Article

China in the Indian Ocean Region India Quarterly

71(2) 146–159
© 2015 Indian Council
The Confined ‘Far-Seas Operations’ of World Affairs (ICWA)
SAGE Publications
sagepub.in/home.nav
DOI: 10.1177/0974928414568616
http://iqq.sagepub.com

Eryan Ramadhani1

Abstract
China has been experiencing major transformation in its naval strategy and capacity. Starting off in
the late 1980s with rapid naval modernisation, China’s naval operation gradually shifts from the over-
whelming ‘near seas’ to the more challenging ‘far seas’. This task is not an easy one. Whilst in the
‘near seas’ China has been enjoying relatively naval superiority, naval operations in the ‘far seas’ is
more demanding. Assessing China’s naval capability in three areas of naval forces, naval activities and
presence, and overseas naval bases throws a light on the discrepancy between actual capability and
intention. Three reasons lend explanation for the hurdles China faces in implementing the ‘far-seas
operations’. First, China is preoccupied with the geopolitical struggle in the ‘near seas’, namely, Taiwan,
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute in East China Sea, and the South China Sea dispute. Second, China is
confronted with the ‘Malacca dilemma’ that shoves it to rethink its naval ambition. Third, the Indian
Ocean Region (IOR) already has two major players, the United States and India, with which China has
to struggle to pursue its interests. The three reasons combined with lack of naval capability to accom-
modate an effective ‘far-seas operations’ are accountable for China’s confined strategy in the IOR.

Keywords
China, Indian Ocean Region, naval strategy, ‘far-seas operations’

Introduction
In the last few years the world has witnessed the ever-growing China’s naval presence in the South China
Sea amidst the problematic islands dispute that pits China against its neighbouring states in Southeast
Asia. China’s frequent naval patrol displaying its modernised fleets around the ‘red zone’ lifts up qualms
amongst Southeast Asian states. With more advanced ships compared to that of Southeast Asian states,
even combined, China seemingly has the upper hand in the contest of naval capabilities. Being relatively

Undergraduate Teaching Assistant, Department of International Relations, Universitas Pembangunan Nasional “Veteran” Jawa
1

Timur, Surabaya, Indonesia.

Corresponding author:
Eryan Ramadhani, Undergraduate Teaching Assistant, Department of International Relations, Universitas Pembangunan Nasional
“Veteran” Jawa Timur, Surabaya, Indonesia.
E-mail: eryantr10@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Ramadhani 147

superior to its neighbours, China feels more confident to project its naval strategy beyond its ‘near seas’.1
An area caught China’s attention is the Indian Ocean―the passage which China’s commerce and energy
needs to go through.
China is relatively a new comer to the Indian Ocean vicinity. The United States (US) and India are
two major players with the former has been wandering around since the Cold War era and has reached
its peak during the global war on terror brought by the Bush Administration in 2001. Whilst India, has
been said the genuine power in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), still plays minor role compared to
the US. Delhi’s growing ambition has steered Indian navy to strategically be involved in maintaining
stability in the respected region for the sake of keeping the international trade flowing without any
hindrances. The coming of China in the IOR is based on the need to secure the International Shipping
Lanes (ISLs) and the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) without relying too much on other players.
The 2013 Defence White Paper affirms the imperative of securing China’s overseas interests including
commerce and the SLOCs that pass through Indian Ocean.2 As a new player with global power ambition,
China is apt to stumble upon India and, not to mention, the US.
It is noticeable that China’s global reach starts with the ‘near seas’. Securing the waters adjoining
the mainland is the top priority for Chinese leaders and strategists. With the coming of the new age
China turns its eyes on the ‘far seas’ which the Indian Ocean falls within this category. Protecting the
‘far seas’ requires more efforts, that is, better naval forces and overseas naval bases. Chinese leaders
are well aware of this. Leading operations in the Indian Ocean which is thousands miles away from the
home bases is highly risky if not accompanied by supporting bases in the IOR. Although Beijing regards
overseas naval bases as important, hitherto China has not had one. In the case of the Indian Ocean, the
‘string of pearls’ so far is supportive only of China’s commercial ships. Following China’s Defence
Minister Liang Guanglie’s visit to the Seychelles in 2011, news hovered around Beijing’s plan to set up
a military base there. In rebuttal, Beijing expounded that it sought only supply facilities to back up its
anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. Given China’s ambition to flex muscles in the Indian Ocean
coupled with evidences of China’s submarines and naval ships caught patrolling for several times in the
last few years, why China still has not embarked on fulfilling its ‘far-seas’ strategy?

China’s Naval Strategy Evolution: The ‘Far-Seas Operations’

in the Indian Ocean Region
Naval Strategies
China has been growing in a quick pace since the ‘Open Door Policy’ escorted this nation into a new era
of rapid industrialisation. Along with its skyrocketing economic growth on an annual basis, the leaders
in Beijing realise that it is in need of strong military to help protect its people and national interests.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the backbone of China’s security and defence comprising the
PLA Army (PLAA), Navy (PLAN) and Air Force (PLAAF). Amongst them PLAN is one that has been
experiencing the ups and downs of PLA’s transformation since Mao Zhedong era. Having been largely
abandoned and secluded from Mao’s ‘people’s war’, the PLAN climbs to the top as its privilege
has been thriving significantly since Deng Xiaoping’s leadership in late 1970s. The PLAN receives
incremental budget to modernise its forces, particularly the fleets.
China’s naval strategy began with the so-called ‘near-cost defence’ undergoing from 1949 to early
1980s (Li 2009, 146). The focus was confined within few number of straits and waterways of strategic
importance including the Bohai Strait (connecting Dalian on the Liaodong Peninsula to Yantai on the
148 India Quarterly 71(2)

Shandong Peninsula), the Taiwan Strait and the Qiongzhou Strait (connecting the mainland China to
Hainan Island). The strategy was directed to a war with the Soviet Union with emphasis on blockading
Soviet naval attack. Albeit bearing a quite crucial role to cloak China from attacks emanating from seas
surrounding it, Mao at that time preferred and exploited land operations, thus emasculating PLAN
strategic value.
Deng brought a fresh way of thinking as to upgrading PLAN comparative advantage. The new
‘doctrine’ bequeathed the PLAN a new independent role supportive of the ground forces (Li 2009, 150).
The scope of vital waters was broadened to encompass three ‘near seas’ of the Yellow Sea, East China
Sea and South China Sea. Central to this strategy, according to Nan Li (2009, 150), are: ‘(a) regaining
unification with Taiwan; (b) restoring the lost territories; (c) preserving China’s maritime resources;
(d) safeguarding the Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs); (e) deterring and defending China from
interference originating from the sea; and (f) exerting strategic nuclear deterrence’. This period also
gave birth to the magnanimous ‘first island chain’ designated as China’s sphere of interest running
southward from Japan’s archipelago to the Philippines, passing through Indonesia and moving
westward to Diego Garcia ‘in a single, sweeping arc’ (Holmes and Yoshihara 2008, 372). One of the big
difference between the earlier ‘near shore’ and ‘near seas’ is the nature of the strategy procured: passive
defence for the former and active defence for the latter. The new strategy constituted an offensive posture
for defensive purpose following the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995–1996.3
Succeeding the previous ‘near-seas active defence’ strategy, the ‘far-seas operations’ was put into
force in the late 1990s. This strategy is furnished by naval modernisation to come to grips with the
new task of protecting national interest afar from homeland. Accordingly, China sets out a ‘going out’
strategy to stimulate overseas investments centring on strategic resources (Weimar 2013, 14). Deputy
Commander of the East Sea Fleet, Rear Adm. Zhang Huachen states, ‘With our naval strategy changing
now, we are going from coastal defence to far sea defence…. With the expansion of the country’s
economic interests, the navy wants to better protect the country’s transportation routes and the safety of
our major sea lanes’ (Lin 2013, 39). Whilst the ‘near seas’ are the waters within the first island chain or
the three seas, the ‘far seas’ lie beyond the second island chain cloaking up the Pacific and Indian
Oceans.4 Of these two oceans, the Indian Ocean is on the limelight of China’s naval strategy.
The so-called first and second island chains are China’s concept exhibiting the geography bottleneck
locking China in from direct access to the open seas, that is, Pacific and Indian Ocean. Eastward, China
has to pass through waters off Japan’s Okinawa Island and/or the Luzon Strait between Taiwan and
the Philippines. Westward, China is closed off by the Malacca Strait. These chains nonetheless act as
China’s defensive strategy: the A2/AD (anti-access or area denial). This strategy roots in the scenario of
Taiwan’s independence struggle backed up by the US. Since the Taiwan Crisis, China has incessantly
topped up its military capabilities to conform to the A2/AD strategy. China today possesses lethal
A2/AD capabilities within ‘near seas’ reach. China’s A2/AD aims at deterring any possible US
interference in China’s ‘near seas’.

China’s Interests in the Indian Ocean

James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara (2008, 368–369) point out that China’s major concern and interest in
the Indian Ocean cannot be disentangled from energy security on which its voracious appetite for energy
depend. Wang Lirong (as cited in Yoshihara, 2012, 492) asserts that the ‘access to the Indian Ocean is
the perfect option for China to reduce its dependence on the waterways of the Western Pacific and to
Ramadhani 149

breach the West’s island chain lock’ (Yoshihara 2012, 492). In the same vein, Che Lin (as cited in Yoshihara,
2012, 491) vouches that ‘China’s national security and peaceful development demand that the Indian
Ocean be incorporated into the nation’s security strategy because China’s trade, investment, energy,
religion, territory and territorial seas are intimately linked to the Indian Ocean’ (Yoshihara 2012, 491).
The Indian Ocean is vital to global energy flows and therefore has a stature in the supply side of
global energy security. It links three world’s most important chokepoints of Strait of Hormuz (17 million
barrels of oil per day flow or bbl/d), Strait of Malacca (15.2 million bbl/d) and Bab el Mandab
(3.4 million bbl/d) (as of 2011) (US Energy Information Administration 2012). China, having passed
Japan as the second-largest oil importer after the US in 2009, is utterly concerned about the security of
the Indian Ocean, for 90 per cent of China’s oil imports that majorly come from the Middle East and
Africa have to cross the Indian Ocean.
Despite China’s reliance on the Indian Ocean through which most of its commerce and energy
interests flow, Beijing is highly conscious of the geostrategic value of the IOR. China’s naval strategy
cannot be disentangled from the work of American naval thinker Alfred Thayer Mahan. Holmes and
Yoshihara (2005) opine that Mahanian doctrine is apprehensible in China’s maritime policy in three
fields: commerce, naval strategy and geography. Mahan’s naval strategy accounts for the eminence a
powerful navy for countries that depend heavily on commerce. This strategy entails offensive sea control
which is in contrast to China’s ingrained defensive strategy. If China is to harness Mahan’s idea, it needs
to re-weigh its naval strategy to move from its typical defensive characteristic―something that Beijing
has not yet ready to abandon. Mahan said, ‘control of key points on the map is indispensable to sea
power’ (Holmes and Yoshihara 2005, 26). China’s key points undoubtedly touch upon the Indian Ocean.
Key to Mahan’s strategy is geography on which commerce and naval strategy are predicated.
Geography determines naval strategy. China unarguably is following this thread. Frankly, China has
been embracing this idea in 1980s under the revolutionary leadership of Liu Huaqing as Commander
of the PLAN, military officer of the Central Military Commission and then member of the Politburo
Standing Committee. It was Liu who accentuated the vital strategy of ‘offshore active defence’, leaving
the phrase ‘offshore’ undefined.5 China, reiterating Mahan, admits that ‘maritime ambitions will reach
as far offshore as the nation’s military capabilities can carry them’ (Holmes and Yoshihara 2005, 28).

Being a Naval Power: Where to Stand

There is no consensus on how to comprehend whether a state acquires resources sufficiently to be
called a naval power. By far, the US is the only state equipped with a powerful navy of global scale.6
The US always regards itself as a maritime nation with vast maritime interests. Washington clearly
states that ‘the safety and economic security of the US depend in substantial part on the secure use of
the world’s oceans’ and that ‘the US has a vital national interest in maritime security’ (Lou 2012, 628).
Even though there is no rigid indicator to assess a naval power, three are proposed here: the size of
capabilities in terms of naval forces, naval activities and presences and overseas naval bases.

Naval Forces
China’s rapid naval modernisation contributes towards the capabilities PLAN now holds. There is no
report as to PLAN real capabilities provided by Chinese government. The Defence White Papers barely
150 India Quarterly 71(2)

talk about data. The US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) estimates China’s naval capabilities as
of 2010 comprises: 54 diesel attack submarines (SSs); 6 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs);
3 ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs); 25 destroyers; 49 frigates; 55 amphibious ships (LSTs and
LPDs); and 85 missile-armed coastal patrol craft (O’Rourke 2014, 36). According to the annual
Department of Defence (DOD) reports to Congress, in 2013 PLAN ships include: 5 SSNs; 49 SSs;
23 destroyers; 52 frigates; 85 missile-armed coastal patrol craft; 29 amphibious ships of LSTs and
LPDs; and 26 amphibious ships of LSMs (O’Rourke 2014, 38).
Surprisingly enough, the total number of USN forces is slightly different to that of PLAN. Data from
the Department of USN shows that the total deployable battle forces ships is 284 of which 88 are
deployed and 52 are underway for local operations or training. However, the number does not always
amount to quality. The US strategist Ronald O’Rourke (2014, 39–40) contends that comparing the
number of ships can only give a dim delineation of the navy’s real capabilities for some reasons: total
number of ships or its aggregate tonnage is less important than the sophistication of internal electronics
and software; the numbers from China’s side ensnares significant numbers of older and obsolescent
ships (the modern units enjoy only scant increase from 10 per cent in 2000–2004 to 25 per cent in
2006 and 26 per cent in 2008); the decrease number of ships does not necessarily equal to decrease in
capabilities (in fact, China has replaced large number of its old ships with the modernised ones); in the
worst-case-scenario when the USN and PLAN collide in a sea, the other military branches of each
side will also be taken into account; the missions carried by the USN and PLAN are different, thus
comparing only the number of ships will obscure the mission-based capabilities of both navies.
A rough comparison based on numbers of ships between the USN and PLAN today puts China more
and less on parity with the US. What Washington is more anxious about, notwithstanding, is whether
or not it can catch up with China’s unremitting military modernisation in the coming years and, most
importantly, whether the US can break the code of China’s naval strategies.

Naval Activities and Presence

In order to be renowned as a naval power, a state has to perform an active role in waters around the world
which it perceives of strategically importance. For the US, ‘forward presence is central to the value of
naval forces to deter adversaries, demonstrate US commitment to allies and partners, and respond rapidly
to tension, coercion, crises, and conflicts’ (Department of the US Navy 2011, 4). According to the US
Navy Program Guide 2012:

The US Navy maintains forces forward through the Fleet Readiness and Training Plan (FRTP), which ensures
a portion of the fleet is always forward deployed (maintaining approximately 40 per cent of the fleet forward
deployed on a given day), whilst an additional portion of the force is available to deploy for crisis response.
(Department of the US Navy 2011, 5)

The US naval presence stands out in different part of the world serving different duties. Amidst the
global war on terrorism frenzy, without the support of the navy the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
would not bear any success. Likewise, the ousting of Libya’s leaders Muammar Gadaffi in 2011 was
not rested on the dexterity of the rebels but the US naval patronage carried through the Odyssey
Dawn Operation. The USN is also a committed player to providing for humanitarian assistance
worldwide, such as the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines.
Furthermore, the USN doubles up its reassurance towards friends and allies in Asia Pacific ‘by leading
Ramadhani 151

more than 170 exercises and 600 training events annually with more than 20 allies and partners in the
Pacific and Indian Oceans’, including the biggest multinational naval exercises, the Rim of the Pacific
Exercise (RIMPAC) (Department of the US Navy 2013, 9). Recently, the US has secured an agreement
to enhance its presence in the Philippines per the latter’s request in the course of China’s aggressive
posture in the South China Sea. All in all, the US is a sophisticated maritime power with decades of
naval experiences second to none.
The trend of China’s presence in the open seas, on the other hand, just currently happens. China
started to engage in the naval mission beyond its ‘near seas’ in December 2008 under the tagline of anti-
piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden. In 2010, China dispatched its first ever overseas medical mission to
the IOR. The USDOD unveils on its Annual Report to Congress 2013 regarding China’s military and
security development that in the period between 2007 and 2012 China has conducted variegated bilateral
and multilateral military exercises including 13 maritime exercises with foreign states.7 Despite the flab-
bergasted number of China’s joint naval exercises, it is worthy a special attention that only the Aman
(Peace) exercise portrays China’s operation in the ‘far seas’.8 Additionally, Indian defence ministry
reported in early April 2013 that attack submarines, suspected to be PLAN’s, became increasingly active
in the IOR with at least 22 contacts had been made in the past year and the latest incident occurred in
February (Cole 2013). The allegation is predicated upon the fact that only Indian and the US navies
conduct naval activities in the IOR milieu and both navies share contact and information pertaining
to their activities.
China’s appearance in the far seas by no mention is relatively scant in comparison to the US. It is
worth noting that in the span of less than 10 years China has been showing its teeth quite aggressively
nonetheless. The pivotal success of China’s first aircraft carrier commissioned on 25 September 2012,
the Liaoning, might be a hint for a more frequent occurrences in the ‘far seas’, especially the Indian
Ocean. However, it is premature to conclude that the possession of an aircraft carrier automatically
transforms China into a ‘blue water’ naval power. The hailed success of the 37-day sea trial of Liaoning
that ended on 1 January 2014 was a glimpse of the readiness of the Chinese side to join the regional
power contestation. One thing merits comprehension that the grandiose voyage took place in the South
China Sea, aka China’s ‘near seas’. Saying that this exercise reflects only China’s crippled capability in
the ‘near seas’ operation can be incongruous as well. It was the first time Liaoning took on a cruise
in deep water afar from its home port in Shanyang. Beforehand, Liaoning has conducted sea training
in both Yellow and East China seas. Regardless what sceptics may say about China’s naval operation,
the success of Liaoning’s jaunt in the South China Sea has boosted Beijing’s confidence to further
its naval ambition.

Overseas Naval Bases

Naval bases are crucial for a naval power as they continually operate beyond their home base. Overseas
bases are highly supportive for the fleets to sustain in remote areas. The US has secured several bases
located in diverging hot spots in major seas: the Pacific Ocean (Commander Fleet Activities (CFA)
Chinhae, South Korea; CFA Okinawa, CFA Sasebo, CFA Yokosuka, Naval Air Facility (NAF) Misawa
and Atsugi in Japan; and the Forces Marianas in Guam), the Indian Ocean (US Navy Support Facility
Diego Garcia and US Naval Forces Central Command in Bahrain) and the Caribbean (Guantanamo
Bay Naval Station, Cuba). These bases enable US vessels to get repaired, rested and refuelled. The
strategic value of overseas naval bases is maintaining and monitoring security in particular region.
Safeguarding the SLOCs and commerce and energy route in the Indian Ocean is one of the sacred duties
152 India Quarterly 71(2)

carried out by the USN. The naval base, Diego Garcia, plays a critical role in US Indian Ocean policy.
It contributes towards the success of the US military operation in the Gulf War of 1991, the Operation
of Enduring Freedom of Afghanistan 2001 and the Operation of Iraqi Freedom in 2003.
In reverse, China up to present does not have any overseas naval base concomitant with the
major base in the Hainan Island and to a lesser degree in the Woody or Yongxing Island, the largest of
the Paracel chains in the South China Sea. China is now projecting a new naval base in the disputed
islands in the South China Sea to strengthen its claims over the area. Such base is still far cry from
realisation as China’s leaders and strategist have to ponder carefully the cost and benefit of building a
naval base in the highly contested waters. The Indian Ocean, where China’s presence is felt strongly
in recent times, is believed to be the potential candidate for China’s ‘first generation’ overseas naval
base. Many non-Chinese scholars and analysts are wary of the ‘string of pearls’ that can someday be
transformed into China’s future naval bases. China’s Coco Island monitoring facility is by far the only
‘valuable’ spot for Beijing to keep an eye on any occurrences arousing in the IOR, especially India’s
manoeuvres around the Bay of Bengal. This facility is of limited functions and nowhere close to naval
base. But there is always possibility that China might turn one of the ‘pearls’ into a naval base.

China’s ‘Confined Far-Seas’ Strategy

Three aforementioned indicators open a Pandora box of China’s naval strategy. The PLAN has been
experiencing superb transformation, thanks to the modernisation brought by Liu more than two decades
ago. China has proved that it is now a maritime power to be reckoned with. More sophisticated ships
are added into the PLAN force but China has not yet achieved the level of the USN, particularly the
high-end technology installed in the vessels. The second indicator, naval activities and presence,
showcases China’s still lack of engagement in the maritime field. In the ‘far seas’, China only recently
brandishes its sword by stealthily consigning its submarines to the IOR. The joint naval exercises
although quite abundant cannot be instantaneously translated into emulating the USN active roles in
its respective ‘far seas’. Finally, China is bereft of overseas naval base which is vital to sustain its
naval operations far away from home waters. Gauging the three indicators of a naval power, China is on
the way to become one but the road is yet to end. It contradicts the ‘far-seas operations’ launched by
the PLAN in late 1990s that underpins China’s naval strategy to be a maritime power. One question
is worth asking: why China has not yet fulfilled its ambition of becoming a naval power through the
‘far-seas operations’?

The Over-laden ‘Near Seas’

China’s ‘near seas’ has always been an area where Beijing can hold its sway by way of exploiting its
preponderance maritime power. There are three core concerns in these China’s most important waters:
Taiwan, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Island dispute, and the South China Sea dispute. Each endows barrier to
furthering China’s naval ambition to tap the ‘far seas’.
Taiwan is China’s endless top priority. As one of the ‘core interest’, Taiwan captivates China’s leaders
since the founding of the People’s Republic. Taiwan is one missing piece of China’s sovereignty puzzle.
As a hardcore issue, Taiwan is responsible for PLAN modernisation. The two early naval strategies of
‘near-cost defence’ and of ‘near-seas active defence’ cannot be dissociated from Taiwan’s factor. China’s
Ramadhani 153

military build-up is on the same tide as Taiwan’s arms purchase from the US―a source of dissatisfaction
amongst Chinese leaders concerning the US interference in China’s internal affairs. In the context of
Taiwan, the PLAN has been improving its A2/AD strategy to strip the USN aircraft carrier battle groups
off access to China’s ‘near seas’, especially the corridor linking the South China Sea to Taiwan Strait
(Prakash 2011, 11).
Putting Taiwan aside for a while, China now is still shackled by territorial disputes scattered in the
East and South China seas. The squabble between China and Japan over Diaoyu/Senkaku Island is
central to Beijing’s maritime policy. The brinkmanship between the two governments festers especially
after Tokyo’s controversial act to nationalise the disputed island. In May 2013 Japan’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs updated Japan’s official position on the Senkaku Island as follows:

There is no doubt that the Senkaku Islands are clearly an inherent part of the territory of Japan, in light of
historical facts and based upon international law. Indeed, the Senkaku Islands are under the valid control
of Japan. There exists no issue of territorial sovereignty to be resolved concerning the Senkaku Islands.
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2013)

One year earlier, in 25 September, the State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of
China released a white paper entitled Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China stating, ‘Diaoyu Dao
and its affiliated islands are an inseparable part of the Chinese territory. Diaoyu Dao is China’s inherent
territory in all historical, geographical and legal terms, and China enjoys indisputable sovereignty
over Diaoyu Dao’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 2012).
Moving southward from the East China Sea, China is at odds against four Southeast Asian states―
the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei―over territorial claims. The impasse on negotiation
between China and other claimant states combined with escalatory acts of not only China but also the
Philippines and Vietnam make for even more simmering fad. If someone is wondering where China
consigns most of naval forces yet pours most of its attention besides the East China Sea, it is undoubtedly
the South China Sea. China regularly dispatches patrolling ships around the embattled waters and several
times engages in skirmishes against the Philippines and Vietnamese vessels. Manila’s recent decision to
recall its security partnership with the US complicates the crisis, followed by Vietnam’s tilt towards the
US for security guarantee. The US ‘pivot’ to Asia announced in 2009 is a wake-up call for Beijing to
contemplate its focus on South China Sea.9
China has always been wary of containment strategy deriving from its experience being locked out by
foreign powers. Even though China is better off in terms of naval capability enabling it to employ
domination and intimidation over the disputants, the US coming-back to Asia consumes most of Beijing’s
attention. The PLAN has been assigned a ‘far-seas operations’ to bring China closer to a maritime power
status, at the same time it is still preoccupied with the ‘near-seas’ problem. The fact that ‘near seas’ is
right in the front door it demands more attentions. China’s ‘far-seas’ strategy will hinge on Taiwan and
the China Sea where reigning control over these two areas outweigh China’s maritime policy (Holmes
and Yoshihara 2008, 386).

The Malacca Dilemma

China relies heavily on the ISLs and SLOCs passing through the Malacca Strait. As one of the chokepoints
in the IOR, Malacca Straits provide valuable access between China’s mainland and its trading partners
in South Asia, Middle East, Africa and even Europe. The overreliance on Malacca Strait induces problems
154 India Quarterly 71(2)

for China. Beijing has no grips on this one of the busiest sea route in the world. Thus, it is susceptible to
any blockades or interferences that might disrupt its interests there. Hu Jintao coined the term ‘Malacca
Dilemma’ to delineate this unfavourable situation at the closing of a Chinese Communist Party economic
work conference in November 2003. Hu noted that ‘certain powers have all along encroached on and
tried to control navigation through the strait… China needed to remain vigilant against foreign attempts
to exploit this vulnerability for strategic advantage’ (Lanteigne 2008, 144). Hu was never clear as to
which foreign powers he referred to. But it is quite discernible that there are two potential candidates
with capabilities to trouble China, namely, the US and India.
The security of Malacca Strait is traditionally borne by the littoral states―Indonesia, Singapore and
Malaysia. China’s concern is not these states but third parties who hold same and/or conflicting interests
with that of China. Knowing that such overdependence might backfire, Beijing keenly seeks for
alternatives: setting up new route and/or taking part in overseeing the security of the strait. China started
its naval modernisation in the late 1980s but the endeavour underwent numbers of shortcomings. It is not
after Hu’s leadership that the PLAN finally is able to maximise its naval forces. In parallel with the
excessive naval build-up, China is ready to get involved in guarding the Malacca Strait. Amidst China’s
ceaseless military build-up, this pretension notwithstanding incurs trepidation amongst regional states
that might veer them to side with other great powers so as to contain China (Lanteigne 2008, 148).
China’s naval base in Hainan Island which is 200 nautical away from the Malacca Strait creates harbinger
amongst Southeast Asian states for possible China’s infringement in the strait. Added to this complicacy
is China’s unsettled island dispute in the South China Sea. With a stronger naval forces vis-à-vis its
Southeast Asian neighbours, it is understandable that China’s aspired presence in the Malacca Strait will
likely to encounter objection from those that are leery of China’s building-up domination in the region.
Facing backlash from Southeast Asian states including the littoral states, China inevitably has to
resort to the second option. In lieu of the unfeasible naval presence in the Malacca Strait, China then
considers mitigating its dependence on it. General Wang Zuxun says, ‘were the US to block Chinese
shipping in the West Pacific, other pathways had to be opened, otherwise China’s economy might be shut
down’ (Ji 2007, 473). China now is enlisted in infrastructure building in the IOR with a view to bypass
the Malacca Strait. Three projects are worth noticing: Kra Canal involving construction of a narrow
waterway along Kra Isthmus in the Southern Thailand; energy pipeline linking the Bay of Bengal to
Kunmin through Sittwe Port, Myanmar; and a pipeline from Gwadar, Pakistan to Xinjiang. Despite some
drawbacks emanating from these projects, it is at least a sign that China is determined to circumvent its
dependency on the Malacca Strait.10
The Malacca Dilemma on one hand outfits China with an opportunity to diversify its shipping route
overstepping the vulnerable Malacca Strait. On the other hand, it contributes to a strategy opposite to that
of the ‘far-seas’ naval aspiration. With China’s naval forces confronts bottlenecks in the Malacca Strait
impeding it to sail further to the Indian Ocean, so does the ‘far-seas’ naval strategy. The shift towards the
new ‘silk road’ in some ways dwarfs China’s blue water ambition. The Malacca Dilemma locks China
in the ‘near seas’.

The Contest for Supremacy in the Indian Ocean

China is relatively a new comer to the Indian Ocean. China’s role in this area is marginal to that of
the US and India but it does not diminish Beijing’s pretension to level up its footing there. That
US preponderance maritime power is irresistible, China’s eyes are on India’s growing power in
the region. Liu Qian, quoted in Yoshihara (2012, 489), explicates that ‘China’s international relations
Ramadhani 155

scholars produced 20 books and an astounding 2,000 research papers and monographs on India
between 1994 and 2008’. This startling number justifies China’s ‘pivot’ to the IOR and India as the
innate regional power in the region. Checking India’s rising power in the IOR is a critical juncture
for Beijing. To ratchet down India’s dominance, China exerts a strategy to maintain good relations
with the IOR littoral states. China–Pakistan strategic partnership is indispensable. Sharing the same
cynicism toward India, Pakistan is ‘a valuable surrogate to provide counter-weight to India in the region’
(Walgreen 2006, 59–60).
China’s deepened relations with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and Myanmar convey an unpleasant
message for Delhi that China is better off in transcending India’s strategy towards its neighbours.
In response to China’s assertive approach, India strengthens its partnership with the US in the region,
inflicting uneasiness amongst Chinese leaders in Beijing. Moreover, Delhi is eager to intensify its
involvement in the IOR by means of improving the competency of the smaller states (e.g., Madagascar,
Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles and Sri Lanka) in controlling and monitoring their
respective waters and providing material assistance to these states so as to prop up the regional maritime
security (Mohan 2012).
China acknowledges India’s superior geographical position may hold back its desire for a forward
presence in the Indian Ocean vicinity. Chinese scholars and strategist believe that India’s great power
strategy lies in controlling the Indian Ocean. India’s climbing military deployment in the Andaman
and Nicobar Islands under the Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) Command established in 2001 is presumed
by China as nuisance to its maritime ambition. Ma Ying depicts the strategic value of India’s ‘near seas’
as follows:

The Andaman-Nicobar Islands stretch from the north to the south for 450 nautical miles, controlling the Bay
of Bengal … The Andaman-Nicobar Islands guard the western entrance to Southeast Asia and separate the
Bay of Bengal from the Malacca Strait. The Andaman-Nicobar Islands are 170 nautical miles from Burma,
270 nautical miles from Thailand, 420 nautical miles from Malaysia, and 90 nautical miles from Indonesia
while the Andaman Sea is the gateway to the Malacca Strait. (Yoshihara 2012, 495)

If India’s burgeoning power poses a threat to China, the US magnifies the burden for China’s naval
forward presence in the Indian Ocean. China might be in a dime better position than India concerning
relationship with South Asian states although India is catching up. But when it comes to the US the sce-
nario becomes even more convoluted. Having sensed a deliberate encirclement by the US in its own
‘near seas’, China has to face the same confrontation in the IOR. Parallel to what happens in the South
China Sea, China’s biggest fear in the Indian Ocean is nothing but the US blocking Beijing’s maritime
policy. The US hunt for maritime domination is clearly defined by Robert Kaplan (as cited in Lou 2012,
628), ‘Along with its continued dominance in the Pacific, the US clearly seeks to be the preeminent
South Asian power’ (Lou 2012, 628). The USN maritime strategy in 2007 implies that ‘the navy
will henceforth seek a sustained, forward presence in the Indian Ocean and adjacent western Pacific, but
less so in the Atlantic’ (Kaplan 2011, 9). This intention might clash with that of India’s as well as China’s.
Whilst India sees the US with whom Delhi can cooperate, regardless India’s rejection of the US domi-
nance in the region, China is cautious of the likely anti-China coalition between India and the US.
China’s naval strategy encounters three hurdles: India, the US, and a combination of the two. China’s
nascent naval power is not yet ready to take care of both India and the US at the same time. Despite rapid
naval build-up on China’s side, India and the US have comparative advantage: of geographical proximity
in the Indian Ocean for India and of superior naval power for the US. China might be capable of projecting
its ‘far-seas’ strategy but both India and the US will not let China roam the Indian Ocean uncontested.
156 India Quarterly 71(2)

Conclusion
China has been applying the ‘far-seas operations’ as a naval strategy since the late 1990s but what it has
done is just the tip of an iceberg. The notion of such strategy is to bring China to places beyond its
maritime domain. Measuring one’s naval power using three indicators of naval forces―naval activities,
naval presences and overseas naval bases, Beijing’s pathways to become a maritime power is still long.
The PLAN forces increase significantly since the mid-2000s both in quantity and quality. But homework
for advancement persists. Of the three indicators, China is somewhere between ‘not’ and ‘may be’ a
naval power constrained by to some degree its geographical priorities. Whilst ‘far sea’ encompasses
waters beyond the second island chain, the Indian Ocean is by no mentions the vital one for China’s
sea-borne trade and energy security.
In spite of the still limited level of success in realising its naval strategy to sail in the open waters,
China’s naval ambition succeeds in raising many eyebrows, especially those within the immediate
scope of China’s sway. There is no gainsaying that disquiet grows rampant amongst them as to China’s
soaring power amalgamation. China’s naval exercise in October 2013―codenamed ‘Manouvre 5’―in
Western Pacific is dubbed by PLA Senior Colonel Du Wenlong as an achievement, in which ‘the
PLAN has cut up the whole island chain into multiple sections so that the so-called island chains are no
longer existent’ (Lague 2013). In the same page, Chinese expert from Fudan University, Shen Dingli,
blatantly says that the ‘Manouvre 5’ ‘tells Japan and the US that they are not able to contain China within
the first island chain’ (Lague 2013). The latest naval drill in February 2014 substantiates China’s
breaking-through-its-island-chain rhetoric. Three vessels were deployed long way southward through
Indonesia’s Sunda Strait, accosted Australia’s Christmas Island, sailed through Indonesia’s Lombok
Strait and went straight back northward to the South China Sea. These are a declaration of the realisation
of China’s long-dream of operating beyond the shackle of the island chains. So are the driving forces
for concerned states to prepare for any contingencies.
As adamant as its insistence to hold power in the ‘far seas’, China is resistant toward foreign
interference under whatever justification in its ‘near seas’. The territorial rows in the East and
South China seas unleash opportunities for outliers to jump in. The US has reiterated and reconfirmed its
commitment to defend Japan and the Philippines under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
and the Mutual Defence Treaty respectively. Japan, whose policy in the South China Sea has usually
been meagre, is zealous to up the ante its bilateral relations with the Philippines by selling coast
guard ships to the latter to upgrade the latter’s naval capability in the lights of China’s more active
naval operations in its vicinity. Even the used-to-be-ignorant India in effectuating its great power ambi-
tion is willing to advance its engagement with Southeast Asian states through, amongst other, defence
cooperation.11 The cropped-up presence of major powers in the ‘near seas’ to certain extent keep China
overwhelmed. Although China has been relentlessly emphasising its adherence to peaceful development,
meaning it will never use force unless being forced, conflict scenario with other major powers never
leaves the table. The US has improved its Air Sea Battle strategy to penetrate China’s A2/AD bastion.
Japan is unyielding to revamp its constitution to boost the active role of its Self-Defence Force with one
thing in mind: to deter China’s naval ambition. Suffice it to say that China’s naval ambition is not and
will not go unopposed even within its own ‘near seas’.
The leaders in Beijing are supposedly attentive of the gap between their ambition and today’s
real capability of PLAN to materialise such desire. It does not mean that China will not patch up the
loopholes along the way. Neither does China will be able to do it overnight. China needs to capitalise on
cooperation in securing the ISLs and SLOCs. Nothing comes clearer of China’s intention to mollify the
neighbours’ fear of China’s assertiveness, while simultaneously attaining the goal of a secure sea passage,
Ramadhani 157

than Xi Jinping’s speech before Indonesian House of Representative members in October 2013.
Xi proposed the idea of ‘maritime silk road’ to connect China and Southeast Asia through waters. Despite
the concept’s implied exclusivity to China–ASEAN maritime cooperation, in February 2014 China
invited India to join the project as preceded by Sri Lanka meaning that this ‘road’ could extend westward
to Indian Ocean covering the ISLs and SLOCs China deems essential. If this project pulls off, China
will cultivate two fruits at the same time: secure ISLs and SLOCs and a stable region that is not
antagonistic towards it.
China’s ‘far-seas’ strategy is still miles away from realisation on account of PLAN limited capa-
bilities and unpalatable ‘near seas’. This naval ambition can at best be described as a double-edged
sword: inciting edginess among neighbouring states and dragging in those with vested interest, on one
hand, while concurrently raising the opportunity for fruitful cooperation amongst concerned states
in safeguarding the ISLs and SLOCs, on the other hand. The best scenario for Beijing is one that could
fulfil its naval ambition without interrupting the ISLs and SLOCs and arousing furore from other. The
worst scenario is one that could only serve one goal at one time, be it the executed naval ambition or
tranquil neighbourhood. Either way, China’s longing for unhindered ISLs and SLOCs is sufficiently
conceivable.

Notes
1. The concept of ‘near seas’ refers to China’s naval strategy starting with the leadership change from Mao to
Deng. The term is associated with Liu Huaqing, a PLAN Commander from 1982 to 1988 named as one of the
most influential person responsible for the dramatic shift of China’s naval strategy. The ‘near seas’, according
to China’s maritime lexicon, covers three seas adjacent to China’s land, namely, the Yellow Sea, the East China
Sea and the South China Sea.
2. The widely mentioned China’s strategy in Indian Ocean is the ‘string of pearls’ strategy. This phrase is nowhere
originally from China. Fabricated by a defence contractor Booze-Allen-Hamilton, it first appeared in the
Energy Futures in Asia report consigned by the Office of Net Assessment of the US Department of Defence in
2005 (Fernando 2012, 463). It represents China’s political and economic diplomacy in the IOR by moulding
cooperation with India’s neighbours such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The ‘pearls’ specifically
refers to ports in which China has invested heavily in the infrastructure building: Gwadar in Pakistan, Chittagong
in Bangladesh, Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Sittwe in Myanmar.
3. The passive–active defence strategy applied by PLAN influences the capabilities betterment in both periods.
China at the ‘near-shore’ period was able to produce its first-generation Han-class (Type 091) nuclear-
powered attack submarines (SSN) marked as one of remarkable achievement, although it was nowhere near
perfection. Surface fleets, such as the first-generation Luda-class (Type 051) guided-missile destroyer (DDG)
and Jianghu-class (Type 053) guided-missile frigates (FFG) were also of importance in the history of China’s
naval build-up. Some technologies like surface-to-air missiles (SAM), electronic warfare (EW), anti-ship cruise
missile (ASCM) were also added. The ‘near-seas’ active defence strategy called for capabilities upgrade with
the built of second-generation Luhu-class (Type 052) and Luhai-class (Type 051B) DDGs, second-generation
Jiangwei-class (Types 055 and 057) FFGs, Ming-class (Type 035) steamships (SS), Xia-class nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). Some improvements were made but deficiencies in the technology
remained especially the air-defence systems and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). In spite
of the still-inferior fleets and technology, it was a starting point for China’s intermittent naval modernisation in
the twenty-first century. For details of the naval capabilities in the early period of ‘near-shore’ and ‘near-seas’,
see Li (2009).
4. China’s second island chain runs from northern Japan going southward through Guam and terminating in
Indonesia archipelago. Even though the chain does not cut through any part of the IOR, it is included in the
‘far-seas’ concept of China.
158 India Quarterly 71(2)

5. Liu Huaqing was named one of the prominent architects of China’s ‘near-seas active defence’ strategy. In the
late 1980s he marshalled the navy to move towards ‘offshore active defence’. Liu did not elaborate the concept
of ‘offshore’ but it was likely directed to the maritime beyond China’s coasts, both the areas within the first
island chain and beyond the second island chain. It is likely that the current ‘far-seas operations’ strategy derives
from that very point of thinking.
6. The US here acts as the baseline to measure whether China is anywhere closer to emulate the US. The US is
chosen for reason that it is to date the strongest navy that has been applying ‘far-seas operations’ for decades.
Comparing China and the US will shed light on how far China has been implementing its own ‘far-seas
operations’. The three indicators listed afterwards will put the US and China face-to-face regarding their stands
within each indicator, whether China has resembled or at least achieved certain degree of naval power status.
7. Maritime exercises comprise: the China–France Friendship 2007; the China–Spain Friendship 2007; unnamed
exercise with India in 2007; the Aman (Peace) 2009 (hosted by Pakistan with 38 countries participated); an
unnamed exercise with Singapore in 2009; unnamed exercise with New Zealand in 2010; the Aman (Peace)
2011, unnamed exercises in 2011 with Tanzania, Pakistan and Vietnam respectively; the Naval Cooperation
with Russia in 2012; the Blue Assault 2012 with Thailand (amphibious assault); and an unnamed exercise
with Vietnam in 2012 (search and rescue). The number of China’s maritime exercises is astounding. Of all the
exercises, China stands on the equal foothold with the US only in the Aman (Peace) naval exercise aimed to
improve surveillance along the shipping route in the Indian Ocean. For details of China’s joint military exercise,
see the US Department of Defense (2013).
8. In 2007 China’s missile destroyer ‘Guangzhou’ went on an 87-day naval European trip visiting four countries,
France, Spain, the UK and Russia. During these friendly visits China held joint exercise with Spanish and
British navies in their home waters in the Atlantic Ocean and in the Mediterranean Sea with French navy.
9. The US officially states not to take side on the island disputes both in the East and South China Seas. Washington
commits only to ensure the SLOC and ISLs are well safeguarded, especially the ones in the South China Sea. So
is to defend its allies when they are attacked without attaching itself to their claims. On the other hand, Beijing
is highly suspicious of the coming-back of the US to Asia underlining Washington’s attempt to check China’s
rising power and counter-balance it in China’s very own backyard.
10. The ‘Kra Canal’ project is dilemmatic for Beijing given the close relationship between Thailand and the US.
The project is bound to be costly with a lengthy work of at least one decade. The ‘Sittwe’ project is deemed
plausible and doable, functioning as a stop-over point for oil from Middle East to be transported to Yunnan or
Sichuan via pipeline. The construction began in September 2007 but then was handicapped by political turmoil
in Yangon. The ‘Gwadar–Xinjiang’ plan will reduce China’s dependence on transporting energy by ocean that
will in return save shipping time and expenses. The Gwadar port development has been completed in early 2013
with China providing 75 per cent of the total US$250 million for the construction. China is expected to soon
start building the land-route connecting Gwadar to Xinjiang.
11. Hitherto India has four bilateral defence cooperation with Southeast Asian states, namely, Malaysia (1992),
Singapore (1993), Vietnam (2000) and Indonesia (2001). Relations with Thailand started in 1995; ever since
bilateral naval exercise has been conducted without the existence of formal agreement. India–Cambodia
defence cooperation begun in 2005 focusing on terrorism. With regards to Myanmar, the relations so far
are limited to high-level military exchange and visits starting off in 2007. Albeit there extant established defence
cooperation between India and several Southeast Asian states, the role of Delhi in the geopolitical contest in
the region surfaces just recently when the accused China’s assertiveness becomes a common language. For
details on India’s defence strategy in Southeast Asia, see Singh (2011).

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