Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University: 764 Vol 58, No 1 February (2023)

JOURNAL OF SOUTHWEST JIAOTONG UNIVERSITY
ISSN: 0258-2724, https://jsju.org.cn/
THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE GRAY ZONE TACTICS

IN SOUTH CHINA SEA AND THE RESPONSE OF INDONESIA
Anton Pallaguna1*, Abd. Rahman Kadir2, Purnomo Yusgiantoro3,

Dwia Aries Tina Pulubuhu4 and Ian Montratama5
124
Faculty of Economic and Business, Hasanuddin University, Indonesia
3
Faculty of Defense Strategy, Indonesia Defense University, Indonesia
5
Department of International Relations, Pertamina University, Indonesia
1
anton.pallaguna@gmail.com; 2ahmankadir@fe.unhas.ac.id; 3purnomo@pycenter.org;
4
dwiatn@unhas.ac.id; 5ian.montratama@universitaspertamina.ac.id
*Corresponding author
How to Cite: Anton Pallaguna, Abd. Rahman Kadir, Purnomo Yusgiantoro,
Dwia Aries Tina Pulubuhu and Ian Montratama (2022). The Impact of Emerging Technology to
Military Strategies of South China Sea Littoral States.
Abstract
The most important security issue in Southeast Asia is China’s challenge of status quo in South
China Sea (SCS). The geographical character of SCS is maritime. Foot on the ground will not be
possible, especially if drones and missiles are the only weapons required to wage conflict there.
This paper would analyze the advent of Chinese maritime militia, Chinese Coast Guard (CCG),
Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV), Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) and hypersonic
missiles for gray zone tactic and their impact to Indonesian military strategy in the SCS. Racing
toward drone and missiles technologies with China would be impossible. ASEAN member states,
that includes Indonesia, who perceived China as threat in South China Sea should consider
focusing on the antidote technology development and hedging strategy with great power to balance
China.
Introduction
From security perspective, SCS has become world attention as it becomes great powers
playground to exert balance of power. SCS can be seen as an arena of great power play, especially
between the United States (US) and People Republic of China (PRC); and arena of imbalance
powerplay between PRC five ASEAN’s SCS littoral states (ASLS), namely Vietnam, the
Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. Indonesia has not become SCS claimant state, but
she has about 35.000 square kilometers waters that overlapped with Chinese claimed-9 dashed
lines (9DL). There are mutually beneficial relationships between the U.S. and ASLS that both feel
unsecure with the rise of China as economic and military powerhouse.
The U.S. has built alignment with major powers from East Asia (Japan), South Asia (India),
and Oceania (Australia) to maintain superiority against China with Quadrennial Defense Dialogue
or abbreviated as the Quad since 2007. The Quad has regular naval joint exercise which is named
Vol 58, No 1 February (2023) 764

Exercise Malabar. The Quad member states have distinctive problems with China. U.S. is global
hegemon that has been challenged by the rising of Chinese power in economy, diplomacy,
technology, and military. India has land border dispute in Aksai Chin and Himalaya with recent
skirmish that killed about 70 soldiers. Japan has maritime dispute in Senkaku Island. While
Australia cannot stand communist power dominate political influence in their buffer zone namely,
in Southeast Asia and Oceania. However, none of the Quad member states are littoral states in
SCS. Their presence in SCS to challenge China has strategic value for each member of the Quad
(Kaushik, 2021).
China has become revisionist of status quo in SCS maritime delimitation by claiming what
have known as 9-dashed lines (9DL) territorial waters since 2009 to the UN. China inserted a map
claiming 9DL which was based on map in 1947 when China was under Kuomintang
administration. After Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took over power over Mainland China in
1949, the U.S. has not acknowledged SCS as Chinese territorial waters, but as global commons
(Gao & Jia, 2013).
Currently, China by far is more powerful that all ASEAN’s SCS littoral states (ASLS)
power combined. China’s national interest in SCS is extremely high and more likely non-
negotiable. However, its intention to use force to control 9DL appears to be low as with the
involvement of the US, China will avoid any conflict that may provoke to major war-especially
between states with nuclear weapons. This offers opportunity that using non-nuclear warfare by
the U.S. and ASLS might be sufficient to prevent a Chinese attack.
However, there is wide array of non-nuclear warfare in the Chinese disposal. China can
play out below the threshold of major war which cannot be deterred with conventional warfare, by
using maritime militias and CCG ships (both are civilian agencies) to effectively occupy their
claimed 9DL. Those non-military tools have been exploiting weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the
contested waters that lack of adequate capacities of ASLS maritime security agencies that include
Indonesia’s (Erickson, 2017).
Regardless of Indonesia’s status of SCS non-claimant state, incidents happened between

Indonesia maritime security and Chinese coast guard ships. From 2009 to mid-2021 there were at
least ten cases of fishing practices carried out without permission by Chinese fishermen in the
Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), especially at North Natuna Sea (NNS). China has
become Indonesia’s de facto potential threat at NNS. The situation in SCS can be regarded, again,
as merely a gray zone of conflict below the threshold of major war. With the advent of Chinese
emerging technologies i.e., UAV, UUV and hypersonic missiles, this paper would analyze how
those technologies would be utilized by China in escalating the gray zone aggression at SCS. As
the character of SCS is maritime domain, the evolution of gray zone conflict would likely be air-
sea battle (ASB) (Fernandes et al., 2021).

Literature Review/Analytical Framework
The South China Sea dispute can be more understood by balance of power context. As
Buzan & Waever (2003) argued, threats travels more easily over short distance than over long one,
security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters. Chinese threat has
been proved when China claimed nine-dashed lines (9DL) to challenge the status quo in SCS in
2009, the year when China formally claim 9Dl to the United Nations (UN).
China undoubtedly has superior power against all SCS claimant states. While extramural
powers have emerged to balance China in SCS since 2007. Those powers namely the US, India,
Australia, and Japan arise with their naval power alignment called Quadrennial Defense Dialogue
or the Quad. The focus of the Quad in super region called “Indo-Pacific” mainly about SCS as
their naval joint exercise in 2007 took place in SCS. While out of exercise activities, the Quad
member naval forces are not rare encountering Chinese paramilitary vessels that have been widely
called as maritime militia, and maritime security ships. However, as those are Chinese civilian
vessels, there were no incidents that may provoke to major war. It makes SCS security situation
remains in gray zone.
The Chinese claimed-9DL in SCS covers wide area that far from nearest Chinese naval
base in Hainan. The distance between Natuna to Hainan is about 1,802 km away. It also far from
the U.S. and its allies’ bases (Guam – Natuna is about 4,143 km away and even farther away from
Okinawa and Darwin). Both the U.S. and China have geographical disadvantage to wage war at
SCS, at least with current military technologies that they operate. Line of logistics is very fragile
to be secured. That makes it both side can only deploy forward (non-permanent) presence in
contested waters i.e. naval ships, patrol jets, patrol UAVs, and sometimes aircraft carrier. The
deployment of Chinese maritime militias, however, has been regarded to achieve two main aims,
which are (i) as proof of effective occupancy over the contested waters and (ii) as field human
intelligence operatives. With the SCS is far from center of gravities of the U.S. and China, the
character of conflict at gray zone is still evolving.
Mazarr et al (2021) argued that gray zone tactics involve gradual application of instruments
of power to achieve incremental progress without triggering a decisive military response. From
defense standpoint, China has been building up forward bases from artificial islands. Those bases
need time and security for constructions. It is very challenging to do reclamation maritime features
without being detected by other claimant states and major powers. We can only assume China uses
gray zone tactics initially to covertly support the development of forward bases directly or
indirectly.
China’s covert strategy to quietly occupy SCS can be traced back to one of 36 Chinese
ancient classical strategies, to be precise at number 30:
“guest becomes (or acts as) host” (反客为主 or fǎn kè wéi zhǔ).

This Chinese ancient strategy aims to take over other’s property gradually by entering other’s
premises quietly and passively, but after consolidating power it shows its truly intention by
exercising its superior power against the property’s owners. It somehow resemble situation in
SCS. China’s claim over SCS was based on map that was produced in 1947. It took more than 50
years for China to formally claim SCS when China has built superior power toward all other SCS
claimant SCS. Now China has even built seven artificial islands and four forward military bases
in Spratly Islands without salient interdictions by claimant states.
The China’s assertiveness in SCS has drawn coalition of willing among extramural to deter
China. The Quad response Chinese challenge by showing of force at SCS in 2007 with its Exercise
Malabar. While in 2021, other military forces had also showcased gunboat diplomacies in SCS,
for instance Canada, France, the UK and Germany. This response increases the stake that China
will face if provoking the use of conventional force to any military forces in SCS. While Vietnam
and Singapore have let their ports or military bases to be utilized for U.S. naval fleet for resupply
facility (Kaushik, 2021).
Up to the time when this article was written, China has never challenge the U.S. into high-
order war in SCS. However, China has been challenging the status quo at SCS without employing
coercive methods and provoking U.S. intervention. China has been well known of using gray zone
tactics that also known as salami-slicing or cabbage-leaf strategy by deploying maritime law
enforcement (MLE) as their outer security assets. Unfortunately, Indonesia nor the U.S. have not
developed sufficient and sophisticated set of tailored deterrence options to deter or defeat such
Chinese gray zone tactics.
Deterring gray zone should be in a way that will be perceived below threshold of major
war. As China uses MLE and maritime militia, it would be inappropriate to deter both of them
using military forces or armed attack. China and ASLS (plus the US) have mutual interest to
prevent escalation of the conflict into major war at SCS. If China uses their CCG ship to conduct
deliberate collision to the her arrested illegal fishing that pulled by ASLS MLE ships, then ASLS
MLE ships need to anticipate that by making China not confident to push the collision, in the
expense of having more damage with ASLS MLE fortified ship hull, for instance (Erickson, 2017).
Nevertheless, China may always seek other gray zone tactics with the emerging
technologies. China has been heavily invested in military research and development and currently
reaches innovation phase in advance technologies i.e., robotic, artificial intelligence and long-
range missiles. This paper tried to predict plausible gray zone tactics that China will use by
utilizing those technologies and provides recommended policy to deter or defeat them.
The advanced technology i.e. robotic, artificial intelligence and powerful thrust engine
have shaped the character of future battle that is dominated by drones (that include the hypersonic
missiles). Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) can perform not only surveillance but also fighter and
bomber roles i.e. Australian Loyal Wingman, American XQ-58 Valkyrie, British LANCA, Russian

S-70 Okhotnik-B, etc. unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) and/or autonomous unmanned surface
vehicle (USV) can perform as mini attack/hunter submarine and mini combat vessel like the
concepts of Russian Cephalopod, Chinese HSU-001, American Sea Hunter, etc. While the advent
of hypersonic missile (HM) technology makes lines of air defense becomes fragile. HM flies faster
(more than Mach 5) and flies lower (by surface skimming) that can penetrate all missile defense
systems. Those three key technologies would be suitable for future air-sea battle in SCS. This
paper would analyze the plausible trend of those Chinese technologies in drone warfare and
critically identify their limitations.
Research Method
This paper research intends to predict evolution of Chinese gray zone tactics in SCS as
China has mastered some key technologies to indigenously build game-changer weapon systems
i.e. robotic, artificial intelligence, drones, and hypersonic missiles. Understanding that China
would not provoke the U.S. into major war, China has been developing new tactics that is called
gray zone tactics. This paper tries to analyze the plausible tactics that China may develop with
those new weapons systems into their gray zone tactics in SCS.
We collect information on China’s new weapon systems from secondary data i.e., IISS
Military Balance, CSIS, and RAND Corps’ reports. A report by Morris, L.J. et al (2019) of RAND
Corporations has developed a solid scenario framework of the Chinese gray zone tactics evolution.
We modify Morris et al framework to be applied into the plausible gray zone conflict between
China and ASEAN’s SCS littoral states (ASLS). As the conflict below the threshold of major war,
it would not provoke intervention of the U.S. and her allies and/or strategic partners.
This research uses qualitative method and secondary data, mainly from research papers and
journals. Data is collected through desktop research from public access sources in World Wide
Web (www). There are two groups of data. First is related to identification of Chinese current and
future gray zone assets. Second is about security posture that has been implemented by Indonesia
from 2014 to 2021. Comparing the two data groups would result to gap analysis between China’s
threat and Indonesia’s deterrence capability.
Analysis
When Joko Widodo assumed presidency in 2014, he inherited TNI posture and outlook
that are heavily land-based, inward looking, and concentrated in Java Island. For example, both of
Indonesian naval fleets are on concentrated in west and east point of the Java Island. That situation
is a result of new order regime paradigm which was dove, inward looking and spend minimum
budget for defense sector. During the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono era, the Government of
Indonesia (GOI) has initiated to reform the defense posture by initiating Minimum Essential Forces
(MEF) a long-term defense posture planning. The MEF gain substantial budgetary support if
compared with budget in President Soeharto’s era.

In President Joko Widodo’s first term, there was maritime vision called Global Maritime
Nexus (GMN). He envisioned that Indonesia military, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), should
become maritime power in the region. This vision marked a new paradigm from inward to outward
looking. It also requires GOI, especially TNI, to solid awareness in geopolitical dynamics and
revolution in military affairs (RMA) in the region. In 2015, GOI release whitepaper that stipulates
concern that the strategic rivalry will threaten Indonesian sovereignty, either through regional
instability or a new cold war with proxy conflict. The U.S. has decided to outpost her marines in
Darwin, while China has built three military bases with runway in Spartly Islands (Sulaiman,
2017).
In December 2018, TNI has installed an integrated military base in Natuna. This would
become part of Indonesia’s new defense strategy called outer and small islands defense concept.
In the future, the similar bases will be installed in Merauke, Yamdena/Selaru, Saumlaki (near
Australia), Morotai, and Biak. This reflects Indonesia’s insecurity toward her neighbours. In 2019,
TNI has been reorganized to have three Joint Regional Defence Commands (Kogabwilhan).
Beforehand, TNI organize the territorial defense into two defense regions: west and east; and they
are no joint service command in every area (Mawangi, 2021).
The reorganization has built the defense structure but it requires substantial funding to
equip all three joint regional defense commands. Current deployment is heavily concentrated in
western region for combat units and also heavy maintenance facilities. Within the western region,
the dislocation of those units and facilities are concentrated in Java Island. The nearby air force
bases to Natuna that have fighter jets squadrons are located in Pontianak (464 km away with BAe
Hawk Mk.109/209) and in Pekanbaru (849 km away with F-16C/Dc and BAe Hawk Mk.109/209).
The nearby Indonesian Navy main naval bases are located in Batam (551 km away which is
equipped with about nine patrol vessels) and in Pontianak (with only three patrol vessels). Natuna
is under supervision of Batam main naval base. The patrol vessel that can be deployed to Natuna
waters may be only three 40-m long vessels. This indicated imbalance naval power toward China,
which operates coast guard vessels with 165-m long.
Indonesian Military Strategy
The relevant Indonesian military strategy to defending North Natuna Sea is what so called
outer and small islands defense concept (OCIDC). The concept was incremented in President Joko
Widodo first term in 2015 but it remains unclear, as no clear definition of what the threat is and
how the OCIDC will be implemented. The obvious policy that resembles OCIDC was the setting
up of TNI Integrated Unit (Satuan TNI Terintegrasi or TIU) in Natuna. In practice, it is only
reallocation TNI combat units into Natuna from elsewhere with no clarity perceived threats and
with what strategy and weapon systems will be used to them (Marewa & Parinussa, 2020).
The above situation rose due the defense planning approach in Indonesia that more close
to financial capacity that operational one. Regardless how sophisticated a defense strategy that had

been formulated by ministry of defense, the allocated budget from GOI would always far below
what it needed. The OCIDC ideally needs more than just posting marines in outer islands, but to
build strategic joint military bases.
Figure 1. Indonesia’s EEZ and Overlapped Area at North Natuna Sea (NNS)
(Source: Flander Marine Institute 2019 in ISEAS Perspective 2020 No. 10)
In the case of TIU in Natuna to protect overlapped area with 9DL (see Figure 1 above),
Indonesian Air Force does not set up permanent patrol and combat squadron in Natuna Besar.
Likewise Indonesian Navy has no permanent warships stationed in Natuna Besar. While
Indonesian Army deployed battalion level unit but also not assigned as permanent post. The unit
would be rotated among Indonesian Army infantry battalion regularly. Facing future battlefield
that will be dominated by drones and hypersonic missiles, Natuna is very fragile to be defended.
Its location, however, is very strategic for forward base if there were major conventional war
between great powers in SCS.
OCIDC has its origin in 1991 when Defense Minister L.B. Moerdani introduced military
doctrine that contain three layers of defense area. First layer is outside EEZ and aerial space above
it. Second layer is between outer EEZ border to outer territorial waters and aerial space above it.
Third layer is the territorial water, lands and aerial space above them. This doctrine was rather a

defense vision than actual strategy as during Soeharto regime, defense sector, especially for air
and naval warfare, had ailing deterrence effect (Marewa & Parinussa, 2020).
The current OCIDC would fall in the second layer of defense of 1991’s doctrine that would
depend on air and sea power under multi-domain operations to deny any foreign military operation
that enters Indonesian EEZ. This layered defense concept was then inserted into new doctrine
called Sad Daya Dwi Bakti in 1994. This doctrine sharpened the 1991 doctrine concept of the
second layer of defense to deny or slow down enemy attack that intends to land in to Indonesian
islands. Moerdani seemed to understand that Indonesian military posture was weak and need to
anticipate stronger potential threats like China that has the capability to eventually land into
Indonesia’s soils. Defending the second layer of defense by weaker power can only be done by
selective offenses, not by controlling the whole second layer (Asana et al., 2017).
Figure 2. Indonesia’s Three Layers of Defense

(Source: Modification of Arsana in Maritime News, 2017)
The military doctrine did not change much than its demilitarization from domestic political
arena in year 1999 to early 2000. Only in 1996, President Soeharto released a decree No. 71 in
1996 that stated Natuna Island as special economic zone. In 2003, in President Megawati
administration, MOD released a white paper that stated Indonesia has unresolved border issues
with ten neighboring states (DOD, 2003). In President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono or SBY
administration, he issued a decree No. 78 in 2005 about outer small islands management.
Government of Indonesia (GOI) then set up outer small islands management coordinating team.
This team would recommend policies and evaluate the implementations to GOI.
In SBY era, outer islands have been in his attention. Law No. 43 Year 2008 concerning
State Territorial mandated president to set up new agency called State Border Management Agency
(SBMA). SBMA was inaugurated based on President Decree No. 12 in 2010. SBMA is non-

structural agency that reports directly to president and chaired by Minister of Home Affairs. There
is no military strategy explicitly made to defend outer islands in SBY era from 2004 to 2014. GOI
was focusing in building-up defense porture through Minimum Essential Force (MEF) that was
eventually started in 2010.
In 2015, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo issued Presidential Decree No. 97 about General State
Defense Guidelines 2015-2019. In the decree, outer islands would be defended by a synchronized
actions among relevant ministries and/or agencies. His defense minister, Ryamizard Ryacudu, then
issued 2015 annual defense policy that positioned outer islands as vital objects for defense. He
also issued white paper in the same year that states there are 92 outer islands and twelve of them
were classified as top priority for defense by intensifying monitoring and social improvement.
However, to implement the policy above, Indonesian military or TNI deployed light infantry team
of 30 soldiers in 12 prioritized outer islands. The relative small units may be hard in neither
denying nor delaying any enemy’s attack that passing the outer islands (Risman et al., 2021).
Natuna was having more attention by GOI due to three incidents happened at North Natuna
Sea (NNS) in 2016 and once in 2020. President Jokowi had showed his attention by visiting the
NNS in 2016 with General Ret. Luhut Pandjaitan (Coordinating Minister for Maritime-then). He
wanted TNI to have sustainable presence in NNS and was responded by TNI HQ in 2017 by
leveraging the TNI presence in Natuna (CNN, 2016). TNI followed up by setting up new army,
naval and air force bases in Natuna. Minister Ryacudu commented to media that Natuna would
become a new large military base (Ryacudu, 2017).
The plan was Indonesian Navy would build their third submarine base in Natuna Besar
Island. Indonesian Air Force would deploy few fighter jets from other base to patrol NNS and
using Raden Sadjad AFB in Ranai, Natuna as forward operating base (FOB). This were in line
with President Jokowi special order on Natuna that he said Natuna is the most important island for
Indonesia. He ordered Indonesian Navy and Coast Guard (Bakamla in Indonesian Bahasa) to
intensify patrol at Natuna waters. The incident in 2016 had been also responded by Indonesia Army
by deploying more troops from 800 to 2000 soldiers to Natuna. Littoral and air defense radars were
also installed in some corners of the island.
Nevertheless, the strategy mentioned above is still far from deterring Chinese military
power in NNS. The limited capabilities would only perform formal TNI presence but is not
relevant to deter Chinese intrusion in NNS. Indonesian military does not have persistent
surveillance system that can monitor all NNS. Patrol by surface vessel or aerial system would not
be permanent. While it would not be efficient to deploy a fleet of combat ships all the time at
Natuna waters. It reflects the military strategy to Natuna is more symbolic than posing real
deterrent effect.

Plausible Chinese Gray Zone Tactics in NNS
Understanding the Indonesian defense strategy and posture in protecting NNS that
overlapped with 9DL, this paper tries to develop plausible gray zone tactics by China. This paper
would base on specific scenario in gray zone which assumes China would impose anti access
strategy to control all 9DL that includes portion of NNS in overlapped area (OA). Gray zone
signifies a situation of neither fully war or fully peace (Brady, 2020). The gray zone poses smaller
risk for China to wage war in SCS as it would limit itself to short war against certain adversaries
which hopefully not put it in major war against other great power, namely the US.
The definition of gray zone is still vague as there are many characters of conflicts within
this zone that may include economic, trade, cyber, and information war. However, gray zone still
poses important concept that identifies many kinds of non-conventional wars that may happened
before the conventional war arises. As gray zone is multi-dimensional, an inter-agencies
approaches are inevitable, while defense sector needs to define its role in facing it.
Mitre & Gellerman (2020) argued that Ministry of Defense should focus on deterring any
kind of threats in the gray zone by utilizing the military assets. The kind of threats would in line
with the development of weapon systems. They suggest a new military strategies need to be
developed with the invention of new kind of weapon systems. While O’Hanlon (2019) projected
the robotics and autonomous systems (RAS) would have a revolutionary development in 2020 to
2040. A fusion of RAS to other systems i.e. missiles, battery power engines, rockets, satellite,
radio-frequency weapon and stealth technologies may result new kind of weapon systems that
suitable for gray zone i.e. kamikaze killer drone, electronic warfare drone and smart anti-ship/air
defense hypersonic missile that can be launched from small boat or small aircraft.
China with its advance technology mastery has the capacity to develop the aforementioned
systems indigenously. China has been able to produce DF-41 ICBM with range up to 15,000 km;
hypersonic glide vehicle DF-ZF on MRBM DF-17; J-20 and J-31 stealth fighter jets; Type 094
SSBN, navigation satellite BeiDou, surveillance satellite Gaofen 4, and others. In implementing
Anti Access strategy in gray zone of conflict, China would require persistent situational awareness
in its area of defense and contested zone. China may use cross-domain integrated sensors
(satellites, AWACSs, ground radars, surface radars, and underwater sensors) to establish battle
information superiority.
Prior detailing the plausible short conflict scenario in gray zone of conflict, we need to
construct the logical cause of conflict between China and Indonesia. From historical standpoint,
back in 1293, the Kubilai Khan and King of Yuan Dynasty had attempted to conquer Java Island.
His amphibious force reached between 20,000 to 30,000 soldiers. This was a punitive expedition
against King Kertanegara of Singhasari, who had refused to pay tribute to the Yuan’s vassal
kingdom. Despite the defeat of the Yuan dynasty’s assault, ancient China had showed their
ambitious expansive strategy to control Java and its controlled waters (Weatherfold, 2004) .

President Xi Jinping’s Chinese Dream of "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation" would concern
many neighboring states if it replicates Yuan dynasty in modern era.
Allison (2017) in his book titled “Destined for War” tried to understand China’s behavior
from historical perspective. He argued by historical data that emerging great power would always
behave aggressive as it supposes to do. The United States of America at the end of 19 th century, as
emerging power had declared war on Spain to expel from Western Hemisphere and acquiring
Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines. The U.S. also supported insurgents in Columbia to create
a new country, Panama, in order to build a canal. The change of the U.S. behavior was very critical
in this phenomenon. She became aggressive only when she gained dominant power in its region.
The nation’s leader has always significant role in shaping that very behavior. At that time the U.S.
was led by Theodore Roosevelt who was very hawkish. With this angle, Allison understood China
aggressiveness resembles the U.S. at the end of 19 th century. Or in other words, China has learnt
well from the U.S. on how to stepping up the ladder as new regional (if not global) hegemon.
The conflict scenario between Indonesia and China in NNS or OA cannot be separated
from the hegemonic rivalry between China and the US-led coalition of the willing. If we exclude
Indonesia and China conflict, the U.S. coalition would remain containing China to become
regional hegemon in East Asia. As incumbent global hegemon, the U.S. would defend her position
and congest with like-minded states to deny China in overtaking global hegemony. Therefore, any
conflict between Indonesian and China will always have impact on enduring power competition
between China and the US. In other words, it would be hidebound if Indonesia’s defense strategy
to deter China without inserting defense cooperation with the US.
Having the American factor in the region, imposing power to NNS is not possible for China
(yet). Many major powers have shown their attention, namely the US, Australia India, Japan,
Canada, France, the UK and even Germany. Those powers are united to balance China’s emerging
power in East Asia, especially SCS. Gunboat diplomacy become often occurrence in SCS waters.
Those powers exhibited their modern naval powers to temper down China assertiveness.
While the U.S. promotes defense cooperations with all SCS littoral states by providing
grants or access to their weapon systems. In October 2003, the U.S. had re-announced Thailand
and the Philippines as her non-NATO alliances. In 2010, the U.S. and Indonesia signed
Comprehensive Partnership Arrangement that had been rank up to be Strategic Partnership
agreement in 2014. Moreover, the obtrusive alliance of Five Powers Defense Arrangement
(FPDA) had found new ground that had been shaped to integrate air and naval power of the
members to anticipate major war in SCS.
Albeit the above situation, China has been keep ambitious in building up their naval power.
Dalian Shipbuilding Industry Company, build PLAN second and third aircraft carrier with
displacement of around 70,000 and 85,000 tons respectively. The other shipyard can build nuclear
power submarine Type 094 Jin type that can carries 12 SLBM. That conventional warfare is likely

prepared for high-order war that wants to be avoided by all parties, due hyper-destruction effects
to humanity and global economy. While short and/or limited conflict, in SCS may still challenges
by China and also the U.S. as well. It is far from both nearest military bases that known as the
tyranny of distance and that conflict may also inflict to nuclear power that will hurt both sides
severely (Lee, 2013).
As China would not provoke major war with the US, it may exert covert hostile behavior
with SCS littoral states that may not escalate incident into armed conflict. This is the essence of
gray zone conflict which aims to disturb lesser states without provoking other great power. China
may wage conflict of gray zone with utilize civilian assents i.e. coast guard, maritime militia, UUV
and other unconventional warfare to intrude Indonesia EEZ, especially that intersect with China’s
claimed 9DL, called OA.
Chinese unconventional warfare and its effect should gain more attention, as they are now
understudied. In the public summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the U.S. Defense
Department argues that “Inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary
concern in U.S. national security.” Numerous statements from senior U.S. defense officials have
made them clear that they expect this strategic competition to be played out primarily below the
threshold of major war. They suggested the Chinese gray zone in SCS deserves more analysis
(Morris et al, 2019).
China has been employing gray zone tactics in Indonesian EEZ in North Natuna Sea since
2016. Two skirmishes happened. First on 19 March 2016 when Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) vessel
deliberately bumped into Chinese fishing boat KM Kway Fey 10078 that being pulled by
Indonesian Ministry of fishery’s vessel of KP Hiu 11. The second on 23 December 2019 when
Indonesian Coast Guard (ICG) detected around 50 fishing ships entering Natuna waters and being
escorted by two CCG ships and one PLAN frigate. ICG deployed KM Tanjung Datuk patrol vessel
to warn them but they refuse leave Indonesian EEZ. Indonesian MOFA sent diplomatic protest to
PRC. It was responded by Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) that the waters was
Chinese territorial waters and whether Indonesia accepted or not, it would not change the PRC
version of objective fact that China own right and interest at the relevant waters. Indonesian MOFA
response back to PRC that GOI did not recognize China’s self-proclaimed nine-dashed lines. China
responded back by sending around 30 fishing ships in early 2020 to Natuna waters that escorted
by two CCG ships (JPNN, 2020).
While in 2019-2020, there were three UUVs found in Indonesian territorial waters, which
were in March 2019 at Bintan Island, at the end of 2020 near Selayar Island and also in Masalembu
water, Sumenep, Madura. All found sea gliders are almost identical to the 'Sea Wing' UUV version
made by China. The Indonesian government chose not to make any accusations because it could
potentially cause an offensive approach towards other countries, unless it is backed with hard

evidence. Nevertheless, the incidents have increase alert of maritime security agencies that the
intrusions have enter far inside Indonesian archipelagic waters (see red stars in Figure 2).
Being supported by inadequate defense budget, Indonesia faces structural problems to

secure her EEZ. Her maritime security agencies assets in North Natuna Sea are limited. They
cannot conduct persistent patrol the EEZ. While the administration process to have fishing license
in EEZ also complicated that limit the number of local fishing activities in EEZ. While regulation
is hard to be enforced as corruption practices in maritime domain still happens. There are 13
agencies in Indonesia that handle maritime security i.e. military, sea police, ministry of fishery,
ministry of transportation, customs & duties agency, coast guard, immigration agency, and others.
It creates complexity for Indonesian agencies to establish synchronized maritime security strategy.
On the other hand, it creates flaw of defense when defense sector has a false confidence that the
other agencies would patrol some areas and deter foreign intrusion, which actually they would not
(as they are not their main duties).
New situation happened on 23 January 2021. PRC enacted Coast Guard Law that
authorizes navy to demolish other states' structures built on reefs and islands claimed by China and
to seize or use weapons against foreign vessels illegally entering its territorial waters. Another
situation happened on 1 September 2021. China unilaterally imposed her regulation that all foreign
special ships on Chinese claimed 9DL should report to Chinese Maritime Security Administration
(CMSA). The special ships may include submarine, nuclear-powered vessel, cargo ships that carry
radio-active materials, tankers for oil, chemical materials, liquid gas, and hazardous materials.
China would deter and move out any violations of the above newly Chinese regulation. China has
capacity to detect and place coercive acts to any surface ships at SCS. The problem would lie on
whether China will use her force with the expense of conflict escalation into high order war or not.
We assume China would prefer to intensify her gray zone tactics with the use of CCG
ships, maritime militia, UUV at 9DL; than using her PLA Navy. This tactic would not provoke to
major war, but mainly only diplomatic notes. New tactic may include the use of MALE UAV that
flies around contested waters and deployment of anti-ship and air defense missiles that carried by
naval ships and/or multi-role combat aircrafts near CCG ships. Mazarr et al (2021) has produced
a solid Chinese gray zone aggression in Senkaku Islands. We use their model to be projected into
plausible limited gray zone conflict between China and Indonesia in NNS, especially in overlapped
area (OA), as follow.

Table 1. Assessment of High-End Gray Zone Deterrence:

Chinese Aggression Against Overlap Area (OA) Between 9DL
and North Natuna Sea (NNS)
Level of
Criterion Details
Deterrence
Intensity of the China’s China has strong, nonnegotiable interests at SCS but
Mixed
motivations exhibits no sense of urgency to use coercive force (yet).
China openly claims the 9DL and has a regular presence
Attribution of the
Mixed of coast guard ships operating near or at NNS. There is
China’s role
increasing Chinese maritime militia activities near NNS.
China’s actions do not attempt a physical change in
territory, but they directly encroach on Indonesia’s
Level of aggression Mixed sovereign right in NNS. In November 2021, PRC sent
diplomatic note to forbid underwater drilling by
Indonesian companies in OA.
Jakarta provided clear statements on its commitment to the
Indonesia’s and the EEZ that includes NNS. There is clear U.S. messaging on
U.S. unacceptable Strong its commitment to assist littoral states to preserve their
outcomes rights (stipulated in President Biden’s Interim National
Security Strategic Guidance in 2021).
Indonesia and the U.S. are strongly opposing Chinese
Indonesia’s and the behavior. Despite there is no agreement of the two states
U.S. on deterrent Mixed to establish combined responses to Chinese provocations
responses anywhere at NNS. The U.S. has not ratified UNCLOS that
it has no ground to acknowledge Indonesia’s EEZ.
Indonesian systems across all domains are ill-developed
Indonesia’s and the
and postured for rapid responses to Chinese gray zone
U.S. proportionate Weak
activity around NNS. The U.S. force presence is rare as
response capabilities
there is far from nearest base in Guam.
There is acute dissatisfaction with China’s actions among
South China Sea littoral states that also view Chinese
Regional and global
Strong behavior as illegal and bullying. Canada, Japan, Australia,
support for deterrence
India, France, UK and Germany have shared the
dissatisfaction by deploying ship visits in SCS.
It is unclear whether the U.S.-Indonesia interaction has
Aggressor’s
created an expectation of responses in China, but the U.S.
expectation of Weak
FOIP policy has served to force Chinese planners to
meaningful responses
consider possible U.S. involvement.
Source: Modification of Mazarr et al (2021) works.
With situation and assumption that have been mapped out above, we make prediction of
how China deploys her gray zone tactics in NNS, especially OA. We predict China would take the
opportunity that OA is rarely sailed by Indonesian fishermen and is under protected by Indonesian
maritime security agencies. Indonesia may eventually realize the intrusion and will assign a
temporary military unit to deter Chinese intrusion. China may retreat for a while in OA until
Indonesia lower their patrol to minimum level and resume the intrusion. That situation has been
happening in OA for years. If Indonesia change their strategy to make Natuna as forward operation
base with all year adequate military force, then China will likely escalate her grey zone tactics with
new and more sophisticated instruments below the threshold of provoking major war, as explained
below in four phases.
Phase 1–Continued Intrusions by Maritime Militias. Chinese gray zone aggression tends to
continue for the near future in OA. This situation has been amplified with increasing numbers of
Vietnamese illegal fishing activities in NNS that in Indonesia is widely known as WPP-711
(Vietnam and China are contesting the major part of SCS). WPP is fishing zone name by GOI that
makes Indonesia sea jurisdiction waters into some compartments. Every WPP will require fishing
license from Indonesian Ministry of Marine and Fishery (MMF). MMF retains its own right to
check fishing license of any fishing ships in Indonesian territorial and EEZ waters.
CSIS report (2021) argued that Chinese gray zone tactic is conducted by deploying
maritime militia fishing ships in NNS and guard the ships by two layered defense. First layer is
CCG ships protection and the second is from PLA Navy combat vessels that operated in near
distance. If maritime militias ships being detention and pull away to Indonesian nearest port, CCG
ship would approach to the site to liberate the arrested ships, even in the expense of drowning
Chinese own fishing ships. Drowning her own ships has been regarded as better than her ships
being arrested by Indonesia. On the other hand that tactics would create psychological trauma to
Indonesian patrol vessels if facing CCG.
The above tactics had been effective as NNS waters is not well guarded by Indonesia’s
maritime security patrol ships. NNS is only fraction of Indonesian waters that need to be protected,
while the number of patrol ships are relatively small. However, Indonesian government will
increase the patrol ships in NNS, by Navy or civil agencies that in line with Indonesia’s growing
security budget. On 31 August 2021, Indonesian Sea Police announced to deploy nine patrol ships
to WPP-711. Two largest ships will have 73 meter and 68 meter long, respectively. This ship will
add one MMF patrol ship, four Indonesian Coast Guard ships along with few naval ships that
protect NNS. This new policy may deter Chinese maritime militia and China may have to change
their gray zone tactics.
Phase 2–More Intense Intrusions by Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV). The finding of
three China made-UUVs in Indonesian territorial waters (without any evidences to back
Indonesian diplomatic protest to accused any state) may lead to provide incentives for China to

deploy more UUV to Indonesian territorial waters. The UUV is used as platform for various
missions i.e., underwater-surveillance and electronic warfare to manipulate fish habitat.
This gray zone tactic may benefit China in formulating underwater warfare planning, such
as submarine route planning, kamikaze killer UUV deployment, planting remotely control sea
mines, and other covert mission that will leverage China strategic position than her adversaries
over contested waters (and underwaters). This tactic cannot be deterred as current technologies
operated by Indonesian military cannot detect small object in very vast underwaters.
This tactic may be protracted in usage but China cannot rely on this tactic alone due to
limitations of UUV. With small volume, UUV generally has short endurance, unable to transmit
data to long distance receiver, and unable to carry heavy load – to carry sand for reclamation
artificial island, for instance. With the finding of three Chinese made UUV in Indonesian territorial
waters, may develop new instruments and tactics to detect and capture those UUV. If that happens,
China may need to change her tactics again.
Phase 3–More Intense Intrusion by Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV). As China has been able to master advance technology in MALE UAV, it
would be logical that soon Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) will be equipped with this platform. Less
the same with UUV, MALE UAV also have low footprint. It cannot easily be detected but can
relay data through satellite to long distance receivers.
The presence of civil agency MALE UAV above contested waters may be dilemmatic to
be deterred by other major powers that have been deploying military maritime patrol aircrafts and
drone in SCS airspace. This MALE UAV tactic is still below threshold of provoking major war as
the UAV is not a airborne combat warfare. The other major powers cannot shootdown civilian
UAV littoral state as it may perceive a abuse of power.
The same with UUV tactic, the MALE UAV tactic may not manipulate other littoral state
behaviors. They are not harmful but only taking data. These tactics may be protracted but China
may need other tactic to have a sort of non-kinetic but coercive effect to impose the targeted object
to behave as what China wants.
Phase 4–Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) Boat Diplomacy. Gray zone tactic always use nonmilitary
assets. CCG ships are always use by China as first line of maritime defense. The deliberate
collision tactic may be further developed by China by using all-around armored hull that is
specially design to survive or prevail in hard deliberate collision with other ships. This tactic is
considered still below threshold of provoking armed conflict.
Winning deliberate collision as tactic was recorded in sea battles between Korean ships (at
Joseon era) against Japanese during the Japan's Korean War (1592-1598). Korea navy used Turtle
ships with iron cladding under Admiral Yi Sunsin's leadership. He won the famous battle by

optimizing his iron ships and the dynamic of sea current into the tactics to beat his enemy’s
weaknesses. Yi resurrected the turtle ship as a close-assault vessel, intended to ram enemy ships
and sink them. Rowed directly into enemy ship formations, the ship disrupted their lines of defense.
Turtle ship tactic would find its place in modern era, especially in gray zone of conflict. If
China intension is not to let its illegal fishing vessels being captured by Indonesian MLE ships, it
may deploy CCG fast Turtle ships to chase, ram and sink, if necessary, her won illegal fishing
vessels. This sort of madness would create panic to the MLE personnel who deal with the event
and in the long-run it may deter MLE ships to encounter CCG Turtle ships. Any incidents would
risk MLE personnel carrier as it may become national headlines. The gray zone of conflict is not
a real war. Escaping from it would become the easiest and safest choice for MLE ships than
accepting the challenge of irrational Turtle ships tactic.
Gap Analysis
Indonesian military posture is not yet designed to deter gray zone. Deterring Chinese tactics
with maritime militia and CCG ships intrusions needs non-lethal warfare that may manipulate their
behaviors. These counter measures are very delicate to be defined as if they are very light i.e.,
water cannon, it would not deter intrusion. While if they are too harmful, i.e. high power or sonic
weapon, it may violate human right.
Manipulating behavior without harming intruders is key character of gray zone warfare.
The warfare may constitute creating continues disturbance to targeted object without affecting the
operators to near the limit of human biological tolerance. Produced effect of the warfare should
not easily be weakened or neutralized by simple solutions. The aim is to make the target giving up
their unwanted behaviors.
Many methods or techniques may be invented to produce this kind of warfare. One of them
is by utilizing UUV that is specifically design to make damage of the ships’ propellers by
deliberately hitting them. This UUV is non-lethal. It may use special systems to destroy the
propellers to make the ships floating off. These systems may contain low technology that makes it
easy for China to copy. If both sides operating these systems, the deterring effect may be null.
Military advance technology is arena that China has competitive advantages in every aspect
than Indonesia. While China (and Chinese Taipei) has high flaw in international norms to justify
their assertive acts in SCS. Indonesia and other littoral states may utilize their patrol assets to
document Chinese maritime militia and CCG ships intrusions in real time basis to proper channels
i.e. diplomatic line, ITLOS and/or media to shape unsympathetic opinion against China behavior
in SCS.
Combining the two approaches would be better for Indonesia if Indonesia building up
coalition of will with other littoral states to counter Chinese gray zone. Among SCS gray zone,

there should be a coordinated patrol mechanism that has been applied in Malacca Strait and Sulu
Sea between three states. This strategy aims to improve maritime domain awareness in SCS by
sharing information’s of any movements at contested waters from all sources of data.
Collaboration with the U.S. and Australian military agencies may be needed as what have been
done with JCPOA for counter terrorism activities.
Conclusions
Indonesian military (TNI) and maritime law enforcement (MLE) should reinvent new
military strategy to face modern unmanned wars. Relying on conventional warfare is not relevant
to deter Chinese day-to-day gray zone tactics at SCS. We recommend Government of Indonesia
(GOI) to increase budget for TNI and MLE, especially for procuring unconventional and non-
lethal warfare that can effectively deter Chinese gray zone tactics.
TNI and MLE need to developed a synchronized maritime security strategy to make more
comprehensive maritime domain awareness and rapid response to any detected intrusion. TNI
needs to consider using satellite imagery and elevated long-range radar that elevated into aerostat
to ensure persistent surveillance over North Natuna Sea.
A regular joint exercise with the U.S. naval force, or the other Quad members, or FPDA
member should also be considered to warn China if its gray zone tactics were more aggressive and
uneasy to be deterred. All foreign military partners may use NNS as trial area to test the efficacy
of their newly invented unconventional warfare against Chinese tactics.
The goal of Chinese gray zone aggression is to gradually strengthened its military position,
and position it to assert greater influence over SCS. Suggesting Government of Indonesia should
continue to build their arms up to narrow the capability gap to People Liberation Army, especially
in air and naval powers. Natuna Islands should be developed as not only forward, but main
operation base for Indonesian Air Force, Indonesian Navy, Coast Guard and also Search & Rescue
Agency to gain geographical advantage in defending NNS.
If there is an air-sea battle in SCS, there is likely it would become “a lab” of major powers
to prove the efficacy of their high technological weapon systems i.e. drones and hypersonic
missiles. Might be similar to Nagoro-Karabakh, but in larger scale. The future SCS war would
become a limited major war, a new kind of war that will be dominated by new unmanned arms
technologies. It will be a war among machines. Men direct involvement would no longer be needed
because of three reasons: geographical aspect, combat agility demand and humanity. Racing
toward emerging technology with China would be impossible for Indonesia. Indonesia should
consider to focus on the antidote technology development and hedging strategy with great power
to balance China.

Acknowledgement
This article was self-funded by authors and we thank to Indonesia Defense University,
Hasanuddin University and Pertamina University that provided access to secondary data from their
respective libraries. We also thank Curie Maharani and Ariscynatha Putra Ingparaja for their sheer
assistances in making up this article.
About the Authors
Anton Pallaguna is an Indonesian Air Force senior officer. He was graduated from USAF Air
Command & Staff College and USAF Air University in 2014. Currently, he serves as the
Operations Assistant for Chief of Capital City Sectoral Command and he studies management at
doctoral program in Hasanuddin University.
Abd. Rahman Kadir is a professor of marketing & strategic management and dean of the faculty
of economics and business at Hasanuddin University. He took his graduate and doctoral studies of
management at Airlangga University in 2000.
Purnomo Yusgiantoro is a professor at Bandung Institute of Technology. He is a former secretary-

general of OPEC, former Indonesian Minister of Energy for three presidents, and former
Indonesian Minister of Defense. He took his Ph.D. natural resources economy at Colorado School
of Mines in 1988.
Dwia Aries Tina Pulubuhu a professor of sociology and former president of Hasanuddin
University. She took her M.A. at Ateneo de Manila University in 1993 and her Ph.D. at
Hasanuddin University in 2005. She took various courses at New York University in 1998,
Chulalongkorn University in 2001, Uppsala University in 2002 and Helenic American University
in 2009.
Ian Montratama is lecturer at Pertamina University in international relations department. He is

alumnus of University of Indonesia, EDHEC Lille, Indonesian Defense University and University
of Padjadjaran.
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JOURNAL OF SOUTHWEST JIAOTONG UNIVERSITY

ISSN: 0258-2724, https://jsju.org.cn/

THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE GRAY ZONE TACTICS

Anton Pallaguna1*, Abd. Rahman Kadir2, Purnomo Yusgiantoro3,

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Regardless of Indonesia’s status of SCS non-claimant state, incidents happened between

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Literature Review/Analytical Framework

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Indonesian Military Strategy

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Figure 2. Indonesia’s Three Layers of Defense

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Plausible Chinese Gray Zone Tactics in NNS

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Being supported by inadequate defense budget, Indonesia faces structural problems to

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Table 1. Assessment of High-End Gray Zone Deterrence:

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About the Authors

Purnomo Yusgiantoro is a professor at Bandung Institute of Technology. He is a former secretary-

Ian Montratama is lecturer at Pertamina University in international relations department. He is

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