table 1 provides a description of the variables collected from the primary
studies; details about the primary studies can be found in Supplement 1 online.
Variables
Independent variable—family firm acquirers. We considered all variables from the

primary studies that measured whether an acquirer is a family firm (1) or not (0) for the var-
iable family firm acquirers, independent of the specific operationalization employed by
primary studies. The extant literature has used various definitions to extract the influence
of family firm acquirers (e.g., Ben-Amar & André, 2006; Caprio et al., 2011), such as (1)
family ownership through substantial voting or cash flow rights, presented as a dummy var-
iable with a defined percentage of voting or cash flow rights or as a continuous variable (e.g.,
André et al., 2014); (2) family presence via one or multiple family members on the executive
or nonexecutive board (e.g., Li & Srinivasan, 2011); and (3) combinations thereof (e.g.,
Defrancq, Huyghebaert, & Luypaert, 2016). In a post hoc test, we controlled for different
operationalizations used in primary studies. For this purpose, we created a dummy variable,
family board involvement, which takes the value of 1 if all the family firms in the primary
study had one or more family members involved in management and/or the board to be con-
sidered a family firm and 0 otherwise.
Dependent variable—M&A performance. In line with prior M&A meta-analyses (e.g.,

Bilgili et al., 2016; King et al., 2021), we considered all M&A performance variables used
in primary studies. While some studies relied on market-based measures of M&A perfor-
mance, such as cumulative abnormal returns around the M&A deal announcement (André
et al., 2014; Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008), buy-and-hold abnormal returns (Ottolenghi,
2017), or Tobin’s Q (Miller et al., 2010), others relied on accounting-based measures of
M&A performance, such as EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amor-
tization)/total assets (Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013), industry-adjusted sales growth (Shim &
Okamuro, 2011), or ROA (return on assets; Hussinger & Issah, 2019).9 We controlled for dif-
ferences between accounting- and market-based measures in a post hoc analysis.
TABLE 1
Description of Variables
Variable Description
Family firm acquirer Binary variable that measures whether an acquirer is a family firm (1) or not (0),
independent of the specific measure used in the primary study (e.g., Duran et al.,
2016).
M&A performance Continuous variable that measures M&A performance through accounting- or
market-based measures of M&A performance (e.g., Bilgili et al., 2016).
Industry-related M&As Binary variable that measures whether the acquirer and target operate in the same
industry (1) or not (0; e.g., Ben-Amar & André, 2006).
Domestic M&As Binary variable that measures whether the M&A deal is domestic (1) or not (0; e.g.,
Ben-Amar & André, 2006).
Cash deal Binary variable that reflects whether the M&A deal was paid in cash or cash equivalents
(1) or not (0; e.g., Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013).
Leverage Continuous variable that reflects the acquirer’s ratio of total debt to total assets or equity
(e.g., Tihanyi et al., 2019).
Acquirer firm size Continuous variable that measures the firm size of the acquirer, commonly measured as
the natural logarithm of the value of total assets or market capitalization (e.g.,
Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013).
Public target Binary variable that reflects whether the target firm is publicly listed (1) or not (0; e.g.,
Aktas et al., 2016).
Family board involvement Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a study requires a firm to have one or multiple
family members on the board to be a family firm and 0 otherwise (Arregle et al.,
2017).
Publicly listed acquirer Binary variable that reflects whether a study uses a publicly listed acquirer sample (1) or
sample a private acquirer sample (0; e.g., Duran et al., 2016).
Publication status Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a study is published and 0 otherwise (e.g.,
Duran et al., 2016).
Time period of data Continuous variable that reflects the median of the period for the data collection of a
collection study (e.g., Duran et al., 2016).
Endogeneity check Binary variable that takes the value of 1 if a study checks for potential endogeneity of
family firm status of acquirers on M&A performance and 0 otherwise (e.g., Duran
et al., 2016).
Note: M&A = merger and acquisition.
Mediation variable—industry-related M&As. Industry-related M&As is a binary variable

that measures whether acquirer and target operate in the same industry (1) or not (0; e.g.,
Ben-Amar & André, 2006). The underlying studies measure industry-related M&As
through different operationalizations of related industries, using two-digit (e.g., Ben-Amar
& André, 2006; Lahlou, 2018), three-digit (e.g., Defrancq et al., 2016; Feldman et al.,
2019), or four-digit SIC codes (Standard Industrial Classification; e.g., André et al., 2014;
Patel & King, 2015). In line with other meta-analyses (King et al., 2021), we followed the
definitions of the primary studies and included all of them in our variable industry-related
M&As. When studies measured industry diversification, we reversed the sign of the effect
size. None of the underlying studies used entropy or Herfindahl indices. To control for the
different operationalizations used by the underlying studies, we ran a series of post hoc
MASEM analyses in which we differentiated effect sizes stemming from studies that
employed two-, three-, or four-digit SIC codes to measure industry-related M&As.
Mediation variable—domestic M&As. Domestic M&As is a binary variable that mea-

sures whether the M&A deal is domestic (1) or not (0; i.e., cross-border) (e.g.,
Ben-Amar & André, 2006; Feito-Ruiz & Menéndez-Requejo, 2012; Gonenc, Hermes,
& van Sinderen, 2013). An M&A deal is considered domestic when the acquirer and
the target are located in the same country. We reversed the sign of the effect size when
studies measured cross-border M&As.
Control variables. In line with prior M&A meta-analyses (e.g., King et al., 2004; King
et al., 2021), we controlled for whether the M&A deal was paid in cash or cash equivalents
(i.e., cash deal) (1) or otherwise (0). The payment method in M&A deals has been shown to
significantly influence M&A performance (King et al., 2021), which could be a result of cash
payments signaling acquirer confidence in an M&A deal (Blackburn, Dark, & Hanson, 1997)
and public firms’ stock payments signaling that the acquirer’s share price is overvalued,
thereby prompting a negative market reaction (Welch et al., 2020). We controlled for the
acquirer’s leverage, typically measured as the ratio of total debt to the total value of assets
or equity. High leverage can signal, as well as act as a financial constraint to, the integration
of the M&A target (King et al., 2021), but it can also represent a form of beneficial external
governance, usually in the form of banks or other creditors (Jensen, 1986). Next, we con-
trolled for the acquirer’s firm size because larger acquirers are more likely to have the capacity
to integrate the target’s operations and thus to realize synergies (King et al., 2021). Primary
studies typically measured the acquirer’s firm size as the natural logarithm of the value of total
assets (e.g., Bouzgarrou & Navatte, 2013) or as the market capitalization (e.g., Gonenc et al.,
2013). Last, we controlled for whether the target firm was publicly listed, which was mea-
sured as a binary variable in primary studies (1 = publicly listed target; 0 = private target),
because prior research shows that M&A deals with publicly listed targets are associated
with higher acquisition costs due to greater competition in the stock market (Aktas,
Centineo, & Croci, 2016).
MASEM Procedure
To examine our hypothesized model, we performed MASEM following established meth-
odological guidelines (Bergh et al., 2016; Combs et al., 2019; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995).
Specifically, MASEM was conducted in two steps. In the first step, a meta-analytic correlation
matrix was developed wherein the meta-analytic effect size was calculated for each relation-
ship in the correlation matrix. We used Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficients (r)
from primary studies to empirically synthesize prior research findings. If studies reported
multiple effect sizes for the relationships of interest, we included all of them (Bijmolt &
Pieters, 2001; Tihanyi et al., 2019).10 However, using multiple effect sizes that stem from
the same study violates the assumption of independence (Cheung, 2019; Hunter &
Schmidt, 2004) and thus might bias the results (i.e., due to the underestimation of standard
errors; Cheung, 2019; López-López, Van den Noortgate, Tanner-Smith, Wilson, & Lipsey,
2017).11 Therefore, we followed recent recommendations (e.g., Cheung, 2014, 2019;
Fernández-Castilla et al., 2020) and used multilevel meta-analysis, which accounts for the
fact that multiple effect sizes can be nested within studies while preventing the loss of infor-
mation that inevitably comes with averaging dependent effect sizes within studies. We
conducted a multilevel approach with restricted maximum likelihood estimation procedures

(Cheung, 2019; Fernández-Castilla et al., 2020) using the metafor package by Viechtbauer
(2010) in R. In the second step, we used the meta-analytic correlation matrix as input to
apply structural equation modeling using maximum likelihood estimation procedures
(Bergh et al., 2016; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995). Given that the meta-analytic relationships
in the correlation matrix were based on different sample sizes, we followed current conven-
tions (Bergh et al., 2016; Combs et al., 2019) and used the harmonic mean of the sample sizes
across all cells for the path analysis (N = 9,117) (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1995). The harmonic
mean is less sensitive to large values when compared with the arithmetic mean and therefore
provides more conservative values (Landis, 2013).
Results
MASEM Results
Table 2 presents the meta-analytic correlation matrix, which was used as input for struc-
tural equation modeling. Table 3 and Figure 1 present the detailed MASEM path results. The
fit indices indicate that the proposed model fits the data well (root mean square error of
approximation = .01, goodness-of-fit index = 1.00, normative fit index = .98, standardized
root mean square residual = .01). We followed Hayes (2013) and tested different nested
models, including direct, partial, and full mediation models.12 A comparison of the different
models indicates that the partial model exhibits a significantly better fit than the direct effects
(Δχ2 [10] = 128.98, p = .000) and the full mediation model (Δχ2 [1] = 10.27, p = .001). To
further examine the mediation hypotheses, we calculated the direct, indirect, and total
effects of family firm acquirers on M&A performance using bootstrapping procedures to
assess the level of significance of the mediation effects (Hayes, 2013).13 In addition, we con-
ducted a series of Sobel, Aroian, and Goodman tests to assess the level of significance of the
different mediator effects between family firm acquirers and M&A performance (Preacher &
Hayes, 2008; Tihanyi et al., 2019).
H1a predicts that family firm acquirers are more likely to engage in industry-related M&A
deals than nonfamily firm acquirers. In line with this prediction, the results in Table 3 show that
family firm acquirers are positively associated with industry-related M&As (β = .04, p = .000).
To illustrate the practical relevance, we applied the binomial effect size display (BESD; Rosenthal
& Rubin, 1982). According to this approach, the meta-analytic effect size of r = .04 (Table 2)
between family firm acquirers and industry-related M&As means that family firm acquirers
are 4% more likely to pursue industry-related M&A deals than nonfamily firm acquirers.
Applied to the worldwide M&A activities in 2022 (Institute for Mergers, Acquisitons, and
Alliances [IMAA], 2022), this effect relates to 1,985 more industry-related M&A deals (4%
of 49,622 deals) conducted by family firm acquirers, reflecting a deal value of US $136
billion (4% of worldwide M&A deal value of US $3.39 trillion).14
In support of H1b, which predicts that industry-related M&A deals are associated with higher
M&A performance than industry-diversifying M&A deals, the results in Table 3 show that
industry-related M&A deals are positively associated with M&A performance (β = .06,
p = .000). While the BESD was initially developed to display the change in success rates
(e.g., survival rates; Rosenthal & Rubin, 1982), we follow prior research (e.g., Han, Harold,
TABLE 2
Meta-Analytic Correlation Matrix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) M&A performance —

(2) Family firm acquirers
r .04
95% CI [.01, .06]
n (k) 140,554 (141)
(3) Industry-related M&As
r .06 .04
95% CI [.02, .11] [.01, .07]
n (k) 132,050 (19) 36,405 (30)
(4) Domestic M&As
r –.04 .03 –.01
95% CI [–.05, –.02] [.00, .06] [–.11, .08]
n (k) 76,136 (7) 11,044 (12) 22,263 (7)
(5) Cash deal
r .02 .02 –.01 –.03
95% CI [–.05, .09] [–.01, .04] [–.03, .00] [–.18, .13]
n (k) 122,772 (14) 25,977 (24) 15,821 (10) 2,200 (4)
(6) Acquirer leverage
r .01 .01 .02 .02 .01
95% CI [–.04, .05] [–.04, .05] [–.01, .05] [–.03, .07] [–.04, .07]
n (k) 30,785 (12) 27,690 (20) 26,849 (7) 22,923 (4) 1,288 (4)
(7) Acquirer firm size
r –.01 .00 –.02 –.06 .06 .17
95% CI [–.10, .03] [–.12, .13] [–.07, .02] [–.17, .05] [–.03, .16] [.11, .24]
n (k) 143,609 (21) 47,277 (37) 40,361 (17) 23,214 (6) 10,885 (8) 32,667 (12)
(8) Public target
r –.05 –.01 .05 .04 .06 .02 .10
95% CI [–.11, .01] [–.05, .04] [–.03, .13] [–.06, .15] [–.09, 22] [–.07, .11] [.03, .17]
n (k) 24,255 (9) 12,052 (15) 22,660 (7) 19,740 (3) 1,155 (5) 22,938 (5) 23,157 (7)
Note: r = inverse variance weighted effect size; 95% CI = 95% confidence interval; n = number of M&A deals
observed in primary studies (sample size); k = number of effect sizes; harmonic mean N = 9,117. M&A = merger and
acquisition.
Oh, Kim, & Agolli, 2022; Wang, Holmes Jr, Oh, & Zhu, 2016) and apply this approach for
interpreting our findings on M&A performance through assuming successful versus unsuccess-
ful dichotomies. Based on the assumption of such dichotomies, the correlation of r = .06
(Table 2) between industry-related M&As and M&A performance means that industry-related
M&As have 6% higher success rates than industry-diversifying M&A deals, which relates to
2,977 industry-related M&A deals with higher success rates, reflecting a deal value of US $203
billion if applied to the worldwide M&A activities in 2022 (IMAA, 2022).
Consistent with H1c, which predicts that the relationship between family firm acquirers
and M&A performance is mediated by higher levels of industry-related M&As, we find a sig-
nificant positive indirect effect of family firm acquirers on M&A performance through
TABLE 3
Pooled MASEM Results
Industry-related M&As Domestic M&As M&A performance
Family firm acquirers .04 (.01) [.000] .03 (.01) [.003] .03 (.01) [.001]
Industry-related M&As .06 (.01) [.000]
Domestic M&As –.04 (.01) [.000]
Cash deal –.01 (.01) [.231] –.03 (.01) [.004] .02 (.01) [.032]
Acquirer leverage .02 (.01) [.026] .03 (.01) [.004] .01 (.01) [.280]
Acquirer firm size –.03 (.01) [.007] –.07 (.01) [.000] –.01 (.01) [.404]
Public target .05 (.01) [.000] .05 (.01) [.000] –.05 (.01) [.000]
Harmonic mean 9,117
χ2 (df) 10.10 (6)
RMSEA .01
GFI 1.00
NFI .98
SRMR .01
Note: Standardized coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses and exact p values in brackets.
MASEM = meta-analytical structural equation modeling; M&A = merger and acquisition; RMSEA = root mean
square error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; NFI = normative fit index; SRMR = standard root mean
square residual.
Figure 1
MASEM Results
Note: Standardized coefficients are reported with confidence intervals in brackets. M&A = merger and acquisition;
MASEM = meta-analytical structural equation modeling.
industry-related M&As (β = .002, p = .002; Sobel test, z = 3.33, p = .000; Aroian test, z = 3.30,
p = .001; Goodman test, z = 3.36, p = .001).
H2a predicts that family firm acquirers are more likely to engage in domestic M&A deals
than nonfamily firm acquirers. In support of this, the results in Table 3 show that family firm
acquirers are positively associated with domestic M&A deals (β = .03, p = .003). The BESD
suggests that family firm acquirers are 3% more likely to pursue domestic M&A deals than
nonfamily firm acquirers.15 Applied to the worldwide M&A activities in 2022 (IMAA, 2022),
this relates to 1,489 more domestic M&A deals conducted by family firm acquirers, reflecting
a deal value of US $102 billion.
H2b predicts that domestic M&As are associated with a lower M&A performance than
cross-border M&A deals. The results show that domestic M&A deals are negatively associ-
ated with M&A performance (β = –.04, p = .000), thus supporting H2b. The BESD illustrates
that domestic M&As have 4% lower success rates than cross-border M&As, which, again
applied to the worldwide M&A activities in 2022, relates to 1,985 domestic M&A deals
with lower success rates, reflecting a deal value of US $136 billion.
H2c predicts that higher levels of domestic M&As negatively mediate the relationship
between family firm acquirers and M&A performance. In line with this prediction, we find
a significant negative indirect effect of family firm acquirers on M&A performance
through domestic M&As (β = –.001, p = .005; Sobel test, z = –2.32, p = .020; Aroian test,
z = –2.27, p = .023; Goodman test, z = –2.38, p = .018), which supports H2c.
Finally, H3 predicts that family firm acquirers are associated with higher M&A perfor-
mance than nonfamily firm acquirers. In line with H3, the MASEM results in Table 3
show a positive and significant direct effect of family firm acquirers on M&A performance
(β = .034, p = .001), resulting in a positive and significant total effect (β = .035, p = .001).
The BESD illustrates that family firm acquirers have 4% higher success rates in M&As
than nonfamily firm acquirers. Applied to the worldwide M&A activities in 2022 (IMAA,
2022), this relates to 1,985 M&A deals with higher success rates conducted by family firm
acquirers, reflecting a deal value of US $136 billion.
Post Hoc Analyses

Family board involvement. We examined whether the influence of family firm acquirers
on industry-related and domestic M&As depends on the operationalization of family firm. For
this purpose, we created a subsample of primary studies that used family board involvement
to differentiate family and nonfamily firms. Given this, we created another meta-analytic cor-
relation matrix and reran the MASEM. The results presented in Table 4 show that the influ-
ence of family firm acquirers on industry-related M&As is significantly (p = .031) more
positive for studies using the family board involvement operationalization (β = .08, p = .000)
as compared with ownership-based operationalizations (β = .02, p = .024). The mediation anal-
ysis shows that the indirect effect of family firm acquirers on M&A performance through
industry-related M&As is substantially higher for family board involvement operationalization
(β = .01, p = .001; Sobel test, z = 4.88, p = .000; Aroian test, z = 4.85, p = .000; Goodman
test, z = 4.90, p = .000) than otherwise (β = .001, p = .019; Sobel test, z = 2.23, p = .026;
Aroian test, z = 2.21, p = .027; Goodman test, z = 2.26, p = .024).
The results in Table 4 show that the influence of family firm acquirers on domestic M&As
according to family board involvement operationalization (β = .03, p = .003) did not signifi-
cantly differ (p = .851) from studies using other ownership-based operationalizations (β = .04,
p = .000). The mediation analysis shows that the negative indirect effect of family firm acquir-
ers on M&A performance through domestic M&As does not differ for studies using the family
board involvement operationalization (β = –.001, p = .006; Sobel test, z = –2.36, p = .018;
Aroian test, z = –2.31, p = .020; Goodman test, z = –2.42, p = .016) than otherwise (β = –.001,
TABLE 4
Family Board Involvement MASEM Results
Industry-Related M&As Domestic M&As M&A Performance
Family board involvement operationalization .08 (.01) [.000] .03 (.01) [.003] .02 (.01) [.039]
Industry-related M&As .06 (.01) [.000]
Domestic M&As –.04 (.01) [.001]
Cash deal –.01 (.01) [.211] –.03 (.01) [.005] .02 (.01) [.033]
Acquirer leverage .02 (.01) [.032] .03 (.01) [.005] .01 (.01) [.252]
Acquirer firm size –.03 (.01) [.009] –.07 (.01) [.000] –.01 (.01) [.193]
Public target .05 (.01) [.000] .05 (.01) [.000] –.05 (.01) [.000]
Harmonic mean 8,726
χ2 (df) 9.66 (6)
RMSEA .01
GFI 1.00
NFI .99
SRMR .01
Note: Standardized coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses and exact p values in brackets.
MASEM = meta-analytical structural equation modeling; M&A = merger and acquisition; RMSEA = root mean
square error of approximation; GFI = goodness-of-fit index; NFI = normative fit index; SRMR = standard root mean
square residual.
p = .003; Sobel test, z = –2.58, p = .010; Aroian test, z = –2.53, p = .011; Goodman test, z =
–2.63, p = .009). In summary, our post hoc analysis suggests that the indirect effect of
family firm acquirers on M&A performance through industry-related M&As is stronger
for studies applying a narrow definition of family firms that requires board involvement
rather than mere ownership.
Post hoc meta-regression. Our meta-analytic results may have been affected by the
research design and characteristics of the underlying studies. To check the robustness of
our results, we conducted a post hoc multilevel meta-analytic regression analysis.
Specifically, meta-regressions use the effect size of the underlying study as the dependent var-
iable and potential moderator variables as independent variables (Gonzalez-Mulé & Aguinis,
2018; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Again, we followed recent recommendations (Cheung, 2019;
Fernández-Castilla et al., 2020) and employed a multilevel approach to account for the fact
that multiple effect sizes are nested within studies through a three-level random effects meta-
regression using the metaphor package in R (Viechtbauer, 2010). In our multilevel meta-
regression, we first controlled for publication bias (Rosenthal, 1979) by including a
dummy variable denoting whether a study is published (1) or not (0). Second, extant literature
has stressed that publicly listed firms are exposed to the pressures for greater risk taking and
higher returns (Carney, van Essen, Gedajlovic, & Heugens, 2015). Hence, we controlled for
whether a study based its sample on publicly listed (1) or private (0) acquirers.16 Third, the
analysis of M&A performance in specific periods, such as during M&A waves, may have a
significant effect on M&A performance (Wang & Shailer, 2017). We thus controlled for
primary study samples that analyzed M&A deals in different periods by including the
TABLE 5
Post Hoc Multilevel Meta-Regression Results
Model 1
Publication status –.01 (.03) [.804]

Publicly listed acquirer sample .01 (.09) [.879]
Period of data collection .00 (.00) [.522]
M&A performance measure .00 (.05) [.998]
Endogeneity check –.03 (.03) [.406]
Q explained 1.47 [.917]
Q residual 468.26 [.000]
AIC −314.70
BIC −291.46
k 141
Note: Unstandardized beta coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses and exact p values in brackets.
Q explained = homogeneity analysis results of the model; Q residual = residual variance; AIC = Akaike information
criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion; k = number of samples.
median of the period of the data collection for each study (Bilgili et al., 2016). Fourth, we
controlled for different M&A performance measures used in primary studies by differentiat-
ing market-based (1) and accounting-based (0) measures of M&A performance. Finally, we
included a dummy variable coded as (1) when effect sizes were taken from primary studies
that conducted an endogeneity check and (0) otherwise (Duran et al., 2016). Results from our
post hoc multilevel meta-analytic regression analysis reported in Table 5 revealed no evi-
dence that different characteristics of the underlying studies significantly affect the relation-
ship between family firm acquirers and M&A performance.
Publication bias. We calculated the number of samples reporting insignificant results that
would be needed to reduce our meta-analytic effect sizes to the point of nonsignificance (fail-
safe n; Rosenthal, 1979). The fail-safe n values indicate that publication bias is not a concern
in this study: family firm acquirers–M&A performance, n = 10,814; family firm acquirers–
industry-related M&As, n = 764; family firm acquirers–domestic M&As, n = 61;
industry-related M&As–M&A performance, n = 717; domestic M&As–M&A performance,
n = 122. Finally, we performed a MASEM with published studies only (see Supplement
2A online). Our results remain robust.
Different operationalizations of industry-related M&As. We conducted post hoc MASEM

analyses to control for different operationalizations of industry-related M&As (see
Supplements 2B–D online). This shows that the influence of family firm acquirers on
industry-related M&As and the effect of industry-related M&As on M&A performance are
strongest in studies using four-digit SIC codes (i.e., horizontal M&As) and weakest yet
still significant in studies using two-digit SIC codes. The mediation path from family firm
acquirers to M&A performance through industry-related M&As increases when the underly-
ing studies measure industry-related M&As using two-digit SIC codes (β = .001, p = .016) to
three-digit SIC codes (β = .002, p = .025) to four-digit SIC codes (β = .006, p = .001). These
results indicate that horizontal M&As have the strongest M&A performance. Finally, we con-
trolled for the extent of prior industry diversification of acquirers in our MASEM, which
shows that our results remain robust (see Supplement 2E online).
Discussion
Prior research has sparked a controversial discussion about M&A performance differences
between family and nonfamily firm acquirers (e.g., Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Caprio
et al., 2011; Feldman et al., 2019). Although research agrees that family influence matters
for M&A performance, the underlying mechanisms and direction of this effect remain
unclear.
We advance the discussion on the underlying mechanisms by theorizing that family
members’ desire to preserve SEW influences their choice of specific M&A strategies
toward industry-related and domestic M&As, which have contrary effects on M&A perfor-
mance. Thus, we contribute to prior research on the family firm–M&A performance relation-
ship by providing a more nuanced understanding of the underlying mechanisms explaining
these relationships. Specifically, we argue, based on family firm research, that family firms
favor the pursuit of industry-related and domestic M&As because they foster transgenera-
tional control, strengthen stakeholder relationships, and maintain the family’s identification
with the firm (Berrone et al., 2012). By integrating prior M&A research, we further
suggest that their preference for industry-related M&As leads to increased M&A performance
(Datta et al., 1992), but their preference for domestic M&As lowers M&A performance
(Meckl & Röhrle, 2016). Mediation hypotheses are supported through meta-analytic tech-
niques based on 51 primary studies, 210 effect sizes, and 242,123 M&A deals. By uncovering
these diverging effects of family firm acquirers, our study helps explain the previously incon-
sistent findings on family firm acquirers’ M&A performance.
Our study contributes to the controversial discussion about the overall effect of family firm
acquirers on M&A performance by building on the concept of SEW resources (Combs et al.,
2022). While prior research shows that family members’ pursuit of SEW creates specific
resources in family firms (e.g., Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013) that can change firm out-
comes (Combs et al., 2022), we extend this idea to the M&A context. We argue that
family firms, due to at least three SEW resources—LTO, strong stakeholder relationships,
and a favorable firm reputation—are particularly well suited to diligently select and thor-
oughly integrate target firms, leading to overall better M&A performance when compared
with their nonfamily firm counterparts. The meta-analytical results are in line with our predic-
tions: we find a positive direct effect in addition to the previously described mediated effects
of M&A strategies, resulting in an overall positive relationship between family firm acquirers
and M&A performance. As such, our study provides important implications for future family
firm research and the M&A literature in general.
Implications for Family Firm Research

Our study identified two important M&A diversification strategies that help explain how
family firm acquirers affect M&A performance. The finding that family firms prefer certain
M&A strategies might also inform family firm research on other firm outcomes, such as
innovation (e.g., Duran et al., 2016), encouraging researchers to identify specific strategies
that are preferred by family firms. Our study suggests that family firms engage in beneficial
and detrimental M&A strategies, indicating that family owners can be a double-edged sword
for M&A performance. This insight might inform other “black box” discussions in the family
firm literature, such as the general family firm–performance discussion (e.g., Davila, Duran,
Gómez-Mejía, & Sanchez-Bueno, 2022; Lohwasser, Hoch, & Kellermanns, 2022).
In our theorizing, we highlighted the role of SEW preservation concerns in pursuing spe-
cific M&A strategies. Prior work by Gomez-Mejia et al. (2018) suggests that M&A decisions
may pose dilemmas for family firms regarding whether to maintain SEW or pursue future
financial wealth. These researchers argue that under certain conditions—specifically, unsatis-
factory firm performance—family firms are willing to forgo their SEW preservation concerns
and engage in unrelated M&As to diversify the family firm’s portfolio. Our findings show that
unrelated M&A strategies do not lead to better, but worse, M&A performance (on average).
In other words, the atypical M&A strategies chosen by family firms in difficult financial sit-
uations might destroy rather than create financial wealth. As suggested by Gomez-Mejia et al.
(2018), one reason for this behavior is that family owners might look at M&As from a port-
folio risk diversification perspective rather than a strategic fit perspective (Larsson &
Finkelstein, 1999), thereby overlooking the enormous challenges of diversifying M&As
(i.e., increased complexity; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010). Hence, more in-depth research is
needed to investigate why family firms engage in these detrimental M&A strategies under
conditions of financial pressure and how specific situations, such as financial duress, alter
strategic preferences (i.e., domestic vs. cross-border M&As).
Our theorizing builds on and extends the concept of SEW resources (Combs et al., 2022) to
the M&A context. Prior theory suggests that SEW resources help family firms better imple-
ment strategies, such as corporate social responsibility, and thus enhance firm performance
(Combs et al., 2022). We apply and adapt this idea by arguing that because of their SEW
resources, family firms are better able to integrate their M&A targets. We theorize that
SEW resources, such as LTO, strong stakeholder relationships, and favorable reputations
(Combs et al., 2022), enable family firms to also make better decisions in the target selection
process. One implication of this theorizing is that future research could investigate how SEW
resources influence other strategic decisions, such as international entry mode decisions
(Arregle et al., 2017), innovation decisions (Calabrò et al., 2019), and corporate entrepreneur-
ship decisions (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2006), and their performance consequences.
Implications for M&A Research

Our study emphasizes that the M&A strategies pursued by family firms differ from those
of their nonfamily firm counterparts, leading to a variance in M&A performance. This finding
implies that different firm owners favor different M&A strategies, which can lead to different
performance outcomes. We focused on the idiosyncrasies of family firm acquirers in this
study; however, the preferred M&A strategies of other firm owners, such as institutional
investors or blockholders, warrant further investigation because they may have different stra-
tegic goals that might contribute to performance differences among M&As (Connelly,
Hoskisson, Tihanyi, & Certo, 2010; King et al., 2021). Such future research might differen-
tiate between owners focused on operational levers, such as family firms, and those focusing
on financial levers, such as family offices. Future research may also examine whether firms
owned by specific owners use M&As primarily to achieve efficiency gains (i.e., economies
of scale and scope) or if they use them as a catalyst for strategic change and corporate
renewal. Prior research suggests that M&As can be particularly helpful for gaining access
to new knowledge (i.e., about technologies; Ahuja & Katila, 2001) or to “recombine knowl-
edge in novel ways” (Graebner et al., 2017: 8). Hence, an important implication of our study
is that future research should move beyond efforts to analyze whether firms owned by a spe-
cific ownership type have better or worse M&A performance (i.e., the direct effect) toward
how their strategic M&A decisions differ and thus help explain different M&A performance
effects.
Our study shows that family firms, irrespective of their motives for pursuing M&As (e.g.,
self-serving motives; Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008), have better M&A performance. We
theorize that this is a result of their unique SEW resources. This finding might also inform
the general M&A literature, which shows that resources such as knowledge, experience,
and capital (social, human, and financial) are important for M&A performance (for an over-
view, see Graebner et al., 2017; King et al., 2021). Our theorizing suggests that other
resources might be important for the selection and integration of M&A targets, such as
“patient capital” (i.e., long-term vs. short-term), the personal networks inside and outside
the acquiring firm (e.g., of the top management, the corporate board, or institutional inves-
tors), and the motivation of the acquirers’ employees. While certainly not all such resources
will be found to be important to the same extent as in nonfamily firms, our research suggests
merit in future studies that investigate whether similar resources matter for other firms (and, if
so, under which conditions) and how such resources affect M&A performance.
Practical Implications
Our study has practical implications for family and nonfamily firms pursuing M&A deals.
First, we present further evidence that industry-related M&As lead to superior M&A perfor-
mance, encouraging family and nonfamily firms to pursue this M&A strategy. Moreover, our
study cautions family firms against the pursuit of often-preferred domestic (vs. cross-border)
M&A deals. Finally, given our findings, decision makers in family and nonfamily firms
should be encouraged to critically assess the resources available in the firm for selecting
and integrating M&A targets, given their critical relevance for M&A performance.
Limitations
Our study has several limitations that provide fruitful additional opportunities for future
research. First, as in any meta-analysis, our study was constrained by the characteristics of
the underlying primary studies. In a post hoc meta-regression, we controlled for whether
the primary studies accounted for endogeneity issues, but meta-analytic methods are
unable to empirically address causality concerns with the methodological approaches avail-
able in primary empirical studies (e.g., instrumental variables; Bergh et al., 2016). To validate
the causal nature of the proposed mechanisms, we encourage future studies to employ alter-
native empirical designs, such as matched-pair or single-industry studies, to study the rela-
tionships of interest.
Second, our findings primarily stem from samples of publicly listed acquirers. However,
privately held family firms are spared from the pressures of the stock market (Carney et al.,
2015) and thus might place even greater emphasis on preserving family members’ SEW in
M&A deals, thereby strengthening the proposed relationships. Although we controlled for
public versus private acquirer status in a post hoc meta-regression, we encourage future
studies to investigate the M&A strategies of privately held family firm acquirers. The relation-
ship between family firm acquirers and M&A performance might also be influenced by
acquirers’ prior M&A experience; research has shown that acquirers are more successful in
M&As when they have conducted M&As in the past, especially when the target is similar
to prior M&As (e.g., prior cross-border M&A activities; Basuil & Datta, 2015; Hitt et al.,
2001). Yet, we were unable to account for this because of the lack of information provided
by primary studies. We therefore encourage future studies to examine whether the perfor-
mance implications and the M&A strategies chosen of family versus nonfamily firms are
affected by prior M&A experiences. In addition, we could test only for linear effects of
prior industry diversification (see supplemental analyses online), and we encourage future
research on this topic.
Third, our study is unable to capture the full spectrum of family firm heterogeneity (Chua,
Chrisman, Steier, & Rau, 2012) because we are constrained to variables investigated suffi-
ciently in primary studies. Future research might investigate the effects of additional
sources of family firm heterogeneity, such as generational stage (Villalonga & Amit, 2006)
or different SEW goals (Kotlar & De Massis, 2013), on family firms’ M&A strategies and
M&A performance.
Fourth, our study builds on only 51 primary studies, and some of our meta-analytic esti-
mates are based on few effects and sample sizes, thereby covering a fraction of all M&A
deals. Although the synthesis of effect sizes from primary studies reduces sampling error,
our findings, particularly those based on a few effect sizes, should still be interpreted with
caution because they may suffer from second-order sampling error (Schmidt & Hunter, 2015).
Conclusion
We theorized that family members’ desire to preserve their SEW favors the pursuit of
distinctive M&A strategies that are beneficial (industry-related M&As) and detrimental
(domestic M&As) to M&A performance. We therefore shed light on the different strategic
mechanisms that help reconcile prior inconclusive findings on the family firm acquirer–
M&A performance relationship. Given recent family firm theorizing, we further argue
that the desire to preserve their SEW also leads to idiosyncratic SEW resources that
help family firm acquirers in better selecting and integrating M&A targets. Consistent
with this logic, family firm acquirers are, on average, associated with better M&A perfor-
mance than nonfamily firm acquirers. Our meta-analytic results, based on 51 primary
studies covering 242,123 M&A deals, are consistent with our predictions. We hope that
our study encourages scholars to go beyond examining the direct (M&A) performance
consequence of family influence and thus to provide more insights into the mechanisms
that help explain these relationships. For practitioners, we hope that our study provides
valuable guidance regarding which M&A strategies are more promising than others to
enhance M&A performance.
ORCID iDs
Priscilla S. Kraft https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1141-2353
Nadine Kammerlander https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7838-8792
Notes
1. While prior research considers M&As an important firm strategy for firm growth or value creation (e.g.,
Cartwright, 2005), the M&A literature distinguishes among strategic approaches, such as industry-diversifying as
compared with industry-related or cross-border as compared with domestic M&A strategies (e.g., Arregle et al.,
2017; Datta et al., 1992; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2010; King et al., 2021; Martynova & Renneboog, 2011). For
brevity, we refer to industry-diversifying or domestic M&As as “M&A strategies” in the remainder of the article.
2. Interestingly, most primary studies do not explicitly define M&A performance in their theorizing. For an
overview of existing approaches to conceptualizing M&A performance, see Zollo and Meier (2008).
3. Meta-analytic evidence shows that the lack of value creation for acquirers following M&As holds for both
market-based and accounting-based measures of M&A performance (Datta et al., 1992; King et al., 2004; King et al.
2021).
4. While we focus on three SEW dimensions, prior research has identified other dimensions, such as family
members’ ability to exercise control in the firm and their emotional attachment to their firm (Berrone et al., 2012).
5. Academy of Management Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Entrepreneurship Theory and
Practice, Family Business Review, Journal of Business Venturing, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of
Family Business Strategy, The Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Management,
Journal of Management Studies, Journal of Small Business Management, Management Science, Organization
Science, Organization Studies, Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal, and Strategic Management Journal.
6. Studies that reported only beta coefficients were excluded from our meta-analysis based on Monte Carlo
simulations by Roth et al. (2018), which show that correlations often substantially outperformed beta estimation
procedures.
7. To prevent sample overlap, we excluded primary studies on performance implications of industry-related or
domestic M&As that were part of the sample of the included meta-analyses.
8. The large number of effect sizes in relation to the identified studies predominantly stems from primary
studies applying different operationalizations of family firm status or analyzing M&A performance using different
performance measures and time windows (see also Bilgili et al., 2016). We accounted for this data structure in
our meta-analytic technique.
9. Additional accounting-based measures of M&A performance: industry-adjusted ROA (return on assets),
industry-adjusted employee growth, growth in sales, EBITDA margin (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation
and amortization), EBIT margin (earnings before interest and taxes), FCF return (free cash flow), net debt/
EBITDA, EBIT/total assets, and ROCE (return on capital employed).
10. This is in line with the findings from a Monte Carlo simulation by Bijmolt and Pieters (2001), which
revealed that the use of a complete set of measurements from each study outperforms procedures that reduce each
primary study to a single value (e.g., Tihanyi et al., 2019).
11. Traditional meta-analytic methods typically rely on the assumption that effect sizes are independent (Hunter
& Schmidt, 2004). Given that effect sizes that stem from the same primary study are typically obtained from the same
sample and study procedure or at least from similar settings, they are likely to be more related (and thus dependent)
than effect sizes extracted from different primary studies (Cheung, 2019; Fernández-Castilla et al., 2020).
12. The latter includes no direct effects of family firm acquirers on M&A performance and presumes that both
M&A strategies fully mediate the relationship between family firm acquirers and M&A performance. In contrast, in
the direct effects model, family firm acquirers and both M&A strategies are assumed to have only direct effects on
M&A performance, excluding any mediating effects.
13. The direct effects refer to the unmediated effects of family firm acquirers on M&A performance, whereas
the indirect effects represent the product of the paths from family firm acquirers to the M&A strategies and from these
M&A strategies to M&A performance. The total effects reflect the sum of the direct and indirect effects.
14. Rosenthal and Rubin (1982) introduced BESD to illustrate the practical relevance of “small correlations”
(Hunter & Schmidt, 2004); since then, it has been applied and recommended by various researchers (e.g., Eden,
2002; Eisend, 2015; Han et al., 2022; Wang et al., 2016). The BESD illustrates the change in outcome rates between
two groups (e.g., family vs. nonfamily firms in our setting) and is calculated as (.50 + r/2) for one group and (.50 – r/
2) for the other, with r representing the correlation coefficient. Applied to H1a, the meta-analytic correlation of r = .04
between family firms and industry-related M&As relates to 52% industry-related M&As conducted by family firms
versus 48% conducted by nonfamily firms. In other words, family firms pursue 4% more industry-related M&A deals
(vs. nonfamily firms). For more information on the BESD see, for instance, Rosenthal and Rubin (1982), Hunter and
Schmidt (2004), or Lipsey and Wilson (2001).
15. Note that the interpretation of the BESD always refers to the meta-analytic correlation coefficient of the
respective relationship, which is presented in Table 2.
16. None of the underlying studies used mixed samples.
References
Ahuja, G., & Katila, R. 2001. Technological acquisitions and the innovation performance of acquiring firms: A lon-
gitudinal study. Strategic Management Journal, 22: 197-220.
Aktas, N., Centineo, S., & Croci, E. 2016. Value of control in family firms: Evidence from mergers and acquisitions.
Multinational Finance Journal, 20: 85-126.
Amihud, Y., & Lev, B. 1981. Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers. Bell Journal of
Economics, 12: 605-617.
André, P., Ben-Amar, W., & Saadi, S. 2014. Family firms and high technology mergers & acquisitions. Journal of
Management and Governance, 18: 129-158.
Aronoff, C., & Ward, J. 2011. More than family: Non-family executives in the family business. Cham, Switzerland:
Springer.
Arregle, J.-L., Duran, P., Hitt, M. A., & van Essen, M. 2017. Why is family firms’ internationalization unique? A
meta–analysis. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 41: 801-831.
Arregle, J.-L., Hitt, M. A., Sirmon, D. G., & Very, P. 2007. The development of organizational social capital:
Attributes of family firms. Journal of Management Studies, 44: 73-95.
Avery, C., Chevalier, J. A., & Schaefer, S. 1998. Why do managers undertake acquisitions? An analysis of internal
and external rewards for acquisitiveness. Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations, 14: 24-43.
Barkema, H. G., Bell, J. H., & Pennings, J. M. 1996. Foreign entry, cultural barriers, and learning. Strategic
Management Journal, 17: 151-166.
Barkema, H. G., & Schijven, M. 2008. Toward unlocking the full potential of acquisitions: The role of organizational
restructuring. Academy of Management Journal, 51: 696-722.
Basu, N., Dimitrova, L., & Paeglis, I. 2009. Family control and dilution in mergers. Journal of Banking & Finance,
33: 829-841.
Basuil, D. A., & Datta, D. K. 2015. Effects of industry- and region-specific acquisition experience on value creation in
cross-border acquisitions: The moderating role of cultural similarity. Journal of Management Studies, 52: 766-795.
Bauer, F., & Matzler, K. 2014. Antecedents of M&A success: The role of strategic complementarity, cultural fit, and
degree and speed of integration. Strategic Management Journal, 35: 269-291.
Bauguess, S., & Stegemoller, M. 2008. Protective governance choices and the value of acquisition activity. Journal of
Corporate Finance, 14: 550-566.
Ben-Amar, W., & André, P. 2006. Separation of ownership from control and acquiring firm performance: The case of
family ownership in Canada. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 33: 517-543.
Bergh, D. D., Aguinis, H., Heavey, C., Ketchen, D. J., Boyd, B. K., Su, P., Lau, C. L. L., & Joo, H. 2016. Using meta-
analytic structural equation modeling to advance strategic management research: Guidelines and an empirical
illustration via the strategic leadership-performance relationship. Strategic Management Journal, 37: 477-497.
Berrone, P., Cruz, C., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. 2012. Socioemotional wealth in family firms: Theoretical dimensions,
assessment approaches, and agenda for future research. Family Business Review, 25: 258-279.
Bertrand, O., & Capron, L. 2015. Productivity enhancement at home via cross-border acquisitions: The roles of learn-
ing and contemporaneous domestic investments. Strategic Management Journal, 36: 640-658.
Bhattacharyya, S., & Nain, A. 2011. Horizontal acquisitions and buying power: A product market analysis. Journal of
Financial Economics, 99: 97-115.
Bijmolt, T. H., & Pieters, R. G. 2001. Meta-analysis in marketing when studies contain multiple measurements.
Marketing Letters, 12: 157-169.
Bilgili, T. V., Calderon, C. J., Allen, D. G., & Kedia, B. L. 2016. Gone with the wind: A meta-analytic review of
executive turnover, its antecedents, and postacquisition performance. Journal of Management, 43: 1966-1997.
Bird, M., & Wennberg, K. 2014. Regional influences on the prevalence of family versus non-family start-ups. Journal
of Business Venturing, 29: 421-436.
Birkinshaw, J., Bresman, H., & Håkanson, L. 2000. Managing the post-acquisition process: How the human integration
and task integration processes interact to foster value creation. Journal of Management Studies, 37: 395-425.
Blackburn, V. L., Dark, F. H., & Hanson, R. C. 1997. Mergers, method of payment and returns to manager- and
owner-controlled firms. Financial Review, 32: 569-589.
Bouzgarrou, H., & Navatte, P. 2013. Ownership structure and acquirers performance: Family vs. non-family firms.
International Review of Financial Analysis, 27: 123-134.
Calabrò, A., Vecchiarini, M., Gast, J., Campopiano, G., De Massis, A., & Kraus, S. 2019. Innovation in family firms: A sys-
tematic literature review and guidance for future research. International Journal of Management Reviews, 21: 317-355.
Caprio, L., Croci, E., & Del Giudice, A. 2011. Ownership structure, family control, and acquisition decisions. Journal
of Corporate Finance, 17: 1636-1657.
Carney, M., van Essen, M., Gedajlovic, E. R., & Heugens, P. P. 2015. What do we know about private family firms?
A meta-analytical review. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 39: 513-544.
Cartwright, S. 2005. Mergers and acquisitions: An update and appraisal. In G. P. Hodgkinson & J. K. Ford (Eds.),
International review of industrial and organizational psychology: 1-38. West Sussex, UK: Wiley.
Cartwright, S., & Schoenberg, R. 2006. Thirty years of mergers and acquisitions research: Recent advances and future
opportunities. British Journal of Management, 17: S1-S5.
Casson, M. 1999. The economics of the family firm. Scandinavian Economic History Review, 47: 10-23.
Chakrabarti, R., Gupta-Mukherjee, S., & Jayaraman, N. 2009. Mars-Venus marriages: Culture and cross-border
M&A. Journal of International Business Studies, 40: 216-236.
Chalençon, L., Colovic, A., Lamotte, O., & Mayrhofer, U. 2017. Reputation, e-reputation, and value-creation of
mergers and acquisitions. International Studies of Management & Organization, 47: 4-22.
Chen, Y.-R., Huang, Y.-L., & Chen, C.-N. 2009. Financing constraints, ownership control, and cross-border M&As:
Evidence from nine east Asian economies. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17: 665-680.
Cheung, M. W. L. 2014. Modeling dependent effect sizes with three-level meta-analyses: A structural equation mod-
eling approach. Psychological Methods, 19: 211-229.
Cheung, M. W. L. 2019. A guide to conducting a meta-analysis with non-independent effect sizes. Neuropsychology
Review, 29: 387-396.
Chrisman, J. J., Sharma, P., Steier, L. P., & Chua, J. H. 2013. The influence of family goals, governance, and
resources on firm outcomes. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 37: 1249-1261.
Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J., & Sharma, P. 1999. Defining the family business by behavior. Entrepreneurship Theory
and Practice, 23: 19-39.
Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J., Steier, L. P., & Rau, S. B. 2012. Sources of heterogeneity in family firms: An introduc-
tion. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 36: 1103-1113.
Cohen, J. 1960. A coefficient of agreement for nominal scales. Education and Psychological Measurement, 20: 37-46.
Colman, H. L., & Lunnan, R. 2011. Organizational identification and serendipitous value creation in post-acquisition
integration. Journal of Management, 37: 839-860.
Combs, J. G., Crook, T. R., & Rauch, A. 2019. Meta-analytic research in management: Contemporary approaches,
unresolved controversies, and rising standards. Journal of Management Studies, 56: 1-18.
Combs, J. G., Jaskiewicz, P., Ravi, R., & Walls, J. L. 2022. More bang for their buck: Why (and when) family firms
better leverage corporate social responsibility. Journal of Management, 49: 575-605.
Connelly, B. L., Hoskisson, R. E., Tihanyi, L., & Certo, S. T. 2010. Ownership as a form of corporate governance.
Journal of Management Studies, 47: 1561-1589.
Datta, D. K., Pinches, G. E., & Narayanan, V. K. 1992. Factors influencing wealth creation from mergers and acqui-
sitions: A meta-analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 13: 67-84.
Davila, J., Duran, P., Gómez-Mejía, L., & Sanchez-Bueno, M. J. 2022. Socioemotional wealth and family firm per-
formance: A meta-analytic integration. Journal of Family Business Strategy. Advance online publication.
doi:10.1016/j.jfbs.2022.100536
De Massis, A., Kotlar, J., Chua, J. H., & Chrisman, J. J. 2014. Ability and willingness as sufficiency conditions for
family-oriented particularistic behavior: Implications for theory and empirical studies. Journal of Small Business
Management, 52: 344-364.
Deephouse, D. L., & Jaskiewicz, P. 2013. Do family firms have better reputations than non-family firms? An inte-
gration of socioemotional wealth and social identity theories. Journal of Management Studies, 50: 337-360.
Defrancq, C., Huyghebaert, N., & Luypaert, M. 2016. Influence of family ownership on the industry-diversifying
nature of a firm’s M&A strategy: Empirical evidence from Continental Europe. Journal of Family Business
Strategy, 7: 210-226.
Donckels, R., & Fröhlich, E. 1991. Are family businesses really different? European experiences from STRATOS.
Family Business Review, 4: 149-160.
Doukas, J., & Travlos, N. G. 1988. The effect of corporate multinationalism on shareholders’ wealth: Evidence from
international acquisitions. The Journal of Finance, 43: 1161-1175.
Duran, P., Kammerlander, N., van Essen, M., & Zellweger, T. 2016. Doing more with less: Innovation input and
output in family firms. Academy of Management Journal, 59: 1224-1264.
Dyer, W. G. 1988. Culture and continuity in family firms. Family Business Review, 1: 37-50.
Eden, D. 2002. From the editors. Academy of Management Journal, 45: 841-846.
Eisend, M. 2015. Have we progressed marketing knowledge? A meta-meta-analysis of effect sizes in marketing
research. Journal of Marketing, 79: 23-40.
Eisenmann, T. R. 2002. The effects of CEO equity ownership and firm diversification on risk taking. Strategic
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26: 301-325.
Feito-Ruiz, I., & Menéndez-Requejo, S. 2012. Diversification in M&As: Decision and shareholders’ valuation. The
Spanish Review of Financial Economics, 10: 30-40.
Feldman, E. R., Amit, R., & Villalonga, B. 2019. Family firms and the stock market performance of acquisitions and
divestitures. Strategic Management Journal, 40: 757-780.
Fernández-Castilla, B., Jamshidi, L., Declercq, L., Beretvas, S. N., Onghena, P., & Van den Noortgate, W. 2020. The
application of meta-analytic (multi-level) models with multiple random effects: A systematic review. Behavior
Research Methods, 52: 2031-2052.
Flammer, C., & Bansal, P. 2017. Does a long-term orientation create value? Evidence from a regression discontinuity.
Strategic Management Journal, 38: 1827-1847.
Gallo, MÁ, Tàpies, J., & Cappuyns, K. 2004. Comparison of family and nonfamily business: Financial logic and
personal preferences. Family Business Review, 17: 303-318.
Gedajlovic, E., & Carney, M. 2010. Markets, hierarchies, and families: Toward a transaction cost theory of the family
firm. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34: 1145-1172.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Cruz, C., Berrone, P., & De Castro, J. 2011. The bind that ties: Socioemotional wealth preser-
vation in family firms. Academy of Management Annals, 5: 653-707.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Haynes, K. T., Nunez-Nickel, M., Jacobson, K. J., & Moyano-Fuentes, J. 2007. Socioemotional
wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from Spanish olive oil mills. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 52: 106-137.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Makri, M., & Larraza-Kintana, M. 2010. Diversification decisions in family-controlled firms.
Journal of Management Studies, 47: 223-252.
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Patel, P. C., & Zellweger, T. M. 2018. In the horns of the dilemma: Socioemotional wealth,
financial wealth, and acquisitions in family firms. Journal of Management, 44: 1369-1397.
Gonenc, H., Hermes, N., & van Sinderen, E. 2013. Bidders’ gains and family control of private target firms.
International Business Review, 22: 856-867.
Gonzalez-Mulé, E., & Aguinis, H. 2018. Advancing theory by assessing boundary conditions with metaregression: A
critical review and best-practice recommendations. Journal of Management, 44: 2246-2273.
Graebner, M. E., Heimeriks, K. H., Huy, Q. N., & Vaara, E. 2017. The process of postmerger integration: A review
and agenda for future research. Academy of Management Annals, 11: 1-32.
Graves, C., & Thomas, J. 2008. Determinants of the internationalization pathways of family firms: An examination of
family influence. Family Business Review, 21: 151-167.
Haider, Z. A., Li, J., Wang, Y., & Wu, Z. 2021. Do family firms have higher or lower deal valuations? A contextual
analysis. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 45: 709-739.
Haleblian, J., Devers, C. E., McNamara, G., Carpenter, M. A., & Davison, R. B. 2009. Taking stock of what we know
about mergers and acquisitions: A review and research agenda. Journal of Management, 35: 469-502.
Han, S., Harold, C. M., Oh, I.-S., Kim, J. K., & Agolli, A. 2022. A meta-analysis integrating 20 years of workplace
incivility research: Antecedents, consequences, and boundary conditions. Journal of Organizational Behavior,
43: 497-523.
Hansen, C., & Block, J. 2021. Public family firms and capital structure: A meta-analysis. Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 29: 297-319.
Hayes, A. F. 2013. Introduction to mediation, moderation, and conditional process analysis. New York, NY:
Guilford Press.
Helfat, C. E., & Eisenhardt, K. M. 2004. Inter-temporal economies of scope, organizational modularity, and the
dynamics of diversification. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 1217-1232.
Hitt, M. A., Harrison, J. S., & Ireland, R. D. 2001. Mergers & acquisitions: A guide to creating value for stakehold-
ers. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Hitt, M. A., Hoskisson, R. E., & Kim, H. 1997. International diversification: Effects on innovation and firm perfor-
mance in product-diversified firms. Academy of Management Journal, 40: 767-798.
Hoskisson, R. E., Hill, C. W., & Kim, H. 1993. The multidivisional structure: Organizational fossil or source of
value? Journal of Management, 19: 269-298.
Hunter, J. E., & Schmidt, F. L. 2004. Methods of meta-analysis: Correcting error and bias in research findings (Vol. 2).
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Hussinger, K., & Issah, A.-B. 2019. Firm acquisitions by family firms: A mixed gamble approach. Family Business
Review, 32: 354-377.
Institute for Mergers, Acquisitons, and Alliances. 2022. Number & value of M&A worldwide. Retrieved from https://
imaa-institute.org/mergers-and-acquisitions-statistics/.
Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review,
76: 323-329.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership struc-
ture. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360.
Kellermanns, F. W., & Eddleston, K. A. 2006. Corporate entrepreneurship in family firms: A family perspective.
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30: 809-830.
Kets de Vries, M. F. R. 1993. The dynamics of family controlled firms: The good and the bad news. Organizational
Dynamics, 21: 59-71.
King, D. R., Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., & Covin, J. G. 2004. Meta-analyses of post-acquisition performance:
Indications of unidentified moderators. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 187-200.
King, D. R., Wang, G., Samimi, M., & Cortes, A. F. 2021. A meta-analytic integration of acquisition performance
prediction. Journal of Management Studies, 58: 1198-1236.
Kogut, B. 1985. Designing global strategies: Comparative and competitive value-added chains. Sloan Management
Review, 26: 15-28.
König, A., Kammerlander, N., & Enders, A. 2013. The family innovator’s dilemma: How family influence affects the
adoption of discontinuous technologies by incumbent firms. Academy of Management Review, 38: 418-441.
Kotlar, J., & De Massis, A. 2013. Goal setting in family firms: Goal diversity, social interactions, and collective com-
mitment to family-centered goals. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 37: 1263-1288.
La Porta, R., Lopez-De-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. The Journal of
Finance, 54: 471-517.
Lahlou, I. 2018. Director compensation incentives and acquisition outcomes. In I. Lahlou (Ed.), Corporate board of
directors: 127-182. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.
Landis, R. S. 2013. Successfully combining meta-analysis and structural equation modeling: Recommendations and
strategies. Journal of Business and Psychology, 28: 251-261.
Langabeer, J., & Seifert, D. 2003. Supply chain integration: The key to merger success. Supply Chain Management
Review, 7: 58-64.
Larsson, R., & Finkelstein, S. 1999. Integrating strategic, organizational, and human resource perspectives on
mergers and acquisitions: A case survey of synergy realization. Organization Science, 10: 1-26.
Li, F., & Srinivasan, S. 2011. Corporate governance when founders are directors. Journal of Financial Economics,
102: 454-469.
Lipsey, M. W., & Wilson, D. B. 2001. Practical meta-analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Lohwasser, T. S., Hoch, F., & Kellermanns, F. W. 2022. Strength in stability: A meta-analysis of family firm per-
formance moderated by institutional stability and regime type. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 46:
117-158.
López-López, J. A., Van den Noortgate, W., Tanner-Smith, E. E., Wilson, S. J., & Lipsey, M. W. 2017. Assessing
meta-regression methods for examining moderator relationships with dependent effect sizes: A Monte Carlo
simulation. Research Synthesis Methods, 8: 435-450.
Lumpkin, G. T., & Brigham, K. H. 2011. Long-term orientation and intertemporal choice in family firms.
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 35: 1149-1169.
Markides, C. C., & Ittner, C. D. 1994. Shareholder benefits from corporate international diversification: Evidence
from US international acquisitions. Journal of International Business Studies, 25: 343-366.
Markowitz, H. M. 1952. Portfolio selection. Journal of Finance, 7: 77-91.
Martynova, M., & Renneboog, L. 2011. The performance of the European market for corporate control: Evidence
from the fifth takeover wave. European Financial Management, 17: 208-259.
Meckl, R., & Röhrle, F. 2016. Do M&A deals create or destroy value? A meta-analysis. Journal of Business
Economics, 11: 9-19.
Miller, D., & Le Breton-Miller, I. 2014. Deconstructing socioemotional wealth. Entrepreneurship Theory and
Practice, 38: 713-720.
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., & Lester, R. H. 2010. Family ownership and acquisition behavior in publicly-traded
companies. Strategic Management Journal, 31: 201-223.
Moeller, S. B., & Schlingemann, F. P. 2005. Global diversification and bidder gains: A comparison between
cross-border and domestic acquisitions. Journal of Banking & Finance, 29: 533-564.
Morosini, P., Shane, S., & Singh, H. 1998. National cultural distance and cross-border acquisition performance.
Journal of International Business Studies, 29: 137-158.
Muñoz-Bullón, F., & Sánchez-Bueno, M. J. 2012. Do family ties shape the performance consequences of diversifi-
cation? Evidence from the European Union. Journal of World Business, 47: 469-477.
Naldi, L., Cennamo, C., Corbetta, G., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. 2013. Preserving socioemotional wealth in family
firms: Asset or liability? The moderating role of business context. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,
37: 1341-1360.
Ottolenghi, E. H. 2017. Essays on corporate finance. Unpublished dissertation, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA.
Patel, P. C., & King, D. R. 2015. Acquire or get acquired: Defensive acquisitions in medium-sized family firms. In
A. Risberg, D. R. King, & O. Meglio (Eds.), The Routledge companion to mergers acquisitions: 57-73. London,
UK: Taylor Francis.
Pratt, M. G., & Foreman, P. O. 2000. Classifying managerial responses to multiple organizational identities. Academy
of Management Review, 25: 18-42.
Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. 2008. Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect
effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior Research Methods, 40: 879-891.
Requejo, I., Reyes-Reina, F., Sanchez-Bueno, M. J., & Suárez-González, I. 2018. European family firms and acqui-
sition propensity: A comprehensive analysis of the legal system’s role. Journal of Family Business Strategy, 9:
44-58.
Rindova, V. P., Williamson, I. O., & Petkova, A. P. 2010. Reputation as an intangible asset: Reflections on theory and
methods in two empirical studies of business school reputations. Journal of Management, 36: 610-619.
Rosenthal, R. 1979. The file drawer problem and tolerance for null results. Psychological Bulletin, 86: 638-641.
Rosenthal, R., & Rubin, D. B. 1982. A simple, general purpose display of magnitude of experimental effect. Journal
of Educational Psychology, 74: 166-169.
Roth, P. L., Le, H., Oh, I. S., Van Iddekinge, C. H., & Bobko, P. 2018. Using beta coefficients to impute missing
correlations in meta-analysis research: Reasons for caution. Journal of Applied Psychology, 103: 644.
Salter, M. S., & Weinhold, M. A. 1979. Diversification through acquisition: Strategies for creating economic value.
New York, NY: Free Press.
Schmidt, F. L., & Hunter, J. E. 2015. Methods of meta-analysis: Correcting error and bias in research findings (3rd
ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Schneider, S. C., & De Meyer, A. 1991. Interpreting and responding to strategic issues: The impact of national
culture. Strategic Management Journal, 12: 307-320.
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. 2002. Altruism, agency, and the competitiveness of family firms.
Managerial Decision Economics, 23: 247-259.
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. 2003. Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms.
Journal of Business Venturing, 18: 473-490.
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N., & Buchholtz, A. K. 2001. Agency relationships in family firms: Theory
and evidence. Organization Science, 12: 99-116.
Shim, J., & Okamuro, H. 2011. Does ownership matter in mergers? A comparative study of the causes and conse-
quences of mergers by family and non-family firms. Journal of Banking & Finance, 35: 193-203.
Shimizu, K., Hitt, M. A., Vaidyanath, D., & Pisano, V. 2004. Theoretical foundations of cross-border mergers and
acquisitions: A review of current research and recommendations for the future. Journal of International
Management, 10: 307-353.
Singh, H., & Montgomery, C. 1987. Corporate acquisition strategies and economic performance. Strategic
Sirmon, D. G., & Hitt, M. A. 2003. Managing resources: Linking unique resources, management, and wealth creation
in family firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 27: 339-358.
Steigenberger, N. 2017. The challenge of integration: A review of the M&A integration literature. International
Journal of Management Reviews, 19: 408-431.
Strike, V. M., Berrone, P., Sapp, S. G., & Congiu, L. 2015. A socioemotional wealth approach to CEO career hori-
zons in family firms. Journal of Management Studies, 52: 555-583.
Tihanyi, L., Aguilera, R. V., Heugens, P., van Essen, M., Sauerwald, S., Duran, P., & Turturea, R. 2019. State own-
ership and political connections. Journal of Management, 45: 2293-2321.
Viechtbauer, W. 2010. Conducting meta-analyses in R with the metafor package. Journal of Statistical Software, 36:
1-48.
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. 2006. How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? Journal of
Financial Economics, 80: 385-417.
Viswesvaran, C., & Ones, D. S. 1995. Theory testing: Combining psychometric meta-analysis and structural equa-
tions modeling. Personnel Psychology, 48: 865-885.
Von Hippel, E., Franke, N., & Prügl, R. 2009. Pyramiding: Efficient search for rare subjects. Research Policy, 38:
1397-1406.
Wang, G., Holmes, R. M., Oh, I.-S. Jr, & Zhu, W. 2016. Do CEOs matter to firm strategic actions and firm perfor-
mance? A meta-analytic investigation based on upper echelons theory. Personnel Psychology, 69: 775-862.
Wang, K. T., & Shailer, G. 2017. Family ownership and financial performance relations in emerging markets.
International Review of Economics and Finance, 51: 82-98.
Welch, X., Pavić ević , S., Keil, T., & Laamanen, T. 2020. The pre-deal phase of mergers and acquisitions: A review
and research agenda. Journal of Management, 46: 843-878.
Worek, M. 2017. Mergers and acquisitions in family businesses: Current literature and future insights. Journal of
Family Business Management, 7: 177-206.
Zaheer, S. 1995. Overcoming the liability of foreignness. Academy of Management Journal, 38: 341-363.
Zahra, S. A. 2003. International expansion of US manufacturing family businesses: The effect of ownership and
involvement. Journal of Business Venturing, 18: 495-512.
Zahra, S. A., Hayton, J. C., Neubaum, D. O., Dibrell, C., & Craig, J. 2008. Culture of family commitment and stra-
tegic flexibility: The moderating effect of stewardship. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 32: 1035-1054.
Zahra, S. A., Neubaum, D. O., & Larrañeta, B. 2007. Knowledge sharing and technological capabilities: The mod-
erating role of family involvement. Journal of Business Research, 60: 1070-1079.
Zellweger, T. M., & Nason, R. S. 2008. A stakeholder perspective on family firm performance. Family Business
Review, 21: 203-216.
Zollo, M., & Meier, D. 2008. What is M&A performance? Academy of Management Perspectives, 22: 55-77.

FF - FF M&a Strategies & M&a Performance, A Meta-Analysis - Palm Et Al. (2023)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

FF - FF M&a Strategies & M&a Performance, A Meta-Analysis - Palm Et Al. (2023)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Journal of Management

Article reuse guidelines:

Family Firms, M&A Strategies, and M&A

Literature Review on Family Firms and M&A Performance

SEW Preservation and M&A Strategies

SEW Resources and M&A Performance

Independent variable—family ﬁrm acquirers. We considered all variables from the

Dependent variable—M&A performance. In line with prior M&A meta-analyses (e.g.,

Note: M&A = merger and acquisition.

Mediation variable—industry-related M&As. Industry-related M&As is a binary variable

Mediation variable—domestic M&As. Domestic M&As is a binary variable that mea-

conducted a multilevel approach with restricted maximum likelihood estimation procedures

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

(1) M&A performance —

Industry-related M&As Domestic M&As M&A performance

Post Hoc Analyses

Industry-Related M&As Domestic M&As M&A Performance

Publication status –.01 (.03) [.804]

Different operationalizations of industry-related M&As. We conducted post hoc MASEM

Implications for Family Firm Research

Implications for M&A Research

You might also like