Introduction

The South China Sea (SCS) is a strategic waterway in the West Pacific Ocean where
much international trade passes through, with current data and research stating its marine
biodiversity, and abundance of oil and natural gas reserves (“The Philippines’ Future”, 2020).
Because of this, multiple countries, such as China and Taiwan, and members of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines,
lay claim to the region in part or in whole, the most infamous claim being China’s “9-dash line”
claim over most of the Sea, that China attempts to assert mainly through the paramilitary
Chinese Coast Guard (CCG) (LaFond, 1999; “South China Sea”, 2021; “Unmoved by China's
new law”, 2021). Over recent years, tensions have been simmering in the Sea, most notably
those between the United States and China (“Philippine ‘within striking distance’”, 2021). While
the former does not claim any part of the Sea, it regularly conducts Freedom of Navigation
Operations (FONOPS) in the area, and provides support to its allied countries with claims over
the region and other nearby waterways, such as Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines (Jennings,
2021; Law, 2020; “The Philippines’ Future”, 2020). The Philippines, despite its 2016 landmark
victory in the United Nations (UN) Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague validating its
claim on the SCS (“The Philippines’ Future”, 2020; Tomacruz, 2020a), has been unable to
effectively assert and defend said claim, the West Philippine Sea, from Chinese intrusion and
interference (Tomacuz, 2020b), one factor being the fact that China does not recognize the
victory despite China being a state party within the UNCLOS, calling it invalid and illegal. The
most recent development in this field is the passing of a new Chinese Coast Guard law last
January 22 that permits the Chinese Coast Guard to use "all necessary means", including the
use of force, to stop or prevent threats from foreign vessels. The new law also allows the
boarding and inspection of foreign vessels, and the demolishing of other countries’ structures, in
“the jurisdictional waters claimed by China.”

Thesis Statement

While a diplomatic protest has already been filed against China by Philippine Foreign
Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr., I assert that the Philippines and other Southeast Asian countries
should bring the issue of the new CCG law to the United Nations tribunal, in order to have the
law declared as void, as urged by retired Philippine Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio
(Ranada, 2021a; Tomacruz, 2021a). I advocate Carpio’s stance because the law, while
technically not violating UN laws in and of itself, has much potential for escalating the already
volatile tensions in the waterway (Tomacruz, 2021a). Adding to this, with the way the law is
written, it supports China’s claims on the waterway, and may be used to enforce said claims,
that have been proven to be illegal by the UN Permanent Court of Arbitration, the same body
that awarded the Philippines' own arbitral award (Tomacruz, 2020a). Therefore, the law is
essentially illegal and wrong, as it supports illegal claims and actions that disregard international
law, and it must be contested, such as through our downplayed and underused 2016 arbitral
ruling (Tomacruz, 2020) that validated our claims. With that in mind, only a coordinated effort by
countries whose sovereignties are violated by China’s illegal claims is capable of combating
China’s intention to forcefully claim the South China Sea. On our part, we can join naval drills
with other countries, such as the U.S., which supports our 2016 victory as well as our legal
claims (“The Philippines’ Future”, 2020). We can also help other Southeast Asian countries,
such as Malaysia and Vietnam, file their own arbitration cases to have their claims validated
(Ranada, 2021a).

Main Argument

The new CCG law was passed last January 22, 2021 by the Standing Committee
China’s National People’s Congress, and went into effect on February 1. The law builds on
other changes that have militarized China’s maritime law enforcement apparatus, including
shifts that have turned the CCG into a paramilitary organization under the direction of the
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and the Central Military Commission (Sakamoto,
2021).

Article 83 of the new law states that “the CCG Organization shall carry out defense
operations and other missions in accordance with the National Defense Law, the Armed Police
Law, and other relevant laws, military regulations, and orders of the Central Military
Commission.” This means that the CCG has the dual functions of a navy conducting military
defense operations in waters under its jurisdiction, and a maritime law enforcement agency
(Sakamoto, 2021). Aside from this, the law has also been considered as an important step in
clarifying and standardizing the operations of the CCG, mainly since it explicitly specifies the
conditions under which the Chinese coast guard would be allowed to use weapons on foreign
vessels (Luo, 2021).
 The law’s different provisions allow the CCG a range of actions to use against foreign
vessels and structures. Notable examples include the use of police implements (like high
pressure water cannons), boarding and inspection, the use of hand held weapons, the
suspension of illegal activities such as demolishing of “illegal” foreign structures, the installation
of various types of fixed or floating devices within maritime territories under Chinese jurisdiction
without the permission of the competent authorities of China, the use of ship borne and airborne
weapons, and even the use of weapons without prior warning (Luo, 2021; Sakamoto, 2021). In
essence, the law permits the CCC the use of aggressive and potentially lethal force against
those who would infringe on Chinese sovereignty and jurisdictional waters, and as such has
multiple parties have stated this to be a potential cause and escalator of conflict in the SCS
(Haver, 2021).

Another aspect of the law that has been considered as problematic is its significant
ambiguity, notably in what constitutes China's “jurisdictional waters''. While Article 74(2) of the
November 4 2020 draft of the law vaguely defined it as “other waters under the jurisdiction of
the People's Republic of China”, in addition to internal waters, territorial waters, contiguous
zones, exclusive economic zones and continental shelves that China already owns under the
UNCLOS, the iteration of the law that was passed leaves China’s “jurisdictional water”
undefined (Martinson, 2021; Sakamoto, 2021). However, other authoritative Chinese sources
reveal that Beijing claims jurisdiction over 3 million square kilometres of maritime space,
comprising the Bohai Gulf, a large section of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea as far east as
the Okinawa Trough, including waters around the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and all the
maritime territories within their “nine-dash line” in the SCS. While China’s maritime claims have
long since conflicted with UNCLOS text as well as the claims of other countries such as the
Philippines, with Beijing itself acknowledging that “over half” of the aforementioned territories
are contested by other states, the fact that Beijing is explicitly permitting the use of aggressive,
potentially deadly force in within its “jurisdictional waters” is alarming. The law clearly states that
the CCG will conduct law enforcement operations to protect Chinese maritime rights and
interests, over maritime territories it has no jurisdiction over under the UNCLOS (Martinson,
2021; Sakamoto, 2021).

As such, if China were to fully implement the law to the letter, consequences would be
dramatic, exacerbated by the huge and still growing gap in maritime capabilities between China
and other claimants (Luo, 2021). Any foreign fishing, survey or research vessel found operating
anywhere within China’s nine-dash line would be subject to boarding and inspection, along with
forcible boarding by armed personnel if they refuse. The CCG would aggressively rid the Spratly
Archipelago of structures on the land features occupied by other countries such as Vietnam,
Malaysia, and the Philippines, along with evicting and barring entry by foreign vessels within the
archipelago. Similar events would take place around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, where the
CCG would ‘expel’ every Japanese ship it encountered. In the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and
South China Sea, the CCG would hunt down and expel US surveillance ships and hydrographic
survey ships for conducting ‘illegal’ activities in China’s EEZ (Martinson, 2021).

However, China allowing its forces to use aggressive force does not mean that they will
enforce it as aggressively as they can. For example, while China’s national fisheries law, which
was last updated in 2013, authorises China’s maritime law enforcement forces to punish and
expel illegal operations conducted by foreign fishing vessels within China’s jurisdictional waters.
However, there are still vast areas of maritime space where such vessels continue to operate
without interference. Likewise, in August 2016, the Chinese supreme court authorised the CCG
to charge foreigners for criminal offences if caught ‘poaching’ in Chinese jurisdictional waters;
since then, the coastguard has not enforced this provision, despite many chances to do so.
Therefore, new aggressive laws do not necessarily cause new coercive behavior, especially
because fully implementing such forceful laws would be terrible foregin policy, alienating its
neighbors and potential allies. Nonetheless, the fact that such laws exist, with China’s reasons
for its existence being the intent of building China into a ‘maritime great power’ and
‘safeguarding maritime rights and interest’, means that China intends to use aggressive,
coercive, and arguably illegal methods in the future if they deem that the situation demands it.
Therefore, neighboring states such as the Philippines must react and make preparations
accordingly (Martinson, 2021).

Controversy has arisen because of the aforementioned aspects of the law, with several
parties expressing concerns that the law is technically legal and similar to laws passed by other
countries, but aggressive and escalatory, or problematic when considering the larger context,
whilst other parties have stated that the law outright violates international regulations. According
to Alexander Vuving, a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security
Studies in Hawaii, authorizing the CCG to use guns and real force would work against the other
claimants in the SCS, intimidating the Southeast Asian states due to the more powerful
weapons and capabilities the CCG has compared to their contemporaries (Jennings, 2021;
Santos, 2021).

Meanwhile, Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro "Teddy Boy" Locsin, Jr. filed a
diplomatic protest against China over the new law, stating that while China has the right to enact
a law, since it is doing so over the disputed and purportedly open SCS, the law “is a verbal
threat of war to any country that defies the law; which, if unchallenged, is submission to it”
(Santos, 2021). Another Philippine government official, National Defense Secretary Delfin
Lorenzana expressed concerns that the new law raises the risk of miscalculation and accidents
at sea since it allows the CCG to fire at foreign vessels, and called for all claimants, such as
China and Vietnam, to exercise caution and in the implementation of their laws (Chaudhury,
2021; Jennings, 2021; Mangosing, 2021a; Santos, 2021). Similarly, Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) chief Lt. Gen. Cirilito Sobejana expressed that the law was both very alarming
and very irresponsible, and would respond by deploying more naval assets to the region in
order to secure their people (Aguilar, 2021). Another Filipino expert, retired Supreme Court
justice Antonio Carpio, who was instrumental in the Philippines' successful legal case against
China's claim to the West Philippine Sea (WPS), expressed that Beijing's domestic law clearly
violates both the UNCLOS and the UN Charter itself, calling it a “grave threat to world peace”.
saying that the law is allowing China to claim maritime areas through war and force, which is
against the international legal order. Carpio also stated that the passing of the law, due to its
permission of the use of force against foreigners, renders any SCS code of conduct (COC)
currently being worked on by the different claimants “useless” and “totally destroyed”, and
shows Beijing's "bad faith" in talks with Southeast Asian nations to finalize the COC. Carpio
further added that China will use the COC to legitimize its artificial island building and its 9-dash-
line, by only signing the code once the former is complete, going as far as stating that the law is
a hegemonic act of China (Ranada, 2021b). A professor from the University of the Philippines,
Professor Jay Batongbacal, Director of the Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea,
argued that any use of force by China's Coast Guard was not law enforcement action, but an
actual use of force by the state, and could therefore be considered as an aggressive act or use
of force contrary to the United Nations Charter, or even an act of war implemented in the waters
of other countries that China claims. He said that the CCG should be considered a military, not
a civilian, agency, since it directly falls under the Central Military Commission, and that while
other coast guards have law enforcement powers that can include the use of force, the new
CCG law was mainly problematic since it would allow the CCG to conduct aggressive acts of
supposed law enforcement in waters that they do not own. According to Batongbacal, this
meant that the probability of an incident involving the use of force is much higher, and that this
is a common challenge facing all Southeast Asian countries near the SCS whose waters are
disputed by China, especially since civilians operating within their countries’ own maritime
territory were at threat since they could be fired upon by Chinese vessels (Anh, 2021).

At the Vietnamese side, Foreign Affairs Ministry spokeswoman Le Thi Thu Hang said
that countries must comply with the international laws and treaties to which they are signatories,
most especially the 1982 UNCLOS. She said that Vietnam had sufficient historical evidence and
legal basis to assert sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly islands under international law
and the UNCLOS, and as such would resolutely and persistently defend their right in
accordance with international law. She further stated that related countries should respect
Vietnamese sovereignty in the SCS, display goodwill in the enforcement of international law and
the UNCLOS, and actively promote contribute to peace and stability in the region (Anh, 2021).

Collin Koh, a research fellow at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International

Studies, argued that the law is an implied warning to ASEAN parties in the SCS to refrain from
challenging China’s actions and interests, even if the states’ claims were legitimate, unlike
China’s own claims. Koh added that China tends to exploit the desire of other parties, often the
Southeast Asian states hat are economically beholden to it, as a type of “lawfare” that Beijing
plays in the disputed regions. Furthermore, Eduardo Araral, associate professor at the National
University of Singapore's public policy school, has stated that China was attempting to use
uncertainty in conjunction with the threat of what is authorized in the new law to prevent other
claimants from acting (Jennings, 2021).

Aristyo Rizka Darmawan, a Lecturer in International Law at the University of Indonesia

and Young Leader at the Honolulu-based Pacific Forum Foreign Policy Research Institute,
writes that the law is illegal under the UNCLOS, escalatory due to allowing the CCG to fire at
foreign vessels, and raises problems, such as by hampering a SCS code of conduct that other
countries are already working on. He said that while states should not intervene in another
state’s domestic legislation, a state’s sovereignty is only limited to their own territory, and that
sovereignty is limited to its legal territory under international law (Darmawan, 2021).
 In Japan, Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi expressed that the law’s implementation
must not violate international standards, whilst Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi expressed that the
law violated international norms. As early as December, while a draft of the new law was still
being debated, Toshinari Matsuo, director of the Operational Law Office at the Maritime Self-
Defense Force’s Maritime Command and Staff College, wrote that the new law went beyond the
norms established by the UNCLOS (Chaudhury, 2021).

Meanwhile, The United States, which has expressed support for the claims of the
Philippines and other Southeast Asians states over the SCS, has strongly criticized the new law.
U.S. State Department spokesman Ned Price said that “The United States joins the Philippines,
Vietnam, Indonesia, Japan, and other countries in expressing concern with China’s recently
enacted Coast Guard law, which may escalate ongoing territorial and maritime disputes,”,
adding that the aggressive language and authorization of the use of force in the law implies that
it could be used to intimidate China’s maritime neighbors, and enforce its unlawful maritime
claims in the SCS that were thoroughly repudiated by the Philippine’s 2016 arbitral ruling
(Haver, 2021; “US raises concern”, 2021).

On China’s end, Standing Committee Chairman Li Shanzhu defended the law, stating
that it “provides legal guarantees for effectively safeguarding national sovereignty, security and
maritime rights and interests'' (Jennings, 2021). Another Chinese official, foreign ministry
spokeswoman Hua Chunying, addressed concerns on the law. She argued that it was in line
with international practices, since other countries, the Philippines included, had enacted similar
laws that permitted its coast guards more options to enforce the law, laws that were not seen as
threats of war (Tomacruz, 2021b). Furthermore, the Chinese embassy in Manila, aside from
denying claims of Chinese harassment of Filipino fishermen, responded to the concerns shown
by the Philippine officials, calling them “false accusations” and saying that the new law was part
of “normal legislative activity of China”, conforms with international conventions, and does not
target any country (Aguilar, 2021; Mangosing, 2021a; Ramos, 2021).

Overall, even if the law itself is technically legal and normal in and of itself compared to
the coast guard laws of other states, it is the greater context of its implementation that many
parties find alarming. China is infamous for its already aggressive and coercive tactics that it
uses to assert its sweeping, and ultimately unlawful claims that violate the sovereignty of other,
often militarily weaker states, including but not limited to equipment confiscation, barring of
entry, blatant intimidation and shows of force, and most notably, ramming (Mercado, 2021;
Talabong and Tomacruz, 2019; Tomacruz, 2020a). The fact that China officially often denies the
use of such tactics only exacerbates the problem further. It is also of note that despite the global
pandemic, China has continued to forcefully assert its unlawful claims, possibly even to a
greater extent and intensity than previous years according to some sources. Therefore, it can be
inferred that China is relentlessly taking advantage of the fact that its rivals are most likely too
preoccupied to properly respond and defend themselves against China’s attempts to assert and
legitimize its illegal claims. As such, it is imperative that China’s new law be declared as void, or
better yet, that China be forced to fully revoke or revise the law.

Considering the law in the context of the Philippines specifically, we must use our 2016
victory to assert our lawful claims and have the law declared as void. I quote “If you are neutral
in situations of injustice you have chosen the side of the oppressor”. If we do not assert our
claims, our sovereign right to the WPS that is lawful under the international law and the
UNCLOS, then we give the message to the international community that what they are doing is
right, or that even if what they are doing is wrong, there is nothing we can do to stop it. As
Locsin said, leaving the law unchallenged means submitting to it, and that cannot be the case.
Many Filipinos, especially fishermen, rely on the WPS for their livelihood, and as such they have
been harmed by illegal Chinese interference and intrusion both before and after the passing of
the new law, including but not limited to confiscation of their fishing equipment, being barred
from entry, having a shipborne weapon aimed at them, and even having their much small fishing
vessel rammed by much larger CCG ships in the middle of the night (Mercado, 2021; Talabong
and Tomacruz, 2019; Tomacruz, 2020a). The application of a law that is ambiguous in where it
can be implemented, and explicitly allows the already relatively strong and powerful CCG to use
aggressive and potentially deadly force against foreign vessels that are weaker and less
capable than it, will only worsen the situation not just for Filipinos, but also for other countries
whose Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Extended Continental Shelf (EES) are violated by
Chinese ships, some notable examples being Japan and Vietnam.

As for using the 2016 ruling itself, we must use it to our advantage since our
government, for one reason or another, has barely mentioned or even asserted it towards the
international community, much less actually seriously implemented it to defend our right to the
WPS. Our internationally-backed, hard earned victory is useless if we do not make an effort to
actually implement it. If there is any time to use it, it is now, since all the diplomatic protests that
we have sent to China have been essentially ignored and dismissed, in a similar fashion to how
they considered our arbitral victory backed by the UNCLOS as illegal and invalid, refusing to
implement it despite being a signatory to the UNCLOS.

Main argument 2

Taking into account that China is a powerful and influential nation in many respects, I
argue that the Philippines should not just assert their legal rights over the SCS and push for the
new CCG law be declared as void, but should also work with other (mainly Southeast Asian)
states, such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Japan, and the U.S., in order to achieve the latter.
Furthermore, not only should we ask for their support in combating the new law, we should also
aid the other claimant states in having their own claims over the SCS validated by the UN in a
similar manner to what we accomplished in 2016. Doing so would not only allow our movement
to gain the support and traction needed to convince the UN, and subsequently force China to
follow what the UN dictates, it would also strengthen our ties and allow us to stand united
against both general adversity and other aspects and manifestations of illegal Chinese claims
and aggression (Chadhury, 2021; Ranada, 2021a).

The Chinese Coast Guard, and the Chinese Navy as a whole, is much more militarily
powerful and capable than its Asian rivals in the South China Sea, including the Philippines
(Chadhury, 2021). As such, encouraging and helping other (Southeast) Asian nations validate
their claims will aid in the creation of a South China Sea code of conduct that China will be
forced to listen to, one that other parties will also benefit from since it will also have their input,
and will also respect each state’s sovereignty according to international law. A code of conduct
that will lower the risk of miscalculation, misunderstanding, and conflict, such as the kind of
miscalculations and conflict that may be fueled by the new law, and respect the claims of other
countries, especially the already UN validated claim of the Philippines.

Regarding our neighbors who are outside of Southeast Asia, such as our longtime ally
the U.S., and Japan, who is also dealing with Chinese intrusions in the regions they claim and
as such is definitely a target of the new law (Martinson, 2021), the Philippines can also make an
effort to strengthen ties and foster greater cooperation with them. We can do so by joining joint
military exercises, not only to better relations with them, but also to give our smaller and less
capable military the experience it needs to properly defend and maintain our claims in the WPS.
 Militarily, we are still building up our limited naval forces (Mangosing, 2021b), and do not
have much compared to our neighbors, especially China, hence why it is important for us to
work with other countries. We need numbers to counter the strong military advantage China
has, and the Hague ruling is a victory not just for the Philippines, but also for the other
Southeast Asian nations, since it invalidates China’s claim (“The Philippines’ Future”, 2020). As
Carpio said, “the Rule of Law is the greatest equalizer” (Law, 2020).

Aside from the already mentioned reasons, there is also the fact that the verbal and
diplomatic protests we have sent before have been essentially useless in dissuading China from
continuing its aggressive and coercive actions, the simple and blatant evidence being the mere
fact that they passed the new CCG law. Judging by the fact that the law is essentially an act of
intimidation, a verbal threat of war considering the context of China’s past and current unlawful
aggressive intentions actions, as well as the power disparity between the CCG and the other
neighboring coast guards, the only way to force China to acknowledge the claims and
sovereignty of other Southeast Asian nations is through a united front, including allied countries
such as Japan and the U.S. empowered by international law (Carpio, 2020). This is because
China is intention is to become a world leader, one of their methods being through increasing
their influence on other, neighbouring states; if they see that their rivals are being pushed to
side with each other, and most especially side with their main rival, the U.S., then they may
revoke the new law in fear of losing more clout (Martinson, 2021).

Counter Argument

Former Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio has urged that the Philippines, along with
other ASEAN nations, should bring the new law to the UN in order to have it declared as void.
He said that the law clearly violates not just the UNCLOS but also the UN Charter itself, and so
the ASEAN states prejudiced by it must make an effort to invalidate the law. Furthermore, he
added that the law would most likely target Vietnam and Malaysia first, since China could take
advantage of a “grey area” that exists because these states lack an arbitral ruling that legally
validates the areas they claim as belonging to their EEZ, and as such they along with other
claimant Southeast Asian nations must consider filing an arbitration case similar to one that
earned the Philippines its 2016 victory. Carpio said that since China’s maritime assets cannot
be directly challenged, and the fact that the new law is a “threat against the world”, international
law is on the side of the Philippines and its allies, and therefore it must use that, such as
through its arbitral victory, to its advantage.

However, Foreign Affairs Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr responded to Carpio’s sentiment

that while he respects Carpio and his mind, he ultimately dismisses the idea. He elaborated that
because the new law has some claims as to the extent of their territory, it would reopen the
arbitral award, which he did not want. He also iterated that reopening the 2016 victory and
bringing up the controversial law to the UN was risky since it was under much Chinese
influence, with many member states being beneficiaries of Chinese aid and diplomacy.
Regarding working with other countries, Locsin stated that "the National Defense will exclusively
be a national endeavor”, and added that it was up to other countries to follow the Philippines’
example of asserting a “very strong foreign policy”. Furthermore, he explained that a diplomatic
protest was enough for now, and that more would be done if an incident were to happen
(Tomacruz, 2021c)

With these arguments in mind, I would like to say that I advocate what Carpio
recommends, despite the valid counter arguments posed by Locsin, for three main reasons.

While it is indeed possible to lose it, since arbitral awards are not unassailable, nor are
they completely final, they are still generally difficult to challenge (Sumit, n.d.; Talmon, 2017).
Aside from this, the potential risk of losing the award is worth the potential gains of bringing the
new CCG law to the UN to be declared void whilst working with other countries and their claims,
since China doesn’t acknowledge the award anyway, and even the Philippines itself has been
unable to properly use it to effectively assert its claims. It was essentially just invoked a few
times last year, but never even truly enforced. If we work with other countries well enough and
provide mutual support, and emphasize how the new law is a threat not only to the Philippines
but also to many other countries since it threatens and arguably blatantly violates the post-
World War Two international legal order that emphasizes peaceful conflict resolution and
prevents the use of violent, aggressive force as a way to assert claims and take territories, then
there is less risk for us to lose the underutilized 2016 award.

Aside from that, we must put an effort to prove that the new law is against international
law, even if much of the UN truly is under China’s sway, to show that China cannot just
unilaterally impose its will on other countries and expect them not to do anything about it, merely
because China has more power and influence. It is simply and utterly wrong for sheer strength
and force, of a single aggressive, inconsiderate, thick skinned, and hypocritical government
(Yap, 2021) no less, to be determinants of what is legal and right, since the dictator of what is
legal and right should be the rule of law. Additionally, the situation in the UN will not change if
we do not make an effort to do something about it. We have to make significant efforts to work
with other countries to oppose China’s influence and aggression, through close support and
cooperation and international law, or China’s influence and aggression will soon become the
new international law. Simply put, the situation at the UN really won’t change if we don’t bother
to do anything about it.

Moreso, while it is true that China does hold much influence over the UN, and many
other countries in general, there is evidence that over the past year, more and more countries
have slowly and quietly begun to assert themselves against China. Aside from this, many
countries, including those who do not lay claim to the SCS, have explicitly or subtly, pushed
back against China in one way or the other. As seen in the previous paragraphs, some state
officials and experts have expressed that the new CCG law is normal or legal in some ways, but
is escalatory, aggressive, and generally problematic considering the wider context, whilst
others, such as the US and Japan, have outright called the law unlawful, escalatory, and
ultimately part of China’s greater plan of acquiring territories through threat, intimidation, and
use of force. Additionally, many countries have also rejected and contested China’s claims even
before the passing of the new law, such as through FONOPS, supporting the claims of other
countries, and of course direct challenge of Chinese claims and calling them illegal and
escalatory. In short, the Philippines is not alone in being concerned and outright violated by
China’s coercive actions, and will not be alone if ever it follows through with Carpio’s advocacy.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can most definitely be argued that the new law is ultimately an
escalatory, aggressive, and coercive tactic being executed by an aggressive, coercive,
hypocritical, and influential state in order to assert, implement, and legitimize its unlawful and
disrespectful maritime claims not just on the SCS, but on all the waters that it claims. Therefore,
the Philippines, as a country whose sovereignty is violated by China’s actions, whose citizens
are directly harmed by Chinese coercive and intrusive behavior, has the responsibility of
defending its rights and sovereignty, and challenging China’s illegal claims and actions.
Furthermore, the Philippines, along with the other countries who are part of the international
community and the UN, have a duty to follow and respect the established international legal
order, especially since in the context of this situation it has been, and still is, instrumental in
promoting peace, reducing conflict, and preventing and punishing the use of aggressive,
coercive, and forceful actions. This includes enforcing the international law against those who
are supposed to follow it, but instead blatantly ignore it. Considering the fact that we are
supposed to make China adhere to the international laws that it has the potential to delegitimize
through the implementation of an aggressive law in order to legitimize illegal claims, the different
nations must work together, not just for the sake of defending and asserting their own
sovereignty and people, but also for the sake of defending and asserting the sovereignty and
peoples of other countries.

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